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**THE NORTH-EAST  
FRONTIER  
OF  
INDIA**



# **THE NORTH-EAST FRONTIER OF INDIA**

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**ALEXANDER MACKENZIE**

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## P R E F A C E .

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FROM 1866 to 1873 I had immediate charge of the Political correspondence of the Bengal Government. In 1869, at the request of the Lieutenant-Governor, Sir William Grey, I wrote for office purposes, and as I could snatch the time from other more pressing work, a "Memorandum on the North-East Frontier of Bengal." Since Pemberton's Report in 1835, no general survey had been taken of the political relations of the Government with the hill tribes of Assam, Cachar and Chittagong; and my 'Memorandum' proved to be extremely useful, both to the local officers and to the Foreign Department of the Government of India. It was, however, at best, a mere Sketch; and was wanting in those precise references to the original records which are essential for many official purposes. Accordingly, in 1871, I began a fresh and detailed examination of all the records from 1780 up to date, both of the Bengal Secretariat and of the Foreign Department, which bore in any way upon the political history of the North-East Frontier. I made full notes and references as I went along, and in 1873 I saw my way, as I thought, to preparing, when I could find leisure or get leave, a work, which, while treating exhaustively of all the frontier tribes in that quarter, in respect of their relations to the Government, their manners, customs, and ethnological affinities, would at the same time serve as a permanent hand-book for the Government and its local officers. But the close of 1873 brought us face to face with the Famine, and in the vortex of "special duty" arising out of that, all personal plans sank out of view. In 1874 my sight gave way under the pressure of compiling Famine Narratives; and my leave, when it came, was spent in

absolute severance from pen, ink, and type in every form. Since my return to India in the end of 1875, I have been unremittingly engaged in duties far too arduous to warrant any dream of authorship. Meantime my Memorandum has gone out of print, and the Foreign Department has repeatedly suggested that a fresh and revised edition of it was very desirable. Hitherto I have evaded compliance with all hints of the kind, hoping against hope for leisure to compile a work in which the public as well as the offices of Government might take some interest. But the pressure has of late become more severe; and finding that, if the Foreign Office could get nothing better, they meant to re-print the old Memorandum, I volunteered to supplement and expand this, for official purposes only, by such of my notes, so long lying by me, as could in this way be utilised. The task of working these in has been much heavier than I anticipated, and when the Press had got fairly started the labour was doubled by a request that I would bring down the Narrative, as best I could, to the present time, or at any rate to the year 1882. This involved an examination of the Bengal Government monthly Proceeding volumes for about six years, for which I had no notes, and of the Assam Proceedings for nine years, besides the reading of numerous heavy files kindly supplied by the Foreign Department. Under the circumstances, I have felt justified in borrowing freely for these later years from the text of the Annual Administration Reports; but every paragraph has been verified, and much additional matter introduced. The whole has been prepared and carried through the Press in little over five weeks—side by side with the full ordinary work of the Home Department. I mention these facts, not by way of boast, but because I wish emphatically to disclaim any literary

pretensions for a volume produced under such conditions. It is meant to be useful to Government and its officers, nothing more. For any inferences or comments not avowedly quoted from the records I alone am responsible.

I have reproduced in a series of Appendixes various papers which seemed to me likely to be useful for reference, but were too voluminous to be incorporated in the text. I have also ventured to reprint some articles on Frontier topics which I wrote in 1870—72 for the *Pioneer* and *Observer*, not because they are of any special merit in themselves, but because some of them throw a certain amount of contemporaneous side-light on questions discussed in the preceding pages, while some of them give sketches of the work and personality of our Frontier officers, with many of whom I have had the pleasure of an intimate acquaintance. To the task of reclaiming the Nagas and Garos of the North-east Frontier my friends Gregory, Butler, and Williamson sacrificed their lives. My friend Edgar has to thank the Lushais for his well earned honours. Of the Chittagong Hill men my friend Lewin, in his happy retirement, has many a curious tale to tell: and my distinguished school-mate, Johnstone, has confirmed his Keonjhur reputation by the hold he has won over the tribes of Manipur. Notices of these men and their work will be found in the articles.

From the lips or pens of them and many others—Dalton, Hopkinson, Agnew, Haughton, Graham, and Power—to say nothing of the untiring officers of the Survey, for whom no peak is inaccessible, no jungle impenetrable, and no tribe too rude to be faced, I had stores of gathered material which cannot now be used. I had, indeed, hoped at one time to have had the aid of some of them in putting the



wild story of this frontier into complete and fitting dress. As it is, any frontier officer who cares to undertake the task is welcome to appropriate anything in the following pages that may suit his purpose.

It only remains to explain that the references to 'Judicial', 'Revenue' and 'Political' Proceedings, and to the earlier 'Consultations' are to the records of the Bengal Government, save where it is specifically stated that the records belong to the Government of India. The 'Secret Proceedings' are those of the Foreign Department of the Supreme Government. The 'Assam Proceedings' are those reported by that Administration to the Foreign Office of the Government of India.

I have to thank Lieutenant-Colonel Deprée, the Surveyor General, for the map attached. I would also express my indebtedness to the Superintendent of the Home Office Press for the skill and patience with which he and his staff have deciphered what was unavoidably at times the roughest of all rough 'copy'.

26th January 1884.

A. M.

*P. S.*—A brief notice of recent events among the Akas (who are treated of in Chapter IV) will be found in the concluding Chapter. It was necessary to print off the book by instalments, which made it impossible to write up to date any of the earlier Chapters.

(2.) The Cachar officials will, at the present time, read with interest and profit Mr. Edgar's valuable Reports in the Appendix, and especially his views on the Kookie Levy and the importance of keeping a strict eye on Kookies settled in Cachar. (See pages 441—443).

(3.) The reader must overlook occasional variations in the spelling of proper names. Every local officer has his own way, sometimes several ways. It has not been possible to reduce all to any uniform spelling.

# CONTENTS.

## PART I.

### CHAPTER I.

#### INTRODUCTION—

	PAGE.
The North-East Frontier—Definition	1
Early History of Assam	2
The Shan Invasion	<i>ib.</i>
The Moamariah Dissenters and their struggles with the Native Government of Assam	<i>ib.</i>
British intervention	3
Withdrawal of British troops, 1794	<i>ib.</i>
Distracted state of Assam—Burmese intervention	<i>ib.</i>
War between the British and Burmese Governments, March the 5th, 1824	4
Organisation of the administration in British Assam	5
Purunder Sing and his Government of Upper Assam, 1832-33	<i>ib.</i>
Assam becomes a Non-Regulation Province	6
The Revenue System of Assam	<i>ib.</i>
State of the province at annexation	7
The Frontier Tribes	<i>ib.</i>

### CHAPTER II.

#### SKETCH OF BRITISH RELATIONS WITH BHUTAN PROPER—

The Bhutan Terai, Dwárs, or Straths	9
The Assam Dwárs of Bhutan	10
Arrangements between the Assamese Government and the Bhutias	<i>ib.</i>
The British mode of dealing with the Bhutias	<i>ib.</i>
Bhutia outrages, 1828	11
Raids in 1836	<i>ib.</i>
Futile attempts at regular negotiation	<i>ib.</i>
Pemberton's mission, 1837	<i>ib.</i>
Final attachment of the Dwárs by the British, 1841	12
Further aggression of the Bhutias, 1854	<i>ib.</i>
Warnings given to the Bhutias	<i>ib.</i>
Mr. Eden's mission	<i>ib.</i>
The Bhutan War	13
Character of the existing treaty with Bhutan	<i>ib.</i>
Demarcation of boundary	14
Later events	<i>ib.</i>

## CHAPTER III.

## THE EXTRA-BHUTAN BHUTIAS—

PAGE.

The Kuriapara Dwár ... ..	15
Trade between Assam and Thibet ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
The Kuriapara Fair ... ..	16
Cession of the Dwár for an annual payment, 1843-44 ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Story of the Gelling Raja ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Later events ... ..	18
Demarcation of boundary ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
The Bhutias of Char Dwár ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
The Thebengea Bhutias ... ..	19

## CHAPTER IV.

## THE AKAS—HAZARI-KHAWAS AND KAPACHORS—

Divisions and allies of the Akas ... ..	21
The right of <i>posa</i> ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Commutation of the <i>posa</i> of the Hazari-Khawas ... ..	22
The outrages of the Kapachors ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Agreements with the Akas, 1842 ... ..	23
Later events ... ..	25

## CHAPTER V.

## THE DUPHLA TRIBES—

Early notice of the Duphlas ... ..	27
Their troublesome character ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Partial submission of the Duphlas of Char Dwár ... ..	28
Submission of the Noadwár Duphlas ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Final commutation of the <i>posa</i> ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Duphla disturbances in 1870 ... ..	29
A Duphla's love troubles... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Further raids in 1872-73 ... ..	31
Later events ... ..	32

## CHAPTER VI.

## THE ABORS AND MIRIS—

Close connection between the Abors and Miris ... ..	33
Their local distribution ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Visits to the Abor country ... ..	34
The Abors have no claim to <i>posa</i> ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Early notices of the Abors and Miris ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Abor claims to revenue from gold-washers and fishermen ... ..	35

CHAPTER VI.—*concluded.*THE ABORS AND MIRIS—*concluded.*

	PAGE.
Captain Vetch's negotiations in 1847 ... ..	36
First collision with the Abors, 1848 ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Further unpleasantness on the Abor Frontier ... ..	37
Measures of conciliation ordered by Government ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Dalton's visit to Membo ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Serious Abor raid, 1858 ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Preparation for an expedition ... ..	38
The expedition and its progress ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Causes of its failure ... ..	40
The second Abor Expedition, 1859 ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Continued hostility of the Mayong Abors ... ..	41
Proposals for guarding the Luckimpore District ... ..	42
Submission of the Abors ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Later events ... ..	44

## CHAPTER VII.

## THE MISHMIS—

Local distribution of the Mishmi Tribes ... ..	47
Early visits to the Mishmi country ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Dr. Griffith's account ... ..	48
Murder of a wandering ascetic ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Murder of French missionaries by Mezho Mishmis ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Eden's expedition into the hills ... ..	49
Good behaviour of Tain Mishmis ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Troublesome character of the Chulkattas ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Defence of the Khampti villages ... ..	50
Submission of a Chulkatta Chief ... ..	51
Later events ... ..	<i>ib.</i>

## CHAPTER VIII.

## GENERAL REVIEW OF POLICY ON THE SUB-HIMALAYAN BORDER—

The Inner Line Regulation ... ..	55
----------------------------------	----

## CHAPTER IX.

## THE KHAMPTI CLANS OF SADIYA—

Early history of the Assam Khamptis ... ..	57
Their official recognition by Mr. Scott ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Continued immigration of Khamptis ... ..	58
Deposition of the Khampti Chief ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
The Khampti insurrection ... ..	59
Dispersion of the Khampti Settlement ... ..	60

## CHAPTER X.

## THE SINGPHOS OF SADIYA—

	PAGE.
Hannay's account of the Singphos ... ..	61
Their first appearance in Assam ... ..	62
First notice of them in our records ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Singpho invasion of Sadiya, 1825 ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
The political view of the situation ... ..	63
Submission of four Chiefs—Burmese Invasion ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Neufville's Expedition ... ..	64
Submission of the Singphos ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Proposals to open up Patkoi trade route ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Recusancy of the Duffa Gam ... ..	65
Invasion from Bor-Khampti ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Discussions of Assam Policy ... ..	66
Continued raids by the Duffa Gam ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Negotiation regarding him with the Burmese Government ... ..	67
Second Burmese embassy to the Patkoi frontier ... ..	68
Further Singpho disturbances ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Submission of Ningroola ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Fresh general outbreak of Singphos ... ..	69
Enquiry into its causes ... ..	70
Final report on the rebellion ... ..	71
Later events ... ..	72

## CHAPTER XI.

## THE MOAMARIAHS OF MUTTUCK—

Early history of the Moamariahs ... ..	73
Relations with the Burmese and British ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Arrangements made on the death of the Bor Senapati ... ..	74

## PART II.

## CHAPTER XII.

## THE NAGA TRIBES. A.—THE PATKOI NAGAS—

Extent of the Naga country ... ..	77
Distinction between the tribes east and west of the Dhunsiri ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Butler's account of the Naga tribes, 1873 ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
First notice of these Nagas, 1835 ... ..	88
Their sufferings from the Singphos ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Proposals for their protection ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
The Inner Line ... ..	89

## CHAPTER XIII.

THE NAGA TRIBES. B.—THE SEEBSAUGOR NAGAS—	PAGE.
Early intercourse of the Seebsaugor Nagas with the plains ...	91
The Boree Naga tract ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
State of things in 1840 ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Mr. Bronson's mission ... ..	92
Brodie's tour, 1842 ... ..	93
Brodie's tour, 1844 ... ..	94
The Naga Kotokies ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Brodie's tour, 1846 ... ..	95
Plan of management ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Events, 1844 to 1854 ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Change of policy ... ..	96
Effects of closing the Dwargs ... ..	97
Attack on Gelaki ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Difficulties with tea gardens ... ..	98
Lieutenant Holcombe's murder and consequent expedition ...	99
Later events ... ..	<i>ib.</i>

## CHAPTER XIV.

THE NAGA TRIBES. C.—THE ANGAMI NAGAS—	
Manipuri Expeditions of 1832 and 1833 ... ..	101
The North Cachar Hills under Tularam ... ..	102
Invitation to Manipur and Tularam to occupy the Naga Hills	103
Cancelment of the foregoing invitation ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Grange's first Expedition, January 1839 ... ..	104
Discussions of policy ... ..	105
Grange's second Expedition, January 1840 ... ..	106
Biggs' Expedition, January 1841 ... ..	107
Settlement of Manipuri boundary, 1841-42 ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Eld's Expedition, December 1844 ... ..	108
Butler's Expedition, November 1845 ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Butler's second Expedition, November 1846-47 ... ..	109
Bhogchand Darogha ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Government orders an expedition ... ..	110
Vincent's Expedition, November 1849 ... ..	111
Vincent's second Expedition, March 1850 ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Tenth Expedition, 1850 ... ..	112
Raids of 1851 ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Policy now laid down—Non-interference ... ..	113
Officer appointed to check Nagas from North Cachar ... ..	115
Persistence in policy of non-interference ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Sir Cecil Beadon's policy, 1862 ... ..	116
Colonel Hopkinson's proposal to post an officer in the Hills ...	118

CHAPTER XIV.—*concluded.*

THE NAGA TRIBES. C.—THE ANGAMI NAGAS— <i>concluded.</i>	PAGE.
The Bengal Government proposal ... ..	119
Lieutenant Gregory occupies Samoogoodting ... ..	120
Razepemah raids ... ..	121
Internecine feuds of the tribes ... ..	122
The Manipur boundary question ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Captain Butler presses for a bolder policy ... ..	123
Sir G. Campbell's views of policy ... ..	124
Survey operations in the Hills ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Extension of British protectorate to Naga villages ... ..	127
Change of policy proposed ... ..	128
Death of Butler ... ..	129
Forward policy finally resolved upon... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Definite orders as to policy issued ... ..	130
Expedition of 1877-78 ... ..	131
Occupation of Kohimah ... ..	132
Mr. Damant's diaries ... ..	133
Indications of pending trouble ... ..	134
Mr. Damant's murder ... ..	135
Siege of Kohimah ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Punitive expedition, 1879-80 ... ..	136
Subsequent operations ... ..	137
Raid on Baladhan ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Measures adopted for defence and punishment ... ..	138
Assessment of revenue ... ..	140
Revised boundary of the district ... ..	141
State of affairs in 1880-81 ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
State of affairs in 1881-82 ... ..	142
Description of Nagas and their villages ... ..	143

## CHAPTER XV.

## NORTH CACHAR—

Hill Tribes in North Cachar ... ..	145
The Kookies ... ..	146
Present composition of North Cachar ... ..	147
Sambhudan's Insurrection, 1881-82 ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
The Kookie Militia ... ..	148

## CHAPTER XVI.

## MANIPUR—

Reasons for noticing Manipur ... ..	149
Position of Manipur ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Condition of Manipur and the surrounding hill tribes ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Rise of our political relations with Manipur : formation of the Manipur Levy ... ..	150

CHAPTER XVI.—*continued.*MANIPUR—*continued.*

	PAGE.
Treaties of 1833 and 1834 : death of Gumbheer Sing, 1834 ...	151
Minute of Lord William Bentinck, 1835 : first appointment of a Political Agent ... ..	152
Intermittent wars for the succession, 1834-1850 ...	153
Special recognition and guarantee of Chunder Kirtee Sing to the Raj of Manipur by the British Government, 1851 ...	ib.
Condition of Manipur under Chunder Kirtee Sing, 1851 to 1861 ...	155
Proposed abolition of the Political Agency in Manipur, 1861 ...	ib.
Memorandum by Major MacCulloch, 8th July 1861 ...	ib.
Opinion of the Bengal Government upon the retention of the Political Agency ... ..	158
Position of the Agency ... ..	159
Modern raids on Manipur ... ..	160
The Lushais ... ..	ib.
Policy to be pursued by Manipur towards the Lushais ...	161
The Political Agent not to visit the Lushai country without sanction ...	ib.
Manipur deputation to the Lushai country in 1877 ...	162
Relations with the Kamhows or Sooties ... ..	163
Manipur Expedition against the Kamhows in 1857 ...	164
Aggressions by the Sooties reported in 1859 ... ..	ib.
Relations between Manipur and the Sooties up to 1871 ...	165
Friendly assurances of the Sooties previous to the Lushai Expedition ...	ib.
Capture of the Kamhow Chief Kokatung by the Manipur Contingent ...	166
Affairs from 1872 to 1875. Policy to be pursued by Manipur towards the Kamhows ... ..	167
Manipur Expedition of 1875 against the Kamhows ... ..	169
Further Kamhow raids on Manipur Territory ... ..	170
Migration of the Sooties into Manipur ... ..	171
Position of the Sooties with regard to Burma ... ..	ib.
Proposal to make the Sooties tributary to Manipur ... ..	175
The Kubo Valley and Affairs on that Frontier ... ..	ib.
Dispute with Burma regarding the right of Manipur to the Kubo Valley ...	176
Cession of the Kubo Valley to Burma ... ..	181
Compensation to Manipur for the loss of the Kubo Valley ...	186
Aggressions in Burmese territory by the Manipur village of Loochoopa ...	ib.
Raid on the Manipur village of Mokoo ... ..	187
Alleged raid on the Manipur village of Nat-tseng-nga ... ..	ib.
General Nuthall's visit to the frontier in 1871 in connection with the boundary question ... ..	188
Colonel Mowbray Thomson's visit to the frontier in connection with the boundary question ... ..	189
Alleged raid by Manipur Nagas on the Burmese village of Beestoop ...	192
Complaints by the Burmese against Manipur. Burmese Government asked to correspond through the Resident at Mandalay on Manipur-Kubo frontier matters ... ..	ib.
Alleged raid by Manipur Kongjais on the Burmese village of Nampee ...	193
Dr. Brown's visit to the frontier to investigate the case ... ..	195



CHAPTER XVI.—*concluded.*MANIPUR—*concluded.*

	PAGE.
Attack by Burmese on the Manipur out-post of Kongal ...	196
Aggressions of the Chasád Kookies ...	203
Arrest of six Manipuri sepoy by Chasád Kookies ...	204
Events of 1879-80 ...	<i>ib.</i>
Chasád raid on Chingsao ...	205
Raids by Sooties, 1879-80 ...	206
Affairs on the Burmese border, 1879-80 ...	<i>ib.</i>
Sootie Kookies ...	208
Lushais ...	<i>ib.</i>
Events of 1881-82 ...	<i>ib.</i>
Affairs on the Burmese Border ...	<i>ib.</i>
Other events of the year ...	210
Account of the Chasád Kookies ...	211
Submission of the Chasáds ...	212

## CHAPTER XVII.

## THE MIKIRS AND RENGMA NAGAS—

The Mikirs ...	213
Raid on Hurlock Parbut ...	214
The Rengma Nagas ...	<i>ib.</i>

## CHAPTER XVIII.

## THE KHASI AND JAINTIA HILLS—

Pemberton's account of Jaintia ...	217
Annexation of Jaintia ...	219
Pemberton's account of the Khasi Hills ...	220
Mr. Scott's negotiations with Nungklow ...	221
The Khasi insurrection, 1829 ...	222
Outbreak of 1831 ...	223
Final pacification of the hills, 1833 ...	230
Account of Khasi Chiefs ...	232
Kyrim ...	<i>ib.</i>
Churra ...	233
Nurtung ...	<i>ib.</i>
Nuspung, Muriow, and Murram ...	<i>ib.</i>
Constitution of the Khasi States ...	<i>ib.</i>
Description of the Hills and Plateau ...	234
Present condition of the Khasi States ...	237
Results of British administration ...	239
Later history of Jaintia ...	<i>ib.</i>
Mr. Mills' deputation ...	240
Mr. Allen's proposals ...	<i>ib.</i>

CHAPTER XVIII.—*concluded.*

THE KHASI AND JAINTEA HILLS— <i>concluded.</i>					PAGE.
Sinteng Rebellion, 1860	...	...	...	...	241
The income tax	..	...	...	...	<i>ib.</i>
Second rising, 1862	...	...	...	...	242
Shillong	...	...	...	...	243

## CHAPTER XIX.

## THE GAROS—

Early history of the Garo frontier	...	...	...	...	245
Mr. Scott's Report of 1816	...	...	...	...	247
Mr. Scott's proposals for settlement	...	...	...	...	248
The orders of Government thereupon	...	...	...	...	249
Legislative proposals	...	...	...	...	<i>ib.</i>
The 'Paghul' riots in Mymensing	..	...	...	...	254
Revival of troubles on the Assam side, 1836	...	...	...	...	255
Raids of 1852	...	...	...	...	257
Lord Dalhousie's views on Garo policy	...	...	...	...	<i>ib.</i>
Views of Colonel Jenkins and Mr. Mills	...	...	...	...	258
Renewed raids, 1856—1859	...	...	...	...	<i>ib.</i>
Proposals for direct management, 1861	...	...	...	...	259
Expedition of 1861	...	...	...	...	<i>ib.</i>
Orders of the Home Government on Garo policy	...	...	...	...	260
Extension of Luskar and Zimmadar system	...	...	...	...	<i>ib.</i>
Raids of 1866	...	...	...	...	261
Appointment of a special Officer to the Hills	...	...	...	...	<i>ib.</i>
Passing of Act XXII of 1869	...	...	...	...	262
The Shoosung case	...	...	...	...	263
Raid of 1872 and final reduction of the Bemulwa Garos	...	...	...	...	265
Later events	...	...	...	...	266
Recent legislation	...	...	...	...	267
The custom of 'dai'	...	...	...	...	<i>ib.</i>

## PART III.

## CHAPTER XX.

## HILL TIPPERAH—

Mythical history of Tipperah	...	...	...	...	269
Annexation by the British	...	...	...	...	271
The hills become Independent Tipperah	...	...	...	...	273
Disputed successions	...	...	...	...	273
Description of the country in 1808	...	...	...	...	275
Succession between 1813 and 1870	...	...	...	...	<i>ib.</i>

CHAPTER XX.—*concluded.*HILL TIPPERAH—*concluded.*

	PAGE.
Aggressive policy of Rajahs in the Hills ... ..	276
Notices of Tipperah in 1824 ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Encroachments in Sylhet ... ..	277
Measures to restrain these ... ..	278
Relations with the Kookies ... ..	279
Kookie murders in 1826 ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Tipperah Raid on Kundul, 1836 ... ..	280
Anomalous arrangements for extradition ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Correspondence regarding dues on hill produce ... ..	281
Further discussions regarding the Sylhet boundary ... ..	282
Survey of Tipperah boundary ... ..	284
Later disputes as to boundary ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Question of the Chittagong boundary ... ..	285
Appointment of a Political Agent ... ..	286

## CHAPTER XXI.

## THE LUSHAI OR KOKIE TRIBES—

Description of the Lushais as known in 1853 ... ..	287
Raids of 1844 ... ..	288
Blackwood's Expedition ... ..	289
Raids on Kookie villages in Cachar ... ..	290
Reports from Manipur, 1847 ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Massacres of 1847 ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Raids of 1849 ... ..	291
Punitive measures ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Lister's Expedition, 1850 ... ..	292
Orders of Government on Lister's Report ... ..	294
Negotiations in 1850-51 ... ..	295
Kookie embassies between 1855 and 1861 ... ..	296
Raids of 1862 ... ..	297
Negotiations with Sookpilal, 1864 ... ..	299
Negotiations with Vompilal ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Proposed Expedition, 1865-66 ... ..	300
Raids in 1868-69 ... ..	301
Punitive measures ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Expedition of 1869 ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Failure of central and western columns ... ..	302
Proceedings of the eastern column ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Proposals for second Expedition negatived ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Mr. Edgar's tour, 1869-70 ... ..	304
Policy proposed by him ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Raids of 1871 ... ..	305
Raids on Cachar ... ..	<i>ib.</i>

CHAPTER XXI.—*concluded.*THE LUSHAI OR KOOKIE TRIBES—*concluded.*

	PAGE.
Raids on Sylhet ... ..	307
Raids on Hill Tipperah ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Raids on Manipur ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Identity of raiders ... ..	308
Discussion of measures to be adopted ... ..	309
Expedition of 1871-72 ... ..	310
Arrangements for carriage ... ..	312
Operations of the Cachar column ... ..	313
Operations of the Chittagong column ... ..	314
Survey operations ... ..	316
Defensive posts ... ..	317
Future policy ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Effect of the expedition ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Movement of the tribes northward ... ..	318
Policy of defence and conciliation ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Sir R. Temple's proposal to control Sookpilal from the south ..	<i>ib.</i>
Mr. Johnson's tour, 1877 ... ..	320
Quarrels between Eastern and Western Lushais ... ..	321
Events of 1878-79 ... ..	322
Events of 1879-80 ... ..	323
Events of 1880-81 ... ..	324
Events of 1881-82 ... ..	325
The Lushai famine ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Visits to Lushai-land by Government officials ... ..	326
Gradual cessation of famine ... ..	327
Exports to and imports from Lushai-land ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Cost of Government relief ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Events of 1882-83 ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Apprehension at present time, January 1884 ... ..	328

## CHAPTER XXII.

## CHITTAGONG FRONTIER TRIBES—

The Chittagong Hill Tracts ... ..	329
Levin's sketch of the Hill peoples ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Revenue system of the Hill Tracts ... ..	332
History of the Phru family and their dissensions ... ..	333
Proposals for defence of country by the Phrus ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Mr. Ricketts' settlement ... ..	334
Shindu raids in 1847-48 ... ..	335
Hopkinson's Expedition, 1847 ... ..	336
Raids of 1849-50 ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Raids in 1850-51 ... ..	337
Discussion of policy ... ..	338

CHAPTER XXII.—*concluded.*

CHITTAGONG FRONTIER TRIBES— <i>concluded.</i>	PAGE.
Views of Government in 1854 ... ..	338
Arrangements made in 1858 ... ..	340
Creation of the Hill Tracts District ... ..	341
Great Kookie Invasion of 1860 ... ..	342
Expedition against Rutton Poa ... ..	344
Submission of Rutton Poa ... ..	345
Defiance of the Howlongs and Syloos ... ..	346
Sir C. Beadon's policy ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Graham's negotiations with the tribes, 1862-63 ... ..	347
Raids in 1866 ... ..	351
Captain Bowie's deputation ... ..	354
Captain Bowie's proposals ... ..	355
Kassalong Meeting of December 1877 ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Raids in 1868-69 ... ..	356
Raids in 1869-70 ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Raids ... ..	357
Frontier defence ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Reconnoissance of the Lushai country ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Outrage committed by Rutton Poa... ..	358
Policy to be followed laid down, 1870 ... ..	359
Policy adopted in 1871-72 ... ..	362
Survey operations ... ..	363
Proposals of the Bengal Government in 1878 ... ..	<i>ib.</i>
Subsequent events ... ..	365

## CHAPTER XXIII.

## CONCLUSION—

The Aka Expedition of 1883-84 ... ..	367
Review of policy in continuation of Chapter VIII ... ..	369

## APPENDIXES.

## APPENDIX A.

WELSH'S REPORT ON ASSAM, 1794 ... ..	377
--------------------------------------	-----

## APPENDIX B.

NOTIFICATIONS DEFINING THE "INNER LINE" OF BRITISH JURISDICTION IN FRONTIER DISTRICTS ... ..	395
---	-----

<b>APPENDIX C.</b>		<b>PAGE.</b>
THE SHEBBAUGOR NAGAS IN 1873	... ..	399
<b>APPENDIX D.</b>		
ORDERS OF 1838 ON HILL TIPPERAH TRANSIT DUES	... ..	405
<b>APPENDIX E.</b>		
PAPERS REGARDING THE LUSHAI COUNTRY AND POLICY—		
I.—Mr. Edgar's Notes on his tour among the Lushais in 1871	... ..	415
Mr. Edgar's Notes on the Lushai and other Kookies	... ..	426
II.—Report of the Political Officer with the Left Column of the Lushai Expedition	... ..	437
III.—Report of the Political Officer with the Right Column of the Lushai Expedition	... ..	465
IV.—Selection of correspondence subsequent to the Lushai Expedition	... ..	471
<b>APPENDIX F.</b>		
CORRESPONDENCE REGARDING THE FRONTIER DEFENCE OF ASSAM	... ..	495
<b>APPENDIX G.</b>		
HOPKINSON'S EXPEDITION UP THE KOLADYNE	... ..	525
<b>APPENDIX H.</b>		
HOPKINSON'S REVIEW OF POLICY ON THE CHITTAGONG FRONTIER IN 1856	... ..	531
<b>APPENDIX J.</b>		
EXTRACTS FROM THE ASSAM CENSUS REPORT, 1881	... ..	537
<b>APPENDIX K.</b>		
ARTICLES ON FRONTIER WORK AND POLICY, 1870-72—		
Act XXII. of 1869	... ..	551
The Garo Hills District	... ..	553
More about the Garos	... ..	554
The Naga Hills District	... ..	556
The Chittagong Hill Tracts	... ..	557
North-East Frontier Defence	... ..	559
Hill Tipperah	... ..	561
The Lushais	... ..	562
More about the Lushais	... ..	564
Mr. Edgar among the Lushais	... ..	566

---

APPENDIX K.—*concluded*.

ARTICLES ON FRONTIER WORK AND POLICY, 1870-72— <i>concluded</i> .						PAGE.
The Lushais	...	...	...	...	...	568
The Lushais conciliated	...	...	...	...	...	570
The Lushai Policy	...	...	...	...	...	572
What the Left Column did in Lushai-land, No. I.	...	...	...	...	...	576
What the Left Column did in Lushai-land, No. II.	...	...	...	...	...	578
What the Right Column did in Lushai-land	...	...	...	...	...	580
Work in Bengal Jungles	...	...	...	...	...	588
Lewin's Proverbial Philosophy	...	...	...	...	...	584

# HISTORY

## OF THE RELATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT

### WITH THE HILL TRIBES

## OF THE NORTH-EAST FRONTIER OF BENGAL.

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### PART I.

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### CHAPTER I.

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#### INTRODUCTION.

THE north-east frontier of Bengal is a term used sometimes to denote a boundary line, and sometimes more generally to describe a tract. In the latter sense it embraces the whole of the hill ranges north, east, and south of the Assam Valley, as well as the western slopes of the great mountain system lying between Bengal and independent Burma, with its outlying spurs and ridges. I propose to trace, with such fulness of detail as the materials warrant, the political relations of the Indian Government with the tribes inhabiting these hills. In doing this it will be convenient to proceed in regular order, first traversing from west to east the sub-Himalayan ranges north of the Brahmaputra, then turning westward along the course of the ranges that bound the Assam Valley on the south, and, finally, exploring the highlands interposed between Cachar and Chittagong, and the hills that separate the maritime District of Chittagong from the Empire of Ava.

Before attempting to record the dealings of the Government with the numerous savage races of this portion of its dominions, it may be well very briefly to refer to the events which led up to the occupation of Assam by the British, and to give some general idea of the state of that Province when we first entered it. This will tend to make clear the manner in which we were originally brought into contact with the hill tribes, and will serve to explain some facts and anomalies that might otherwise prove stumbling blocks to the student of frontier policy.



Into the dim history of the Hindu kingdom of Kamrup, the most

#### Early History of Assam.

notable precursor of the later Governments of Assam, there is no need to enter. Nor is it necessary to suggest any curious disquisitions on the origin and progress of that amorphous empire of Pong\* whose victorious Generals are said to have extended the power of the Shans from Sadiya to the Monass. It is enough for us to know that in the eighth century after Christ, the Brahmaputra Valley was invaded by a

#### The Shan Invasion.

vigorous and warlike race of Burmese Shans, which had by the commencement of the thirteenth century wrested the whole country from its Hindu rulers and arrogated to its own dynasty and people the title of 'Ahom,†—the unequalled'—destined in the softened form 'Asam' to become the modern name of the province.

With the consolidation of their rule the fate of all eastern conquering tribes overtook the Shans. In the sleepy hollow of Assam, they lost the qualities which had won them power and prestige, while by adopting the language, customs, and religion of their Hindu subjects, they speedily sank into the position of a mere ruling caste, and ceased to present the characteristics of an alien‡ race. It was indeed owing chiefly to intestine troubles brought about by their fanatical Brahmanism, and their bigoted persecution of the Moamariah dissenters that the British were first led to take cognizance of Assam affairs.

The Moamariahs§ were a tribe of proselytes to Hinduism as preached

The Moamariah Dissenters and their struggles with the Native Government of Assam.

by the Śūdra sectarians, Sankni and Madhit, who denied the supremacy of the Brahmans and rejected the worship of Siva. For long years

they were treated with tolerance, and so gathered numbers and strength, until they occupied nearly the whole tract of Upper Assam known as Muttuck in Luckimpore, while they had also many adherents in other parts of the province, especially about Jorhāth. The oppressions of the later Ahom Kings drove them at last into rebellion, and about 1770 A. D., led on by their high priest, they attacked, captured, and succeeded in holding for nearly six months Gowhatty, the capital of the kingdom, taking possession also of the person of the reigning prince. Expelled at length by stratagem, their leaders slain and their bands at the same time broken and dispersed, the Moamariahs were for fourteen years but little heard of. In 1774, when Gourinath Sing was reigning Raja, they again rose in arms, and after a severe struggle, attended by

\* See Pemberton's Reports on the Eastern Frontier of British India, Section 5.

† Assam is commonly supposed to be derived from "A-sam-a," the 'pearl-land,' 'unequalled,' and Ahom is said to be equivalent to Assam. The point is, however, open to doubt.

‡ Dalton's Ethnology of Bengal.

§ For a fuller notice of this sect, see Chapter XI. below.

many vicissitudes, succeeded in driving the Raja and his party from the seat of his Government.

In 1788, Gourinath made a desperate effort to retrieve his fortunes, but apparently to little purpose. Beaten back from Gowhatty, after days of fruitless fighting, he applied to Mr. Raush who farmed the salt revenues at the British frontier station of Goalpara, begging him to procure the assistance of the British Government. The farmer, probably on his own responsibility, sent over a body of burkundazes, or locally enlisted fighting men, but these were, as the histories tell us, cut off to a man by the Moamariahs in the first encounter. Nor had an expedition despatched in aid of Gourinath by the State of Manipur any better success; 1,500 men out of a force of 4,500 which crossed the hills from Manipur being slain by the rebels.

Assam was now given over to confusion and misery. All the

British intervention.

turbulent ruffianism of the great bazars of Bengal flocked thither.

Large bodies of disbanded sepoy and bands of fighting fanatics from Hindustan pillaged the villages and laid waste the fields. The Raja once more, therefore, appealed to the British, demanding that they should at least aid in expelling the lawless robbers who had come over from Bengal. Lord Cornwallis, admitting the obligation, ordered a detachment of sepoy, under Captain Welsh, to enter Assam. This force completely routed the Moamariahs and other rebellious Chiefs in the cold season of 1792-93, and succeeded in recovering possession of Gowhatty. Enquiries then instituted made it manifest that much of the discontent prevalent in the province had its origin in the tyranny and mismanagement of Raja Gourinath and his advisers. Accordingly with the sanction of the Supreme Government, Captain Welsh, in communication with the principal nobles and officers of the kingdom, took steps to put affairs on a sounder basis; and, as a necessary guarantee for the maintenance of order in the future, arrangements were made for the retention in the province of a brigade of British troops, the revenues of Lower Assam being pledged for their maintenance. Unfortunately for the country, before these projects could be fully matured, Captain Welsh was recalled to Bengal by Sir John Shore, whose cautious policy of non-interference and retrenchment was opposed to such an enterprise as had been sanctioned by the more imperial spirit of Cornwallis. In July

Withdrawal of British troops, 1794.

1794, Assam was deliberately relegated to anarchy and civil war.\*

The miseries of the country reached their climax in the reign of Raja Chunder Kant, which commenced in 1809. The principal ministers of State, who had themselves seated Chunder Kant on the throne, headed a rebellion against him of the most formidable character, and contended in arms with varying

\* The probable effect of the withdrawal of our troops was clearly pointed out by Captain Welsh. See an interesting report by him in the Appendix, with notes by Mr. Scott, afterwards the first Commissioner of Assam.

fortunes for the possession of the capital and the control of the revenues. Failing to obtain aid from the British, who continued to hold aloof from Assam affairs, the Raja's party had recourse to the Burmese, and Chunder Kant was twice indebted to that power for material assistance. Purunder Sing, a prince of the royal house, the most able among the various pretenders who sought to get possession of the throne, was driven out by the Burmese in 1816 and took refuge in British territory. The Burmese proved, however, to be but dangerous allies. The price demanded by them for their aid was more than Chunder Kant was willing or able to pay, and he soon became anxious to get rid of them. A futile attempt to shake them off resulted in the expulsion of Chunder Kant himself, and the elevation, by the Burmese, of a new Raja in the person of Jogeshwar Sing.

There were thus at this time (1821) in British territory two scions of Assamese royalty, Chunder Kant and Purunder, each busily engaged in organising means for the invasion of Assam. Chunder Kant had left behind him in the province many faithful adherents on whose efforts he chiefly relied; while Purunder sought to get together a mercenary army from the hill passes of Bhutan and Bijni. Chunder Kant was the first to make an aggressive effort, and was for a time successful; but fresh reinforcements from Ava again turned the scale in favour of the Burmese, and the unfortunate prince became once more an exile. The Burmese General followed up his success on this occasion by sending an insolent message to the British Officer commanding at Goalpara, warning him that if protection was afforded to Raja Chunder Kant, the Burmese troops would invade the Company's territories and arrest the fugitive wherever he might be found. This demonstration was answered on the part of the Indian Government by the despatch to the frontier of troops from Dacca, and by a distinct intimation that any advance of the Burmese would be at their certain peril.

Meanwhile, events at another part of the North-East Frontier were rapidly hurrying the British Government into collision with the ignorant and overbearing Court of

War between the British and Burmese Governments, March the 5th, 1824.

Ava. The Raj of Cachar which lay directly in the way of any force invading Eastern Bengal from Burma, had some time previously placed itself under British protection. In the face of repeated warnings and expostulations the Burmese, who then held the valley of Manipur, persisted in advancing upon Cachar and threatening Jaintia (a bordering dependency of Bengal); and no resource was at length left to the Indian Government save to declare war. To re-conquer Assam from the Burmese was a natural and necessary part of the consequent operations.

In less than a year from the commencement of hostilities, the British troops had driven the Burmese from the valley of the Brahmaputra; and on the 24th February 1826, when the operations of the campaign elsewhere had been brought to a close, the King of Burma, by the treaty of Yandaboo, renounced all claim upon, and covenanted to abstain from all future interference with, the principality of Assam

and its dependencies, and the contiguous petty States of Cachar and Jaintia.\*

While the military conquest of Assam was thus being effected by our troops, the direction of all civil matters in connection with the province was entrusted to Mr. David Scott† as Governor General's Agent on the North-East Frontier. Subsequently, as regarded Upper Assam alone, the Officer in command of the troops was associated with Mr. Scott in a Commission for general administration. When the conquest was complete, Upper Assam was formally placed under Captain Neufville in subordination to Mr. Scott. Captain Neufville also held military charge of the Assam Light Infantry, a corps organised for the purpose of holding the outposts of the valley looking towards Burma.

Very little change was made at first in the Native mode of administration. In fact, it was long debated whether the British Government should retain Assam in its own hands, or restore it altogether to its Native rulers. The Government in Calcutta was strongly averse to taking absolute possession of the province; and had any of the Native royal house shown real capacity or ability to govern with acceptance to the people, there can be no doubt, from the tenor of the Secret Consultations in the Foreign Office, that he would have been forthwith installed as Raja. The Assamese princes were, however, mere worthless debauchees, and the security of our eastern districts made it necessary to retain strong military control of this part of the frontier. But, having provided for this, the Government was anxious to hand over to Native management all that part of the valley which was not required for military purposes or for the maintenance of the British troops. Accordingly in 1832, after much deliberation, Upper Assam, with the exception of the tract about Sadiya and Muttuck, was made over to Purunder Sing, who was believed to be morally and otherwise the most eligible representative of the royal stock. Purunder Sing was placed in the position of a protected prince, guaranteed against invasion, and entrusted with uncontrolled civil power, on condition of his paying

\* Aitchison's Treaties, Vol. I., p. 213.

† Mr. Scott died in August 1831, and was succeeded by Mr. T. C. Robertson, and he again by Captain F. Jenkins in January 1834.

The name and fame of David Scott are still green on the North-East Frontier. He was one of those remarkable men who have from time to time been the ornament of our Indian services. Had the scene of his life's labours been in North-West or Central India, where the great problem of Empire was then being worked out, instead of amid the obscure jungles of Assam, he would occupy a place in history by the side of Malcolm, Elphinstone, and Metcalfe. As it is, his writings lie buried amid the dust of official record-rooms, and though his name is known to most of our Frontier Officers, his work in its extent and power is still but little understood. The most interesting and personally instructive part of my task in preparing the present volume has been the perusal of Scott's admirable Reports and Letters. My only regret is that I have not been able to afford time to collect or tabulate these for a volume of official "Selections".

a tribute of Rs. 50,000 annually to the Government. The experiment did not succeed. Purunder Sing's administration proved a failure, both financially and generally, and in October 1838 his territories were placed under the direct management of British officers, and Assam as a whole became a Non-Regulation Province of the Indian Empire.

The foregoing is a brief sketch of the mode in which the Government obtained possession of Assam. It is necessary for the purposes of this narrative to add some few facts as to the state of the country and the revenue system in force there at the time of the British occupation.

In Assam not only the soil but the dwellers thereon were treated as being the property of the State. All the free population was divided,

The Revenue System of Assam. according to caste or calling, into *khels*, or clans, numbering from 1,000 to 5,000 able-bodied men in each. The *khela* were sub-divided into *ghôts* of three or four *paiks*, or freemen, each, and one *paik* of each *ghôt* was bound to render personal service throughout the year to the Raja or to any officer of State to whom he might for that purpose be assigned. The Raja on his part allowed to each *paik* in the *ghôt* two *poorahs* of rice-land, the land of the *paik* absent on service being cultivated for him by the rest of the *ghôt*. This allotment was known as *goamutti* or 'body land.' The *paik* also received a piece of land for garden and homestead (*bâri*) free of assessment; in acknowledgment of which he paid one rupee annually either as house-tax or poll-tax or hearth-tax, as the custom of the district might determine. If a *paik* cultivated any rice-land in excess of his two *poorahs*, he paid the State one rupee annually for each *poorah* so tilled. Artizans and other non-cultivating classes paid a higher rate of poll-tax. The aboriginal and other wild tribes occupying the low jungly hills within the province paid a hoe-tax on their cotton cultivation. The salaries of all Government officers, favourites, and retainers, and the maintenance of the numerous religious institutions of Assam, were provided for by assignments of *paiks* along with their *goamutti* lands to the persons to be benefited. The estates of the Native gentry were universally formed in this way, and were supplemented by the *khels*, or lands, which they had themselves reclaimed from waste by slave labor, and which were held by them rent-free and as hereditary in their families.

The British Government commuted all the *paik* service for an annual cash payment to the State of Rs. 3 per man, and released the slaves—measures which, however wise and proper in the abstract, had the effect of reducing the Native gentry to poverty, and left no class, either in fact or theory, intermediate between the cultivator of the soil and the supreme authority. The mode and amount of assessment of the cultivators, now no longer called *paiks* but *ryots*, have undergone many changes since that time; but the idea of personal service due to the State by the subject has never revived, and the practice of cash payments to and by Government has always been thoroughly established.

Nothing could have been more wretched than the state of Assam when the valley was first occupied by our troops. Thirty thousand

State of the province at annexation. Assamese had been carried off as slaves by the Burmese. Many thousands had lost their lives, and large tracts of country been laid desolate by the wars, famines, and pestilences, which for nearly half a century had afflicted the province. The remnant of the people had almost given up cultivation, supporting themselves chiefly on jungle roots and plants. The nobility and priestly families had retired to Goalpara or other refuges in British territory, often after losing all their property; and with them had gone crowds of dependents glad to escape from the miseries of their native land.

Such was Assam as we found it, and such the revenue system that prevailed there. The old records give much curious information in regard to both, which it would be interesting to set out at length; but I have confined myself to a summary of salient facts as detailed in the ordinary histories, this being sufficient for my present purpose. So much as has been stated it was desirable to bring into prominence, that there might be a clear understanding of the circumstances under which a frontier policy first became necessary for us in the north-east. These will be made more apparent as we deal with the history of each tribe. But I may here remark, by way of general preface, that we found the Assam Valley surrounded north, east, and south by numerous savage and warlike tribes whom the decaying authority of the Assam

#### The Frontier Tribes.

dynasty had failed of late years to control, and whom the disturbed condition of the province had incited to encroachment. Many of them advanced claims to rights more or less definite over lands lying in the plains; others claimed tributary payments from the villages below their hills, or the services of *paiks* said to have been assigned them by the Assam authorities. It mattered of course little to us whether these claims had their basis in primeval rights from which the Shan invaders had partially ousted the hillmen, or whether they were merely the definite expression of a barbarian cupidity. Certain it was that such claims existed, and that they had been, to some extent and in some places, formally recognised by our predecessors. The engagements under which the Native Governments lay were transferred to us with the peculiar revenue system above described; and it was one of our earliest tasks to endeavour to reconcile such arrangements, where we could discover them, with the requirements of enlightened policy. But it was not always easy to discover them, for the tribes asserting them knew nothing of our intentions, and seldom in the earlier years of our administration referred their claims directly for acknowledgment or compromise. When we did arrive in any case at a definite understanding as to the rights of any tribe, we were ready, as a rule, to treat them fairly and liberally; and, on the whole, we have no reason in this respect to be ashamed of the general bearings of our policy upon the North-East Frontier. But we are met to this day by difficulties arising from

the indefinite nature of the connexion subsisting between the Assam sovereigns and their savage neighbours. These difficulties, as they arise, have not been lessened by the fact that here, as elsewhere in British India, the Government has had an active policy forced upon it uniformly against its will ; and while anxious in the extreme to leave the tribes alone, if they would but consent to be let alone, it has been compelled from time to time by the mere force of events to take up questions it would have gladly overlooked, and to govern actively where it would have been content to be at peace. A strong, systematising, aggressive despotism would have found a policy and enforced it long years before the British Indian Administration could be brought to confess that a definite policy on this frontier was either necessary or desirable.

## CHAPTER II.

## SKETCH OF BRITISH RELATIONS WITH BHUTAN PROPER.

It forms no part of my design to describe in detail the political relations of the Indian Government with tribes or peoples admittedly independent of its rule and dwelling outside the recognized limits of the Empire. The history of British intercourse with Bhutan as a foreign power has already been well and fully told in the admirable reports of Pemberton, Eden, and others; and there is no need again to traverse the same ground. But inasmuch as Bhutan marches with the most westerly districts of Assam, and seeing that the occupation of that province brought us into peculiar revenue relations with the Bhutias both of Bhutan proper and of its neighbouring highlands, it is necessary to say something of that uncouth race, to give completeness to the history of the frontier administration.

Along the base of the Bhutan hills and sloping downwards to the plains, there stretches from west to east a narrow tract of fertile land varying in breadth from ten to twenty miles, the possession of which has always, to the inhabitants of the barren hills above, been a matter of importance. Cotton, rice, and other staples grow there, the value of which was always greatly appreciated both by them and by the Native Assamese Government. But the malarious and deadly character of the tract and their own feebleness of late years prevented the Assam Rajas from giving efficient protection to the indigenous cultivators or establishing an undisputed dominion over the soil and its products; while by means of the passes or broad straths leading from the hills and intersecting this belt of *terai* the highlanders held the practical command of the border, and in course of time established what they considered rights over the whole of the debatable tract.

Along the frontier of Bhutan proper lay eighteen of these passes, straths, or *dwárs*, eleven on the frontier of Bengal and Cooch Behar, seven on that of Assam. The land at the foot of the Bengal and Cooch Behar *Dwárs* had long since been forcibly annexed by the Bhutias; and the Assamese rulers, though always keenly alive to the value of this malarious Goshen which lay upon their border, and never to the last resigning their claim to be at least paramount owners of the plains up to the actual mountain ridges, were in their decay unable fully to vindicate their claims. Accordingly to the hill tribes here, as well as to those on other parts of the border, concessions were made by the Assamese authorities, which it is probable could not have been refused, but which would undoubtedly have been retracted had opportunity made this possible.



The Assam\* Dwárs, with which alone we are at present concerned,  
The Assam Dwárs of Bhutan. were these :—

Five in Kamrup	...	Bijni.
		Chappakhamar.
		Chappaguri.
		Banska.
		Ghaukolla.
Two in Durrung	...	Kalling.
		Booreeguma.

These seven Dwárs, including the tract below them already described, were made over by the Assam Government to Bhutan in consideration of an annual payment of tribute. This tribute was to consist of yak tails, ponies, musk, gold-dust, blankets, and knives, of an estimated value of Naraini Rupees 4,785-1 yearly. So long as this was paid, the Kamrup Dwárs were to remain in the hand of the Bhutias all the year round, but, by a curious arrangement, the Durrung Dwárs were to be annually surrendered to the Assam Government from July to November. This anomalous provision of course led to trouble. The subordinate collecting agencies, whether Assamese or Bhutia, were not very careful in giving effect to the stipulation ; and the unfortunate peasants were in the end harassed by two sets of tax-gatherers equally obnoxious and equally oppressive in their mode of dealing. A further and endless source of dispute was the fact that the tribute was paid in kind, while its value was fixed in specie. Instead of operating as a permanent settlement of claims and liabilities, this arrangement opened out an annually recurring topic for disputation and bargaining.

So long as the weak rule of the later Ahoms lasted, such quarrels were probably settled by the Bhutias in their own favour and without much trouble. But a British Government is of all others most tenacious of its rights in matters of bargain, and, though it confirmed to the Bhutias the arrangements made with them by the Assamese, it would not consent to be periodically swindled even in such things as yak tails and piebald ponies. Dealing with the question as a mere matter of business, the Governor General's Agent put up the Bhutia tribute as it came in to public auction, and debited the highlanders with the difference between the price realised and the amount due at the treaty valuation. In this way a constantly accruing balance mounted up, which the Bhutias could never be induced to adjust, and which probably they were never able to understand. Demands for payment were met by evasion, or by aggression,

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\* The Dwárs in Goalpara are not noticed here, inasmuch as Goalpara, though afterwards made a district of Assam, was long ere our conquest of that province a part of the British district of Rungpore.

and the plunder and abduction of British subjects. In 1828 outrages committed by the Jongpen or Bhutia official in charge of the Booreeguma

Bhutia outrages, 1828.

Dwār led to the attachment by the Government of the tract so-called. It was restored in 1834 on payment of a fine, and in consequence of an assurance that the principal offenders had died in the interim.

Fresh outrages in the Bijni Dwār in the following year, coupled with a refusal to pay even the current tribute, led to threats of further attachment, which were not, however, at that time carried out. But the enrolment of the Assam Sebundy Corps for frontier defence proved that the Government was gradually being driven to the conclusion that energetic measures of repression or retaliation might shortly be called for. Wanton incursions from the Banska Dwār into North Kamrup in

Raids in 1836.

1836 led to the attachment of that Dwār and ultimately to armed collision with the Bhutias, in which the hillmen suffered heavy loss. With savages, as with children, punishment brings about a speedy, though not always a lasting repentance, and the Central Government of Bhutan, with its local representatives, speedily making submission, the attached lands were again given up. There was much reason to fear, however, that our officers were in this matter cajoled into negotiations with irresponsible agents, for the Deb Raja of Bhutan never formally ratified the treaty purporting to have been made in his name. Unable to realise a state of complete anarchy where all

Futile attempts at regular negotiation.

the forms of Government existed, the Calcutta Secretariats seem always to have believed that could the central authority in Bhutan be only reached, the peace of the border would be effectually secured. The local officers knew better than this, but time after time they had to become the channels for solemn remonstrances which had no result, and to advise as to the conduct of negotiations for which they could only anticipate failure.

In 1837 Captain Pemberton, then the great authority on all Eastern

Pemberton's mission, 1837.

Frontier matters, was sent on a special mission to the Dhurm and Deb Rajas, and his report is still our chief source of information regarding the interior of this barbarous State. He was instructed "to settle terms of commercial intercourse between British India and Bhutan, and, if possible, to effect such an adjustment of the tribute payable for the Dwārs as might diminish the chances of misunderstanding arising from that source." The impression derived by Captain Pemberton from what he saw of the country was that the Central Government was powerless to control the Penlows or local authorities of the outlying districts, and that it was mainly owing to the conduct of these men, and notably of the Tongso and Paro Penlows, the Governors, respectively, of East and West Bhutan, with their subordinate local officers, that the peace of the frontier had been so often disturbed.

No effectual or permanent result accrued from the mission. The treaty proposed by the envoy the Bhutan Durbar was afraid to sign, bearing somewhat severely as its stipulations did upon the Tongso Penlow.

Bhutan continued to be racked by intestine troubles, and the border outrages remained unchecked. Kalling, Booreeguma, and Ghaukolla Dwárs were soon again attached, while the others were now deserted by the cultivators. In 1841 the Government made up its mind to attach finally the whole of the Assam Dwárs, as the only means of securing tranquillity for that part of the frontier; a sum of Rs. 10,000 being thereafter annually paid to the Bhutan Government as compensation for the loss of revenue entailed on them by the resumption.

This measure, which added 1,600 square miles of territory to Assam, proved on the whole effectual as regards the country lying under this portion of the Bhutan hills. But along the Bengal section of the Dwárs, outrage followed upon outrage, in all of which the Bhutia officials, or robbers, openly harboured by them, had an undoubted share. The forbearance shown by the Government seemed to the Bhutias merely proof of weakness and ineptitude. Remonstrance elicited only insolence, covert or overt, and at length in 1854 the Durbar sent a rude intimation that the compensation paid for the loss of the Assam Dwárs was insufficient and must be increased. The Indian Government, as a matter of course, refused to comply with the demand, and the refusal was followed by Bhutia raids on Assam in which the Dewangiri Raja and his superior, the Tongso Penlow, were shown to have been concerned. A feeble attempt by the Deb Raja to call Tongso Penlow to account provoked from that chieftain a most insolent communication addressed to the Governor General's Agent in Assam. Lord Dalhousie, before whom it was laid, was the last Governor General likely to overlook an insult. He at once directed that the Durbar should be told through Tongso Penlow himself that the value of all property plundered by the Bhutias would in future be deducted from the sum annually paid on account of the Assam Dwárs, and that any further outrage would lead to the permanent annexation of the Dwárs on the Bengal side also. In the position occupied by Tongso Penlow, these measures would, it was conceived, affect him even more directly than they affected the Central Government of Bhutan.

Warnings given to the Bhutias. Threats, however, had no permanent effect upon a people so barbarous as the Bhutias. Year after year fresh violations of British territory were perpetrated till the Government was at last driven into action. In 1860 it attached the estate of Fallacotta, the revenues of which had long been paid to Bhutan, in virtue of an old arrangement, and was fully prepared to give effect to the scheme of finally annexing the Bengal Dwárs. But, before taking this extreme step, the Governor General—that no shadow of excuse might be left to the Durbar—thought it well to send a fresh mission to explain to the Deb and Dhurm Rajas the light in which the British Government of India was compelled to view the acts of officials, who, whatever their real position,

Mr. Eden's mission. and was fully prepared to give effect to the scheme of finally annexing the Bengal Dwárs. But, before taking this extreme step, the Governor General—that no shadow of excuse might be left to the Durbar—thought it well to send a fresh mission to explain to the Deb and Dhurm Rajas the light in which the British Government of India was compelled to view the acts of officials, who, whatever their real position,

were nominally subordinate to the Durbar. Accordingly in 1862 a Native emissary was despatched to Poonakha, the capital of Bhutan, to announce the Governor General's intention of sending an envoy and to make preliminary arrangements for a mission. On the return of this messenger, the Honourable A. Eden, Secretary to the Bengal Government, was, in August 1863, appointed to conduct a special embassy to Bhutan to explain to that Government the reasons which had led to the annexation of Fallacotta, to demand the surrender of all captives taken from British Territory, and to negotiate some stable arrangements for the better conduct in future of the relations between the two States. The mission proved a failure. The envoy, in compliance with the instructions of the Foreign Office, penetrated through many difficulties to Poonakha and the Bhutia Court, only to meet with insult and annoyance, and purchased the safe return of his escort by signing under protest a preposterous treaty, which it became the first duty of his Government to disavow.

War with Bhutan followed, and the allowance paid on account of

#### The Bhutan War.

the Assam Dwárs and Ambari Fallacotta was of course stopped. After a campaign, which if not uniformly satisfactory was in the end entirely successful, the Bhutias were compelled to make humble submission. As a lasting lesson to them, they were thereupon finally and absolutely deprived of all the lands they had held below the hills—the Bengal Dwárs being formally annexed by the British Government. It was, however, arranged that as some compensation for the loss of this valuable territory, a sum of Rs. 25,000 should be annually paid to officers deputed by the Central Government of Bhutan, and in this grant the older grant of Rs. 10,000 on account of the Assam Dwárs may be considered to have merged.

The wisdom of making any such payment to a State which had so often offended has been frequently called in question by irresponsible critics. It has been urged that concessions of this nature are viewed by barbarous enemies as tokens of weakness and signs of fear; that the long course of outrage in which the Bhutan Durbar and its feudatories had indulged should have called forth such emphatic marks of our displeasure and such a lasting demonstration of our power to punish, that there could have been thereafter no hope left to the hillmen of successful aggression. These views though popular are not, I believe, held by any responsible officers having full cognizance of the true facts of the case. It must be remembered that from the Dwárs the whole aristocracy of Bhutan had for many years drawn their chief support. Deprived of the income they received from these lands they lost at once the means of supporting their own position, and of maintaining their crowds of habitual dependents. Had the Indian Government taken possession of the Dwárs without granting any equivalent, it would have established on a most vulnerable frontier a stronghold of needy and desperate men, having nothing to lose, but much to gain by repeated raids upon our defenceless villages and

border farms. It is true that all our expectations in regard to the effect of the payment have not been realized. It has not yet created a strong central power able and willing to control at all times the outlying Chiefs. Internal dissension has been rife and fatal to the advance of the country. The feudatories who formerly shared in the distribution of the Assam stipend, or who levied their own shares therefrom as it passed their hands, now see themselves overlooked. But they find it a safer and more profitable enterprise to wrest what they can from the authorities at Poonakha than to attempt any further violations of British territory. They limit their lawless efforts to internecine struggles for power and place, seeking each for himself to be the chief recipient of the British bounty. On more than one occasion it has been found that a threat to stop the treaty payment has produced amid the contending factions a ready unanimity to comply with our demands. And so long as this is the case, and the peace of the border is maintained, it hardly seems the duty of the British Government to interfere in the internal concerns of a foreign people however barbarous, even on the ground that our doing so would confer on them material benefit. Our frontier relations with the Bhutan Durbar are now extremely simple. We hold the Dwárs and permit no interference with our subjects there settled; but so long as the Bhutias behave themselves peaceably, we pay to the central power for the time being the sum of Rs. 25,000 as compensation for the loss of its only fertile territory, and for the due maintenance of the *de facto* rulers of that State. When the results of this policy are shown to be unsatisfactory, it will be time to change it.\*

The boundary line between British Territory and Bhutan from the Monass river on the west to the Deosham river on the east (where the territory of Independent Bhutan ends) was laid down in 1872-73. It was found that the Bhutias had again taken possession of Dewangiri and were making collections from the traders there. These sums were deducted from the next Treaty payment, and a warning given them future encroachments would be seriously regarded. No further complications have since been reported.

Towards the close of 1874 the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, Sir R. Temple, received a visit from the Deb Raja at Buxa, when friendly sentiments were interchanged. Late in 1876 news came of civil war in Bhutan, and the Poonakha Jongpen and Paro Penlow took refuge in British territory, where they and their followers were provided with subsistence by the Government; their extradition, which was demanded, being refused. The only question now likely to disturb our amicable relations with Bhutan is this matter of the extradition of offenders, the principles upon which we demand or refuse this not being understood by uncivilised highlanders unacquainted with the rudiments of international law.

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\* In 1874 a deduction was made from the Treaty payment on account of dacoities committed by Bhutias in Kamrup. The arrangement thus places in our hands an effective means of dealing with border crime as well as with State aggression.

## CHAPTER III.

## THE EXTRA-BHUTAN BHUTIAS.

The five Dwárs of Bijni, Chappakhamar, Chappaguri, Banska, and Ghaukolla lie on the northern face of the District of Kamrup. Crossing the Bornuddi river eastward, we come to the District of Durrung, and to the Dwárs of Kalling and Booreeguma. Of these seven Dwárs, held formerly by the Bhutias of Bhutan Proper, enough has been said in the preceding chapter. To the east of Booreeguma is another Dwár

The Kuriapara Dwár. called Kuriapara, formerly held by hillmen of the Bhutia stock in more or less direct subjection to Thibet and owing no allegiance to the Poonakha Durbar.

Many interesting facts regarding the state of commercial intercourse between Assam and Thibet are collected by Pemberton in his Report on the North-East Frontier. There we find quoted the following

Trade between Assam and Thibet.

description of the trade as given by Hamilton: "At a place called Chouna, two months' journey from Lassa, on the confines of the two States, there is a mart established, and on the Assam side there is a similar mart at Geegunshur, distant four miles from Chouna. An annual caravan repairs from Lassa to Chouna, conducted by about 20 persons, conveying silver bullion to the amount of about one lakh of rupees, and a considerable quantity of rock salt for sale to the Assam merchants at Geegunshur, to which place the latter bring rice, which is imported into Thibet from Assam in large quantities; Tussa cloth, a kind of coarse silk cloth, manufactured by the Native women in Assam from the queen downwards; iron and lac found in Assam, and other skins, buffalo horns, pearls, and corals, first imported from Bengal." In 1809 this trade amounted in value to two lakhs of rupees, even although Assam was then itself in a most unsettled state. The imports from Thibet, in the shape of woollens, gold dust, salt, musk, horses, chowries, and Chinese silks, were especially noticeable. The protracted troubles of Assam ultimately affected the traffic, but even in the year before the Burmese invasion, the Lassa merchants were said to have brought down gold amounting in value to Rs. 70,000. The Burmese occupation put a stop to this annual fair for a time. In 1833 a successful attempt was made to revive it by Lieutenant Rutherford, who then had charge of Durrung. Of all this trade the Kuriapara Dwár is the principal channel.\* Udalgiri is now the place where the fair is held,

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\* Less important fairs for the Bhutan Bhutias are held at Kerkaria on the Lukmi River just beyond the borders of Durrung; and at Daimara, north of Udalgiri.

and a very interesting spectacle may be seen there annually. Traders

#### The Kuriapara Fair.

from all parts of Thibet, from Lassa and places east, west, and even north of it are present in crowds, some of them clad in Chinese dresses, using Chinese implements, and looking to all intents Chinese. Many have their families with them, and carry their goods on sturdy ponies, of which some hundreds are brought down the fair yearly. In 1852 the Government sanctioned a proposal to move the site of the gathering to Mungledye which was expected to be more convenient for the Bengal and Assam traders.<sup>(1)</sup> It was found, however, that such a change would not be popular. The hill caravans would not venture so far into the plains, and existing arrangements were left undisturbed.

The Bhutias of Kuriapara are under the direct government of a body of Chiefs known as the "Sath Rajas"\* who call themselves subordinates of the Towang Raja, a tributary of Lassa. Between 1830 and 1840, these Bhutias gave as much trouble as their neighbours on the west, and in consequence of outrages committed by them, the Dwár was resumed by the authorities of Durrung. In the cold season of 1843-44, the Sath Rajas, in company with representatives of the Towang Durbar, had an interview with Captain Gordon, Assistant to the

Cession of the Dwár for an annual payment, 1843-44.

Governor General's Agent, and formally relinquished all claim to the lands of the Kuriapara Dwár in consideration of an annual payment of Rs. 5,000; this sum very nearly representing the amount which they used to realise from the tract by direct collection during the eight months of the year for which they held it. The annual stipend of the Sath Rajas is spent at the Udalgiri fair, and finds its way in the shape of cotton and other goods towards Towang and Lassa.

In 1852 a misunderstanding arose between the British and Thibetan Governments on account of one of these Sath Rajas, known as the Gelling or Gelong, who had been entrusted by the Lassa

#### Story of the Gelling Raja.

authorities with control over the other Chiefs and jurisdiction in the hills near Kuriapara. The Gelling took advantage of his position to declare himself independent, and to intercept the money paid by the British authorities. Troops were sent against him from Lassa, and, though at first able to hold his own, he was eventually driven across the border into Durrung. His extradition was demanded by the Thibetans in the most peremptory terms, perpetual war being the lightest penalty threatened in the event of refusal. An army was pushed down towards the plains, and there was at one time imminent prospect of a Thibetan invasion of Assam. Four hundred light

\* "Seven Princes":—a common title of the Bhutia Chiefs in this quarter, not necessarily implying the existence of the precise number seven.

(1) Judicial Proceedings, 9th September 1852, No. 93.

infantry and a couple of six pounders were hurried up to the frontier, and served to check the ardour of the hillmen, who after much bluster and many demands for the Gelling's head, said they would be content with a document from the Governor General's Agent, certifying that the Gelling was no longer in life. They were not particular as to the actual fact; but wished to save their honor by an appearance of success; in this being perhaps not less diplomatic than more civilised nations. The desired certificate they did not obtain; but eventually peace was made by a treaty\* ratifying, on the one hand, the former payment of Rs. 5,000, and guaranteeing, on the other, to the followers of the Gelling Raja immunity for their rebellion. It was agreed also that the Gelling himself should live under British protection and restraint to the south of the Brahmaputra. The Thibetans did not respect the stipulations of the treaty as regards the Gelling's partizans, for seven of these were brutally murdered as soon as they returned to the hills. The Government did not think it necessary to take notice of this, as the event took place outside British Territory. The Gelling himself continued for several years to reside at Gowinghatty. About 1861 he became reconciled to the Towang Deo or Deb Raja of Towang, and returned to the hills. There he soon again became involved in quarrels with the Sath Rajas, whom he defrauded of certain dues upon caoutchouc (an important staple in those parts) and once more he had to fly into Durrung, where till 1864 he occupied a house near Kuriapara. In April of that year 50 or 60 Bhutias came down by night, surrounded his dwelling and murdered him in cold blood. This was presently ascertained to have been by order of the Sath Rajas, under instigation of the Towang Deo, with whose summons to attend him the

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\* The text of the treaty is subjoined. (Political Progs., October 1853, No. 64.) For the earlier treaty of 1844, see Aitchison, Vol. I., pp. 143.

*Treaty signed by Captains REID and CAMPBELL, and CHANGDANDOO NAMANG LEDEN, and DAO NURHOO, Bhutia Rajas, on the 28th January 1853, at Kurreakpara, Zillah Durrung.*

We, Changdandoo Raja, Namang Leden Raja, Dao Nurhoo Raja, being deputed by the Daba Rajas to carry letters of friendship to the Agent, Governor General, North-East Frontier, desiring that the former friendly relations which existed between the Government of India and our Lassa Government (lately disturbed by the misbehaviour of one of our Gellings) should be again resumed, and being ourselves desirous above all things that peace should exist between our Government and that of India, do (now that we are assured the Government of India do not intend to invade our country) hereby solemnly declare that all military force in excess of what is required to maintain order in our own country shall be immediately withdrawn, and the soldiers sent to their houses; and should the peace be ever broken by us, we shall consider that all claim to the Rs. 5,000, hitherto yearly paid to our Government by the Government of India, shall be forfeited, and that our trade with the people of the plains shall be put a stop to.

And all this we of our own good will agree to and swear to in the presence of Captains Reid and Campbell, signing the agreement as copied out in Bhutia language from the Bengali copy made by Tuckha Mahomed Darogah.

And, moreover, with regard to the followers and others of the Gelling who have come down to the plains for protection, we promise not to molest them, but hope, with the good help of the Agent, Governor General, to make friends with them and persuade them to return to their own country.



Gelling had refused to comply. No very decided action was taken by Government upon this violation of its territory. Towang being nominally under Thibet, the Government of India sanctioned a reference to Lassa on the subject, but this was never actually made; and the idea of stopping payment of the annual allowance of the Sath Rajas was deprecated by the local authorities as being likely to lead to further raids.<sup>(1)</sup> The Rajas were, it was urged, mere savages who looked on the Gelling as one of their own tribe, and could not realise that they did any injury to us by dealing out punishment to a kindred Bhutia, even in British territory. The Government of Bengal ordered a demand to be made for the surrender of the murderers, and the Government of India pointed out afresh that political refugees should not be allowed to live near the frontier; but the demand was never pressed, and the advice could only be noted for future guidance; and so the matter dropped.

In the cold weather of 1867 there was an unfounded alarm that<sup>(2)</sup> the Thibetan Thalong Bhutias intended to attack Assam, but as a fact the relations of the Bengal Government with these tribes have for many years been perfectly amicable, and limited mainly to payment of the annual stipend, and the commercial intercourse of the Udalgiri fair.

The restrictions placed on free intercourse with the hills under the Inner Line Regulation (described in Chapter VIII below) gave rise to some complaint in 1876-77, but the grievance was met by the issue of passes to all persons *bonâ fide* engaged in supplying the hillmen. In 1878 the provisions of the Regulation were suspended along their frontier, and in 1880 the good offices of the Deputy Commissioner of Durrung were effectual in settling a quarrel between these Bhutias and those of Kukaria subject to Bhutan proper.

In 1872-73 the boundary between Assam and the Towang Bhutias was formally laid down from the Deosham river on the west to the Rowta river on the east. The line proposed by the British officers was readily accepted by the Bhutias and by certain Thibetan officials who came down to inspect it.

Eastward of Kuriapara lies the extensive division of Char Dwâr or "the four passes," on the borders of the Bhutias of Char Dwâr. which are the Rooprai Ganw and Sher Ganw Bhutias, who claim to be independent of Towang. Their Chiefs, like those of the Kuriapara Bhutias, are called "Sath Rajas," the principal one having the title of Durji Raja. In common with all the other tribes on this frontier, these Bhutias claimed a tribute or

(<sup>1</sup>) Political Proceedings, June 1864, Nos. 3-6.  
Political Proceedings, October 1864, Nos. 18-21.

(<sup>2</sup>) Political Proceedings, December 1867, No. 57.

payment from the plains which they collected annually.\* In February 1826, an arrangement was made with them by Captain Matthie, in virtue of which the Durrung authorities resumed the right of direct collection and paid the Bhutias Rs. 2,526-7 as compensation on that account. In 1839, however, this payment was stopped in consequence of their having murdered one Madhoo Sykeah, a British subject. The Durji Raja with the rest made in the usual inconsistent way the most earnest protestations of innocence of present guilt and promises to behave better for the future, and as usual they were eventually pardoned, and a reduced allowance of Rs. 1,740 guaranteed them. The boundary line of the Char Dwár Bhutias was laid down in 1872-73 from the Rowta river on the west to the Ghabroo river on the east. The Bhutias here put forward extravagant claims to lands on the plains, which were rejected by the officers demarcating the boundary. At a meeting with the Deputy Commissioner of Durrung in February 1876 their Chiefs expressed themselves satisfied with this decision. They have come down regularly every cold season to trade, establishing themselves at a place called Dármára, two miles north of our boundary. In the case of these Bhutias also the Inner Line Regulation has been kept in abeyance.

The most easterly tribe of Bhutias are the Thebengeas. These live in the interior of the hills, and formerly collected dues in Char Dwár along with the Rooprai clans. A feud, however, sprang up between them, and for years they only entered Assam to trade by the circuitous route of the Kuriapara Dwár. Their annual visit to purchase goods was made to a mart called Mazbat in Char Dwár. Their chief village is 16 days' journey from the plains, and they have always been peaceably behaved. They receive an annual stipend of Rs. 145-13-0 only.

Satisfactory evidence of the friendly relations existing between our officers and the Thibetan Bhutias will be found in the following incident, which is reproduced from the Assam Administration Report for 1879-80 :—

At the beginning of February a difference occurred in British territory between the Thibetan and the Kherkeria Bhutias, subjects of Bhutan Proper, which was amicably arranged by the Sub-Divisional Officer of Mangaldai. The circumstances of this affair are as follows :—

One Pema Thallong Bhutia, a resident of Bhutan Proper, made his way last year to the Towang Bhutia encampment at Amratol (the first stage in the hills after leaving British territory), and, it is alleged, stole a pony belonging to the Towang people. He was caught and taken before the Gelleng Raja, who sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs. 20 in cash, 4 pieces of cloth, and 4 brass pots. Pema Thallong, feeling aggrieved at the punishment awarded him last year by the Gelleng Raja, sought his opportunity for revenging himself, and on the 1st February last, while one of the Gelleng Raja's personal attendants was trading in a village in the neighbourhood of Udalguri, suddenly appeared with a companion, seized him, and forcibly took

\* Their agreement, similar in terms to that of the Towang Bhutias, is printed in Aitchison's Treaties, Volume I., pp. 146. The precise amount of the allowances, as given in Aitchison, differs from the figures in the text : but the point is unimportant.

from him a pony and a silver waist-belt which were in the servant's charge. Pema then returned to Kherkeria, leaving a letter with the Gelleng Raja's man, stating that he (Pema) had done this in return for the fine the Gelleng Raja had sentenced him to pay in the previous year. On the above facts being reported to the Sath Rajas, who were at the time at Udalguri, by the Gelleng Raja's servant, they at once sent 25 followers to the scene of the occurrence to search for Pema and arrest him. Mr. Driberg, the Sub-Divisional Officer at Mangaldai, immediately sent instructions to Prem Gaimbo, the Chief of the Sath Rajas, to recall his men and not to make any disturbance in British territory, and himself went promptly to Udalguri to inquire into the matter. Mr. Driberg found that Pema had retired to the hills after selling the pony for Rs. 45, and had taken the waist-belt with him. He had a long discussion with the Sath Rajas, pointing out the impropriety they had committed in sending their men to attempt the arrest of Pema in British territory, and that had Pema been reinforced from Kherkeria a serious disturbance between the Towang and Bhutan people would probably have followed, for which they would have been held responsible. Having thus convinced the Rajas of the mistake they had made in attempting to take the law into their own hands while they were guests of the British Government, and on its territory, Mr. Driberg obtained from them an ample apology, and a promise to leave the settlement of the matter in his hands. He thereupon wrote to the Radi Dumpa, the Bhutanese Raja of Kherkeria, with whom he was well acquainted, and at a meeting with him succeeded in obtaining from him not only a written apology, but also the payment of Rs. 45, the price at which Pema had sold the pony, and Rs. 55, the estimated value of the waist-belt, as well as a promise to restore the stolen belt within twenty nights and to procure the exemplary punishment of Pema. With this satisfaction Mr. Driberg expressed himself content, and, re-purchasing the stolen pony from the person to whom Pema had sold it, restored it to its owner. [The belt was subsequently recovered and restored to the Gelleng.]

## CHAPTER IV.

## THE AKAS—HAZARI-KHAWAS, AND KAPACHORS.

Eastward of the Bhutias, and between them and the Bhoroli (or more correctly the Dessera) river, live the Akas or Arkas, known among themselves as Hrusso.\* The Akas are of two clans—(1) the Hazari-Khawa, or “eaters at a thousand hearths,” and (2) the Kapachors, or “thieves who lurk amid the cotton plants.”

## Divisions and allies of the Akas.

These are a most energetic and savage tribe, who for twenty years were the pests of Char Dwār. With the aid of the Migis, a fierce and cognate race in the interior, they long defied the power of the Towang Deo in the hills. Both clans of Akas together did not, however, in 1844 number over 260 families. Of the Migis there were from three to four hundred households. The Hazari-Khawas were the only branch of this tribe to whom the Assamese conceded formally any right to share in the produce of the Dwārs. The Kapachors had no such rights, and anything that they received from the cultivators was simply extorted from their fears. To the Hazari-Khawas the Assam Government had granted the right of *posa*,

The right of *posa*.

or, as it is often rather inaccurately called, “black-mail.” The nature of this right will be easily understood from the description already given of the old revenue system of Assam in Chapter I. Certain sets of *paiks* were assigned to the hillmen, and made liable to pay to them instead of to the State their fixed annual contributions.

It is a mistake to suppose that the *posa*, which, as we shall see, was paid to most of the hill tribes bordering on the plains, was an uncertain, ill-defined exaction, depending in amount upon the rapacity of the different hordes who might descend to levy it.<sup>(1)</sup> It was really a well-ascertained revenue payment, on account of which a corresponding remission was made in the State demand upon the ryot satisfying it. It may have had its origin in encroachment, or it may have been based upon customary and primeval rights asserted by the hillmen; but it was a distinct feature in the revenue system of the country when the British annexed Assam. As stated in Chapter I it was at first the object of our local officers to maintain intact the arrangements of their Native predecessors, and to avoid the appearance of anything like radical or unexpected change; and Mr. D. Scott, the British Governor of Assam for some years after its annexation, was peculiarly cautious

\* Hoeslmeyer, *Apud Dalton in loco*. See also Asiatic Society's Journal, XXXVII—194.

(<sup>1</sup>) Revenue Proceedings, 11th August 1884, No. 5.

in dealing with the rights, fancied or real, of the hill tribes. He explicitly continued to them the right of realizing their respective shares of *posa* from the ryots direct.

According to the records of 1825, it would seem that the Hazari-Khawas were entitled to receive from each house<sup>(1)</sup> of their allotted khels "one portion of a female dress, one bundle of cotton thread, and one cotton handkerchief." At this period the Kapachors (or Koppaturas as the old records style them) were probably not looked upon as a separate clan, for we read that the Hazari-Khawas were excepted to give 'a part' of their collections to the Kapachors.

The inconvenience of permitting a horde of savages to descend annually upon the cultivated lands for the purpose of collecting petty dues from each household was very soon felt by the British Government to be unbearable. Quarrels and outrage were the natural concomitants of such a custom, and at a very early period of our management orders were given to invite the hillmen to surrender their right of direct collection for an annual lump payment in lieu. In many instances no difficulty was found in introducing this reform; in others the proposals were looked upon with suspicion. The claims of the Hazari-Khawas were at last commuted for a yearly sum of Rs. 175. This, however, they did not long continue to draw, their connection with the Kapachors having brought them into trouble with Government in 1835. For nine years after that they kept aloof from any intercourse with our officials, and it was not till 1844 that they were finally brought to terms.

The Kapachors under their leader, the Tangi or Taghi Raja, were long the terror of Durrung and the outrages of the Kapachors. of all the neighbouring clans. Although they numbered only about 50 families, they were able, from the nature of the country and their local knowledge, to defy both the Assam and British Governments for many years.<sup>(2)</sup> Shortly before the annexation the Taghi Raja murdered the Native official in charge of Char Dwár, with twenty of his immediate followers. For this the clan was outlawed, and Mr. D. Scott, the first Commissioner of Assam, forbade their entering the plains, styling them a set of lawless brigands; but they nevertheless extorted from the ryots of Burgong a contribution of cloths year by year, just as though they were legally entitled to *posa*. In 1829 they were worsted in a quarrel with their brethren, the Hazari-Khawas, and their leader fled into Assam, where he was captured and sent to Gowhatty Jail. Here he became devout, and placed himself under the ghostly teachings of a Hindu\* spiritual guide,

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\* Dalton.

(1) Political Proceedings, 5th February 1825.

(2) Political Proceedings, 13th March 1835, Nos. 7-8.

on whose security he was somewhat rashly released by the Governor General's Agent in 1832. Once free he fled to the hills, rallied his broken clan, murdered all who had been in anyway concerned in his capture, and brought his career to its<sup>(1)</sup> climacteric on the 3rd February 1835, by cutting up and burning the Assam Light Infantry outpost at Balcepara, massacring 17 souls—men, women, and children. In this outrage it was believed that the Taghi Raja had been assisted by the Hazari-Khawas, and there were good reasons for suspecting that his energy and daring had made him at this time virtual Chief of both clans of Akas, and given him influence even over the Duphlas in the neighbouring hills. At any rate the payment made by Government to the Hazari-Khawas was stopped, as already noted. For seven years after the Baleepara affair, this successful brigand haunted the border jungles, evading every effort made for his capture, and leading repeated forays into Char Dwár.<sup>(2)</sup> In December 1837 he carried off several captives, and outposts of troops had to be moved up into stockades at the very foot of the hills to protect the low country from his depredations. Again in 1838-39, and yet again in March 1841, similar raids took place, and Government was seriously contemplating an expedition in force, when suddenly either weary of a hunted life, or distrustful of his ability to face of a regular attack, he came in and surrendered. It was alleged that offers of pardon had been unauthorisedly held out to him by the "Kotokies" (an officially recognised class of interpreters and clan agents), and looking to the bad effect any ostensible breach of faith might have, the Raja was released on his binding himself by solemn oath not to injure our ryots again. He gave hostages for his good conduct, the Kotokies on this occasion becoming his formal sureties. He even agreed to live permanently on the plains, and a small allowance of Rs. 20 was settled upon him. Through his influence, the other leaders of the Akas came in and accepted stipends, at the same time binding themselves to preserve the peace of Char Dwár.

The whole amount to be disbursed to the Akas was at that time fixed at Rs. 360 per annum. The Agreements with the Akas, 1842. oaths taken by them "on the skins of a tiger and bear, on elephant's dung, and by killing a fowl," have on the whole been faithfully observed, though they have made several attempts, not always unsuccessful, to get their allowances raised. In April 1857, for instance, it was reported that they had refused to accept their stipends which had gradually been increased to a total of Rs. 668. The Taghi Raja was believed to be at the bottom of this combination, the object of which was avowedly to obtain a further increase. Government at once stopped the whole allowances pending further orders,

(1) Political Proceedings, 13th March 1835, Nos. 7-8.  
Political Proceedings, 4th May 1835, Nos. 2-3.

(2) Political Proceedings, 17th January 1838, Nos. 46-48.  
Political Proceedings, 16th January 1839, Nos. 52-53.  
Political Proceedings, 20th July 1840, Nos. 114-15.  
Political Proceedings, 19th April 1841, Nos. 80-1.  
Political Proceedings, 27th September 1841, Nos. 95-6.  
Political Proceedings, 14th February 1842, Nos. 11-12.

closed the Dwárs to trade, and kept a sharp outlook for the first indication of disturbance. These measures had the desired effect: several of the Chiefs were detached from the Taghi Raja's influence, and early in 1859 sued for pardon. In 1860 the Raja himself submitted, and as he had committed no active aggression, he was, almost too considerably, allowed to draw his former pension with all arrears.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Akas\* have given no trouble of late years, a fact which may, perhaps, be accepted as proving the success of the policy of Government in dealing with this tribe. Their frontier line was demarcated with those of the tribes west of them in 1872-73; and the Deputy Commissioner of Durrung who carried out this duty reported that both they and the other hillmen came down in considerable numbers to the plains to trade and graze cattle. To this privilege of grazing they all attach cardinal importance, and Sir G. Campbell was of opinion

\* Their agreements run as follow (Aitchison Vol. I., pp. 148-49):—

*An Agreement entered into by the TAGHI RAJA of the Aka Purbat, dated 26th  
Maug 1250 B. E.*

Although I entered into an Agreement on the 28th January 1842 A. D., that I should in no way injure the ryots in my dealings with them, and have received from the British Government, since 1842, a Pension of 20 Rupees, and traded in all the villages in Char Dwár, it being now considered that my trading in this way is oppressive to the ryots, and therefore required to be discontinued, I bind myself to confine my trade to the established market places at Lahabarree and Baleepara, and to adhere to the following terms:—

1st.—Myself, with my Tribe, will confine ourselves in our trade exclusively to the markets in Lahabarree, Baleepara, and Tezpor. We will not, as heretofore, deal with the ryots in their private houses.

2nd.—I will be careful that none of my Tribe commit any act of oppression in the British Territories.

3rd.—We will apply to the British Courts for redress in our grievances, and never take the law in our own hands.

4th.—From the date of this Agreement I bind myself to abide by the foregoing terms, on condition that the following Pensions are regularly paid:—

To Seemkolee Aka Raja	...	...	32 Rupees.
To Soomo Raja	...	...	32 "
To Nesoo Raja	...	...	26 "
Total			120 Rupees.

5th.—In the event of my infringing any of the foregoing terms, I subject myself to the loss of my Pension of 20 Rupees, and shall also forfeit the privilege of visiting the Plains.

(True Translation.)

FRANS. JENKINS,  
*Agent, Governor General.*

(<sup>1</sup>) Political Proceedings, 25th June 1857, Nos. 305-7.  
Political Proceedings, 19th May 1859, Nos. 6-7.  
Political Proceedings, June 1860, Nos. 55-56.

that, if given as a privilege and not allowed as a right, it afforded a valuable means of securing their good behaviour. The Hazari-Khawas took no objections to the boundary; and in 1873 the Government gave them a grant of 49 acres of land in the plains which much gratified them. But the Kapachors refused at first to recognise the line between the Bhoroli and Khari Dikrai rivers, and put forward extravagant claims. Their Chief, Midhi, eventually however gave in, and the line was demarcated in 1874-75: the Chief also agreeing to send two of his relations to the school at Government expense. In March 1878, Midhi's people

Later events.

gave some trouble on their annual visits to the plains, and three of them were whipped for theft. In January 1882, the forest guards reported that a large body of Kapachor Akas and Duphlas had come down and set up boundary marks in the forests at Potashali, Diyu, and Naminimukh, declaring that they would allow no one to pass those points which were all within our territory. Midhi was sent for and denied the fact; and as it was afterwards discovered that a number of

*An Agreement entered into by CHANGJOE, HAZARI KHAWA AKA RAJA, CHANG SUMLY HAZARI KHAWA, KABOOLOO HAZARI KHAWA AKA RAJA, and NIJUM KAPASORAH AKA RAJA, on the 29th Maug 1250 B. E.*

We hereby swear, according to our customs, by taking in our hands the skin of a tiger, that of a bear, and elephant's dung, and by killing a fowl, that we will never be guilty of any violence or oppression towards any of the ryots of the British Government, and that we will faithfully abide by the following terms:—

1st.—Whenever any of us come down into Char Dwár, we will report our arrival to the Patgarra, and fairly barter our goods, being guilty of no theft or fraud in any way with any of the ryots.

It shall also be our particular care that none of our people shall be guilty of any crimes in the territories of the Honourable Company.

2nd.—We also engage never to join any parties that are or may hereafter be enemies to the British Government, but pledge ourselves to oppose them in every way in our power. We will also report any intelligence we may get of any conspiracy against the British Government, and act up to any order we may receive from their authorities. Should it ever be proved that we have participated in any conspiracy, we shall have forfeited our privilege of coming into the British Territories.

3rd.—In coming into the Plains we will always appear unarmed, and confine ourselves exclusively to the haunts or market places established at Lahabarree, Baleepara, Oorung or Tezpore, and not, as heretofore, traffic with the ryots at their private dwellings; neither will we allow our people to do so.

4th.—All civil debts with the ryots shall be recovered through the Courts, as we acknowledge ourselves subservient to the British laws in their country.

5th.—I, Kapasorah Aka Raja, agree to take in lieu of the Black Mail of Char Dwár a yearly Pension of 60 Rupees; and I, Hazari Khawa Aka Raja, a Pension, in like manner, of 120 Rupees: This will be considered to deprive us of any connection with Char Dwár, and of exacting anything from the ryots. We pledge ourselves to abide strictly by the above terms, or forfeit our Pension.

(True Translation.)

FRANS. JENKINS,  
*Agent, Governor General.*



Nepalese were trying to get passes from our officers permitting them to go into the Aka hills to collect rubber, it was supposed that the movement of the tribesmen was directed against them. The passes desired by the Nepalese were refused. In this year Midhi's brother who had read at Baleepara School since 1876 suddenly left it. The cold season of 1883-84 has witnessed the first Aka raid since our early connection with the tribe and our first expedition into their hills. There seems to be little doubt that there has been some local misunderstanding in respect of forest matters.

## CHAPTER V.

## THE DUPHLA TRIBES.

Eastward of the Bhoroli river, and occupying the hills north of Naodwâr (the Nine Passes) in Durrung, and Chedwâr (the Six Passes) in Luckimpore, as far east as the upper courses of the Sundri, lie the numerous cognate tribes of Duphlas.\* Of them wrote Mohummed Kazim in the days of Aurungzeb—"The Duflehs are entirely independent of the Assam Raja, and, whenever they find an opportunity, plunder the country contiguous to their mountains."† They are, however, not so much a single tribe as a collection of petty clans independent of each other, and generally incapable of combined action. To show the extent of inter-tribal sub-division among them, Dalton notes that two hundred and thirty-eight gams or chiefs of Duphlas are in receipt of compensation for loss of *posa*, amounting altogether to only Rs. 2,543. Their form of Government is oligarchical, there being sometimes thirty or forty chiefs in a clan. The Duphlas call themselves only "Bangni," meaning "mén." The tribes on the border of Durrung are now generally called 'Paschim' or Western Duphlas; and those on the border of North Luckimpore, 'Tagin' Duphlas.

From the beginning of our occupation of Assam the Duphlas gave much trouble to the local officers, and many fruitless efforts were made to induce them to resign the right of collecting *posa* directly from the ryots. Their troublesome character. From an account bearing date the 13th May 1825 it appears that the Duphlas were entitled to receive, from every ten houses, one double cloth, one single cloth, one handkerchief, one dâo, ten head of horned cattle, and four seers of salt. The *paiks* of the 'Duphla Bohotea Khel,' or that section of the Assamese cultivators which had originally been partially assigned to the Duphlas as responsible for their dues, being subject to this heavy impost<sup>(1)</sup> paid only Rs. 3 instead of Rs. 9 per *ghôt* to Government, the balance being remitted to enable them to meet their engagements. The different clans of Duphlas did not interfere with each other on the plains. Each knew the villages to which it had to look for *posa*. But they claimed a right to collect from their allotted *paiks* wherever these might migrate, and they demanded full dues whether the *paiks* could pay or not. This exacting spirit made them very difficult to deal with. Such indeed was the dangerous character of this tribe that Government

\* A report of 1861 puts them between the Runga Nadi and Kuchoo Jan, extending over an area of 200 square miles, and numbering 8,000 souls. The figures are of little value.

† Asiatic Researches, Vol. II.

(1) Revenue Proceedings, 11th August 1834, No. 5.

did not for many years see its way to insisting upon commutation of *posa* where the clans objected to it. The Duphlas of Char Dwár in Durrung were the first to come to a settlement.<sup>(1)</sup> Early in 1835 they had raided, probably under the instigation of the Taghi Raja, and as a punishment had been forbidden to enter the plains to collect their dues. In November following, some few months after the Taghi Raja's successful raid near Baleepara, the Duphlas attacked that place and carried off several British subjects. An expedition, consisting of a small military force, was sent into the hills and rescued the captives, taking at the same time several Duphla prisoners. Of the thirteen Duphla clans north of Char Dwár, the names of which are given on the

Partial submission of the Duphlas of Char Dwár.

(a) Pykewooleah.	Salaho-oleah.
Upertowooleah.	Lamtapoo-oleah.
Upertakooleah.	Rambo-oleah.
Lamtakooleah.	Runghoo-oleah.
Rukhoowooleah.	Saroo Dhunneah.
Upertako-oleah.	Bor Dhunneah.
Lamtyooleah.	

margin, (a) eight upon this came in and submitted to Captain Matthie, the Officer in charge of Durrung. They agreed to resign the right of collecting direct from the ryots, and consented for the future to receive the articles of *posa* from the malguzar or revenue officer of the villages according to a revised tariff.

Any complaints they might have against the malguzars they promised to refer to the Magistrate.<sup>(2)</sup> They undertook not to aid the enemies of the Government, and to help to arrest offenders. One Chief was to live on the plains near the Magistrate, to be a medium of communication and represent their interests. Their *posa* was fixed at one coarse arkut sheet, one long cotton handkerchief, two seers of salt, one dào, and one goat for every ten houses. The other clans shortly afterwards made similar agreements.

The Duphlas of Naodwár were longer in coming to terms.<sup>(3)</sup>

Submission of the Naodwár Duphlas.

They did indeed in 1837 consent to receive their dues through the malguzars, but they claimed a right to two-thirds of all the revenues paid by the *paiks* of the Duphla Bohotea Khel already mentioned, who were, they insisted, their hereditary slaves. In 1838-39 they became very actively troublesome, and it was at one time thought probable that a military force would have again to be sent into the hills. The collection of *posa* was entirely stopped for a time. Somewhat unexpectedly this measure had the effect of bringing the clans to order.

It appeared<sup>(4)</sup> from facts that came to light at this time that the

Final commutation of the *posa*.

nearer Duphlas were practically subordinate to the Abor Duphlas of the higher ranges, and these remote clans, feeling the loss of the regular

(1) Political Proceedings, 20th February 1834, Nos. 23-24.

(2) Political Proceedings, 8th May 1837, Nos. 62-63.

(3) Political Proceedings, 16th January 1839, Nos. 52-53.

Political Proceedings, 30th January 1839, Nos. 1-2.

Political Proceedings, 6th March 1839, Nos. 135-136.

Political Proceedings, 13th May 1839, Nos. 10-11.

(4) Political Proceedings, 15th May 1837, Nos. 10-11.

payments, and perhaps not understanding what the borderers were haggling for, had insisted on submission being made. It was not, however, till 1852 that the *posa* was finally commuted for a money payment,<sup>(1)</sup> and then only because the Court of Directors at home insisted on this being done, if the local officers could enforce it without causing disturbances.

Up to that time the Duphlas had been a source of frequent anxiety, and military posts along the frontier had been necessary to secure its peace. From 1852, however, the Duphlas, much to the relief of the local officials and somewhat to their surprise, settled quietly down, many of them devoting their attention to agriculture and residing permanently as our subjects on the plains. The payments made to them stood as follow at the time of Mill's inspection of Assam (1853-54) :—

	Rs.	As.	P.
From Tezpur treasury to Duphlas of Char Dwār and Naodwār ...	2,494	0	0
From Luckimpore treasury to Duphlas of Char Dwār ...	1,243	14	5
Ditto ditto ditto of Banskotta ...	392	1	6

with 24 maunds of salt to the last-named in lieu of certain hāth or market dues.

The tribe remained quiet and gave no cause of anxiety up to 1870, when parties of Duphlas from the hills committed,<sup>(2)</sup> on two occasions, outrages on certain Duphla villages lying in Naodwār within the District of Durrung.

In one case their object was said to be to recover an absconding slave. This action on the part of the Hill Duphlas did not indicate any ill-feeling towards British authority, but it was nevertheless deemed necessary to visit them with some mark of displeasure.<sup>(3)</sup> Accordingly the annual allowances of all supposed to have been implicated in the transactions were withheld, and a reward was offered for the capture of the principal offender. At the same time it was pointed out to the local officers that runaway slaves ought not to be allowed to settle in villages near the frontier where their presence incited to attempts at recapture.

The secret of the other raid was not so easily found out.<sup>(4)</sup> The facts, as at last discovered, appear to have been these :—The Chief of one

A Duphla's love troubles. of our Duphla villages sought as a wife for his son the daughter of a neighbouring Chief. The proposals were accepted, and to close the transaction presents were made in Duphla fashion to the lady's relatives. Probably some wealthier suitor appeared, for very shortly afterwards the intending bridegroom was told that his alliance was not desired. To this he might have become reconciled; but to the insult was superadded material injury—his presents were not returned. He was mulcted not

(1) Judicial Proceedings, 8th April 1852, No. 171.

(2) Political Proceedings, January 1870, Nos. 1-3.

(3) Political Proceedings, February 1870, Nos. 12-21.

(4) Political Proceedings, February 1870, Nos. 12-21.  
Political Proceedings, November 1870, Nos. 3-9

only of his first betrothed, but of the means of procuring a second. He laid his wrongs before the Deputy Commissioner of Durrung, and was by that officer referred "to the civil court". The fatuity of thus treating the grievances of a Duphla savage will be evident to most minds, and drew forth eventually strong censure from Government. The Deputy Commissioner should of course have dealt with the case in his political capacity, summoning a Duphla punchayet and dispensing equal justice in a simple way. The injured man failing to get redress in the plains (for to him "the civil court" was a meaningless phrase), betook himself to the hills. His brethren there took a more practical view of the case, descended one night with swift primitive retribution on the village of the dishonest marriage-mongers, and carried off as hostages all on whom they could lay hands. The mere fact of the raid was at first all that the Government came to know. The allowances of all supposed to be concerned in it were stopped, and a reward was offered for the capture of the ringleader.<sup>(1)</sup> The Duphlas in the course of a few months settled their private quarrel: the marriage presents were returned, and the hostages restored. But when they had so settled their feud, they were astonished to find that Government, or its local representatives, were still dissatisfied and not disposed to overlook the way in which the affair had been conducted. After waiting a time they threatened that, if the allowances were not restored, they would raid upon the plains. A foolish foray made by the Deputy Commissioner into the hills in search of the proclaimed Chief still further irritated them, and at one time the political prospects were reported so doubtful that fresh stockades were established and the police guards increased. Eventually, however, amicable relations were restored. The Duphlas were not apparently at that time prepared to violate the peace they had so long to their own advantage preserved; and though the ringleader in the raid escaped capture and punishment, the tribe as a whole gave no further trouble. Instructions<sup>(2)</sup> were issued by Government which, it was hoped, would for the future lessen the chances of the occurrence of such raids.\*

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\* The following extracts from these, drafted in the characteristic style of Sir G. Campbell, may be given (Political Proceedings, June 1871, No. 28) :—

"There may be, and no doubt are, difficulties about the application of ordinary law in Assam and other districts peculiarly situated; but the Lieutenant-Governor considers that district officers should not raise and suggest difficulties. It is not for them to pick legal holes and find legal flaws, and to affect a pedantic legality. They should make the best of the situation. Some districts have been exempted from the Regulations and Acts to such a degree as to place the procedure, and even the substantive law, very much within the discretion of local officers, and to enable them to administer a broad equity; and even where the law is more defined, the combination of civil, criminal, and revenue powers in the same officer gives much opportunity for tempering a too harsh administration of any law.

"Above and beyond, or it may rather be said before law, is the legitimate influence which a good district officer may and should exercise. There are very many cases in which, by a judicious personal interference, matters may be arranged, or in which the

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(1) Political Proceedings, March 1871, Nos. 19-30.

(2) Political Proceedings, June 1871, No. 28.

The Duphlas have not yet been brought to see that they are not at liberty to attack men of their own race living within our territory.

Further raids in 1872-73.

The Administration Report of 1872-73 gives the following account of another outrage committed by them in that year, and of the views of Sir G. Campbell upon it:—

The Duphlas along the Durrung and North Lukhimpore borders had not for many years past given much trouble, though the report for 1870 described an outrage committed for private reasons by one hill Duphla upon another man of the same tribe living on the plains. Many Duphlas have settled as colonists in our territories, and a few even occasionally work on tea gardens. The tribe of Tagin Duphlas living in the hills on the borders of East Durrung and part of Lukhimpore have, however, this year placed themselves in an attitude of positive hostility to the Government, and perpetrated a raid which, though directed against Duphla colonists in the plains, and not against the Assamese, was far too serious to be overlooked. On the night of the 12th February 1872 the village of Amtolla, two miles north of the Gohpore police station of Durrung, and seven miles from the foot of the hills, was attacked by a body of two or three hundred hillmen. The village was sacked, two persons—a man and a woman—who resisted the being tied up, were murdered, and 44 persons—men, women, and children—with their property, were carried off. The villagers who were taken away were all western Duphlas (not Tagins), while a few settlers belonging to the Tagin Duphlas were left unharmed—a circumstance which tended to confirm the belief, since supported by ample evidence, that the aggressors were chiefly men of the Tagin tribe. The guard at Gohpore made an attempt to follow the raiders, but did not succeed in overtaking them. Orders were, however, sent to reinforce the district police with troops. All the Duphla passes to the east of Durrung and along the Lukhimpore frontier were blockaded, and payment of the allowances annually made to the Tagins was stopped. Spies sent into the hills traced the raiders to their homes, and by their reports and the statements of one or two captives who escaped, the position of their villages has now been pretty well ascertained. The cause assigned for the outrage is a curious one. The hillmen had, it seems, been much troubled by an epidemic, which they believed to have been imported from the plains. They called upon the Duphlas of the plains to compensate them for the loss they had sustained in children and adults from the disease; and because the Duphlas of Amtolla declined to meet their wishes, they came down to recoup themselves by seizing them all as slaves. The Tagins refuse to surrender the captives save on ransom paid, and even threaten further raids if the blockade is maintained. The blockade has of course been strictly maintained, and it is believed that this exclusion from all trade with the plains has been felt by the hillmen, though as yet they show no signs of giving in. The Lieutenant-Governor, after personal consultation with the Deputy Commissioner,

path of law (where a resort to law becomes absolutely necessary) may be smoothed over. Take the case of a run-away wife: that is, no doubt, one of the cases, perhaps the case, in which our law is least in accord with Native feeling. In such a case between our people and those beyond the frontier, the Deputy Commissioner may not only call the parties together and try to settle it, but may also, when necessary, put them in the way of the law as it were. Instead of harshly referring a foreign savage to the courts, the Deputy Commissioner might make a suit for the restitution of conjugal rights or a criminal case of adultery, or an action for breach of promise, a very simple affair for him, by making out his petition, summoning the opposite side promptly, and administering justice, which may be rapid and complete without ceasing to be legal. The Lieutenant-Governor does not think that to be within the law it is necessary to be slow, exacting, and unintelligible to simple people; on the contrary, he believes that if an officer knows how to go the right way about it, he may do much prompt and vigorous justice *within* the law, especially, as has been said above, when he combines all powers in his own person. The Lieutenant-Governor trusts that you will impress these views on the officers of your division, and try to make them act upon them in cases in which savage and simple people are concerned. There are legal difficulties enough without their being raised by the officers entrusted with the administration of frontier districts, and the Lieutenant-Governor will not permit them to raise unnecessary legalities."

Colonel Graham, has seen reason to hope that strict maintenance of the blockade during the ensuing cold weather may possibly bring them at last to terms. Precautions will be taken against any further raids; but it may be necessary to adopt more active measures of reprisal. The Duphla hills are not specially difficult of access. Elephant-hunters from Assam have been several days' march within them, going up one way and returning another. The villages where most of the captives are, are but four or five marches off, or at most perhaps seven marches. The tribes have no unity of organization; every village is separate, and if one is hostile, the next may be friendly. They have not fire arms, and for some years, as above remarked, they have not shown themselves hostile to our Government, but have yearly drawn allowances for loss of their practice of making collections from the Assamese ryots of the Dwárs or passes, and have done much profitable trade with our bazars and markets. There is reason to hope that a small expeditionary force might bring the contumacious to terms, and that the effect of such a settlement would be lasting. The Lieutenant-Governor has, however, rather shrunk from recommending a regular expedition owing to the chronic difficulty which exists in Assam in getting coolly carriage for troops. He has stated to the Government of India his belief that we ought to have for service on the North-Eastern Frontier a permanent cooly corps to be available for expeditions of this kind, which we must expect occasionally until the frontier difficulties are finally solved and the tribes come to find their interest in peace and trade. Such a corps could always be usefully employed in making roads when not required for hill service. Meantime what His Honor has proposed is that we should place on the Duphla frontier next cold season a sufficient number of troops and police to establish a rigorous blockade, and furnish, if called for, a small expeditionary force. Colonel Graham, the Deputy Commissioner, would be allowed, if he saw a good opportunity, and other means had failed, to make a dash into the hills with this force and with the elephant and local cooly carriage available. He would, while looking out for this and watching the blockade, superintend also the operations of the survey, which should carry eastward along the foot of the hills the line of demarcation successfully settled along the Kamrup frontier, so as to mark distinctly for the future the territory which we claim as ours and within which we shall refuse to permit any outrage or encroachment.

That the blockade will probably secure the surrender of the captives, we may perhaps be encouraged to hope, from the fact that another Duphla village to the north of Luckhimpore, which had carried off in similar fashion last year one or two Duphlas of the plains, has lately restored them, when it found that Government insisted on viewing such conduct as a grave offence. In this instance the local officers had, however, been fortunately able to capture one of the offenders, and held him as hostage till his village sent back the captives.

The blockade proving ineffectual, a military force was sent into the hills in 1874-75, and the release of the captives followed, no active opposition being offered by the Duphlas. Since that year the Duphlas have as a clan given no trouble. Occasional offences by individual members of the tribe have been duly dealt with as matters of police; but our relations with the Chiefs have been uniformly amicable.

## CHAPTER VI.

## THE ABORS AND MIRIS.

The Akas and Duphlas are, according to ethnologists, one in race with each other, and with the tribes of Abors\* and Miris inhabiting the hills north of Luckimpore, of whom it is next necessary to speak.

Close connection between the Abors and Miris. The information available to us does not indeed show that any social or political connection subsists now

between the Akas and the Duphlas, and until very recently there was no evidence of intercourse between the Duphlas and the Abors, their neighbours to the east. It seemed as though all along the frontier the several tribes were entirely independent of their respective neighbours on the east and west, while owning subordination to the more remote races behind and to the north of them. Even now we have very little definite knowledge of the inter-tribal relations of these sub-Himalayan highlanders: and it is as historically accurate as it is convenient to treat most of them as distinct and separate peoples. The Abors and Miris may, however, be considered an exception to this rule. Coming no doubt originally from the same habitat, they are still so alike in all material respects as to warrant us in calling them earlier and later migrations of the same tribe—the Abors as the last comers retaining more of their pristine savagery and hardihood, while the Miris have been to some extent influenced by free association with the plains and the settled habits of civilization. The intercourse between Abors and Miris is nevertheless constant and intimate.

The Miris were found in 1825, by Captain Neufville, inhabiting the plains and lower hills, along the north bank of the Brahmaputra from the Sisi District of Luckimpore as far as the Dihong river. The Abors he places further east in the hilly country between the Dihong and the Dibong, the Bor Aborst† occupying the inner and more lofty ranges.

\* The term 'Abor,' signifying barbarous and independent, is by the Assamese applied very indefinitely to all the independent tribes on both sides of the valley, but it is more especially the appellation of the great tribal section which this chapter deals. The word in Assamese is opposed to Bori, which means dependent. (*Dalton*.) According to Wilcox 'Bor' = bara, great. The Abors, however, call themselves "Padam."

† In a report by the Deputy Commissioner of Luckimpore, dated 8th October 1861, the Bor Abors are put "in the hills extending from the Sensere river to the Dihong, covering an area of 200 square miles, and numbering about 10,000 souls." The Meyongs are placed in the hilly tracts from the Dihong to the Galee Sootee, an area of 200 square miles, and their numbers at 14,000. From the Galee Sootee to the Runga Nudi are placed the other Abors and Chang Miris over an area of 600 square miles, and numbering 10,000 souls or more. This information is, however, of very doubtful value.



This division may be taken as approximately correct. To the westward of the Dihong Abor villages may be found here and there among those of the upper hill Miris. No Miri villages are, however, situated between the Dihong and the Dibong, and no Abor villages exist among the Miri settlements on the plains near Luckimpore. The Miris of the plains are here claimed by the Abors as their dependents and runaway slaves; and under the Assam Government the Miris acted, and they do now to some extent act, as the go-betweens of the Abors and the traders of Assam.

In the hills west of the Dirjmoo and to the north of the Sisi and Damaji mouzas of the Luckimpore District, Dalton places the Ghyghazi tribe of Parbatia or Hill Miris, who would seem to be in nowise subordinate to the Abors. North of Bordoloni, and on the course of the Subanshiri, he puts the Sarak Miris, and on the same river the Panibotia and Tarbatia, all branches of the Hill Miris.<sup>(1)</sup> These tribes were visited by Dalton in 1845, and a full description of their habits and village sites is given by him in his "Ethnology of Bengal". He also mentions a tribe called Anka Miris or 'Tenae' living to the north-west of the Hill Miri country on a stream which is probably an upper course of the Sundri River. These Anka Miris have never been seen on the plains.

The Abor or Padam country was visited in a friendly way in 1825-26 by Bedford and Wilcox, and by Dalton in 1855. The right bank of the Dihong was found occupied by the Pasi and Meyong Abors, the left by the Padoo, Siboo or Silook, Meybo, and Goliwar Abors. Membo was the most important of the settlements. This village was built on a range of hills rising from a small stream called the Shiku, about four miles from its confluence with the Dihong, and numbered probably over 300 houses.

The Hill Miris, commanding by their position the cultivated tracts of Bordoloni, Sisi, and Damaji, had acquired an acknowledged right to *posa* similar to that asserted by the Duphlas, Akas, and Bhutias. So far as can be gathered, the Abors, though much more powerful than any of these tribes, had no such rights. This was owing no doubt to their comparatively remote situation, cut off as they were by the great river Dihong from the cultivated country along the Brahmaputra Valley. Rights, however, they had of a somewhat different kind, which were more difficult to settle even than those arising out of the *posa*.

The Abors claimed, as I have said, an absolute sovereignty over the Miris of the plains, and an inalienable right to all the fish and gold found in the Dihong River.

Early notices of the Abors and Miris. The Miris for many years acknowledged the Abors as their masters. They were quite ready to accept their position of go-betweens of the rude hillmen and the Assamese traders. It was on the whole a profitable one, and the more so while

(1) Political Proceedings, 2nd May 1845, Nos. 145-47.

the unsettled state of Assam under its Native Government made simple agriculture a somewhat precarious pursuit. The Assamese Government also, anxious to conciliate their highland neighbours, had long since relieved these Miris of all revenue charges, acknowledging thereby the subjection of that tribe to the Abors, whose interpreters they were officially recognized to be. During the Burmese invasion, and after the British annexation of Assam, more than one community of Miris found it to their advantage to move away from the vicinity of their Abor lords, and one of the earliest notices of the Abors outside of geographical memoirs is an account of a demand made by the 'Duba' tribe of Bor Abors in February 1830, that the British authorities would send back a village of Miris who had moved away to the detriment of the Abor trade.<sup>(1)</sup> The Government of course could not coerce the Miris into returning, but it sanctioned certain expenditure by the Political Agent, with a view to induce these or kindred tribes to settle where they could minister to the wants of the Abors in the way of trade. Eventually the original Miri village returned to its old site, and the Agent induced the Bor Abors to undertake to leave them free of exaction for two years, two Chiefs of the lower Abors becoming surety for their good treatment. The Abors are curiously enough described in the correspondence as "far the best disposed of the hill tribes, though the most powerful, and never known to commit an act of unprovoked ravage or outrage on the villages of the plains."

The first impression made on the Abors by our local officers would seem to have been also favourable, for early in 1836 a body of 200 Abors<sup>(2)</sup> came down and offered to settle on the Dibong. They were willing to submit to our criminal jurisdiction, but objected to pay taxes. The local officers were afraid that they might prove dangerous neighbours, but the Governor General's Agent, viewing them as little other than Miris, a tribe which had long since proved itself amenable to order, overruled the opposition. Two years later<sup>(3)</sup> he urged upon Government, without success, the deputation of a special officer to conciliate the hill Miris and Abors. It is probable that the Abors, as a warlike race, were expected by the local officers to act as a counterpoise to the Khamptis, Singphos, and Mishmis, who at this time were giving cause for anxiety. In 1840, indeed, the Abors did take the side of Government unmistakably, when the Khamptis, in alliance with the Mishmis, were fighting against us.<sup>(4)</sup>

Besides asserting their sovereignty over the Miris, the Abors claimed, as above stated, a right to all the fish and gold found in the streams that flowed from their hills. In the islands of the Brahmaputra, and along the lower courses of its northern feeders, were numerous

Abor claims to revenue from gold-washers and fishermen.

(<sup>1</sup>) Political Proceedings, 7th May 1830, Nos. 47-48.

(<sup>2</sup>) Political Proceedings, 9th May 1836, Nos. 7-8.

(<sup>3</sup>) Political Proceedings, 23rd August 1838, Nos. 62-68.  
Political Proceedings, 29th August 1838, Nos. 90-91.

(<sup>4</sup>) Political Proceedings, 16th March 1840, No. 112.

villages of Hindu gold-washers and fishermen called Beeahs or Beheeahs, who had, perhaps, themselves originally been driven from the hills by the Abor-Miri advance. In the pursuit of their avocation these Beeahs were wont to frequent the Dihong, Dibong, and other tributaries of the Brahmaputra, and from them the Abors were always in the habit of receiving, if not regular black-mail, at least frequent conciliatory offerings and acknowledgments of superiority. The Assam Government, which derived no small portion of its revenue from the gold-dust of the rivers, had an interest in keeping stationary these Beeah settlements, even when the occupation of gold-washing became much less remunerative than it once had been. Under British rule the Beeahs became their own masters, and many of them, like the Miris, moved lower down the valley. The few who remained soon found out that the new<sup>(1)</sup> Government had different ideas on the question of protecting its subjects from those of the imbecile administration it succeeded, and they began to repudiate the claims of the Abors to restrict their movements on the Dihong and elsewhere. The Abors in revenge carried off to the hills such of the refractory Beeahs as they could lay hands upon.

Their feelings towards us do not appear to have as yet been actively hostile, for in 1847 Captain Vetch, Captain Vetch's negotiations in 1847. the Political Agent, had a most friendly conference with the Pashi, Meybo, and other Padams, who to please him voluntarily released all the captives they had taken. Negotiations for the establishment on the Dihong of a trading store under Government protection were at this time set on foot, with a fair prospect, as it seemed, of ultimate success.

Unfortunately, however, this promising commencement of intercourse was never regularly followed up, and a year or so<sup>(2)</sup> later we were brought into hostile collision with a neighbouring tribe of Dhobas or Dubba Abors lying west of the Dihong. The facts were these: Captain Vetch had gone to the hills with a small party of troops to demand the restoration of a body of Cachari gold-washers carried off by these Abors. The captives were restored, but his camp was attacked by night, and the Abors were only beaten off after hard fighting. To punish this treachery, Captain Vetch burnt their village—a step which led to the submission of the offending tribe, but which, however righteous an act in itself, tended greatly to disturb the generally harmonious relations hitherto subsisting between the Assam officials and the wild tribes in this quarter. Not that friendly intercourse<sup>(3)</sup> was openly broken off, for early in 1851 a large body of upper Abors came down and settled on the Dirjmoo, advances being made them by Government to enable them to purchase implements of husbandry. But from

(<sup>1</sup>) Political Proceedings, 24th March 1848, Nos. 199-201.

(<sup>2</sup>) Political Proceedings, 28th April 1848, Nos. 104-6.

Political Proceedings, 23rd June 1849, Nos. 23-24.

(<sup>3</sup>) Revenue Proceedings, 12th March 1851, Nos. 61-62.

this point we begin to find frequent notice of outrages committed by the Abors and of remonstrances offered by the British officials.

At the very time of the settling of the Abor village on the Dirjmoo the clans on the Further unpleasantness on the Abor Frontier.

Government now farmed out the right of gold-washing (for the vast sum of Rs. 80 per annum), it felt bound to protect the Beeahs from such encroachment<sup>(1)</sup>, and orders

were given that an escort should accompany them to the Dihong, and a guard be permanently stationed at the mouth of that river. An effort was still, however, to be made to establish an annual fair for the conciliation and profit of the Abors; and a proposal to tax the Miri<sup>(2)</sup> villages near the Dihong, north of the Brahmaputra, was negatived as being likely to annoy the paramount tribe. These measures were designed to combine the advantages of a strong and of a conciliatory policy; but they were not fully or fairly carried into action. It is doubtful whether their intention was ever properly made manifest to the tribes concerned. The guard only remained on the Dihong for one season, and the Abor trade was lost sight of amid the pressure of other more urgent matters.

In 1855 (as already noted) the village of Membo<sup>(3)</sup> was visited by Dalton, then Principal Assistant to the Governor General's Agent in Assam. An account of his expedition was published in No. XXIII of the Bengal Selections, and has been incorporated by him in his work on the Ethnology of Bengal.

In 1858 occurred the first serious Abor outrage.<sup>(4)</sup> On the 31st January of that year the civil station of Debroogurh was startled by the news that the Beeah village of Sengajan, only six miles distant from the station, though on the north of the Brahmaputra, had been cut up by Abors from the hills. Inquiry soon made it tolerably certain that the Kebang clan of Bor Meyongs were the perpetrators of this atrocity. It was designed apparently to punish the Beeahs for having some years before deserted their village, and for a recent refusal to pay the dues or tribute which the Abors demanded of them. An attempt was made to follow up the raiders to the hills, but, owing to the extremely inaccessible character of the country and various mischances, which need not be specified in detail, the troops did not succeed in overtaking the Abors or in reaching the village of Kebang. It was indeed with difficulty and with some loss of credit to those in command that they got back to Debroogurh. Emboldened by their impunity, the Kebang men took up a more advanced position threatening the plains; and it

(1) Judicial Proceedings, 30th April 1851, Nos. 166-68.

(2) Judicial Proceedings, 4th March 1852, Nos. 127-29.

(3) Judicial Proceedings, 3rd January 1856, Nos. 31-34.

(4) Judicial Proceedings, 19th August 1858, Nos. 262-84.

now became evident to Government that if it wished to prevent a state of chronic outrage along the border, a serious effort was necessary to convince the hillmen of our power to punish. An offer of the Meybo Abors to act as mediators had no practical effect. Government could only accept an unconditional submission, which the Kebang people were in no mood to offer.<sup>(1)</sup>

Preparations for an expedition into the hills upon a somewhat imposing scale were put in hand with vigour. No doubt was entertained as to the propriety of invading the Abor territory to punish the authors of a crime so flagrant as the massacre of Sengajan. The safety of our own civil stations was at stake. Indifference would, it was felt, lead only to more daring attacks.

The civil officers of Debrooghurh spared no pains to get together the information necessary to render the military operations successful; and if the results of their inquiries proved eventually of less value than was anticipated, that fact may serve as a warning and a lesson for future enterprises of the kind. While the military authorities were settling the character and strength of the force to be employed, the Deputy Commissioner of Luckimpore had, as he believed, fixed the precise *locale* of Kebang, and the best way of reaching that village. From the report of a Pashi Abor scout, it appeared that Kebang lay on the Yembopani, a tributary of the Dihong, only four and half days' direct journey from the plains. Such, however, was the difficult character of the country that it was considered better to convey the force in canoes by the route of the Dihong than to attempt the trackless hills between the Brahmaputra and the Yembopani. This determined, the Deputy Commissioner went on in advance to make arrangements for food depôts, and to conciliate, if possible, the intermediate clans. At Pashighât, opposite the junction of the Sikoo with the Dihong, deputations from the Pashi, Meybo, and Pado communities presented themselves, professing friendship and promising not to oppose the advance of troops. The Deputy Commissioner appears to have relied too confidently upon these protestations. He conversed freely about the approaching expedition, and gave, it was afterwards feared, by far too many indications of the route which it was intended to follow. By the 19th March a force of the strength shown on the margin\* had arrived at Pashi under the command of an officer of the rank of Captain.<sup>(2)</sup>

#### The expedition and its progress.

##### \* *Naval Brigade.*

- 1 European Officer.
- 15 Do. Gunners.

##### *Local Artillery.*

- 1 Native Officer.
- 15 Privates.
- 2 12-pr. howitzers, with 50 rounds per gun.

##### *Native Infantry.*

- 3 Native Officers.
- 11 Non-Commissioned Officers.
- 3 Buglers.
- 88 Sepoys, with 100 rounds each.
- 1 European medical man.

(1) Judicial Proceedings, 27th January 1859, Nos. 88-100.

(2) Judicial Proceedings, dated 19th August 1858, Nos. 262-34.

On the morning of the 20th the advance began into the Abor Hills. As far as Pangee, an Abor village fifteen miles upstream, the force proceeded in boats. The guns were for some distance carried on elephants along the bank, but the hill ranges between Pashi and Pangee proved to be so precipitous and came down so close to the river that this mode of conveyance had to be abandoned, and the guns were eventually taken on board the boats. At Pangee it was discovered by the civil officer that the coolies supplied by him at Debroogurh for carrying food had through some mistake of the military commander been discharged soon after leaving that station. He had, however, a body of 70 coolies with him, and these were pronounced sufficient for Commissariat purposes as the guns were to be left at Pangee to guard the boats, which had there to be abandoned owing to the occurrence of dangerous rapids that could not be stemmed. On the 22nd March the troops, numbering with officers 104 fighting men, broke ground at Pangee, marching by the left bank of the river over a steep hill four miles to Ruttoomi Ghât, a point above the rapids, where the river had to be crossed on rafts of bamboo. These, it was found, the Ruttoomi Abors had, as a measure of conciliation, prepared in anticipation, though not in sufficient numbers. The Ruttoomis also offered to find guides, and professed the most remarkable hatred for the Kebang Abors, the object of attack.

The Deputy Commissioner, who had accompanied the force so far, remained with a guard of 12 men at Ruttoomi Ghât, while the rest set out on the morning of the 24th for the final advance on Kebang, supposed to be only 12 or 14 miles distant. Next morning two messengers came back to Ruttoomi Ghât with a note from the Commanding Officer asking for meat and liquor for the Europeans to be sent by the bearers, and containing in a postscript the words "Rice, rice". The meat the Deputy Commissioner sent at once, while he proceeded to hurry up supplies of rice from Pangee and Pashi, at the same time sending coolies with two respectable Assamese acquainted with the Abors to ask rice from the villagers of Ruttoomi. In a few hours two of this party came running back, crying that the rest had been set upon and made prisoners by the Abors. Other signs of hostility soon manifested themselves. A party of 12 bringing up provisions was attacked between Pangee and Ruttoomi, and 7 were killed.

Meantime nothing had for two days been heard of the advance force. At last, on the morning of the 27th firing was heard, and the little column appeared on the heights under Ruttoomi hard pressed and pursued, but keeping the enemy fairly in check. The force had failed altogether to reach Kebang, though there was afterwards reason to believe that it had got within 800 yards of that village. The troops had had to fight almost every step of the way; had lost a European and three Native soldiers besides coolies, the only wonder being that the losses were so small; and had had to retire without effecting the object of the advance, owing as it seemed to the entire want of any proper arrangements for keeping up a supply of provisions from Ruttoomi

Ghât. In the end the officer in command had become distrustful of his guides, would not believe that Kebang was anywhere near, and turned back at the very moment when a little perseverance would probably have carried everything. The only excuse for his action is, that in the absence of reliable information it is very difficult on such expeditions to say how far perseverance should be carried.

The whole of the Abor villages round, seeing the discomfiture of the expedition, now made common cause against it; and without attempting to punish Ruttoomi for its treachery, the force returned as fast as possible to Pangee, Pashi, and the Brahmaputra.

The relations between the civil officer and the officer in command of the troops had unfortunately, from the outset, not been cordial, and the return of the expedition in this ignominious plight was the beginning of much recrimination, fruitless correspondence, and departmental bickering. The Government could not but hold that both parties were in fact to blame. The Deputy Commissioner had been too ready to trust to his powers of negotiation, and believed that he was in this way winning allies when he was only revealing his plans to enemies. The military commander did not see that his supplies were secure, but recklessly led his men into the hills, trusting to the civil authorities to provide all that he required. But, above all, it was clear that for an advance into a hostile territory, physically difficult and quite unknown, the detachment of troops sent was altogether inadequate, either to cover its own communications or to force its way. But for the individual bravery of those concerned—a quality which is nowhere more conspicuous than in these frontier expeditions—the troops would never have returned to tell the tale.

The Bor Meyong Abors of Kebang and other villages rendered bold by the repulse of the expedition took up a still more advanced position towards the plains, stock-

The second Abor Expedition, 1859. ading themselves at Pashi, with which village they were now in offensive and defensive alliance. After<sup>(1)</sup> much anxious consultation, it was held by the local officers and by Government that it was absolutely necessary to devise some means of punishing their insolence and protecting the district from outrage and attack. Proposals for establishing a line of posts from Sisi to Pobah Mukh were taken into consideration, but the plan which commended itself to all as politically essential was that of another expedition on such an effective scale as should infallibly command success.

Rumours that some such step was contemplated soon reached the hills, and a deputation<sup>(2)</sup> from the Meybo Abors (a neutral clan) came to the Deputy Commissioner, professing their own feelings of friendship,

(1) Judicial Proceedings, dated 25th January 1859, Nos. 88-100.

(2) Judicial Proceedings, 27th January 1859, Nos. 88-100.

Judicial Proceedings, 24th February 1859, Nos. 108-9.

and offering to become mediators with the Meyongs. They were civilly treated, but their overtures were on this occasion not entertained.

While<sup>(1)</sup> the expedition was preparing, the orders of the Secretary of State upon the former *fiasco* arrived in India. He forbade the undertaking of any second expedition, "save upon trustworthy information, and with an adequate force." This instruction was not held to interfere with the course of action already determined upon.

<i>Indian Navy Brigade.</i> 2 Buglers. 60 mon. 4 European Officers. <i>Native Artillery.</i> 3 Havildars. 2 Naiks. 1 Bugler and 50 men. 2 12-pounder howitzers. 2 4-2-5 mortars. 1 European Officer.	<i>Assam Light Infantry.</i> 6 Native Officers. 13 Havildars. 14 Naiks. 5 Buglers. 211 Sepoys. 1 European Officer. 1 European Non-Commissioned Officer.	the margin. On the 26th February 1859 it reached Pashi, where the Abors had entrenched themselves in great force. On the 27th the troops stormed the village, which was perched on a hill, and defended by eleven stockades, nine of which were obstinately held by the hillmen till they were driven from each
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successively at the point of the bayonet. The neighbouring village of Kingkong was taken in like manner. Our loss was 1 killed and 44 wounded, chiefly by poisoned arrows. After halting for a few days to show that they were complete masters of the position, the troops burnt the villages and retired leisurely to their boats.

Later in the year a strong reconnoitring party passed along the whole Abor frontier between Sisi and Lallee Soota; but no attempt at hostile demonstration was made by the tribes.

The Pashi Abors, with other clans in their neighbourhood, would seem after this to have made up their minds not<sup>(2)</sup> to provoke the Government further, for in July 1860, they came in to make formal overtures of friendship, which were of course accepted. The Meyongs still continued hostile, and towards the close of 1861 they again cut up a Beeah village, situated this time on the further or south side of the Brahmaputra 15 miles from Debroogurh. These Beeahs were part of a body of ryots who had deserted the north side of the river after the former Meyong massacre in 1858, and the present raid appears to have been designed partly to show them that they were not yet beyond the reach of their Abor lords, and partly to take vengeance for aid rendered by the Beeahs to the troops in the campaign of 1859.<sup>(3)</sup> Inquiry seemed to show that the Abors had been assisted in planning these daring attacks in the neighbourhood of a military station by information received from the

(1) Judicial Proceedings, 7th April 1859, Nos. 75-83.  
 Judicial Proceedings, 22nd September 1859, Nos. 87-89.

(2) Judicial Proceedings, August 1860, Nos. 417-19.

(3) Judicial Proceedings, January 1862, Nos. 305-8.



Miri villages lying between them and the Brahmaputra, and a proposal was brought forward by the local authorities that all the Miris on the line of the Booree Dihing should be deported far south of the Brahmaputra, in order thereby to deprive the Abors of the covert help rendered them by these allies. The Miris of this neighbourhood were however, it was admitted, by no means dangerous in themselves. They had for years been quietly cultivating the soil and paying rent to Government for their fields. Their extreme subservience to the Abors was the result not of love but fear; and Government, seeing clearly that its duty lay rather in giving them efficient protection than in punishing them for a very natural timidity, refused to move them from their village sites,<sup>(1)</sup> one reason for leaving them alone being that their labour was necessary to carry through any works of frontier defence that might be resolved upon.

The question of defending the country from further raids was then anxiously discussed. Those who best knew the frontier advocated the opening of a line of road and the establishment of fortified posts between Sisi and Lallee Soota, or along the face of the Abor tract. Others maintained that no merely defensive line of the kind would be sufficient, but that, until roads were run into the hills themselves, making the hill villages accessible at all times, no hope of security could reasonably be entertained. The occupation of the Abor hills for a whole season by a strong military force was, as a still more thorough scheme, advocated by some. A chain of forts had in fact been sanctioned by the Local Government after the first Abor massacre; but their erection was stopped on financial considerations by the Public Works Department of the Supreme Government. The present repetition of outrage had the effect of compelling the Local Government to act irrespectively of such formal sanctions. The Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, as now advised, held that he was bound either to abandon the extensive tracts in Luckimpore lately assigned to tea planters, or to give efficient protection to an industry already directly encouraged by the State. The cost of compensating the tea interests would, it was argued, to put the case on the lowest possible grounds, be more than the cost of organising a proper frontier defence. Accordingly, the local Public Works Department was ordered to complete the forts at once by convict labour. The road along the frontier to Pobah Mukh was to be opened and maintained; and a scheme was laid before the Supreme Government for "retaining by means of troops, forts, and roads, effective military command" of the whole Abor marches.

The bustle of all this preparation and defensive energy did not fail to attract the notice of the Abors, who, doubtless interpreting matters by the light of their own fears, made overtures for general reconciliation.

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(1) Judicial Proceedings, April 1862, Nos. 646-48.

The Government directed that any such advances should be favourably received, and endeavours made to bring the Chiefs to enter into a binding agreement for the preservation of order along the frontier. Small stipends were to be allowed to those who would undertake to prevent hostile aggression by their own or kindred clans, to keep up a tribal police for the prevention of marauding, and to surrender criminal refugees. An annual meeting between the civil officers of Luckimpore and the covenanting clans was suggested as an important matter to have secured. No relaxation of military preparation was permitted during the pendency of these negotiations. After what had happened in 1859, the Government could only afford to conciliate while it was materially strong. At length, in November 1862, the Deputy Commissioner met the Meyong Abor deputies in solemn conference at Lalee Mukh, and after a prolonged *palaver* extending over seven days, an agreement was concluded between the British Government and eight communities of Meyong Abors, a copy of which will be found below.\* In lieu of money stipends to Chiefs, the treaty provided for payments in kind of

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\* Whereas it is expedient to adopt measures for maintaining the integrity of the British Territory in the District of Luckimpore, Upper Assam, on the Meyong Abor Frontier, and for preserving peace and tranquillity; and whereas, by virtue of a letter, No. 11 of 11th October 1862, from the Officiating Commissioner of Assam, transmitting orders from the Government of Bengal, conveyed in a letter, No. 256T., dated the 8th August 1862, from the Officiating Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, the Deputy Commissioner of Luckimpore has been authorized to proceed in this matter, and an engagement to the following effect has been entered into with the Meyong Abors this 5th day of November A. D. 1862, at Camp Lalee Mukh :—

*First.*—Offences commenced by the Meyong Abors in a time of hostility towards the British Government, and for which the assembled heads of villages have sued for pardon, are overlooked, and peace is re-established.

*Second.*—The limit of the British Territory which extends to the foot of the hills is recognized by the Meyong Abors, who hereby engage to respect it.

*Third.*—The British Government will take up positions on the frontier in the plains, will establish stations, post guards, or construct forts, or open roads, as may be deemed expedient, and the Meyong Abors will not take umbrage at such arrangements, or have any voice in such matters.

*Fourth.*—The Meyong Abors recognize all persons residing in the plains in the vicinity of the Meyong Hills as British subjects.

*Fifth.*—The Meyong Abors engage not to molest or to cross the frontier for the purpose of molesting residents in the British Territory.

*Sixth.*—The communication across the frontier will be free both for the Meyong Abor and for any persons, British subjects, going to the Meyong villages for the purpose of trading, or other friendly dealings.

*Seventh.*—The Meyong Abors shall have access to markets and places of trade which they may think fit to resort to, and on such occasions they engage not to come armed with their spears and bows and arrows, but merely to carry their dāos.

*Eighth.*—Any Meyong Abors desiring to settle, or occupy lands, in the British Territory, engage to pay such revenue to Government as may be fixed upon by the Deputy Commissioner, the demand, in the first instance, to be light.

*Ninth.*—The Meyong Abors engage not to cultivate opium in the British Territory or to import it.

articles that could be distributed among the whole community. The democratic nature of the Abor system of government made this course advisable, and the plan has the advantage of giving each leading member of the clan a personal interest in keeping the peace. Numerous other societies of Abors have given their assent to similar engagements. Among others our old enemies of Kebang executed an agreement of this nature in 1863.

Since these forms of agreement were instituted, the Abors have given but little trouble. They are a sulky, intractable race, and it is possible that some day they may break through the restraint which self-interest at present puts upon them. But it is reasonable to hope that

Later events.

*Tenth.*—In event of any grievance arising or any dispute taking place between the Meyong Abors and British subjects, the Abors will refrain from taking the law into their own hands, but they will appeal to the Deputy Commissioner for redress, and abide by his decision.

*Eleventh.*—To enable the Meyong Abors of the eight khels or communities who submit to this engagement, to keep up a police for preventing any marauders from resorting to the plains for sinister purposes, and to enable them to take measures for arresting any offenders, the Deputy Commissioner, on behalf of the British Government, agrees that the communities referred to shall receive yearly the following articles:—

100 Iron-hoes.

30 Maunds of salt.

80 Bottles of rum.

2 Seers of Abkaree opium.

2 Maunds of tobacco.

*Twelfth.*—The articles referred to above, which will be delivered for the first year on the signing of this engagement, will hereafter be delivered from year to year to the representatives of the eight khels or communities of the Meyong Abors, as aforesaid, on their meeting the Deputy Commissioner at Lalee Mukh, or at any other convenient place on the Meyong Dwár side.

*Thirteenth.*—On the occasion of meeting the Deputy Commissioner the Meyong Abors, in earnest of their continued friendly feeling, engage to make a tribute offering of a pig and fowls, in exchange for which they will obtain usual suitable acknowledgments.

*Fourteenth.*—In event of the Meyong Abors infringing, or failing to act up to any of the provisions of this engagement, it will be considered void and will no longer have effect.

*Fifteenth.*—The original of this engagement, which is drawn up in English, will remain with the Deputy Commissioner of Luckimpore, Upper Assam, and a counterpart or copy will be furnished to the subscribing Meyong Abors.

*Sixteenth.*—In ratification of the above engagement contained in 15th paragraph, the Deputy Commissioner of Luckimpore, Assam, on behalf of the British Government, puts his hand and seal, and the recognized Headmen or Chiefs of the eight khels or communities of the Meyong Abors affix their signatures or marks this 5th day of November in A. D. 1862.

H. S. BIVAR, Major,

Deputy Commr., First Class, Luckimpore, Upper Assam,  
and Agent, Governor General, N. E. Frontier.

[Here follow signatures of 84 Chiefs on account of 8 different Khels.]

every year of quiet, every visit paid by them to the markets of Sadiya, renders this more improbable. New wants are being created and new ideas imbibed, which cannot fail to have effect. At the same time the local officers feel that they must be ever on their guard lest opportunity lead to outrage, and the fruit of years be lost in a moment of unbridled savagery. Much tact is required in dealing with them. They are in manner insolent and rude beyond all other tribes of this frontier.<sup>(1)</sup> In 1863, for example, the Meybo Abors went off in a temper from the annual meeting, refusing to take their presents, because the Deputy Commissioner would not allow them to treat him with impertinent familiarity. Again in 1865 the Meyong Abors absented themselves from the meeting, alleging as an excuse the prevalence of small-pox and cholera on the plains.<sup>(2)</sup> It transpired, however, that they were really indignant because the price of salt had risen in the Sadiya bazar, and that they had in spite eaten the agreement entered into with the Deputy Commissioner, and shown in various indescribable ways their low opinion of that officer and his superiors.<sup>(3)</sup> In 1866 they were again absent, but sent in a demand that the posts at Pobah Mukh should be abandoned. Of course this only led to the stockades being strengthened, and the Meyongs by degrees came round to a better frame of mind. The Bor Abors, a very influential clan, attended the meeting of 1866, and entered into agreements. This may have had a good effect on the rest, for there has been no open disturbance or dissatisfaction since. There is reason to believe that the Miris form very unsatisfactory agents between the local authorities and the Abors. It would be of great advantage to secure some Abor lads to educate as interpreters.

In 1876-77 the tribe showed symptoms of hostility consequent upon the advance of a Trigonometrical Survey Party into the hills, and it was thought expedient to discontinue these operations. The local authorities subsequently proposed a military demonstration along the frontier to overawe the hillmen, but this was negatived by the Government of India. The aggressive attitude taken up by the Bor Abors towards the Chulkatta Mishmis led, however, 1881 to a forward movement on our part: the fear being that if the Bor Abors were once allowed to cross the Dibong, they would establish themselves in the plains and seriously threaten Sadiya. Troops were advanced to Bomjur and Nizamghât, and the object in view was attained without opposition, the Bor Abors withdrawing to their own hills. The occupation of Nizamghât has served up to date to impose a salutary check upon the Bor Abor villages. But the Assam Report for 1881-82 contains an account of an outrage committed by Borkheng, the Chief of Pado, upon two Miris and a Native Sepoy, which had not up to the close of the year been properly explained.

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(1) Judicial Proceedings, November 1863, No. 166.

(2) Judicial Proceedings, May 1865, Nos. 119 to 121.  
Judicial Proceedings, June 1865, Nos. 72 and 73.  
Judicial Proceedings, September 1865, No. 1A.

(3) Judicial Proceedings, June 1866, Nos. C-7.

It is to be regretted that the effect of direct and unofficial intercourse with these Abor clans in their own villages has not been more thoroughly tried. They are not unamenable to kindly treatment, for in 1855-56 the Reverend Mr. Higgs, a worthy clergyman of Debroogurh, obtained a considerable influence over them, and was wont, it is said, to pay annual visits to their hamlets under the escort of their young men.<sup>(1)</sup> He also settled some Abor immigrants near Debroogurh. It would perhaps be now a desirable thing to procure and educate some Padam youths who might hereafter become missionaries of civilisation and of higher things to their uncouth brethren in the hills. The Abors, however, still want their Cleveland.

(1) Judicial Proceedings, 21st February 1856, No. 123.

## CHAPTER VII.

## THE MISHMIS.

Beyond the Abors eastward lie the various tribes of Mishmis. Roughly speaking, it may be said that the whole of the hills which close the north-east corner of the Assam Valley are occupied by these tribes. From the Dibong to the Digaru, in the ranges to the north of Sadiya, are to be found the Chulkatta or "crop-hair," the most dangerous of all the Mishmi clans, who derive their cognomen from their fashion of cutting the hair square across the forehead. From the Digaru river westward, and on both sides of the Brahmaputra, reaching up the frontier of Thibet on the north, and as far as the Nemlang river on the south, are various other sects of Mishmis known as the Tain, Mezho, and Maro clans. Dalton gives their habitat as  $96^{\circ}$  to  $97^{\circ} 30'$  E. Long.,  $27^{\circ} 40'$  to  $28^{\circ} 40'$  N. Lat. "The Mishmis to the west of the Du river, an affluent of the Brahmaputra above the Brahmaputra, trade with the British possessions, and are in the habit of constant intercourse with us;" these are the Tain or Digaru. "The tribes to the north-east of the Du trade only with Thibet;" these are the Mezho or Miza Mishmis. The Maro are those to the south of the Brahmaputra whose settlements are scattered and mixed up with Khampti\* and Singpho villages.

The first mention of the Mishmis in the Bengal records dates from<sup>(1)</sup> 1825, when Lieutenant Early visits to the Mishmi country. Burlton, in exploring the upper course of the Brahmaputra beyond the Noha Dihing, reported that the "Mishmah" Hills were occupied by tribes "who were very averse to receive strangers." In 1827 Lieutenant Wilcox succeeded in persuading the Tain Mishmis to pass him through their villages on to the country of the Mezhos. He found that there were then three Chiefs (brothers)

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\* These facts have, for the sake of convenience, been taken from "Dalton's Ethnology," but a full account of the habitat of the Mishmis, so far at least as it was known to early explorers, will be found in XXIII. of the published Selections from the Bengal Records, and in Volume XVII of the Bengal Asiatic Society's Researches. A report by the Deputy Commissioner of Lushai in 1861 places the Mezho-Mishmis in "the hilly tract east and north between the Wapah Bhoon and the Dillipani, a tributary of the Brahmaputra, over an area of 800 square miles and numbering 12,000 souls; the Digarus are put between the Dillipani and Digaru river, over 200 square miles, and numbering 6,000 souls; the Chulkattas, between the Digaru and Samserepani, over 200 square miles, and numbering 5,000 souls." This information is, however, by no means certain to be correct.

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(1) Secret Proceedings, 29th April 1825, No. 2.

ruling over the Tains, by name Krisong, Ghalum, and Khosha. Of the Mezhos, one Chief, called Euding, gave a certain amount of assistance to the travellers; but the principal Chief, Jingsha, would not receive them, and they only escaped from a treacherous attack by a hasty retreat overnight. They succeeded in penetrating "to the point where the Brahmaputra in its hill course, after flowing nearly due south from Thibet, suddenly changes its course and flows in a westerly direction."

In October 1836<sup>(1)</sup> Dr. Griffiths paid a visit to the Mishmi

Dr. Griffith's account.

Hills; he only succeeded in penetrating to the village of Ghalum on the Lohit, and though he was kindly received by the Tains, they absolutely refused to pass him on to the Mezo-Mishmi country, stating as their reason that, just before his visit, the Mezhos, aided by a force of seventy Lamas, had invaded their country and done much damage. He found that the Singphos, and especially the Duffa Gam, had considerable influence over the Tains. They were most anxious to come to Sadiya to trade. The Mezhos, Dr. Griffiths thought, to be descended from the crop-haired Mishmis of the Debong, but, like the Tains, they preserve their hair. The Tain population he estimated at 460 only in the seven villages he saw near the Lohit. Ghalum, Khosha, and Prinsong were now the principal Chiefs. With the Chulkattas it was said both the other tribes were at constant war.

In 1845 Lieutenant Rowlatt penetrated to the Du, and up that river in a northerly direction to the village of Tuppong, where he met Thibetans.\*

Early in 1848<sup>(2)</sup> Government received intelligence of the murder,

Murder of a wandering ascetic.

by Mezho Mishmis belonging to Jingsha's and other villages, of a *fakir*, Permanund Acharjya, who had tried to make his way from Assam to Thibet. Rewards were proclaimed among the neighbouring tribes for the apprehension of the murderers, and it was afterwards reported, or rumoured, that the Lamas or Thibetans had punished the guilty persons, but no reward has ever been claimed on this account.

In 1851 M. Krick, a French missionary, made his first journey into these hills under the guidance of a Khampiti Chief of Sadiya, the Choukeng Gohain. Avoiding Jingsha's village, he reached in safety the Thibetan Settlement of Oualong, where he was well received. Beyond that village, as far as Sommeu, he found extensive cultivation and a well-peopled tract along the open valley of the Upper Brahmaputra. On his return he stopped at

Murder of French missionaries by Mezho Mishmis.

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\* Dalton *in loco*. Bengal Asiatic Society's Journal, 1845.

(<sup>1</sup>) Political Proceedings, 6th March 1837, No. 67.

(<sup>2</sup>) Political Proceedings, 18th February 1848, Nos. 122-125.

Jingsha's village, where he would have fared but badly had it not been for his medical skill. In 1854 he returned to the hills with a colleague, M. Bourri, and, under the escort of the Tain Chief Khosha, was brought safely through to Thibet. He was, however, followed across the border of that territory by a Mezho Chief of the Menong clan, named Kai-ee-sha, who murdered both the missionaries and carried off their property and servant in utter disregard of the Thibetan authorities of Rima, a small post near which the travellers had encamped. The news reached Assam in November. It seemed almost hopeless to attempt to punish the murderers. But both the local officers and Government felt that, if possible, something in the way of retribution should at least be attempted. Lord Dalhousie, moreover, was not the man to trifle with such a matter. The neighbouring Mishmis, who appreciated our bazars and dreaded their closure, undertook to assist the passage of any avenging force, and their offer was accepted. In the end of February

Eden's expedition into the hills.

1855 a small party of twenty Assam Light Infantry, with forty Khampti volunteers and a few hill porters, marched from Sadiya under the command of Lieutenant Eden. For eight days this little band pressed on by forced marches, swinging across dangerous torrents on bridges of single canes, climbing for hours at a time without water and in bitter cold, till in the grey dawn of a misty morning Kai-ee-sha was surprised and captured in his village on the Du, his elder sons slain in open fight, his people dispersed, and the murdered Frenchmen to the full avenged. Such an exploit did not fail to astonish and awe the tribes around. Kai-ee-sha was hanged at Delroogurh, but not before he had in prison killed two of the guards appointed to watch him. A son of his named Krosho, who had, owing to his youth, escaped the fate of his brothers, was present, a peaceful purchaser, at the Sadiya fair of January 1871.

The Tain Mishmis are keen traders, and they appreciate so highly the advantages of our markets that Good behaviour of Tain Mishmis. they never give any trouble to the authorities of Luckimpore. That they have inter-tribal feuds with the Mezhos has been already noted; but they suffer most from the ferocity of the Chulkattas, who have also been to us most unpleasant neighbours, and to whom the narrative must now refer.

Between Sadiya and the hills inhabited by these savages, lie Troublesome character of the Chulkattas. twenty or thirty miles of dense forest through which run the paths used by the hillmen when frequenting the markets of the plains. The Chulkattas were wont to take advantage of these routes to surprise frontier villages and travellers and carry off captives. In April 1855 they took away three servants of Lieutenant Eden's. When the hue and cry was raised, the Bomju Abors sent in to offer their aid to intercept the raiders, but the message was received too late to be of



any practical good.<sup>(1)</sup> Some information was, however, at this time gathered about these Mishmis from the other tribes. There were, it appeared, at least four clans of Chulkattas known as Apelong, Ahompo, Nossa Mega, and Goroï Mechai. The offenders in the present case were Apelongs, who had acted apparently without any concert with the rest, for the Nossa Mega people as well as the Alundi section of the Tains gave information against the Apelongs, and the former eventually succeeded in recovering the captives for us. These savages thus seem to be more under the influence of inter-tribal jealousy than bound together by any common bond of union. It is right to mention, however, that some pressure was no doubt brought to bear upon the whole of the clans in this instance by our closing all the paths leading to our markets, save two adapted only to the convenience of notoriously friendly clans.

Towards the close of the same year the Apelongs made a sudden attack upon a village near Sadiya, killing two and capturing others of the inhabitants.<sup>(2)</sup> Again friendly Mishmis undertook the task of recovering the captives and, curiously enough, of punishing the aggressors. In January 1857 a third daring foray was made by the Apelongs who cut up a village within earshot of the sepoy guard at Sadiya. Fear or carelessness prevented the sepoys from making any attempt at rescue or pursuit. Measures were upon this concerted for a punitive expedition, but the Sepoy Mutiny broke out in Upper India, and all such petty matters were put on one side for a time. The last raid was instigated, it was reported, by relatives of Kai-ee-sha.

In October 1857,<sup>(2)</sup> the Chulkattas again sacked an outlying homestead, and in the month following they massacred the women and children of a village belonging to the Khampiti Chief, Choukeng Gohain, while the male inhabitants were absent with the Assistant Commissioner establishing outposts to check these very Mishmi raids. The excuse which they took the trouble to put forward for this atrocity was that some of their clan had died of cholera when visiting the Gohain. This outrage roused the spirit of the Khampiti villagers in their own defence. They armed, and shortly afterwards drove back with loss a body of Chulkattas whom they detected stealing down upon their settlements.

In 1861, and again in 1866, these Mishmis attacked Choukeng Gohain's village on the Koondil, and  
 Defence of the Khampiti villages. though beaten off with loss, yet did  
 some damage. The Khampitis had by this time received arms from

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(1) Judicial Proceedings, 10th January 1856, Nos. 244-46.  
 Judicial Proceedings, 21st February 1856, Nos. 123-25.  
 Judicial Proceedings, 17th April 1856, Nos. 158-60.

(2) Judicial Proceedings, 16th July 1857, Nos. 168-72.  
 Judicial Proceedings, 10th September 1857, Nos. 120-23.  
 Judicial Proceedings, 31st December 1857, Nos. 182-84.  
 Judicial Proceedings, 26th February 1858, Nos. 351-60.

Government, and proved as a rule quite able to defend their own. The frequency of these Chulkatta raids, which threatened the prosperity of the settlements round Sadiya, induced the local authorities to inquire whether an extension of Khampti colonies would not form a screen round that important frontier post.<sup>(1)</sup> Further supplies of arms were accordingly promised, and a monthly payment of one rupee was guaranteed to each Khampti who accepted arms and took up a site for cultivation to the north of the Brahmaputra. This frontier militia proved a success. A strong colony occupied a position towards the Dikrang, and the Chulkattas have not since attempted to give trouble.

In March 1868 Kalood, a Chulkatta Chief, came to visit the Deputy Commissioner at Luckimpore. He was taxed with the numerous raids committed by his tribe since 1841, but with cool effrontery denied them all. He<sup>(2)</sup> said that he was at feud with the Tains and his other neighbours, and was anxious to settle under our protection in the valleys of the Dikrang, Koondil, and Diphoo, two days' march from Sadiya. After some discussion he was allowed sites for his people at Habba in the Koondil Valley, where he would be fairly under supervision, and he undertook forthwith to bring down 200 houses of his clan to this place.

In February 1872 the Chulkattas visited the Sadiya fair in large numbers bringing India-rubber, wax, and skins for sale. They behaved well, but on their way home murdered a worn-out Naga slave of their own, whom they had hoped to dispose of at the fair and did not think worth taking back when they failed to sell him. The enquiries consequent upon this led to the discovery of the fact that an extensive system of slave dealing prevails among the hill tribes, in which the Singphos are understood to take an active share. The Tains (or, as they are now generally called, Digaru) and Chulkattas, have given no serious trouble of late years. Occasional offences by individual member of the clan must of course be expected; but the Chiefs as a rule do their best to maintain order and assist in the apprehension of criminals. During the cold season of 1878-79 some Mishmis of the Bibegia clan committed two small raids into the plains during the cold season, killing, in one instance, two Assamese of the village of Potia Pathar, and in the second killing two Khamptis and carrying off four others, whom they found cutting rubber in the country twenty miles beyond Sadiya. The captives were afterwards ransomed by their friends. The reason alleged for the murder of the Assamese was an old feud dating from 1865, when the Mishmis stated that some of their people had been killed by British subjects, and in the other case it was stated that the Khamptis had on some previous occasion killed some of their people;

(<sup>1</sup>) Political Proceedings, February 1866, Nos. 11-15.  
Political Proceedings, July 1866, Nos. 45-49.

(<sup>2</sup>) Political Proceedings, May 1868, Nos. 56-57.

but the Deputy Commissioner thought that plunder was quite as much the object of these outrages. The raiders were promptly pursued by the Frontier Police, with some men from the military guard at Sadiya, as far as Jerindamukh, where the dead bodies of their victims were found, but the murderers were not overtaken.

The advance of our frontier outposts to Nizamghat and Bishemnagar, and the opening of a patrol-path between them, will, it is hoped, put a stop to such marauding expeditions for the future, or at least will afford greater facilities for promptly punishing the offenders.

In 1880 Kaladoi, one of the leading Chiefs of the Chulkattas, formally professed allegiance at the Sadiya fair. Fighting between the Digarus and the Thibetans in the interior hills was reported during the cold weather of 1879-80.

## CHAPTER VIII.

## GENERAL REVIEW OF POLICY ON THE SUB-HIMALAYAN BORDER.

We have seen that as regards those tribes who had long established claims upon the plains, the policy of Government has been one of fair and equitable dealing. While maintaining a force strong enough to punish any wanton aggression, it has refrained from creating unnecessary foes, and has scrupulously made good to the hillmen all that they appeared fairly entitled to claim. We have, however, made them clearly to know that the payment of their dues is contingent on their good behaviour, and that the strong arm of British power is for ever interposed between them and the ryots they once oppressed. At the same time we have welcomed them as cultivators in the plains, and we have seen whole communities of border bandits settle down into peaceful tillers of the soil. Not a trace of a policy of "extermination and repression"\* can be found by any one who takes the trouble to enquire into the facts. The sound sense on which these arrangements are based is stamped, moreover, with the seal of success. Kamroop and Durrung for long years were as undisturbed as the 24-Pergunnahs. It is true that while these pages are passing through the press the Akas have, after nearly half a century of good behaviour, broken out into open hostilities, but it will probably be found that for this there has been some special irritant cause which might with care have been avoided. Sir George Campbell's wise instructions may perhaps have been forgotten. Both Akas and Duphlas may generally be trusted to behave properly, so long as their *pasa* is paid and they are not unduly interfered with by Forest regulations. Nor is the case much altered when we come to the wilder tribes living near Luckhimpore. Even as regards the Abors, a fierce and uncouth race with whom we have been brought into sharp conflict, there is little to criticise in the policy pursued. It is the work of time to make such savages understand a policy of conciliation, and the time has hitherto been short. In dealing with them the first necessity is to ensure that they should not despise us. Hence the punishment for any outrage must be, and usually has been, summary and severe. But our aim as a whole has been conciliatory. Some are disposed to scoff at the concomitants of this policy, and to deride the Government for endeavouring to conceal what these critics call a weak system of bribery under the name and pretence of payments for police service. Now, it

\* The general charges of this character which unfortunately found eloquent expression in the Political Dissertation, prefixed to Hunter's Comparative Dictionary of Non-Aryan Languages, were officially refuted by the Government of Bengal in 1869.

will be remembered that the payments to the Abors at any rate are not money payments to the Chiefs, but payments in kind to the whole community. Where the constitution of a tribe is patriarchal or aristocratic, payments to the Chiefs suffice. There is no difference in principle, but the variation in the expression shows what the principle really is. It may be, and no doubt is, true that with the sums or for the sums so paid no organized Police Establishment is kept up by the Abors. It was never expected that they would appoint constables in red turbans and locate them in well found station-houses. It was simply intended that they would adopt their own rude means of securing a quiet frontier, and would take such steps as were in their judgment necessary, and in accordance with their tribal organization, to prevent the evil disposed among them from doing any act which, in conformity with the understanding under which the payment is made, they are bound to prevent. As a matter of fact, we have evidence from the mouths of the Abors themselves that the desired effect was produced in the very first year of the agreements, and an attack on Sadiya proposed by some tribes was prevented by the rest. The following passages from a Bengal Report shew how the policy of thus dealing with these tribes was explained by Government in 1865 :

"The essential difference between 'black mail' and the annual allowances paid to the Abors is this : that in the one case the forbearance of the savage tribe is made by them conditional on payment of the stipulated allowance, and in the other the payment of the allowance is made by us conditional on the good conduct of the tribe. The one is initiated in an aggressive spirit, the other in a spirit of conciliation.

"It is an arrangement of this kind which was made in the last century with the aborigines of the Rajmehal Hills, who had previously been the terror of the surrounding country, whom successive military expeditions had failed to subdue, but who, under the operation of an annual payment conditional on good conduct, have remained perfectly quiet and peaceable ever since. It is true that the amount of the allowance paid to the Rajmehal Hill Chiefs is considerably greater than the value of the presents made to the Abors, but the principle is the same and is as certain to be efficacious in one case as it is in the other, provided the allowance be sufficient to compensate the tribe in their own estimation for the advantage they might gain by the occasional plunder of a border village—an advantage which they well know is materially qualified by the risk of reprisals.

"It is very desirable that the younger men of the tribe should be induced, if possible, to take service in the police, and that the hill tribes generally should be employed in this manner, for after a certain degree of training and education, not only are they by their physique better qualified than the people of the plains for most of the duties required of the police in frontier districts, but their employment sets free the labour of others accustomed to industrial occupations.

"What is of the utmost importance in dealing with uncivilized tribes is patience. No one supposes that their civilization is to be

effected in a few years, and no one expects that in endeavouring to conciliate them the Government will not meet with occasional disappointment, but the policy is none the less on this account sound and intelligible."

With the majority of the Mishmi tribes we have had none but casual trading intercourse. They are too remote to interest us directly, and they do not in any way molest us. The Chulkattas have of late years been coming down more freely to the Sadiya markets, and seem disposed to maintain more friendly relations. They still require, however, to be very closely watched.

It is not open to us on the Abor frontier to have recourse to the policy of permanent occupation and direct management, which we shall find successfully carried out in the Naga, Garrow, Cossyah, Jynteeah, and Chittagong Hill Tracts. To annex the Abor Hills would only bring us into contact with tribes still wilder and less known, nor should we find a resting place for the foot of annexation till we planted it on the plateau of High Asia; perhaps not even then.

Our immediate border we might do much to secure by running roads along the river lines into the interior, but the cost would be enormous, and while there is such a demand for communications within our settled districts, we should not be warranted in carrying even one such *cul-de-sac* into the Abor or Mishmi Hills.

I have said enough to show that on this frontier the policy has been from the beginning not a policy of coercion and "contemptuous devastation," as it has sometimes been erroneously described, but a firm and kindly policy of defence and conciliation.

In 1872-73 the Statute 32 and 33 Vic , Cap. 3, which gives a power	of summary legislation for backward
The Inner Line Regulation.	tracts to the Executive Government
	was extended to Assam.

The first use of the power of summary legislation given by that Act was to pass a regulation for the frontier districts

It had been found that there was pressing necessity of bringing under more stringent control the commercial relations of our own subjects with the frontier tribes living on the borders of our jurisdiction. In Luckimpore specially, the operations of speculators in caoutchouc had led to serious complications, not only interfering with the revenue derived by Government from the India-rubber forests in the plains beyond the line of our settled mehals, but threatening disturbances with the hill tribes beyond. The spread of tea gardens outside our fiscal limits had already involved the Government in many difficult questions with the hillmen, and on the whole the Government came to the conclusion that it was necessary to take special powers and lay down special rules.

Accordingly a regulation was drawn up by the Lieutenant-Governor, and approved by the Governor General in Council, to give effect to this policy. This regulation gives power to the Lieutenant-Governor to

prescribe a line, to be called "the inner line," in each or any of the districts affected, beyond which no British subject of certain classes or foreign residents can pass without a license. The pass or license, when given, may be subject to such conditions as may appear necessary. And rules are laid down regarding trade, the possession of land beyond the line, and other matters, which give the executive Government an effective control. The regulation also provides for the preservation of elephants, and authorizes Government to lay down rules for their capture.

## CHAPTER IX.

## THE KHAMPTI CLANS OF SADIYA.

Mention has been already made of the Khamptis of Sadiya, and although in Assam not strictly a hill tribe, they may fairly claim a more detailed notice on account of the important part they have played in frontier history. The Khamptis were originally immigrants from Bor-Khampti, the mountainous region which interposes between the eastern extremity of Assam and the valley of the Irrawaddy. They are of Shan descent and adhere to the Buddhist religion.\* When they first came to Assam they settled on the Tengapani, but in 1794, during the troubled reign of Gour Sing, probably in consequence of pressure from the then invading Singphos, they crossed the Brahmaputra, ousted the Khawa Gohain, or Assamese Governor, of Sadiya, the Khampti Chief usurping his titles and dignity, and reduced the Assamese ryots to a position of subservience if not of actual slavery. The Gowhatty Government was compelled to acquiesce in the arrangement, and, after the annexation, the British Government found the Sadiya tract entirely under Khampti management.

Mr. Scott, the Governor General's Agent, recognized the Khampti Chief "Chousalan Sadiya Khawa Gohain" as the local officer of the Assam Government, permitted him to collect the poll tax of the Assamese of the district, and entered into arrangements under which the Khawa Gohain, instead of himself paying taxes, undertook to maintain a contingent of 200 men, to be armed by the British Government. In 1824 the Khamptis rendered such material aid in the campaign against the Singphos, that Mr. Scott was led to urge upon Government that in any arrangement made for handing over Upper Assam to a Native prince, the country inhabited by the Khamptis should, with that of the Muttucks, be kept apart.

The relations which subsisted between the Sadiya Khamptis and their brethren in Bor-Khampti led, however, at times to much uneasiness and doubts as to the loyalty of the former. In 1830, for instance, a body of Singphos and Bor-Khamptis invaded the tract south of the Brahmaputra, but were dispersed by troops under Captain Neufville.<sup>(1)</sup>

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\* Pemberton, page 70. See accounts of visits to Bor-Khampti by Wilson and Burlton in XXIII. of the Bengal Selections. See also Dalton *in loco*.

(1) Political Proceedings, dated 7th May 1830, Nos. 7-8.



The current rumour in Assam at the time was that the Khawa Gohain was in league with these, though the local officers discredited the report. It certainly appeared to be the interest of that Chief to cultivate our friendship, but it is impossible to trust absolutely to a *priori* argument of that kind where semi-savages are concerned.

In May 1835, a fresh immigration of 230 Moonglary Khamptis took place. They came wishing to settle under the British Government, and asking for arms and exemption from taxes for 10 years. They were refused fire-arms, but were told that they would be allowed to live free from all dues for three years. The Government seems at this period to have been much impressed with the advisability of inducing colonists to take up land at the head of the Assam Valley, provided that their doing so did not interfere with the area reserved for tea cultivation.<sup>(1)</sup> What was wanted was a cheap and effective barrier against future invasion from Burma, the dread of which long continued to trouble the Government and explains much of the policy in regard to Upper Assam, Manipur, and this frontier generally.

It was unfortunate that just about this time the arrogance of Chowrangfat Sadiya Khawa Gohain (the son of the man we had found in office, who died early in 1835) compelled the Government to remove the Khamptis from the position of pre-eminence which they had hitherto occupied, and which had doubtless acted as an attraction to their tribe in Bor-Khampti. A dispute had arisen between the Khawa Gohain and the Bor Senapati, or Chief of the Muttucks, in regard to a tract of land called Chukowa, on the south of the Brahmaputra. The British officer in charge of Sadiya, to prevent collision, attached the land, and ordered both parties to refer their claims for his consideration. The Khawa Gohain in defiance of this order took forcible possession, and treated all remonstrances with open contempt. The Governor General's Agent was compelled, in vindication of his authority, to order first the suspension, and thereafter the removal of the Khampti Chief from the post of Khawa Gohain, which had indeed come to be looked upon by his tribe less as a dignity conferred or ratified by our Government, than as an inherent attribute of their Chief as a tributary power. If any proper control was to be maintained over the Sadiya tribes, the authority of Government certainly needed at this time to be re-asserted. The Khawa Gohain was therefore removed to a station down the river out of the reach of temptation to intrigue, and his post was abolished, the duties being made over to the British officer stationed at Sadiya in charge of the troops, who was to collect the capitation tax from those cultivators who paid it, and to administer justice to the Assamese either directly or by a punchayet. As regards internal management, the Singphos and Khamptis were left to their own Chiefs.

(<sup>1</sup>) Political Proceedings, dated 1st June 1835, Nos. 4-5.

No change was made in their relations to Government, and no taxation was in fact ever imposed on them. The British officer in charge was, as far as they were concerned, left to interpose or mediate only in serious cases or where members of different tribes were parties to the dispute.<sup>(1)</sup>

At first the minor Khampti Chiefs seemed satisfied with these arrangements. They did certainly good service immediately afterwards

The Khampti insurrection.

against the Singphos—so good indeed that the Government rather rashly rewarded them by permitting the ex-Khawa Gohain to return to Sadiya in a private capacity to live among them.<sup>(2)</sup> They were not, however, really content. They had lost their profitable position of control over the Assamese. Their slaves had been released. They knew that proposals for bringing them under regular assessment had been more than once mooted.<sup>(3)</sup> Many incentives to revolt were secretly rankling in their minds. In 1837, the local officers were warned that the ex-Khawa Gohain was intriguing to form a combination of tribes to attack Sadiya, but no tangible proof was obtained, and the warning was disregarded.<sup>(4)</sup>

At length in January 1839, the long meditated plot developed itself in action.<sup>(5)</sup> On the evening of the 19th of January, Colonel White, the officer in command at Sadiya, had held a durbar at which the Khampti Chiefs attended, to all appearances as friendly and loyal as they had hitherto outwardly shown themselves. That very night, a body of 500 Khamptis under their Sadiya Chiefs advanced upon the post from four different directions, surprised the sentries, and made for Colonel White's quarters and the sepoy lines, firing the station as they rushed through. The surprise was complete, and their enterprise was fatally successful. Colonel White was butchered, eighty others were killed or wounded, and all the lines but two were burnt to the ground.

Had the Khampti Chiefs now shown resolution equal to their skill in combination, they might have done serious damage to our position on this frontier. As it was, their hearts failed them after the capture of Sadiya. They retreated with all their adherents without waiting for attack, and deserting their villages took refuge with their leaders, the Tao and Captain Gohains, among the Dibong Mishmis. A rising among the Khamptis south of the Brahmaputra was

(1) Political Proceedings, dated 13th March 1835, Nos. 1-8.

(2) Political Proceedings, dated 24th November 1835, No. 11.

(3) Political Proceedings, dated 9th February 1836, Nos. 2-3.

(4) Political Proceedings, dated 15th May 1837, No. 12.

(5) Political Proceedings, dated 20th February 1839, Nos. 105-10.

Political Proceedings, dated 27th February 1839, Nos. 159-63.

Political Proceedings, dated 6th March 1839, Nos. 119-23.

Political Proceedings, dated 20th March 1839, Nos. 31-32.

Political Proceedings, dated 3rd April 1839, Nos. 116-18.

Political Proceedings, dated 10th April 1839, Nos. 160-61.

Political Proceedings, dated 10th July 1839, Nos. 61-62.

put down by the troops. The Singphos, Muttucks, and Abors at once offered their aid in punishing the insurgents. The Khamptis had no friends among those they had so long oppressed. Treachery too was soon at work in their ranks. One Chief, the Chouking Gohain, came in and surrendered, and then led a party of troops into the hills who drove the Tao and his followers from their Mishmi refuge. This defeat of the rebels set free a number of Mooluck Khamptis, 200 in all, who had been compelled by the Tao to follow him into the hills after he had murdered their Chief for refusing to join in the attack on Sadiya. Soon after, about 900 Khamptis laid down their arms and were removed from Sadiya to sites in Luckimpore lower down the river.<sup>(1)</sup> In the cold weather of 1839-40 a second and a third expedition into the Mishmi hills again and again dispersed those who still remained in arms. But it was not till December 1843 that the remnant came in and submitted. These were settled above Sadiya to form a screen between the Assamese and the Mishmis.

(2) In 1844 the position of the Khamptis in Assam was this: one body had been settled at Choonpoorah above Sadiya under the Captain Gohain, cousin of the late Khawa Gohain. The few Moonglair

Dispersion of the Khampti Settlement. Khamptis formerly on the Tengapani were located near Saikwa to the south of the Brahmaputra. A third party under Chowtang Gohain were settled at Damadji, while a fourth was placed under Bhodia, son of the late Khawa Gohain, to the west of Luckimpore. By this dispersion they were effectually prevented from doing any further mischief. They ceased from that time to be of any political importance.\*

\* All the information that the Deputy Commissioner of Luckimpore could give regarding them in 1871 is contained in the following extract from a report of his dated 9th May of that year:—

8. <i>The Khamptis</i> .—In the year 1839,		owing to their misbehaviour, the Khamptis were removed from the villages of Tengapani, Makoo Derack, and Sadiya, where they had till then resided, and were sent to Narsinpore in North Luckimpore, Maijain, and Debroogurh. Since then persons have come down from time to time from the Bor-Khampti country and settled in the villages or settlements marginally given.
<i>On the north bank of Brahmaputra.</i>	<i>On the south bank of Brahmaputra.</i>	
Narsinpore.	Bogyarah.	The population of these settlements is estimated to be 3,930 souls, of which 1,970 are estimated to be male, 930 female adults, and 1,130 children of both sexes. Besides,
Bangfang.	Sessee.	
Dikroong.	Mankatta.	
Dhamsa.	Choykhawah.	
Sadiya.	Derack.	
	Makoom.	
	Joypora.	
	Nidopani.	
	Tengapani.	
	Dehing.	
	Morowapani.	
	Kopahatoli.	

there are four khels known as Monglong, Panangpan, Chiamangthee, and Manoho, who live with the Singphos, and have the same relations with Government as the Singphos. They number, it is estimated, 400 souls, 130 being male and 150 female adults, and 120 children of both sexes.

The Khamptis have also taken to agricultural pursuits to some little extent. The settlers at Sadiya, Derack, Nidopani, Tengapani, Dehing, Morowapani, and Kopahatoli do not pay any revenue, the rest pay revenue, and are much on the same footing as the other ryots of the plains.

(1) Political Proceedi. 24, dated 26th December 1839, No. 67.

(2) Political Proceedings, dated 20th January 1844, No. 61.

## CHAPTER X.

## THE SINGPHOS OF SADIYA.

Of the Singphos we possess an admirable account from the pen of Colonel Hannay, whose knowledge of the North-Eastern Frontier and of Burma was singularly extensive. In giving a general summary of the origin of this people, I cannot do better than follow him, turning to the records for their later history. He considers the Singphos to be identical in race with the Kakus or Kakhyens of Burma, whose chief habitat was on the great eastern branch of the Irrawaddy. They extended nearly as far south as N. lat.  $24^{\circ}$ , while touching on the north and east the borders of China in lat.  $27^{\circ} 30'$ . With the break-up of the Northern Shan kingdom, the Kakhyens entered on a career of aggression and conquest, which practically placed in their hands the whole country lying between Upper Assam and Bhamo.

Such is the account of the origin of this people put forward by the best critics; but the Singphos\* of Assam will by no means allow themselves to be classed as Kakus or Kakhyens, though they do in fact call their eastern and southern brethren by that name, and maintain the same family titles and divisions of clans as prevail among the more remote tribes. The following are the designations of the principal clans:—(1) Tesan, (2) Mirip, (3) Lophæ, (4) Lutong, and (5) Mayrung. Each clan has a Kaku and a Singpho branch. Besides these there is a clan of Lattora Kakus called Lessoo, on the east of Assam, who originally came direct from the Chinese frontier.

The different members and branches of Singpho<sup>(1)</sup> clans and families are thus distinguished:—*Gam* is the affix indicating the elder branch or member of a family; *Noung*, the second; † *La*, the third; *Thu*, the fourth; *Tung*, the fifth, &c. We have thus Beesa Gam, the head of that clan; Ningroo La, the third branch of the Ningroo family; and so on. In Assam (with the exception of the Pisi Gam, Kudjoo, and Jagoon, who appear to be distinct families, and Tang Jang Tung of the Mayrung clan), the whole of the resident Singphos are of the Tesan division. They are sub-divided into three clans, called Tenghai,

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\* Singpho is merely the Kakhyen for 'man.'

† Dalton errs apparently in making *La* = the second.

(1) Political Proceedings, dated 12th June 1837, No. 64.

General Proceedings, dated 29th March 1848, No. 25, and 19th July 1848, No. 29.

Mayho, and Nimbrong, and including the elder branch, comprise the following heads of families :—

1	2	3	4
Tenghai.	Mayho.	Nimbrong.	(Elder branch in
Shiro.	Gakhen.	Beesa.	Hookong, from
Ningcoop.	Latao.		whom the others
Poongeen.	Ningroo.		separated years
Kumchang.	Seeong.		ago.)
Tsanla.	Tsoopkonk.		Imbon.
Kottah.	Duffa.		Undooptun Sah.
Kenah.			Laloung.

The first appearance of the Singphos in Assam was during the troubles following on the Moamariah rebellion in the reign of Gourinath Sing. They drove out the Khamptis from the lowlands under the Patkoi hills, and settled themselves on the Tengapani east of Sadiya, and on the Upper Booree Dehing, in the tract called Namrup. At first they were welcomed as deliverers by the Assamese peasantry, and, under their Chief Gakhen Thu, restored order to the country devastated by the Moamariahs. But when the Burmese invaded the province in 1817, an era of plunder and misrule supervened, and every petty Chief, who could get together a following, pillaged the Assamese on his own account. Thousands of Assamese cultivators were carried off as slaves; and the whole of East Assam was well nigh depopulated.

There are, as has been already stated, no full and authentic accounts of this troublous period in the later history of Assam, and if this is true even of the lower and more civilised portions of the province, it cannot be expected that there should be found in the records of Government any information of value regarding the remote and savage frontier of Sadiya. The first notice of the Singphos as yet brought to light in our records dates only from 1825, when it would appear that a fresh incursion of the tribe from beyond the Patkoi drew the attention of the British Government to the fact of their existence. The Burmese had but lately been expelled from Assam. The Khamp-tis were still in charge of Sadiya. The Government had not made up its mind as to its future policy in Assam. It was unwilling to undertake the defence of a tract so remote as Sadiya. It shrank from interfering with tribes so uncouth as those of the Patkoi and sub-Himalayan ranges.

At this crisis the Singpho bands, numbering in all about 7,500 men—as frontier rumour reckoned them—shut up the Sadiya Khawa Gohain within his stockades, and attacked the Bor Senapati in his own territory. The Khamptis called in the Abors to their aid, and both

Khamptis and Moamariahs sent praying for British assistance, recognizing thereby the position of Government at that time as arbiter of the destinies of Assam. Assistance was given for defensive purposes only, strict injunctions being laid down that no advance was to be made into the country undeniably held by the Singphos, and that no offensive operations should be attempted against that tribe.

The Singphos seem early to have conceived a respect for the British arms. Very shortly after the issue of the orders above described, they made advances to our local officers, and negotiations were entered upon with the view of inducing them to surrender their Assamese captives, and refrain from plundering the Sadiya villages. Enquiries were also instituted as to whether they would undertake to hold the passes of the Patkoi against the Burmese. The character of their tribal organization, not perhaps at that time fully understood, rendered the ultimate success of any such negotiations very uncertain. They were not ordinarily, or save for combined aggression, a united tribe, but an aggregation of independent petty cantons each under its own Chief, and each jealous of the other, and quite ready to attack its neighbour, if need were or interest prompted. Hence it was almost impossible to deal with them as a whole, though it was by no means difficult to attach temporarily to our interests any individual Chief who thought he saw some advantage to be gained therefrom. They seem to have had serious fears lest the British should proceed to expel them as they had driven out the Burmese. Considerable tracts of land had been occupied by them and were cultivated by slave labour. These they were anxious to retain. They also hoped, it was found, that by being on good terms with the British they would be protected from the Burmese—an expectation which, when known, rendered somewhat futile the proposal that they should themselves shield Assam from the incursions of that power. The main difficulty, however, which lay in the way of a permanent understanding with the Singphos was the uncompromising attitude taken up by Government with regard to the retention by them of captives and plunder.

Early in 1825 the four chief cantons under Luttora Gam, Lattao Gam, Beesa Gam, and Duffa Gam, made definite advances, and were assured of the quiet possession of their lands if they would only restore their Assamese slaves and give up their Assamese booty. We had good reason at this time to encourage their overtures, for the Burmese were expected daily to show themselves on the Patkoi, and early news of their advance could come to us only through the Singphos.<sup>(1)</sup> No pains were, however, taken to protect

Submission of four Chiefs—Burmese Invasion.

(1) Secret Proceedings, 10th June 1825, Nos. 21-28.  
Secret Proceedings, 2nd Sept. 1825, Nos. 16-24.  
Secret Proceedings, 23rd Sept. 1825, Nos. 8-11.  
Secret Proceedings, 30th Sept. 1825, No 14.

them from the invaders, and accordingly they with prudent alacrity made over their stockades to the Burmese forces, when these did appear, and professed to their new allies the most perfect contempt for the far away English at Sadiya, though they sent at the same time messages to us expressive of their anxiety to be rid of the Burmese. In June Captain Neufville advanced up the Noa Dehing, and by a series of gallant as-

#### Neufville's Expedition.

saults expelled the Burmese from the villages of the Beesa and Duffa Gams, and eventually from the plains altogether. The Singpho Chiefs, doubtful of our intentions, having been unable to resist the temptation of taking an active share in the fighting, and unfortunately for them on the wrong side, fled to the hills. Their villages were therefore destroyed, and 3,000 Assamese captives restored to freedom. Captain Neufville after this set himself to pacify the whole low country round Sadiya. But first he summoned the Bor Senapati, the Khamptis, and the Miris, to aid him in making a progress through the other Singpho villages, in order to release all the Assamese slaves that yet remained there. He was only partially successful. The Singphos of that day did no manual labour, and as their very subsistence depended on their slaves, they made (even the most friendly of them) strenuous exertions to conceal these useful chattels. His operations resulted, however, in the surrender of the Beesa Gam and other Chiefs (September 1825). The Beesa Gam was permitted to move the site of his village from the pass on the Noa Dehing, hitherto occupied by him, to a more accessible place near Borhath, on the Booree Dehing.

In June 1826 Mr. Scott, the Governor General's Agent, visited

#### Submission of the Singphos.

Sadiya, when sixteen out of twenty-eight Singpho Chiefs entered into engagements with the British Government, agreeing to give up captives and assist the British troops in case of future need, and promising to refer disputes to the arbitrament of the local officers. Hostages were given for the due fulfilment of these engagements.

Altogether Captain Neufville had released 6,000 captives. The loss of this wealth was severely felt by the Singphos; and to give them some equivalent, Mr. Scott proposed to create a trade between Assam and the Upper Irrawaddy, which should pass through their hands. It was settled that the Beesa Gam should have a general control over the rest of the tribe who had submitted, and that the twelve Chiefs who still held out should be warned that if they did not come in within two months they would not be allowed to settle in Assam. It does not appear that the idea of opening up a trade across the Patkoi ever came to anything, or indeed that any active steps were ever taken to develop it. Mr. Scott's hands were full, and his letters everywhere teem with large ideas and proposals that he could never himself have hoped to carry out, but which testify to the genius of the man, and have lain many of them in obscurity from that day to this.<sup>(1)</sup> Four

(1) Political Proceedings, 14th May 1830, Nos. 29-30.

years later, in 1830, an attempt was indeed made to create a trade at Sadiya itself, by the opening of a Government depôt, and a Mr. Bruce was appointed to the charge of it on a salary of Rs. 100 monthly with a share in the profits. The idea was a good one, and, if properly developed, might have had a very marked effect upon our relations with savage tribes all round the frontier. How long the experiment was persevered in it is impossible to say. Like many other points of interest in the older records, it drops out of sight.

The refugee Singphos were in no hurry to come in and respond to our overtures. Perhaps the policy adopted of treating the Beesa Gam as paramount Chief of the tribe tended of itself to keep away the Duffa Gam, <sup>(1)</sup> his life-long rival, who took advantage of the disturbed state of the frontier to carry on a continued series of raids out of Burma on the Beesa Gam and his dependent villages. The Duffa Gam indeed seems to have had his hand against every man, for we read of his siding with the Shans against the Burmese, a confederacy which the British officer at Sadiya was at one time invited to join.

In February 1830 the Agent reported the prevalence of rumours that the Khamptis and Singphos would unite with their brethren beyond the frontier to expel us from Sadiya. <sup>(2)</sup> Nor were the rumours without some basis; for before the month was out, the Beesa Gam reported that large bodies of Singphos and Khamptis had crossed the Booree Dehing and invaded the plains. They made the village of Luttora Gam on the Tengapani their head-quarters, and presently set out on rafts down that river for Sadiya. Captain Neufville attacked and dispersed them, and afterwards drove them out of Luttora back to the Bor Khampti Hills. Rumours were current that the invaders had been called in by the Sadiya Khawa Gohain; <sup>(3)</sup> but Captain Neufville attached no importance to this, holding that such treachery was opposed to that Chief's interests—an argument by no means in itself conclusive, looking to the history of this frontier. Be that as it may, certain members of his family who rendered very efficient aid were rewarded by grants of land, and his own conduct was highly spoken of in the despatches. The Beesa Gam had throughout these operations shown himself loyal to his engagements.

In 1831 rumours were again afloat <sup>(4)</sup> that a large Burmese force was about to invade Assam, and every arrangement was made for

(<sup>1</sup>) Secret Proceedings, 10th November 1826, Nos. 20-21.  
Political Proceedings, 13th December 1833, Nos. 85-93.  
Political Proceedings, 26th February 1834, Nos. 23-24.

(<sup>2</sup>) Secret Proceedings, 5th March 1830, No. 8.  
Secret Proceedings, 12th March 1830, No. 34; 16th April 1830, Nos. 6-10.

(<sup>3</sup>) Political Proceedings, 7th May 1830, Nos. 7-8.

(<sup>4</sup>) Political Proceedings, 18th February 1831, Nos. 28-32, and 18th March 1831, No. 4.



repelling such an attack, even to calling on Gumbhir Sing, the Raja of Manipur, to hold his levy in readiness to march across the hills.

Mr. Scott at this time submitted an elaborate report on the

Discussions of Assam Policy.

Government of Assam, advocating, as he had done before, the establish-

ment of a Native Government in Central Assam as the best means of providing employment for the nobles and contenting the people<sup>(1)</sup> He also proposed to concentrate the friendly Singphos in one settlement near Borhath, and to compel all the rest to leave the country. Government was, however, very unwilling to retain the Sadiya tract in its own hands if a Native Government was to hold Central Assam; and it was even debated whether it would not be wise policy to ask Manipur to extend its dominion so as to take in all that frontier. The difficulties involved in any settlement of this matter of a Native raj in Central Assam were so great, that the question was again and again re-opened, only to be set aside for future consideration.<sup>(2)</sup> In February 1833, Government at length determined to make Upper Assam a Native State under Purunder Sing. The result of that experiment has been already noticed in Chapter I. In carrying it out, as we have seen, the country about Sadiya and Muttuck was reserved by Government in its own hands, but I cannot discover that any attempt was made to introduce a comprehensive policy of dealing with the tribes of Khamptis, Singphos, and others who occupied that portion of the Province. In April 1832, the Agent had reported<sup>(3)</sup> that the country of Sadiya was tranquil. But neither Khamptis nor Singphos had settled to agriculture, spending their time in hunting and catching elephants. They had been deprived of most of the slaves who tilled their fields, and were as yet too proud to stoop themselves to manual toil; and although trade was said to be developing, and enterprising Indian merchants had opened stores at Beesa, there was much in the situation to render the frontier officers anxious.

Notwithstanding all that had been done, we still hear of Assamese<sup>(4)</sup> slaves among the Singphos in 1833. Some of these were runaways from Burma, and many were released by the exertions of our Native officials at Sadiya. In July 1834, a European officer was posted at Sadiya permanently; and the chances of any Singpho Chief retaining his slaves became smaller than ever.

There was indeed work and anxiety enough at this outpost for a  
Continued raids by the Duffa Gam. permanent officer of exceptional qualifications. The Duffa Gam by his restless intrigues and constant raids or feints of attack was a

(1) Political Proceedings, 10th June 1831, Nos. 50-59.

(2) Political Proceedings, 4th February 1833, Nos. 123-24.

(3) Political Proceedings, 8th October 1832, No. 78.

(4) Political Proceedings, 30th March 1833, No. 110.

Political Proceedings, 30th May 1833, No. 117.

Political Proceedings, 6th June 1833, No. 14.

Political Proceedings, 24th July 1834, Nos. 78-79.

standing trouble to us and all the frontier.<sup>(1)</sup> In 1835 he made a sudden foray from across the Patkoi, and cut up Beesa's village, killing some 90 persons, including women and children. Later in the year, he again appeared, built stockades as though he meant to stay for months, and drew to his side most of the Gams who had been made subordinate to the Beesa Gam in 1829. A party of troops, however, drove him over the hills again, and all the Chiefs save the Luttora Gam returned to their allegiance. We had to treat such defections and re-submissions as things very much of course. It would have been useless resenting them too violently. We gave our subject Chiefs no adequate aid or protection, and could not blame them over much for saving themselves from outrage by temporary submission to an invader.

In February 1837, the Luttora Gam, who next to Duffa was the most powerful of the contumacious Chiefs, submitted.<sup>(2)</sup>

The Government, anxious for a settlement, about<sup>(3)</sup> this time addressed the Court of Ava, urging it to restrain its subjects (for such the Duffa Gam now claimed to be)

Negotiation regarding him with the Bur-  
mese Government.

from such attacks. After some trouble the British Resident succeeded in getting leave for Captain Hannay to accompany the Burmese Governor of Mogoung to that quarter, there to see what could be done. The Duffa Gam, thus beset as it were behind and before, placed himself in the hands of the Burmese,<sup>(4)</sup> and it became a question whether we should claim him from them as a recusant British subject, and if we got him, what to do with him. It was determined ultimately to leave him in their hands. The Duffa Gam returned with the Burmese to Ava,<sup>(5)</sup> where he was received with honours, which gave great umbrage to the Governor General in Council, who ordered the Resident in Burma to report upon the facts.

The result showed that our representative at Ava had acted weakly at the outset in not pressing on the Burmese Government the correct view of matters, and the Government of India contented itself with urging the despatch of a second Burmese deputation to the frontier, with a view to making a final settlement of Singpho affairs. To this the Ava Government at last consented.

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(1) Political Proceedings, 21st September 1835, Nos. 1-2.  
Political Proceedings, 1st October 1835, Nos. 3-4.  
Political Proceedings, 3rd August 1835, Nos. 10-11.  
Political Proceedings, 17th August 1835, Nos. 3-4.  
Political Proceedings, 10th September 1835, Nos. 1-2.  
Political Proceedings, 27th April 1836, Nos. 41-42.  
Political Proceedings, 26th September 1836, Nos. 47-48.

(2) Political Proceedings, 6th March 1837, Nos. 33-34.

(3) Political Proceedings, 12th January 1836, Nos. 1-2.

(4) Political Proceedings, 20th June 1836, Nos. 14-15.

(5) Political Proceedings, 23rd January 1837, Nos. 24-28.  
Political Proceedings, 6th February 1837, Nos. 17-19.  
Political Proceedings, 20th March 1837, Nos. 81-83.

Mr. Bayfield accompanied this embassy, with the Duffa Gam in Second Burmese embassy to the Patkoi frontier. It was arranged that an officer from Assam should cross the Patkoi to meet them. Major White, Captain Hannay, and Dr. Griffiths accordingly proceeded from Sadiya for this purpose. Want of provisions compelled Major White to fall back, but the other two went on and met Mr. Bayfield on the Patkoi. While Major White was moving down from the Patkoi, he came across a band of Nigrang Singphos from Burma, who were attacking certain Naga tribes living on the north face of the Patkoi.<sup>(1)</sup> As all north of this range was British territory, he compelled the Singphos to give up their captives and make peace. After Major White left,<sup>(2)</sup> the Burmese Governor appeared and advanced a most insolent claim to the whole of Upper Assam as far as Jeypore. Captain Hannay and Mr. Bayfield of course treat this demand with ridicule, upon which the Burmese officials set off on their return to Burma.

It would seem that nothing was settled about the Duffa Gam, for, shortly after the termination of this fruitless embassy, it was reported that that Chief was about to make fresh attempts on Assam.<sup>(3)</sup> A military post on the Booree Dehing was established in consequence, and orders were given to prevent his entering the province on any pretext whatever.

Early in 1838 the Assam Singphos began to quarrel among themselves, the Peeshee Gam attacking the villages of the Lat Gam. The troops went out to restore order, and were opposed by the Peeshee and Luttora Gams, who now again made common cause against us.<sup>(4)</sup> It

Further Singpho disturbances. was evident to all the local officers that the Singphos were in a most disturbed and discontented state, and that further trouble would yet be given by this tribe. In 1839 we had indeed both Singphos and Khamptis on our hands, and risings of both tribes had to be put down by military force. In suppressing the Khampti rising, a strong body of troops passed through the Singpho country.<sup>(5)</sup> This had a good

Submission of Ningroola. effect, for it led apparently to the submission of Ningroola, a Chief of influence, hitherto attached to Duffa Gam. This man was now induced to undertake the cultivation of tea near his villages, where the plant was indigenous. Although his village had been burnt by

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(<sup>1</sup>) Political Proceedings, 10th April 1837, Nos. 120-23.

(<sup>2</sup>) Political Proceedings, 24th April 1837, Nos. 103-4.

(<sup>3</sup>) Political Proceedings, 19th June 1837, Nos. 57-58.

Political Proceedings, 3rd July 1837, Nos. 48-49.

Political Proceedings, 14th August 1837, Nos. 77-78.

Political Proceedings, 25th Sept. 1837, Nos. 111-113.

(<sup>4</sup>) Political Proceedings, 4th April 1838, Nos. 117-118.

(<sup>5</sup>) Political Proceedings, 27th January 1840, Nos. 59-60.

Political Proceedings, 13th April 1840, Nos. 132-133.

the troops before his submission, he seemed honestly anxious to behave loyally for the future, and among other proofs of his good faith he revealed the existence of a store of brass cannon of Hindustani make,<sup>(1)</sup> that had been buried in the jungle in the days of the Mogul invasion of Assam, and never before discovered by the Authorities, though long known to the tribes.

An attempt was made at this time to bring all the Singpho settlements within reach of surveillance, by insisting on their being transferred within the line of our stockades from Ningroo to Chykoa. No information is given as to how far the attempt succeeded; but for a year or two we find very little notice of the Singphos in the records.

In the cold weather of 1841-42, Captain Vetch visited the Singpho and Naga frontier, and found every thing quiet; so quiet, that Government<sup>(2)</sup> transferred the management of the tract from the Political Department to the Revenue and Judicial Departments of the Bengal Government. The slave difficulty had not, however, entirely died out, for it would appear that the local officers had again referred it to Government,<sup>(3)</sup> which now ordered a neutral course to be observed. The slaves were not to be assisted to run away, but no force was to be used to bring them back if they escaped.

Peace did not last long. On 10th January 1843,<sup>(4)</sup> a party of Singphos from Burma attacked our Fresh general outbreak of Singphos. outpost at Ningroo in large numbers and killed seven men. A simultaneous and successful attack on the guard at Beesa was reported, and Saikwah was threatened by a large body of combined Khampis and Singphos. The movement was evidently concerted and extensive. The Tippum Raja from Hookoom was said to be in it, and both the Beesa Gam and Ningroola were suspected of having been accomplices at least. This latter fact was a great surprise and disappointment.<sup>(5)</sup> All the Singphos on the Noa and Boree Dehing joined in the revolt. No time was lost in marching troops against them. Ningroola surrendered at the outset, and the Beesa Gam soon after. They protested their innocence, and offered to serve against the Burmese Singphos who were under Seroola Sain and the Lat Gam. The remaining Singphos and Nagas of Assam quickly returned to their allegiance, and gave vigorous assistance against the foreign invaders. The Lat Gam was beaten and surrendered.<sup>(6)</sup> Stockade after stockade was taken; but still the war dragged on for months, as jungle warfare often does.

(1) Political Proceedings, 20th April 1840, Nos. 87-89.

(2) Political Proceedings, 17th August 1842, Nos. 187-89.

(3) Political Proceedings, 9th November 1842, Nos. 86-87.

(4) Political Proceedings, 1st February 1843, Nos. 94-100.

(5) Political Proceedings, 22nd February 1843, Nos. 162-64.

(6) Political Proceedings, 31st May 1843, Nos. 75-86.

The end was however from this date certain, and Government appointed a Commission (Colonel Lloyd and Mr. Stainforth) to inquire into its causes.

Both these gentlemen were prevented by delicate health from undertaking such an arduous duty in a bad climate, and the inquiry was eventually entrusted to Captain Jenkins, the Governor General's Agent on the spot. That officer declared the causes of the rebellion to be three, viz.:—(1) encroachments on the lands and privileges of the Singphos; (2) the seizure and punishment by local officers of some members of their tribes; (3) the orders of the Tippum Raja, now Chief of the Hookoom province under Burma. The Governor General in Council in reviewing the report set aside the last two grounds, as it was certain the orders of Tippum, if ever given, would have had no effect unless they had fallen on willing ears; and as to the second point, it was shown that no Singphos had been punished save under the terms of their engagements, and in accordance with established usage. The real cause Government sought in the first point noticed. Although the Singpho agreements made with Mr. Scott are personal rather than local, yet it was clear they were meant to apply within certain limits, that is, within the ordinary habitat of the tribe. Unfortunately no such limits were ever regularly defined, and of late the extension of tea cultivation had made this omission of serious consequence. Just eight days before the insurrection broke out, the Deputy Commissioner had submitted a sketch, in which three lines were drawn from a common point at the mouth of the Noa Dehing diverging south. The most westerly was the limit of the Singpho tribes in Scott's time; further east was the limit of their cultivation now; while still further east from the Noa Dehing Mukh to Ningroo was the line to which Captain Vetch in future proposed to limit them. This showed clearly, the Government thought,<sup>(1)</sup> how the action of the local officers was gradually pushing back these tribes from territories which they once had occupied. (The Beesa Gam had, in 1842, complained bitterly of the loss of lands. The factory of a Mr. Bonyng, which had been a prominent object of attack in the late rebellion, actually stood on forfeited Singpho territory.) Add to this the accumulated grievances arising from our forcible release of their original slaves, and our continued care to prevent their acquiring others, and sufficient causes for rebellion seemed to be established, the Singphos being what they were. On these views of Government, the Agent was invited to submit further report. It was proposed to have a line laid down as in Scott's time, on which no encroachment was to be allowed save under definite and fresh concessions. The right of taxing to Government dues Assamese voluntarily resident among the Singphos, which had never been enforced, was to be definitely given up. A new convention was to be made. But all captured rebels were to be brought

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(1) Political Proceedings, 12th August 1843, Nos. 90-106.

to trial. The Beesa Gam was found guilty of rebellion, and imprisoned at Debrooghur for life.

The Agent in his<sup>(1)</sup> final report contended that the main cause of the

Final report on the rebellion.

Singpho insurrection was the loss of their slaves. The Beesa Gam was the Chief who had suffered most by this. He had also been irritated by our communicating with the other Chiefs direct, and not through him; though his own intrigues had rendered this necessary. He had appointed one Seeroo-la-sen to be his successor, and this man was irritated by the imprisonment of a cousin of his for selling an Assamese; so he joined and led the insurrection. A son-in-law of the Beesa's, Jugundoo, had been imprisoned for cattle stealing. He also rebelled. The Lat Gam, a Kaku, was another dependant of Beesa's; and he was afraid of punishment from us for putting slaves to death for witchcraft. In this way the action taken by the Beesa Gam and his family was held to be explained. The rebellion of Ningroola and his sons was less easily accounted for. Probably loss of slaves and temporary irritation caused it. Ruffandoo joined the rebels, because he was not allowed to raid on the Nagas. All the other Chiefs who took part in the outbreak were from Burma.<sup>(2)</sup> Captain Jenkins was now certain that the loss of lands had nothing to say to it. No lands had ever been granted to the Singphos, or recognized as theirs, or been claimed by any of them till lately, when the Beesa, instigated by Tippum Raja, set up such a notion. The Agent in conclusion held that the loss of their slaves would soon compel the Singphos<sup>(3)</sup> to settle down and engage personally in cultivation as many of them had already done, and then he said, we could assign them definite lands and limits. Meantime that matter might be left alone. There were possible other minor grievances that had helped to irritate the Singphos, such as demands for forced labour to build stockades for our troops, but, on the whole, the Agent believed that in the slavery question lay the secret of this abortive rebellion.

Government accepted this report, though it is hardly, perhaps, satisfactory upon some points. To educate the Singphos into civilisation a school was ordered to be opened at Saikwah. Ningroola and his son were pardoned and released. On the question of slavery the Government was fully committed, and no retrograde policy could be entertained. Nothing was to be done to encourage the Singphos to believe that slavery would ever be winked at. With these orders the memory of the Singpho insurrection was allowed to die away.

(1) Political Proceedings, 9th March 1844, No. 142.

(2) Political Proceedings, 28th April 1848, Nos. 103-104.

(3) Political Proceedings, 23rd March 1844, Nos. 89-91.

The Singphos have of late years given absolutely no trouble. They are indeed of great use to us in restraining and keeping in order the Naga tribes of the Patkoi.\*

\* The following extract from a report by the Deputy Commissioner of Luckimpore, dated 9th May 1871, shows all that is locally known of the present state of the Singpho cantons.—

2. *Singphos*.—The names and sites of the principal settlements of the Singphos are given in the margin.

1 Tengapani	10 Dehingpani.
2 Morowapani	11 Boroah Pattar.
3 Pechela Mookh.	12 Kherimpani
4 Diasapani	13 Dhekori Doobie.
5 Menaboem	14 Monking Tap.
6 Naginipani.	15 Tetap Mookh.
7 Merippul	16 Noyan Pattar.
8 Tangun Joop	17 Nangdoo Pattar.
9. Mamoidan.	18. Jingthoapani.

These settlements contain forty-eight khels or sections, numbering about 3,435 souls, of which 1,120 are estimated to be male, 1,190 female adults, and 1,185 children of both sexes

3. The arrangements made after the Singpho rising of 1843 have been carried out to good purpose, and they may now be reckoned as peaceful and friendly neighbours

4. The Singphos have settled down to agriculture, and do now for themselves what formerly they depended on their Assamese slaves to do for them. They apparently, however, only cultivate sufficiently to meet their own consumption for a portion of the year, the remaining months they live upon wild yams and other jungle products, and what they can procure from other places

5. The Government has no fixed relations with them; they are generally obedient, and in such way recognize British supremacy

6. There are a handful of Singphos—ten or twelve only in number—who have settled in the villages of Tegee and Koolie in the Megala mouzah of this district, who pay revenue, and are on precisely a similar footing as the other ryots of the mouzah.

7. The Singphos meet the Government officer yearly at the mela held at Sadiya, and they are in the habit of visiting the officer in military command at that place. Further than this there is no material intercourse.

## CHAPTER XI.

## THE MOAMARIAHS OF MUTTUCK.

Some account of the Moamariahs has already been given in the first chapter, but a brief notice of the part they have played in the history of Upper Assam since the British annexation is necessary to the completeness of our subject, as several allusions have been made to them in the foregoing chapters.

The district known as Muttuck in Luckimpore, inhabited by the Moamariah, Moram, or Morah tribe, Early history of the Moamariahs. was bounded, according to Pemberton, on the west and north by the Brahmaputra, on the south by the Booree Dehing, and on the east by a line extending from the Dehing to a point nearly opposite the mouth of the Kondil Nullah. The area of this tract was about 1,800 square miles. The original Moamariahs are supposed by some to have been a rude tribe who settled before the Ahom invasion on the Upper Debroo, in the district of Moram. What were known among them as the "upper nine families" claimed certainly to be descended from such a race. "The lower nine families" of Moamariahs settled on the Lasa were proselytised Ahoms. The whole tribe embraced Hinduism, rejected the popular worship of Siva, and professed themselves sectaries of the *Vishna-vishnu* caste. Their persecution by the Ahom Kings of Assam and their rebellions have been noticed before.<sup>(1)</sup> To the last days of Raja Gourinath they maintained their independence, although when beaten by Captain Welsh they admitted in general terms the supremacy of the Gowhattay Raja. They gained many adherents from among the Assamese and Ahoms.

At the time of the Burmese invasion, the Bor Senapati, as the Moamariah ruler was called, assisted Relations with the Burmese and British. the Burmese with provisions and labour, but not with troops. On the British annexation he at once acknowledged our supremacy and entered into engagements with Mr. Scott. By these he undertook to contribute an armed contingent of 360 gotes of paiks, of whom only one-third or 300 men should be called out at one time.<sup>(2)</sup> He was to pay no revenue himself, but was to be responsible to the Government of Upper Assam, whether British or Native, for the poll-tax of any ryots emigrating into his territories. Owing to the easy terms on which he was thus allowed to hold the country, the Bor Senapati was able to leave his people under a very moderate

(1) Political Proceedings, 6th October 1839, No. 89.

(2) Political Proceedings, 13th April 1835, Nos. 4-5.



assessment. The men of his own tribe paid little or nothing. From the other cultivators the Senapati and his seven sons, each of whom managed a district, realized about Rs. 22,000 yearly, where under the British fiscal system over Rs. 50,000 would have been collected. Hence there was naturally a constant influx of emigrants into his territory not only from Lower Assam but from the tract over which we eventually placed Purunder Sing. It is true that the Senapati was bound to account for these immigrants, but the facilities for concealing, and the difficulty of tracing such mobile assets were very great. The desertions from Upper Assam became so serious at last that Purunder made it the chief excuse for his failure to pay the tribute assessed upon him by the Government. For these and other reasons it was frequently proposed that the Bor Senapati should be brought under regular assessment. The tract which he managed was strictly an integral part of Assam, and there was, it was argued, no obligation resting upon Government compelling it to recognize in him any absolute rights of sovereignty in the country which he had usurped.<sup>(1)</sup> It was felt, however, that it would be more equitable and politic to allow the arrangements made by Mr. Scott to continue during the life-time of the old Senapati, and the only change made was in 1835, when the obligation of furnishing 300 gotes of paiks was commuted for a payment of Rs. 1,500 annually—the sum offered by the Senapati himself.

On the 24th May 1839, the Bor Senapati died. Before his death he had tried to obtain the recognition of his second son, the Majoo Gohain, as his successor. The Government, however, had declined to sanction this arrangement; and on his decease, holding that the Majoo Gohain had no claim to be treated as a tributary prince, or as anything but a revenue settlement-holder under Mr. Scott's management, it decided to propose to him a settlement on revised terms. He was offered the management of the country with the same civil authority exercised by the Bor Senapati, provided that a proportion of what might be exacted from the paiks in money or service was paid to Government, on the basis of a fresh census every five years; the paiks to have the option of rendering service or commuting for money on the same terms as in other divisions. The occupied jungle tracts were to be at the disposal of Government, and the Muttuck Chief was to have no authority over tea gardens. The above arrangements were to apply only to the lower nine families of Muttucks and not to the upper nine of Morams, (for so the older and the later members of the tribe seem to have been distinguished) who had declared their wish to be under direct British management.<sup>(2)</sup> The proportion to

Arrangements made on the death of the Bor Senapati.

(1) Political Proceedings, 19th December 1833, No. 8593.  
Political Proceedings, 20th February 1834, Nos. 23-24.

(2) Political Proceedings, 14th August 1839, Nos. 10-36.  
Political Proceedings, 16th January 1839, Nos. 47-19.  
Political Proceedings, 30th January 1839, Nos. 63-66.  
Political Proceedings, 20th February 1839, 67-69.

be taken by Government and the terms of commutation were at first left open; but a preference was to be given to the exaction of personal service, as roads were much required in Upper Assam. The terms of commutation were eventually fixed at Rs. 2 per paik.

None of the Senapati's sons would engage for Muttuck unless the upper Morans were included in their settlement, so the tract was eventually taken into direct management by the British officer in charge of Upper Assam. The sons continued for some time to live in the country, but were removed to Gowhatty in 1840 for intriguing against the Government; and Muttuck ceased to be a separate State.\*

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\* The condition of the Muttucks, both politically and fiscally, is, according to a recent report, good. They are friendly with the other tribes. The population is estimated to be about 25,067 souls, of which 8,347 are estimated to be male, 13,220 female adults, and 3,500 children of both sexes. The followers of the Tepook Gossam pay a poll-tax; those of the Dingoi and Gorpoora Gossams pay a land-tax. The Gossams are mouzadars in their ilaques. This means in effect that the Moamarahs are now merged practically in the ordinary cultivating population of Assam.

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## PART II.

### CHAPTER XII.

#### THE NAGA TRIBES. A.—THE PATKOI NAGAS.

I have now to give some account of a group of tribes inhabiting part of the great mountain system which lies to the south of the Assam valley—tribes many in number and differing in characteristics—but which extend under the generic name of Naga, from the Bori Dihing River and Singpho country of Luckimpur west to the Kopili River in Nowgong, and south to the confines of Manipur and Cachar.

Dalton in his *Ethnology of Bengal* draws a line of distinction between the Nagas to the east and those to the west of the Dhunsiri River, asserting that traces of a common origin are to be seen in all the tribal dialects found between the Bori Dihing and Dhunsiri, while these radically differ from the dialects of the clans bordering on north Cachar. He further states that the Nagas east of the Doyeng (the eastern affluent of the Dhunsiri) are divided into great clans under influential hereditary Chiefs or Rajas, while those to the west of the Doyeng are more democratic in character, electing elders from time to time to serve as spokesmen in debate or temporary leaders on the warpath, but yielding no certain or regular obedience to any recognised head. Our knowledge of the Naga tribes though of late years fast extending is still very incomplete, and we shall find it more convenient to group them rather with reference to their political relations to our frontier districts than in accordance with any supposed ethnical differences. As an introduction to a survey of the Naga tract, the following paper by Captain Butler, who in 1873 was Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills, may here be reproduced. I have given it complete, although some passages in it were of only temporary interest, because it is a comprehensive survey of the whole Naga country by an officer who had devoted special study to the question:

Of all the tribes inhabiting that enormous tract of mountainous country hemming in Assam on the south, the "Nagas" are one of the most numerous.

Roughly speaking, they may be said to extend from the Kopili River on the west to the Bori Dihing on the east. Towards the north they occupy the whole hill country bordering upon the plain districts of Nowgong, Sebsaugor, and Luckimpore.

In a southerly direction we now know positively that they not only extend up to, but actually cross over, the great main watershed between the Irrawady and Brahmaputra, how far, however, they really go down and extend into the valley of the Kniendwen or Ningthi has never yet been clearly ascertained. Indeed, we know that the country in that direction extending from the north-eastern corner of Manipur up to the south-western portion of the Patkoi, and lying south of that narrow strip of comparatively low mountains explored by Brodie, and roughly mapped out by Messrs. Bedford and Thornton in 1842-44, has never yet been visited by any European; and hence almost everything that has been said and written regarding it has been pure conjecture.

Captain Yule, who went as Secretary to the Envoy to the Court of Ava in 1855, in his interesting narrative of the mission, very graphically summarises (from the accounts of Hannay, Griffiths, Bayfield, Wilcox, and Pemberton), almost all we know about the country in and around the tract above alluded to as follows. He says—

“The northern chain, the Himalaya, stretching far beyond Assam, bounds that valley, but as it bounds all India with its awful barrier of unchanging snow. The southern, a chain of far less altitude and celebrity, and of no name, is co-extensive with the valley which it limits and defines, and may conveniently be termed the Assam chain, as it has been, I believe, in some atlases.

“Rising suddenly from the plains of Eastern Bengal, as from a sea, about 220 miles north-east of Calcutta, it stretches eastward in a broadening chaos of woody spurs and ridges, and grassy undulating table-lands, taking successively the names of the races which inhabit it, Garos, Khasias, and Nagas of many tribes; ever increasing in the elevation of its points, from 3,000 and 4,000 feet among the Garos, to 6,000 among the Khasias, 8,000 and 9,000 in the region north of Manipur, till sweeping north-eastward in a wide mass of mountain, of which the general direction only is known, it emerges to knowledge again as the Patkoi, traversed by the Burman armies in their Assamese inroads; further on, abreast of the Brahmakund, rises to a height of 12,000 and 14,000 feet, and then coming in contact with the spurs of the waning Himalayas, lifts itself into the region of eternal snow, and stretching still eastward embraces its northern rival, and forms that amphitheatre of snowy peaks, glorious, doubtless, but unseen as yet by European eye, in which the Brahmaputra has its earliest springs.

“This lofty prolongation of the southern chain, known now as the Langtang,

It is still an open question whether the Irrawady does really rise from this chain, as surmised by Wilcox and generally acquiesced in by most geographers.

J. B.

sends down from the snows of its southern face the head-waters of the Irrawady. Beyond the eastern sources of the river it strikes southward a great meridian chain, snow-capped in places like the parent ridge, and from old time the bounding wall of China to the westward. It is called by the Singpho tribes, which cluster round the roots of all these mountains of northern Burma, the Goolansigoung, and its offshoots stretch with a variety of breaks and ramifications, of which we know nothing precisely, but ever tending southward, between the Irrawady and the Salween, till one of its great spurs almost reaches the sea near Martaban, where it parts the Salween from the big-mouthed Sitang. Nearly abreast of Toungoo, and 170 miles north of Martaban, this chain is known to attain an elevation of 8,000 feet.

“The snowy range of Langtang projects its shorter spurs between the branches of the Irrawady, and this side the westerly branch it sends down an offshoot called the Shwe-doung-gyi, separating the Irrawady from the springs of the Kyehdwen.

“Still further westward in the Naga country, between longitude 93° and 95°, a great multiple mass of mountains starts southwards from the Assam chain. Enclosing first the level alluvial valley of Manipur, at a height of 2,500 feet above the sea, it then spreads out westward to Tipperah and the coast of Chittagong and northern Arracan, a broad succession of unexplored and forest-covered spurs, inhabited by a vast variety of wild tribes of Indo-Chinese kindred, known as Kookies, Nagas, Khyenes, and by many more specific names. Contracting to a more defined chain, or to us more defined, because we know it better, this meridian range still passes southward under the name of the Arracan Yuma-doung, till 700 miles from its origin in

the Naga wilds, it sinks in the sea hard by Negrain, its last bluff crowned by the golden Pagoda of Modain, gleaming far to seaward, a Burmese Sunium. Fancy might trace the submarine prolongation of the range in the dotted line of the Preparis, the Cocos, the Andamans, the Nicobars, till it emerges again to traverse Sumatra and the vast chain of the Javanic Isles.

"Between these two great meridian ranges that have been indicated—the one eastward of the Irrawady and the Sitang, the other westward of the Kyendwen and the Irrawady—lie what have been characterised above as the first three divisions of the Burman territory. \* \* \* \* \*

"The tract enclosed by these ranges is not to be conceived of as a plain like the vast levels that stretch from the base of the Himalayas. It is rather a varied surface of rolling upland, interpersed with alluvial basins and sudden ridges of hill.

"The Burman is himself nowhere a dweller in the mountains, though thus girt round with a noble mountain barrier.

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"The river recognised throughout its course by the Burmans as the Irrawady comes, we may assume, from the snowy peaks which separate the valleys inhabited by the Shan race of Khauntis, from the head-waters of the sacred Brahmaputra, in latitude 28°. For nearly 200 miles below this the Burmese know little of it. In their forays into the Khaunti country, they never took the river line, and they care not to meddle much with Singphos and savage Kakhyens, who line the mountain ranges on both banks. It receives a branch of size equal to its own from the eastward about latitude 26°, emerges into the familiar acquaintance of the Burmese at the mouth of the Mogoung River (in 24° 56'), where they turn off in their route to the so-called city of that name, once the head of a flourishing Shan principality, of which manuscript histories exist, professing to commence from the eighth year of our era, now a poor village in the centre of a damp, unhealthy, and dreary plain, scantily cultivated by the remnants of the Shan population. Mogoung gives name to a moonship or province, which nominally includes the whole breadth of Burma to the Assam Hills, and is the residence of the Governor of these northern tracts when he comes from court to express such revenue as they will yield.

"The Mogoung River is tortuous and sub-divided with occasional rapids, but boats of some considerable size ascend it, and several of its branches above Mogoung are navigable by canoes. One of its most considerable tributaries, the Eudankhyong, has its source in the Eudangyi, a lake among the hills, to which the traditions of the people assign a volcanic origin.

"Of the mineral traffic of the province, in serpentine and amber, we have already spoken. The greater part of the region is a howling wilderness, exhibiting levels of winter swamp and low jungle intermingled with low hills, and sometimes with belts of noble trees; the higher mountain range of the Shwe-doung-gyi (4,000 feet), running down on the eastward, and screening off the Irrawady from the head-waters of the Kyendwen. In the seclusion of its valleys Kakhyen villages are said to be numerous, but few or no habitations are seen in the open country north of Mogoung, till you reach the comparatively peopled valley of Hookong or Payendwen, the site of the amber-mines, seventy miles north of Mogoung. Even this plain does not show a population of more than ten to the square mile. It is the most northerly locality in which the Burmans venture to exercise authority. With the Singphos they rarely or never meddle, but they have sometimes enforced their claims on the remote Shans of Khaunti. Passes lead from the Hookong plain into Khaunti over the shoulders of the Shwe-doung-gyi, a distance of sixteen days' journey, and also direct towards China through the district east of the Irrawady, called Kakhyo-Wainmo. By this route the Lapai Singphos come to purchase amber. These living on the Chinese frontier have adopted a good deal of the Chinese dress and habits, and are by far the most numerous and civilized tribe of their nation. From this valley, also the path

traversed by Dr. Griffith in 1837 leads over the Patkoi range to Sadiya in Upper Assam. The distance from Mainkhwon to the summit of the range, which is crossed at a height of 5,600 feet, is eleven stiff marches (130 to 140 miles), the greater part of which are through dense jungle or up the bouldery beds of rivers. Eleven more, but somewhat shorter stages (121 miles) bring the traveller to Sadiya. The path does not appear to be practicable for elephants. Other passes are said to cross

Griffith gives the height of the Patkoi Pass as 4,520, Hayfield makes it 4,927, whilst Jenkins says "water boiled at a temperature of 209, giving an altitude of about 2,140 feet. The air was very clear, and it was plain to see that the Patkoi, which is here only a single ridge, could be crossed five or six hundred feet lower by making a slight bend to the westward of the present path," and finally Brodie gives the height of the peaks north of the Pass as 7,640 and 7,690 feet.

J. B.

the range a little further to the westward.

"Hookong or Payendwen produces salt, gold, and ivory in addition to amber. It was formerly occupied by the Shans, but they fled from Burman oppression, and the inhabitants are now chiefly Singphos, with their Assamese slaves. The villages generally consist of ten or twelve of the long barrack-like houses of the Singphos crowded together without order, and almost without interval, within a bamboo stockade, the extension of which for further defence is surrounded with small bamboo spikes stuck obliquely in the ground—a favourite defensive device among all these nations.

"The Kyendwen rises in Shwe-doung-gyi, north of Mogoung, and thence passes northward, north-westward, and westward through the plain of Payendwen, already a broad and navigable stream. After leaving the plains it curves round to the south and keeps its southern course till terminating in the Irrawady.

\* \* \* \* \*

"Of the middle course of the Kyendwen, between the valley of the amber mines, in latitude  $26^{\circ} 30'$ , and the Burmese post of Kendal, which had several times been visited by our officers, both from Manipur and Ava, little is known. The Burmese, I believe, scarcely exercise any jurisdiction over the inhabitants, who are chiefly Shans along the river, the Kakhyens and other wild tribes keeping to the hills. The navigation is interrupted at several places by falls or transverse reefs, a series of which is known to exist some sixteen miles below the plain of Hookong, and another which first bars the traffic upwards, at Kaksa or Kat-tha, four days north of the head of the Kubo Valley, in latitude  $24^{\circ} 47'$ . Not far below this last it receives a large tributary in the Ooroo, near the sources of which, in a long narrow valley, are the You stone mines, which bring the Chinese trafficking to Mogoung. The lower part of the Ooroo Valley is said to be peopled and well cultivated. \* \* \* below the Ooroo the narrow alluvial valley of the Kyendwen is also tolerably peopled, and affords occasional rice-grounds fertilised by annual inundation.

J. B.

"West of the river, between the parallels of  $22^{\circ} 30'$  and  $24^{\circ} 30'$ , stretches from north to south the valley of Kubo. It is a long strip, not more than 10 to 15 miles in greatest width, separated from the Kyendwen by a range of uninhabited and forest-covered hills called Ungoching. The valley itself is, with the exception of sparse clearances for cultivation, a mass of forest abounding in varnish and wood-oil trees and in valuable timber, saul and teak, which, however, is not available for want of water-carriage; and though its inhabitants are remarkably hardy, it is notorious for jungle fever, most fatal to strangers. The northern portion of the valley, called by the Burmese Thounghwtot, by the Kathés, or Manipurees Sanjok, and the southern called Kalé, are still under the rule of the Native Shan Tsaubwas tributary to Ava, the only such who have maintained their position under the Burmese Government on this side of the Irrawady. The central portion, Khumbat, is under a Burmese Governor. Kalé is much the most populous part of the valley. \* \* \* The hills on the west of Kalé are occupied by the Khyens, a race extending southward throughout

the long range of the Yoma-doung to the latitude of Promé." And here there comes a foot note telling us that "Colonel Hannay identifies the Khyens with the Nagas of the Assam mountains," and that "they must also be closely allied to the Kookies. \* \* \*

Further on we are told that "the most interesting race in Southern Burma is that of the Karens; among the Burmese, but not of them, scattered up and down through all the wildest and most secluded parts of Pegu and Martaban, as well as Tenasserim and the western parts of Siam." And again later, in speaking of the Karen-ni, or red Karens, who inhabit the mountains separating the Sitang from the Salween, we learn that—"Their villages are generally perched on rounded knolls, or on tops of tabular hills. The population is considerable. In one part of their country, between the Salween and the Mepon, Dr. Richardson found the land cultivated to the tops of the hills, the valleys terraced in the Chinese manner, cross-roads in all directions, and villages so numerous that eight were visible at one time. \* \* \* \*

These red Karens are the terror of all the adjoining Burman and Burma Shan districts on which they make their forays. \* \* \*

They are also the receivers of slaves carried off in the mutual feuds of the numerous small Karen communities. \* \* \* The nearest towns pay them black mail to purchase immunity for their inroads"—a description which exactly answers to the condition and state of affairs existing at the present day in the Angami country.

If we now turn to the map accompanying Captain Yule's work, we find the respective positions supposed to be occupied by the several tribes inhabiting the great range of mountains which, commencing at Cape Negrais, extends up to and beyond the head-water of the Irrawady very carefully noted down upon it. Thus taking the most southerly first, and proceeding north, we meet with the "Karens," "Khyens" and "wild Khyens," after which we come upon the "Looshai," "Kom Naga," "Arong Naga," "Kutcha," and "Anghami Naga," and finally the vague, general term "Naga tribes," which latter words are written exactly along the course of what we believe to be the run of the main watershed; and due east of this tract, south of the Hookong Valley, we find another tribe here called the "Kakhyens," and north of them again we have the "Singpho." But in Colonel Dalton's late work on the Ethnology of Bengal we are told that "*Karens* are sometimes called *Kakhyens*, which is a name applied to the Singphos," and that Latham thinks that word for word *Khyen* is *Karen*, and, moreover, that Mr. Mason tells us it is a Burmese word signifying *aboriginal*. Again Bayfield on the occasion of his expedition to the Patkoi, speaks of passing the site of an "old Khyen village" north of the Hookong Valley, and finally Pemberton, generally considered one of our best and most reliable authorities on all matters connected with the Eastern Frontier, in speaking of that particular portion of the country regarding which we are now finding it so difficult to obtain

The "Maglung" is a river rising from the southern slopes of the Shitrofarun mountain, the most eastern point to which we penetrated this past cold season.

J. B.

River we have only the imperfect account of natives. \* \* \*

Of the geological structure of this tract our information is particularly incomplete and defective," and further on, after describing the several routes leading from Manipur into Assam, he adds—"East of these routes from the 25th to the 27th degree of latitude and between the 94th and 96th degrees of longitude is an extensive tract of mountainous country inhabited by tribes (the Tiklya Nagas of Buchanan) similar to those before mentioned, but with whom no communication ever appears to have been

I cannot help thinking this term "Tiklya" is merely a corruption of "Mekhla," an Assamese word meaning "petticoat" or "kilt," and which the latter often apply to the Angamis in speaking of them as the "Mekhla" or "Mekhla-pendha" Nagas (i.e., the kilted or petticoat-weaving Nagas).

J. P.

Manipur, or indeed had I been simply left alone to my own devices, instead of being

any reliable information, says "of the streams north of the Maglung\* which flow from the hills connected with this mountain barrier into the Ningthi (or Kyendwen) held by the people of Assam, Manipur, or Kuba, and nothing is in consequence known of the country beyond the fact of its mountainous character." And this remark, although written nearly 40 years ago, holds good up to the present day. Had I only received the slightest assistance from



harnessed and opposed in every conceivable way, on the occasion of our late expedition, by far the greater portion of this very *terra incognita* would have been thoroughly explored and carefully surveyed, whereas, owing to the extraordinary action taken by the Raja, we had barely time just to dip into it. However, the views from Shiroifara, Kopamedza, and the hill above Gaziphemi, enabled us to obtain a very fair general idea of the lay of the country on ahead, which we distinctly saw to be a huge tract of high rolling mountains running away to the north and west in long parallel ranges, broken here and there apparently by the larger feeders of the Lanier, with lofty conical summits towering up to 12,000 feet above the sea level, the water-parting line apparently taking a north-easterly direction. A full and detailed account of the physical aspect of this tract, as far as it goes, has already very lately been given by Major Godwin-Austen in his report on the operations connected with the Manipur and Naga Hills boundary survey, and I therefore deem it needless to enter into any further details regarding it.

I trust I have now succeeded in clearly showing that our knowledge of a great portion of the Naga country really rests almost entirely upon "pure conjecture," and that beyond the fact of its mountainous character we know nothing at all about it up to the present date; for even the past cold season's work, although it cleared up a good deal, has still left it an open question whether the Lanier does flow north into Assam as all of us (Austen, Thomson, Ogle and I) concur in thinking, or whether it turns eastward and falls into the Kyendwen as Tongal Major and the Manipurees would have us believe. And thus the line of the main watershed may eventually either lead us along the Sarawoti range, as I have good reason to suppose it will do, or, on the other hand, it may take us down the Kopamedza ridge, according to whichever belief turns out to be correct. And finally, with regard to the inhabitants of this huge tract, we are equally in the dark; and indeed to such an extent does our ignorance go that we cannot even safely suggest any limit at all to the country occupied by the Naga race in this direction, for it is quite possible that we may yet some day discover that the Naga, Kakhien, and Khyen, are in fact off-shoots of one and the same race; and, moreover, I think the balance of such evidence as we have got seems rather inclined to favour this view. However, under present circumstances, it is merely a matter of another season's hard work to clear up the whole mystery in which this question is still enveloped, and in the meanwhile I deem it would be simply a waste of time to indulge in theories so easy to propound so difficult to refute. I will therefore now content myself with giving a brief outline of the rest of the Naga country, restricting myself to the so-called British Territory.

But before doing so, I beg first of all to invite special attention to the accompanying copy of a map which has just been very carefully compiled in the Surveyor General's Office from the very latest information we have got on the subject, and upon which I have very carefully noted down (in red) the geographical position of every tribe along the frontier of which we have any knowledge. The local distribution of the tribes in that portion of the country lying between the Kopili and the Doyeng as well as in that extending south and south-east across the Barak River into Manipur has been made under my personal direction, and may be accepted as correct. I cannot, however, take upon myself to vouch for the absolute correctness of that portion lying between the Doyeng and the Bori Dihing (in the Sebsaugor Naga country), a tract which never has been properly surveyed, and which, if we put aside the very hasty short visits of only one or two days' journey into the hills, made by the missionary Mr. Clarke and the two tea planters, Messrs. Peale and Begg (the first of whom visited Dekahimong, whilst Peale went as far as Banpara, and the latter never got beyond Kampongia, all three villages situated close to the plains) has never been invaded by any European since Brodie's day (1842 and 1844). I think, however, it will be found to be pretty correct on the whole, at all events, as regards the relative positions of the several tribes and villages.

To commence then from the south-western corner, the first Naga tribe we come in contact with is the "Arung," a small and peaceful community inhabiting the North Cachar Hills, who never have given, and probably never will give, us any trouble at all, and so I need not say anything more about them beyond expressing an opinion,

that I believe this tribe is simply a branch of the Kutcha Naga. I have, however, personally seen very little of the "Arung," and cannot, therefore, speak with any great confidence as to the identity of the two races.

We next fall in with the "Kuki" or "Náíá Kuki," a powerful community consisting of the "Thádo," "Changsen," and "Shingshon" clans who inhabit that portion of the Barail mountains from which on the one side the head-waters of the Lanting and Dhansiri take their rise and go off towards the west and north; and on the other, the Chulins Makho and Jhiri Rivers spring and flow east and south; a tangled mass of forest-clad hills, with

comparatively low ridges thrown off from the parent range upon which the broad conical peaks of Angoolo and Laishiang rise up to nearly 7,000 feet above the level of the sea. On the last occasion when I had the census of this tribe taken in March 1872, it consisted of 21 villages, containing 718 houses, with a total population of 2,599 souls. These Kukies are the most clannish of all the tribes with whom we have come in contact on this frontier, and from being a bold and hardy race, well armed, mostly with muskets, besides which they also use the bow, arrow, and spear, and thoroughly under the control of their respective "Houshins," (i.e. Chiefs), bitter enemies but staunch friends, they were much feared by all their neighbours. This tribe is now, and has been for some little time advancing towards the west, in the direction of the Dhansiri Valley, and also towards the north-east, on which side I should not be surprised to find them very shortly pushing up to the head-waters of the Barak and Iril on to the southern prolongation of the Kopamedza range, a tract of country which, being thickly covered with forest, is well adapted to jooming—the only system of cultivation the Kuki indulges in, for he abominates the fine fields of terrace cultivation of which Angami is so proud. The village of Aimulkun is at present the most north-easterly point that they have yet reached.

The next tribe we meet with are the "Kutcha" or "Mejhameh" Nagas who inhabit the slopes on both sides of the water-parting line of the Burrail mountains, north towards the valley of the Dhansiri, south towards the Barak, a country very similar in many respects to that just spoken of, the most marked difference being that the Burrail watershed from the Naga village of Lakemah east to Tenepu Peak forms a most precipitous and almost impassable barrier chain, whereas west and south between Angnoh and Laishiang in the Kuki country it sinks into a low saddle—back easily crossed in any direction. The "Kutcha Naga" tribe possesses 23 villages containing 1,284 houses, which, on a rough calculation of five souls to a house, gives us a population of over 6,000 souls. To a certain extent their dress, manners, and customs are a little like the Angami, with whom, in fact, they are closely connected, although possessing an almost totally dissimilar dialect. This tribe, although it gave us trouble in former days, has been very quiet of late, and would, I believe, be very glad indeed if the British Government would take over the active and actual control of their country, and protect them from the devastating attacks and extortionate demands of their more warlike neighbours the Angamis, who are constantly levying black-mail from them, in like manner as they used to do from the Kachari border villages—a state of affairs which has reduced the size of many of their chief villages enormously. Thus, for instance, the late General Jenkins tells us in one of his letters to Government that, on the occasion of his being deputed to explore a route through the Naga country in 1831-32, when his escort consisted of a force of 700 men from the Manipuri Levy, and his whole party numbered "1,300 people altogether," they were attacked by the people of Papolongmai, a village which he states then contained "about 900 houses;" whereas, on referring to the diary of my tour in the cold weather of 1869-70, when I had occasion to visit this very village, I find the following entry—"On walking over the village, I found it in a regular state of barricade and palisading thrown up in all directions, with a strong stockade surrounding the upper portion of the village, the sides of the hill cut down and steeply scarped with deep ditches dug right across the ridge of the hill, and the whole place so thickly

studded with *pazies* that one of my constables was accidentally wounded in two places by them, and I myself very narrowly escaped being struck in the same way. This is all owing to the Samemah Khel of Khonomah having made a raid upon this village, in revenge for the Merimah Khel of Khonomah having attacked their allies in Tapnemah. Kenomah (i.e., Papolongmai) only a few months ago was one of the most prosperous of the Kutcha Naga villages, containing 282 houses; but 72 were burnt to the ground in this last raid, and there only remain now 160 houses of the Samemah Khel and 50 of the Behootzoomah." Thus it would appear that in the very short space of 38 years this village has been actually reduced to less than three-fourths of its original size, and I have little doubt but that many other villages have shared a similar fate.

The next tribe we have to deal with is the turbulent Angami, by far the most powerful and most warlike of all the Naga tribes we have yet met.

This great division of the Naga race occupies a most charming country, enjoying a beautiful climate and a most fertile soil, well cultivated, drained, and manured, the hill sides being covered with a succession of terraces of rich rice, with numerous villages in every direction, some of them so large that they might justly be called towns. Thus, Kohimah, for instance, contains 865 houses, Khonomah 545, Viswemah 530, and even the much split up Jotsomah boasts of 434. Roughly speaking, the country they inhabit may be described as a fine, open, rolling mass of mountains, bounded on the east by the Sijjo River, and towards the south and west, as regards the high land, by the range on which the peaks of Japuo, Suwemuchikha, and Kedinba rise up, respectively, to a height of 9,952, 7,379, and 4,756 feet above the level of the sea. They, however, extend beyond this tract into the low country to the west, as far as the Samagooting and Sitekemah range. In the course of the last four-and-a-half years it has so happened that I have been fortunate enough to explore the whole of this tract of country thoroughly and repeatedly, and I am consequently now in a position to speak with all due confidence regarding it. I must here explain that among the people themselves the term "Angami" is utterly unknown except among those few who speak Assamese or Manipuri, and their own most widely used term is "Tengimah." The clans to the west towards Mezipheimah and Samagooting, however, are generally spoken of as "Chakromah," whilst those towards the south-east corner, including the villages from Púchámáh to Kidimah, are in like manner spoken of as the "Chakhomah," and these groups are again divided and sub-divided under other names which it is needless to recapitulate here, especially as they all most undoubtedly form one great group, and it is much less confusing to speak of the whole under the one comprehensive term "Angami." There are altogether 46 Angami villages. The total number of houses (obtained by actual enumeration) is 6,367, which, at five souls to each house, gives us a population of 31,835 souls, which I believe to be rather under than over the mark; and this population covers a tract of mountainous country with an average length of 30 miles and an average breadth of 20, or only about 600 square miles altogether; from which figure we may assume that we have here got a population of something over 50 to the square mile, whereas on referring to the last Census Report of Bengal (1872), I see that the Khasi Hills have only 23 souls to the square mile, and the Chittagong Hill Tracts positively only 10, whilst Hill Tipperah is lowest of all, with only 9!

I have written so often and at such length regarding the Angamies and the glorious country they inhabit, that I deem it right to refrain from entering into any further details here: indeed, to do so would be to monopolize the space I wish to devote simply to giving a very brief account of the position and resources only of every tribe we have come in contact with, so far as our information extends; and it is perhaps needless for me to say that the political and social history of the tribe, with an account of their manners and customs, is not within the scope of this paper.

On the south-east corner of the Angami country we come upon a small compact community generally spoken of as the "Sopumoh" or "Mao" group of Nagas. In former days the villages forming this group were looked upon by our officers as British territory, even so late as February 1851. Reed visited them, and found they were ill disposed towards him, and he could not in consequence obtain any rice from them,

he destroyed one of their villages, and we are told that "this had the desired effect, for early next morning the heads of clans of the whole of the villages came in and inquired what tribute was required; an ample supply of rice was then brought in for the troops." They are now outside the limits of our jurisdiction, and I need not refer to them further, beyond stating that, although using a different dialect, they are very like the Angamies both in dress and customs.

Due east of the tribe above alluded to are the seven villages of the "Khezami" or "Kolia" Nagas, another tribe scarcely to be distinguished from the Angami except by a practised eye and one long resident among them.

Across the Kopamedza range we come upon the Zami Nagas, a group of only five villages, evidently belonging to the great Lahúpá division, upon whom we come next. How far the "Lahúpá" extends has not yet been clearly ascertained; we know, however, that he occupies a great portion of the watershed between Kopamedza and Shiroifarar, and that in a southerly direction he extends down the Iril and Ihang Rivers, whilst towards the north he probably goes some way down the course of the Lanier.

I may here remark that the shades of difference dividing one Naga tribe from another, especially if that other happens to be a close neighbour, are often very slight indeed. Thus, if we compare an Angami of Mezomah with a Kutchá Naga of Paplongmai, or with a Khezami of Kezakenoma, we should probably say they were very much alike; but let us miss over the nearest link or two, and compare the Angami with the Zami or Lahúpá, and we then see how almost totally unlike they are. Portions of the dialect, manners, customs, and dress of any one tribe we may like to take up will constantly keep cropping up in other tribes as we go on, thus clearly proving the unity of the race.

North and north-east of the Angami we come upon the "Sehmah Nagas," regarding whom we at present know very little beyond the fact that they possess five villages on the left bank of the Doyeng, and probably extend across to the other bank as well.

Immediately to the north of these Sehmah Nagas we have only very lately discovered the existence of another tribe, called the "Mezomah" or "Rengmah Naga." This tribe, as far as I have yet been able to ascertain, possesses seven villages containing about 2,000 houses, which, roughly speaking, we may calculate to contain a population of about 10,000 souls. It was from this tribe that in olden time the Rengmah Nagas now inhabiting the hills between the Kolliani and the Jumunah emigrated owing to intestine feuds. These latter Rengmahs were persuaded to pay in a regular revenue to Government in 1847, but after paying it for two years they refused to do so any more, and were apparently left alone until early in 1870, when I visited them, and finding that they were well able to pay their quota, I assessed them again, since when they have given no trouble whatever.

I may here make the general remark regarding the country lying between the Rengmahpani on the west and the prolongation of the Kopamedza range on the east, that I have never seen a hill country so thickly populated, so well cultivated, and so overrun with such a net-work of capital paths.

We now come upon what are generally called the Sebsaugor Nagas, inhabiting that long strip of hill country bordering Sebsaugor on the south, of whom we really know very little indeed, and that little has to be gleaned from the old records of Brodie's time (1842 and 1844), and a short paper written by Mr. Peale (above alluded to) which was published by the Asiatic Society in their Journal, Vol. XLI, Part I. From these papers we learn that between the Doyeng and the Dikhu the Naga country is divided into six Dwárs. Thus, commencing from the west, we have the "Lhotah Nagas," who are sub-divided into the "Paniphatias" consisting of ten villages, and the "Torphatias" or "Doyongias" with eleven villages; we next have the "Hati-ghorias," who have only six villages; and next to them we come upon the "Assyringias," also possessing six villages; these again are followed by the

"Dupdorias" with twelve villages; and finally we have the "Namsangias" group of but four villages. In like manner between the Dikhu and the Bori Dehing we meet with the "Tablungias," comprising thirteen villages, who are followed by the "Jaktoongias" with eight villages; next to whom come the "Mooloongs" with only five villages; these again are succeeded by the "Changnois," who are said to possess eight villages, after them come the small tribe termed "Joboka," which only comprises four villages; next we have the "Banparas," also with only four villages; and after them the "Mutons" or "Kooloongs," also with but four villages; next to this tribe are the Panidwaris with ten villages and the Bordoorias with eight villages; and, finally, we have the "Namsangias," also possessing eight villages, who, I may add, are in no way connected with the "Namsangias" who inhabit the low border hills on the left bank of the Dikhu, already alluded to above. In speaking of the country and tribes between the Bori Dihing and the Dikhu, Captain Brodie tells us that—"The portion of the hills we passed over may be described as a succession of steep ridges, our marches being generally up one side of a hill and down the other to a stream at the bottom; these streams generally forming the boundaries of tribes. The soil appears to be very fertile, and there is a very large portion of it under cultivation. \* \* \*

"The villages seem without exception on the top of precipitous hills with commanding views of all the approaches to them. \* \* \* The roads throughout are generally very good; near the villages they are sometime 20 or 30 feet wide. \* \* \* The men are a stout athletic race; most of the tribes have their faces tattooed with distinctive marks. \* \* \* At Tabloong, Konghan, and Jaktoong, they were in a state of nudity, their loins being lightly girt with a smooth rattan passed twice or thrice round the body. To the eastward a straight piece of cotton cloth of about 18 inches long and 9 broad is worn suspended from the middle."

Captain Brodie thinks the population of this strip of country lying between the Bori Dehing and the Dikhu cannot be less than from 40 to 50 thousand souls. He says, "the number of houses in the villages may vary from 40 to 300 or 400 in each," and he also mentions that "in the neighbourhood of Changnoi and Mooloong there are large herds of buffaloes and oxen," thus showing that they must be a wealthy community notwithstanding their intestine feuds.

Of the Western Nagas inhabiting the strip of country between the Dikhu and the Doyeng, Brodie gives us very little information indeed, and it is therefore very difficult to form even an approximate estimate of the population in this tract. I, however, gather from his report that both the people and the hills they inhabit are very like those to the eastward already described. One very marked difference which he notices is the great want of influence and power of the chiefs over their followers, which was almost nil upon this side, whereas, to the eastward of the Dikhu he had generally found that their orders were readily obeyed. I am myself, however, rather sceptical on this point, and am inclined to believe that the Naga nowhere really accepts a chief in our sense of the term. Chiefs they do have, but they are merely the nominal heads of each clan, men who by dint of their personal qualities have become leaders of public opinion, but without the least particle of power beyond that given them by the *vox populi* and that only *pro tem*, upon the particular question that may happen to be exciting attention at the time being. The Government of every Naga tribe with whom I have had intercourse is a purely democratical one, and whenever anything of public importance has to be undertaken, all the Chiefs (both old and young) meet together in solemn conclave, and then discuss and decide upon the action to be taken, and even then it often happens that the minority will not be bound by either the wish or act of the majority; and as to any one single Chief exercising absolute control over his people, the thing is unheard of.

I have already rather fully explained that we know nothing of the tribes lying behind and to the south of these Sebsaugor Nagas; and Brodie, I may here add, remarks that "beyond the Dikhu to the southward lies the great range which separates Assam from the Burmese dominions. The summit of this range could not be more than from 15 to 20 miles off. We could see roads and villages in many directions, and

the people of Changnoi seemed to know that there was a pass leading from thence to Burma, but they said they had little or no intercourse with the Nagas beyond them to the south, and could give no information as to the distance to the other side."

In another letter he says—"On referring to notes of my trip to Mogoung in 1835-36, I find a route was given me with the names of three stages towards Assam from the Shan District of Monpong on the Kyendwen as per margin. I think there can be little doubt but Longba is Loungparoo, and from what the Nagas mentioned it would appear to be a sort of entrepôt between the tribes on both sides."

Loungparoo, Loungseing, Santoung, Lum-  
singlong.

"I find also that, although our friendly Nagas have little knowledge as to the relative position of Longba with regard to the nearest Shan villages, further than that they can be reached in three days I have ascertained from Dhoanniahs, long residents in the Mogoung, that from Moongdow, a Shan village situated on the Kyendwen at the mouth of the Namee River, you can ascend to Longba in two days." Now as regards the route here alluded to, strange to say in the course of conversation with Itonias (or "Dhoanniahs," as Brodie calls them, although I believe they are really an offshoot of the Singphos), they have often assured me of the existence of a route across the eastern Naga Hills leading into the valley of the Khaiendwen, which they say is used (though not frequently) to this day, and I think in all probability the route here referred to must be that shown in our maps as the one by which the Burmese army invaded Assam some fifty years ago. I am, however, a little doubtful whether this route ought not to be placed a little further to the east, for Mr. Carnegie, the Assistant Commissioner at Jorehaut, tells us in a very late communication (dated 10th July 1873) that "the tribes of whom we have any actual knowledge inhabit merely the outer edge of the hills which extend from the southern boundary of the Assam Valley to Burma; none of the people we see come from villages more than three days' journey from the plains. \* \* \* Of the tribes beyond, who are called Abors, but who are of course Nagas, we know nothing," and if communication is still kept up across the great range, as my informant (the Itonia) said, it is very evident our officers in the plains know nothing about it. This, however, is, I think, not at all improbable, for, having held aloof, as we have done for years, from holding any direct communication with the tribes, we cannot possibly hope to know much about what is going on in their hills, and we have only to recall the fact that an armed party of Shans did actually visit the neighbourhood of Changnoi in 1846, thus clearly proving that there must be a more or less well-known route in that direction.

And, finally, we have the route over the Patkoi, which was visited by Mr. Jenkins (a tea planter) in December 1868, and again in December 1869; and judging from the description given by him of this route, I should say it must be anything but a favourite one. Thus we learn that he was no less than nine days after he left the last Assam village before he reached the Namyong village the furthest point to which he penetrated, and the consequence was that the day before he reached it he found that "there was barely rice enough in the camp to give each man one meal," and Bayfield and Hannay appear to have met with the same difficulty about supplies when they visited the same spot in 1837; so the country does not seem to have become more populous in the interval. The physical aspect of the country, however, offers no real obstacle, and the pass itself seems an easy one, as we learn that "the ascent was not steep," and no difficulty was experienced in getting ponies over it; but, owing to the old paths being no longer kept open, "the route has now fallen almost entirely into disuse," and Mr. Jenkins gives it as his opinion that "numbers of persons who leave Hookoong for Assam never arrive." "They lose the path; and wandering about in the jungles, starve to death or are killed by wild animals," and he therefore suggests that the opening up of a road would prove of no small value to the province of Assam—a question about which I think there can scarcely be two opinions.

The above note includes, I believe, in a condensed form almost all the information of any value regarding the Naga country which we possess up to date, and I trust it

may prove useful in throwing a little light upon that subject, which, as Mr. Mackenzie says, is "an anxious problem on which much thought has been spent and many official hopes been staked."

#### A.—THE PATKOI NAGAS.

Taking up the tribes then in the same order of geographical contiguity, which has been followed in the preceding part of this narrative, I have first to notice a group of Nagas living on the northern slopes of the Patkoi mountains with whom we first came in

contact about 1835. In the correspondence of that period regarding the Singpho Chief, the Duffa Gam, mention is made of raids committed upon villages under our protection by Nagas of the Upper Patkoi Hills. The first impression among our local officers was that we had now in this quarter to reckon upon frequent incursions by Nagas as well as by hostile Singphos and Burmese; and orders were given by Government to retaliate sharply and severely upon all villages concerned <sup>(1)</sup> in such outrages. But it was shortly afterwards discovered that these Nagas were themselves most peaceably inclined, and that if any of our villages had been attacked by them, it was only in mistaken retaliation for wrongs done to the Naga tribes by Sing-

phos either of Assam or Burma. Their sufferings from the Singphos. The Singphos seem in fact to have sought by conquest of the Nagas to supply the deficiency of slave labour following on the annexation of Assam. In 1837 when a party of British officers was sent across the Patkoi to negotiate with Burma regarding the Duffa Gam, they encountered a war party of Singphos fresh from the sack of Naga Settlements and dragging along gangs of captives. In those days we <sup>(2)</sup> considered all upon this frontier that was not Burmese to be actual British territory, and our officers had no scruples about interfering to deliver the Naga captives. Subsequently it was proposed to give permanent protection to these Naga clans by establishing a post under a European officer on the upper waters of the Bori Dehing. It was hoped that such an officer would be able to take efficient political charge of all this Singpho-Naga tract. The Government, however, felt doubtful of the expediency

of assuming active charge of this sparsely-peopled wilderness; and indicated its preference for the plan of deputing an officer from head quarters occasionally to visit the tribes and settle disputes as they arose. A further series of Singpho outrages shortly after led to the temporary occupation of a military station on the Bori Dihing and to the deputation of Captain Hannay to report more fully as to what was feasible to give protection to the Naga tribes. But the result of his enquiries was to show that Government had taken the

(1) Political Proceedings, 24th November 1835, Nos. 32 and 33.

(2) Ditto, 10th April 1837, Nos. 120 to 123.

correct view, and that, unless the Nagas would remove their settlements within the circle of our posts<sup>(1)</sup> we could afford them no effectual protection. Their communities\* were few in number and reckoned in all at under 5,000 souls. To protect by military defences a mountain territory 90 miles long by 40 miles deep inhabited by such a mere handful of people was clearly more than Government was warranted in attempting.

From this point the notices of these Patkoi Nagas are few and unimportant, and in later years their very existence seems to have been lost sight of or to have been confusedly merged in that of the greater tribes to the west who are ordinarily communicated with through the officials of Sebsaugor. At any rate in 1871 the Deputy Commissioner of Luckimpur reporting specially on the Nagas of his district stated their numbers at 14,383 living in 2,865 houses and belonging to <sup>(2)</sup> seven different clans, but the names of the clans as given by him are certainly most of them names of Sebsaugor clans, viz., Nam Sangia, Bor Dwaria, Dadum, Joboka, Banfera, Toopigonuja, and Holagonuja. The fact is that the Eastern clans of the Sebsaugor Nagas trade both with that district and with Luckhimpore.

The general character of the Inner Line Regulation has been described in Chapter VIII above. The question of laying down the Inner Line for the Luckimpore district generally was taken up by the Chief Commissioner of Assam in 1875. South of Jaipur it was found necessary to enclose within it a tract of country which had not up to that time been subject to the formal and plenary authority of the district officer. The object of enclosing this tract was to bring into the ordinary jurisdiction the tea gardens of Namsang, Taurack, and Hukunjuri. For the Taurack Garden compensation was paid to the Mithonia Nagas. For the Hukunjuri and Namsang Gardens similar compensation was paid to the Namsang and Bordwaria Nagas.† The sums thus paid are of course recovered as revenue from the occupiers of the gardens.

Under the orders of the Government of India the 'Inner Line' is defined merely for purposes of jurisdiction. It does not decide the sovereignty of the territory beyond. The active control of the district officer need not necessarily extend up to the boundary, but it must under no circumstances be carried further. Beyond the line the tribes are left to manage their own affairs with only such interference on the

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\* The names of the settlements are given as follow : Takauk, Kengew, Taheoo, Kotoo, Hasang, Loongsang, Yalung, Tonging, Nekjuk, Kambah, Tiethah, Tiesoo.

† All Sebsaugor tribes.

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(1) Political Proceedings, 8th May 1837, Nos. 64 to 66.  
 Political Proceedings, 19th June 1837, Nos. 57 and 58.  
 Political Proceedings, 8rd July 1837, Nos. 48 and 49.  
 Political Proceedings, 14th August 1837, Nos. 74 to 78.  
 Political Proceedings, 25th Sept. 1837, Nos. 111 to 113.

(2) From the Assam Commissioner, No. 379 T, dated 15th May 1871.



part of the frontier officers in their political capacity as may be considered advisable with the view of establishing a personal influence for good among the chiefs and tribes. Any attempt to bring the country between the settled districts of British India and Burma under our direct administration, even in the loosest way that could be contrived under Act XXXIII. Vic., Cap. 8, or to govern it as British territory is to be steadily resisted. No European planter is to be allowed to accept any grant beyond the line or under a tenure derived from any chief or tribe<sup>(1)</sup>.

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(1) Political Proceedings, February 1872, No. 131.

## CHAPTER XIII.

## THE NAGA TRIBES. B.—THE SEEBSAUGOR NAGAS.

The tribes occupying the low hills to the south of the Seebsaugor district have been in close communication with our local officers ever since the first annexation of Assam. The Assamese Government had at times indeed claimed them as its subjects, and Purunder Sing is known to have asserted successfully his right to share with the Nagas the produce of the salt manufacture of the lower hills. The hill chiefs, when the Native Government was strong, came down annually bringing gifts, that may perhaps have been considered to be tribute. It has in fact been conjectured that the inhabitants of this tract are descended from settlements of hill mercenaries of various tribes planted here by the ancient Ahom Kings, and the variety of the tribal dialects is adduced to support this theory. However that may be, it is certain that several of the chiefs had received grants of *khuts* or lands, and of *bheels* or fishing waters on the plains, and enjoyed assignments of *paiks* like the ordinary Assamese nobility.

The tract occupied by the clans of whom we have any knowledge may be taken to extend back for 30 miles from the frontier of Seebsaugor to the Patkoi Range, and to run for 60 miles from east to west. The tribes in this tract are termed '*Boree*' or dependent; beyond them in the recesses of the Patkoi are many '*Abor*' or independent clans, of whom we know little save from some one or other of them occasionally figuring in a raid. The Abor trade is chiefly conducted through the medium of the '*Boree*' clans, which last, in spite of their title, are really more powerful than those beyond them.

In the years 1840-44 our dealings with the '*Boree*' villages became more direct and intimate. Captain Brodie, then Principal Assistant to the Governor General's Agent, drew attention to the fact that the perpetual quarrels subsisting between the different villages and clans showed a dangerous tendency to boil over, as it were, into the plains, where our revenue-paying villages offered themselves a tempting prey to savages already armed for internecine strife, and when in fighting humour not very particular as to the precise direction of their raids. Brodie, therefore, suggested that he should be allowed to bring them all under formal agreement to the British Government, and exact a small annual tribute as token of submission, and the course of events led very shortly to the acceptance of his proposals.

State of things in 1840.

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From the records of 1840 it appears that the Nagas living near Jeypore, the Namsang, Pani Dwár, and Bor Dwár Nagas, lived chiefly by manufacturing salt, which they retailed to the people of the plains.<sup>(1)</sup> There were in the lower hills eighty-five salt wells in all, of which the Government was allowed to be absolute owner of only three, enjoying merely a right to a certain number of flues or fire-places at each of the others. These rights Purunder Sing had regularly asserted, but our officers had contented themselves with levying a duty of 20 per cent. on all salt brought down to the regular markets for sale. Early in 1841 the Government abolished these duties, thereby giving a great stimulus to the intercourse between the Nagas and the plains.<sup>(2)</sup>

A missionary, Mr. Bronson, had for some years resided among the tribes, teaching them Christianity and the art of cultivating tea.<sup>(3)</sup>

Mr. Bronson's mission. The Governor General's Agent thought so highly of this gentleman's work, that he asked Government to give Rs. 100 a month towards his Naga schools. Government, however, at this time thought it improper to give direct aid to missions, even when working among savage tribes, forgetting perhaps that it had made grants in 1829 to the Garo missions with very fair results, but it agreed to pass for a year any small sums shown in the Agent's contingent bill and not exceeding a monthly maximum of Rs. 100, "for objects of practical utility connected with the improvement of the Naga country, and spent with the view of leading its population into habits of industry." The mission school was kept up till Mr. Bronson was compelled, by illness, to leave the place.<sup>(4)</sup> While it lasted it was very successful, as many chiefs of the eastern tribes sent their sons to him for instruction. It is interesting to note that Mr. Bronson, who knew these Nagas better than any European before or since, was all in favour of Brodie's plans of direct and active control. He reported that the only effect of our tacit surrender of our rights in the salt mines had been to make the tribes independent and insolent as they had never been before. His prognostications were certainly supported by subsequent events, for in March 1841 the Nagas of Teeroo and Kapung Dwárs attacked a party of Assamese on the road to Borhâth; and the chiefs refused to attend when summoned to explain their conduct.<sup>(5)</sup> Guards had therefore to be posted to close the passes to trade and so to coerce the hillmen into submission. This being done during the rains, when there is little traffic between hill and plain, had not much effect, and in the cold weather Brodie was ordered to enter the hills with a party of troops to compel all the chiefs to enter into

(1) Revenue Proceedings, 27th September 1840, Nos. 7 and 8.

(2) Revenue Proceedings, 8th August 1842, Nos. 125 and 126.

(3) Political Proceedings, 11th May 1840, Nos. 128 and 129.

(4) Political Proceedings, 22nd November 1841, Nos. 1 to 24.

(5) Political Proceedings, 19th April 1841, Nos. 78 and 79.

engagements, such as had already been taken by a few of the clans, binding them to keep the peace towards one another and towards our subjects.

In January 1842 Captain Brodie began his tour for the pacification of the Naga Frontier between the  
 Brodie's tour, 1842.                      Dikho and the Bori Dihing.

He found in this tract ten different clans—

(1) The Namsangias with	... 8 villages.
(2) „ Bordwaras with	... 8 do.
(3) „ Panidwaras with	... 10 do.
(4) „ Mutons or Kooloongs with	... 4 do.
(5) „ Banferas with	... 4 do.
(6) „ Jobokas with	... 4 do.
(7) „ Changnois with	... 8 do.
(8) „ Mooloongs with	... 5 do.
(9) „ Jaktoongias with	... 8 do.
(10) „ Tabloongias with	... 13 do.

The Mooloong Raja, head of the Teroo Dwár, was the most powerful of the Naga chiefs, and the Changnoi Raja, of Namsang, ranked next to him. To the latter all the Nagas from the Dikho to Jeypore paid tribute.

Brodie took engagements from all the chiefs to abstain from outrages in the plains, to be responsible for the surrender of offenders within the limits of their Dwárs, to discontinue hostilities with other tribes, leaving Government to punish any attacks made on them, and, finally, to abstain from importing Naga children as slaves to British territory. All existing feuds he settled. The villages in these parts were found situated on high hills surrounded by ditches and barricades indicating an ever present fear of attack. Each village had a large building or morung, where hung a hollow tree that was beaten to give the alarm of an enemy's approach. In the morungs the skulls of slain foes were also kept. In one morung Brodie counted 130 of these trophies. The arms used were spear, dao, and cross-bow. All the men went nearly naked, a thin rattan passed twice round the loins being the prevailing fashion among a large section of the people. The chiefs were distinguished by girdles of brass-plates. An Assamese, Neeranye Deka Phokon, who had been an officer under Raja Poorunjer, gave much assistance to Brodie in his tour, and was made Superintendent of the Naga frontier on Rs. 30 a month. The whole population was estimated at between 40,000 and 50,000.

The agreements thus accepted by the chiefs were not in every case or all at once successful in preventing raids by subordinate sections of tribes. In November 1842 the Khettree Nagas, a clan owning some sort of fealty to the Changnoi Raja, attacked a friendly village, and when Captain Brodie, attended by the Namsang and Bor Dwár Nagas,

to whom the village belonged, went<sup>(1)</sup> up to enquire into matters, they even attacked him; and he was compelled to retire till troops came to his assistance.<sup>(2)</sup> The Khettrees then deserted their village and withdrew to the inner hills.

In January 1844 Captain Brodie made a tour through the western clans lying between the Dikho and the Doyeng. His report mentions in detail the villages visited and gives the title of chief to the head of each; but from other papers it would appear that on this side the

Brodie's tour, 1844.

tribes arranged themselves in six groups; the Namsangia (not the same as the Namsangias of the east), with four villages; the Dopdaria, with twelve villages; the Charmgaya or Asringaya, with six villages; the Hatheegurhiya, with seven villages;<sup>(3)</sup> the Doyengiya or Torphatia, with eleven villages; and the Panihatia, with ten villages. The Panihatias and Doyengias are described as branches of the Lhota Naga tribe.\* No information is given by Brodie as to the probable strength of these western clans. He was met on his tour by the chief of the Seema Nagas, a powerful clan of the inner hills, ruling over 14 villages, who desired to open a trade with the plains; and he obtained a certain amount of information regarding the names of various Abor communities, of which we hear nothing nowadays. They are probably now known under other appellations. Generally he remarked that the Boree Nagas to the east of the Dikho seemed more powerful than those to the west, and were more under a settled form of government by chiefs. They held also apparently a somewhat effective control over the Abor tribes of the interior—a state of things which did not obtain between the Dikho and the Doyeng. The western communities were found to be disorganised and democratic, and their principal men being ordinarily drunk had no authority in the villages, and could not be trusted. Still Brodie cherished hopes that, "though no absolute confidence could be placed on such vile people as the Nagas," the arrangements made by him, and which were similar to those effected in the eastern tract, would prevent their disturbing the peace of the plains.

To each of the Dwárs in this quarter was attached a Kotokie or clan representative to be the channel of communication between the Government and the tribe ordinarily using that Dwár. These

The Naga Kotokies.

men were paid by a remission of the poll tax, and under our revenue system received a remission on their land equal to the amount

\* The Lhota Nagas were long afterwards included within the Naga Hills District. In a report of 1871 they are stated to have 10 villages, only one of which, Sonareegaon, entered into an agreement with Brodie. They claimed possession of a *khat* in the plains of 160 bighas in extent, and usually come down to trade by the route of the Doyeng. (Judicial Proceedings, October 1871, Nos. 202 to 204; December 1871, Nos. 279 to 281.)

(1) Political Proceedings, 4th January 1843, Nos. 149 to 151.

(2) Political Proceedings, 1st February 1843, Nos. 91 to 93.

(3) Political Proceedings, 19th October 1844, Nos. 123 to 126.

of the old remission of poll tax. Some of the Kotokies also managed the khats or grants held by different Naga chiefs on the plains, and from reports of 1871 it may be gathered that they, being generally Assamese, have in most instances succeeded in appropriating these lands altogether. One of these khats still claimed by the Nagas is Bhitur Namsang, and their rights over this were acknowledged in 1871.<sup>(1)</sup>

The total number of Kotokies in Sebsaugor was eighty-eight, and the total revenue remission on account of Nagas (Kotokies and Khats) was Rs. 797.<sup>(2)</sup> Government agreed on Brodie's suggestion to give the Lhota Nagas some lands on the Dluksiri, and to compensate some other chiefs for lands formerly held by them, but which had become lost to them.

In 1846 an attack upon the Boree Naga tribes of Changnoi and Tangroong by some Abor Nagas (called Longhas), accompanied by Singphos or Shans, took Brodie<sup>(3)</sup> again into the hills. It was supposed that the Singphos had come from the valley of the Kyendwen in Burma, and some anxiety was felt locally as to the possibility of a Burmese inroad, but nothing more was heard of them, and the thing died out.

The plan that Brodie proposed for future management was that every village should be visited periodically by an officer with a strong escort to prove to the people that they could easily be got at. Then he meant uniformly to insist on their referring all quarrels to the Sebsaugor officials, and he intended to punish contumacy by fine, occupation, or otherwise. Where an Abor tribe attacked a Boree clan, he did not propose retaliatory expeditions, but trusted to negotiation to bring in the Abors to submit themselves to our officers. In brief, the policy proposed here as elsewhere on the north-east frontier during the early days of our occupation of Assam was one of active control, and tolerably vigorous interference in tribal matters.

It was at first found necessary from time to time to prove to the chiefs by show of force that the Government intended them to keep to their engagements.

In April 1844, for instance, the Bor Mootuns attacked the Banferas, and Brodie had to send up troops<sup>(4)</sup> to enforce his demand for the offenders. The expedition brought down the chief of the

(1) Judicial Proceedings, September 1871, Nos. 47 to 49.

(2) Political Proceedings, 18th January 1845, Nos. 58 to 61.

(3) Political Proceedings, 23rd May 1846, Nos. 28 and 29.

(4) Political Proceedings, 15th May 1847, Nos. 14 to 18.

offending tribe a prisoner to the plains. Again, in April 1849, the Namsang Nagas committed<sup>(1)</sup> a murder on the plains, and a similar plan was adopted to compel obedience. The offenders were, however, in this case given up as soon as the troops showed themselves at any of the villages reached by Captain Brodie. Generally it was inferred that the Nagas in this part were too entirely dependent<sup>(2)</sup> on the plains to afford to quarrel with us. It was Brodie's opinion that only a little time was required to make them see that we were determined to stop outrages, and in fact the frontier settled down and became perfectly tranquil. As a rule no difficulty was found in getting the tribes to act up to their engagements.

The events of the next few years were unimportant.

In April 1851 some Banfera Nagas committed a cruel murder in Sebsaugor on the Dhodur Allee (the frontier road running along the foot of the hills and at that time representing the line of our revenue jurisdiction), and then fled to the Juboka villages.<sup>(3)</sup> On our closing the Dwār the Juboka Raja gave them up.

In March 1852 the Lhota Nagas attacked Borpathor and killed some few persons, but were beaten off by the villagers. The Commissioner on this ordered<sup>(4)</sup> the resumption of two khats at Nagoora and Jamoogoori, hitherto held by these Nagas, till the murderers should be given up, and muskets were given to the Borpathor men to defend themselves in case of future attack. The result of these steps has not been traced, but certainly no further raid or outbreak was reported to Government.

In the cold season of 1853-54, there was an outbreak between the Namsang and Bor Dwār Nagas.<sup>(5)</sup> The Sebsaugor Principal Assistant, however, brought about an amicable settlement.

Other cases of murders by Sebsaugor Nagas are reported in 1854-55, but the chiefs always gave up the accused on demand.

Soon after this the policy of Government with reference to these tribes was radically changed. Non-interference became the rule, and our officers were not encouraged to visit the hills or to keep up intercourse with the hillmen. The Boree Nagas, however, on the Sebsaugor frontier continued to be generally well behaved. They frequented the

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(1) Political Proceedings, 7th July 1849, Nos. 30 and 31.

(2) Political Proceedings, 5th July 1850, Nos. 55 to 57.

(3) Judicial Proceedings, 8th April 1852, No. 162.

(4) Judicial Proceedings, 20th January 1853, Nos. 120 to 125.

(5) Judicial Proceedings, 6th April 1854, Nos. 180 to 184.

plain markets regularly and combined to exclude therefrom the Abor Nagas of the upper hills. The charms of trade appeared indeed to have taken so strong a hold on the clans in this quarter, both Boree and Abor, that it was almost the only frontier on which the policy

Effects of closing the Dwárs. of closing the markets on occasion of a murder or outrage by hillmen was speedily followed by surrender of the guilty parties. In April 1861 the Dwárs were closed to Naga traders by order of the Commissioner of Assam, in consequence of the murder of one Tonoo Cachari in the Gelaki Dwár, used by the Namsang and neighbouring clans. In February following, the Nangota Abor Nagas, who were not known to us to be the guilty tribe, surrendered five of their number as those who had committed the murder. This surrender, it appeared, they made under pressure brought to bear on them by the Boree Nagas of Tabloong, Jaktoong, Kamsang, and Namsang, who being much distressed by the closure of the Dwárs threatened to attack the Nangotas if they did not give up the offenders. In March 1863<sup>(1)</sup> a murder was committed in Mouzah Oboipore of Seebesaugor by Banfera Nagas; and at the close of the same month the guard-house in Gelaki Dwár was burnt down by a raiding party belonging apparently to some of the Abor tribes. It was never distinctly brought home to any of them, and the Government did not on this occasion order the closing of the Dwárs.

Some alarm was, however, felt at these disturbances on a usually tranquil part of the frontier; and when in 1866 it was reported that Naga trading parties were wandering about Seebesaugor armed, contrary to custom, with spears and dāos, stringent orders were given for disarming temporarily all Nagas who passed the police out-posts. In November

Attack on Gelaki. 1867 the Gelaki guard-house was again attacked at night,<sup>(2)</sup> and some of the constables killed. The outrage created much excitement among the European settlers of the neighbourhood, which was not certainly lessened by a subsequent attack upon a village not far off. Every possible motive was suggested to account for the outbreak. Every known clan was suspected in turn. One officer thought the prohibition to carry spears to market had something to do with the raid. Another was convinced that the encroachments of tea planters in the hills were unsettling all the frontier tribes. A third thought survey operations had excited their suspicion. The Dwárs were at any rate closed to trade; the out-posts strengthened; and neglected stockades hastily repaired. The stoppage of trade again proved a successful policy. The Tabloong, Namsang, and other Nagas, who were now carrying on a most profitable traffic with the tea gardens, which they could not afford to

(<sup>1</sup>) Judicial Proceedings, May 1863, Nos. 391 to 395.

(<sup>2</sup>) Judicial Proceedings, December 1867, Nos. 57 to 64.

Judicial Proceedings, February 1868, Nos. 12 to 24.

Judicial Proceedings, March 1868, Nos. 216 and 217.

Judicial Proceedings, June 1868, Nos. 136 to 139.



lose, speedily combined, and in a few months' time they succeeded in tracing out the raiders, and arresting by force or strategy two of their leaders, who were delivered over to the British authorities for punishment. These men proved to belong to the Yungia Abor Nagas, a remote clan in the upper hills, who actuated by a love of plunder and a craving for skulls had led a stealthy war party through the trackless jungles to the plains below; and had, as they said, attacked the police station under the notion that it was a settlement of ryots—a mistake not very creditable to the discipline of the post.

In 1869 the Changnoi<sup>(1)</sup> Nagas were charged by a tea planter with

Difficulties with tea gardens. carrying off three labourers from his garden on the pretence that they

were escaped slaves. The Nagas were communicated with by the Deputy Commissioner and denied the charge, declaring that the men had left the garden because they did not get their wages. The Nagas were warned not to take the law into their own hands, and the planters advised to cultivate a good understanding with their savage neighbours and to avoid engaging hillmen unless they were prepared to face difficulties arising from such relations.

The rapid extension of tea cultivation along this frontier gave rise to considerable correspondence between 1869 and 1873.\* The limit of the revenue jurisdiction of Lukhimpore and Sebsaugor to the south was, as above noticed, the old frontier road called the Dhodur Allee and Ladoigurh road. Although the Government claimed as British territory the whole country up to the boundaries of Manipur and Burma, it had hitherto treated the Naga tract as outside Assam for all civil purposes. The tea planters had long since in many places, both in Lukhimpore and Sebsaugor, taken up lands south of the revenue line, in some instances paying revenue to us, and in others to the Naga chiefs. The earlier settlers found it to their interest to conciliate the Nagas, and troubled themselves little about Government protection. But now the fashion of claiming police assistance in every little difficulty came into vogue, and the Government had to consider what course it should adopt. The question acquired prominence from a quarrel<sup>(2)</sup> between a planter and some Changnoi Nagas in Lukhimpore early in 1871, which led to serious apprehension of Naga raids.

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\* An account of the Boree Nagas between the Dikho and Doyeng as they were in 1873 will be found in the Appendix.

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- (1) Judicial Proceedings, April 1869, Nos. 274 to 276.  
Judicial Proceedings, February 1870, Nos. 110 and 111.
  - (2) Judicial Proceedings, March 1871, Nos. 278 and 274.  
Judicial Proceedings, April 1871, Nos. 1 to 3.  
Judicial Proceedings, April 1871, Nos. 39 to 41.  
Judicial Proceedings, April 1871, Nos. 194 to 198.  
Judicial Proceedings, April 1871, Nos. 223 to 232.  
Judicial Proceedings, May 1871, Nos. 36 and 37.  
Judicial Proceedings, September 1871, Nos. 30 to 46.  
Judicial Proceedings, March 1872, Nos. 118 to 115.

At length in 1872 the occurrence of a massacre of Borlangia Nagas perpetrated by Kamsingias within two miles of a tea garden showed that measures for defining clearly the limits of Naga territory towards the plains could no longer be deferred. Under the provisions of the Inner Line Regulation already described, such a boundary was accordingly laid down, compensation being paid to the Nagas for the area occupied by those tea gardens which lay beyond the Inner Line.

The later references<sup>(1)</sup> to the Sebsaugor Nagas contain an account of differences between them and one Mr. Minto, tea planter, which do not seem to have been of any great importance. There appear also to have been also certain intestine quarrels brought to the notice of our officers. With the tribal disputes of Nagas beyond the Inner Line the Government does not now interfere, save so far as the good offices of the Deputy Commissioner of Sebsaugor may serve to bring about peace.

In 1875 an attempt made to complete the survey of the Eastern Naga Hills led to serious results. Lieutenant Holcombe, Assistant Commissioner of Jaipur, and the Survey Party under Captain Badgeley, were on the 2nd February treacherously attacked at Ninu, a Naga village four days' march from the plains. Lieutenant Holcombe and eighty men were butchered, while Captain Badgeley and fifty men were wounded. Captain Badgeley succeeded in bringing off the remnants of the party, and a military expedition sent up promptly to the hill (in March 1875), destroyed the offending villages, and recovered the heads of the murdered men, and nearly all the arms and plunder taken by the Nagas. In 1876 a small force again escorted a survey party through the hills, and again burnt Ninu which refused to surrender some of those concerned in the massacre of 1875.

Since then the Nagas on this frontier have given no trouble directly ; but the Namsingias and Bordwáris have for years been at feud among themselves, and there is always some danger of a collision between the members of these or other warring clans taking place within our border. Petty occurrences of this description have indeed more than once been reported, but the offending villages have hitherto readily submitted to the fines imposed on them by our officers for violating our territory. An American Baptist Missionary, the Reverend Mr. Clarke, has for some years past been settled in the Naga village of Molong Kong, south of Amguri, and his labours are apparently bearing fruit in leading to the settlement of blood feuds, and a desire on the part of those villages which have come under his influence to live at peace

(1) Political Proceedings, January 1873, Nos. 20 to 22.  
 Political Proceedings, March 1873, No. 43.  
 Political Proceedings, June 1873, Nos. 56 to 59.  
 Political Proceedings, November 1873, Nos. 73 to 82.  
 Political Proceedings, December 1873, Nos. 8 and 9.

with their neighbours. They are, however, exposed to attacks from the outer tribes, against which they desire to have the assistance of Government. They have been told that they must depend upon themselves, show a firm front, and avoid all provocation to quarrel. The local trade with the Nagas is largely developing, and even the remoter Lhota Nagas are now found visiting our markets and showing a wish to maintain commercial intercourse with the plains. Altogether the state of the South Lukhimpore and Sebsaugor frontier is at present satisfactory. The latest information gives the strength of the tribes thus—going from east to west:

	Villages.	Population.
1. Namsangias or Jaipurias ...	30	25 to 30,000
2. Bordwarias ...	10	10,000
3. Mutonias ...	4	4,000
4. Jabokas or Banferas, or Abhoi- purya ...	12	20,000
5. Sangloi or Changnoi ...	?	20,000
6. Tabloong or Naked, including Moolungs, Jaktungs, and Tablungs ...	30	25,000
7. Tribes on the Patkoi ...	?	10,000

## CHAPTER XIV.

## THE NAGA TRIBES. C.—THE ANGAMI NAGAS.

Crossing the Doyeng westward, we come to the tract known as the country of the Angami Nagas. For long years the tribes inhabiting this tract were supposed to be a powerful homogeneous race of highlanders. The fact, however, is that here, as on the Sebsaugor frontier, the country is divided among cognate but warring clans, which have all, until very recent times, been ready to raid indifferently upon neighbouring villages or upon British territory as opportunity offered or the prospect of plunder prompted. Our relations with these tribes have from a very early date been troubled; and the problem of their management is in fact only now being solved.

We began to hear of them soon after the close of the earliest of our wars with Burma.

The importance of opening up direct communication between Manipuri Expeditions of 1832 and 1833. Assam and Manipur\* was at that time much insisted upon, and it was in the course of explorations directed to this end that we first came into conflict with the Nagas of these hills. In January 1832 Captains Jenkins and Pemberton led 700 Manipuri troops with 800 coolies from the Manipur valley, *via* Popolongmai, Samoogoodting and the Dhunsiri to Mohung Dijooa on the Jumoona.<sup>(1)</sup> They had literally to fight their way through the whole Kutchha and Angami Naga country. So irritated were the hillmen by this invasion that British troops were sent to Mohung Dijooa to protect Assam from a threatened inroad of the united clans. In the cold season following (1832-33) Raja Gumbheer Sing of Manipur, accompanied by the Manipur Levy under Lieutenant Gordon, again marched through to Assam by a route a few miles to the east of Jenkins' track.<sup>(2)</sup> They too had to fight almost every step of the road. Facts came to light which made it clear that the object which Gumbheer Sing had in view was the permanent conquest of the Naga Hills. The ambitious Manipuri would have been a very dangerous neighbour for our vassal Purunder Sing, whom we were then endeavouring to establish on the throne of Upper

\* It was even proposed in 1831 to make over to Manipur the defence against Burma of the whole Sadiya Frontier.

(1) Political Proceedings, 5th March 1832, Nos. 69-71.  
Political Proceedings, 20th March 1832, No. 110.  
Political Proceedings, 30th April 1832, No. 43.

(2) Political Proceedings, 14th January 1833, Nos. 69-70.  
Political Proceedings, 30th March 1833, No. 110.  
Political Proceedings, 30th May 1833, No. 105.

Assam, and the Government began to feel uncomfortable in prospect of Gumbheer Sing's operations.<sup>(1)</sup> It did not absolutely prohibit him from subjugating the Nagas; but it forbade him to descend into the plains on the Assam side. Captain Jenkins, when reporting with Pemberton in 1833-34 on the North-East Frontier, proposed to give up to Manipur definitely all the hills between the Doyeng and Dhunsiri. This proposal did not receive any formal approval, but it came to be supposed in a general kind of way that Manipur exercised some sort of authority over the southern portion of the Naga Hills. In 1835 indeed the forest between the Doyeng and the Dhunsiri was declared to be the boundary between Manipur and Assam.<sup>(2)</sup>

But besides all the complications arising out of the question of the extent of Manipuri jurisdiction and of communication between that State and Assam, we were brought into contact with the Angamis in

The North Cachar Hills under Tularam. another way, viz., by the acquisition of Cachar with its hill territory, running up as this did between the Angami Hills and the Khasi Hills, to the very confines of Nowgong. Cachar was formally annexed to British territory on 14th August 1832<sup>(3)</sup> on the death of its Raja, Govind Chunder, who left no descendant either lineal or adopted. The principal Chief in the North Cachar Hills at the time of annexation was Tularam Senaputty. This man was the son of Kacha Din, a table servant of a former Raja of Cachar, and had himself been an orderly in attendance on Govind Chunder. Kacha Din had been appointed by the Raja to some office in the hills and had rebelled in 1813. Govind Chunder enticed him down to the plains and had him assassinated. Tularam then set himself to avenge his father's death, and now by the aid of the Burmese, now by his own levies, managed to hold out against every effort of the Raja to expel him from the hills. In 1828 Tularam made over his levies to his cousin Govind Ram, who, after defeating Govind Chunder in the last attempt made by that prince to reconquer the hills, turned upon Tularam and drove him into Jaintia. In 1829 Tularam, with the assistance of the Manipuris, expelled Govind Ram, who then submitted himself to Raja Govind Chunder. At this stage Mr. Scott, the Governor General's Agent, anxious to stop the constant border warfare, induced Govind Chunder to assign to Tularam a definite tract of country to be recognised as his separate fief,<sup>(4)</sup> bounded on the west by the Kopili, north by Bhateebagram, south by the Julinga as far as Keynugur Mukh, and east by Samseyagram. After the annexation of Cachar, this territory was reduced in area<sup>(5)</sup> as a punishment

(1) Political Proceedings, 19th December 1833, Nos. 85-93.

(2) Political Proceedings, 11th February 1835, No. 90.

(3) Political Proceedings, 9th July 1832, No. 16.

(4) Secret Proceedings, 14th August 1829, No. 5.

(5) Political Proceedings, 29th October 1832, Nos. 132-133.

Political Proceedings, 3rd December 1832, Nos. 108-104.

Political Proceedings, 31st July 1834, No. 22 A. C.

Political Proceedings, 16th October 1834, Nos. 52-54.

for the murder by Tularam of two British subjects, and his jurisdiction was restricted to a tract lying between the Dhumsairi and Doyeng, the Naga Hills and the Jumcoona, a pension being also allowed him of Rs. 50 per mensem. This tract lay on the eastern side of North Cachar, and was about 2,224 square miles in extent.\*

When in 1835 our hill villages in North Cachar were found to be constantly suffering from Naga exactions and raids, the Government conceived that the duty of controlling the hostile Nagas devolved jointly upon Tularam and the Manipur State, as the two powers holding jurisdiction over at least some portions of the Naga Hills. It was proposed, therefore, that a line of posts to protect our subjects should be established by Tularam and the Manipuris at Semkhor and along the neighbouring Naga frontier.<sup>(1)</sup> Tularam protested earnestly that he had no control over the Nagas or any means of checking their raids; while Manipur, whose only system of control consisted in raids as savage as those of the Nagas themselves, did occupy Semkhor for a time and harass the Nagas in a desultory way, the only effect of which was to bring down the hillmen upon our villages in force as soon as the Manipuris had withdrawn. Captain Jenkins, now Commissioner of Assam, who knew something of the real position of Manipur in these hills, urged upon Government the impropriety of encouraging that State in its career of aggression against the Nagas. Its troops got no pay, and had to live on the plunder of the villages they occupied. The only effect of Manipuri occupation had been to exasperate the tribes. The Government was not prepared itself to take over the Naga country, and still inclined to regard the Manipuris as the *de facto* masters of the hills. It therefore persisted in calling upon Manipur to occupy the country of the Angamis and arranged at the same time to depute a detachment of sepoys under a European officer to prevent any needless outrage by the Manipuri levies. The very terms of the instructions issued for the guidance of this officer showed that in Calcutta the Government had no clear knowledge of either the geographical or political situation.

The continued remonstrances of the Assam Commissioner led at length to a cancelment of the call upon Manipur, and a European officer was in 1837 ordered to occupy a post near the Naga country and

\* Tularam held the most of this till 1844, when he made over its management to his sons, Nokoolram and Brijnath Burmon. From them it was resumed in 1854 by Government on account of raids committed upon the Nagas, the family getting small pensions instead with a grant of revenue-free land.

Political Proceedings, 10th October 1844, Nos. 76 to 78.

G. O. No. 4611, dated 14th October 1833.

(<sup>1</sup>) Judicial Proceedings, 22nd November 1836, Nos. 37-39.  
Judicial Proceedings, 17th January 1837, Nos. 72-74.

endeavour to bring the Chiefs to terms.<sup>(1)</sup> The expectation of fresh war, with Burma prevented his actual deputation for the time; but the Court of Directors having now condemned emphatically the policy of making over to Manipur fresh tracts of mountain country for conquest or management, the first renewal of raids led in 1838 to a revival of the proposal to depute some English officer to deal locally with the Naga difficulty. The raising of a small Cachari levy was sanctioned to assist in this especial service, and the whole tract of North Cachar was transferred to Assam and attached to the district of Nowgong, under the belief that the Assam officials could deal more effectually with frontier matters of the kind than those of Dacca to which Cachar belonged. Mr. Grange, Sub-Assistant at Nowgong, was chosen to conduct the first Angami expedition. He was directed to investigate fully the causes of the Angami raids, and to endeavour to punish the Chiefs of the large villages of Konemah and Mozemah who were known to be implicated in these outrages. Owing to mismanagement, Mr. Grange was not properly supplied with troops and carriage, and his expedition degenerated into a somewhat hurried march through a part only of the Naga Hills.

Mr. Grange discovered that a great trade in slaves was carried on by the Angamis with Bengali merchants: and that one main object of the raids was to procure supplies of such slaves. The villages most frequently attacked were small settlements of Naga stock occupying clearings in the south of Tularam's hills.

Several of the independent Naga villages received Mr. Grange in a friendly spirit. At Beremah he was shewn the remains of a circular fort built by Raja Kishen Chunder of Cachar, who had, the Nagas said, once invaded their hills. He saw also an old 10-pounder which the Raja had left behind him on his retreat. Possibly this trophy was exhibited by way of a significant hint; for, though some clans made professions of amity, hostile war parties hovered constantly about the camp, and speared one or two of the sentries. The brother of the Chief of Konemah came down to see what the stranger wanted, and Mr. Grange, unable to punish, was compelled to speak him fair. Ikkari also, the powerful Chief of Mozemah, who had led most of the raiding parties in Cachar, a perfect savage, wild and suspicious, wearing a collar fringed with hair of his enemies' scalps, came down to see for himself what the camp was like. Him Mr. Grange induced to swear not again to molest the Company's villages. The oath was solemnly ratified, Ikkari and Mr. Grange holding opposite ends of a spear while it was being cut in two, and strange to say was for some time honourably kept. Mr. Grange was too weakly

(1) Judicial Proceedings, 26th February 1837, Nos. 65-67.

Judicial Proceedings, 25th April 1837, No. 17.

Judicial Proceedings, 19th September 1837, No. 7.

Political Proceedings, 25th May 1835, No. 8.

Political Proceedings, 21st November 1838, Nos. 104-108.

Political Proceedings, 9th January 1839, Nos. 160-163.

supported to say anything about restoration of captives. He fixed, however, the position of the villages that had raided on Cachar, and found a way out of the hills to Assam *via* Samoogoodting,<sup>(1)</sup> at which place he advocated the establishment of a permanent military post.

It had already been decided that the Cachar hills, north of the water-pent, should be controlled from Assam and placed under Nowgong. The question was now debated as to how this control was to be exercised. The Nowgong authorities proposed to make the hills a substantive district, under a separate officer, to assess a house tax on the subordinate Nagas, and station thannas in the hills. But the whole returns would have been only Rs. 3,000 yearly, against an expenditure of over Rs. 16,000, and this scheme was not approved. Captain Jenkins, the Commissioner, proposed simply to attach the tract to Nowgong, giving an extra Assistant to that district,<sup>(2)</sup> who should visit the hills in the cold weather. He advised that Mr. Grange should again visit the Angamis by the Samoogoodting route, receive the submission of those Chiefs who might be willing to be subject to us, and place a thanna of Shans on the Dhunsiri. He might at the same time be allowed to punish any villages that did not submit. Captain Jenkins insisted that the boundary line between Assam and Manipur and Assam and Cachar must now be clearly defined to be the water-pent of the great ridge of mountains. Manipur, he suggested, should be compelled to co-operate with us in bringing the Nagas into subjection to our rule. Upon this the Government said that it had never contemplated anything more than the exercise of a general political control over the hill tribes, and, if necessary, the establishment of a military post to overcome the ill-disposed and give protection to the peaceable. Anything beyond this was not desired. It sanctioned, however, Mr. Grange's deputation to receive the submission of the Angami Nagas, to confirm the doubtful in their good disposition, and to choose a post in easy communication with Assam or Cachar, at which to place a permanent garrison under a Native officer for protection of our subjects and to encourage communication. At this post a market was to be established. No interference with the internal management, even of Tularam's tribes, was to be allowed. Though the original orders of the Government were thus restricted, I cannot find that it raised any formal objections<sup>(3)</sup> to a further letter of Captain Jenkins, in which he reported his having instructed Mr. Grange to subdue all the Angamis north of the water-pent, and his having invited Manipur to subdue all south of it. This subjugation was, he explained, only to be carried far enough to stop outrages, and especially affected the Chiefs of Mozemah

(1) Political Proceedings, 10th July 1839, No. 56.

(2) Political Proceedings, 14th August 1839, Nos. 107-109.

(3) Political Proceedings, 2nd October 1839, Nos. 89-90.



and Konemah, the principal leaders of raids. From these Chiefs hostages for good conduct were to be demanded. But all the hillmen were to be told that we had no wish to interfere with their internal affairs. All that we sought was peace and free intercourse;<sup>(1)</sup> and all who acknowledged our virtual supremacy and gave a small tribute were to be admitted to terms.

A party was ordered to march from Manipur to co-operate with Mr. Grange. He entered the hills *Grange's second Expedition, January 1840.* *via* Samoogoodting on 24th January 1840. Here the villagers were unwilling to receive him, but he overawed them into compliance. Thence he pushed across the hills to Hoplongmai or Popolongmai expecting to meet the Manipuris, but found that they had turned back without waiting for him. He went on two marches towards Manipur to a point between Yang (= Tzukquama) and Mooeelong (= Tokquama). Here he found to his astonishment that the Nagas were avowedly hostile to Manipur, and not tributary as had been given out by that State. The only traces of Manipuri occupation were the charred beams of Naga huts. The people of Popolongmai, Tzukquama, and Tokquama, seeing in Mr. Grange only an ally of Manipur, attacked him in a *defile*, but he beat them off and burnt down the half of Popolongmai inhabited by Angamis, the other half being discovered to be inhabited by Cachari Nagas, subservient to the Angamis. The expedition resulted in the burning of five villages and the capture of eleven Naga prisoners.<sup>(2)</sup>

The effect of these somewhat strong measures was apparently to stop the raids, for it was reported in 1841 that there had been no raids in Cachar<sup>(3)</sup> during 1840, and a continuance of the expeditions from Assam was recommended. Soon after Mr. Grange had returned from the hills the second time, the two Ganw Boorahs, or Chiefs of Samoogoodting, came down and entered into written engagements<sup>(4)</sup> to be friendly, expressing a wish to settle on the plains. Lands east of Mohung Dijooa were promised them, and the Naga prisoners were all released, but it does not appear that any active steps were taken to induce a Naga immigration to the plains.

Proposals for constructing a great road across the hills to Manipur were about this time rejected on the score of expense. Lieutenant Biggs, Principal Assistant in charge of Nowgong, was, however, authorized to enter the hills and make a leisurely and, if possible, friendly progress from village to village, conciliating the Chiefs by personal intercourse and bringing to bear on the people that nameless attraction which

(<sup>1</sup>) Political Proceedings, 1st January 1840, Nos. 112-13.

(<sup>2</sup>) Political Proceedings, 24th May 1840, No. 113.

(<sup>3</sup>) Political Proceedings, 19th April 1841, Nos. 107-108.

(<sup>4</sup>) Political Proceedings, 15th June 1840, Nos. 98-99.

frontier officers are supposed, and often with justice, to exercise over uncivilized races. In 1841 Lieutenant Biggs' Expedition, January 1841.

Biggs carried out his tour.<sup>(1)</sup> He met with no opposition, and concluded friendly agreements with most of the leading communities. A depôt for salt was at their request opened at Demapore. The Dhunsiri was fixed as the boundary between the British districts and the Angami tract. The Government directed that a repetition of these friendly visits should be made from time to time, mainly with a view to the suppression of the slave traffic carried on by the Nagas with the Bengalis of Sylhet. The boundary between the Angamis and Manipur was to be finally settled, to prevent irritation on that side, and a road was to be opened to Samoogoodting from the plains. A nominal tribute was to be taken from the Nagas as soon as they could

be brought to consent to its payment. To arrange the boundary, Lieutenant Biggs marched across

the hills in the cold weather of 1841-42. It was decided, in conference with Captain Gordon, Political Agent at Manipur, that "commencing from the upper part of the Jeerie River, the western frontier of Manipur, the line of boundary formed (1) by the Dootighur Mountain, or that range of hills in which the Mookroo River takes its rise, east on to the Barak River; (2) by the Barak River up to where it is joined by the Tayphani River, which flows along the eastern line of the Popolongmai Hill; (3) by the Tayphani River up to its source on the Burrail range of Mountains; and (4) by the summit or water-pent of the Burrail range on to the source of the Mow River flowing north from that point towards Assam, was the best boundary between Manipur and the Angami country: 1stly—Because the Angami Nagas and all the inferior tribes subject to their influence occupy the mountainous part north of the boundary here given, and have together been the perpetrators of all the acts of aggression which have been committed of late years both in Cachar and Manipur. 2ndly—Because along the western portion of the boundary here proposed, the whole of the villages south of it, which were before near this frontier, having been from time to time destroyed by the tribes from the north, and their inhabitants obliged for protection to locate themselves further south, a considerable tract of mountainous country in this direction is completely deserted. 3rdly—Because along the portion of the boundary here proposed to the east of Popolongmai the Angami tribes are separated from the Nagas of Manipur by a lofty range of mountains, across which little, if any, communication takes place. 4thly—Because the Manipur Government not having at present any control or authority over the villages to

(1) Political Proceedings, 1st March 1841, Nos. 55-56.  
 Political Proceedings, 22nd March 1841, Nos. 92-93.  
 Political Proceedings, 18th April 1841, Nos. 79-80.  
 Political Proceedings, 19th July 1841, Nos. 101-106.  
 Political Proceedings, 13th September 1841, Nos. 107-108.  
 Political Proceedings, 8th October 1841, Nos. 55-56.  
 Political Proceedings, 7th March 1842, Nos. 39-39.

the north,\* and the Angamis not possessing any influence over those to the south of this proposed boundary throughout its whole extent, its adoption would not disjoin connected tribes or separate any village from a jurisdiction to which it has been long attached, as would be the case were any portion of the country north of the line suggested made over to the Manipur Government."

A proposal to establish a British out-post on the Popolongmai hill was negatived. The attempt to make a road to Samongooding failed.

In spite of some desultory raiding in Cachar and Manipur the Angamis, as a whole, seemed anxious at this time to cultivate friendly relations with the authorities at Nowgong.<sup>(1)</sup> They came down to the station, and entered into agreements to obey Government, to pay yearly tribute, and to abstain from internecine feuds. The Chiefs of Konemah and Mozemah made up an old quarrel in the presence of our officers, and all seemed as promising as Government could wish. Raids were not by any means entirely stopped, but it was hoped that things were in a fair way to a peaceful solution.

In April 1844, however, when an Assistant was sent up to collect the first year's tribute, the Chiefs defied him and absolutely refused to pay.<sup>(2)</sup> They followed this up by a series of daring raids, in one of which they overpowered a Shan out-post and killed most of the sepoy. Re-

tribution was speedily had by the local troops for these outrages, but so little discrimination was shown in the mode of its exaction, that Government was compelled to censure the local officers for burning villages that might well have been spared. The correspondence shows that Manipuri troops had at this time again been actually helping one Naga clan to attack and destroy another. It seemed impossible to get Manipur to carry out honestly the orders of Government. The necessity of occupying the hills with a strong force as a permanent measure was again discussed, and again a middle course was adopted. In

November 1845 Captain Butler,<sup>(3)</sup> Butler's Expedition, November 1845. Principal Assistant of Nowgong, was deputed to the hills with a force and made a peaceable progress through the country, conciliating the tribes and mapping the topography. He succeeded in inducing the Chiefs to come in to meet him, and they even paid up their tribute in ivory, cloth, and spears.

(1) Political Proceedings, 1st June 1842, Nos. 10-13.

Political Proceedings, 12th April 1843, Nos. 76-78.

(2) Judicial Proceedings, 10th September 1844, No. 211.

Political Proceedings, 16th November 1844, Nos. 73-76.

Political Proceedings, 28th December 1844, Nos. 86-89.

Political Proceedings, 1st February 1845, No. 146.

Political Proceedings, 23rd May 1845, Nos. 69-72.

Political Proceedings, 27th June 1845, Nos. 125-28.

(3) Political Proceedings, 23rd May 1846, Nos. 30-31.

Political Proceedings, 30th June 1846, Nos. 27-29.

Political Proceedings, 19th September 1846, Nos. 18-19.

Political Proceedings, 14th November 1846, Nos. 17-21.

The Chiefs told Captain Butler that they had no real control over their people, and had absolute authority only on the war-path. The different villages eagerly sought our protection, but it was only to induce us to exterminate their neighbours. As soon as the expedition left the hills, the tribes recommenced their raids on the plains and on one another. Butler came to the conclusion that only a strong permanent post in the hills would effect any good. The Governor General's

Butler's second Expedition, November 1846-47.

Agent, however, preferred the plan of annual expeditions. In 1848-47

Captain Butler again<sup>(1)</sup> visited the Angamis, and the same farce of agreements, oaths, and presents was gone through. As the result of this tour a road was opened from Mohung Dijooa to Samoogoodting, a new stockade and grain godowns were erected at Demapore, and a market established at Samoogoodting. With reference to this last measure Captain Butler remarked that he had placed it in charge of a Sezawal named Bhogchand *with authority over the whole Angami tribe*, because he had been ordered to do so, but he saw little chance of the villagers supplying the post voluntarily.

Bhogchand appears to have been a man of much personal bravery,

Bhogchand Darogha.

with but little discretion. He had brought himself first to the notice

of Government in 1847 through the bold and skilful manner in which he brought away a small party of Shan sepoys who had been set upon by overwhelming numbers of Nagas in the hills. He appeared from his nerve and fearlessness to be well qualified to hold charge of the new advanced post, and at first all went satisfactorily. As the first effect of its occupation over a thousand Nagas visited Nowgong to trade in 1848. Unfortunately Bhogchand was not content to let well alone. He was ambitious of quelling by direct interference the internecine quarrels of the clans, and was constantly urging the establishment of advanced posts.<sup>(2)</sup> At length he succeeded in getting leave to place a guard in the village of Mozemah which was apprehensive of an attack from the neighbouring community of Konemah. Before he set out for this duty, some time in April 1849, a letter was received by him from one Huri Das, Cachari, calling himself a darogah of the Manipuri Government, saying that "certain Angami Nagas" had attacked a Manipuri village, and calling on him to arrest the culprits.<sup>(3)</sup> Captain Butler, to whom the matter was referred, as no village of Angamis was named, told Bhogchand to go to Beremah, which was near where Huri Das was supposed to be, to confer with him; but as Huri Das was a doubtful character, having been in Nowgong jail in 1843, on suspicion of having assisted Konemah to attack Mozemah, a reference was made to Manipur about him. Captain McCulloch, the Agent there, replied

(1) Political Proceedings, 24th April 1847, Nos. 37-40.  
Political Proceedings, 3rd June 1848, Nos. 136-38.

(2) Political Proceedings, 17th June 1848, Nos. 97-99.

(3) Political Proceedings, 17th November 1849, Nos. 156-71.

(18th May 1849) that Huri Das had certainly been in the employ of Manipur, but being sometime before suspected of malpractices had been summoned to the capital, an order which he had evaded. Captain McCulloch suspected that Huri Das had himself instigated Konemah to attack Mozemah. He said there was no regular agent of Manipur on the Frontier. Emissaries from the capital were sometimes sent out, but made no permanent stay. Bhogchand, nevertheless, set out to meet Huri Das, taking Mozemah on his way. The two Chiefs of this village, Nilholi and Jubeelee, were at feud about land, and Jubeelee had (it appeared) been aided by Cacharis sent by Huri Das. Nilholi, on the other hand, had been helped by the Konemah people. One of Jubeelee's adherents had lately been killed. On Bhogchand's arrival both Chiefs met him, and, in compliance with his orders, built the stockade for the new post. Bhogchand then insisted on Nilholi's pointing out those of his followers who had killed Jubeelee's man, and when they were pointed out, he at once arrested the offenders. Nilholi upon this left the village in dudgeon. Bhogchand, to be strictly impartial, next arrested seven Cacharis of Jubeelee's party and disarmed them, and started to escort his captives to Samoogoodting. Bhogchand had a firm belief in the prestige of a British constable, and conducted the whole of the proceedings exactly as he would have done those in a case of riot on the plains. The Nagas at first seem to have been stunned by what must have appeared to them his sublime audacity. But at night both parties, Nilholi's and Jubeelee's, united to attack him at Prephemah where he had encamped; and his guard running away, Bhogchand fell pierced by spears. It was afterwards stated that he had neglected all ordinary precautions, disbelieving utterly in the possibility of the Nagas venturing to attack him. It was also asserted that he had not been altogether clean-handed in his dealings with the clans; but he was undoubtedly a brave man, and fell in attempting the impossible task of controlling a horde of savages with a handful of nervous policemen, for the Shan sepoy who formed his guard were merely an armed police.

The Governor General's Agent now reported to Government that if we wished to recover our influence in the hills, we must systematically burn granaries and crops to enforce our demands for the surrender of those concerned in Bhogchand's murder. This was the Manipuri plan, and the Nagas thought much better of them than of us. We marched up the hills, held big talks, and marched back again. No one could stand against us, it is true, but we never did much damage, all the same. The orders of Government on this affair were these:—

The President in Council has learnt with much regret the failure of the endeavours which have been so long and perseveringly made to induce the Naga tribes to live quietly and peaceably, as evidenced by the deadly feuds reported still to exist among themselves, and by the recent acts of atrocity committed by some of them upon officers and subjects of our Government. His Honor in Council is so strongly impressed with a conviction of the absolute necessity which exists for the adoption of the most stringent and decisive measures in regard to these barbarous

tribes, in order to deter them from a repetition of these outrages upon our people, that he is willing to leave a very wide discretion in your (Captain Jenkin's) hands as to the steps to be taken during the approaching cold season.

The Government of India has certainly been always most averse to resort to such extreme measures, as burning villages, destroying crops, granaries, and the like; and as respects these Naga tribes in particular, very great forbearance has been shewn. For some years a policy, entirely conciliatory in its character, has been adopted towards them; unceasing efforts have been made to induce them to live on terms of amity with each other, and to refrain from committing those horrible acts of cruelty to which they were known to be addicted. These efforts, however, seem unhappily to have been quite unproductive of any good result; and the recent murder of one of our police officers in the execution of his duty, followed up as it has been by a deliberate attack of one of our frontier posts, in which two police sepoyas have been killed, has rendered it imperatively necessary, in the opinion of the President in Council, that immediate and severe measures should be resorted to, in order to convince the tribes that such acts of outrages cannot be committed with impunity. His Honor in Council desires, however, that the officer who may be entrusted with the execution of such measures during the next few months should receive from yourself specific instructions for his guidance. The discretion which the Government is willing to place in your hands should not be delegated by you to others except on very emergent grounds. As far as it may be possible so to arrange, no village should be burnt, nor the crops of any village destroyed, except those which you may yourself point out to be so dealt with, in the event of a non-compliance by the clans to whom they belong, with the demands which you may consider it necessary to make upon them for the surrender of those who are known to have been concerned in the recent attacks upon our subjects.

An expedition was accordingly despatched<sup>(1)</sup> to avenge Bhogchand's death, and plenary powers of granary burning, in case of armed resistance, Vincent's Expedition, November 1849. were, under a liberal interpretation of the Government sanction, confided to it by the Governor General's Agent. In December 1849 it set out, but the Officer in command fell ill. A friendly village which it occupied was burnt while the troops were attacking another not far off, and the detachment had to make a hurried retreat. The Nagas celebrated the occasion by a series of raids all round the border. Indications were not wanting that other tribes were becoming uneasy, and that vague feeling of trouble in the air well known to Frontier Officers began to make itself felt. Manipur was said to be fomenting disturbance by under-hand intrigue. Shans of various septs were wandering about the hills. The need of strong measures of repression was very clearly marked.

Nearly all the local officers at this time considered that the only plan likely to succeed with the Angamis was boldly to enter their hills, locate an officer in charge of them, enable him to establish a chain of posts across the country, and give him an armed levy of 500 men to maintain order.

Early in March 1850 Lieutenant Vincent returned to the hills, Vincent's second Expedition, March 1850. re-captured Mozemah<sup>(2)</sup> and burnt down part of Konemah. He established himself in a stockade at Mozemah and remained there during the

<sup>(1)</sup> Political Proceedings, 22nd December 1849, No. 102.  
Political Proceedings, 19th April 1850, Nos. 277-97.  
Political Proceedings, 7th June 1850, Nos. 139-42.

<sup>(2)</sup> Political Proceedings, 7th June 1850, Nos. 139-48.

rains, punishing villages round about which had been concerned in outrages, and receiving the submission of some of the Chiefs; but after holding his own for some months, the steady hostility of the Nagas became so formidable that he felt compelled to concentrate all his forces at Mozemah itself, and to call for assistance from the plains. Major Jenkins ordered up a strong force with guns, to march as soon as the road was fit.<sup>(1)</sup> Government approved of this, as Lieutenant Vincent was in danger; but pointed out how the situation falsified the sanguine predictions of the easy conquest of the hills in which some officers had indulged. It ordered that, after a blow had been struck, the Chiefs should be called together, and the position Government meant to hold towards them clearly explained. What this position should be it called on the Commissioner to report, suggesting at the same time that all the recent hostility had arisen from our interfering in the internal feuds of the tribes.

Lieutenant Vincent submitted a very good report on his first and second expeditions, and on the whole Angami question. He showed that in every Angami village, there were two parties, one attached to the interest of Manipur and the other to the British, but each only working for an alliance to get aid in crushing the opposite faction. The hope of getting help from Manipur against us, and their inability to understand how Manipur was under our influence, had led to so much protracted fighting. Even now, though aid was not openly given by the Raja, no doubt Manipuris helped the tribes, and were found in the hills from time to time. The attacks on our villages, so far as could be traced, were always made by the Manipuri factions, and never by those who looked to us for alliance. Any English officer entering the hills and taking up his post at a Naga village was looked on merely as the ally of the Teppremah or Assamese faction, and not as the representative of any paramount power. Hence an officer establishing himself should take up an independent post and not locate himself in a Naga village. Besides the 'grand clans' in each village, there were in each portion many sub-divisions adhering to one side or the other; hence indiscriminate burnings of villages should be avoided as injuring friends as well as foes.

Meantime in December 1850, the tenth Naga expedition left to

Tenth Expedition, 1850.

relieve Lieutenant Vincent. After

Naga fort at Konemah and fighting a bloody battle against great masses of the tribes at Kekremah, the troops were eventually in March 1851<sup>(2)</sup> withdrawn from the hills. In 1851 no fewer than 22 Naga raids were reported, in which 55 persons were killed, 10 wounded, and 113 taken captive.

Raids of 1851.

It is true only 3 of these raids

were positively traced to Angamis, but they were most of them

(1) Political Proceedings, 20th December 1850, Nos. 296-313.

(2) Political Proceedings, 18th June 1871, No. 97.

Political Proceedings, 1st August 1861, Nos. 117-18.

committed in North Cachar by Naga tribes who must almost certainly have been Angamis.

Immediately after the capture of the stockade above Konemah the Policy now laid down—Non-interference. Commissioner of Assam submitted his views as to the future policy to be pursued towards the Angamis. He admitted that it was now practicable to withdraw our troops from the hills without detriment to our military reputation, but he feared that such quick withdrawal would involve the certain destruction of the friendly clan of Mozemah, unless the Manipuris, of whose secret aid to the hostile Nagas he entertained no doubt, could be restrained from aiding them further. If this could not be done, he apprehended that, after the annihilation of Jubeelee's clan, which would be the last blow to our authority in the hills, the most daring outrages would be committed upon our villages throughout 200 miles of frontier, as no system of defensive posts could possibly restrain an enemy to whom every mountain torrent was a highway, and no forests, however dense, were impassable. He also represented that, now that the leading traits of the Angami character had been ascertained, we might by gradual means take advantage of them to effect a progressive reform. Though wild, bold, and ruthless, the savages we now knew were very intelligent and exceedingly anxious for traffic and gain. This disposition had hitherto manifested itself only in the trade they carried on in slaves, for obtaining which they committed most of their depredations, but recently they had commenced a more beneficial barter, exchanging articles of their own produce for the necessaries and luxuries to be obtained in our markets; and this spirit the Agent expected could be turned to a profitable account if our connection with them was not altogether stopped. He therefore suggested that the post at Mozemah should be retained experimentally for one year.

Captain Butler, the Principal Assistant at Nowgong, recommended an entirely different course. He urged the immediate and complete abandonment of the hills, our interference with the internal feuds of the enemy having in his opinion proved a complete failure. Captain Butler stated that the Mozemah people had no further claims on our protection, having been reinstated in their village, and the fortified post of their enemies having been effectually destroyed. Lieutenant Vincent, the Junior Assistant, urged the policy of retaining our control over the hills.

After a full consideration of these several proposals, the course recommended by Captain Butler was adopted by the President in Council, and the troops were directed to be withdrawn to Demapore, the friendly clan of Mozemah being offered the option of remaining at Mozemah, relying solely on their own strength, or of taking refuge in our territory.

These orders were afterwards approved by the Governor General, Lord Dalhousie, in the following Minute of the 20th February 1851:—

I concur in the conclusion to which the Hon'ble the President in Council has come respecting the relations to be maintained with the Angami Nagas, and consider that His

Lord Dalhousie's Minute. Honor has judged wisely in directing the withdrawal of the force which has been sent, and of the post which has been established in advance in that country.



I dissent entirely from the policy which is recommended of what is called obtaining a control, that is to say, of taking possession of these hills, and of establishing our sovereignty over their savage inhabitants. Our possession could bring no profit to us, and would be as costly to us as it would be unproductive. The only advantage which is expected from our having possession of the country by those who advocate the measure, is the termination of the plundering inroads which the tribes now make from the hills on our subjects at the foot of them. But this advantage may more easily, more cheaply, and more justly be obtained by refraining from all seizure of the territory of these Nagas, and by confining ourselves to the establishment of effective means of defence on the line of our own frontier.

I cannot, for a moment, admit that the establishment of such a line of frontier defence is impracticable. Major Jenkins describes the troops who compose the Militia and the Police as active, bold, and hardy. With such materials as these, there can be no impossibility, nor even difficulty, in establishing effective lines of frontier defence, if the plan is formed by Officers of capacity, and executed by Officers of spirit and judgment. This opinion is not given at random. The peace and security preserved on other portions of the frontier of this Empire, where the extent is greater and the neighbouring tribes far more formidable, corroborate the opinion I have given.

As it is impolitic to contemplate the permanent possession of these hills, so it seems to me impolitic to sanction a temporary occupation of them. We have given our aid to the friendly tribe and replaced them in their villages. We have destroyed the military works and have "broken and dispirited" their enemies. I can see, therefore, no injustice or impropriety in leaving that tribe to maintain the ground which is now its own.

Our withdrawal now, under the circumstances above described, when our power has been vindicated, our enemies dispersed, and our friends re-established, can be liable to no misrepresentation, and can be attributed to no motive but the real one, namely, our desire to shew that we have no wish for territorial aggrandizement, and no designs on the independence of the Naga tribes.

And as there is, in my judgment, no good reason against our withdrawing, so there are good reasons why we should withdraw.

The position of the European Officer and of the troops during last season appeared to me far from satisfactory. I should be very reluctant to continue that state of things in another season. The troops so placed are isolated; they are dependent, as appears from Major Jenkins' letter to Lieutenant Vincent, on the Naga tribes for their food, and for the carriage of supplies of every description; while Major Jenkins evidently has no great confidence that even the friendly tribe, for which we are doing all this, can be relied upon securely for supplying the food of the force which is fighting its battles.

For these reasons I think that the advanced post should be withdrawn now, at the time of our success, and when we have executed all we threatened. Hereafter we should confine ourselves to our own ground; protect it as it can and must be protected; not meddle in the feuds or fights of these savages; encourage trade with them as long as they are peaceful towards us; and rigidly exclude them from all communication either to sell what they have got, or to buy what they want if they should become turbulent or troublesome.

These are the measures which are calculated to allay their natural fears of our aggression upon them, and to repel their aggression on our people. These will make them feel our power both to repel their attacks and to exclude them from advantages they desire, far better, at less cost, and with more justice, than by annexing their country openly by a declaration, or virtually by a partial occupation.

With respect to the share the State of Manipur has borne in these transactions, I must observe, that the reasoning by which Major Jenkins is led to assume that Manipur has been abetting the Nagas is loose in the extreme.

If, however, better proof of the fact be shown, and the complicity of Manipur either recently or hereafter shall be satisfactorily established, there can be no difficulty in dealing with it.

In such case it would be expedient to remind the Rajah of Manipur that the existence of his State depends on a word from the Government of India; that it will not suffer his subjects, either openly or secretly, to aid and abet the designs of the enemies of this Government; and that if he does not at once control his subjects and prevent their recurrence to any unfriendly acts, the word on which the existence of his State depends will be spoken, and its existence will be put an end to.

The increase of Police which is asked should be granted, and Major Jenkins should be desired to submit his scheme of frontier posts when it is prepared, together with a map showing its disposition.

In conclusion I would observe that I have seen nothing in these papers to change the unfavourable opinion I expressed of the conduct of affairs relative to the Angami Nagas, as it appeared in the documents previously transmitted to me.

In 1853<sup>(1)</sup> the Government consented to appoint a European Officer to the charge of North Cachar, to protect our villages there from the inroads of the wilder tribes, and soon after the tract held by Tularam's sons was annexed in consequence of their fighting with the Nagas, Lord Dalhousie remarking that he would rather have nothing to do with these jungles, but to occupy the country was in this instance better than to let it alone.

In 1854 a Manipuri force invaded the Angami Hills, and twenty-two villages sent deputies to beg our interference and protection. But the Government now hold that it was not justified in calling upon Manipur to abstain from working its will among these tribes, as they were not under our protection.

The repeated efforts of the local Officers to induce Government to take once more a direct part in hill management were sternly repressed. The line of out-posts which it had been proposed to occupy was contracted. Punitive expeditions for recent outrages were discouraged unless the punishment could be inflicted with certainty and at once. Nothing that occurred beyond the outskirts of our inhabited villages was to receive any attention. Demapore was abandoned. Borpathar became our most advanced guard. The Officer stationed in North Cachar was strictly charged to look upon the Angamis "as persons living beyond the jurisdiction of the British Government." For years raids went on, which our frontier posts proved quite unable to check. North Cachar suffered most from the effects of this policy. Here the frontier line was always matter of doubt, and the presumption under the current policy was, that any village attacked lay beyond the boundary. At one time it was proposed by the local Officers, almost despairingly, to abandon North Cachar itself, as there seemed to be no hope of effectually protecting it without the employment of means which the Government would not sanction.

The Supreme Government was not, however, to be moved from its resolve, even though the Court of Directors expressed a strong opinion that the policy of absolute withdrawal would only encourage the tribes to advance, and become more positively aggressive. The Directors would have preferred the plan of settling between our villages and the Nagas colonies of Kookies and other self-reliant races as buffers—a plan of which some trial had already been made. They suggested

(1) Judicial Proceedings, 12th January 1854, Nos. 74-98.

Judicial Proceedings, 23rd March 1854, Nos. 166-72.

Judicial Proceedings, 18th November 1852, No. 125.

also the enlistment of Angamis in the military police. This last idea had also been tried without much success. The hillmen could not be induced to remain long under discipline; of 37 Angami recruits the average service proved to be only eight months.

The non-interference policy was maintained, and the raids went on, until at length<sup>(1)</sup> in 1862 the Commissioner was constrained to report :—

It is not creditable to our Government that such atrocities should recur annually with unvarying certainty, and that we should be powerless alike to protect our subjects or to punish the aggressors. It is quite certain that our relations with the Nagas could not possibly be on a worse footing than they are now. The non-interference policy is excellent in theory, but Government will probably be inclined to think that it must be abandoned.

A new Lieutenant-Governor (Sir Cecil Beadon) had then succeeded to office, and he reviewed afresh the whole question of the treatment of these tribes. He dissented from the policy of interdicting them from trade, which had of late years been usual. It was, he thought, not only unsound in itself, but it was a policy which, in regard to a country situated as is that of the Angami Nagas, it was impossible to carry out. He directed that an Officer subordinate to the Deputy Commissioner of Nowgong should be placed in immediate communication with the Nagas. The Chiefs on the border were to be informed that Government looked to them to be responsible for the good behaviour of their villages, and annual stipends for this Police duty would be paid to them so long as they performed it well. Written agreements were to be taken to this effect and annual presents interchanged. The

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<sup>(1)</sup> The following are the references to the official correspondence between 1854 and 1861 :—

- Judicial Proceedings, 29th April 1854, Nos. 743-749.
- Judicial Proceedings, 11th May 1854, No. 149.
- Judicial Proceedings, 15th June 1854, Nos. 210-212.
- Revenue Proceedings, 26th January 1854, Nos. 4-5.
- Judicial Proceedings, 12th April 1855, No. 155.
- Judicial Proceedings, 17th May 1855, No. 215.
- Judicial Proceedings, 26th July 1855, Nos. 56-61.
- Judicial Proceedings, 20th September 1855, No. 193.
- Judicial Proceedings, 27th September 1855, Nos. 399-400.
- Judicial Proceedings, 7th January 1856, Nos. 186-189.
- Judicial Proceedings, 6th March 1856, Nos. 239-240.
- Judicial Proceedings, 15th May 1856, Nos. 165-168.
- Judicial Proceedings, 26th June 1856, Nos. 158-159.
- Judicial Proceedings, 15th May 1856, Nos. 188-189.
- Judicial Proceedings, 5th July 1856, Nos. 185-187.
- Judicial Proceedings, 18th September 1856, No. 266.
- Judicial Proceedings, 26th December 1856, Nos. 120-121.
- Judicial Proceedings, 9th April 1857, Nos. 100-101.
- Judicial Proceedings, 27th August 1857, Nos. 171-178.
- Judicial Proceedings, 31st December 1857, Nos. 180-181.
- Judicial Proceedings, 15th July 1858, Nos. 450-452.
- Judicial Proceedings, 27th January 1859, No. 86.
- Judicial Proceedings, 14th April 1859, No. 45.
- Political Proceedings, 14th April 1859, Nos. 18-14.
- Revenue Proceedings, 17th November 1859, No. 3.
- Revenue Proceedings, 3rd May 1860, Nos. 9-10.
- Political Proceedings, April 1861, Nos. 4-5.

Officer to be appointed to this duty was further ordered to decide any disputes voluntarily referred to him, but not to interfere in internal affairs, at any rate for the present. Some delay occurred in bringing this policy into actual operation, owing to official changes among the local officers and the successive representations of conflicting views. It came, however, in the course of the next year or two to be recognised that there were the following three distinct lines of policy open, and each had its defenders :—<sup>(1)</sup>

- (1.) We might abandon North Cachar and all the hill tracts inhabited by Nagas, and strictly enforce the non-interference policy of 1851.
- (2.) We might advance into the hills, place special officers in charge, and maintain them there by force of arms.
- (3.) We might, while confining ourselves to the plains, cultivate political relations with the neighbouring clans and bring their Chiefs into stipendiary police relations to ourselves. (This was Sir Cecil Beadon's original scheme of 1862.)

Nothing decisive was done for over two years or until further raids in March and April 1866 forced upon Government a definite settlement of the question. Lieutenant Gregory, an officer of much tact and energy, was at that time in charge of North Cachar, and he reported that, unless he were allowed to adopt more vigorous measures than were permitted to his predecessors, he could not guarantee the safety of his Sub-Division. Still the Commissioner, possibly because he saw no alternative between absolute conquest and absolute non-interference, proposed to abandon the whole hill tract to its fate; or at least to close the Dwárs to all Naga trade; and it became necessary for the Lieutenant-Governor to give decisive orders. Sir Cecil Beadon insisted accordingly on a fair trial being given to the policy sketched out by him in 1862, remarking that if the policy indicated in 1862 had been carried out in the spirit in which it was conceived, there was every reason to suppose these outrages would not have occurred. Two years and a half had been allowed to elapse, and nothing had yet been done to give effect to the orders of Government, and though these orders were peremptorily repeated in a subsequent letter, dated 30th July 1863, they had apparently received no attention whatever. The proposal to recede before these wild tribes and fall back from their neighbourhood whenever they chose to annoy us, was one which the Lieutenant-Governor could not for a moment entertain. The practical effect of such a measure would be that in the course of a few years Assam would be divided amongst the Bhutias, Abors, Nagas, Garos, Mishmis, and other wild tribes; for exposed as Assam is on every side, if petty outrages were to be followed by withdrawal of our frontier, we should very speedily find ourselves driven out of the province.

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<sup>(1)</sup> Judicial Proceedings, June 1865, Nos. 9-11.

In reply to this the Commissioner entered into an elaborate review of our position in regard to North Cachar and the Nagas, denying that he was himself decidedly averse to taking a more direct control of the country. He, however, pointed out that the democratic nature of the tribal arrangements among the Angamis, the infinite divisions and disputes existing even in a single village, rendered it impossible to hope for success from the policy of conciliation *ab extra* proposed by the Government. He admitted that no system of frontier military defence that could be devised would secure perfect immunity from raids. A country void of roads, void of supplies,—a country of interminable hills, of vast swamps covered with dense forest, save where here and there a speck in the ocean of wilderness reveals a miserable Mikir or Cachari clearance, could not possibly be defended at every point against a foe for whom hill and swamp and forest are resources rather than obstacles. From 1854 to 1865 there had been nineteen Angami raids, in which 232 British subjects had been killed, wounded, or carried off. Ninety-two of these unfortunates had been so lost during three years (1854-56), when a chain of outposts was in existence from Borpathar to Assaloo connected by roads which were regularly patrolled. "At most we should be able to keep the raids of such savages below a certain maximum, and prevent their extension to settled districts." The settlement of a trade blockade, the Commissioner maintained, was advantageous when it could be made practically complete, and so far as it was complete; but none of these schemes would secure the peace of the frontier. They had all been tried and found wanting. If Government were prepared to consider a more advanced policy he was ready to show how it could best be carried out. He would depute a specially qualified Officer to proceed with a force of not less than 200 men, and effect a permanent lodgment in the country at a point most convenient for keeping open communication and procuring supplies. This Officer would then invite the Chiefs to submit themselves to us. Those who agreed would, as a token of submission, pay an annual tribute, and in return receive our aid and protection; while those who refused would be told that we would leave them to themselves so long as they kept the peace towards us and those who submitted themselves to us.

The Commissioner now suggested that Lieutenant Gregory should occupy Samoogoodting, the post formerly held by Bhogchand Darogha, in the way above described. The following was Lieutenant Gregory's own idea of how his operations should be conducted:—

He was totally averse to any attempt to subdue the country. It could only be done at great expense, and would require a strong force to hold it. It would be further embarking on an unknown sea, for we knew nothing of the tribes beyond the Angamis, except that they are fierce and warlike; so that it would be well our acquaintance with them should be made gradually and peacefully, which it is most certain would not be the case if we began by annexing them the Angami country *vi et armis*.

He would advance step by step, yearly opening out a good road as he went, never getting in advance of the road, and never in advance of ground he was not sure of, until he reached the very centre of the most thickly-populated part of the country. There,

clear of any village but that of his own hewers of wood and drawers of water, on the slopes of what is described as a most beautiful country, fertile to a degree, finely wooded with oak and beech and fir, and well watered, he would build the permanent station.

The way in which the Lieutenant-Governor received these proposals

The Bengal Government proposal. will be best seen by the following extract from his letter to the

Government of India in regard<sup>(1)</sup> to them :—

In regard to the policy to be pursued towards the Angami Nagas, the Lieutenant-Governor is clearly of opinion that the abandonment of the position we held previously to 1854, and the withdrawal of our line of frontier posts to the left bank of the Dhunsiri is proved, by the events which have since occurred, to have been a grave mistake, and that the only course left us consistently with the duty we owe to the inhabitants of the adjoining frontier districts as well as to the Angami Nagas themselves, who are torn by intestine feuds for want of a government, and unable to exercise any general self-control, or to restrain independent action on the part of any village or even of a section of any of the numerous villages inhabited by the tribe, is to re-assert our authority over them, and bring them under a system of administration suited to their circumstances, and gradually to reclaim them from habits of lawlessness to those of order and civilization.

These Angami Nagas are frequently mentioned in the correspondence of late years as independent Nagas, and a distinction is made between the tract they inhabit and British territory, as if the former were not included in the latter. But for this distinction there is no real ground. The treaties with Burmah and Manipur recognize the Patkoi and Burreil ranges of hills running in a continuous line from the sources of the Dehing in the extreme east of Assam to those of the Dhunsiri in North Cachar as the boundary between those countries and British India. There is no intermediate independent territory, and while the wild tribes who inhabit the southern slopes of those ranges are subject to Burmah and Manipur, those who inhabit the northern slopes are subject to the British Government. These latter, including the Angami Nagas, are independent only in the sense that the British Government has refrained from reducing them to practical subjection, and has left them, except at occasional intervals, entirely to themselves; but they have never enjoyed or acquired political or territorial independence; and it is clearly open to the British Government in point of right, as it is incumbent on it in good policy, to exercise its sovereign power by giving them the benefit of a settled administration.

This is the course advocated by all the local authorities, and it is the one which the Lieutenant-Governor strongly recommends as the only means of establishing peace in this part of the frontier, and of putting an end to the atrocities which have prevailed more or less for the last thirty years, and which a policy of non-interference and purely defensive action is now found to be wholly inadequate to prevent. Even if the right of the British Government were less clear than it is, the existence on its border of a savage and turbulent tribe, unable to restrain its members from the commission of outrages, given up to anarchy, and existing only as a pest and nuisance to its neighbours, would justify the Government in the adoption of any measures for bringing it under subjection and control.

The Lieutenant-Governor therefore proposes to direct Lieutenant Gregory to remove his head-quarters from Assaloo\* to Samoo-gooding, to abolish Assaloo as a sub-division, apportioning a part among the districts of South Cachar, the Cossya and Jynteah Hills, and Nowgong, and constituting the remainder lying on the right bank of the Dhunsiri, together with the Angami Naga Hills and the country on both banks of the River Doyeng (a tributary of the Dhunsiri) a separate district, to be administered by Lieutenant Gregory as Deputy Commissioner, under the direct orders of the Commissioner, and no longer dependent on the District of Nowgong.

The orders of the Government of India thereon were as follows :—

With reference to various passages of your letter under reply, indicating a desire to bring the whole country of the Angami Nagas at once under the subjection of the

British Government, I am desired to observe that such a policy is more than the local

(1) Judicial Proceedings, June 1886, Nos. 133-84.

officers recommend, of the Government of India is prepared to sanction. Colonel Hopkinson appears to agree entirely in Lieutenant Gregory's proposals, and the only instance in which the latter officer contemplates any assertion of actual authority over the Nagas is that of the villagers of Samoogoodting who are said to have been always friendly to us, and to be really anxious for our re-occupation of their territory. Lieutenant Gregory's object is, from his position at Samoogoodting and by the exhibition to the other Nagas of the kindly relations subsisting between the Samoogoodting people and himself, gradually to win the confidence and friendship of the neighbouring villages, and so, village by village, to bring the whole Naga country under control, but he deprecates strongly any attempt to do this by force, he is 'totally averse to any attempt to subdue the country.' This, I am to intimate, is the policy which commands itself to the approval of the Governor General in Council.

Lieutenant Gregory may take up the proposed position at Samoogoodting, and do his best by tact and good management, supported by a moderate display of physical force, to bring that portion of the hill tract adjacent to the plains into order. He will remember that our main object in having any dealings with the hill people is to protect the low lands from their incursions. Instead, therefore, of exerting himself to extend our rule into the interior, he will rather refrain from such a course. Subject to this general principle, his line of action may advantageously be left in great measure to his own good judgment. A conciliatory demeanour will of course be indispensable, and perhaps the expenditure of a little money to leading men will be useful. When conciliation fails, punitive measures will not be shrunk from. In some instances a blockade of the passes, so as to exclude the offending tribe or village from our bazars, may be attended with good results. But in all cases the great point will be to select a penalty suitable to the circumstances of the particular affair. Where roads are necessary, they must be constructed in a simple and inexpensive manner, just sufficient for the opening of the country to the extent actually required.

Should the plan thus sketched succeed, and the hillmen be gradually reclaimed to our rule and civilised, without much cost to the British Treasury in the process, it will be a good work well accomplished. But His Excellency in Council cannot admit that we are bound to attempt more in their behalf than the resources of the empire can reasonably afford.

The Secretary of State cordially approved of all that had been done.

It will be seen that the Supreme Government gave no sanction to a gradual occupation of the Naga Hills, such as the Commissioner certainly contemplated, and the Bengal Government desired, but merely allowed the establishment of a strong central station, the officer in charge of which was to endeavour to maintain conciliatory intercourse with the Nagas.<sup>(1)</sup>

It is not necessary to enter into a detailed statement of the mode in which the arrangements thus approved were carried out. Lieutenant Gregory was ordered to establish himself at Samoogoodting. Assaloo, in North Cachar, was abandoned, save by a small Police guard. A road was opened from Demapore to the new station. A compact force of 150 Police, all hillmen and well armed, was placed at Lieutenant Gregory's disposal. Large discretionary powers were entrusted to him of proceeding summarily against villages concerned in any gross outrage, and a rough

(1) Judicial Proceedings, June 1866, Nos. 113-14.  
 Judicial Proceedings, April 1867, Nos. 109-12.  
 Judicial Proceedings, October 1866, Nos. 56-57.  
 Judicial Proceedings, April 1866, Nos. 69-140.  
 Judicial Proceedings, May 1866, Nos. 8-11 & 127.  
 Judicial Proceedings, July 1866, Nos. 97-98.  
 Judicial Proceedings, June 1867, Nos. 142-145.  
 Judicial Proceedings, October 1867, Nos. 139-41.  
 Judicial Proceedings, February 1868, Nos. 165-167.

system of judicial procedure was laid down. The Manipuris were not to be allowed any longer to make retaliatory expeditions into the Naga Hills. Measures to redress any outrages committed by Angamis in Manipur were to be taken in concert with Lieutenant Gregory. This was not, of course, to prevent Manipuri troops from following up and punishing any marauding party they fell in with in their own territory. All Angami Nagas visiting the plains of Assam were to be furnished with passes, by Lieutenant Gregory, as they passed through Samoogoodting, where they were also to leave their spears.\*

At the very time of the change of policy thus inaugurated, in January 1866, the Nagas of the village of Razepeamah cut up a Mikir village in North Cachar. In March Lieutenant Gregory made a dash with a little force of Police and burnt Razepeamah to the ground. In June the Razepeamah men, to retrieve their honour, made a raid and butchered twenty-six Mikirs in the village of Sergamcha. The rains prevented any immediate steps being taken to avenge this outrage. But it was determined that, as soon as Lieutenant Gregory had fairly established himself in the hills, a salutary lesson should be given to the Razepeamah community, while an amnesty for the past was extended to all others. This was accordingly done. Razepeamah was levelled to the ground; its lands declared barren and desolate for ever; and its people, on their making complete submission, were distributed throughout other communities.

The occupation of Samoogoodting was followed by the opening of a school and dispensary, the extension of trade and construction of roads to the plains. A plan was also sanctioned of receiving at Samoogoodting residuary delegates from the various communities,

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\* The boundaries of the District of the "Naga Hills" were thus fixed in 1867:—

*Eastern Boundary.*—The "Doyeng" or "Rengmah" river.

*Northern Boundary.*—A line from the confluence of the "Doyeng" and "Dhunseery" river along the "Dhunseery" for a distance of six miles, thence up the "Nambar" Nulla to its source and across country to a point on the "Doeegporoong" Nulla, thence along it northwards for a distance of  $7\frac{1}{2}$  miles, from which point it takes a due westerly course across to a point on the "Kollesanee" river along which it runs for a distance of 28 miles.

*Southern Boundary.*—A line along the crest of the Burrail range from the source of the "Rengmah" or "Doyeng" river to the small western feeder at the source of the "Dhunseery" river.

*Western Boundary.*—A line from the crest of the "Burrail" range down the "Dhunseery" river for a distance of 26 miles, thence across the Hills to a point on the "Loongteng" river and along it to its confluence with the "Doyeng" river; across the Hills to "Gungah Ghat" on the "Kopilee" rivers; and along it to the junction of the "Kopilee" and "Doyeng" rivers; along the Kopilee for three miles, from whence in an east by south direction it extends for eight miles to a point three miles east of the "Deeklem," thence in a N. N. E. direction crossing the "Longboomlong," "Ranga Jan," "Long-koi Noi," and "Dikreng-kong" Nullah, to a point on the "Kakee-Noi" which form the boundary till its confluence with the "Tereh Langsoh Jan," from which point with a semicircular line it touches the "Jumoona" Nuddee about a mile above the confluence of the "Booreegunga" with the "Jumoona," which forms the boundary to the "Sesah Jan" Nullah, from whence it crosses the "Meekir" and "Rengmah" Naga Hills in a northerly direction till strikes the "Kollesanee" river.



to whom small stipends were allowed for acting as interpreters and messengers to their respective clans.

The permanent establishment of a British Officer in the Angami

Interneine feuds of the tribes.

Naga country had the effect for a time of stopping the annual raids upon British territory, and the tours of Gregory and his successor Captain Butler greatly extended our knowledge of the tribes and convinced them of the peaceable character of our intentions towards them. The Naga question was not however yet by any means finally settled. More intimate relations with the hillmen revealed more clearly than ever the wretched state of inter-tribal warfare which prevailed.

Fresh complications also speedily arose with reference to the Manipur boundary and the interference of that State in certain parts of the hills. The boundary laid down in 1842 had been in 1867 re-asserted by the Government, but was little regarded by Manipur. Moreover, as our officers were prohibited from directly controlling the independent Nagas within the limits of the Hills District, the assertion of such a boundary line merely prevented Manipur from retaliatory raids on what was nominally British territory, while the Nagas had no scruples in violating that of Manipur. This furnished a standing excuse for Manipuri reprisals. Manipur also objected to the line as robbing it of villages that had for years paid willing tribute. The Administration Report for the Hills District for 1868-69 noted the progress of survey operations in the Naga country, the difficulty of procuring supplies and carriage, and the pressing importance of finally demarcating the boundary between

The Manipur boundary question.

Manipur and the Naga Hills. The Lieutenant-Governor (Sir W. Grey)

was doubtful as to the advisability of pushing on regular survey operations at the present stage, but agreed in the necessity of settling the boundary question. The leading Naga villages of Konemah and Mozemah had complained of attempts made by Manipur to levy contributions, and it was clear that, if raids were to be avoided, such interference with the Nagas within the Hills District must cease. The Government of India concurred in this view, holding that as we had resolved on avoiding encroachment from our side upon the Naga communities, Manipur also must be restricted to the limits laid down by Gordon and Biggs in 1841-42. Captain Butler, the Deputy Commissioner of the Hills District, and Dr. Brown, Political Agent at Manipur, accordingly met in the cold weather of 1869-70 and endeavoured to trace out the boundary line. They differed, however, in opinion as to the position of part of it, and it was decided to appoint a Boundary Commissioner to go over the ground again and settle all disputed points. Into the details of his enquiry it is not necessary to enter. The boundary was, after much correspondence, eventually settled in July 1872. The line of 1842 was maintained in all essential points so far as it was clearly identified. A few villages on the dividing ridge of the water-pent, over which Manipur had acquired supremacy, were demarcated as belonging to that State; and from the termination of the line

of 1842, at a point called the Telizo Peak, eastward the watershed of the main line of hills which divide the affluents of the Brahmaputra from those of the Irrawaddy as far as the Patkoi Pass was declared to be the limit of Manipur on its northern frontier. The Naga Hills District was advanced to march with the boundary of Manipur as thus determined. The Kookie colonies on the Langting (of which we shall hear more in connection with North Cachar) were brought within<sup>(1)</sup> the limits of the Naga Hills District—a measure rendered necessary by their having commenced a course of active hostilities against certain Naga villages. Manipur afterwards objected to the boundary, but its objections were overruled.

Captain Butler, the Deputy Commissioner,\* whose title was in 1872 changed to that of Political Agent, had for some time past been urging upon Government the adoption of a bolder policy with reference to these tribes.<sup>(2)</sup> He begged to be allowed to step in as authoritative arbiter between the clans, believing that he could with a moderate show of force support his position and reduce the refractory to order.

Captain Butler presses for a bolder policy. The Bengal Government was not unwilling to allow Butler to try the effect of mediation in stopping feuds between hostile villages, but neither the Local nor the Supreme Government was as yet prepared to undertake the complete administration of the Naga Hills. In March 1871, when reporting on raids said to have been committed by Nagas in Manipur, Captain Butler had offered to assume the direct management of the tribes, if a moderate increase were made in his armed Police. In forwarding this report Colonel Hopkinson, the Commissioner, wrote:—

Before embarking on such an enterprize, I must say I would prefer to push non-interference to the utmost verge of forbearance, though it may be that I hardly hope for any other advantage from it than may result from the conviction it is likely sooner or later to bring, that interference is unavoidable, and being unavoidable, that a thorough business should be made of it when once it is taken in hand.

It is certain that our actual position with respect to the Naga tribes is most unsatisfactory, and that the complications arising from it are increasing in seriousness and magnitude. The prevention of their raids into North Cachar is no longer our chief concern. There is first the much greater difficulty, as this letter shows, that has arisen in keeping the peace between the Angamis and the Manipuris. I am satisfied that the Manipuris will spare no intrigue that may serve to foment disturbances along the boundary, to the recent settlement of which they have shown themselves so much averse, and, apart from their possible intrigues, they seem to have a right to attach responsibility for the conduct of those tribes over whom we refuse to allow them control. \* \* \*

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\* A son, I believe, of the Butler mentioned above.

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<sup>(1)</sup> The correspondence regarding the Naga-Manipur boundary is as follows:—  
 Judicial Proceedings, November 1869, Nos. 96 to 99 and 136 to 141.  
 Judicial Proceedings, September 1870, Nos. 141 to 159.  
 Judicial Proceedings, November 1870, Nos. 192 to 198.  
 Judicial Proceedings, September 1871, Nos. 12 to 26.  
 Judicial Proceedings, February 1872, Nos. 76 and 77.  
 Judicial Proceedings, July 1872, Nos. 237 to 242.  
 Judicial Proceedings, January 1873, Nos. 159 to 161 and 223 and 224.  
 Judicial Proceedings, February 1873, Nos. 31 to 34.

<sup>(2)</sup> Judicial Proceedings, February 1871, Nos. 278 to 282.  
 Judicial Proceedings, March 1871, Nos. 225 and 256.

I very much fear that affairs cannot remain as they now are, and that we shall be obliged to decide shortly whether we are to advance to the occupation of Naga Hills, or retire, letting the Manipuris complete the conquest of the Angamis on their side, and on ours withdrawing our frontier to a safe distance from the incursions of the tribes. As to the adoption of this latter course, I would only say that it seems like an abandonment of our duty, and that it is uncertain whether, even in a remote province like Assam, we could afford to make so great an exhibition of our weakness. Neither, may I add, would such a measure of retreat be very easy of execution, nor the cost of executing it inconsiderable so long as a line of frontier would have to be guarded.

On the other hand, I see no reason to doubt the feasibility of the occupation and thorough reduction to our control of the whole of the country by the same means as were successfully employed under the same circumstances in the Khasi Hills some forty years ago. With a fine body of infantry properly posted in it, strong supports below, and a good military road traversing the entire country, there would probably be very soon an end of the Naga, as there has been an end of Khasi difficulty, and I am much mistaken if it will ever be perfectly solved in any other way.<sup>(1)</sup>

In a subsequent letter Colonel Hopkinson asserted that the Government of India, by directing Lieutenant Gregory, on establishing himself at Samoogoodting, to refrain from any attempt to extend our direct rule, had entirely changed the character of the advance then contemplated by the local authorities. True, raiding upon the plains had for the time been stopped, but lawless violence was as rife as ever in the hills, and might at any moment spread over into the plains.

The Lieutenant-Governor Sir George Campbell, after much deliberation, came to the conclusion that the only satisfactory plan of dealing with the Naga tribes was to bring about gradually the establishment of political control and influence over them without any assertion

of actual government. He proposed that this control should extend to the introduction of a sort of political police over the tribes. We were no longer to refuse to arbitrate between hostile clans, but to accept the position and, if need be, to enforce our awards. The Political Agent was to be removed to a more central site and authorised to keep the peace of the hills by the exercise of his influence, and if need be by the display of force. To enable him to give effect to this policy, extensive explorations were proposed, and the clear definition of boundary lines and local limits was postulated as essential to any proper working of the scheme. These views were in their broad outlines eventually accepted by the Supreme Government.<sup>(2)</sup> The weaker villages very soon began to show a desire to place themselves under our protection, and, although raids by one clan upon another continued to be reported, no hostility to the British officers was anywhere manifested.

In February 1874 the Naga Hills were made over to the charge of the newly-appointed Chief Commissioner of Assam.

It has been stated above that from the Telizo Peak eastward the watershed between the affluents of the Brahmaputra and Irrawaddy was to be the boundary of Manipur on the north. In December 1872 Major Godwin Austen was deputed to explore this boundary up to the Patkoi Pass.

(<sup>1</sup>) Judicial Proceedings, September 1871, Nos. 12-16.  
Judicial Proceedings, October 1871, Nos. 206-207.

(<sup>2</sup>) Letter to Bengal, No. 1661, dated 24th July 1873.

The result of the expedition was not altogether satisfactory. The actual demarcation of the line was carried up to the Telizo Peak, and a considerable area of unknown country was surveyed. But beyond Telizo Peak it was found impossible to proceed with the demarcation. The Manipuris threw every obstruction in the way of the party, and the want of labour made further advance hopeless. It was not even decided in what direction the boundary would lie. Two distinct ranges, a considerable distance apart, inclosed between them the broad valley of the Lanier. These ranges were traced for some distance in a north-easterly direction, and named, respectively, the Kopamedza and Saramethi mountains. The latter and more southerly range was apparently the more considerable, and the presumption was that the boundary line would lie along its watershed. Major Godwin-Austen was of opinion that the Lanier river maintained a northerly source, and emerged from the Naga country as the Dikkoo which flows past Seesaugor into the Brahmaputra. But it was possible, on the other hand, that the Lanier and Dikkoo might be separate rivers, and that the Lanier might be, in fact, an affluent of the Irrawaddy. The question involved was one of considerable importance. If it turned out that the northern range was, in fact, the watershed dividing the affluents of the Brahmaputra from those of the Irrawaddy, and if we determined to adhere to that watershed as the boundary, Manipur would be at liberty to annex the whole tract of Naga country lying between the two ranges, and to confine us to a narrow strip running up the eastern bank of the Doyeng and along the southern frontier of the Seesaugor District.<sup>(1)</sup>

For the settlement of this question it was accordingly arranged that a survey party under Captain Badgley should, in the cold weather of 1873-74, follow up the work begun by Major Godwin-Austen. The main object of the expedition was to trace the Lanier either to some point in the Saramethi range or northwards into the Dikkoo. No boundary was to be demarcated. In view of the great concession to Manipur which would be involved in the acceptance of the Kopamedza range, Government was anxious to obtain accurate information without pledging itself by any demarcation. Captain Butler and Captain Badgley were ordered to collect all the information they could, and meanwhile to avoid any reference to the British boundary. The boundary when laid down would be between Manipur and the Nagas, not between Manipur and British territory. How far we might choose to extend our frontier southwards was a matter for further consideration and had nothing to do with Manipur.

With these instructions the party started from Kohimah on the 1st of January 1874, and a successful exploration was made. The Lanier was followed up to the village of Thetchuma (latitude  $25^{\circ} 50'$  longitude  $94^{\circ} 49'$ ), where it was met by an equally large river flowing from the north north-east, bent round in its course, and made for a point in the Saramethi range some 12 miles south-west of the Saramethi Peak. The Lanier therefore was an affluent of the Irrawaddy, and the Kopamedza range was the actual watershed.

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(1) Assam Proceedings, February, March, July and August 1875.

It remained to be seen where the Dikkoo rose. As the Chief Commissioner of Assam pointed out there seemed to be no area left for that river to drain.\* But this question could not be solved during the season. The party succeeded in surveying 2,000 miles of new country, and returned to Samoogoodting on the 23rd March, after two brushes with the Nagas, who turned out in some force to attack, and were driven off with some loss. These small affairs however caused little anxiety. The Chief Commissioner expressed regret that the necessity for hostilities should have arisen. But he seemed to think the village feuds of the Nagas made such encounters inevitable, and he was rather disposed to attach fresh value to the expedition on account of its having been "strong enough to defy opposition." The result he believed would be to lessen the chance of such affairs in future. The military force attached to the expedition consisted of 70 men of the 43rd Native Infantry.

Meanwhile a survey party under Major Lance had been demarcating the southern boundary of the Seesaugor District. The line to be laid down was to be the limit of our civil jurisdiction; and the broad principle on which Major Lance was working was the distinction of the lowlands from the hills. He had met with considerable difficulties from the nature of the ground, and had only succeeded in determining ten miles of the boundary out of a total length of 120 miles. In the summer of 1874, the Chief Commissioner suggested that this boundary survey should be discontinued. There was, he thought, no necessity for an immediate demarcation, and there were many reasons against it. He proposed therefore the merging of the boundary survey in the general survey of the country lying south and east of Seesaugor and Luckimpore. It would be time enough to fix the boundary of our civil jurisdiction where we knew something of the country. Meanwhile the unexplored tract might be opened up by two parties starting—the one from Samoogoodting, and other from Jeypur, and working to meet one another. Such an exploration could not fail to discover the source of the Dikkoo and fill in the gap between the Seesaugor frontier and the lately surveyed portion of the Naga Hills.

The suggestion was approved. It was decided that Captain Badgley should accompany Lieutenant Holcombe, Assistant Commissioner of Luckimpore, and work in a south-westerly direction from Jeypur, while Captain Butler and Lieutenant Woodthorpe of the survey struck out to the north-east from Samoogoodting. Both the District Officers were instructed to proceed with the utmost caution. They were to avoid all chance of hostility with the savage tribes, and to retire if it became evident that they could not proceed without imminent danger of a hostile reception. Captain Butler was provided with a military guard of 70 men. Lieutenant Holcombe's guard was at first fixed at 30 men, besides police. It was afterwards raised to 40 men.

From the very beginning of operations the Nagas showed a hostile spirit. The eastern survey party under Captain Butler marched from Samoogoodting on the 23rd December 1874. On the 3rd January 1875

\* This mystery was afterwards cleared up. See Butler's Report of 29th May 1875 in Assam Proceedings for August 1875.

they reached Wokha, a large village on the western slope of the Wokha Peak. The following day a coolie was murdered. Some useless negotiation followed, and it was clear that mischief was meant. About 7 P. M., when it was quite dark, the party was startled by the Naga cry and some shots. It soon appeared that the camp was entirely surrounded, and some confusion took place among the non-combatants. As soon as they were in order, Captain Butler with a detachment of about 40 men went straight at the village, drove the Nagas through it, killing some twenty men, and returned without loss, after posting a police guard within the village with orders to patrol all night. The village was in great measure destroyed. The upshot of the whole affair was that the murderers of the coolie were surrendered by the Wokha men, and on the 20th January Captain Butler marched out of the place.

In reporting the matter the Chief Commissioner wrote that Captain Butler had again been warned to proceed with caution. He had no fears for the safety of the party, and the Chief Commissioner himself was inclined to hope that the lesson given at Wokha would be enough to deter the Nagas from any further opposition. Captain Butler accordingly went on with the survey, and a large tract of country was mapped out before he received orders to close operations and join the expedition which was about to start to revenge Lieutenant Holcombe's murder.

An account of that unfortunate event has been given in the preceding chapter.

The northern boundary of Manipur eastward of Telizo was not settled until 1878 when a line was finally laid down and accepted by that State.<sup>(1)</sup>

In the spring of 1874, Captain Johnstone, who was then officiating for Captain Butler at Samoogoodting, informed the Chief Commissioner that he had formally taken under our protection on payment of revenue two Naga villages which were in imminent danger of attack, and had ordered other hostile villages to leave them alone. He justified this action as the only one "consistent with honor, justice, and sound policy." In this view the Chief Commissioner agreed. He thought Captain Johnstone could not have allowed women and children who claimed his protection to be massacred almost within sight of his own bungalow. Colonel Keatinge was fully aware of the importance of the precedent and of the responsibility we were incurring by assuming any such protectorate. But he thought that considerations of duty, of prestige, and of personal interest combined to force it upon us. The orders of Government upon his letter conveyed a very guarded approval of Captain Johnstone's action. The Supreme Government was not even yet prepared to assume the direct administration of the hills. But it

Extension of British protectorate to Naga villages.

(1) Assam Proceedings, March and June 1878.

clearly laid down the principle that absolute non-interference was not in all cases necessary, and that the acceptance of a protectorate might in some cases be justified by circumstances. This principle is one bearing so closely on our future dealings with the Nagas that I think it may be as well to quote the actual words. They were as follows :—

His Excellency in Council considers that Captain Johnstone ought not to have taken this step without consulting superior authority, unless, indeed, the necessity of protecting the villages was very urgent. And so far as the step, if approved, may involve us in the reduction of the country by degrees to a regular system of government regardless of expense, to that extent it certainly expresses a policy to which His Excellency in Council does not assent. Moreover, you have described the complication into which the government might be led by such proceedings and the inconvenient responsibilities that might arise out of it. If such complications ensue, the Political Agent, whose action may have brought them to pass, will of course be liable to be called to account for his want of judgment and caution; and you will no doubt take some opportunity of intimating to the Political Agents in your province how far you intend them in future to use their discretion in such contingencies without first taking your orders.

In regard, however, to the affair now reported, His Excellency in Council would, as it stands at present, desire to leave the management in your hands, to be conducted according to circumstances. His Excellency in Council does not understand that the affair must necessarily involve any question of large policy or definite acknowledgment of a principle so that it might be best to avoid the use of such formal terms as that of accepting from these Nagas 'their fealty as subjects of the Queen.' Our relations with these barbarous tribes will bear treating much more roughly and indefinitely. The Government of India have not hitherto objected to the establishment over the tracts bordering on British territory of so much influence as will enable our Political Officers to keep order on the frontier and to prevent raids on the British territory; and inasmuch as such raids always grow out of turbulence and disorganisation across the border, for that reason it is very essential to maintain peace within the scope of the Political Agent's influence on both sides of the frontier. Now the Government are aware that this influence cannot well be established without some kind of action or exercise of material authority. Captain Johnstone's act was an exercise of such authority, and the question for you to decide is, whether it was necessary for the maintenance of good order on the frontier, and also whether it was exercised with prudence and without greater risk than the object was worth. If you are of opinion that these villages are worth protecting in the interests of our own territory, that they can be conveniently and substantially protected, and that they are within easy range of your power to control, then Captain Johnstone's proceedings need not be disallowed. But if you think, after taking account of the localities and state of affairs, that the cost and consequence of this extension of our protectorate has been miscalculated, and that no adequate advantage is to be gained, in that case you will possibly be obliged to take steps to withdraw from an embarrassing and perhaps untenable position. And I am to say distinctly that the Government of India desire neither to accept fealty nor to take revenue from the independent villages, and would rather not extend their protecting obligations unless you are satisfied and can report that it is now necessary to uphold what has been already done.<sup>(1)</sup>

A few weeks after the despatch of this letter news arrived that Captain Johnstone had taken a third village under his protection, and in submitting the administration report for the year that officer intimated that in his opinion the action taken by these villages was the beginning of a general voluntary submission on the part of the Nagas.

The Chief Commissioner Colonel Keatinge, in March 1875,<sup>(2)</sup> re-opened the question of policy, advocating the gradual and systematic prosecution of the survey of the hills, not for mere purposes of exploration but

<sup>(1)</sup> Political Proceedings, India, July 1874, No. 146.

<sup>(2)</sup> Assam Proceedings, March and July 1875.

as a continuation of our political occupation of the hills. In July 1875 he followed this up by recommending the transfer of the head-quarters from Samoogoodting to Wokha. Colonel Keatinge pointed out that Samoogoodting was originally chosen as lying between the Naga villages of Mozemah, Konemah, and Jotsomah, and the plains of Nowgong, and it had effectually protected Nowgong from raids. He showed that in 1873 the Bengal Government was in favour of moving the officer in charge of the hills to a site more healthy and nearer to the chief Naga communities. What was now especially required was a screen for Seeb-saugor, and a move to Wokha would bring influence to bear on the Lhotas, Hathigorias, and neighbouring tribes who threaten that district. Though Wokha was further from the Angami Naga centres than Samoogoodting the road thence was easier. Samoogoodting would be kept up as an outpost, but was in any case too unhealthy for the permanent head-quarters. The Government of India decided to await the result of the next season's survey operations before moving the head-quarters of the district.

In November 1875 the Chief Commissioner reported that the number of Naga villages tendering revenue to our Political Officers was increasing. From villages within reach of Samoogoodting he had ordered this to be accepted. From the more powerful and turbulent villages to the east such as Sepemah and Mozemah he had declined to receive revenue. The Government of India approved of his action, with a caution to the local officers about going too far. The policy laid down in 1874 was still to be maintained.<sup>(1)</sup> During the cold weather of 1875-76 the survey went steadily on in the Hathigoria country, though encountered much opposition from the tribes.

In December 1875 Captain Butler, the Deputy Commissioner, who was singularly qualified to acquire influence over these tribes, and was a most able and enthusiastic officer, was killed in an ambushade at the village of Pangti, a Lhota Naga village not far from Wokha, while leading the survey party through the hills. Lieutenant Woodthorpe, who was in charge of the Survey, promptly burnt Pangti, and the neighbouring villages remaining friendly, the work of the survey was carried on to completion. Although the weaker villages continued after this to seek our protection, the leading villages of Mozemah and Konemah persistently held aloof.<sup>(2)</sup>

In August 1876 the Chief Commissioner again drew attention to the continued aggressions of the Angamis, and specially of the villages of Konemah and Mozemah, upon Naga communities living under Manipur, and to the state of perpetual warfare in which they lived among themselves. No actual raids upon our villages in North Cachar had taken place of late, partly because the Kutcha Nagas usually submitted to Angami exactions, partly because they were able to shelter themselves

(1) Political Proceedings (India), December 1875, No. 70.

(2) Assam Proceedings, June and August 1876.



behind the Kookies, whom the Angamis dared not touch; but from 1874 up to date six villages had been plundered, nine wholly or partially destroyed, and 334 persons killed, chiefly by Konemah and Mozemah. Colonel Keatinge accordingly proposed to send the Political Officer, Mr. Carnegy, with a strong escort in the cold season to meet the Manipur Political Agent on the frontier and enquire into the state of matters and endeavour to pacify the tribes. The Government of India, while holding that measures to repress these outrages were certainly called for, decided in October 1876 to postpone any expedition<sup>(1)</sup> until Lieutenant Colonel (lately Captain) Johnstone, an experienced frontier officer, who had just been appointed Agent in Manipur, had time to master recent local politics and confer with Mr. Carnegy. Meantime Mr. Carnegy was to use his influence to prevent outrage and push on road-making. The Secretary of State, however, when the facts were reported home, deprecated any avoidable delay, remarking that no time should be lost in taking vigorous steps to prevent a repetition of these Naga outrages. Upon this authority was given to the Chief Commissioner to adopt any measures he might consider necessary "for preventing future raids and exacting reparation for past outrages."

Meantime, the Assam reports were full of accounts of raids by one Naga village on another, and at last in February 1877 the Mozemah people attacked the Cachari village of Gumaigaju within a short distance of Assaloo, formerly the head-quarters of North Cachar.<sup>(2)</sup> In this six men were killed, two wounded, and two guns carried off. Mozemah refused all reparation, and an expedition in force was arranged for the next cold season to settle the Angami question once for all.

In June 1877 the Government of India addressed the Secretary of State on the subject of the policy to be followed in future in the Naga Hills. It was admitted that up to date the objects kept in view had merely been the peace of our own border. No attempt had been made to civilize the Nagas, or maintain order among them, save so far as our own immediate interests were concerned. The local officers had all been anxious for authority to act as arbiters in inter-tribal feuds with power to enforce their awards, and the Governor General in Council was now of opinion that the British Government was bound to acquire effective control and influence over a larger section of the hills. It was proposed, therefore, to move the head-quarters station to some locality in the interior of the hills, and to strengthen the administrative staff, so as to provide for the management, on the new and more active principles, of both the Eastern and Western tribes. The Secretary of State entirely agreed that the attitude of indifference to the internecine feuds and the raids of the Nagas on Manipur could no longer be maintained without discredit to British Administration.<sup>(3)</sup>

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(1) Assam Proceedings, December 1876.

(2) Assam Proceedings, March and April 1877.

(3) Political Proceedings (India), August 1877, Nos. 120 to 132.  
Political Proceedings, October 1877, No. 468.

On the 6th December 1877 the Political Officer, Mr. Carnegie, left Samoogoodting with the expedition.<sup>(1)</sup> The force was commanded by Captain Brydon, and consisted of 196 rank and file of the 42nd Assam Light Infantry and 50 Police. The troops advanced on Mozemah on the morning of the 8th December. On the approach of the troops, the inha-

**Expedition of 1877-78.**

bitants of the village at once opened fire on them. The village was accordingly attacked and carried by assault, and the whole of it, with the exception of three or four houses, was burnt to the ground. This burning of the village was not intended. The Mozemah men, after having been driven out, dispersed themselves among the neighbouring jungles and hill crests, and did all they could to harass the troops by intermittent firing and frequent night attacks. They also adopted the tactics of operating in rear of the force and interrupting communication between it and Demapore, in the plains, on the road to Golaghat, at the same time frequently threatening Samoogoodting. An addition to the force employed was consequently deemed necessary to bring the expedition to a successful termination, and a reinforcement of 100 men from the 43rd Assam Light Infantry, under the command of Lieutenant Macgregor, who was accompanied by Captain Williamson, the Inspector General of Police, was despatched to the Naga Hills. In the meantime, desultory fighting had been going on there, and, finally, the Mozemah Nagas, being without food and shelter, and their village and all their stores of grain having been destroyed, made overtures for peace. These negotiations were, however, interrupted by the death of Mr. Carnegie, the Political Officer, who was accidentally shot by one of his own sentries. On hearing of the accident to Mr. Carnegie, Captain Williamson hastened up from Samoogoodting, assumed charge of the Political Officer's duties, and commenced to settle the conditions to be imposed upon the Mozemah people. The following were the principal conditions:—

- (1.) That they should pay a fine of Rs. 50.
- (2.) That they should restore the arms and accoutrements of three constables who had been waylaid and also the contents of a plundered mail bag.
- (3.) That they should surrender four of their own firearms.

Pardon was extended to Konemah and Jotsomah, on their Chiefs formally tendering their submission.

These conditions were certainly lenient, but it was taken into consideration that an ample punishment had already been inflicted on the Mozemah people by the destruction of their houses and food-supply, and in the privations they had undergone, and it would have been futile, as well as inexpedient, to impose on them a heavy fine, which, all their property having been destroyed, they would not have been able to pay. It had not, however, been intended that Konemah and

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(<sup>1</sup>) Assam Proceedings, October 1878.

Jotsomah should have escaped comparatively scot-free. The omission to impose a fine upon these villages was due to the fact of Captain Williamson having no knowledge of the correspondence which had passed in connection with the expedition. The requisite papers were not at hand in camp for reference, and Mr. Carnegie was too ill to be consulted.

On the 18th January, the terms imposed upon Mozemah were fully complied with, and, peace being thus formally concluded, the expeditionary force fell back upon Samoogoodting on the 28th January.<sup>(1)</sup>

In March 1878<sup>(2)</sup> the Chief Commissioner reported that after personal

Occupation of Kohimah.

al exploration, he considered Kohimah the best site for the head-quarters of the Political Officer, commanding, as it did, the principal Angami villages and the Manipur frontier line. Wokha was also to be occupied to control the Lhota country. Sixteen Naga villages had by this time accepted the British protectorate, thirteen of which paid a revenue of Rs. 1,032. To protect them and maintain order generally, a force of 450 armed police was considered requisite. It was anticipated that eventually we should, at Rs. 2 per house, draw a revenue of Rs. 26,000 from the Naga villages—Angamis (7,367 houses), Kutcha Nagas (1,286 houses), Rengma and Lhotas (number doubtful). But meantime a very heavy expenditure was unavoidable. Kohimah was occupied, without opposition, on the 14th November 1878.

In July 1878<sup>(3)</sup> the Government of India communicated to the new Chief Commissioner, Sir S. C. Bayley, its general views of the more forward policy advocated by Colonel Keatinge, and so far approved.\* It

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\* The following extracts from the orders may be given :—

"After careful consideration of Colonel Keatinge's views, and of the general course of affairs in the Naga Hills during past years, His Excellency the Governor General in Council agrees that a more definite policy ought to be adopted in our dealings with these tribes. Such a policy would necessarily look beyond our immediate needs and interests, and could not be confined to questions of the best system for protecting our own settled districts, and the villages in the Naga Hills which have submitted to our authority. Colonel Keatinge's proposals for advancing our protectorate would no doubt bear upon these questions; for it is plain that our frontier, as at present established, will gain greatly in security if our dominion is advanced well beyond it, and that our interior administration will be benefited proportionately. But the scheme for largely extending our dominion could not be supported entirely upon such arguments; because our settled territory is understood to be already sufficiently safe from molestation. At any rate, there is no need of any such comprehensive project as that which is now before the Government, for the sole object of ensuring the security of our present line. The plan advocated by Colonel Keatinge contemplates the extension of our authority, village by village, over the whole tract between our present border and the longitude specified, not only for the purpose of placing beyond reach of danger the villages which we already protect, but upon the principle that we should undertake gradually to subdue and settle down all the wild tribes which inhabit these hills.

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(1) Assam Proceedings, October 1878.

(2) Assam Proceedings, March 1878.

(3) Assam Proceedings, May 1879.

held that it was justifiable and should be systematically pursued, but at the same time enjoined caution in procedure, and the keeping in mind the object of securing a definite limit of administration and a fixed political boundary. Roads to open out the country were put in hand; and the Nagas began to come in from all sides tendering submission and promising to obey orders.

The diaries of Mr. Damant, the Officer now in charge, were during the early part of 1879-80 full of encouragement; recording generally the arrival of deputations from distant villages with offers of submission, his efforts to prevent inter-tribal massacres, and his successful enforcement of fines and penalties on those villages which had been guilty of raiding in disobedience to his orders.<sup>(1)</sup>

These tribes now live in a state of constant internal disorder, their raids and feuds among themselves and with Manipur cause incessant bloodshed, and they have no elementary form of Government for which improvement might be hoped. In a tract of country adjoining British possessions, and separated from our protected villages by an indistinct and arbitrary arrangement, this is a state of things which cannot be expected to last. Whether we should leave the changes that must eventually come to be accomplished piecemeal, according to the exigencies of the moment; or whether we are now to shape out and proceed to forecast and steadily follow up a plan for reducing all these tribes under our control, is the question which is now before the Government for decision.

"His Excellency observes that our actual system of administration in the Naga Hills District is at present indefinite. We administer only those villages which have placed themselves under us, to the extent of protecting them from raids, and receiving some taxes, and we keep out the Manipuris from the whole district. These are, of course, no more than rudimentary functions of Government. And the consequence is that the present boundary has no special or intelligible meaning in an administrative sense; while neither for defensive purposes, nor for the protection of our settled borders, has it an advantage over the further boundary up to which Colonel Keatinge desires to extend our influence.

"This being the present situation, His Excellency in Council is inclined, upon a full review of it, to determine that the policy of the scheme proposed by Colonel Keatinge is justifiable and expedient; and that some such measures are becoming practically unavoidable. The experience already gained in our dealings with the tribes leads to the belief that no serious difficulties may be anticipated to hinder the execution of the scheme. If it can be carried, by degrees, into effect without unreasonable risk or any very disproportionate expense, His Excellency will be disposed to accord a general sanction to the policy, and to decide that in future it shall be systematically pursued. His Excellency would, however, desire you to proceed cautiously, and to avail yourself fully of local knowledge and experience before adopting your practical conclusions. You will probably see fit to examine and test Colonel Keatinge's views upon the ultimate line of boundary which will be most convenient for general administration of all these hills, and as a fixed political frontier. And you will satisfy yourself that the force he asks for is adequate for the ends proposed, having regard to the nature of the country and to the resistance likely to be offered. In short, His Excellency in Council believes that you will find it necessary to obtain a more distinct conception of the scheme which Colonel Keatinge has laid before the Government in outline, than can be readily gathered from these papers. Meanwhile, the details of Colonel Keatinge's plan have to be arranged. You are requested to submit a report giving some estimate of the total expense that is likely to be incurred, and specifying particularly the cost of the Kohima station and of the Wokha Sub-division. The cost of the additional police, and of the military officer who is to command them, should also be stated exactly. And you will have to explain how you propose that this expenditure shall be provided."

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(1) Assam Proceedings, June 1880.

The first interruption to this peaceable state of affairs was in April 1879, when a policeman, who was (contrary to orders) singly escorting the mail-runner, was shot. It turned out that only one Naga was concerned in this murder, which was committed with a view of obtaining the policeman's rifle, but the mail-runner seized it, and pointed it at the Naga, who fled, while the runner proceeded with the mail to Piphimah. As the murderer failed to obtain the rifle, it was impossible to ascertain from what village he came, but representatives of all the principal villages in the neighbourhood came in and swore to their own being unconcerned in the matter.

It may be mentioned incidentally, as disclosing the relative value attached in these hills to arms and women respectively, that the same diary mentions Mr. Damant's recovery from the people of one village of the sum of Rs. 80, which they had received as the price of an old musket stolen from Samoogoodting, and from another village of Rs. 40, which they had received as the price of a Hathigoria woman whom they had captured and sold into slavery.

In May Mr. Damant reported that the village of Konemah was acquiring arms and ammunition, and it subsequently appeared that the same information was given about the same time to the Political Agent at Manipur.

In June the attitude of Konemah was so decidedly threatening, that Mr. Damant proposed to organise a hostile expedition against it after the rains; but even at this time Konemah was apparently divided against itself, for in his diary of the 11th June he reported that the Semmama Khel had sent their representative to declare that they would not assist the other Khels if they proved hostile to Government. In July the attitude of the village had so far changed that it quietly paid a fine which Mr. Damant had inflicted on it, and in that month he reported it to be peaceably disposed, and that no hostile action would, he thought, be necessary.

From time to time Mr. Damant reported that he had difficulty in procuring supplies, or rather in procuring carriage to bring in supplies, and this difficulty became so serious that in August the military authorities found it necessary to send up a special officer to arrange for the storing of adequate supplies for the military in the stockade.

There were not wanting at this time indications of an unfriendly  
 Indications of pending trouble. if not absolutely of a hostile spirit  
 on the part of the Nagas, but  
 though it is easy to put this interpretation on them in the light of subsequent events, Mr. Damant did not so interpret them at the time. Such petty insults as throwing stones at the stockade were attributed to the natural insolence of savages, which it was not necessary to notice. Late in September there was, it is said, an abortive demonstration made against the stockade at Piphimah. But this could not have been very serious, as it was not reported by Mr. Damant, and no details were ever communicated to the Chief Commissioner.

It is quite evident that Mr. Damant had no suspicion of there being anything to fear from the attitude of the Nagas at this time. In the beginning of October he went down with an escort of only ten policemen to visit Piphimah, Samoogoodting, and Demapore, and to bring up Captain Reid and the detachment of the 43rd; he also planned a lengthened expedition into the Hathigoria country to the eastward; but before carrying out this expedition, which involved taking with him as escort a considerable proportion of the Kohima garrison, he determined to ascertain the real intentions of those villages the attitude of which he had most reason to doubt. On the 11th October he wrote—"I intend starting on Monday for Jotsomah, Konemah, and Mozemah, as I want to find out what disposition they are in before starting for the Hathigorias."

On Monday, the 13th October, Mr. Damant<sup>(1)</sup> set out on his expedition accompanied by an escort of 21 military and 65 police. He halted for the night at Jotsomah, and thence obtained coolies to carry on the baggage of the party to Konemah. Before starting the next morning he was warned by a Jotsomah interpreter that the Konemah men meant mischief. One of the escort afterwards narrates that "the interpreter begged Mr. Damant not to go on, and on several occasions fell in front of the Political Officer and caught him by the hand, beseeching him not to proceed, but Mr. Damant replied that there was no danger." On arriving at the foot of the hill, on the summit of which stood the strongly fortified village of Konemah, Mr. Damant left his baggage and half his escort, and with the other half of the party advanced up the steep pathway leading to the place. This pathway is described as having a precipice on one side, and a high wall, which was lined by the young men of the village, on the other. The gate was found to be closed, and while Mr. Damant stood before it, with no advanced guard and all his escort clubbed together, a single shot was first fired at him, striking him in the head, and then a volley was fired into the escort, who endeavoured as best they could to escape and join the baggage-guard below. The Nagas swarmed out and succeeded in dispersing the troops, who broke up and attempted to return to Kohimah in twos and threes. The Jotsomah men joined in the attack, and the Chetonoma khel of Kohimah came out to cut off their retreat. Ultimately, of the 65 police who accompanied Mr. Damant 25 were found to

Siege of Kohimah. be killed or missing, and 14 more were wounded, and of the 20 military 10 were killed and 5 wounded. Three domestic servants who accompanied the party were also killed. The news of the disaster reached Kohimah the same afternoon, and preparations were at once commenced in expectation of an immediate attack. The force there consisted of about 100 police, 32 of whom were recruits, and 80 military; and the civil charge of the garrison devolved on Mr. Cawley, District Superintendent of Police. A message was at once sent to Wokha, a distance of 57 miles,

(1) Assam Proceedings, December 1879.

and Mr. Hinde, the Extra Assistant Commissioner in charge, taking 40 sepoy, his whole available force, and 22 police, reached Kohimah on the 19th. Mr. Hinde's action in himself going to the rescue was, under the circumstances, eminently courageous, and his march was exceedingly well executed. He managed, by marching through hostile villages at night, and by coming through the village of Kohimah instead of by the regular road, to bring in his small but welcome reinforcement without the loss of a man. Messengers were also sent to Samoogoodting, but these never arrived. The Nagas made hostile demonstrations against Kohimah on the 16th and 17th, but did not commence any serious attack till the 21st. Thereupon a sortie was made under Native officers, in which the garrison lost two men killed and four wounded. On the 23rd the Nagas succeeded in establishing themselves close to the stockade, and attacked it with some persistence, but without doing serious damage; and on the 24th, having apparently heard that help was coming from Manipur, they commenced to treat. They offered the garrison a safe conduct to Samoogoodting, and the defenders, who were very sorely pressed for want of food and water, were glad of the respite which the negotiations gave them, but it became clear that their enemies were not acting in good faith, and, had they accepted the terms, they would all undoubtedly have been massacred. Before active hostilities could recommence, they were cheered by the news that Colonel Johnstone, with a force of Manipuris, was on his way to relieve them, and on the 27th Colonel Johnstone marched in unopposed, and the siege was at an end.

Colonel Johnstone had, as soon as the news of Mr. Damant's death reached him, asked the Maharaja of Manipur to put 2,000 men at his disposal, and these men, under the command of the Minister and the Maharaja's two sons, started the next day. Colonel Johnstone had also with him his own escort of 30 men of the 34th N. I., and a small body of Cachar Frontier Police. The whole force accomplished the distance of nearly 100 miles, over a roadless and most difficult country, in five days, and the service thus rendered by Colonel Johnstone and the Maharaja to the Government was one which was not forgotten later on.

The news of Mr. Damant's murder reached Shillong on the 18th October. The 44th S. L. I. were at this time at Goalundo, having been ordered to Cabul; but these orders had already been countermanded, and they were directed to return. In the meantime, a party of the 43rd A. L. I., under Major Evans, was despatched from Dibrugarh on the 23rd, and marched from Golaghat to Samoogoodting, where they were joined by Lieutenant Maxwell, the Assistant Commissioner, who had pushed on with a few Frontier Police. This party, making forced marches, arrived at Kohimah on the 30th, when they found that the garrison had already been relieved.

To punish Konemah and re-assert the supremacy of the British Government in these hills, Brigadier-Punitive expedition, 1879-80. General Nation determined to take the field in person with a force consisting of the 44th S. L. I.,

under Colonel Nuttall, c. b., a detachment of the 48rd A. L. I., under Major Evans, and two mountain guns under Lieutenant Mansel, r. a.

Thanks in a great measure to the exertions of Colonel Campbell, the Deputy Commissioner of Sebsangor, carriage was collected, the troops were enabled to reach Sachimah by the 21st November, and Konemah was attacked on the following day. The place, which was by nature very strong, had been fortified with immense labour and skill, and was deemed by the Nagas impregnable. The assault lasted all day, and at nightfall only the lower portion of the village had been captured, after the severest fighting ever known in these hills. In the night, the Nagas evacuated the upper works, and on the following day the British force occupied the position, having lost in the assault two British Officers and the Subadar-Major of the 44th S. L. I. killed, two British and two Native Officers wounded, and 44 of the rank and file killed and wounded. The Nagas retreated to a strongly-fortified position on a crest of the Burrail range, where, as their access to their fields and houses was cut off, the General with his small force deemed it inexpedient to follow them preferring to reduce them to terms by the slower process of blockade.

Of the 13 villages hostile to us, Piphimah, Merramah, Sachimah,

#### Subsequent operations.

Sephamah, and Puchamah were attacked and destroyed before the attack on Konemah took place. Some fighting occurred at Sephamah, which was destroyed by a party of the 43rd Assam Light Infantry, with a loss of Lieutenant Maxwell severely wounded, two sepoys killed and two wounded. Subsequently, the village of Konemah was destroyed and the site occupied by our troops, and Jotsomah, which is close by, was captured on the 27th November, and a portion of it was burned. On the arrival of reinforcements from Shillong, a detachment was sent out to punish a group of villages to the eastward, that had taken part in the siege of Kohimah, and this work was effectually accomplished; another party under Mr. Savi was afterwards detached to the westward into the North Cachar country to cover the routes by which the Angamis generally visit the plains, either of Nowgong or Cachar.

During February and March 1880 there was a series of skirmishes, connected with our endeavours to prevent supplies being brought in by the enemy to their stronghold, known as the Chakka Forts, and to capture and occupy Popolongmai, while the Nagas maintained a guerilla warfare, constantly firing at sentries, convoys, and water parties, but making no sustained attack, save on the Nichi guard outpost, on which in one week they made three night attacks, without causing serious damage. Altogether in these, petty onslaughts they inflicted throughout the expedition a loss of nearly 50 in killed and wounded.

One party of Nagas, however, executed a most daring raid, which, as it disclosed our weakness in an unexpected quarter, requires to be noticed.<sup>(1)</sup> Late in January a party of 55 men of Konemah, with only

Raid on Baladhan.

(1) Assam Proceedings, February 1881.



seven firearms among them, started from Popolongmai, marched down the bed of the Barak through Manipur territory, requisitioning food from some of the Kutcha Naga villages on the way, crossed by a disused road from the Barak into British territory, and, hiding in the jungles during the day, surprised the Baladhan tea-garden at nightfall, slew the manager, Mr. Blyth, and 16 coolies, plundered what they could, and burned everything on the place. They then marched back unmolested by the same route. The distance in a straight line cannot be less than 80 miles, and, even for Nagas, it was a good four days' march each way. The country through which they came is one of hill and dense jungle, so scantily populated that they might scarcely meet a single village in a day's march, and these villages, though in Manipur territory, are so profoundly dominated by terror of the Angamis, that no resistance was to be expected from them. The Baladhan garden was well known to the Angamis, being the furthest and most exposed on the line of road which they usually take in trading at the Lakhipur Bazar. On that line, however, there are police posts and Kookie villages, and they could not have adopted it without the danger of an alarm being given, so they took the remoter line down the Barak. It is obvious, that through such a country, small parties of Nagas travelling unhampered can vary their route indefinitely, can evade a police post, and can escape from a pursuing party.

The Chief Commissioner himself visited Cachar shortly after this occurrence, and made such arrangements as he could for the protection of the frontier from a repetition of such attacks, and no further attempts took place; but it was some time before confidence was restored, and the success of the raiders on this occasion must necessarily cause serious anxiety lest it should lead to a repetition of the attempt in future years. From Cachar the Chief Commissioner went on through Manipur to the Naga Hills, and remained at Kohimah from the 1st to the 11th March.

At this time further reinforcements were on their way, and, Popolongmai having been occupied successfully by Captain Abbott's detachment, it was possible to enforce a stricter blockade of the enemy's position in the Chakka Forts, and to make demonstrations against it with a view, if necessary, to taking it by assault; happily, this was not necessary, the Nagas having already shown a disposition to treat. On the 27th March they finally submitted, and on the 28th the Chakka Forts were surrendered.

Generally, those villages which took part against us were punished by fines in grain and cash and a certain amount of unpaid labour. The Nagas had to surrender without compensation the firearms they were known to possess, and those that stood out against us and had to be attacked were in most instances punished by the demolition of their village, and in some instances by a removal of the site from a fortified and inaccessible crest to a position more easily accessible. The village

of Konemah suffered, in addition, the confiscation of its terraced cultivation and the dispersion of its clans among other villages. Two men were excepted from the amnesty by name. From all villages an agreement was taken to pay revenue in the shape of one maund of rice and one rupee per house, to provide a certain amount of labour annually for State purposes, and to appoint a headman who should be responsible for good order and for carrying out the wishes of Government.

Subsequently the Chief Commissioner found it necessary to sanction some modifications in these terms. The changes were all in the direction of greater leniency. The two main points in which the conditions laid down were relaxed were these—(1) permission was given to the dispossessed villages or *khels* to re-occupy their old cultivation; and (2) the terms of the revenue assessment were modified.

After the operations were closed the Political Officer reported that the punishment inflicted by our troops had been far more severe in its results than was at first supposed. The dispossessed villagers of Konemah and other communities had not only been deprived of their homes, but, by the confiscation of their settled cultivation, they had, during the whole of the past year, been reduced to the condition of houseless wanderers, dependent to a great extent on the charity of their neighbours, and living in temporary huts in the jungles. The result had been great sickness and mortality among them, and a severe strain upon the resources of those who had had to supply them with food. The object aimed at in the policy of Government was to induce the dispossessed clans to settle elsewhere, either bodily in Manipur, where land and an asylum had been offered them, or on fresh land in the Naga Hills, which was pointed out to them by the Political Officer. But in this we were disappointed. They could not be persuaded willingly to settle elsewhere, and from the nature of the case wholesale coercion was impossible. No other Nagas were willing to take up the confiscated lands, fearing probably future retribution; and the dispossessed clans, except in occasional instances, had, for the most part, been receiving such shelter and livelihood as they could obtain from the villages in the neighbourhood of their old homes.

Under these circumstances, finding the prosecution of the policy of dispersion impossible, Sir Steuart Bayley considered that the question was narrowed to one of the sufficiency of the punishment already inflicted. After learning where the dispossessed clans were, how they were living, and what was their condition and attitude, he came to the conclusion that their punishment had been terribly severe; that the risk of their supposing that we were actuated by weakness in restoring their lands was not great; and that the first step towards enforcing on them permanently peaceful habits must be to let them have not only the means of livelihood, but lands, the loss of which they would not again lightly care to risk. He therefore agreed to let the dispossessed *khels* return to their confiscated lands, on condition that they were not to be

re-occupied till February 1881, when the cultivating season commenced, and, with the further condition, in the case of Konemah, that the village site would on no account whatever be restored to them, and that the three *khels* must build their houses on separate sites in the valley, aloof from their former strong position on the heights, to be marked off for them by the Political Officer. These conditions were accepted, the new sites occupied, and when Mr. Elliott, who had then succeeded Sir S. C. Bayley as Chief Commissioner, visited Konemah in March 1881, he found houses already built, and the *khels* engaged in preparing for their cultivation.

In regard to the rates of revenue to be assessed, the Chief Commissioner were of opinion that, in the first instance, the measure was important rather from a political than from a fiscal point of view; and he insisted on it as a public and well-understood symbol of obedience rather than as a valuable contribution to the revenue. Major Michell, the Political Officer, pointed out that, in his opinion, the assessment of one rupee, plus one maund of rice, per house was far too high, and that in the first year at all events it could not possibly be collected. The Nagas had not, he said, the rice to give, as much grain was destroyed in the operations of the troops. There were many more mouths than usual to be fed, and much land, especially in the neighbourhood of Kohimah, was uncultivated. Cash they had in greater plenty than usual, as our payments for labour and for rice had made money circulate largely in the hills; but they had not more rice than was necessary to feed themselves. Sir Steuart Bayley, therefore, consented to the Political Officer changing the general rate of assessment from one rupee and one maund of rice per house to two rupees a house, which is the usual rate at which house-tax is levied from other wild tribes in Assam, and from the villages which have hitherto paid revenue in the Naga Hills; and he allowed him large latitude in dealing with the assessment of any particular village. These rates were readily accepted, and were paid punctually and spontaneously.

In the matter of forced labour, the conditions of the agreements were not formally abrogated, and labour was demanded and given in accordance with our requirements from time to time. But it was not found possible to regulate its incidence so that the burthen should fall equally on all villages bound to bear it: those far from Kohimah and the road down to the plains escaped, while those nearer were unduly pressed. In all cases, however, wages were paid at the full rate of four annas a day, instead of the subsistence rate of two annas. In the matter of fines, also, the Political Officer was lenient, not demanding the full payment when he had reason to think that it could not be paid without some hardship.

In a note<sup>(1)</sup> of the 10th March 1880, Sir S. Bayley pointed out the necessity of bringing the Kookie and Kutcha Naga villages of North Caohar under better control. It was found that they had been carrying

(<sup>1</sup>) Assam Proceedings, March 1880.

on a trade in arms with the Angamis and indeed the Kookies, who had originally been settled as a screen to protect the North Cachar villages, had latterly been getting out of hand altogether. The Chief Commissioner proposed therefore to reconstitute the Assaloo Sub-

Revised boundary of the district. Division moving its head-quarters to the north-east and placing the whole country from the Burrail on the south to Nowgong on the north under the Naga Hills District. The limits of the Political Officer's jurisdiction, so far as taking revenue and direct interference went, he proposed to fix to the eastward by a line drawn from the Manipur frontier through the Kopamedza Hill along the Munnoo ridge, and thence northward by the Doyeng, from the junction of the Sijjoo and Zuloo Rivers to the Wokha and Golaghat road. This included the country of the Lhota, but excluded the Sema and Hathigoria Nagas. Sir S. Bayley had no doubt that in time we should have to go beyond this line, but meantime the Officer in charge of the hills should consolidate his authority within these limits. These proposals were carried out, and the Secretary of State again confirmed the policy of effectively administering the tract thus brought within the Naga Hills District.

The attitude of the tribes during the year 1880-81 was one partly of exhaustion and partly of expectancy. The indirect results of the war were far more grievous to them than the actual hostilities; and those on whom the blow had fallen hoped, by quiet and peaceable demeanour, to earn some relaxation in the stringency of the conditions to which they were bound. Accordingly, throughout the year there was little or no crime, no outbreak, and no necessity to employ force. There were many disquieting rumours, it is true, most of which originated in Manipur; but these gradually passed away, and no evil followed. Kohimah was again declared to be the most suitable head-quarters station.<sup>(1)</sup>

The difficulties with which the force occupying the hills had to contend were terrible: there was cholera on the line of communications and scurvy in the hills; great mortality and desertion in the transport train; bridges and roads washed away, with no local labour to fall back upon for repairs. But, so far, the policy pursued was apparently successful. The revenue was paid up, and the peace kept. Major Michell at the close of 1880 reported that officers could safely go about the hills unattended, and that sepoys visited the villages as freely as in the Khasi Hills; while he had had on more than one occasion to refuse revenue from distant villages, situated beyond the boundary fixed by Sir Stuart Bayley.

Of deeds of violence, the Political Officer reported only (1) an affray at Kigwemah in December 1880, where two clans contended with two others with sticks and stones, and two persons were killed: the

(1) Assam Proceedings, March 1881.

village was fined Rs. 200, which amount was paid; (2) a murder near the village of Kekrimah of a Naga of Viswemah, the perpetrators of which had not up to the close of the year been detected; and (3) the murder of a man of Kohimah at Chajubama, a village outside our frontier, whither he had gone to trade. This last event resulted, in April 1881, in an expedition being led by the Political Officer against Chajubama, which was burnt.

The revenue, as already mentioned, was got in from the Angami Nagas without any necessity for using force. The Lhota and Rengma Nagas (except those of the latter tribe living across the Dhansiri in the Mikir Hills) have not yet been assessed to revenue. Their attitude during the year was one of complete tranquillity.

The boundaries of the district were definitely settled, and a notification defining them appeared in the *Gazette of India and Assam*.<sup>(1)</sup> On the south and north these are identical with those laid down in 1875, with the exception of the portion between the Doyeng and the north-east corner of the district, which had then been left unsettled; on the west they are also the same as were determined seven years ago, with a slight modification whereby a triangle inhabited by Kookies and Cacharis, and bounded on the south by the Langting and Langreng rivers, on the north-east by the Lumding, and on the north-west by the Doyeng, has been transferred from the Naga Hills to North Cachar; on the east the frontier is that proposed by Sir Steuart Bayley in March 1880, and follows generally the course of the Doyeng to where that river abandons its northward direction and flows south-west; thence the line is drawn to the Sebsaugor border in such wise as to include all the villages of Lhota Nagas, and exclude all those of Hathi-gorias, who are here the neighbours of the former.

On the 2nd May 1881, the Chief Commissioner, Mr. Elliott, submitted a comprehensive memorandum on the administration of the district, in which he took a hopeful view of the future, and insisted on the advantages accruing from free intercourse between our officers and the Naga tribes.

Of "political cases" the record of the year 1881-82 is fortunately brief. An attack by certain

State of affairs in 1881-82.

Lhotas of Lakhuti on the Hathi-goria village of Nungatung, where they killed two persons, was punished by sentencing the guilty parties to two years' rigorous imprisonment. An inter-tribal dispute at Kigwemah, in which one man was killed, was settled by demolishing the defensive works raised by the *khels* and the house of the murderer, compelling the guilty *khel* to work off a fine of Rs. 200 in labour contributed to the Public Works Department, and posting a police guard at the village till the murderer was hunted down. A man of Mozemah, who was accused of having sold a girl of Kerumah to the Kookies, was compelled to procure her restoration, and did so. There was an undiscovered murder

(1) Assam Proceedings, November 1882.

on the North Cachar frontier at Langtingbra, where a shop was plundered and six men killed. The place was solitary, and the crime remained undetected till it was too late to track the murderers, regarding whom nothing is as yet known. But the most successful and satisfactory exploit performed in this branch of the administration was the reparation exacted from a Sema village named Philimi, which had raided on the Lhota village of Chingaki, killing two persons.<sup>(1)</sup> An expedition, consisting of about 50 men of the 42nd Regiment under Captain Abbott and some Frontier Police, was skilfully and suddenly led against the aggressors by Mr. McCabe, the Political Officer, the resistance of the village anticipated, and the site occupied. The inhabitants were kept out of their houses for two days, and finally Mr. McCabe threatened to burn the village unless the principal culprit, a headman named Kenilhi, was surrendered. This demand was complied with, and the man brought into Kohimah and sentenced to ten years' rigorous imprisonment. This result seems to prove that prompt and ready action, backed by sufficient force, is now adequate to procure respect to law and authority, and that the barbarous expedient of village-burning which confounds the innocent and the guilty, is not essential to the enforcement of order in these hills.

Much has been done within the last few years to open up the country, and the Naga communities are now apparently settled down as revenue-paying subjects of the British Government. They may no doubt at times break out into savagery, and they must be firmly held and closely watched for many years to come; but on the whole the Angami Naga problem is, it may be hoped, at last in a fair way to final solution.

The Officer in charge of the hills is now taking steps to have the fortifications of villages gradually destroyed,<sup>(2)</sup> and is empowered to punish by military force all incursions into our territory by the tribes outside the line, being at the same time responsible for preventing raids by our subjects upon the tribes beyond.

The Angami Nagas have figured so prominently in the frontier history of Assam that a brief description of them and of their villages, furnished for the Assam Gazetteer, may appropriately close this Chapter :—

They are an athletic and by no means bad-looking race; brown complexion; flat noses, and high cheek bones; brave and warlike, but also treacherous and vindictive. The men dwelling in the higher ranges of the hills are fine, stalwart, hardy-looking fellows. Their dress consists of a dark blue or black kilt, ornamented with rows of cowrie shells, and a thick cloth of home manufacture thrown loosely over the shoulders. Strings of various-coloured beads ornament their necks in front, a conch shell being suspended behind. The warrior wears a collar round his neck made of goats' hair dyed red, intermixed with long flowing locks of hair of the persons he has killed, and ornamented with cowrie shells. No one is allowed to wear these insignia of honour unless he has killed many of his enemies and brought home their heads. As ear-ornaments they use the tusks of the wild boar, with tufts of goats' hair dyed red. They also wear earrings of

(1) Assam Proceedings, May 1882.

(2) Assam Proceedings, July 1882.

brass wire. Above the elbow they wear armlets, either of ivory or plaited cane, prettily worked in red and yellow. Between the calf and knee they bind strips of finely-cut cane dyed black, the calves being encased in leggings made of fine cane, similar to that of the armlets. These are generally worked on the leg, and allowed to remain until they wear out. Some of the men cut their hair square in front, and wear it pushed up above their foreheads, the hair at the top and back of the head being tied into a knot behind, and ornamented with eagle and toucan feathers. Others, again, cut their hair all round, leaving it about three or four inches long in front, and from six to eight inches long behind, and allow it to remain loose and dishevelled. The women are short in stature, stout, and extremely plain featured. They have to perform all the drudgery of the house, to work in the fields, hew wood, and draw water, besides weaving the clothing required for the family.

The Angami villages are invariably built on the very summits of the hills, and vary much in size, some containing as many as a thousand houses, while others consist of no more than twenty. The villages are all strongly fortified with stockades, deep ditches, and massive stone walls, and the hill sides thickly studded with *pánjis*, a *chevaux de frise* of sharp-pointed bamboo sticks planted in the ground. In some cases, also, the sloping side of the hill is cut away so as to form a perpendicular wall. The approaches to the villages are tortuous, narrow, covered ways, only wide enough to admit the passage of one man at a time; these lead to gates closed by strong, heavy wooden doors, with look-outs on which a sentry is posted day and night when the clans are at feud. Very often these approaches are steeply scarped, and the only means of entry into the village is by means of a ladder consisting of a single pole, some fifteen or twenty feet high, cut into steps. The sites of the villages, however, are sometimes ill chosen, being commanded by adjoining heights from which the internal economy of the hamlet can be viewed, and well-judged attack with firearms would render opposition useless.

## CHAPTER XV.

## NORTH CACHAR.

West of the Angami territories and lying between the Districts of Nowgong (on the North), the Khasi and Jaintia Hills (on the East), and Cachar Proper (on the South) is a tract of hilly country which for years had distinct administrative recognition as the District of North Cachar. The greater portion of this tract belonged to Tularam Senaputty of whom an account has been given in the Chapter on the Angami Nagas. The history of North Cachar is indeed, as has been shown, intimately connected with that of the Angami Hills. The tribes of Cacharis and Kutcha Nagas living in the eastern part of North Cachar were for many years harried by the Angamis, and the principal administrative question connected with the tract was the protection of the villages of these our subjects against their turbulent neighbours of the inner hills.

In 1839 North Cachar was annexed to Nowgong, and in 1852 it was placed in charge of a separate officer whose principal duty it was to keep order among certain Kookie Settlements established near Assaloo, the head quarters station, and to protect them and the other peaceable hillmen under our rule as far as possible from the Angamis. In 1844 Tularam made over his territory to his son; but as it was found that the Senaputty family were quite unable to keep out the Nagas, in 1854 the tract was finally taken over, the five surviving members of the family being pensioned. In 1867, when the Naga Hills District was formed, North Cachar was parcelled out between the Districts of Nowgong, Cachar, and the Naga Hills, the principal portion together with the chief Station, Assaloo, falling to Cachar.

There are six distinct tribes of hillmen in North Cachar. Their names and numbers, as given in Mills' Report (1854) and Allen's Report (1859), are—

	Mills.	Allen.
Hill Cacharis ...	3,940	6,735
Hozai Cacharis ...	1,170	3,260
Mikirs ...	1,820	5,076
Old Kookies ...	3,335	3,709
New Kookies ...	7,575	4,763
Aroong Nagas ...	3,505	5,885

These all pay to Government either a house tax or hoe tax through their elected headmen or mouzahdars. There is reason to suppose that



the Cacharis were formerly more numerous, but that many villages were deserted in consequence of the raids of the Angami Nagas. The Mikirs are the remnants\* of a tribe that has for the most part migrated northward to the plains of Nowgong and the isolated group of hills between the Jumoona and Berhampooter. The Aroong Nagas are an inoffensive tribe, probably an offshoot from the Kutchha Nagas who have settled down to peaceful habits.

#### The Kookies.

They were great sufferers from the Angami raids. The Kookies are all immigrants from the south, and formerly inhabited the hills south of Cachar, from which they were driven by the advance northward of a more powerful people from the unexplored country between British territory and Burma. They are a hardworking, self-reliant race, and the only hillmen in this quarter who can hold their own against the Angamis. The 'old Kookies' came north according to their own account about 85 years ago. They were made use of by Rajah Govind Chunder of Cachar in his feud with Tularam Senaputty (1828-29). Band followed band from time to time belonging to different tribes and speaking different dialects. In 1846-47 especially a large immigration took place, the leaders of which informed our officers that they had left their own hills to avoid the oppressions of Manipur and the attacks of Lushais. In the year 1851-52, another great band, numbering about 8,000, moved north.

The old Kookies were reported in 1853 to be in four clans, viz., Khelema, Ranthai, Bete, and Lamkron. The new Kookies (of 1851-52) were of three tribes—Jangseen, Tadoi, and Shingshoon. Each clan or tribe was under a regular gradation of chiefs generally elected. It was this organization mainly that rendered them superior to the Nagas. They were ready at once to avenge an inroad, and, using bows and arrows instead of spears, were much respected even by the Angamis. Before the establishment of the Naga Hills District, proposals were frequently made to utilise these Kookies as a buffer or screen between our more timid subjects and the Angamis. In 1856-57 lands were assigned rent-free for 10 and afterwards for 25 years to any Kookies who would settle to the east of North Cachar beyond the Langting River. Fire-arms and ammunition were given them by Government. In 1859 about 600 Kookies had accepted free settlement on these terms; and in 1860 the colony contained 1,356 inhabitants in seven villages. These villages the Angamis avoided, and to some extent the country in the rear of the Kookie Settlements was free from incursions. But it would have taken scores of such settlements effectually to cover such a broken frontier. In 1867 the number of the Langting colonists had risen to 1,967, and 500 new immigrants had come from Manipur. To these last arms were not supplied. The establishment of the Naga Hills

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\* Probably Mills' numbers are more correct for the Mikir population than Allen's. There is no doubt that the bulk of the Mikirs are in "the Meikir Hills".

District has deprived this colonising scheme for the present of much of its political interest.<sup>(1)</sup>

The tract now known as North Cachar is made up of (1) the hills which have always been under Cachar jurisdiction; (2) that part of the Assaloo Sub-division made over to Cachar in 1867 on the formation of the Naga Hills District; and (3) a tract of low undulating hills made over from the Naga Hills in 1876. The tribes pay a light house-tax and are content and peaceful. In 1875 the population was returned at 7,536 Nagas, 10,824 Cacharis, 15,080 Kookies, and 4,335 Mikirs. In 1880 a Kookie militia 100 strong was raised as a protection against Angami raids, and a European officer was again stationed in the hills to more effectively control the different tribes. In 1881-82 a rising took place, which in the words of the Annual Report, "seemed contemptible in its origin, but was lamentable in its conclusion."

The mainspring of the revolt was a Cachari named Sambhudan, who first set up as a worker of Sambhudan's Insurrection, 1881-82. miraculous cures, and presently went on to claim divine inspiration, and took the title of a god, a "*deo*." Among the credulous population of the hills followers were soon attracted to him; the afflatus of his inspiration extended to them, and they too became "*deos*," though Sambhudan was still the principal god. He took up his abode at Maibong, the ancient capital of the Cacharis, and lived at free quarters on the forced contributions of his neighbours. At length a man brought a complaint against him in the Sub-Divisional Officer's court, having been beaten by him and his followers for resisting the expropriation of a buffalo. It was found that the dread of Sambhudan was so great that no one could be induced to serve a summons on him. The Sub-Divisional Officer then called in the Deputy Commissioner, Major Boyd, who went to his assistance with a force of some 30 police. On the way, some huts erected for a camping place were found burnt down by Sambhudan's party, but no other impediment awaited the District Officer on his road to Gunjong, the present head-quarters of North Cachar. Maibong is some six or eight hours' march from

(1) The principal authorities for North Cachar are,—Pemberton's, Mills,' and Allen's Reports; and the following :—

Secret Proceedings, 14th August	1829, No. 5.
Political Proceedings, 14th May	1832, No. 90.
Political Proceedings, 29th October	1832, Nos. 132 and 133.
Political Proceedings, 3rd December	1832, Nos. 103 and 104.
Political Proceedings, 31st July	1834, No. 22.
Political Proceedings, 30th May	1833, No. 100.
Political Proceedings, 11th February	1835, Nos. 82 and 83.
Political Proceedings, 16th October	1834, Nos. 52 to 54.
G. O., No. 4411, dated 14th October	1853.
Political Proceedings, 19th October	1844, Nos. 132 to 134.
Revenue Proceedings, 5th April	1848, Nos. 19 and 20.
Revenue Proceedings, 17th November	1859, Nos. 3 and 4.
Revenue Proceedings, 3rd May	1860, Nos. 9 and 10.

Gunjong. On the 15th January, Major Boyd, accompanied by one European Officer and some 25 police, marched to Maibong and found it deserted, except for three or four men who ran away on his approach, and two women. Sambhudan and his party, supposed to be about 20 men, had countermarched him on the same day, and about noon fell upon Gunjong, where only a weak police guard had been left, which became panic-stricken, and fled without firing a shot. The "*deos*" burnt down all the houses at Gunjong, and killed two servants and a sick policeman, but left precipitately, neither plundering the small amount of treasure that was left there, nor carrying off the police rifles or ammunition. Though Maibong was so near to Gunjong, the police were too disorganised to send any news of the disaster to Major Boyd, who, with his party, passed the night in the houses of the "*deos*," unaware of what had occurred. Soon after dawn on the morning of the 16th they were awakened by the shouts and drums of Sambhudan and his followers, who had marched straight back from Gunjong and passed the night in the jungle. In the skirmish which followed, several of the insurgents were killed, and Major Boyd received a wound in the hand which ultimately brought on tetanus and caused his death.

Sambudhan, the leader of this insane and murderous revolt, had not been arrested at the close of the year. The language of the hill Cacharis is hardly known to any one, and they are a race famed for clannishness and for their readiness to support each other. Hence our police are practically helpless when following up offenders whom the people desire to screen.

In the Chief Commissioner's opinion no people came worse out of this affair than the so-called Kookie Militia. They gave no information

beforehand of the probability of a Cachari rising, and they were found of no use after it in hunting down the fugitives or collecting evidence against them. They were the first to run away at Gunjong, and the only Kookie sentry there was at Maibong also ran away. They were accordingly disbanded by the orders of the Chief Commissioner. Badly, however, as the Kookies seem to have behaved in this instance, there can be no doubt that they have done admirable service as hill-porters on dangerous expeditions, and they are the only tribe able to defend themselves against the Angamis who have, as numerous reports show, a real respect for them. Under proper organization I can see no reason why they should not still be utilised for defensive purposes.

## CHAPTER XVI.

## MANIPUR.

Although, as stated above in Chapter II, it formed no part of my plan to describe the relations of the British Government with independent States lying outside its border, it has been suggested to me that I should include in this work some notice of Manipur, which, though independent, is at the same time a protected State, and which has played and continues to play a prominent part in the politics of the North-East Frontier. I have already in the Chapter on the Angami Nagas shown how constantly Manipur had to be taken into account by our Assam officials in dealing with those tribes. When we come to treat of the Lushai tribes, South of Cachar, we shall find that there also the action of Manipur is an important factor which has frequently to be recognised. On her eastern border Manipur, by rash dealing with the neighbouring tribes, may at any moment compromise the British Government with Independent Burma. In order, therefore, to make the history of the North-East Frontier complete, I have been furnished by the courtesy of the Foreign Office with various official documents and précis from which the following paragraphs have been reproduced :—\*

Manipur is a little territory lying on our North-East Frontier between Cachar and Burma. The population is about 75,000, and the aggregate money revenue is about Rs. 21,000 per annum, in addition to a considerable amount of land revenue, which is paid in kind. The country consists of a central valley surrounded by hills, spreading over an area of about 7,000 square miles. The region is rich, but undeveloped. Iron and gold have been found, and tea grows in wild profusion. Above all, the Manipur Valley forms the great highway between the British Provinces of Assam and Cachar on the one side, and the Kuba Valley, which now belongs to Burma, on the other.

The early history of Manipur was barbarous in the extreme. It was not only marked by constant raids of the Manipuris into Burma, and of Burmese into Manipur, but by internal wars of the most savage and revolting type, in which sons murdered fathers and brothers murdered brothers, without a single trait of heroism to relieve the dark scene of blood and treachery. Meantime, not only is slavery an institution, but the so-called free

\* A full account of Manipur by Colonel McCulloch, who was for many years Political Agent there, was printed in 1839 as a volume of Government of India Record Selections.

The account given of recent Manipuri politics in this Chapter is in length out of all proportion to its importance: but I have not been able to find time to condense the very voluminous précis of the Foreign Office.

inhabitants are compelled, under a system termed "Laloo," to render ten days' service to the Rajah out of every forty, without any remuneration. The hill tribes, consisting of numerous Naga and Kookie clans, also live in frequent feud.

In early times occasional communications passed between the British Government and the Manipur State, but our present relations may be said to have originated in the first Burma War. Manipur had been devastated by the Burmese, and its ruling family had fled to Cachar. In 1823 the British Government opened communications with Gumbheer Sing, one of the members of the Manipur family; upon which 500 Manipuris under his command were taken into the pay of the British Government, and co-operated with the British troops in driving the Burmese out of Cachar. In 1825 this force was increased to 2,000 men, and placed under the command of Captain Grant; it was denominated the Manipur Levy, and was paid, accounted, and supplied with ammunition by the British Government. Subsequently by the Ava Treaty of 1826, Gumbheer Sing was recognized as the Rajah of Manipur, though without any corresponding obligation so far as the British Government was concerned. The language of the Treaty was as follows:—"With regard to Manipur, it is stipulated that, should Gumbheer Sing desire to return to that country, he shall be recognized by the King of Ava as Rajah thereof." Shortly afterwards the British Government discontinued the payment of the Manipur Levy, but still furnished ammunition for the reduction of refractory hill tribes; and further supplied 3,000 muskets and sets of accoutrements, on the condition that the Rajah should raise the Manipur Levy to the same number. The condition of affairs may be, perhaps, best understood from the following extract from a Minute by Lord William Bentinck dated the 25th March 1833:—

Previous to the late war with Ava we possessed no knowledge of the Passes connecting Manipur with our Territories: of its resources we were equally ignorant, and the panic occasioned by the simultaneous appearance of two divisions of the Burmese Army, one from Manipur and the other from Assam, led to a very general flight of the inhabitants of Cachar and those occupying the northern and eastern borders of our District of Sylhet. Under such an emergency it was natural that every resource, however trifling, should be sought after, and the re-establishment of the Manipur dynasty seems to have been a scheme peculiarly favoured by our late Agent, Mr. Scott, as affording, in his estimation, a well-founded prospect of defence of our frontier in that direction by the interposition of a race of people known to entertain a rooted antipathy to the only enemy against whose aggressions it was necessary to guard, and of the fertility of whose country highly-coloured descriptions had been given.

Whether the policy of identifying our interests with those of this petty State,—separated from our Territories by an extremely difficult tract of country, and from those of Ava by one of great comparative facility,—has ever been made a question I have not learned; the advantages, however, to us of a connection with Manipur appear to me very problematical, and this is the consideration to which I would now more particularly direct attention.

The result of our late enquiries have clearly shown that, after an uninterrupted tranquillity of seven years, this small State is still considered as totally incompetent to defend itself against a Burmese invasion. Its entire population is supposed not to amount to more than 30 or 40,000 souls and its available revenue to 4 or 5,000 rupees

a year. Its situation—surrounded by mountains—excluded it from any great participation in the advantages of traffic, and the whole tenor of the several communications made to Government by the Officers most intimately acquainted with the country proves that at this moment it is without the means of efficiently extending its agriculture.

The Levy, consisting, as we are told, of 3,000 men, is shown to be but very imperfectly disciplined and very little under the control of the Officers specially appointed for the purpose of ensuring its efficiency. And although we may fairly assume that, armed as they now are, they would be a match for an equal number of Burmese, we could hardly place any great reliance upon their undisciplined efforts when opposed to the vastly superior force, which, in the event of war, would inevitably be brought against them.

If, therefore, our connection with this dependent State is to be continued, I should prefer placing in it a small garrison of our own troops to retaining so large a portion of its scanty population for military duties; and we can hardly doubt that the feeling of security to the inhabitants of Manipur generally would be greatly increased by the permanent residence amongst them of such a body. Considering the system, then, which is now in operation as radically defective, I am unwilling to sanction any measures likely to lead to its permanency.

It was under the circumstances reviewed in the foregoing Minute that two Treaties were concluded  
Treaties of 1833 and 1834: death of Gumbheer Sing, 1834. one of 1833 and one of 1834. By the Treaty of 1833 the British Government agreed to give to the Rajah of Manipur the line of the Jeeree River and the western bend of the Barah as a boundary; the Rajah, in return, agreeing to the following conditions, which are still in force, and are, therefore, extracted here from Aitchison's Treaties, Volume 1, page 123:—

1st.—The Rajah will, agreeably to instructions, without delay, remove his Thanna from Chundrapore, and establish it on the eastern bank of the Jeeree.

2nd.—The Rajah will in no way obstruct the trade carried on between the two countries by Bengali or Manipuri merchants; he will not exact heavy duties, and he will make a monopoly of no articles of merchandise whatsoever.

3rd.—The Rajah will in no way prevent the Nagas, inhabiting the Kalanaga and Noon-jai Ranges of Hills, from selling or bartering ginger, cotton, pepper, and every other article, the produce of their country, in the plains of Cachar, at the Banskandee and Oodharbun bazaars, as has been their custom.

4th.—With regard to the road commencing from the eastern bank of the Jeeree and continued *vid* Kalanaga and Kowpoom, as far as the Valley of Manipur; after this road has been finished, the Rajah will keep it in repairs, so as to enable laden bullocks to pass during the cold and dry seasons. Further, at the making of the road, if British Officers be sent to examine or superintend the same, the Rajah will agree to every thing these Officers may suggest.

5th.—With reference to the intercourse already existing between the territories of the British Government and those of the Rajah, if the intercourse be further extended, it will be well in every respect, and it will be highly advantageous to both the Rajah and his country. In order, therefore, that this may speedily take place, the Rajah, at the requisition of the British Government, will furnish a quota of Nagas to assist at the construction of the road.

6th.—In the event of war with the Burmese, if troops be sent to Manipur, either to protect that country or to advance beyond the Ningthee, the Rajah, at the requisition of the British Government, will provide hill porters to assist in transporting the ammunition and baggage of such troops.

7th.—In the event of anything happening on the Eastern Frontier of the British Territories, the Rajah will, when required, assist the British Government with a portion of his troops.

8th.—The Rajah will be answerable for all the ammunition he receives from the British Government, and will, for the information of the British Government, give in every month a Statement of expenditure to the British Officer attached to the Levy.\*

By the Treaty of 1834 the Kubo Valley was transferred from Manipur to Burma, and a money compensation was awarded to the Rajah by the British Government in the shape of a stipend of Rs. 6,000 per annum.

Meantime Gumbheer Singh died in January 1834; but the policy of the time will be found sufficiently explained by the following extract from a further Minute by Lord William Bentinck, dated 7th February 1835:—

Minute of Lord William Bentinck, 1835 :  
first appointment of a Political Agent.

With regard to the petty State of Manipur, I cannot agree in the opinion expressed by the late Commissioner of its importance, for, so far from considering it an useful outwork in the event of a war with the Burmese, I am rather inclined to regard it as an useless and inconvenient post to defend, in doing which we might lose, but could gain no advantage. I have, however, entered more than once into this subject, and I would refer, for my opinion generally on it, to my Minute of the 25th March 1833.

Since that period the Rajah, Gumbheer Sing, has died, and his infant son has been placed on the guddee without any disturbance of the public peace under the Regency of the Sunnaputtee, the Maharanee retaining all the State honors and emoluments of Queen. It is not my intention to enter into the various subjects adverted to in Major Grant's Report, but merely to observe that the measures adopted on the occasion of it appear to have been judicious, and everything seems to promise a state of tranquillity for the future, and confine myself to a few observations on the substance of the 8th paragraph of Major Grant's letter and to the Manipur Levy, to which it refers.

Major Grant suggests that "it would be advisable to place 200 men of the Levy under the sole and immediate control of the British Officer in Manipur. The most implicit confidence could be placed in the fidelity to him of the men so attached, and they would form a *nucleus*, round which the people would assemble to carry into effect the views of Government."

Where the policy of identifying ourselves with the interests of this petty State is at least questionable, it does not appear to be a matter of importance to attain the object of Major Grant's proposition; and if it were, it is doubtful how far the means recommended are adequate to the end, for I concur in the opinion expressed by Mr. Robertson on this point, that, unless cemented by the receipt at his hands of a regular pay, little reliance could be placed on the adherence to the British Officer at Manipur of any portion of the Levy that may be placed nominally under his control.

My objections, however, are not limited to this point alone, but extend to the Manipur Levy in general. On this body I have already expressed my opinion, and have now only to repeat that I cannot decide, on any one point of view, the expediency or advantage of maintaining it. It consists nominally of 3,000 men, but so imperfectly disciplined, that, as a military force either for offence or defence, it cannot in any respect be considered efficient or important; and it might certainly, so far as our interests are concerned, be much more advantageously replaced on occasion by a Detachment from Sylhet than retained on its present dubious and unsatisfactory footing.

If it be true that the whole population of the Manipur State does not exceed 30,000 or 40,000 souls, the keeping up of this Levy draws one individual in twelve of the most able-bodied from the number to an unproductive military occupation from profitable mercantile or agricultural pursuits; the extension of the latter being, it is understood, of the utmost importance to the prosperity of the State circumscribed as it is: I should therefore prefer, if our connection with Manipur is to be continued, placing in it a small garrison of our own troops to retaining so large a portion of its scanty population for military duties.

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\* As the connection of the British Government with the Manipur Levy and the supply of ammunition to the Levy have ceased, this clause is inapplicable to present circumstances.

Desirous as I am of terminating a system which, I am satisfied, is radically defective, I propose, for the consideration of Council, the discontinuance of British superintendence over the body denominated the Manipur Levy, leaving it optional with the Government of the country to maintain that force or not as it pleases.

Should this measure be resolved upon, Major Grant's services can be no longer required in Manipur. He has, by the Regulations of the service, become ineligible for the employment he is in by his promotion to a regimental majority, and he may accordingly be placed at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief.

The preservation of a friendly intercourse, and as a medium of communication with the Manipur Government, and, as occasion may require, with the Burmese Authorities on that frontier, and more especially to prevent border feuds and disturbances which might lead to hostilities between the Manipurians and the Burmese, it may be necessary to retain an Officer in the character of Political Agent in that quarter. Lieutenant Gordon, whose ability, intelligence, and local knowledge have more than once been brought favourably to the notice of Government, seems to be well qualified for this situation, and I beg to propose that he may be appointed to it on a consolidated salary of Rs. 1,000 per mensem.

Lieutenant Gordon will receive his instructions from, and correspond directly with, the Secretary to Government of Bengal in the Political Department.

On the death of Gumbheer Sing in 1834, his infant son, Chunder Kirttee Sing, the present Rajah, was placed upon the throne of Manipur by the Senaputty Nur Sing, whilst the Senaputty himself became Regent. Subsequently frequent attempts were made by different Chiefs to obtain possession of the throne, but all were frustrated, and three of the leaders lost their lives. At length in 1844 the mother of the young Rajah made an attempt to murder the Regent Nur Sing. The attempt failed. Nur Sing was severely wounded, but many of the participators were apprehended, and the Rancee, fearful of the consequences, fled from the country with the young Rajah. This flight was treated as an abdication of the throne by Chunder Kirttee Sing, and the Regent Nur Sing became the actual Rajah, and was formally recognised as such by the British Government on the 28th September 1844. From this time, however, the rumours of intended attacks are said to have been unceasing. In 1847 it was reported that one Chief was about to invade Manipur with a force from Ava, and the Manipuri Princes in Cachar were warned by Government that they were liable to be removed into Bengal if their proceedings were such as to create disturbances in Cachar or on the borders of Manipur. In 1850, however, three Princes concerted measures for another attack of Manipur, and all three were killed. Shortly afterwards Nur Sing died and was succeeded by his brother Debindro Sing.

The most important event of the period which followed was the dethronement of Debindro Sing, the accession of Chunder Kirttee Sing, the present Rajah, and the subsequent special recognition of the latter by the British Government. The facts were as follow :—Debindro Sing had succeeded to the throne on the death of his brother Nur Sing. At the same time, Chunder Kirttee Sing, the ex-Rajah, who had been carried away by his mother in 1844

Special recognition and guarantee of Chunder Kirttee Sing to the Raj of Manipur by the British Government, 1851.



after the attempted murder of the Regent, advanced his claim, and appeared prepared to support it by force of arms. Under these circumstances, and at the earnest recommendation of Captain MacCulloch, who had for some time succeeded to the post of Political Agent, the British Government recognised the succession of Debindro Sing, and sanctioned the apprehension of Chunder Kirtee Sing and the removal of both the Ex-Rajah and his mother to Dacca, in order to prevent a contest which might be attended with serious results. Accordingly, Chunder Kirtee Sing was arrested, but managed to effect his escape from his guards, and again advanced to assert his claim to the Guddee. Meantime Captain MacCulloch withheld the recognition of Debindro Sing; and it was fortunate that he did so, for the cause of Chunder Kirtee Sing rapidly gained strength, whilst that of Debindro Sing declined, until at length the former succeeded in gaining possession of the throne and became *de facto* Rajah.

But, notwithstanding Chunder Kirtee Sing's success, attempts were frequently made by Debindro Sing, or one or other of his brothers, to invade Manipur; and in 1851, in order to check these attacks and put a stop to the anarchy which resulted from them, Captain MacCulloch made certain propositions which are here given *in extenso* :—

Apprehending troubles I recommended the removal of Kirtee Chunder to Dacca. My recommendation was, per letter No. 1271, dated 17th May 1850, acceded to; but, before having been carried into effect, he escaped from Cachar, and having gained possession of the throne, the circumstances of the country, judging from the late contests and now existing rumours of others, appear to be about to return to the state they are described by Captain Pemberton to have been in before connection with the British Government commenced.

I beg to state most respectfully that in my opinion the establishment of good order and the maintenance of authority in this country can be effected only by the British Government. In a country which, like this, owes its existence, and owns that it does so, to the British Government, the influence of that Government ought, I humbly conceive, to be paramount and capable of effecting this; but oft-repeated contests for the throne have lessened that influence, and will, I fear, if not prevented, destroy it eventually altogether: a successful attempt from Burma would do so at once.

Towards the effecting of good order and maintenance of authority the stationing of British troops in Manipur would be the most effectual means. These troops, however, could not be paid either in whole or part, and I have not contemplated this measure; but a more formal acknowledgment of the Rajah, with a declaration that he will not recognize as Rajah any Prince who by force may dispossess him, would, I think, prove a strong check upon these frequent attacks, would induce a feeling of security in the Authorities, and with that an inclination to improve rather than grind the people, and in this manner put a stop to these contests for the throne, so injurious to the country and British interests.

I beg to state that the Manipurians are, in civilization only, a slight degree superior to the wild tribes by whom they are surrounded, and it may occur, in spite of the declaration I have above suggested should be made, that a successful attempt may be made against the Rajah. In such case the interference of our troops might be required; but I trust the dread of the British Government may be sufficient to deter the boldest from attempting to achieve the possession of what he would know he could not hold.

In reply to these recommendations, Captain MacCulloch was told on the 3rd October 1851 that the British Government had heretofore abstained from interference in settling the succession to the guddee of

Manipur; but that, under the circumstances, he was authorised "to make a public avowal of the determination of the British Government to uphold the present Rajah, and to resist and punish any parties attempting hereafter to dispossess him." This declaration appears to have done but little towards suppressing either the rumours of attacks or the attacks themselves. Meantime the Court of Directors remarked in a despatch dated 5th May 1852 :—

The position which you have assumed, of pledged protectors of the Rajah, imposes on you, as a necessary consequence, the obligation of attempting to guide him by your advice, but, if needful, of protecting his subjects against oppression on his part; otherwise our guarantee of his rule may be the cause of inflicting on them a continuance of reckless tyranny.

From this time to the temporary retirement of Major MacCulloch from the Political Agency in 1861 there occurs very little worthy of notice respecting Manipur in the Foreign Department Records. The conduct of the Rajah during the mutiny was reported to have been praiseworthy, and the satisfaction of Government was accordingly expressed on this subject. In 1859, in consequence of some aggressions of the southern tribes upon the Manipuris, a quantity of powder and lead to the value of Rs. 2,500 were given by Government to the Rajah.

In February 1861 the Civil Finance Commission proposed the abolition of the Manipur Agency.

Proposed abolition of the Political Agency in Manipur, 1861.

Immediately afterwards Major MacCulloch intimated his intention of submitting an application for leave to England, and requested to be informed whether Government intended appointing a successor to his office. In reply he was informed that Government had no such intention.

Major MacCulloch next submitted, on the 18th July 1861, the following Memorandum on the duties of a Political Agent of Manipur :—

A Political Agent was first appointed for the preservation of a friendly intercourse and as a medium of communication with the Manipur Government, and as occasion may require with the Burmese Authorities on the Frontier, and more especially to prevent border feuds and disturbances which might lead to hostilities between the Manipurians and the Burmese.

My Report on Manipur, printed by Government, will inform you of the many attempts, since the Rajah Gumbheer Singh's death (when the Political Agent was first appointed), made to upset the ruling Princes. To prevent these often-recurring attacks, Government, in 1851, avowed publicly their determination to uphold the present Rajah, and to resist and to punish any parties attempting hereafter to dispossess him: this avowal added to the duties of the Political Agent. The Court of Directors said—"The position, however, which you have assumed, of pledged protectors of the Rajah, imposes on you, as a necessary consequence, the obligation, not only of attempting to guide him by your advice, but, if needful, of protecting his subjects against oppression on his part; otherwise our guarantee of his rule may be the cause of inflicting on them a continuance of reckless tyranny. The obligation thus incurred may be found embarrassing, but it must, nevertheless, be fulfilled, and, while needless interference is of course to be avoided, we shall expect, as the price of the protection afforded him, the Rajah will submit to our

maintaining a sufficient check over the general conduct of his Administration; so as to prevent it from being oppressive to the people and discreditable to the Government which gives it support." This is very strong—too strong, indeed, for the circumstances of the country. You will observe in my printed account that the whole system of Government since first its establishment in Manipur is oppressive in the extreme, yet, unless much abused, it is not complained of. Needless interference is to be avoided—and it would, of course, be considered needless were one to interfere with a whole system. This I have not done, for that would have been to subvert everything; but particular cases, bearing on their faces oppression not required to carry out the particular system under which the country is governed, I have considered to be of the nature of those that should be interfered with; and I have, consequently, prevented such. Manipuris are now loud in complaining; this formerly they were afraid of doing; but every complaint requires consideration, not only on its own merits, but with reference to the system of government which has been handed down to them by their ancestors. I consider that by degrees this system must be modified, and in fact, in my own time, it has much changed. But much is required to be done, and to keep up a salutary check, complaint must be encouraged, not discouraged. Many complaints will be worthless, but still the hearing of them will give you an insight into the peculiar system which cannot be got by merely reading my account or papers in the Office.

The hill people require much attention, and those on the Burmese Frontier more especially. It was the dread of their lawless habits that led to the appointment of an Agent here. These people are now pretty well in hand. It is principally towards Sumjok that apprehensions of the hillmen committing breaches of the peace of the Frontier by carrying off cattle, &c., are to be entertained. Between these men and the southern tribes the people are quiet; and all that is wanted there is to see that traders are not impeded in passing through them by petty plundering. In the south occasional raids of the tribes take place, and I have had several complaints from the Burmese Authorities in consequence. These raids they usually attribute to people in the Manipur territory, whilst they are mostly committed by men to the south of our boundary, the Numsailung River. South of the Numsailung are some powerful tribes, amongst whom Manipur is nothing; in fact to that part no Manipuri has ever penetrated, and even as far as the Numsailung no one but myself has ever attempted to proceed. The people as far as the Numsailung have all submitted to me and will obey my orders, and my name is amongst those to the south of it. This quarter will claim much attention, but I hope nothing will occur requiring much investigation, for there is no one who could assist you much in the matter. You might, however, find Gnargomba Jemadar, a person who could assist you a little in reference to the Kookies; and he is well acquainted with the other tribes, the Phukloes, who are Anals, and under my superintendence.

Langatel, Pulel, Aimole, Konggang, and Soobong must not be allowed unnecessarily to be interfered with. These are villages on the principal line of route to Burma, who carry rice to the Thanah and give coolies on public service.

On the western side, the Koupoee tribe requires much attention. Through them the Manipur road runs, and on their presence depends its efficiency; they have much heavy work to perform for the Government, which must not be unnecessarily increased. Several villages of this tribe, which had deserted their positions, I have re-established, and since their re-establishment insisted that oppression shall not be the cause of their again leaving them. These villages do work for the Rajah, but under my control. The whole ranges between the Barak and Jeeree were by Treaty given to the Rajah; one of the conditions was that he would not oppress their inhabitants or prevent them freely taking their products to the markets at Luckipore, Oodarbund, or elsewhere. This was special: the order of the Court of Directors applies to all.

Besides these there is the Angamee tribes which will require attention; the Manipur Government ought not there unnecessarily to interfere. Our Government has ceased to have anything to say to that tribe; but to allow the Manipuris to do as they wished in that direction would not be expedient or politic. There is cause for Manipur interference with as high a hand as they could assume, but still the idea that their acts amongst the Angamees are being observed keeps them from doing much that they would otherwise do. In the month of Mera it was agreed that an expedition should proceed to the Angamee Hills: I would urge it.

In the hills all round the valley, and to the west beyond the Barak and Mookroo, are Kookies over whom I exercise a general superintendence to prevent oppression of the people, driven from their homes by their enemies in the south. The late Rajah of

Manipur, Nur Singh, made over the superintendence of all these tribes to me. This arose from the first proceedings in connection with them for the establishment of a line of villages to the south of the Koupooes, a matter which came before the Governor General in Council. The Subadar, who was general manager under me, is dead; but the interpreters or Lumpoos remain, and will be of use in matters connected with this people. I prevent as much as possible the selling of slaves by Kookies, and decline altogether to revive old causes of complaint arising from a time when they were quite out of any control but their own passions.

Beyond the Manipur boundary are the Soote and Loosai tribes. These are both powerful and dangerous, but at present they profess friendship, and I encourage them to come and go, though, if it were possible, the Soote tribe should be attacked. In connection with these people, and as a protection to the south of the valley, the Rajah and I have established in the south villages of Kookies, to whom are given arms, and whom we call sepyo villages. They are to be unrestricted in their cultivation, and have to send scouts to watch the tribes at the season when they are most able to move about and do mischief. These sepyo villages are not quite settled, but by care they might be brought to a proper state of usefulness.

It is necessary to protect traders of all descriptions who visit the valley itself to trade in it, or who pass through it to Burma for that purpose. All who pass through for that purpose get passes from me, and when they return I see the cattle they bring, and after having inspected them, my servant, Nansekpa Hazoree, collects the tax, pays it to the Rajah, gets the proper Mohurs, and sends them on. This is done to prevent delay and oppression, which would take place were the business left to the Rajah's people alone. Under Treaty heavy duties are not to be exacted on commodities. It has been my endeavour to encourage trade by every means in my power; and the present traffic, now pretty considerable, would entirely stop were I to refrain to take the trouble I do about it. I do not think you will have many complaints, at least for several years I have not, but I obtained immunity only from prompt measures, and sometimes severe ones. I do not think there is anything else much requiring notice here except the subject of slavery. Formerly slaves were taken into Burma, and there exchanged for ponies, &c. This I have entirely stopped; but, though stopped, the trade is not detested, and were it thought that attention was not directed to this point, it might revive. I would therefore occasionally ask concerning it, and express strong determination to punish any one breaking the prohibition. Manipuris from Cachar sometimes come here and claim people as their slaves: when I hear of such, I entirely disallow any proceedings.

An allowance is paid to Manipur for the giving up of the Kubboo Valley to the Burmese. This allowance Sonut Rupees 500 per month is paid to the reigning Rajah, &c., &c., &c.

Subsequently on the 18th August 1861, Major MacCulloch transmitted the following communication from the Rajah of Manipur to the Governor General:—

(After usual compliments.)

I beg to state that the Political Agent at Manipur has prepared himself to obtain leave and go to his Native country, but I learn that no person will be appointed as his successor. This circumstance will place the territory in danger. Manipur was ruined by the Burmese, but the British Government, having re-established it, appointed a Political Agent there. From the fact of a European Officer having been stationed at Manipur to settle all the affairs of the Burmese Frontier, the people of my territory dwell in peace and without any fear. There is an order of Government to the effect that no Prince would create rebellion and commit slaughter. From this order, as well as from the presence of a Political Officer, the people of this country feel more confident than before that no misfortune will befall this place. Should an evil occur in this territory, there is no one but the Government to which an application can be made for its removal. The inhabitants of Bengal, Naga, Burma, and Manipur are now trading to different places in safety; but if there be no Political Agent at Manipur, the people thereof will not, from fear, be able to enjoy peace and tranquillity. I therefore beg that Your Excellency will take the foregoing circumstances into your consideration and adopt such measures as may be deemed proper.

The Memorandum of Major MacCulloch and the letter from the Rajah of Manipur were referred to the Bengal Government for an expression of opinion as to whether the Lieutenant-Governor saw any serious difficulty in transferring the duties of the Agent in Manipur to the Superintendent of Cachar. In reply the Lieutenant-Governor submitted the opinion of Captain Stewart, the Superintendent of Cachar, together with his own views.

The Superintendent of Cachar considered that the peace of Manipur and of the Eastern Frontier required that a European Officer should reside at Manipur. The capital is 132 miles from Cachar, from which it is separated by seven ranges of hills varying from 2,000 to 7,000 feet high and four large rivers unbridged. Should the Political Agent be withdrawn, the wild and savage tribes of Nagas and Kookies, surrounding the valley of Manipur, would be up in arms; whilst the Manipuris themselves, who are already divided into a dozen factions, would split against the present Rajah, and each endeavour to place his own man upon the throne. Under these circumstances Captain Stewart expressed the opinion that, separated as Manipur is from Cachar, the Officer resident at Manipur should be authorised to act independently, being responsible to Government alone; but if it were resolved to abolish the Agency, then he would recommend the appointment of a young Military Officer as an Extra Assistant to be Resident at Manipur under the authority of the Superintendent of Cachar. The Lieutenant-Governor endorsed the views of Captain Stewart, and also expressed the opinion that, owing to the inadequacy of military force in that quarter, the Bengal Provinces were deeply concerned in the continuance of tranquillity beyond the Cachar Frontier.

The Government of India accordingly determined to maintain the Agency. But in October 1863 the question of its abolition or retention was again raised. Pending the consideration of the question the Agency records were removed to Sylhet. Mr. H. Beveridge, the Officer deputed to remove the records to Sylhet, gave his opinion on the subject. He was "decidedly of opinion that the Agency ought not to be abolished." His chief reason for this opinion was that he believed the Rajah, the Ministers, and the people all wished that the Agency should be continued. The reasons also for which the Agency was established still existed. An Agent was required to arbitrate disputes on the Burmese frontier, and Manipur being surrounded by hill tribes, he said there was no doubt that a Political Agent could be of great service to both the tribes and to Manipur by using his influence to check lawlessness on the one hand and oppression on the other, and that the removal of the Political Agent would be the signal for disorder. There were several Princes in Cachar and Sylhet, he remarked, ready to re-enter Manipur and renew their conflicts on the first opportunity. He also considered that the increased intercourse between Manipur and Cachar and the tea-planters made the presence of a Political Agent in Manipur even more desirable than

formerly. In a letter dated 10th February 1864, the Rajah himself again asked the Government of India to place an officer in Manipur.<sup>(1)</sup> He said he believed the country would sustain injury if no officer were stationed there, and asked that Colonel McCulloch might be re-appointed. The Bengal Government considered that, if it were determined to abolish the Agency, the relations of Government with Manipur might be conveniently managed by the Superintendent of Cachar, acting under the orders of the Local Government. It was finally decided by the Government of India to maintain an Agent at Manipur. The following is an extract of the orders passed :—

The past history of the country shows that no Chief has been able to manage the people: they have one and all proved cruel, oppressive, and weak. The country has been the scene of civil wars, murders, devastation, and misery under the nominal control of the Chiefs; while, as a rule, peace, order, and comparative prosperity reigned while a British Agent was present. In addition to these arguments in favour of the appointment of an Agent is the circumstance that indigenous tea has been found in large quantities all through the country: the knowledge of this will ere long make it the resort of Englishmen in great numbers. It will be difficult, therefore, if not impossible, to prevent constant collision between them and the natives, unless a British Officer is on the spot.

On the other hand, Manipur is too distant and too difficult of access to be properly managed by the District Officer at Cachar. Captain Stewart, the Superintendent, states that Manipur is 132 miles from Cachar "over seven ranges of hills, each from 2,000 to 7,000 feet in height, and across four large rivers unfordable during the greater part of the year and not admitting of boats." The post takes seven days in the dry season and ten in the rains.

Lastly, but not least, both the Chief himself and his people desire to have a British Agent among them; they have told Captain Stewart that the presence of one is equal to a brigade as regards the security of the country. The Governor General in Council is, therefore, of opinion that it is expedient that there should be an Agent at Manipur, and will communicate hereafter the name of the officer whom he selects for the appointment.

On the Agency being re-established Colonel McCulloch was again appointed Political Agent.<sup>(2)</sup>

Various officers have since then held the appointment, and have endeavoured with more or less success to induce the Maharajah to behave with propriety to his own immediate subjects, and the hill tribes owing a nominal allegiance to his Government. But since Colonel McCulloch's time none has been more successful than Lieutenant-Colonel Johnstone who took charge in September 1877 and has with occasional absences on leave remained there up to date.

The Agency was from 1836 under the direct control of the Government of India. In 1867 Sir J. Lawrence proposed its transfer to that of Bengal, but the Lieutenant-Governor (Sir W. Grey) objected,

(1) Political Proceedings (India), April 1864, No. 102.

Political Proceedings (India), April 1864, Nos. 104 to 106.

Political Proceedings (India), April 1864, No. 108.

(2) Political Proceedings (India), April 1864, No. 111.

on the ground that the Agent might, at any time, be mixed up in transactions with Burma with which a Local Government was not competent to deal. It would suffice if copies of reports relating to tribes bordering on Bengal were forwarded by the Agent to the Bengal Secretariat. When the Assam Chief Commissionership was formed, the Agent was ordered to forward his letters through the Chief Commissioner under flying seal, and he and the officers of Manipur have now been placed entirely under the control of the Chief Commissioner.

For many years after the accession of Chunder Kirttee Sing, Mani-

Modern raids on Manipur. pur was disturbed by raids organised by Debindro Sing, Kanai Sing, Gokul Sing, and other members of the Royal Family, with the object of driving Chunder Kirttee from the throne. The British Government took steps to prevent and punish such enterprises, and since 1866 they have entirely ceased, their possible leaders having either died in confinement or being still detained under surveillance at a distance from the frontier.

It has been suspected that not a few of the raids of Lushais and other hillmen on Manipur and even on British territory were instigated by members of the Manipur house. Of the Lushais we shall hear more in the next chapter, but it will be convenient to bring together here all that is on record of the connection of Manipur with that and other tribes, even though in so doing the narrative has to assume some knowledge of what follows.

It is unnecessary here to enter into details regarding the raiding

The Lushais. propensities of the Lushais. In the year 1871 they had committed raids

in Cachar, Sylhet, Manipur, and Hill Tipperah, and were at the same time at feud with the Kamhows or Sokies, a tribe living to the south of Manipur; and their aggressions had become so unexampled in violence as to lead to an expedition being sent against them at the end of that year by the British Government, in which the levies of Manipur were invited to join. The expedition was extremely successful. The tribes of Vompilal, Poiboi, and Vonolel, the most powerful Chiefs, were reduced to submission by the British troops, the fine imposed was paid, hostages accompanied the force on its return, and guarantees were given of free passage through the country in future for Government agents. Previous to the withdrawal of the Manipur troops from the Lushai country several of the Chiefs entered into an engagement with the Manipuri authorities also to keep the peace with Manipur for the future. Several of them afterwards visited Manipur and there renewed their engagement. After the expedition Lushai raids into British territory entirely ceased, but this can hardly be said with regard to such raids on Manipur territory. The Lushais have but little direct communication with Manipur, and the Political Agent has few dealings and little influence with them. The Deputy Commissioner of Cachar is regarded throughout the Lushai country as the *Burra Sahab*.

The policy to be followed by Manipur with regard to the Lushais was laid down by the Government of India in a letter to the Political Agent, No. 1127P., dated 30th June 1870,<sup>(1)</sup> of which the following is an extract :—

It is essential that similar measures for the establishment of friendly relations with the Lushais should be adopted from the side of Manipur, and that the Raja and his subjects should be restrained from committing aggressions on these tribes. I am therefore to request that you will impress on the Raja, in the most emphatic manner possible, that while he should take all necessary measures for the protection of his frontier, no unprovoked aggression on his part can be permitted, and that he must take effective steps to make his subject Kookies understand this, and to punish rigorously any disobedience of these instructions.

This line of policy was again confirmed after the Lushai expedition. In October 1872, the Government of India referred the Political Agent to the above letter as showing the general policy to be pursued by Manipur towards the Kookies and Lushais.<sup>(2)</sup>

The following year the Political Agent reported that the Lushai Chief, Damboom, who, with his followers, had settled in the Manipur hills to the south of the valley, had paid a visit to Manipur. The Manipur Authorities tried to keep this visit a secret, and the Political Agent, having heard of the Chief's arrival, sent for him privately. He promised to come, but did not do so, as he was hurried out of the capital that afternoon. The Maharajah's explanation was not considered by the Political Agent to be satisfactory. He, however, said he would send for Damboom, if required, and did so. Damboom duly arrived, and was brought to the Agent, Dr. Brown. Dr. Brown took the opportunity of asking him to explain to the Lushais that it was the desire of the British and Manipur Governments to remain at peace with them, that every protection would be afforded them should they desire to trade with Manipur, and to assure them that trade and free communication were most desirable. Dr. Brown, in reporting this, said he considered that a personal visit to the Lushai country and an interview with the Chiefs and inhabitants would be productive of much good. He was not sure whether such a course would be practicable and safe, but asked the permission of Government to make the attempt. Damboom thought that such a visit might be made with safety, but would not state positively that the Chiefs would receive the Agent, though he promised to bring information on the subject. Damboom was, however, detained in the Lushai country when he returned thither, and was not allowed to return to Manipur. Dr. Brown's proceedings with regard to Damboom were approved, but he was told not to visit the Lushai country without the express sanction of the Government of India. The Bengal Government was of opinion that the Political Agent should only be allowed to enter that portion of the

<sup>(1)</sup> Political Proceedings (India), July 1870, No. 275.

<sup>(2)</sup> Political Proceedings (India), November 1872, No. 104.



Lushai country which borders on Manipur, if expressly invited by the Chiefs to do so. The Lieutenant-Governor, however, thought that his going there could do but little good, and that it would be much better that he should encourage the Lushais to come into Manipur to see him.<sup>(1)</sup>

In 1877, it was reported that for some years previously the Kapni Nagas living in Manipur territory, in the villages adjacent to the main road from Cachar to Manipur, had suffered severely from repeated raids by Lushais subject to Poiboi, Lalbura, and Lengkam. The Manipuri guards at Kala Naga and Kowpum had been attacked and defeated more than once and had proved unable to protect the Kapni Nagas. Such was the terror instilled by the Lushais that a large tract of country had been deserted, and there was scarcely a village to be found to the south of the line of road, the inhabitants having fled to Cachar, or removed further north. The Maharajah of Manipur having ascertained that the Lushai Chiefs Poiboi and Lengkam were willing to establish friendly relations with the Kapni Nagas, proposed, in March 1877, to send a deputation to Tipai Mukh to conciliate these Chiefs. Captain Durand, the Officiating Agent, informed the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar that the Maharajah was sending the deputation, but added that he thought it would be better if the Lushai Chiefs were invited into Cachar by the Deputy Commissioner. The deputation duly arrived in Cachar, but the Deputy Commissioner disapproved of their proceeding to Tipai Mukh, where they expected to meet the Lushais. It appeared that the Manipuris proposed only to enter into treaty with Poiboi and Lengkam, and had brought presents only for these Chiefs. The Deputy Commissioner feared that the Chief Lalbura would resent the fact of his being overlooked; but he nevertheless allowed the deputation to go to Tipai Mukh to renew overtures with the mantries of Poiboi and Lengkam, and, if the Chiefs were still disposed to enter into engagements, to ask for an interview with one Chief, and request him to convene a meeting of all the Chiefs to consider the question of future relations. Some of the heads of the deputation, however, went beyond Tipai Mukh and visited Poiboi, contrary to the instructions given them. They were well received by Poiboi, who agreed to their proposals, but dissuaded them from going to Lengkam's village, though that Chief sent men to escort them. This slight offended Lengkam; but his mantries said that if the presents were brought, he too would, no doubt, agree to live in amity with the Kapni Nagas.<sup>(2)</sup>

The Chief Commissioner of Assam objected to all this that he could not give the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar permission to act as a medium in such negotiations till the Maharajah stated plainly the

(1) Political Proceedings (India), January 1874, No. 271.

(2) Political Proceedings (India), August 1877, Nos. 178-195.

terms he desired to make with the Lushais, and formally engaged that, in the event of disputes arising as to his observance of the conditions, he would abide implicitly by the Chief Commissioner's decision. He also requested the Political Agent to inform the Maharajah that, though he was willing to assist him, he felt assured that no negotiations would have any lasting effect, while he failed to protect his country by force of arms. The Government of India approved the Chief Commissioner's orders, but requested that the Maharajah might be discouraged from sending such deputations, the effect of which might be to cause complications with the tribes on the British frontier.

The country inhabited by the Kamhow or Sootie (sometimes called Sooktie and Sektie) tribe lies to the south of Manipur and east of the Toorool or Manipur river, that is between the country inhabited by the Lushais proper and the territory of the Rajah of Kulé,\* who is a tributary of Burma. Yatole, the present Chief of the Sooties, lives in the village of Molbhem, which lies far in the interior.<sup>(1)</sup> The Manipuris consider this tribe to be a much more formidable one than the Lushai. They are a constant source of trouble to them, and have at times rendered the southern portion of Manipur uninhabitable. They are constantly raiding, and Colonel Johnstone thinks the cause of all this is probably that the Sooties are being driven forward by the Shindus, a powerful confederacy living to the south-east of the Chittagong Hill Tracts. The Lushais hold the Sooties in great dread, and are falling back before them. They are well supplied with fire-arms, supposed to be procured from Burma, whence they also obtain their ammunition. They have never had any dealings whatever with the British Government. The Chief, Kamhow, after

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\* "The district of Kulé, which, as has been before observed, forms the southern portion of Kubbo, extends a short distance beyond the confluence of the Kathé Khyoung with the Ningthee to Mutoogaundee, on the right bank of the latter river. The present Tsubwa, or chieftain tributary to Ava, is, according to Lieutenant McLeod, a Shan, and lineal descendant of the ancient chieftains of that district, which the Raja said extended formerly nearly down to the junction of the Ningthee and Irrawaddy rivers. At present it is sub-divided into 12 small districts, with four towns and three hundred and sixty villages, and is supposed altogether to contain about 20,000 houses, and 100,000 inhabitants of every description. The Raja admitted, however, that the population had very much decreased since the last census was taken in 1784 A.D. That portion of his subjects who reside in the plains is almost entirely composed of Shans, while those on the hills west of Kulé are all Kyens, or wild mountains tribes, who tender but a very imperfect submission to his authority. The force kept up by the Kulé Raja principally consists of these Kyens, who are only occasionally called upon; and it is probable that in a case of extreme urgency, he might be able to raise a force of 5,000 men from among the Shans and Kyens; but the latter could never be depended upon for service beyond his own district, and even then reverse would cause their immediate dispersion, and return to their fastnesses in the hills."—*Pemberton's Report on the Eastern Frontier*, pp. 119-120.

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(1) Political Proceedings (India), August 1872, No. 14.  
Political Proceedings (India), August 1872, No. 3.

whom the tribe is named, died in 1868, but Yatole, the present Chief, is often called Kamhow when referred to as the principal Chief or head of the tribe. From the isolated position of the Sooties there is not much trustworthy information regarding them. In 1875 the general opinion amongst the best informed authorities in Manipur was that at least 2,000 men, two-thirds of them armed with muskets, would be available in the event of an attack being made on the villages in the interior.

The Sooties are old and formidable foes of Manipur.<sup>(1)</sup> The Manipur Expedition against the Kamhows in 1857. Nur Sing's time (1834-50) they made several raids upon Manipuri villages and took possession of Mombee and Heeroway, within Manipur territory, which are still occupied by the Kokatung section of the Sooties. In 1856 they committed a serious outrage on a hill village in Manipur territory. The Maharajah resolved to punish them for this outrage, and in January 1857 sent an expedition 1,500 strong against them. He was so impressed with the importance of the operations of the expedition being brought to a successful issue that, with the object of encouraging his force, he accompanied it in person. It nevertheless ended in the disgraceful flight of the Manipur troops. They neglected to secure their line of communications, provisions consequently became short and, instead of falling back on their line of advance, they, after some skirmishing with the enemy, fled in confusion by another and unknown route, along which it must have been known that they could not possibly obtain provisions. Colonel McCulloch, who was then Political Agent, believed sheer cowardice to have been the cause of the failure of the expedition. The troops basely left their Rajah, who, with some twenty followers, arrived some days after they had reached the valley.

In April 1859, the Political Agent reported two serious aggressions by the Kamhows on Manipuri subjects.<sup>(2)</sup> The first was an attack on a Hankeep village near Shoogoonoo, not far from the southern frontier. The village was burnt and the headless trunks of fifteen men were found. Forty-five men, women, and children were also carried into captivity, with their flocks and herds. The second aggression was an attack on Saitol, in which the village was burnt and a part of its herds driven away, but none of the people killed or captured. After these attacks a line of posts was established for the protection of the south of the valley and for the resistance of any sudden attack the tribes might make.

(<sup>1</sup>) Political Proceedings (India), August 1872, No. 90.  
Foreign Consultations, 13th February 1857, Nos. 181-83.  
Political Proceedings (India), August 1872, No. 90.

(<sup>2</sup>) Foreign Consultations, 27th May 1859, No. 332.

In the Administration Report for 1868-69 it was stated that a month after the Manipur force returned from the expedition of 1857, the Sooties sent messengers to Manipur and promised Colonel McCulloch not to molest the Maharajah's subjects further, that this promise had been adhered to, that they were then decidedly friendly, and traded freely with the valley, and that Kamhow reported regularly any suspicious doings amongst the Lushais, and would remain neutral, or even give assistance, in the event of their being attacked by Manipur. This assertion that the Kamhows submitted to Colonel McCulloch after the expedition of 1857, and that they had remained friendly from that time up to 1871, has been repeated by various officers, but no report of any such submission was then made by Colonel McCulloch to the Government of India. On the contrary, the aggressions referred to in the foregoing paragraph show that they were not friendly in 1859, and the Maharajah then applied for a quantity of ammunition on payment, so that he might be able to retaliate on this tribe, which was granted.<sup>(1)</sup> The Manipur authorities, in 1872, also asserted that Kamhow raids had occurred at intervals from 1857 to that year. They mentioned seven Kamhow raids on Manipur villages which had taken place from 1857 to 1871 and two during the Lushai expedition. The recent raids prior to 1872 were, however, repudiated by the principal Chief. When referred to about a raid committed on a Manipur village by the Kokatung section in 1871, he declared that it was done without his authority, and that he had very little control over the clan in question. The question whether, up to this time, the Sooties were really friendly or hostile to Manipur, was therefore a disputed one. In the beginning of 1871, while the fighting men of the Lushais were raiding on Manipur and Cachar, the Sooties entered the Lushai country and killed and carried off a large number of Lushais. The Sooties sent the heads of four of the men killed on this occasion to Manipur. It would thus appear that they were not then openly hostile to Manipur.

Towards the end of 1871, when preparations were being made for the expedition against the Lushais, the Maharajah of Manipur, with the concurrence of the Political Agent, sent for the Chief of the tribe to ascertain what assistance he could afford towards the expedition.<sup>(2)</sup> The Chief replied that he was unable to leave his tribe as the Lushais were then collecting in great force, and he did not know whether their object was to attack his tribe or to set

(<sup>1</sup>) Political Proceedings (India), May 1871, No. 576.  
 Political Proceedings (India), August 1872, No. 3.  
 Political Proceedings (India), August 1872, No. 14.  
 Foreign Consultations, 6th May 1869, Nos. 332 and 333.  
 Political Proceedings (India), August 1872, No. 70.  
 Political Proceedings (India), May 1871, Nos. 576, 588, and 609.

(<sup>2</sup>) Political Proceedings (India), August 1872, No. 2.  
 Political Proceedings (India), August 1872, No. 38.  
 Political Proceedings (India), August 1872, No. 46.

out in any other direction. He, however, sent a deputation to the Maharajah with friendly assurances. The members of this deputation expressed a strong desire to be allowed to go forward and attack Vonolel's tribe of the Lushais. They received strict injunctions not to do so, but they do not appear to have heeded these injunctions, for, a few weeks after, a report was received that they had actually engaged Vonolel's tribe, but without serious loss on either side, only three of the Lushais being killed and one Sootie wounded.

The Maharajah of Manipur supplied a contingent of about 2,000 men to assist in the operations in the Lushai country, which acted under the orders of Major-General Nuthall, who was then Officiating Political Agent at Manipur.<sup>(1)</sup> The contingent occupied an extended line of posts along the southern boundary of Manipur for the purpose of watching the Lushais against whom Brigadier-General Bouchier was operating through Cachar. This position was also calculated to secure the fidelity of Kamhow, whilst it enabled the contingent to take full advantage of any assistance he might render. The hostile attitude of the Sooties towards the other tribes was well known, but, in the event of their throwing in their lot with them, the contingent would also have been in a position to attack them. When the Manipur troops were returning after the conclusion of the expedition they fell in with a party of Kamhows under the Chief named Kokatung, who were carrying away 957 captives from two Lushai villages. The Kamhows came into the camp of the Manipur Contingent apparently not expecting to be treated as enemies, but were all made prisoners by the Contingent and taken to Manipur and placed in irons in the jail. The 957 captives were also taken to Manipur, but not as prisoners; they were settled in the valley. General Bouchier stigmatized this as an act of "treachery" on the part of the Contingent, though it had been admitted that Kokatung had committed a raid on a Manipur village in 1871. General Nuthall, the Officiating Agent, however, maintained that the Sooties were hostile to Manipur, and, with the view of refuting the representations made to the Government of India regarding the "friendly alliance" of the Sootie tribe, he submitted a list of raids alleged by Manipur to have been committed on that State from 1835 to that date. He described Kamhow's attitude since the affair of 1857 already described to be "one of alternate pretence of submission, raid upon Rajah's distant villages, and assurance of non-participation." It was, however, generally considered by other officials that the Kamhows were friendly. Mr. Edgar, the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, said there could be no doubt that "Kamhow was quite in earnest in desiring to help Manipur and us against his old enemies, the people of Vonolel's villages, but of course," he added, "he can never forgive that wonderful piece of treachery" (referring to the capture of Kokatung and his followers). It should,

(1) Political Proceedings (India), August 1872, No. 70.

however, be mentioned that General Nuthall was not actually present when Kokatung and his followers were disarmed and made prisoners, but was a few miles in advance: he nevertheless approved what the Manipur Majors had done, and thus became responsible for their act. He also asked that the Governor General in Council might be moved to acknowledge "the judicious and resolute conduct of the two Majors" to whom the "success" was due.

The Kamhows were anxious to obtain Kokatung's release, and, in April 1872, sent an embassy to Manipur with that object.<sup>(1)</sup> Kikoul, who was chief of the embassy, was informed that no proposition of any kind could be entertained whilst a single subject of the Maharajah remained in their hands, and that, if the captives were not released, the Maharajah would take measures to punish the Kamhows. Kokatung died shortly after this in the Manipur jail.

In August 1872, the Political Agent reported that he had heard it was the intention of Manipur to attack the Kamhows during the ensuing cold season. They wished to release the Manipur captives with the Kamhows and bring the tribe into subjection. The Political Agent asked whether the expedition should be allowed.<sup>(2)</sup> The Maharajah had for some time previously been pressing him to obtain the sanction of Government for the supply of four mountain guns with elephant gear complete, the same as used by the British troops during the Lushai expedition. The Kamhows, on the other hand, had given out that they would require 100 human heads to perform the funeral obsequies of their late Chief. The Government of Bengal and the Government of India were averse to any war taking place on our frontier, and the Political Agent was informed that, in the opinion of the Governor General in Council, it would be exceedingly impolitic to authorize any such expedition by Manipur against the Kamhows. The Political Agent was also referred to this office letter already quoted on the general question of the policy to be pursued by Manipur towards the Kookies and Lushais. The policy to be followed by Manipur towards the Kamhows is therefore the same as that towards the Lushais proper, viz., that while the Maharajah should take all necessary measures for the protection of his frontier, no unprovoked aggression on his part can be admitted.

In October 1872, the Kamhows sent another embassy under Kikoul to Manipur. This embassy brought with them four of the captives who had been carried off in the raid of the previous year on a Manipur village, and also an elephant tusk for the Maharajah. Kikoul said that it was the intention of their Chief to return all the Manipur captives, but when asked by Colonel Mowbray

(<sup>1</sup>) Political Proceedings (India), August 1872, No. 90.

(<sup>2</sup>) Political Proceedings (India), November 1872, Nos. 100-104.

Thomson, who was then Officiating Political Agent, in how many days he would guarantee their release, he made excuses and gave evasive replies. The four captives who were returned said that they were given to understand by some of their brethren who had settled with the Kamhows that Kikoul had only been sent to find out whether the Manipur Durbar would release the followers of their late Chief, Kokatung; if not, they were determined to destroy all the Manipur villages in the hills on their frontier. This statement Kikoul denied. While Kikoul was in Manipur Cononel Thomson endeavoured to effect a reconciliation between Manipur and the Sooties, though he said it was a difficult task, as it was impossible they could easily forget the treachery practised towards them by Tangal Major in capturing Kokatung and his followers.<sup>(1)</sup> His efforts, however, met with some success, for, in December 1872, the deputation again returned to Manipur, accompanied by 26 captives of Manipur Naga tributaries taken two years previously. Colonel Thomson promised Kikoul that a similar number of Kamhow captives in Manipur should be released, and the following month Kikoul brought 14 captives more, when a further exchange was effected. On this occasion Colonel Thomson proposed that the tribe should swear allegiance and fealty to Manipur, to which Kikoul agreed, and said they wanted peace with Manipur, but stipulated that the son of their late Chief, Kokatung, should be released, and the skull and bones of his dead father made over to them. This request was complied with by the Manipur authorities, and in March 1873 peace was sworn between Kokatung's son and Manipur, and the whole of the Kamhows released then took their departure for their Native hills. The Manipur Durbar had been very anxious to get Yatole, the Rajah of the Sooties, to come in from across the boundary and make him also take the oath of allegiance to the Maharaja before releasing Kokatung's son. Colonel Thomson dissuaded them from this, as he thought such a proceeding might lead to a complication with Burma. He told them that he could in no way recognise their authority over the Kamhow Rajah. After these exchanges of captives there still remained eight Kamhows with the Maharajah of Manipur who were to be released on the restoration of ten more Manipur captives supposed to be with the Kamhows.

But the peace thus brought about did not last long. In October 1874 the Kamhows attacked two villages, Kumsol and Mukoong, in Manipur territory, to the south of the valley. Dr. Brown visited the villages attacked and found them partially destroyed by fire and totally abandoned. According to statements made by two villagers, 17 men were killed and 78 men, women, and children carried off by the Kamhows on this occasion, but from the subsequent papers the numbers appear to have been exaggerated. So far as the Political Agent could ascertain no provocation was given on the part of Manipur. There appeared little doubt from his investigations that the raid was committed by the

(<sup>1</sup>) Political Proceedings (India), January 1873, Nos. 441-447.  
Political Proceedings (India), April 1873, No. 26.

Kokatung section, residing in the group of villages called Mombee. Mombee, he remarked, according to Captain Pemberton and Colonel Thomson, is within Manipur territory and has been encroached upon, and the former inhabitants driven out by the Kamhows. Mombee is in fact well on the Manipur side of the boundary line laid down by the agreement of 1884 with Burma. The Maharajah of Manipur proposed to send an expedition against the Kamhows to punish them for this raid, and the Political Agent recommended that permission should be granted. The Chief Commissioner of Assam also thought that the Rajah should be allowed to take such measures in retaliation as he might deem expedient.<sup>(1)</sup> He considered that, for a State situated as Manipur is, a policy of retaliation was the only safe one. In reply the Government of India said that, should there have been no provocation on the part of the subjects of Manipur, the Rajah would be justified in adopting such measures as might be necessary to protect his own territories from similar raids in future; and, if retaliation was considered to be absolutely necessary, he should be advised to move in such strength as would preclude the risk of defeat. The Political Agent recommended that the Government of India should not identify itself with the expedition further than by limiting the Manipur advance to Mombee, and this was approved.

The Maharajah accordingly organized an expedition 2,400 strong. As it was expected that the Kamhows would fight, the Political Agent asked for sanction to accompany the expedition. This proposal was not acceded to by the Chief Commissioner of Assam on the ground that it would identify the Government of India more emphatically than was advisable with the Maharajah's proceedings. The Chief Commissioner's proceedings were approved, and it was remarked that the Governor General in Council considered it advisable to avoid, as far as possible, any direct interference in the matter. The expedition started on the 19th February and returned on the 14th April 1875. The Majors who were in command reported the result of the expedition to Dr. Brown after their return. They said that before sunset on the 20th March their advance guard, about 300 strong, was attacked by a party headed by Yatole's brother and son. The Manipuri party made a good stand, and firing continued for an hour and a half, when the Kamhows fled. The next morning the Majors and the main body of the force arrived on the ground. Preparations for an attack on the Sootie villages were in progress, when a Sootie deputation arrived in camp. They said that two of their men had been killed and five wounded on the previous evening. They placed Yatole's sword before the Majors, acknowledged themselves to be the Maharajah's ryots, promised to pay tribute, and to abide by the terms imposed. They begged the Majors not to send the force to their

(1) Political Proceedings (India), February 1875, Nos. 46-57.



villages, so 2 subadars and 22 sepoy only were sent, and returned with the wife and child of the Chief of Kumsol, who had been captured in the raid. A few days after a deputation consisting of Kikoul and a few others arrived with the Chief of Kumsol and six other captives. The remaining captives, it was said, had been sent into the interior, but the Sooties promised to do what they could to get them back.<sup>(1)</sup> From the evidence of captives subsequently released, it, however, appears that they were at Mombee all the time. The force then returned to Manipur, accompanied by the Sootie deputation. The Political Agent considered the result of the expedition to be fairly successful, though he was disappointed at no hostages having been brought in. The Majors had been instructed to insist on hostages being given to be held until the other captives, of whom there were said to be twelve, were restored. There were, however, five Sootie captives remaining in Manipur, and the Sootie deputation were told they could not be released unless an equivalent number of Manipur captives was surrendered. In May seven of these captives were returned to Manipur, and, in accordance with the promise given, the five Sootie captives in Manipur were set free. The Sootie messenger who brought the captives to Manipur said he was confident that the other captives they had would also be given up. Dr. Brown, in referring to this expedition in his Administration Report for 1874-75, stated that from past experience he was led to doubt the correctness of the Majors' account and made independent enquiry regarding the doings of the expedition. He found that, so far as his informants knew, some of whom were with the force, not a shot was fired on Mombee, each party seeming to be afraid of the other, and he remarked that the Sooties were not likely to be deterred from committing further raids on Manipur territory from any fear of the Manipur troops.

For a short time after the expedition of 1875 no raids were committed on Manipur by the Sooties, though attempts had been made, in one of which a Kamhow was killed.

The effect of the expedition, however, was not much felt by them. In 1876 the Political Agent said they seemed to be becoming more aggressive and arrogant than before; the establishment of four new thannahs on that frontier had, however, in a great measure, prevented the attempts at raiding. Two Sooties of Noongeah came to the Manipur village of Mungote and persuaded the Chief, named Bomyam, and two men to accompany them to Nongeah to receive certain Manipur captives collected there, whose release had been promised by Kikoul. When in the Sootie country the two men were deliberately shot by Kikoul and a brother of Yatole named Khooding. Bomyam escaped, the musket aimed at him having missed fire. During the years 1876, 1877, and 1878 Sootie raids were frequent and numbers were reported killed on both sides. The Political Agent reported that during the year 1876-77

(1) Political Proceedings (India) B., June 1875, Nos. 1-4 and 51-52.

the condition of affairs between Manipur and the Sooties had been in a "most unsatisfactory state." Matters had drifted, and no real attempt had been made to arrive at a satisfactory understanding. The Manipur diaries for 1877 and 1878 contain frequent allusions to Kamhow raids, but it was doubtful whether the Kamhows are altogether to blame. In May 1877, in referring to an attack on a Manipur village by Kamhows, of whom 22 were reported to have been killed, the Agent said he was afraid that the origin of the raid was an attack made by Manipuri Kookies on peaceable Kamhows the previous month. A few days later he reported that five Kamhow heads had been brought into Manipur and offered up, as is usual in such cases, in the hole\* on the north side of the Nursing Durwaza, called "Suroong," to the presiding deity. In January 1878 it was reported that the Kamhows had attacked the Kulé Valley in force, and that a Burmese force of 2,000 men had been sent against them. Colonel Johnstone strongly urged on the Durbar the necessity of sending messengers to ask the Chiefs to come in and see him, but as two men who previously went had been murdered, nobody liked to undertake the dangerous office.

In the Administration Report for 1877-78, a remarkable circumstance in connection with the Sootie Migration of the Sooties into Manipur. tribe and Manipur is recorded. Parties to the number of over 2,000 persons belonging to the Sooties migrated during the year into Manipur territory, where they settled down on lands assigned to them by the Maharajah in the neighbourhood of Moirang, to the south-west of the valley. The Political Agent was visited by the Chiefs of the immigrants, who expect the number to be increased this year. Colonel Johnstone considered this immigration important. The Sooties, weakened by the loss of 2,000 of their number, and with the early prospect of losing more, will be less formidable to Manipur. The new comers are mostly not actually of the Sootie tribe, but are reported to belong to a Helot race living in villages of their own among the Sooties. Their object in leaving their country was simply to find a place where they might live in peace and security.

In 1834 when the Kubo Valley was ceded to Burma, the eastern and a small portion of the southern boundary of Manipur was laid down. Position of the Sooties with regard to Burma. It is in connection with this small portion of the southern boundary that the question is raised of the position of the Kamhows with regard to Burma. According to the Treaty of 1834 ceding the Kubo Valley to Burma the southern boundary of Manipur from the east begins at the point where the river called by the Burmans Nansawing, and by the Manipuris Numsaulung, enters the plain, *up to its sources and across the hills due west down to the Kotli Khyoung (Manipur River).* Captain Pemberton, in his report, dated 19th April

\* This hole is most sacred, and it is said that few Manipuris even are allowed to see it.

1884, says that the Numsaulung River appeared to have been always considered by the Burmese as the northern limit of the Kulé Rajah's territory in that direction. This accounts for the Numsaulung forming the southern boundary of the northern divisions of the Kubo Valley. Captain Pemberton does not, however, explain why the line was extended from the sources of the Numsaulung westward to the Manipur River, for the Kulé Rajah's territory does not extend so far in that direction. A line drawn from the sources of the Numsaulung due west to the Manipur River passes through the northern portion of the country at present inhabited by the Sooties. Thus, according to the boundary laid down by Captain Pemberton, contained in the Treaty of 1834, part of the Sootie tribe at present live in Manipur and part in Burmese or independent territory.

In November 1872, Colonel Mowbray Thomson, the Officiating Political Agent, reported that, from an examination of Pemberton's map and the Treaty of 1834, he considered that the country inhabited by the Sooties clearly belonged to Burma, and that, in his opinion, the Manipuris had no right to make war in that direction, but that, if threatened or injured by the Sooties, they should refer their grievances to the Burmese Government through the Government of India. He considered the fact of the Sooties inhabiting Mombee and other villages nearer Manipur to be an encroachment, though he said the Manipuris treated the encroachment very lightly, and had no intention of immediately resorting to arms to expel them.<sup>(1)</sup> The truth was, Colonel Thomson said, the Maharajah's sepoys would not fight for him, for they knew they had nothing to gain in such a cause. At this time the Sooties were treating with Manipur for the restoration of captives, and as Colonel Thomson looked upon them as Burmese subjects, he said that it placed him in an awkward position. A party of 400 of the Kamhows had approached within two days of the Manipur stockade at Kumah and had told Tangal Major that they had come there to treat with him and him only. Tangal Major, however, feared treachery, and refused to go. He asked them to come into the stockade and there treat with the officer he appointed, but this they refused to do. Until instructions were received, Colonel Thomson said he would not allow Manipur to strike the first blow. In the event of the Burmese ignoring their control of the Kamhows, he submitted for consideration the question how Manipur should act. He said the Maharajah would well weigh the consequences of another attack on the tribe, after having been so thoroughly worsted by them in 1857. Mr. Edgar, Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, who was consulted, said there was not much to be made of Colonel Thompson's letter, except that the Manipur officials, and probably the Chief himself, were "determined to do what they could to avoid a peaceful settlement of their disputes with Kamhow." He thought that "if they were to try honestly to

(1) Political Proceedings (India), January 1873, Nos. 442-47.

make terms with the Sooties, they might be successful, for the latter have shown a desire to avoid fighting, which could scarcely have been expected after the way in which they were treated by the Manipuris during the Lushai expedition." He finally recommended that the peace on the frontier should not be disturbed. The Government of Bengal also deprecated fighting between Manipur and its border tribes, as such collisions always created an uneasy feeling in the hills. Should fighting actually take place, the Lieutenant-Governor thought our only course could be "one of absolute non-interference." The following is a copy of the orders passed by the Government of India in Foreign Department letter No. 216P., dated 30th January 1873 :—

I am to state that His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council approves of your endeavours to effect an amicable settlement of the quarrel between Manipur and the Sooktees, and desires that you will continue to advocate a surrender by both parties of their prisoners and captives, so as to bring about a good understanding.

His Excellency in Council sees no objections to the Maharaja of Manipur building stockades within his frontier and taking other reasonable precautions for frontier defence. But His Highness should be careful to require his frontier posts to act only on the defensive and not to vex the tribes beyond the border, or give provocation for their attacking Manipur territory.

His Highness the Maharaja should understand that any unprovoked hostilities with tribes beyond his boundary may involve him in difficulties with Burmah, and will not receive the approval of the British Government. In the event of such hostilities breaking out, you should report the fact at once, and, pending the arrival of instructions from the Government of India, abstain from all interference other than friendly advice. His Excellency in Council, however, is sanguine that by the exercise of the judicious influence you have already exerted with so good effect, you may be able not only to prevent any outbreak, but probably also to arrange an amicable settlement of the causes of misunderstanding.

So far as our records show, the Burmese Government do not appear ever to have exercised any control over the Sooties to the south of the Manipur boundary line. The whole tribe seems to be practically independent, and not to have been affected at all by the Treaty of 1834. Though a line was drawn westwards from the source of the Numsaung to the Kathé Khyoung, there is no mention in the Treaty of the territory south of this line having been made over to Burma. It was only the Kubo Valley which the Burmese Government asked for, and that was all that was made over. In Captain Pemberton's report of his proceedings in handing over the Kubo Valley and laying down the boundary, the only mention he makes of this line is the following :—

He (the Khumbat Woon) questioned us very particularly as to our intentions regarding the southern line of boundary, which was formed by the Numsaung River. The Burmese had evidently thought that we intended to run this line directly across from the hills on the west to the Ningthoe River, and were much pleased to find that we had no such wish, and, on the contrary, that it was to run due west from the foot of the hills down to the Manipur River, where it would terminate. At their request we consented to omit the name of the Khyendwen or Ningthoe River, which had been inserted with the view of rendering our intentions more clear.

No Burmese officers appear to have ever taken charge of this tract of territory under the fifth Article of the Treaty, and the Burmese and

Manipuris alike appear to have treated the Sooties as wild and hostile tribes not amenable to their authority. They committed a raid on villages in the Kubo Valley subject to the Burmese in 1856, at the same time that they committed the raid in Manipur territory for which the Manipur expedition of 1857 was sent against them (paragraph 73 of the *précis*)<sup>(1)</sup> The Gendat Woon complained to the Political Agent regarding the raid, as he believed the raiders came from villages in Manipur territory. In the Administration Report for 1872-73 Dr. Brown said that "the frontier Burmese authorities generally repudiate the idea of their being under Burmese control, although they lie unmistakably to the eastward of the Manipur boundary" (they do not, however, lie to the eastward, but to the south of the Manipur boundary), and in the Report for 1873-74 he says that, in the event of any realized or threatened disturbances by the Kamhows, the Burmese invariably make the matter one of complaint against the Manipur State, assuming that State to be responsible for their good behaviour. He adds that for all practical purposes this tribe should be considered as independent, and liable to punishment from either power it raids upon. There is, however, no definite information among our records regarding the Burmese complaints referred to by Dr. Brown.<sup>(2)</sup> In a letter dated 30th January 1872 from General Bouchier, to General Nuthall, it is said that the Burmese authorities complained against the ravages of the Sooties in 1871, and in a letter from General Nuthall to the Maharajah of Manipur, dated 16th April 1872, he says:—"Not long ago the Burma authorities complained of the ravages committed by his (Kamhow's) dependants upon the village of Beetoo, in the Kubo Valley." General Bouchier and General Nuthall doubtless referred to the same complaint. Paragraph 114 of this *précis* gives an account of the attack on the village of Beetoo, a reference to which will show that it is not so very clear that the Burmese authorities complained against the Kamhows. It was a complaint against Manipur Nagas, "assisted by ten Nagas of the mountain range." Assuming that the ten Nagas referred to were Kamhows, it is very probable that they belonged to the Kamhow villages within the Manipur boundary, and hence the Burmese complaint. There is nothing to show that the Burmese ever complained of raids committed by the Kamhow tribe living beyond the Manipur boundary. From Captain Pemberton's map published in 1835, and a demi-official letter to the Chief Secretary to Government, dated 9th September 1823, he believed that the Kamhows were tributary to Kulé, and had continued so for many years. Captain Pemberton had not, however, visited this part of the country, for in the same letter he said he had

(1) Foreign Consultations, 15th February 1856, No. 112.

Foreign Consultations, 13th February 1857, No. 181.

(2) Political Proceedings (India), August 1872, No. 88.

Political Proceedings (India), August 1872, No. 86.

not been able to go so far south.<sup>(1)</sup> In 1856, Colonel McCulloch said the south-eastern portion of Manipur territory had never been explored, and that the Manipur authorities had never tried to bring the tribes inhabiting it into subjection.

Colonel Johnstone reported in 1878 that the Maharajah was anxious to be allowed to subdue the Sooties, but acknowledged that he cannot do so without assistance in arms and ammunition. Were the Sooties made tributary to Manipur, "that State would touch on the Chittagong Hill Tracts, and would border the Kulé Valley (Burmese), but would not interfere with Burma. It is asserted in Manipur that the Burmese would be glad to see the Sooties subdued, as they are a terror to the Kulé people." It is, however, doubtful whether the Kamhow tribe extends so far south as the Chittagong Hill Tracts. According to Mr. Edgar only the north-east portion of what is generally termed the Lushai country is inhabited by the Kamhows.<sup>(2)</sup> To the south-east of the Lushais proper there are villages of different tribes called Pois by the Lushais. "These northern Pois are said not to be Lakhayr Pois (Sindhus), but probably they are closely connected with them." Colonel Johnstone stated that the Lushais had offered assistance in case the Maharajah wished to attack the Sooties their deadly enemies. He considered that, if the Maharajah's surmise as to the feeling of the Burmese on the subject is correct, it would be greatly to our advantage to annex the Sootie country and thus secure peace. He said—

The cost to us would be small, and through him we should be able more effectually to coerce the Eastern Lushais, if at any time necessary, as they, with their western brethren, would then be completely hemmed in between us and our feudatories.

At present we are not directly concerned with the Sooties, but we may be twenty years hence, and timely, and to us inexpensive action now, may save trouble and money in the future.

The Government of India is not in favour of aggressive action of the kind suggested.

The Kubo Valley lies between the Heerok or Yoma range of mountains, which bounds the eastern side of the Manipur Valley, and Ningthee or Kyendwen River.<sup>(3)</sup> It commences from the foot of the hills in latitude 24° 30' north and extends south to 22° 30', where it terminates on the left bank of the Kathé Khyoung, or Manipur river, which falls into the Ningthee, and marks the southern limit of the Kulé Raja's territory. The Valley

(1) Consultations, 3rd October 1828, No. 1. Extracts from correspondence regarding cession of Kubo Valley.

Foreign Consultations, 15th February 1856, No. 112.

Consultations, 8th January 1880, No. 36.

(2) Memorandum by Mr. Edgar, dated 9th March 1871, p. 28.

(3) Pemberton's Report on the Eastern Frontier, pp. 116-117.

is divided into three principalities, viz., Sumjok, Kumbat, and Kulé. "The first and last are still governed by descendants of the original Shan chieftains, who were dependant upon Mongmaorong, but Kumbat appears never to have regained its former prosperity, after its destruction by the united forces of Pong and Manipur; and during the Burmese supremacy, their principal officer on this frontier derived his title from it, though Tummoo was always his place of residence, and the head-quarters of the military force of the province." The Kubo Valley is semi-independent, the northern and middle portions being ruled by a Rajah titled the Rajah of Sumjok (the name of the village in which he resides), whose Raj is hereditary in his family. He is generally titled the Tsaubwa (Feudatory Chief) of Tounghtwot (Sumjok) by the Burmese Government. Before the first Burmese war the northern and middle divisions contained a population of about 10,000 inhabitants. The southern portion is ruled by the Kulé Rajah, the boundary between the territories of the two Chiefs being the Numsaulung River. In olden times the Kubo Valley was sometimes under Manipur and sometimes under Burma. It was in the possession of Burma on the outbreak of the first Burmese war, and had been so for twelve years before. For about the same period preceding these twelve years it had been in the possession of Manipur. In the Treaty of Yandaboo the upper and middle portions of the Kubo Valley were not ceded by the Burmese. On the other hand, though they were taken by our ally, the Chief of Manipur, during the war, they were not retroceded by the Treaty. In fact no mention whatever is made of the Kubo Valley in the Treaty of Yandaboo. With regard to Manipur itself, it was simply stipulated that "should Gumbheer Sing desire to return to that country, he shall be recognized by the King of Ava as Rajah thereof." Nothing was mentioned about the boundary between Manipur and Burma. The Government of India considered it but just and proper that all the places and territory in the ancient country of Manipur, which were in possession of Gumbheer Sing at the date of the signing of the Treaty of Yandaboo, should belong to that Chief. The Sumjok and Kumbat Divisions of the Kubo Valley, as far east as the Ningthee or Kyendwen River, were accordingly given to Manipur, and the Ningthee River formed the boundary between the two countries.

The right of Burma to the Kubo Valley became a subject of dispute from the signing of the Treaty of Yandaboo in February 1826. The Commissioner in Sylhet, in a letter dated 19th April 1826, remarked that the Ningthee was no doubt the original and natural boundary between Manipur and Burma, and that, if the Burmese were permitted to cross it, it would be difficult to define a line of demarcation that would preclude the possibility of future dispute. In acknowledging this letter the Government of India said that it was—

unquestionably most desirable that the River Ningthee should form henceforward, as it did of old, the boundary between Ava and Manipur, and Gumbheer Sing having been in

possession of Pergunnah Kubo when the Treaty was signed, we are fairly entitled to require the relinquishment of that integral and material portion of his (the King's) Raj, still, however, if the point is contested by the Burmese on the ground of the pergunnah having been formally annexed to the territories of Ava for some years prior to the war, whilst no provision is made by the Treaty for any alteration in the existing boundaries of the Raj, the question must be settled by negotiation on the best terms that circumstances will permit.

And in the instructions to the Envoy at Ava, dated 30th June 1826, it was said that His Lordship in Council trusted that as the Burmese retreated from the Kubo District and retired beyond the Ningthee, he would succeed in establishing that river as the boundary. In the instructions to Major-General Sir A. Campbell, dated 15th June 1827, it was said that His Excellency in Council was decidedly of opinion that the right of Gumbheer Sing should be maintained to the northern and middle portions of the Kubo Valley, bounded on the east by the Ningthee. It was also said that he would not have failed to observe that the acquisition of Kulé, the southern portion of the valley, would secure the marked and desirable boundary of the Nuringerah River. The cession by the Burmese of this portion of the Valley, however, it was said, could not be reasonably expected, and its annexation to Manipur would, therefore, have to become a subject of negotiation. In February 1827 the question of the boundary was discussed between the Burmese Ministers and Mr. Crawford, the British Envoy.<sup>(1)</sup> The Burmese claims were so extravagant that, if acceded to, Gumbheer Sing would have been deprived of what he considered the larger portion of the proper principality of Manipur; they had fabricated a map showing the Burmese frontier to extend nearly to the Manipur capital.

Captain Grant and Lieutenant Pemberton were appointed Commissioners to meet the Burmese authorities and settle the boundary in accordance with the principles enunciated by the Government of India, and they were told<sup>(2)</sup> that, as a preliminary measure, it would be proper to suggest to Gumbheer Sing to fix his posts on such line to the southward as would include the northern and central districts of the Kubo Valley, regarding his right to which, by actual conquest, no discussion was to be allowed. In April 1828 the Commissioners met on the banks of the Ningthee or Kyendwen River, but little could be done in consequence of the very advanced state of the season, and the Burmese Commissioner proposed to postpone it until the ensuing year. A regular written engagement was made by the Commissioners on both sides to meet in 1829. The Burmese Commissioners then pretended that the Ningthee was not the Kyendwen, but a river to the westward of the Kubo Valley.<sup>(3)</sup> This, Sir A.

(<sup>1</sup>) Despatch from Mr. Crawford, dated 21st February 1827.

(<sup>2</sup>) Instructions to Commissioner in Sylhet dated 23rd November 1827.

(<sup>3</sup>) Consultations, 8th August 1828, No. 4.  
 Consultations, 8th August 1828, No. 10.  
 Consultations, 8th September 1828, No. 2.  
 Consultations, 3rd October 1828, No. 1.  
 Consultations, 7th February 1829.  
 Consultations, 7th February 1829, Nos. 3-7.  
 Consultations, 19th June 1829, No. 10.  
 Consultations, 10th July 1829, No. 28.



Campbell observed, might alter the decision of Government. Subsequently, a Burmese map was transmitted to Calcutta, in which the Ningthee and Kyendwen were laid down as separate rivers. This map was sent to the British Commissioners in Manipur, with instructions to enquire and report whether any such river as that laid down on it as the Ningthee existed. It was observed to them that the map had probably been made to suit the views of the Burmese, and they were instructed to propose to the Burmese Commissioners when they met them in the ensuing cold weather to visit the large river said to exist to the westward of the Kubo Valley. In the improbable event of the Ningthee flowing to the westward of the Kubo Valley, the British Commissioners were called on for their opinion whether the Burmese establishing themselves in the upper and middle divisions of Kubo would be particularly objectionable. In their reply these officers clearly proved the deception attempted to be practised by the Burmese. Lieutenant Pemberton scouted the idea that the Ningthee had been mistaken for another small river as stated by the Burmese. In a private letter to the Commissioner in Sylhet he remarked, "you may depend on it the Burmans knew as well as ourselves that the Kyendwen was the river to be made the boundary, and no other. Sir A. Campbell expressly told them so, and in consequence of a representation to that effect they prevented their men from crossing the river into the Kubo Valley." In reply to the enquiry whether the establishment of the Burmese in the upper and middle divisions of Kubo would be particularly objectionable, both officers expressed their unqualified opinion that the preservation of the tranquillity then existing could not be insured were the Burmese allowed to re-establish their authority there. They said—

A century of aggression on the one part, and of suffering on the other, has excited a feeling of mutual hatred, at all times prompt to evince itself in the extremity of vengeance. The chance of such a collision, which could not fail to be productive of the most lamentable consequences, is effectually obviated by making the Ningthee or Kyendwen, on which stands the Burmah post of Kintat, the boundary between the States of Ava and Manipur; no aggression can under such an arrangement be easily committed by either party, without crossing the river for the purpose—an act which would suffice to establish the culpability of the aggressor.

The report of the British Commissioners was sent to Major-General Sir A. Campbell in October 1824, who was directed to inform the Court of Ava that the British Commissioners were prepared to prove that the Ningthee and Kyendwen were the same river. He was also requested to repeat the intimation previously conveyed to the Court of Ava respecting the right of Gumbheer Sing to the northern and central districts of the Kubo Valley, which he had continued to hold since the war.

In January 1829 the British Commissioners reported the receipt of a letter from the Burmese Governors on the Ningthee, stating that the proposed meeting of the Commissioners for the settlement of the boundary could not take place that year. They stated at the same time their intention to proceed to the Ningthee to be in readiness to meet the Burman Commissioners. The Burmese Government also informed the Government of India that their Commissioners were busy collecting money to pay the third instalment of the war indemnity and celebrating

festivals and could not come. Captains Grant and Pemberton were, however, directed to proceed to the banks of the Ningthee, and in the event of the Burmese Commissioners failing to meet them, to select at once the boundary line to the northward of the Kulé or southern district of Kubo, which it might be desirable to fix as the southern boundary of Gumbheer Sing's dominions in that quarter, including only the country re-conquered by him, and from which the Burmese had been expelled during the war. Having made a sketch of the boundary, they were directed to transmit a copy of it to the Burmese authorities with a distinct declaration that, under the orders of the British Government, they had fixed the boundary of Gumbheer Sing's territory to the southward, the Ningthee being the boundary to the eastward. Sir A. Campbell was at the same time instructed to apprise the Court of Ava of the orders issued to the British Commissioners. The Burmese Commissioners having failed to keep their engagement, our Commissioners fixed the boundary in accordance with the instructions they received, and they were informed that the boundary selected by them appeared to be well chosen, and that much advantage would be derived hereafter from the assumption of it as the basis of their settlement in concert with the Burmese Commissioners, who were invited to meet them on the frontier in January 1830. In the event of the Burmese Commissioners not meeting them in January 1830, they were authorised to fix Manipur thannahs on certain places indicated on the sketch of the boundary without further reference to the Burmese authorities.

On 10th July 1829, the Chief Secretary to Government addressed a letter to the Burmese Ministers, in which he referred to the communications made to the local Burmese authorities by the British Commissioners, and observed that when the Burmese Commissioners should meet the English officers, they would be satisfied that the country to the northward of the boundary line had been clearly and uninterruptedly in the possession of Gumbheer Sing since the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace, and that nothing would remain but to visit the spot together and fix the posts on each side of the boundary, so that in future no doubt or dispute might arise. On the 17th November 1829 Captain Grant and Lieutenant Pemberton reported that the Burmese Commissioners had announced their intention to meet them in January following. They called the attention of Government to the fact of the Burmese Government having found it necessary to change the nature of its objections to Rajah Gumbheer Sing's claim; they no longer denied the fact of the re-conquest of Kubo, but said that the retention of those territories recovered by the British armies formed no part of the Treaty of Yandaboo. They added:—"Feeling the justice of our claims, we have not hesitated to follow the line of defence the Burmese have chosen, and the fact of three of the Thannahdars being at this moment here, who in the reign of Cheroojeet Sing held that situation in Kubo, must, we think, silence any further objection on the subject of possession anterior to the war." With the same despatch the British Commissioners forwarded a letter from the Ministers at Ava

to the British Government, in reply to the Chief Secretary's letter of 10th July 1829, maintaining the right of the Burmese Government to the Kubo Valley as a dependency of the Burman Crown.

In January 1830 Major Burney was appointed Resident at Ava in conformity with the 7th Article of the Treaty of Yandaboo, stipulating for the permanent residence of a British officer at the Court of Ava.<sup>(1)</sup> In paragraph 7 of his instructions he was informed of the determination of Government to fix the boundary line between Manipur and Ava as laid down by Captain Grant and Lieutenant Pemberton. He was told to repeat to the Burmese Ministers the motives which obliged Government to assume a boundary line, and to satisfy them that it was not our intention to go beyond such line, though the arguments contained in their last letter would justify our considering several places to the southward of it as belonging to the ancient territory of Manipur. He was also to encourage the Burmese to depute Commissioners to meet our officers on the frontier, and thus ascertain for themselves the incorrectness of their map which contained a river that had no existence in reality. He was also furnished with a letter to the Burmese Ministers from the Chief Secretary to Government, in which it was distinctly stated :—

What places and territory in the ancient country of Manipur were in possession of Gumbheer Sing at the date of the signing of the Treaty of Yandaboo, the Governor General of British India considers it but just and proper that all these should still belong to that Chief. When the British Officers in Manipur prove to the Burmese Officers on the frontier by living witnesses and by undoubted testimony that so late as the years 1809-10 or 11 the towns of Khambat, Woktong, Khmmoo, Mungsa and Sumjok, comprising the whole extent of the Kubo Valley from Khambat, north, were held by Manipuri Thannahdars on the part of the Manipuri Raja Cheroojeet Sing, the Governor General of British India trusts that the King of Ava will perceive the propriety and advantage of putting an end to all further discussions on this subject.

The Commissioners of both Governments met on the frontier in January 1830 as arranged. The Burmese acknowledged the incorrectness of their map, and the boundary was fixed, though the Burmese Commissioners would not consent to the renunciation of the territory. The Resident at Ava then suggested that Captain Pemberton might be authorized to join him at Ava, so that he might hear what the Ministers had to say against Gumbheer Sing's claim, though he said he was convinced that no friendly means or argument would ever be successful in persuading the King to acknowledge Gumbheer Sing's right to the valley of Kubo. Captain Pemberton proceeded to Ava, but, as was anticipated, no arguments or explanations which Major Burney could urge, even with the aid of Captain Pemberton, effected any change in the sentiments of the Ministers, and the question still remained for the final decision of the Governor General. Captain Pemberton's presence,

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(<sup>1</sup>) Consultations, 8th January 1830, Nos. 19-23.  
 Consultations, 8th January 1830, No. 32.  
 Consultations, 8th January 1830, No. 36.  
 Consultations, 20th January 1831, No. 6.  
 Consultations, 16th March 1831, No. 15.  
 Secret Consultations, 21st May 1832.

however, enabled Major Burney to convince the Burmese Ministers of the inaccuracy or untruth of several assertions which they had before advanced. They had denied that the Kubo Valley had ever been taken by the Manipur troops during the war, which they then admitted. They had declared positively that at no former period had the Manipur Princes ever exercised authority in it, but they then admitted that it had at various periods been in possession of Manipur. They acknowledged the incorrectness of their map showing the Kyendwen and the Ningthee as distinct rivers, and admitted them to be the same. They had asserted that Sir A. Campbell at the Treaty of Yandaboo had recognized and acknowledged their right to Kubo, but were unable to prove it, and met Captain Pemberton's proof that he did not do so by a silent acquiescence. They, however, produced extracts from their national records (which were believed to be genuine) showing that at different times they overran and conquered certain portions of territory on the eastern and western banks of the Ningthee.

In a letter dated 15th December 1830, the Resident at Ava reported that he had hinted that the British Government might be disposed to give up a portion of the remaining instalment of tribute for the sake of fixing the Ningthee as the boundary. The Ministers were inclined to listen to the proposal as advantageous to Ava, but they did not dare even to mention it to the King, who felt the loss of a single foot of land as a diminution of his own consequence and power. In May 1831 Major Burney expressed his opinion that no plan existed for appeasing, in an amicable manner, the King's mind on the subject of Kubo, and that there would be little advantage derived from the permanent residence of a British Officer at Ava till the question was properly settled. In April of the following year Major Burney informed Government that as they wished to establish the Ningthee as the eastern boundary of Manipur, to accomplish which object was one of the principal points of his instructions when deputed to Ava, he had used his best endeavours to discover how this could be accomplished, and to reconcile the Burmese Government to this boundary. He had, however, failed entirely. He said that his own opinion had always been in favour of the abstract right of the Burmese, and that views of expediency only, founded on an apprehension that Ava might advance other claims, as well as the circumstance that the British officers in Manipur considered the Ningthee as the most eligible boundary, made him question the policy of such right. He questioned whether "keeping Gumbheer Sing in possession of an unhealthy and depopulated strip of territory which is divided from Manipur by a range of hills, and with which our officers even cannot communicate without being always attended by large parties of coolies to convey every necessary of life for their subsistence, is worth the risk of thoroughly disgusting the Court of Ava and accelerating another war." In reply to this letter Major Burney was called upon

to state distinctly the grounds on which he thought that the Government of Ava possessed a right to those portions of the Kubo Valley from which the Burmese had been expelled during the war, and in which the British Government had declared that the authority of Rajah Gumbheer Sing must be upheld. To this Major Burney submitted a lengthy reply, in which he detailed the grounds on which he formed his opinion, showing the various times which, according to the Burmese history and other proofs, Kubo had belonged to Burma during the previous 800 years. The matter was then fully considered by the Government of India. The undeniable facts of the case were that Manipur conquered the disputed territory during the war; that for about 12 years previous the territory was in possession of Ava; that for about the same period preceding those 12 years it was in the possession of Manipur; and that at more remote periods, extending far back into past times, it was sometimes under the one and sometimes under the other of those powers. The question was whether, at the close of the Burmese war, that territory was to be considered as forming undoubtedly a part of Manipur, or as a part of the dominions of Ava in consequence of its having been so at the commencement of the war. The Governor General remarked on the case that though no satisfactory opinion could be formed upon the question, he thought, upon the whole, that Government was warranted in its first decision that the Ningthee should be the boundary between Ava and Manipur. He said,—

“ But although the consideration, already stated, namely, the misinterpretation that the conceit of the Burmese may put upon the concession to their own prejudice, and the more reasonable ground of dissatisfaction that will be given to Gumbheer Sing, might forbid any change, yet, with reference to the anxious desire for Kubo expressed by the Government of Ava, to the humiliation of their pride and to their reduced if not extinguished power, I think it will be both generous and expedient to grant them this gratification. It is true that we give up the best boundary line, and the admission of the Burmese into the valley may tend to much more collision with the Manipuris, but with our superior power a better or worse military boundary is of no consequence whatever, and these boundary disputes if arising can lead to no war.”

The following were the final orders of Government on the subject, contained in a letter to the Resident at Ava, dated 16th March 1883 :—

On your return to Ava you will announce to the King that the Supreme Government still adheres to the opinion that the Ningthee formed the proper boundary between Ava and Manipur, but that, in consideration for His Majesty's feelings and wishes, and in the spirit of amity and good-will subsisting between the two countries, the Supreme Government consents to the restoration of the Kubo Valley to Ava and to the establishment of the boundary line at the foot of the Yoma Doung Hills.

You will further apprise His Majesty that the exact line must be established by Commissioners on the part of the British Government, who will proceed to the frontier in November next, when the Kubo Valley will be given up to such Commissioner as His Majesty may appoint.

The Burmese Government were also informed by the Government of India, and they were requested to depute, in November 1883, two

officers of rank to meet two British officers, who would deliver over to the Burmese the towns of Khumbat, Tummoo, Thongthwot, &c., "and fix and point out the line of hills which may be selected as the future boundary between Ava and Manipur." It was said that the eastern foot of the hills known in Manipur as the Muring hills and supposed to be the same as that called by the Burmese Yoma Doung, would form a good line of demarcation between the possessions of the two States. Captain Pemberton was at the same time directed to proceed to the Kubo Valley in November, in company with Captain Grant, to make it over to the Burmese. Captain Pemberton's instructions are important as showing the right asserted at the time by the British Government to fix the boundary and not to allow the Burmese Government to interfere at all in the matter. The instructions were as follows:—

Early in the month of November you will proceed in company with Captain Grant in the direction of the Kubo Valley, taking with you any officer whom Gumbheer Sing may wish to depute. You will there be met by Commissioners on the part of the King of Ava to whom you will make over the Kubo Valley. These functionaries will probably be accompanied by Captain Macfarquhar, but they will be given distinctly to understand that they are not to interfere at all in the settlement of the boundary, which is to be fixed by yourself and Captain Grant, taking the eastern base of the Muring range of hills as the line of demarcation. You will further point out to the Burmese Commissioners the line of demarcation which you may fix as the boundaries to the north and south of the Kubo Valley.

When the Commissioners met, the Burmese claimed the Muring hills, as the Yoma Doung range was a little to the westward of them. The British Commissioners, in order to terminate the discussion, tendered a copy of that part of their instructions above quoted, debaring the Burmese Commissioners from interfering. The Woondouk was told that the cession of the Kubo Valley was a favour, for which the British Government had consented to make compensation to the Rajah of Manipur, and that if he did not agree to the line of boundary laid down by the British Commissioners, they could not, under the instructions they had received, consent to give up any of the territory, but would leave the Manipur Thannahs on the Ningthee just as they stood. This greatly embarrassed the Woondouk, and he begged hard for a delay of 13 days to enable him to represent the matter to Ava; he even solicited the aid of the Manipur officers in obtaining the required delay, but the British Commissioners firmly expressed their inability to consent to the postponement. The Woondouk objected to the Manipur Thannah of Moreh being so close upon Burmese territory, and expressed a desire that it should be removed to some more distant spot, as quarrels were likely to arise from the inconsiderate conduct of the people there. He was told that as Moreh was on the Manipur side of the line, the Rajah had as much right to establish a thannah there as the Burmese had to establish one at Tummoo. The Woondouk was also anxious that the tribes occupying the eastern face of the hills between Manipur and Kubo should be called and examined in his presence as to their desire of living under the Burma or Manipur rule, but this

was refused on the grounds that it would be a direct infringement of the orders of Government expressly prohibiting the Burmese from ever interfering with these Khyens, but it was added "that if hereafter any inhabitants of these hills chose to run away and seek Burmese protection, they would not be demanded, but that if any Burmese Agents were detected tampering with their fidelity, they would be liable to any punishment, however extreme, which the Manipuri officers might inflict upon them." To the justice of this he assented. After another request for delay by the Woondouk, which was not granted, Captain Pemberton drew up the agreement. A Burmese translation was made for the Woondouk's perusal, but he objected to it and prepared another in Burmese form containing many objectionable passages. To this agreement the British Commissioners objected. The Manipuri interpreter declared that the Woondouk would never sign the agreement drawn up by the Commissioners as it was not according to Burmese form. Captain Pemberton remarked that "the reply to this was evident, the paper was *ours*, and in accordance with *our forms*, and that if the Woondouk refused to receive and sign such a document as we should tender to him, we would not surrender possession of the country." The boundary was then laid down, and the agreement defining the boundaries signed as originally prepared, with some trifling alterations. The Burmese Commissioners added a note to the effect that the Burmese Ministers would address the British Government regarding the small strip of country between the eastern base of the Yoma Doung range and the Muring hills which they had expected to get. The Court of Ava, however, formally acquiesced in the boundary laid down, and so the matter then ended.

The following is the English version of the agreement, with translations of the Burmese version :—

( 1 )

## ENGLISH VERSION.

[*Secret Com., 26th April 1884,  
No. 11.*]

*First.*—The British Commissioners, Major Grant and Captain Pemberton, under instructions from the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council, agree to make over to the Woondouk Mahamengyan Raja and Tsarndangee Ni Myookawthoo, Commissioners appointed by the King of Ava, the towns of Tamoo, Khambut, Samjok and all other villages in the Kubo Valley, the Ungoching Hills and the strip of valley running between their eastern foot and the western bank of the Ningthee or Khyendwen River.

*Second.*—The British Commissioners will withdraw the Munneporee Thannas now stationed within this tract of country and

( 2 )

## TRANSLATION OF A TRANSCRIPT OF THE BURMESE VERSION, BY MAJOR-GENERAL NUTALL, OFFG. POLY. AGENT, MANIPUR.

[*Political A., May 1871, No. 188.*]

*First.*—The British Commissioners, Major Grant and Captain Pemberton, under instructions from the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council, agree to make over to the Woondouk (Under Secretary), Maha Mengyan Raja, and to Tsarndangee (Chief Writer of Court), Nemyookanthoo, Commissioners appointed by the King of Ava, all the villages in the Kubau valley, together with Tamoo, Kampat, and the towns of Tonngwat (*alias* Samjok), also the Ungan Hills and the lands between these and the Khyendwen River.

*Second.*—The British Commissioners will withdraw the Munnepore Thannas now stationed within this tract of country, and make

( 3 )

## LITERAL TRANSLATION OF THE BURMESE VERSION, RECEIVED FROM THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER, BRITISH BURMA.

[*Politiepl. A., June 1872, No. 107.*]

The two Political Agents appointed by the British Government, Major Grant and Captain Pemberton, and the two Agents deputed by the King of Ava, the Royal Woondouk Maha Mingyan Yazaw and Tsarndawgyee (Royal Scribe) Nay Myo Kyawthoo, have mutually agreed that the towns and villages in the Kubau Valley, together with the towns of Tamoo, Khambut, and Thung Thwat, including the Engaw range of hills, shall be given over, as also the land situate between the two branches of the Khyendwen river. The two British Political Agents shall withdraw the guards and thannas placed within these limits.

make over immediate possession of it to the Burmese Commissioners on certain conditions.

over immediate possession of it to the Burmese Commissioners on certain conditions.

The conditions under which these tracts shall be made over to the two Burmese Agents are as follows:—

*Third.*—The conditions are that they will agree to the boundaries which may be pointed out to them by the British Commissioners, and will respect and refrain from any interference, direct or indirect, with the people residing on the Munneporee side of those boundaries.

*Third.*—The conditions are that they will agree to the boundaries which may be pointed out to them by the British Commissioners, and will respect and refrain from any interference, direct or indirect, with the people residing on the Munnepore side of those boundaries.

*Fourth.*—The boundaries are as follow:—

*Fourth.*—The boundaries are as follows:—

1st. The eastern foot of the chain of mountains which rise immediately from the western side of the plain of the Kubo Valley. Within this line is included Moreh and all the country to the westward of it.

1. The eastern foot of the chain of mountains which rise immediately from the western side of the plain of the Kuban Valley. To the west of this line the village of Moreh and all its lands are to belong to Munnepore.

2nd. On the south, a line, extending from the eastern foot of the same hills at the point where the river, called by the Burmahs, Nansaweng, and by the Munneporees, Numsaelung, enters the plain up to its sources, and across the hills due west down to the Kathé Khyoung (Munneporee River).

2. On the south a line extending from the eastern foot of the same hills at the point where the river called by the Burmahs Nansaweng, and by the Munneporees, Numsaelung, enters the plains, up to its sources and across the hills due west to the Nankathé Kay-ong (*alias* Munnepore river.)

3rd. On the north, the line of boundary will begin at the foot of the same hills at the northern extremity of the Kubo valley and pass due north up to the first range of hills, east of that upon which stand the villages of Choetair, Noongbree, Noonghmur, of the tribe called by the Munneporees Loochoops, and by the Burmahs Lagwensoung, now tributary to Munnepore.

3. On the north, the line of boundary will begin at the foot of the same hills at the northern extremity of the Kuban Valley, and pass due north up to the first range of hills, east of that upon which stands the villages of Tewartara, Noangbye, and Nosuhara, now tributary to Munnepore.

4th. The Burmese Commissioners hereby promise that they will give orders to the Burmese officers, who will remain in charge of the territory now made over to them, not in any way to interfere with the Khyens or other inhabitants living on the Munneporee side of the lines of boundary above described, and the British Commissioners also promise that the Munneporees shall be ordered not in any way to interfere with the Khyens or other inhabitants of any description living on the Burma side of the boundaries now fixed.

*Fifth.*—The Burmese Commissioners hereby promise that they will give orders to the Burmese officers, who will remain in charge of the territory now made over to them, not in any way to interfere with the Khyens or other inhabitants of the lines of boundary above described, and the British Commissioners also promise that the Munneporees shall be ordered not in any way to interfere with the Khyens or other inhabitants of any description living on the Burma side of the boundaries now fixed.

And the two Burmese Agents agreeing to the following terms:—

1st. That they take over the tract of country as pointed out by the two British Political Agents.

2nd. That the villagers living on the Cassay side shall not be interfered with, or in any way molested.

On these terms (the above towns and villages) shall be made over.

The boundaries to be as follows:—

The eastern foot of the range of hills immediately on the west border of the land situate on the western side of the Kabaw Valley, shall be fixed as the boundary.

Beyond the above boundary on the west is the village of Moia, &c., &c., which is to belong to Munnepore.

The boundary on the south shall be fixed by a line extending from the eastern foot of the same hills at a point where the river, called by the Burmese, Nansaweng, and by the Cassays, Nan Taim Lan, enters the plain and along its course down to the mouth of the said river, and from thence due west as far as the Nan Kathey Choung or Creek.

The boundary on the north shall begin from the eastern foot of the same range of hills and run along to the end of the Kabaw Valley, and from thence due north as far as a hill which is situate on the eastern side of the range of Cassay hills, on which stand the villages of Tewartard, Hnanbye, and Moamhara belonging to Munnepore.

The two Burmese Agents do hereby promise to issue orders to the officers, who shall be left in charge of the territory now made over, not in any way to disturb or molest any people (Khyens or otherwise) who live on the Cassay side, and the two English Political Agents promise that orders will be issued to the effect that Khyens, who live beyond the eastern boundary above described, shall not be interfered with or molested by the Cassays.

Signed in a temporary shed erected for the purpose on a sand bank west of Nat Kyoon Oung Myay on the 15th Waning Moon of Pyatho 1194.

Seal.

F. J. GRANT, Major.

Seal.

F. J. GRANT, Major.

Seal.

R. B. PEMBERTON, Capt.

Seal.

R. B. PEMBERTON, Capt.,  
Commander.WOODPOK MANA MINGAU  
BAJAN.

Sunmyashil Ghat, Ningthee River, 6th January 1934.

THAYEDAUYSHE NEMTOOKAETHOO.

Signed. West of Natkwen on  
6th January 1934.



By the following agreement, dated 25th January 1884, Manipur was granted 500 Sicca rupees monthly as compensation for the loss of territory<sup>(1)</sup> thus involved :—

Compensation to Manipur for the loss of the Kubo Valley.

Major Grant and Captain Pemberton under instructions from the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council having made over the Kubo Valley to the Burmese Commissioners deputed from Ava are authorized to state—

*First.*—That it is the intention of the Supreme Government to grant a monthly stipend of five hundred Sicca rupees to the Raja of Manipur, to commence from the ninth day of January one thousand eight hundred and thirty-four, the date at which the transfer of Kubo took place as shown in the agreement mutually signed by the British and Burmese Commissioners.

*Second.*—It is to be distinctly understood that should any circumstances hereafter arise by which the portion of territory lately made over to Ava again reverts to Manipur, the allowance now granted by the British Government will cease from the date of such reversion.

After the cession of the Kubo Valley to Burma disputes were constant, though, in a letter dated 17th November 1840, the Political Agent, Manipur, stated<sup>(2)</sup> that up to that time the peace of the frontier had been preserved without a reference to the Court of Ava or to the Government of India. The Resident at Ava, in 1834, said that the death of Gumbheer Sing had removed all feelings of personal resentment from the minds of the King and Court of Ava. From this time correspondence was carried on between the Political Agent and the Burmese local authorities, cases then arising with Burmese traders in Manipur being decided by the Political Agent. Dr. Dillon visited Sumjok in 1863.<sup>(3)</sup> He was received with much attention and kindness by the Rajah, who provided houses and food for his attendants, and spoke gratefully of the support he gave them. Dr. Dillon's camp was besieged by claimants for medical relief. In 1868 Dr. Brown said that disputes between the Manipuris and residents on the Burmese frontier were not then very frequent, and were mostly caused by mutual cattle and pony stealing. In April 1869, on the invitation of the Rajah of Sumjok, he paid a friendly visit to the Kubo Valley. The Rajah told Dr. Brown that he intended writing to the King of Burma to say how much he was pleased with the visit.

In 1848 the Burmese complained of aggressions by the hill village of Loochoopa, situated in Manipur territory.<sup>(4)</sup> This village had never been reached by Manipuris, and before it could be reached several others would have to be subdued. The Burmese authorities, knowing this, affected a doubt whether the village was in Manipur or Burmese territory, and stated their desire,

(1) Secret Consultation, 24th April 1884, No. 12.

(2) Political Consultation, 28th December 1840, No. 78.

(3) Political Proceedings (India), November 1863, No. 8.  
Political Proceedings (India), September 1868, No. 359.

(4) Foreign Consultation, 31st January 1851, No. 120.

should the village be declared not in Manipur territory, to punish it themselves. Colonel McCulloch said that owing to the difficulties which would attend the reduction of the village, the Burmese probably thought that it would be disowned by Manipur, and he immediately declared it to be in Manipur territory. In February 1849 a Manipur force went against the village and reduced it to subjection.

In 1869, a village called Mokoo, inhabited by Burmese, but on the Manipur side of the boundary, was Raid on the Manipur village of Mokoo. forcibly entered by an armed party of Burmese and the wife and five children of a man named Wonkowmen carried off.<sup>(1)</sup> On the demand of the Political Agent, the Thoogyee of Tummoo ordered the family to be restored. The matter was also referred to the Burmese Government, and the Prime Minister readily acceded to the request of the Political Agent at Mandalay to obtain all possible information about the raid and take such action as justice demanded. After receiving reports from the frontier officials, the Minister replied that, on the issue of a Royal order to apprehend dacoits who had attacked a Chinese trader, Wonkowmen absconded and took up his residence in the Mogoung forests, and, on being sent for, again absconded. His wife and children were thereupon taken and brought before the local Court; while there, the Political Agent at Manipur demanded their restoration, and they were given up. In forwarding the Minister's letter the Chief Commissioner, British Burma, remarked that the proceedings of the Burmese officials in seizing the family and property of a man charged with a criminal offence was quite in accordance with Burmese usage. He, however, said there was reason to believe that the Burmese who committed the raid were ignorant of the fact that the persons arrested were not subjects of Burma, but of Manipur, as the village was situated very near the boundary line, and also very near a Burmese frontier garrison. Considering this, and the fact of the individuals having been given up when their surrender was demanded by the Political Agent at Manipur, the matter was allowed to drop.<sup>(2)</sup>

In a letter dated 21st January 1871 Dr. Brown informed the Woon of Gendat that the inhabitants of the village of Nat-tseng-nga, in Manipur territory, 50 in number, Alleged raid on the Manipur village of Nat-tseng-nga. had been forcibly carried off by Burmese and the village destroyed. Before reporting the matter, he asked the Woon to hold an investigation. The Woon's reply, which was received by General Nuthall nearly three months after, raised the question whether the village was within Burma or Manipur territory. The Woon asserted that it belonged to Burma, that the inhabitants left it of their own accord, because the superior of the village had oppressed them, and that they had stated

(<sup>1</sup>) Political Proceedings (India), July 1870, Nos. 240-41.

(<sup>2</sup>) Political Proceedings (India), March 1871, Nos. 587-88.

that they did not wish to live at Nat-tseng-nga. He at the same time stated that two other villages, Mokoo and Namweeloong, were in Burmese territory.

General Nuthall proceeded to the frontier in April 1871 in order to ascertain on which side of the boundary line these villages really lay. He took the Ayapoorel Major (Manipur Foreign Minister) with him in order to come to an understanding with the Woon of Gendat regarding some unsettled complaints of plunder and outrage which had been made by Manipur.<sup>(1)</sup> The Government of India approved his having proceeded to the frontier, but directed him to confine himself to the particular duties for which he went, and to refrain from raising any general question of boundary between Manipur and Burma without specific instructions from the Government of India. The result of General Nuthall's investigation proved that Nat-tseng-nga and Mokoo were both within Manipur territory. General Nuthall did not, however, meet with a proper reception when he went to the frontier. Although he informed the Gendat Woon by letter that he was going to proceed to the frontier, and invited that official to meet him, yet when he arrived at the encampment about a mile from Tummoo, none of the authorities came to welcome the party; on the contrary, aversion, if not actual hostility, was shown them. A musket was fired off near the encampment, which, General Nuthall said, might appear trivial, but its significance was well known to the Burmese as also to the Manipuris, who at once noticed it. A thannah had also been constructed on ground that had always been deemed Manipur territory, and the guard turned out armed and attempted to stop the party. The Tset Kai (Burmese Native Judge) had been deputed by the Gendat Woon to meet General Nuthall. When he arrived at Tummoo he requested General Nuthall to go to him. This being an undue assumption of rank on the part of the Tset Kai, General Nuthall declined to do so. The next day the Tset Kai asked him to avail himself of some huts built for the reception of the party and he would meet him there. General Nuthall replied that if they really wished his party to occupy the huts, they should have asked them to do so before they constructed huts for themselves, that he had no intention of moving for the Tset Kai's convenience, and that if he wished to see him he would have to come to where he was. General Nuthall did not really want to see him, as he considered that a reference to Government would be necessary. He accordingly returned to Manipur without seeing either the Tset Kai or the Woon. He, however, informed the Woon by letter that the villages were in Manipur territory. He also informed him about the Tset Kai's conduct, for which the Woon apologised.

(<sup>1</sup>) Political Proceedings (India), May 1871, Nos. 151-59.  
Political Proceedings (India), June 1872, Nos. 384-413.

In the first edition of Aitchison's *Treaties* the boundary between Manipur and the Kubo Valley is described as follows:—"The eastern *part* of the chain of mountains which rise immediately from the western side of the Kubo Valley." General Nuthall pointed out that this was probably a misprint as it is defined in the original Burmese as "the eastern *foot*," &c. General Nuthall considered it not improbable that the Burmese Government had obtained possession of our translation of the Treaty, and had thus taken the opportunity of asserting its claim to Mokoo, Nat-tseng-nga, and Namweeloong. [The misprint has been corrected in the revised edition of the *Treaties*.]

There is a great public road, much frequented by both Manipuris and Burmese, which runs parallel to, and at the foot of, the Muring hills. It is called the "Lan-ma-dan" or Royal road, and was constructed so many years ago that the inhabitants of the valley can give no account of its origin. General Nuthall said this road seemed to have been recognized by both Governments as the established boundary, and he could find no trace of a defined boundary other than this road. He thought that Captain Pemberton must have cleared the jungle and opened out this line. The road is, however, shown on Captain Pemberton's map to be well in Burmese territory, and to have been in existence when the boundary was laid down.

The following remarks were made by the Government of India on General Nuthall's reports:—

As regards the boundary itself, His Excellency in Council considers that there can be no reasonable doubt on the subject. It is quite clear from the report of Captain Pemberton, the officer deputed in 1884 to demarcate the boundary, that Manipur territory extends to the foot of the eastern slope of the Muring hills and not to any highway such as that mentioned in your letter. The boundary is, indeed, clearly laid down in Captain Pemberton's map of Manipur, copy of which is doubtless in your possession. If not, a copy will be sent from this office. As regards, then, the action of the Burmese in the villages of Nga-teenga and Mokoo, the issue turns on the easily ascertainable fact whether they are on the slope of the hill or in the plain, and this I am to request that you will at a convenient opportunity ascertain and report to this Office.

As General Nuthall did not possess a copy of Captain Pemberton's map he was furnished with one. A second copy was also sent for the use of the Maharajah. General Nuthall was at the same time told that any deviation from the boundary as laid down by Captain Pemberton could not be countenanced by the Government of India.

In accordance with the instructions quoted in the foregoing paragraph, Colonel Mowbray Thomson, who had been appointed Officiating Political Agent, proceeded to the frontier in November 1872 to settle the disputed portion of the boundary and other matters in dispute between Manipur and Burma. The Burmese Government had been communicated with and appointed an official to meet Colonel Thomson on the frontier. Colonel Thomson sent timely information of his coming in English and Burmese, and informed the authorities that he was

to commence his enquiries from the village of Weetooop.<sup>(1)</sup> When he arrived at the village of Satumkhoorum, one march from Weetooop, he sent information to the Burmese authorities at Weetooop that he had arrived, and was prepared to meet the officer deputed by the Burmese Government. His advance party preceded him to build huts, and they had just commenced building when a shot was fired at them by a villager of Weetooop. The huts were, however, constructed. Colonel Thomson remarked that the Burmese could have no excuse for this outrage as they knew full well that his visit was a friendly one. They afterwards told some of his party that it was done by a child. Notwithstanding his having sent early information of his coming no one was there to meet him. The Gendat Woon afterwards arrived. He begged that the matter might be deferred till they met the Tsauba of Sumjok at Mongsa, to which Colonel Thomson agreed. The Numthow Thannah was the only point of dispute raised by the Burmese officials. (No complaint regarding this thannah had been forwarded to the Government of India.) This thannah Colonel Thomson stated was considerably within the Manipur boundary. Colonel Thomson allowed the Manipur official to ask why the people of the village of Nat-tseng-nga had not been returned, but the Burmese official said he was only authorised to speak on the subject of the Numthow Thannah, and declined to confer on any other subject. They had no actual complaint regarding the boundary; what they required was that the Treaty of 1834 should be adhered to. They pointed out to Colonel Thomson two villages Thangboong and Monggong, to the south-west of Tummo, which they said had paid tribute to them for the previous three years. These villages do not now occupy the same sites shown in Pemberton's map. Colonel Thomson went to the villages and ascertained personally that they had never paid tribute to Burma. He also visited Mokoo and Nat-tseng-nga and satisfied himself that they belong to Manipur.

With his report Colonel Thomson forwarded a map showing Captain Pemberton's boundary as he proposed that it should be considered to exist.<sup>(2)</sup> It was a line drawn generally from village to village, along the foot of the hills. Colonel Thomson was asked whether the line described by him did or did not correspond with Captain Pemberton's line, and he was requested to report whether Captain Pemberton's line could be identified. He was told that—

If Pemberton's line can be identified, it must be maintained as the boundary. If it cannot, His Excellency in Council is of opinion that next cold season you and the Political Agent at Mandalay, if the King of Burmah will place the matter in his hands, otherwise a Burmese official, should meet and, making use of Captain Pemberton's map on

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(1) Political Proceedings (India), January 1873, Nos. 424-430.

(2) Political Proceedings (India), January 1873, No. 428.  
 Political Proceedings (India), March 1873, Nos. 394-95.  
 Political Proceedings (India), May 1873, No. 151.  
 Political Proceedings (India), November 1873, Nos. 23-25.  
 Political Proceedings (India), October 1874, Nos. 18-20.  
 Political Proceedings (India), March 1876, Nos. 536-42.

the best data available, ascertain what is the real boundary, note the villages on either side of it, and take such compass bearings, &c., as will admit of recognition hereafter in the event of dispute.

Colonel Thomson replied that he could not strictly identify Pemberton's line, and that the line he suggested was the nearest approximation to it which he could define. He proposed that a professional surveyor might be made available to accompany him and the Manipur and Burmese officials during the season 1873-74, when the whole of the Manipur-Kubo boundary could be properly demarcated. In a letter dated 28th March 1873 the Political Agent was told that, in consideration of the occurrences on the Naga-Manipur boundary (paras. 30-35), the Government of India was not disposed to make a reference to Burma on the subject till the Manipur Durbar placed the settlement of the boundary in the Political Agent's hands without reservation. When the Durbar consented to this, the Government of India would take steps for the deputation of the Political Agent at Mandalay or of some one nominated by the King of Burma to settle the frontier in company with the Political Agent. The Chief Commissioner, British Burma, was however of opinion that under no circumstances should the Political Agent himself leave Mandalay for that duty. The Maharajah of Manipur did not reply to the Political Agent's letter till six months after, when Dr. Brown had relieved Colonel Thomson. He agreed to place the matter unreservedly in the Political Agent's hands for settlement. On the Burmese Government being then asked to depute an officer for the purpose of settling the boundary, they replied that the boundary was satisfactory and that the appointment of a deputation for the purpose of demarcating it was deprecated. On this the Chief Commissioner, British Burma, suggested that unless the matter was considered very important in Manipur, it should not be pressed. The Manipur Durbar was then consulted, and they agreed to accept what had long been recognized on either side as Pemberton's line. The Political Agent remarked that the boundary had only been called in question during the previous few years, and that the Burmese had withdrawn the thannah they had established on the Manipur side and abandoned their claim to the villages. He also remarked that the line proposed by Colonel Thomson, which seemed intended to run straight nearly from village to village, and cut out an old established Manipur thannah named Moreh, was strongly objected to by Manipur, as it would deprive these villagers of almost all the land they cultivated. Dr. Brown mentioned another objection, viz., that bringing the Burmese line close up to these villages would be a strong temptation to interference. He proposed that the old line, with the exception of a portion he had altered in a map sent, should be adhered to as marked. On the matter being referred to the Burmese Government, they said they wished to adhere, without any modification, to the Treaty of 1833 laying down the boundary. The boundary question was thereupon dropped.

The messengers who brought the letter to Manipur from the Woon of Gendat regarding the village of Nat-taeng-nga (page 187 above) brought a second letter to the Political Agent, in which the Woon complained that Manipur Nagas of the village of Hmautsem, "assisted by ten Nagas of the mountain range," had attacked and burned the Burmese village of Beetoop,<sup>(1)</sup> killing two men and 26 buffaloes, and carrying off twelve men, women and children. They destroyed all the property in the village by fire, including 400 baskets of rice, and took away 200 baskets of rice with them. The Woon said that on the matter being investigated the Hmautsem Nagas confessed that it was done by them, and he requested the Political Agent to try and make them deliver up the villagers and property. The Maharajah of Manipur assured General Nuthall that the village of Hmautsem was far to the south (it is not marked on Pemberton's map) and had not been brought under the control of Manipur. When General Nuthall proceeded to the frontier in April 1871 in connection with the boundary, he intended to make enquiries regarding the attack, but no further action in the matter was reported to the Government of India.

In July 1872 the Political Agent at Manipur reported that a deputation had arrived there from Mandalay with a letter from the Woonshindan Myngee, and had requested him to enquire into and settle certain matters of dispute between Manipur and Burma. They were not furnished with any authority for their visit by the Political Agent at Mandalay, but Colonel Thomson, the Political Agent at Manipur, fearing that Manipur interests might suffer by sending them away, took up the questions.

The first dispute was that about ten years previous<sup>(2)</sup> a man and his wife, residents of Sumjok, when going from Manipur were murdered near the Lokstow River in Manipur territory, and no steps were taken by the authorities in the matter. In reply to this the Manipur authorities asserted that the murders alluded to, as also of two Manipuris, were committed by their baggage coolie, that enquiry was instituted at the time, and that the perpetrator was brought to justice. The second dispute was that the Manipur thannah, which had been at Ochanpok, was removed three years previously about four miles towards Burma, that it was requested at the time that it might be withdrawn to its original site, but as no steps had been taken for its removal, the request was again made. In reply to this Colonel Thomson said that he was

(<sup>1</sup>) Political Proceedings (India), May 1871, Nos. 151 and 156.

(<sup>2</sup>) Political Proceedings (India), August 1872, Nos. 213-15.

to visit the boundary during the ensuing cold weather, and he would then settle the dispute. The third dispute was that some Nagas from Manipur territory had attacked the village of Mowlong, near Sumjok, and killed and carried off ten persons, and a considerable amount of property, Rs. 800 being paid for the release of the captives. They said the Manipur authorities took no notice of the matter. The Manipur authorities asserted that they never heard of it before, and the deputation appeared satisfied with this reply. The fourth dispute was regarding twelve muskets which were stolen by Burmese from the Manipur thannah of Montom in 1869, but which could not be recovered.<sup>(1)</sup> This theft was admitted by the Rajah of Sumjok at the time it occurred; as he could not recover the muskets, he was prepared to give compensation for them. The deputation asked the Manipur Durbar whether they would accept twelve other muskets or double the value of those stolen. The proposals were not accepted. Colonel Thomson told them that the Maharajah could accept of no other guns or even double the value of those stolen. The fifth dispute was regarding a Manipur sepoy's wife said to have been seduced and carried off, together with her son. The deputation brought the woman, who was examined by Colonel Thomson. She stated that she went of her own accord and lived with a man in Sumjok and was not willing to join her husband again. Colonel Thomson suggested to the deputation that damages to the extent of Rs. 120 should be paid to her husband and his child left with him. To this they willingly agreed, and the money was paid at once.

The Political Agent at Mandalay was requested<sup>(2)</sup> to inform the Burmese Government of what had taken place, and to add that it would be better, and lead to the speedier and more satisfactory settlement of such matters if they were referred through him instead of direct to the Manipur Durbar.

In February 1875 the Rajah of Sumjok complained to the Political Agent, Manipur, that a party of Kongjai Kookies belonging to that State had attacked the village of Nampee, situated within Burmese territory, and killed 45 men, women, and children. The village of Nampee is not marked on Pemberton's map, but is situated near the northern boundary of the Kubo Valley.

According to the Manipur authorities, the Ayapoorel (Manipur official detailed for matters connected with Burma) had been recently appointed, and went to the Burmese frontier for the purpose of making himself acquainted with his duties. While there some dispute occurred between his men and the inhabitants of some villages situated in the Tankhool Naga Hills in Manipur territory. While the dispute was

(<sup>1</sup>) Political Proceedings (India), August 1869, Nos. 46 to 48.

(<sup>2</sup>) Political Proceedings (India), August 1872, No. 314.



under settlement, the inhabitants of one village, in which the Manipuris had halted, set upon them during the night and killed eleven Manipuris and one Kookie. This led to an expedition of 150 Manipuri sepoys and 700 Hill Kookies being sent to punish the offending village. They assembled at the Kongal Thannah, from whence they proceeded and destroyed the offending village, killing nine men, and then returned to the thannah.

When the Burmese complaint was received the Political Agent was absent on duty in Cachar. The man who brought the letter, by name Tammoo Seajah, was said to be acquainted with the case, as he was at the Kongal Thannah when the attack on Nampee was said to have occurred. He waited in Manipur till Dr. Brown's return, who examined him. He said that the Manipur force returned to the Kongal Thannah on the 1st February, and that he received information on the 3rd that Nampee had been attacked on the night of the 2nd. He also said that the Ayapoorel denied the possibility of his Kookies having committed the raid, but refused to investigate the matter, saying that the raid, if committed, must have been done by Nagas or others in Burmese territory. None of the Kongjais were seen between the Kongal Thannah and Nampee, but they were accused because the Burmese considered that no other party could have committed the raid.

On first receipt of the Burmese complaint the matter looked so suspicious that Dr. Brown asked the Maharajah to suspend the Ayapoorel, pending the result of an enquiry on the spot. He at the same time asked that arrangements might be made for coolies, and a head official appointed to assist in the enquiry. The Maharajah replied that he considered the suspension of the Ayapoorel before an enquiry had been made to be unjustifiable; and he threw difficulties in the way of the enquiry by saying that the greater part of the Nagas had gone with the Kamhow force (paragraph 82), and that those who came with Dr. Brown from Cachar had gone to their hills and were not then fit to be called again. Dr. Brown by this time having made fuller enquiries, thought that the Manipur case looked favourable, and the only way he could account for their obstructiveness was that they dreaded an investigation into the original expedition. He thought that some oppressive measures on their part had led to the attack and murder of the Manipuris and Kookies. He however afterwards acquitted the Maharajah of any wish to interfere with the investigation, and said he thought he only wished for delay in order to obtain the services of Tangal Major, who was with the Kamhow expedition. The matter of the coolies having been arranged, Dr. Brown proceeded to the village of Nampee, accompanied by the Ayapoorel. He had previously written to the Rajah of Sumjok, asking him to depute an official of standing from the Burmese side to assist in the investigation; but he said he would prefer that the Rajah himself would find it convenient to meet him, instead of any other official.

Dr. Brown reached the frontier on the 1st April, but as nothing had been heard of the Rajah of Sumjok, he sent off a short note to him intimating his arrival.<sup>(1)</sup> The

next morning a Burmese arrived in camp, who said he had heard that the Rajah intended meeting the Political Agent, but was delayed, as his mother was sick. Late the same night a short note was received from the Rajah, saying he could not come as his head priest had just died, but that he would send an official of standing as soon as possible. A meeting had been arranged to take place at Mongsa, a short distance from where Dr. Brown had encamped, and he went there on the 3rd. He found no preparations being made for the reception of any one in the village, and no official of any kind to afford information; he therefore returned to his standing camp the following evening, where he had left the Manipur party. None of the people of Mongsa had heard anything about the raid, except through the Burmese messenger who had passed through their village, and as the case at this stage appeared likely to break down and prove a false charge altogether, Dr. Brown reinstated the Ayapoorel. A Burmese official, said to be a nephew of the Rajah of Sumjok, arrived at Mongsa on the evening of the 4th, and met Dr. Brown at his camp the next morning. The matter was then gone into, with the result of further weakening the Burmese case. The raid having been committed on the evening of the 2nd, and the whole of the Manipur party having returned to the capital on the 5th, it was admitted that, if the dates given by the Burmese and Manipuris were correct, it would have been impossible for the Manipur Kongjais to have committed the raid, as the journey from Nampee to the Manipur capital could not possibly be done under four days. Dr. Brown, however, in his report to Government, said there was no doubt the Kongjais with the Manipur force could have committed the raid, if a raid had been committed, the distance between the Kongal Thannah and Nampee being much less than he was at first led to believe. The Burmese admitted that no one had seen Kongjais going to or coming from Nampee, and that Kongjais were in the habit of trading in numbers in the Kubo Valley. They therefore retracted what they had positively maintained, viz., that if Kongjais had committed the raid, it could only have been done by those with the Manipur force. They, however, insisted that a raid had been committed as alleged, and Dr. Brown proceeded to the village, the Burmese having pledged themselves to show the remains of the 45 persons killed. When Dr. Brown arrived at the village, there was no sign that it had been attacked at all. The houses were all intact, the headman of the village failed to produce the remains of the persons said to have been killed, and the marks on doors said to have been produced by bullets were found, with one exception, which was even doubtful, to have been cut with some instrument. Dr. Brown considered that the evidence led to one of two conclusions,—the first, and by far the strongest, was that the case was an entirely

(<sup>1</sup>) Political Proceedings (India), May 1875, Nos. 141 to 151.

false and malicious one without foundation; the second, that if it contained any element of truth, it had been much exaggerated, and the Manipur State accused without a shadow of proof to support the accusation. The only explanation he could offer was that the complaint had been intended as a set-off against former Manipur ones, it being common to both States to have pet grievances on either side to which they constantly refer, and the Manipuris had then by far the heaviest list against Burma.

Dr. Brown informed the Rajah of Sumjok and the Maharajah of Manipur of the result of the enquiry. He told the Maharajah of Manipur that, although he thought it highly improbable that the Manipur Kongjais had committed any raid, still there was an element of suspicion in the case, as they had opportunity, being encamped so far from the Kongal Thannah where the Manipur force was, that no personal control by the Manipur officers was possible. He therefore asked the Maharajah, in all cases of the employment of armed Kongjais with Manipur troops, to direct a sufficient watch to be kept over them, so as to render the occurrence of such complaints impossible. He also asked the Maharajah, whenever he had occasion to use troops near the Burmese frontier, to intimate the fact to the nearest Burmese official where the force was to assemble, and its objects.

On 14th May, the Chief Commissioner, British Burma, reported that the Burmese Government had complained to the Resident at Mandalay regarding the attack on Nampee and asked what settlement would be effected. At this time Sir Douglas Forsyth was about to proceed to Mandalay in connection with Western Karennee affairs, and the Chief Commissioner was requested to furnish him with a copy of Dr. Brown's report, with an intimation that he was to make no allusion to the subject at Mandalay, but that if the Burmese Government referred to it, he should inform them of the result of the investigation, and say that the Government of India were satisfied that there was no just cause of complaint against Manipur. The matter does not, however, appear to have been alluded to by the Burmese Government, for it is not mentioned in Sir Douglas Forsyth's report.

The Kongal Thannah is a Manipur outpost situated on the banks of the River Nummeah, which forms the boundary between Manipur and Burma, and is due north of the

Attack by Burmese on the Manipur outpost of Kongal.

Kubo Valley. It was garrisoned by one Jemadar and 20 sepoys. On the morning of the 14th December 1877 the thannah was attacked by about 100 Shans, Burmese subjects, of the Kubo Valley. Eight Manipuris were killed and the guard-house burnt.<sup>(1)</sup> On the morning of the attack the Jemadar had heard that a large party of Burmese were assembled in a village not far off, and sent four men to see if the report were true; a party had also been sent on other duty to the Kampang

(<sup>1</sup>) Political Proceedings (India), May 1878, Nos. 107-28.

Thannah on the Manipur road ; and the Jemadar and three men had gone to superintend the erection of some huts about 200 yards distant from the stockade. Six men were thus only left in the stockade. One was on sentry outside, another was cooking, and the remaining four were inside. There was also a Naga who had come to sell something. The sentry and three of the men inside were killed ; the four men who had gone off to enquire regarding the reported assembly of Burmese were also found killed about 50 yards from the stockade. When attacked the four men inside the stockade kept up a fire on the Burmese till three of the four fell ; the fourth man then climbed over the rear of the stockade and escaped into the jungle. The Burmese had also some loss on their side, for the man who escaped reported that he saw two bodies being carried away by the attacking party.

On the outrage being reported, Colonel Johnstone, the Political Agent, proceeded at once to the Kongal Thannah to investigate the matter.<sup>(1)</sup> The result of his investigation left no doubt about the correctness of the report. The opinion of the people there was that the attack had been committed by the Sumjok Rajah with the permission, if not at the instigation, of the King of Burma, with the object of seeing how far they could go with Manipur ; and that, in the event of the outrage being passed over without notice, it was feared that it might only be the prelude to a more serious attack. In corroboration of this it was reported on good authority that the women and children of the Kubo Valley had all been put across the Ningthee River, and that the men were under arms. The news of the attack caused great excitement in Manipur. The Maharajah said that it was only owing to the presence of the Political Agent that the people remained quiet. Every one to the south of the capital had his bundle of clothes and parched rice ready to flee. Colonel Johnstone at first was inclined to think that the Manipuri interpretation of the cause of the attack was a pretty correct one. "For many years past," he said, "much ill-feeling has prevailed along the border, both parties, being dissatisfied with the boundary as at present defined, or rather I should say ill-defined, and it is quite possible that the Rajah of Sumjok, whose son has a very bad reputation, may have represented his supposed grievances at Mandalay, and been encouraged to insult the much-hated and despised Manipuris." Subsequently, however, he said he was inclined to lay the entire blame on the Rajah of Sumjok.

Since the attack was made the passes leading to Burma have been closed to all comers from thence except Burmese officials, but Burmese and others travelling from the west have been allowed to pass on, on the understanding that their safety could only be guaranteed as far as the Manipur frontier. Colonel Johnstone explained that this was done to prevent panics in Manipur, as the appearance of a few Burmese unescorted would have created great alarm.

(<sup>1</sup>) Political Proceedings (India), May 1878, No. 108.

Before any information regarding the attack had reached the Resident at Mandalay, a letter was received from him forwarding a communication from the Burmese Minister for Foreign Affairs.<sup>(1)</sup> The Burmese Minister represented that the Rajah of Sumjok had complained that a body of Manipuri Khyens had made three attacks on the Burmese Khyen village of Nampee—the first in 1874-75, when over 40 men were killed; the second in October-November 1877, when 20 were killed; and the third in December 1877, when 30 were killed. The first of these alleged attacks was reported at the time it was said to have occurred, and the details of which are given in paragraphs 116-21, but this was the first mention of any raids by Manipur in 1877.

A copy of Colonel Johnstone's report regarding the attack on the Kongal Thannah was sent to Colonel Duncan, Resident at Mandalay, and a copy of Colonel Duncan's letter and enclosure regarding the alleged attacks on the village of Nampee were sent to Colonel Johnstone. Colonel Duncan was instructed to request an explanation from the Burmese Government, and Colonel Johnstone was instructed to request a similar explanation from the Manipur Durbar, but in doing so they were merely to state the facts of the cases and to make comments or reflections thereon themselves.

The Maharajah of Manipur denied all knowledge of any attacks made on the village of Nampee.<sup>(2)</sup> He remarked that the first charge had been investigated by Dr. Brown and proved to be false, that he had heard nothing of the other two outrages, that no complaint had been made by the Rajah of Sumjok, and that it was usual in such cases for him to complain to the Manipur officers and to the Political Agent. Colonel Johnstone said he did not attach the slightest credence to the report. He believed that the charge had been got up simply as a set-off against the charge preferred by Manipur against Burma. When the Kongal outrage was first reported, he took some pains to ascertain if the tribes on the Manipur side of the boundary had been engaged in any attack on Burmese territory, which might have led to the aggressive act, but could not find the least evidence to show that such had been the case. He pointed out how improbable the attacks were, and referred to Dr. Brown's investigation into the alleged raid in 1875. He remarked that, on Dr. Brown's investigation of the alleged attack in 1875, the headman put down the number of inhabitants of the village of Nampee as 21,\* but assuming that he meant heads

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\* (*Extract from Dr. Brown's report of 1875.*)

"Asked (the headman of Nampee): How many inhabitants were in the village before the raid? He replied twenty-one. And after? Fifteen. He seemed utterly unconscious of there being any discrepancy regarding the number killed, forty-five, and the number of original inhabitants."

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(1) Political Proceedings (India), May 1878, Nos. 110-12.  
Political Proceedings (India), May 1878, Nos. 114-15.

(2) Political Proceedings (India), May 1878, Nos. 110-20.

of households, and allowing four or five to a house, the number of slain would be so out of proportion to the population as to render the case quite unique in Naga warfare, and cast a grave doubt on the statement, even were there no other negative evidence to be brought forward.

In reply to the letter of the Resident at Mandalay asking for an explanation, the Burmese Government said that they had received accounts from their officials on the Manipur frontier which confirmed the account given by the Political Agent, Manipur.<sup>(1)</sup> They disavowed the conduct of their local officials, who, they said, had acted without orders, and they promised to call to Mandalay all those engaged in the affair, and make an investigation and punish the offenders. The Burmese Minister, however, in his letter complained that "there being an insufficient disposition of ordnance and ammunition in Manipur for the purpose of effectually attacking Sumjok, 200 maunds of powder and 5,000 muskets had been sent for from Calcutta and preparations made." He further complained that the Manipur guard at Mo-le Thannah had been strengthened by 100 men, and that orders had been issued by the Maharajah and the Political Agent, prohibiting Burmese from entering or leaving Manipur. In a letter dated 4th May 1878, Colonel Duncan was told that the Governor General in Council was glad to recognise the friendly and well disposed character of the communication made by the Burmese Government, but he was at the same time told to watch the progress of the case carefully, and to satisfy himself that a thorough investigation was made into the conduct of the Sumjok Rajah as promised. About this time the Government of India had supplied the Maharajah of Manipur with 750 percussion muskets and a quantity of ammunition on payment. The arms were given to replace the smooth-bore muskets supplied on the formation of the Manipur Levy in 1825, which were returned to the arsenal at Fort William to be broken up; and the ammunition was supplied simply because the Maharajah's stock was nearly exhausted. This being probably the foundation of the Burmese rumour that the British Government had supplied arms and ammunition to Manipur for the purpose of attacking the Rajah of Sumjok, the facts of the case were explained to the Resident in order to prevent misunderstanding on the part of the Burmese.

On the 5th July 1878 the Burmese Minister for Foreign Affairs informed the Resident that the Rajah of Sumjok had arrived at Mandalay and been examined regarding the attack on the Kongal outpost. The Rajah denied that his people attacked the thannah. He did not know for certain who did so, but he had heard that wild Khyens attacked the stockade and killed the eight Manipuris. He again repeated his charge against Manipur, saying that Manipuri Khyens came frequently into his villages and killed people, whereby he had lost over 100 men. In forwarding this deposition the Minister asked the Resident to give the

(1) Political Proceedings (India), May 1878, No. 121.

Political Proceedings (India), May 1878, No. 128.

Political Proceedings (India), June 1878, No. 63, and K. W.

Political Proceedings (India), August 1878, Nos. 256 to 261.

names and places of abode of those who headed the attack, and they would be examined and punished, if found guilty. In a separate letter of the same date he asked the Resident for information as to the steps which had been taken regarding the enquiry into the attacks on the village of Nampee, and the punishment of the offenders. In a conversation the Sub-Minister also informed Mr. Shaw that, as the Rajah of Sumjok denied that it was his people who committed the assault on the Kongal Thannah, the proper course was to substantiate the charge by specific evidence, and that, unless this were done, no further investigation could be made by the Burmese Government. Mr. Shaw remarked that it would be very difficult for us to ascertain the names and residence of the culprits, as we could not prosecute an enquiry in Burmese territory, and that our request for an investigation had reference to an attack the fact of which was admitted by the Burmese Government themselves; it was therefore hoped that the Burmese Government would, whether the Rajah were implicated or not, make a full enquiry. It was urged by the Minister that the attack having been denied by the Sumjok Tsauba there was no reason for further enquiry; they nevertheless issued orders to the frontier officials to make enquiry whether those who attacked the thannah were Burmese or not.

In a letter dated 5th September 1878,<sup>(1)</sup> Colonel Johnstone reported that he had again made very careful enquiries with the view of ascertaining whether there was any truth in the charges brought by Burma against Manipur, with the result that he was more than ever convinced that they were groundless. He was more confirmed in this opinion from a conversation he had in July 1878 with a Burmese official who brought a letter to him from the Poongree of Tummoo and the Woon of Gendat. This man requested that the witnesses in the Kongal case might be allowed to go to Tummoo with him to give evidence at the investigation, and Colonel Johnstone sent them together with two of the Maharajah's officers. They left Manipur on 14th July, and did not return till 4th September. They said they had been kept at Tummoo waiting till the Rajah of Sumjok should return from Mandalay, and were sent back without any investigation having taken place. They were told that a letter had been sent to the Resident at Mandalay, that the Sumjok Rajah denied having committed the offence, that there would be no investigation, and that Manipur had committed many outrages in Burma. The witnesses heard from the people of Tummoo that the Wundouk who had been charged with the investigation had taken the part of the Sumjok Rajah. The Burmese explanation was that they issued orders regarding the investigation to the Wundouk in charge of the frontier province; he passed on the orders to the Governor of Tummoo, and informed the Manipur authorities by letter; meanwhile the Manipur party had returned, and the letter was not delivered. It also appeared from letters from the Burmese Minister to the Resident at

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(1) Political Proceedings (India), November 1878, No. 300.  
Political Proceedings (India), November 1878, No. 306.

Mandalay that the Manipur party arrived at Tummoo on the 26th July, and that after their arrival the Burmese frontier official wrote to Mandalay for instructions, and that the reply arrived too late. The Burmese Government explained the matter to the Manipur Durbar, and asked that the men might be sent to Tummoo again, but that previous notice be given of their departure. Mr. Shaw also asked that he might be previously informed of the probable date of arrival in Burmese territory of the Manipur party. Colonel Johnstone was requested to bear this point in mind in sending the party again. He was, however, asked by the Government of India whether, in his opinion, the enquiries then made were sufficient to render the recurrence of similar outrages improbable. It was said that if, owing to the delay which had already passed, no practical advantage was to be hoped for by pressing the investigation further, it would be desirable to advise the Manipur Durbar to drop the matter. Colonel Johnstone, however, could not recommend the adoption of such a course. He felt sure it would lead to serious trouble in future. The Manipuris so distrust the Burmese that he did not think a peaceable state of affairs could be expected unless some reparation was made; he remarked that the Kongal outrage was the culminating act of a long series of minor offences, and that the Manipuris considered that unless some punishment was awarded to the offenders, there would be no security for the future. Every dacoity by the hill tribes was believed at Manipur to be instigated by the Burmese, and Colonel Johnstone had difficulty in persuading the Maharajah that this was not likely to be the case. Colonel Johnstone, however, suspected that there was a tendency on the part of the Sumjok people to encourage the Kookies on the Manipur border to give trouble, though the disposition was exaggerated.

The Manipuri witnesses were sent to Tummoo the second time on the 17th January 1879, a month's previous notice having been given by the Political Agent to the Resident at Mandalay. According to information received by Colonel Johnstone a Court was convened for the investigation of the outrage, consisting of eight persons, among whom were a son of the Wundouk, two sons of the Rajah of Sumjok, and an officer of the Rajah of Sumjok.<sup>(1)</sup> The Manipur witnesses stated that two men who were brought before them were not the men whose names they gave, and Colonel Johnstone had heard some time before that it was intended to substitute other people for the real offenders, in the hope that the witnesses might be led to assert that they were the men that they had seen, when decisive proof to the contrary would have been brought to discredit their statements. The Poongree of Tummoo also wrote to Colonel Johnstone regarding the investigation; he stated that besides the two men brought not being recognized by the Manipur witnesses, the two Sumjok officials denied the existence of the two other men named, and the witnesses were unable to point out their houses. The Poongree therefore suggested that it was desirable to settle the matter by a payment of Rs. 900. This Colonel Johnstone

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(<sup>1</sup>) Political A, June 1879, Nos. 236-245.



refused, and urged that more active efforts might be made to find out the offenders. The Poongree duly received the letter, and at once despatched it by an express messenger to Mandalay.

The Burmese official from Mandalay charged with investigating the affair informed the Manipur officer in charge of the witnesses that, if the investigation could not be finished at Tummoo, he and his witnesses were to go to him at Gendat.\* Colonel Johnstone, however, directed the officer not to go beyond Tummoo. He acted thus as he was very doubtful if any real investigation was contemplated, and he thought it highly probable that compliance with the request would be followed by an intimation that the witnesses must go to Mandalay. The Court of Enquiry broke up on the 1st March; but, as the Manipur witnesses were accused of having left on the previous occasion without giving time for the investigation, Colonel Johnstone directed them to remain a short time longer before returning to Manipur, which they did. It seemed to Colonel Johnstone that no real attempt had been made to elicit anything respecting the authors of the outrage, and that there was no real wish on the part of the Burmese to make an example of any of the offenders; in fact, he thought the letter from the Poongree of Tummoo, suggesting a payment of Rupees 900, showed conclusively that there was a desire to evade enquiry: and the attacking party having been estimated at from 100 to 200 in number, he considered that it would not have been difficult to obtain evidence regarding some of those concerned, even admitting that the Manipur witnesses were at fault. He remarked that instead of acting honestly they had employed the sons of the Rajah of Sumjok, one of whom, it was reported, ought himself to have been on his trial, to aid in arresting the men mentioned by the witnesses, with the result that might have been expected.

After the Court of Enquiry had dissolved, rumours reached Manipur that the inhabitants of the Kubo Valley were in an excited state, and that the Burmese meant mischief. Troops were reported to be assembling at Gendat and Tummoo, and Colonel Johnstone received word that many families from Kubo wished to take refuge in Manipur, as they anticipated trouble near home. He did not think any danger was to be apprehended, but as a precautionary measure he delayed for a short time the departure of the relieved guard of the 34th Native Infantry, which was then about to leave for Cachar, and went to the Burmese frontier and selected suitable sites for stockades.

The following were the orders passed by the Government of India on Colonel Johnstone's reports, contained in a letter No. 1544 E. P., dated 11th June 1879, to the Resident at Mandalay :—

You will observe that the Court of Enquiry assembled to investigate the case was dissolved on the 1st March 1879 without arriving at any satisfactory conclusion. The

\* Gendat is a town of some size with a Woon as head official. It is situated on the left bank of the Ningthee River at the extreme south-east corner of Manipur. A large stockade was constructed there by the Burmese in 1875.

only offer made by the Burmese was to settle the affair by the payment of a sum of Rs. 900 as compensation for the outrage, and this proposal has been rejected by Colonel Johnstone.

It would doubtless have been a more satisfactory termination to the question had the Burmese authorities displayed greater energy in prosecuting the enquiry, and had the actual offenders been brought to justice and to punishment. But in consideration of the difficulty, and perhaps even impossibility of now attaining this result, owing to the lapse of time since the occurrence and the impracticability of the local authorities, the Government of India have decided, under the circumstances of the case, to raise no objection to a settlement by a suitable money compensation. The amount, however, offered by the Burmese is clearly insufficient to meet the grave requirements of the case; and, as the object of the two Governments is admittedly to prevent further trouble and occasion for ill-blood between the people dwelling on the frontier, the Mandalay Government will doubtless concur in recognizing the importance of the settlement of the present difficulty being such as may fairly satisfy the aggrieved parties according to the usage and ideas of the people concerned.

I am, therefore, to request that you will place the case in this light before the Mandalay Ministry, and that you will move them to issue orders to the frontier authorities for the early payment of such increased indemnity as, under the circumstances of the case, may seem to be reasonable.

The tribe of Chasáds has only recently brought itself to notice.

Aggressions of the Chasád Kookies.

No mention of these Kookies can be traced in any correspondence previous to 1878. They are not mentioned in Dr. Brown's account of the hill country and tribes under the rule of Manipur, contained in the Administration Report for 1868-69, nor in any of the subsequent Administration Reports. Colonel Johnstone reports that they lived for a long time in Manipur territory, but have recently taken up their abode on the borders of the Kubo Valley in territory which he states really belongs to Manipur, but which has often been claimed by the Burmese. He also says that they are "one of the numerous Kookie tribes that are gradually pushing on towards the north-east from the country south of the valley." In October 1878 Colonel Johnstone received reports of outrages committed by the Chasáds, who were attacking the Tankhool Nagas and carrying off the people as slaves. The Tankhools are Manipur subjects, and occupy the hill country to the east of the valley. One report received was that the Chasád outrages were instigated by the Rajah of Sumjok; another was that Jamoo, one of the men who took part in the Kongal outrage, had instigated the Chasáds to attack the Tankhools, and had given presents to Touong, the Chasád Chief, who promised in return to subdue the Nagas east of the Tooyong River and bring them under Kubo. Colonel Johnstone was inclined to believe the latter report. The Maharajah informed the Political Agent that he wished to attack a Burmese Naga village as a warning to the Sumjok people that they could not intrigue with impunity. Colonel Johnstone dissuaded him from doing this, pointing out that there was no evidence that the Burmese had been intriguing. He, however, authorized the establishment of a strong post of observation at a place called Nombesa, about six miles from the border, and a force being sent to Chattik, in Manipur territory, but north of the Kubo Valley, where the Chasáds were said to be assembled in large numbers: the force was in no case to cross

the border line into Burma or to advance within a day's march of it. After this Colonel Johnstone received word from the Manipur officer on the frontier that the Chasáds had been driven out of Manipur and taken refuge in Kubo, where Colonel Johnstone said, "if report speaks truly, they will be warmly welcomed." In connection with this case, Colonel Johnstone again raised the question of the boundary between Manipur and Burma. He remarked :—

As long as asylum is granted to these troublesome Kookies, so long will there be trouble on the eastern frontier of Manipur. It is the position of the Kubo Valley running into Manipur territory as it does that gives the Sumjok people such advantage for annoying their neighbours, as where the boundary is disputed they can always assert that the depredators are not their subjects. When the Kubo Valley was taken from Manipur much future trouble was predicted in consequence, but the great difficulty which now exists from the fact of Kookies and Nagas, who are constantly quarrelling, being under two distinct Governments, could not be then foreseen, as those tribes were then all under Manipur. Now, however, while things remain as they are, difficulties are likely to increase, as the tribes will not cease to quarrel, and the rulers of the countries they inhabit must be responsible for their depredations. Were the broad Ningthee or Kyendwen the boundary, these troubles would cease.

In December 1878 six Manipuri Sepoys were arrested in the Kongal village (Manipur) by a party of 30 Chasád Kookies and six Kubo men, and taken to a Chasád village said to be in a high valley between the Ungoching and Kongal Hills, where they were kept as prisoners in the stocks for nine days. They were then taken to Tapp (old Sumjok), where they were detained for 26 days, but not subjected to any indignity. They were then taken to Mungsa, where their arms were restored to them, and thence to Yangapokpee Thannah, where they were handed over to a Manipur subadar, together with a letter addressed to Tangal Major. The letter stated that the men had been arrested in Burmese territory by Tonghoo, a Chasád Chief, when on their way to the said Chief with a message asking him to come in to Manipur, that the Chasáds arrested them hoping thereby to effect the release of one of their men who had been taken prisoner and carried to Manipur, and that on the case being referred to the Sumjok Rajah, he, from a feeling of friendship, sent the six men back and asked that the Chasád prisoner might be released. Colonel Johnstone remarked that there being thus a great difference between the two statements, it was difficult to decide who were the offenders, and that, if the Manipuris really did go into Burma with arms in their hands, the Burmese authorities were justified in detaining them.

Thus far I have utilised a very full précis drawn up in the Foreign Office in 1879. For later events I turn to the Assam Administration Reports.

In February 1880 information was received of a raid committed by Chasád Kookies on the Manipuri village of Chingsao, wherein 45 people were slain and 8 more carried off into captivity. After consultation with the Chief Commissioner, who was then at Manipur, it was de-

Events of 1879-80.

cided that Colonel Johnstone should himself investigate the facts of the case, and, there being a long-standing dispute between the Manipur Durbar and the Court of Ava as to the exact boundary in the neighbourhood, ascertain in whose territory the village of the Chasád Kookies lay.

In the event of the village proving to be in that of the Maharajah, it was determined to destroy it. Colonel Johnstone arrived at Chingsao on the 16th March. He learnt that in the previous year a party of Chasáds came to Chingsao and demanded tribute from its inhabitants, asking them to become the subjects of the Sunjok Rajah. This they refused to do, and the Chasáds went away. There had previously been other aggressive acts committed against different Naga villages on the frontier, and these did not cease ; but no further demonstration had in the meantime been made against Chingsao, which is three days' march to the north of the Kubo Valley. It is clear that Chingsao, which is a powerful village, was selected for attack, in the hope that, if it was subdued, all the Naga (Lahoopa) villages on the Angoching range would be induced to transfer their allegiance from Manipur to Sumjok. The Sumjok Rajah is a tributary rather than an official of the Mandalay Government, and the Chasád and other Kookies in this raid acted apparently as his instruments.

About daybreak on the 17th of February the villagers of Chingsao were disturbed by a volley of musketry, and some 50 Kookies, all armed with muskets, then entered the village and slaughtered the inhabitants as they ran out of their houses. A body of Nagas came up from the western end of the village, and drove out the Kookies, who, however, succeeded in burning half the houses of the village, and in carrying away a great quantity of plunder. The Chasád and other Kookies were armed with guns, having, as was previously reported, been supplied with them by the Sumjok Rajah. When the people of Chingsao reckoned up their losses, they found that 20 men, 7 boys and 25 women and girls had been killed, and that one man, one woman, and one girl were missing,—the girl, it was ascertained, had been given as a present to the Rajah of Sumjok. Five Nagas of Chattik were recognized among the Kookies. Colonel Johnstone satisfied himself of the truth of these facts, and, having ascertained that the Chasád village was unquestionably within Manipur territory, returned to Manipur.

A messenger was afterwards sent to Tonghoo, the Chasád Chief, who refused to come to Manipur himself, but sent Yankapoo, his younger brother. The latter admitted that the Chasád village was in Manipur, and that five men of his village had been taken part in the raid, but stated that the chief offenders were the men of the neighbouring villages of Chumyang, Chungle, and Moonoye, inhabited by Kookies of the same tribe as the Chasáds, but situated within Burmese territory. Yankapoo did not accept the terms offered by Colonel Johnstone on the part of the Durbar, and the negotiations terminated. It was then determined, with

the sanction of Government, to chastise the Chasáds, and a force of 1,000 men under Tangal Major and Balaram Singh Major was despatched for this purpose. Unfortunately, the whole affair was managed in a most dilatory manner. The Chasáds were allowed, under pretence of negotiations, to leave their village in a body, and finally nothing was done, except to burn the houses of the five men who had taken part in the raid. No opposition to this expedition, of which notice was given to them, was offered by the Burmese authorities. Friendly letters afterwards passed between Manipur and Burma, but nothing was done towards restoring the captives or punishing the offending Burmese village. In Colonel Johnstone's opinion this was due rather to the corruption of the Burmese frontier officials than to unwillingness on the part of the Court of Mandalay to come to a settlement.

The fact remained, however, that for the past three years a series of wanton and destructive aggressions had been inflicted in Manipur territory at this point by subjects of Burma, and that, in spite of promises and protestations, no attempt had been made to give satisfaction. The Chief Commissioner reported his opinion that the boundary between the two States required to be defined and demarcated in this neighbourhood; but, besides this, it was, Mr. Elliott thought, essentially necessary that some punishment should be inflicted for past aggressions, and some guarantee given to Manipur against similar outrages in the future. Manipur, as a protected State, is prohibited from seeking forcible remedies in the shape of reprisals, and it is only to the interference of the British Government that she can look either for satisfaction or protection.

Rumours of a Burmese invasion of Manipur were rife in September and early in October and were repeated in November, causing a serious panic.

The Sootie Kookies again committed a number of atrocities on the frontier; but it was observed that considerable numbers of them came into Manipur and took up cultivation there.

During 1879-80 the Political Agency was placed entirely under the Chief Commissioner of Assam, and Mr. Elliott paid a visit to Manipur to make himself acquainted with local politics. One result of this visit was the decision to open out a cart-road from Manipur to Kohima, the new head-quarters of the Naga Hills. Already trade is improving between the two places.

The boundary between Burma and Manipur, as laid down by the British Commissioners in 1884, was exactly defined by natural landmarks only along the western face of the Kubo Valley. North of that valley the country was at the time uninhabited, and the boundary

running through it was never laid down on the ground. This boundary was expressed in the agreement with Burma as "a straight line passing due north from the northern extremity of the Kubo Valley up to the first range of hills east of that upon which stand the villages of Cho-estiar, Noongbree, and Noonghur," of the Lahupa (or Tangkhul) tribe of Nagas. Since 1834, however, the Tangkhul Nagas from the west, and the Kookies, partly subject to the Rajah, or Tsauba, of Sumjok, a tributary Chief of Burma, and partly belonging to tribes dwelling on Manipur territory, from the south, had been gradually pushing up into this formerly unoccupied tract; and the doubtfulness of the mathematical line, with the standing hostility of Kookies to Nagas, had led to several outrages, to the series of which the attack on the Kongal Thanna, a Manipuri military post at the head of the Kubo Valley, in December 1877, and that on the village of Chingsao in February 1880, belong. This series was continued during the year 1880-81. One of the results of the massacre at Chingsao was the establishment of a Manipur Thanna at Chattik, a Tangkhul Naga village south of Chingsao, standing on a ridge almost exactly coincident with "Pemberton's line" (the mathematical boundary already referred to). In the neighbourhood of Chattik is a village site known as Chowhoom *Khoonao* ("the little") an offshoot of a larger village called Chowhoom *Khoolel*. This village site had been for some time deserted; and was in November 1880 reported to have been occupied by Choomyang Kookies from Sumjok territory, who claimed it as part of the Sumjok dominions, and refused to pay revenue to Manipur. Some time was spent in parleying between the Kookies in Chowhoom *Khoonao* and the Manipur guard at Chattik; and when a party was sent by the order of the Manipur Court to visit the former village, it was found stockaded, and, besides the Kookies, a Shan officer, with 60 men from Sumjok, in possession. This officer addressed a letter to the Manipur Subadar, claiming the village as Sumjok territory, and matters rested thus for a short time. About the 16th or 17th January a collision occurred, precipitated apparently by a stealthy attack which the Kookies were endeavouring to make on the post at Chattik, between the Manipuris and the Sumjok people, which ended in the latter being driven out of Chowhoom *Khoonao*, and their stockade destroyed. On the 23rd January the village of Chowhoom *Khoolel*, the parent of "Little Chowhoom," was visited by a party of Sumjok Shans and Choomyang and other Kookies, and 15 persons carried off captive. This village is undoubtedly within Manipur territory, being west of Chattik, which itself stands near the line. Passing on from this place a village of Tangkhul Nagas, still further west, named Moolung, was attacked, 15 people killed, and 5 carried off as prisoners.

While this was going on in the north, two villages on the road from Manipur to the Kongal Thanna, named Koontuk *Khoonao* and Kussoong, were about the 24th January attacked and plundered by another body of Kookies from Sumjok territory. The party which made this raid was,

however, intercepted on its return by a Manipuri force from the Khang-bom Thanna, who recovered some of the booty, and captured two Kookies, from whom valuable information was gained. These outrages of January were the last overt acts of violence. The Manipur posts on the frontier were strongly reinforced, and no further aggression followed from the side of Sumjok. Rumours reached the Government of preparations being made at Sumjok, to resist any attack which might be made by way of reprisals by Manipur; and in February there was a report that a force of 1,000 Burmese had arrived at Sumjok from Mandalay. No confirmation of this story was, however, received.

The Sootie Kookies remained quiet during the year 1880-81, so far as Manipur was concerned. They committed, however, several outrages in the Kubo and Kulé Valleys, subject to the Burmese Government. The south of Manipur was said to be well protected from these Kookies by those of their number who had settled in Manipur territory, and by Khongjais. As the Kubo and Kulé Valleys are unprotected, it was thought probable that they would continue to raid in that direction, and not towards Manipur.

#### Lushais.

The Lushais maintained friendly relations with Manipur during the year 1880-81.

There was no renewal during the year 1881-82 of the disturbances on the Burma frontier, which looked so threatening in the beginning of 1881 that a body of native troops was kept prepared to start from Silchar at a day's notice in order to assist the Maharajah against aggression. But these aggressions were so grave that the British Government determined on appointing a Commission to lay down a definite boundary to replace the imaginary line drawn northwards from the Kubo Valley in 1834, and known as Pemberton's line.

#### Affairs on the Burmese Border.

Colonel Johnstone, the Political Agent, was selected as Boundary Commissioner, and Mr. R. Phayre, c.s., of the British Burma Commission, was associated with him as his Assistant, it being deemed advisable to have an officer acquainted with the Burmese language for the purpose of communicating with the officers of the Mandalay Government stationed on the frontier. Major Badgley, of the Topographical Survey, was sent with the party to survey the country and to map the boundary selected, and two scientific gentlemen were also attached to the expedition,—Dr. Watt, who combined the duties of botanist and of medical officer to the party, and Mr. Oldham, of the Geological Survey. The escort consisted of 200 men of the 12th Khelat-i-Ghilzai Regiment, under the command of Lieutenant Angelo, and of 50 men of the

**Frontier Police.** The Maharajah of Manipur deputed one of his Ministers, Balam Major, to go with the Commission, and insisted on providing at his own expense all the supplies needed for the expedition.

In order to carry out the survey as rapidly as possible, two parties were sent out: one undertook the northern part, travelling eastward through Chattik Thanna, and the other the southern, beginning their work from Kangal Thanna. The latter party, with Colonel Johnstone himself, left Manipur on the 10th December; and the survey work was accomplished rapidly and effectually, meeting with no resistance, except that two parties sent to clear survey points in the Angoching range were turned back by armed followers of the Tsauba, or Chief of Sumjok. It was, however, found possible to dispense with these points.

Colonel Johnstone's hopes that he would be met by Burmese officials to act in concert with the British Commissioners in laying down the fresh boundary were disappointed. The Pagan Woon and Phoongyee of Tummoo both wrote letters saying they had no authority to discuss the boundary question, and throughout the whole of the subsequent operations there was no representative of the Burmese Government.

The Tsauba of Sumjok showed himself unfriendly on more occasions than one, and tried to stir the Chasád Kookies to attack the expedition, but in vain: and no hostile action interrupted the work of the Commission.

Remonstrances were addressed to the Pagan Woon, to whom the Sumjok Tsauba is subordinate, complaining of the obstructive attitude of the latter official, and the Woon replied by urging Colonel Johnstone to come to Tummoo to talk matters over, although he had previously intimated that he had received no authority from the Court of Mandalay to discuss the boundary question. Mr. Phayre was accordingly deputed by Colonel Johnstone to visit Sumjok and Tummoo, and Major Badgley accompanied Mr. Phayre as far as Sumjok, to take what observations he could without exciting suspicion. Mr. Phayre was to go on from Sumjok to visit the Pagan Woon at Tummoo, and to return to Manipur *via* Moreh Thanna and the Aimole Pass. Mr. Phayre's visit was quite fruitless: the Sumjok Tsauba refused to have anything to do with the settlement of the boundary, saying he was without authority from Mandalay. Mr. Phayre went on to Tummoo, where he was received with great ceremony by the Phoongyee (Bishop) and by the Pagan Woon. The Woon, however, though showing a friendly disposition, declared himself powerless to act. During Mr. Phayre's stay at Tummoo he received news from Colonel Johnstone that the demarcation had been completed; on which, after impressing upon the Woon the advisability of the acceptance by himself and by the Sumjok Tsauba of the new boundary, he re-joined Colonel Johnstone, and the party, after completing their work, left for



Manipur, which they reached on January 10th. The result of the demarcation may be summed up as follows :

It was found that the imaginary boundary known as Pemberton's line had been incorrectly drawn on the map, for it neither agreed with the actual condition of things, nor did it carry out the terms of the Treaty of 1834: for, instead of following the eastern slopes of the Yomadoung or Malain Hills, and curving round the head of the valley, it cut off from Burma and handed over to Manipur a large portion of the Kubo Valley. The Commission, however, laid down a boundary which agrees as nearly as possible with the terms of the Treaty, while it gives a fair and clearly-marked frontier. The boundary thus fixed follows the base of the eastern slopes of the Malain range, crosses the River Namia a few hundred yards south of Kangal Thanna, thence turns east to the Talain River, follows that river upward to its source, and then proceeds down the Napanga River to where it passes through a gorge in the Kusom range. From thence it runs northward along the crest of that range. The points where the boundary intersects the Namia River and touches the Talain River have been marked with pillars, and a road has been cut connecting these two points.

This boundary has not yet been accepted by the Burmese Government; but its settlement has already produced a good effect. Some of the Chasád villages situated on the frontier formerly debated have moved westwards and peaceably settled down as quiet subjects of Manipur, and thus removed the possibility of dispute as to whether they belong to Burmese or Manipur territory.

Two events in the internal history of Manipur during the year call for notice. One of these, which occurred early in May, was the homicide of a servant by the fourth son of the Maharajah. For this act the offender was tried, and, though acquitted by the Court of Justice, was banished by his father, who disagreed with the verdict, to a lonely island in the Logtak Lake. In this matter the Maharajah behaved with justice and dignity, and the severe penalty inflicted was not relaxed till May 1882.

The second important event was the rising of a man called Erengba during the latter part of June, while the Political Agent was absent on privilege leave. This person, who claimed descent from one of the former Rajahs, gave out that he was warned in a dream that he was to become Rajah, and soon collected a heterogeneous party of followers. Among these he selected 18 persons to receive letters of dignity as his principal Ministers of State and chiefs of his army. The band, numbering less than three hundred in all, proceeded towards the capital on the 23rd June 1881, but were easily put down by the Maharajah's troops. Eighteen of the ringleaders were tried and executed, and the remainder were either imprisoned, or compelled to work at the manufacture of salt, or whipped and let go. The rising never had the slightest support

among the general population, and it was thought that when the ring-leaders, who knew the risk they incurred, had been put to immediate death, the rest of the following might have been treated with scornful clemency. Accordingly, the Government of India, in reviewing the proceedings, expressed their displeasure at the disproportionate severity with which this miserable *émeute* was suppressed.

In his final report on the survey Colonel Johnstone gives the following account of the Chasád Kookies :—

Account of the Chasád Kookies.

The Chasáds, or more properly speaking the Cháksáds, are a branch of the great Kookie race which found originally in southern Burmah, has pushed its settlements as far north as the Naga Hills. They are nearly related to the Sookties or Kumhows, who inhabit the country to the south of Manipur, but not so closely as to have prevented the usual tribal feuds, which made it unpleasant for them to live near one another.

The Chasáds left their old home to the south of the valley of Manipur between 10 and 20 years ago, and settled in the hills bordering on the Manipur Valley near the Kongal route to Burmah. Previous to their settling there, a foul act of treachery had made them, at heart, deadly enemies of Manipur. It may be related in a few words.

At that time Colonel McCulloch, the Political Agent, had direct political charge of most of the Kookies in Manipur. He had by a large expenditure of his private means and great tact, generosity, and kindness won over and settled down the early Kuki immigrants, and Raja Nur Sing had wisely assigned to him their entire management. As might be expected, jealousy sprung up in the minds of many of the Manipuri officials, and when Colonel McCulloch first established relations with the Chasáds as new settlers, an effort was made to obstruct his arrangements. On a certain occasion, when the Chief of the tribe, the father of the present Chief Tonghoo, was coming in to Colonel McCulloch by his invitation and under safe conduct, he was murdered by a high Manipuri official, the brother-in-law of the present Raja. This abominable act, as might be expected, alienated the Chasáds; and though they settled, as I have said, near the valley, they never appear to have been satisfied with their lot, and always complained of the oppression of the Manipuris. In the end of 1877, the Chasáds, with their tributary off-shoots, Choomeyang, Chungle, Moonoye, Koomeyang, &c., began to move, and determined to leave Manipur altogether, Choomeyang apparently went first, and crossing the Ungoching Range began to settle down in Burmese territory. The other villages began to follow suit, but, together with Choomeyang, were told by the Sumjok Tsaubwa to settle down in their present place, he adding, significantly, "if Manipur objects, I will protect you." This is the story told by the Kookies themselves and corroborated by careful enquiries.

After the Kongal outrage, Manipur was for some time unrepresented on that part of the frontier, as the thana was not again posted there, and advantage was taken of this remissness on the part of Manipur to try and encroach on her territory. The Chasáds, finding themselves protected by the Sumjok Tsaubwa, with the great name of Burmah at his back, were only too glad to engage in a life so consonant with their tastes; and being supplied with arms and ammunition by Sumjok, began a series of outrages and a system of plunder and rapine, which has made their name a terror to all the now peaceful Tankhools and Lahoops in their neighbourhood; and the many complaints made while the expedition was at Kongal Thana, prove that these depredations have been carried on up to the time of our arrival there. In fact the Chasáds have recently done for Sumjok and the Kubo Valley what the Kongal Thana formerly did, viz., checked the depredations of the tribes who came before them; and these astute Kookies, if not afraid of Sumjok, as they say they are (a statement I do not believe), have all along seen that it is their policy to share their plunder with, and to some extent obey, a power whose name has hitherto given them free license to attack with impunity their old masters and enemies—the Manipuris.

The Chasáds may briefly be said to inhabit the country lying between Chattik and Kongal Thana on the north and south, and between the Ungochings and main portion of the Malaya Range on the east and west.

They inhabit 12 villages, some of which are mere off-shoots of others.

After the survey one of the Chasád Chiefs, Tonghoo, at once submitted himself. The other Chum-

Submission of the Chasáds.

yang held aloof, and in February

1888 the Political Agent and Manipuri troops took possession of his village. The Agent declined to allow it to be burnt, and eventually Chumyang came in to the Agent and told him that if the Kookies were managed by him, they would submit at once, but they feared the Manipuri Durbar. Time was given them to decide on staying and submitting or moving off into Burma ; and so the matter rests.

## CHAPTER XVII.

## THE MIKIRS AND RENGMA NAGAS.

Bordering upon the plains of Nowgong, and in fact within the limits of the district, are two tracts of hilly country inhabited the one by Mikirs, the other by Rengma Nagas.

The Mikir Hills extend from the Jumoona to the Dhunsiri, and their greatest distance from the Kullung and Brahmapootra rivers is 10 miles. They are separated from the Naga range by low undulating hills and small valleys, and their average height is not more than 500 feet. Their length from east to west is about 50 miles, and breadth from north to south about 30 miles.<sup>(1)</sup> The Mikir villages are never situated more than half-a-day's journey from the plains, and extend only as far as the Koliani, in Morung. Beyond that point the hills are occupied by the Rengma Nagas.

The Mikirs have no written character, and their language is said to differ from that of the surrounding tribes. According to their own tradition they originally occupied the low hills afterwards included in Tularam Senaputtis's country, from which they were driven by the Raja of Cachar into Jaintia, whence again they emigrated to their present site. They long remained subject to demands from Cachar and Jaintia, and a prey to the incursions of the Nagas. The Assam Rajas claimed their principal allegiance, appointed their Chiefs, and took a tribute in cotton, mats, &c., valued at about Rs. 300. The Mikirs received permission from the Assamese authorities to cultivate a strip of land under the hills, and an assignment of the proceeds of certain fisheries and ferries. These they farmed out, and received their rents in the shape of dried fish and rice when they brought down their tribute.

In 1838 it was determined to bring them under a revenue settlement of some kind, and to raise them, if possible, in the social scale by putting them on the same fiscal platform as the Assamese of the plains. The Assamese had always looked upon the Mikirs with contempt and dislike, and the tribe had kept itself aloof in the jungles, away from all civilising intercourse. The hills were now visited by a British officer and a settlement effected with the consent of the Chiefs, by which the old tribute was converted into an assessment upon each house according to the number of male cultivators living therein. The total net revenue so assessed was about Rs. 1,700. The hills were divided into five dwars, each under a chief, who was made responsible for the collections

(<sup>1</sup>) Revenue Proceedings, 1838, 3rd April, Nos. 53 and 54.  
Revenue Proceedings, 1841, 19th January, Nos. 46 and 47.

and took a commission of 12½ per cent. on the gross payments. The total population of the hills bordering on Nowgong was estimated at 12,000 souls. Taking into account certain outlying portions of the tribe, the total number of Mikirs was probably 20,000 in 1838. They are said to sacrifice to the sun, moon, rivers, large stones, and trees, in order to avert sickness or procure favourable harvests. They are much addicted to spirits. Marriage is ratified by draining a bowl of liquor. Polygamy is unknown. They burn the dead and bury the ashes. They are intensely devoted to keeping pigs, and are altogether a very inoffensive race; not given to crime of any kind.

The effect of the settlement, which was afterwards modified to a uniform house-tax, was to bring about a marked improvement in the social condition of the tribe. The Mikirs had always been treated as bondsmen, and been in the hands of a few hereditary Assamese kotokies or managers. They now found themselves on a par with their neighbours, and began to send their children to school.

They have always been well behaved with but one solitary exception.<sup>(1)</sup> In May 1863 a party of Mikirs from a village on the con-

Raid on Hurlook Parbut.

finies of Jaintia attacked another Mikir village at Hurlook Parbut and killed some of the inhabitants. When pursued by the Assamese Police they showed fight and resisted capture. Enquiry seemed to show that the Jaintia insurgents (then in the field) had instigated the Mikirs to this attack, to which they were the more readily incited, because they had suffered from an oppressive Mouzadar. Redress being given they settled down again at once.

Strangely enough, while the Mikirs were thus early brought under

The Rengma Nagas.

our fiscal system, the Rengma Nagas, inhabiting part of the same range towards Golaghat, were to a great extent overlooked<sup>(2)</sup>. They are first mentioned in 1839 as a tribe living in the jungly hills between the Koliani and Dhunsiri, and apparently were considered a section of the Angamis. In 1841 it was reported that they were always at feud with the Lhota Nagas, but were willing to pay tribute to us and swear to keep the peace. They had held lands under the Assam Government, but had subsequently lost these. The lands Government agreed to restore. But no steps were taken at this time to fix the tribute payable by the tribe. Owing to some misapprehension the lands were not actually

(1) Judicial Proceedings, July 1863, Nos. 402 to 405.  
Judicial Proceedings, September 1863, Nos. 194 to 197.  
Revenue Proceedings, 1848, 25th May, Nos. 103 to 105.

(2) Revenue Proceedings, 1848, 18th October, Nos. 9 and 10.  
Revenue Proceedings, 12th April 1843, Nos. 76 to 78.  
Political Proceedings, 18th April 1841, Nos. 79 and 80.  
Judicial Proceedings, 15th June 1854, Nos. 210 to 212.  
Revenue Proceedings, 26th January 1854, Nos. 4 and 5.  
Revenue Proceedings, 24th January 1845, Nos. 45 to 49.

given over till 1854 when the Rengmas refused to pay tribute on the ground that Government had not kept faith with them or protected them from the Lhota Nagas or Angamis who had raided on their villages. Even when the North Cachar Nagas and Kookies were assessed in 1842, the Rengmas still escaped. Allowances were, however, sanctioned in 1845 "for the 6 kotokies of the *Rengma* and Lhota and Angami Nagas in Nowgong," two for each tribe whose grants had been inadvertently resumed. It was only in 1848 that they agreed to pay a small house-tax, the net proceeds of which from 32 villages, of about 2,756 inhabitants, came to Rs. 459.\* The payment of this tribute fell very soon into abeyance: and for twenty years nothing was realized from the tribe.

In the spring of 1870, the Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills district visited twenty out of the thirty-two Rengma villages and

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\* The following account of their natal tradition, taken from the journal of Mr. Masters, the officer who effected this settlement, is not without interest:

"They have no written language, but they hold a tradition of their origin, which though not quite so extravagant as the tales we meet with in the history of some of the nations of the earth, and yet may be equally true. Formerly there were no Nagas in this world. It is here necessary to premise that the "world" of the Rengma Naga includes all that tract of country which can be seen from the highest peaks of the Rengma Hills, but no more. It includes Upper and Central Assam, and is bounded on all sides by lofty mountains inhabited by Abors, great enemies to the Rengma Nagas. Their tradition states that a young man whose name is not known came from some other country, or some other world, and alighted in the province of Assam. Wandering in the forests here he met with a young woman, with whom he was so much pleased that he took her to be his wife. They lived comfortably together, and in course of time had four sons—Ram, Krishna, Ahom, and Naga. All these grew up together healthy young lads. When they arrived at the state of manhood, their father became anxious to portion them out in the world; but before doing so he thought it necessary to make himself acquainted with their capabilities, and fortunately hit on a happy expedient. His house was very much infested with mice: in order to try the qualifications of his four brave sons, he resolved on setting them to work to destroy the mice and clear the house of his unwelcome visitors. Ram, being the first-born, had the honour of the first chance. He tried his best, but effected little, and was compelled to give it up as a bad job. Krishna was next called upon, but he, instead of killing the mice, took up his pipe and began to play a merry tune, and the mice all came dancing round him. Ahom was then ordered to try his skill, but Ahom was a poor, weak, soft-hearted lad, without spirit, without energy, and wished for nothing, but to sit still and smoke his tobacco, chew his pan tamook, and, enjoy himself as much as possible. He consequently killed no mice. The old patriarch being convinced of the incapacities of his first three sons, became exceedingly anxious to know what the youngest could do, and ordered Naga to kill the mice, promising him a good reward if he succeeded. Naga immediately set to work and very soon cleared the house of mice, with which his father was so pleased that he gave Naga the first portion of the inheritance and allotted him all the high peaks on the Rengma Hills. To Ram, from whom the Mikirs descended, he gave the next lower range of hills. To Krishna, father of the Cucharies, he gave the low hills and all the high spots of ground in the plains. To Ahom he gave nothing but the low ground in the plains, the rice pothars, the rivers, and the swamps. Thus was the world portioned out at the first, and so has it continued to the present day, except that the Mikirs are encroaching on the inheritance of their younger brothers and extending their cultivation close up to his villages. Some have imagined that the Assamese have got the best portion, and that the rich and extensive pothars, which produce abundant crops without much labour, were selected for Ahom rather out of pity than otherwise; his father being convinced by his evident want of energy that he would never exert himself sufficiently to effect any difficult office. The Assamese maintain their character to this day."

appointed Mouzadars elected by the villagers, who were in future to be responsible for the revenue.

The Rengmas have always been well affected, and it is believed that they have been of some use as a check upon the Lhota Nagas behind them. The Chief of the tribe has for years past held an allowance of land (23 poorahs) granted by Government on account of this service.<sup>(1)</sup>

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(<sup>1</sup>) Revenue Proceedings, February 1861, Nos. 116 to 118.

## CHAPTER XVIII.

## THE KHASI AND JAINTIA HILLS.

Proceeding westward from the Naga Hills and North Cachar we come to the Khasi-Jaintia Hills. The story of our early connection with this tract has been already written by Pemberton, and as his report is scarce and out of print, I cannot do better than reproduce here the portion\* relating to the acquisition of the Khasi-Jaintia Country the accuracy of which I have verified from the Records:—

“From the few scattered notices which are found in the works of Buchanan and Hamilton, little more information can be gleaned than

Pemberton's account of Jaintia.

that the State of Jynteeah is situated between Cachar and Sylhet; and until the Burmese war, our knowledge was almost entirely derived from those authors; the Rajahs of the country having uniformly shewn the same unwillingness to admit foreigners within their boundaries as had been exhibited by the neighbouring princes of Assam and Cachar.

“In 1774, Jynteeah is said to have been attacked by a force under a Major Henniker, but of the causes which led to this step there appears to be no record in the archives of Government, though from its being one of the most considerable of the Cossya States it is probable that some aggressions against the inhabitants of the adjacent plains of Sylhet had rendered the chastisement necessary. It continued unnoticed until the year 1821, when some emissaries from this State were detected and punished in an atrocious attempt to carry off certain British subjects from the Sylhet District, for the purpose of immolating them: the circumstances were brought to the notice of the Supreme Government, and a solemn warning was given to the Rajah, that any repetition of so horrible an offence would be followed by the immediate confiscation of his territory.

“The invasion of Kachar by the forces of Ava in 1824, and the information that they were likely to march through Jynteeah to Assam, rendered some precautionary measures immediately necessary to prevent such an intention being carried into effect, which, if successful, must have seriously compromised the security of Sylhet. Mr. Scott, the Governor General's Agent, opened a negotiation with the Rajah of Jynteeah, proposing that he should enter into a treaty of alliance with the British Government; but this, with the usual procrastinating policy of all natives, he declined doing, until the necessity for such a measure became more apparent. He was promised the assistance of the Government troops, if his own resources were actively employed in repulsing

\* Pemberton's Report: sub-sections 2 and 3 of section 2. See also volumes 27 and 28 of the *Calcutta Review*; and Reports by Mills (1853) and Allen (1858). Reference should be made to these Reports for information as to the revenue and judicial administration of the Hills.



the enemy, and threatened with punishment if he admitted the Burmese into his territory. He had collected a force, which was said to consist of several thousand archers, but which most probably amounted to only a few hundreds ; and he was conjectured to be favourable to the British power, though unwilling to compromise his independence by any engagements, until the destruction of his country, or compliance, became the only remaining alternatives.

"On the 2nd of February 1824, a letter was addressed by Mr. Scott to the Commander of the Burmese force in Kachar, prohibiting his entering the Jynteeah territory, on the ground that the Rajah's ancestor had received that country as a gift after conquest from the Honourable Company ; that he had himself sought British protection ; and that the Burmans having openly threatened war, they could not be permitted to occupy that, or any other favourable position, for commencing hostilities. Notwithstanding these representations, a letter was addressed by the Burmese Commander to the Rajah of Jynteeah, requiring his presence in the Burmese camp, on the affirmed ground of his known vassalage to the princes of Assam, which latter country had become tributary to Ava ; and a party of Burmese appearing shortly afterwards near the Jynteeah frontier, a detachment of 150 men, under a British officer, was sent to reinforce the Rajah's troops, on which the Burmese force withdrew.

"In the course of the following month of March, the Rajah of Jynteeah entered into a treaty with Mr. Scott, who marched through his territory early in April, from Sylhet to Assam, with an escort of three companies of the 23rd Regiment Native Infantry, under Captain Horsburgh. On this occasion, Mr. Scott represents the reception he met with from the Rajah as most cordial ; and his personal exertions in procuring porters for the party, and pacifying some differences amongst them, are said to have greatly exceeded any thing that could have been expected from a person of his rank. In the treaty formed with the Rajah, he formally acknowledged his dependence on the British Government, pledged himself to abstain from all independent negotiations with any foreign power, and to aid us with a military contingent in any wars waged east of the Burhampooter. None of these conditions, however, did he fulfil with sincerity ; and it was notorious that during the war he permitted a Burmese detachment from Assam to occupy his territory, in direct violation of the treaty which had preserved his country from the calamities that overwhelmed the less fortunate States of Kachar and Muthpore.

"During the unsettled state in which Assam continued for some time after the Burmese war, the Rajah of Jynteeah is affirmed to have appropriated considerable tracts of land, which properly belonged to the former province ; and in 1830, he was repeatedly, but fruitlessly, ordered by Mr. Scott to remove a chokey, which he had established without authority at Chapper Mookh, at the confluence of the Kopili and Dimla rivers ; and the remonstrances of Mr. Robertson, at a subsequent period, on the same subject, were treated with similar indifference.

In 1832, British subjects of the British Government were seized by Chandra Sing, the Rajah of Goba, one of the petty chieftains dependent on Jynteah, to whom the order was conveyed from the heir apparent of the present Rajah, by the chiefs of Nurtung; they were carried to a temple within the boundaries of Goba, where three were barbarously immolated at the shrine of Kali; the fourth providentially effected his escape into the British territories, and gave intimation of the horrible sacrifice which had been accomplished. The culprits were immediately demanded by the Supreme Government from Ram Sing, the Rajah of Jynteah, by whose express order, the seizure of the people was said to have been made; and two years of fruitless negotiation were expended in endeavouring to obtain them. The death of the Rajah Ram Sing, in November 1832, was followed by the accession of his nephew, Rajundur Sing, then about 20 years of age, upon whom the demand for the surrender of the culprits was pressed, with the earnestness which retributive justice so imperiously demanded. He was reminded of the consequences of refusal, and of the solemn warnings which had been given before, when similar, but unsuccessful, attempts were made on the lives of British subjects in the district of Sylhet, in the years 1821, 1827, and 1832. The requisitions of Government were met with the same evasive spirit which had characterised the conduct of his predecessor, and every minor expedient having been unsuccessfully resorted to, it was finally resolved to mark the atrocious nature of the crime, by proceeding to the extreme measure of dispossessing the Rajah of such portions of his territory as were situated in the plains, and confining him to the hilly tract, where fewer opportunities would be offered of again committing so serious an offence.

" Firm, however, in his determination not to surrender the guilty perpetrators of this most barbarous sacrifice, and led by a few crafty Bengallees to believe that they possessed influence sufficient to effect the restoration of his principality, he refused to continue in possession of any reduced portion of it. On the 15th of March 1835, Captain Lister, with two companies of the Sylhet Light Infantry, took

#### Annexation of Jaintia.

formal possession of Jynteahpoor, the capital of the country; and the determination of Government, to annex the plains to the British territory, was made known by proclamation.<sup>(1)</sup> The whole of the Rajah's personal property, amounting to more than a lakh and a half of rupees, was made over to him; and in the following month of April the district of Goba, in which the sacrifice had been perpetrated, was taken possession of by a detachment of the Assam Light Infantry. The Rajah of Jynteah retired to Sylhet, where he has since continued to reside; and the severe example will doubtless effectually check the repetition of a crime, which, there is every reason to believe, had been also frequently perpetrated in the adjoining provinces of Kachar and Assam, while they remained subject to native rule.\*

\* Orders of the 30th March 1835 placed Jaintia under the Political Agent, Khasi Hills. Act VI of 1835 provided for the judicial control of the Khasi Hills and Jaintia.

(1) Revenue Proceedings, 14th April 1835, No 11.

Ditto,

28th

"

Nos. 17—20.

"The country which has thus become annexed to the British territories embraces an area of about 3,850 square miles, which, like that of Kachar, consists of three principal divisions: the first, comprising a very fertile and well cultivated tract of level country, extending from the foot of the hills to the north bank of the Soormah river, and a small portion on the southern bank, known by the name of the Seven Reaches, which are supposed to contain about 4,500 koolbas of the best description of land; the central division includes all the hills bounded by Kachar on the east, and the districts of various Cossya tribes on the west; the northern portion stretches from the foot of the inferior heights, to the south bank of the Kullung river, and is a tract of tolerably open level country, little if at all inferior in fertility to the southern plains, which form by far the most valuable portion of the principality.

"The boundaries of this State are formed, on the east, by the Keeroowah and Kopili rivers, which separate it from Kachar; the former flowing from the southern face of the mountain chain into the Soormah; and the Kopili, on the north, into the Kullung, which latter river separates Jynteeah from Assam, on the north: on the west, it is bounded principally by the hill district of the Kyrin Rajah, from whence the line runs south along the Pian nullah, and, on reaching the plains, is deflected in a south-easterly direction, crossing and skirting several other streams, until it reaches the Soormah, which river, with the exception already mentioned, forms the southern boundary of the whole district.

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"The whole of the mountainous country, until within a few miles of the descent into the plains of Assam, is inhabited by the people called by us Cossyas, but who denominate themselves Khyee. They are a handsome, muscular race of men, of an active disposition, and fond of material exercises. They always go armed; in general with bows and arrows, and a long naked sword and shield, which latter is made very large, and serves them occasionally as a defence against rain."

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"Between the State of Jynteeah and the hills on the west, occupied by the Garrows, is a tract of mountain territory inhabited by the Cossyas, which, until the year 1826, had never been visited by any European, although the fierce tribes who occupied it had at different times descended into the plains both of Assam and Sylhet, and ravaged, with fire and sword, the villages which stretched along the base of this lofty region: night was the time almost invariably chosen for these murderous assaults, when neither sex nor age was spared; and long before the dawn of day the perpetrators, glutted with slaughter, and loaded with plunder, were again far among the fastnesses of their mountains on the way home.

"On the side of Assam, from the year 1794, many of the various tribes on the southern borders of that valley, had gradually established themselves in the plains, from whence the Government of that country was unable to dispossess them; and conscious of its weakness, was glad to compound with them for an acknowledgment of supremacy, which they spurned and disavowed, whenever its exercise appeared likely to encroach on that independence of action which they rarely permitted to be controlled.

"On the Sylhet or southern side, the establishment of British supremacy brought these fierce marauders into immediate contact with a power which they in vain attempted to resist; they were driven back from the plains to the mountains, and redoubts were built along the line of frontier, in which guards were permanently stationed for the protection of the country. The most effectual check upon their conduct, however, was found in excluding them from the frontier markets, to which they had habitually resorted for the sale of their produce and purchase of grain; and this measure, when rigorously enforced, rarely failed to extort from them some compensation for the property they had plundered, though they never would consent to surrender the culprits.

"When the fate of war had transferred Assam to British rule, the expediency of endeavouring to open a direct communication between it and the more southern provinces of Sylhet and Kachar, was not likely to escape the penetration of Mr. Scott; and his march through the Jynteah territory in 1824, to which allusion has been already made, afforded a striking practical proof of the value of such lines of intercourse between the remote districts of our eastern frontier.

"It was not, however, until the year 1826, that negotiations to effect this desirable object were entered upon by Mr. Scott with the Cossya chieftains; when Teerut Sing, the Rajah of Nungklow, having expressed a desire to rent some lands in Assam, which had once been held by his ancestors under the native princes of that country, Mr. Scott's negotiations with Nungklow.

Mr. Scott promised compliance with his request, if he would endeavour to obtain from his people permission for the unrestricted passage of British subjects through his territory, from and to Sylhet, and Assam. The Rajah agreed to convene a meeting for the purpose of considering the subject, at which Mr. Scott's presence was requested. The principal chieftains of his own and the adjacent States having assembled at Nungklow, a debate, which lasted for two days, was followed by a decision in favour of Mr. Scott's proposition, and a treaty was concluded with the British Government, the Cossyas agreeing to aid in the construction of a road which was to pass through their territory.

"For upwards of eighteen months after the ratification of his agreement, the most cordial understanding appeared to exist between the British authorities and their new friends. Bungalows had been constructed at Nungklow, a road had been cleared, improved systems

of agriculture and gardening with many new vegetable products had been introduced, and the most sanguine anticipations of the benevolent spirit which influenced every act of Mr. Scott's life, appeared already realized. On the 4th of April 1829, these bright prospects were obscured by an act of the most atrocious cruelty, which completely

**The Khasi insurrection, 1829.** changed the character of the existing intercourse, and converted the powerful friends of the Cossyas into formidable and irresistible enemies.

"The immediate cause of the dreadful massacre, which consigned two most promising officers, Lieutenants Bedingfield and Burlton, with about 50 or 60 native subjects, to an untimely grave, is supposed to have been the speech of a Bengallee chuprassee, who in a dispute with the Cossyas had threatened them with Mr. Scott's vengeance, and told them that they were to be subjected to the same taxation as was levied on the inhabitants of the plains. False as was the declaration, it proved sufficient to excite the suspicions of the Cossyas, and to fan the flame of dissatisfaction which had been already kindled by the insolent demeanour and abuse of the subordinate native agents who had accompanied Mr. Scott into the hills.

"The vengeance of a savage is never satiated but in the blood of his opponent, and a general confederacy was formed for the extermination of the low-land strangers. Lieutenant Bedingfield, the first victim of this most atrocious conspiracy, had, from the first hour of his intercourse with the Cossyas, evinced the liveliest interest in their welfare; he had studied their language as the best avenue to their affections, and the great aim of his residence among them appeared to be an anxious desire to improve their condition, to instruct them in the arts of civilized life, and to create a relish amongst them for its humanizing enjoyments. This spirit of comprehensive benevolence was united to an amenity of manner, eminently calculated to conciliate regard; and so sensible did the Cossyas appear of his kindness, that an intercourse of the most friendly and intimate nature existed between them, the very moment preceding that in which their guilty hands were imbrued in his blood. He was invited to attend a conference, and disregarding the prophetic warnings of his companion Burlton, who suspected treachery, he entered the assembly unarmed, and was barbarously slaughtered.

"Lieutenant Burlton, with the aid of a small military guard, defended himself in his bungalow against vastly superior numbers, and at night succeeded in effecting his retreat a considerable distance on the road towards Assam; his route was, however, discovered on the following morning, and his exhausted party rapidly overtaken by their blood-thirsty pursuers: even under these depressing circumstances, the cool determination and unerring aim of Burlton, long protracted the struggle, and they were at length only overpowered, when a heavy fall of rain had rendered their firearms nearly useless: unable longer to keep their assailants at bay, the party dispersed; Burlton fell covered with wounds, and the faithful naick who commanded the small military party

refusing to desert him in his extremity, perished by his side. The remaining fugitives were overtaken and butchered by their merciless pursuers, with the most aggravated circumstances of diabolical cruelty, and few survived to describe the horrors that had been perpetrated by these misguided and infuriated savages.

"The unexpected departure of Mr. Scott from Nungklow for Churra Poonjee, saved him from the dreadful fate which befel his valued friends, and faithful followers, and some days had elapsed before he was made acquainted with the afflicting reality. Troops were immediately called up from Sylhet and Assam to avenge the atrocious murders which had been committed, and a harassing warfare commenced, in which the lives of many most valuable officers were sacrificed, and which continued to be waged up to a very recent period. The Cossyas, conscious that they had violated every pledge which even savages are accustomed to regard with superstitious reverence, viewed with suspicion every pacific overture; and despairing of pardon, protracted a contest, which their first skirmishes with our troops proved to be hopeless.

"Captain Lister, commanding the Sylhet Light Infantry, with a mere handful of men, drove the Cossyas from post to post, stormed their intrenchments, penetrated into their caves and fastnesses, and by the rapidity of his movements, and the boldness of his assaults, so completely destroyed the confidence in their own prowess with which they had commenced the contest, that they latterly confined themselves to attacks upon small parties of five or six individuals, for whom they lay in ambush, and rarely ventured to contend openly with any detachment, however inferior to them in numbers.

"On the night of the 5th of January 1831, a most serious assault was made by the chiefs of Ramryee (one of the Cossya States, which overlooks the Assam Valley), and a party of Garrows, amounting altogether to about 200 men, on the people of Pantan, Bogace, and Bongaung, three Dowars in the plains. Zubbur Sing, the chief of

#### Outbreak of 1831.

Ramryee, had tendered his submission to the British Government in October 1829, and was murdered in November of the following year, by his kinsmen Nyehan Koonwur and Lall Chund, who were supposed to have instigated this outrage on the British territory. It has always been doubtful whether the murder of Zubbur Sing was the consequence of dissatisfaction at his submission to an authority which they disliked, or was the result of a conspiracy to usurp his authority; but Mr. Scott, in a letter of the 17th January, written very shortly after he had received intelligence of the outrage, gives a brief sketch of the relations of the British authorities with the occupants of the several southern Dowars, which accounts in some degree for an attack, the most serious that had taken place since the catastrophe at Nungklow in 1829.

"The estates in question,' says Mr. Scott, 'were under attachment; the first, in consequence of the part which the Rajah had taken against us in the hills, and the two latter, for the recovery of

arrears of revenue; and there is every reason to think, that the irruption of the mountaineers was favoured and connived at by the local authorities, most of whom are necessarily ill affected towards our Government, owing to the strict control now exercised over them, and to the deprivation of the illicit emoluments they used to derive from fines from criminals, and other illegal cesses, which they were in the habit of levying under the Assam Government.'

" 'The treacherous and refractory disposition of the people of the Dowars was frequently evinced during the Assam Government, and petty revolutions attended with the murder of rival chiefs and their adherents, was matter of frequent occurrence. Such acts the Assamese were latterly under the necessity of tolerating; and practically speaking, at the time of our accession to the government of the country, the chiefs of the Dowars exercised criminal jurisdiction, and made war upon each other with perfect impunity, or at the worst, subject to the payment, for forgiveness, of a fine.'

" 'As it was impossible to tolerate such proceedings under our Government, and as it clearly appeared that the chiefs of the Dowars possessed no legitimate independent authority in the plains, they were subjected, like other Assamese subjects, to the ordinary laws; but in order to conciliate them as far as practicable, and to ensure to them the observance of the peculiar customs of the tract in question, a separate court was established, composed of the chiefs themselves, and a few of their principal local functionaries, before which all civil and criminal cases have hitherto been tried.'

" 'Under the Assam Government, the estates forming the Dowars had not paid any regular annual revenue, but large sums were exacted on the accession of a new chief, and raised by contribution on the people, and they were bound to furnish *poiyks* for the public service. This arrangement was commuted for a money payment; a few working *poiyks* only being retained for local purposes; but although the revenue was fixed at a very low rate, and abatements made in favour of the chiefs, in some cases amounting to nearly 50 per cent. upon the *jumma*, few of them have been able to fulfil their engagements, owing chiefly to their total incapacity for business, and the roguery of their servants, under which circumstances, the temporary attachment of several of their estates became indispensable, and it has probably in some degree led to the recent catastrophe.'

" 'Under the above circumstances,' adds Mr. Scott, 'I am of opinion that the only course that can be advantageously pursued is that of reducing to practical subjection the tribes bordering on the Dowars, who have perpetrated the late outrages, and who are at present independent of our authority; and establishing amongst them the same sort of internal Government which has been maintained amongst the Garrows of the north-east parts of Lungpoor since the year 1817.'

" A reward was offered for the apprehension of Lall Chund, the leader of the attack on the Dowars, but apparently without effect, as it was not until September of 1833 that he voluntarily surrendered

himself to the native officer in charge of the post at Nungklow, and of his subsequent fate there appears to be no trace. A heavy fine of Rs. 5,000 was imposed upon the eight villages composing the State of Ramryee, and Rs. 10,000 on the chiefs of six other States who were associated in the attack on the Dowars, making altogether a sum only equivalent to the estimated amount of loss incurred by the inhabitants of the plundered villages.

"A very few days after the attack on the Dowars in Assam, the border villages near Kanta Kal, in the Sylhet District, were invaded by a party of the same inveterate tribe, headed by Munboot, and some other less celebrated leaders of the petty States on the western confines of the Cossya territory. They were pursued and defeated by Captain Lister, and this appears to have been the last attempt made upon the settlements in the plains, though the unequal contest was still partially waged in the hills by a small band headed by Munboot.

"This, the most daring and successful leader among the Cossyas, and whose unconquerable spirit tended to perpetuate a contest from which almost every other had withdrawn in despair, was originally a slave to the Rajah Teerut Sing, but had risen by the force of innate courage and great personal prowess to considerable distinction amongst his comrades; and though frequently defeated, as constantly renewed the contest in some spot far removed from the scene of his recent disaster; with inconceivable rapidity he traversed his native mountains in every direction, wherever there appeared a probability of inflicting injury on his powerful foes; descending, as we have seen, even to the border villages in the plains, where his very name struck terror to the hearts of their timid inhabitants.

"He was opposed, however, to men of courage and perseverance fully equal to his own; and the names of Lister, Townsend, Vetch, and Brodie became so formidable to his followers, that seeing the hopelessness of his cause, they gradually deserted their leader, and left him to the destiny which appeared inevitable. In a quarrel with one of the followers of Teerut Sing, his immediate chieftain, he either killed or severely wounded him; and dreading that Teerut Sing would punish him with death, sought an asylum in the remote villages of his countrymen; but having at length obtained a promise that his life should be spared, he surrendered himself in October 1832 to Lieutenant Townsend, then commanding at Nungklow.

"The conspicuous gallantry which he had displayed on every occasion naturally excited a more than ordinary interest on his behalf in the minds of his generous opponents, and he was entrusted with the command of a small detachment of Cossyas, and received a monthly stipend for his subsistence. Secure of life, and raised to a situation of comparative affluence, the quondam patriot immediately commenced rendering his position subservient to his pecuniary advantage; and having been convicted of numerous acts of oppression, and of levying heavy



fines on his countrymen in the name of the Government, he was discharged two years afterwards, and appears to have again fallen to the degraded and menial condition which he originally occupied.

“Teerut Sing, the principal culprit, for whose apprehension large rewards had been offered, still eluded the pursuit of justice, and found a temporary asylum among the different chieftains, whose feelings of honour prevented their surrendering him to the British Government; but his situation becoming daily more precarious, as they tendered their submission, he was at length compelled to treat for his surrender through Sing Manick, the Rajah of Kyrim.

“On the 19th of September 1832, Captain Lister and Lieutenant Rutherford, with a party of 30 sepoy, were deputed by Mr. T. C. Robertson, the Governor General's Agent, to Nongkreem, the residence of Sing Manick, for the purpose of negotiating for the surrender of Teerut Sing; the latter, still apprehensive that treachery was intended, refused to meet the officers, except at the residence of Sing Manick, and with the stipulation that they should go unarmed.

“On the 23rd an interview, at which Teerut Sing was present, took place, but without producing any effect, as the only proposition he made contained a requisition for the restoration of his country, and the abandonment of the line of road which had been cleared through it; neither of which could of course be granted. On the 24th, as the deputies were about to return to Charra, Sing Manick begged that they would grant another audience to two of Teerut Sing's principal Muntrees, Man Sing and Jeet Roy, which was conceded. From Man Sing they learnt ‘that they were tired of opposing us, but that their fears of our wrath, the despair of some of the most hot-headed among them, and exaggerated ideas of our implacable enmity, kept up by the Churra and other interested parties, deterred them from coming in.’

“Although no definite arrangement was made for the surrender of Teerut Sing, the interview was not unattended with advantages: the most prominent of which were thus stated by the officer who had been deputed to treat with the disaffected parties.

1st. “They were satisfied that Manick Sing was sincere in his intentions of effecting an amicable arrangement, and that he was deserving of confidence and encouragement.

2nd. “That although it would not be advisable to place much reliance on Teerut Sing, yet that an arrangement might be entered into for a peaceable adjustment of differences with his followers.

3rd. “That a schism would be effected amongst them, after witnessing our good faith, and finding that we were not so implacable as they had been led to suppose.

4th. “That should hostilities be renewed, the interview had afforded an opportunity of observing, and again recognizing the countenances of Teerut's followers.

5th. "They had ascertained that the rebels were enabled to continue their opposition by the people of Churra and other avowedly friendly States, from whom they obtained supplies."

"Subsequently to the interview on the 24th of September, several communications had taken place between Mr. Robertson and Sing Manick, the result of which was a second deputation of the same officers to Nongkreem, on the 20th of the following month, with permission to treat on the following terms:—

1st. "Teerut Sing to be given up, on an assurance that his life would be spared; but with no other condition whatever, and to be dealt with as the Government might direct.

2nd. "In the event of his being so given up, the confederate Rajahs were authorized, in conformity with the customs and usages of their tribe, to select a person to occupy his place, and a promise given, that the election would be sanctioned by the British Government, and the person selected be confirmed in all the possessions and privileges formerly enjoyed by Teerut Sing, subject only to such modifications as might be subsequently noticed.

"To all of the other chieftains full amnesty was offered on the following conditions: First—"That the British Government shall have a right to carry a road, in whatsoever direction it may think proper, across the whole extent of country lying between Churra and the plains of Assam.

Secondly.—"That the British Government shall be at liberty to construct bridges, and to erect halting bungalows, stockades, guardrooms or store-houses, at any point along this line of road." To render this condition less objectionable, the deputies were authorized to promise, if necessary, that no building should be erected at a greater distance than a hundred yards from the line of road.

Thirdly.—"That each chieftain shall engage to furnish as many workmen as shall be required, on their receiving the usual remuneration for their labour, to assist in the completion and keeping in repair of the road, and other works, above detailed.

Fourthly.—"That the posts of Myrung and Nungklow, with an extent of territory of not less than — cross or miles (the exact limits of which are to be fixed hereafter, and accurately marked out) shall be ceded in absolute sovereignty to the British Government.

Fifthly.—"That the chieftains shall engage to furnish, on being paid for the same, the undermentioned articles for the use of any establishment which Government may set on foot, either at Nungklow or Myrung: timber, stone, slate, and lime, for building.

Sixthly.—"That in consideration of no revenue or tribute being exacted of them, the chieftains shall engage to furnish grazing land for as many cattle as Government may deem it necessary to keep on the hills, and for which it may be impossible to find pasturage within the

limits laid down in the fourth article. The chieftains are severally to be responsible for the proper care of such cattle, as may be sent to graze on their lands.

Seventhly.—“The chieftains shall engage to arrest, and hand over to the British authorities, any person accused of committing an offence within the limits of the posts of Myrung and Nungklow; and to assist in apprehending any convict or other person who shall abscond from either of these posts.

Eighthly.—“The chieftains shall engage to pay such fine as may be imposed upon them by the Governor General's Agent for any breach of the preceding conditions of which they may be convicted.

Ninthly.—“In the event of their acceding to the preceding terms, the chieftains are to be at liberty to return to, and re-occupy, their respective villages; and to exercise over the inhabitants of the same, whatever authority belonged to them, according to the established practice of the country, before they placed themselves in a state of hostility towards the British Government.”

“As an additional motive for accepting these terms, the deputies were authorized to promise that the Agent's influence should be exerted, in case of their compliance, to obtain from Government restitution of all the lands formerly held by them in the valley of Assam; and, in the event of failing to effect a pacific negotiation, Captains Lister and Rutherford were instructed to direct an immediate cessation of intercourse on the part of those chiefs who professed to be friendly with those whose contumacy it would be necessary to punish by a renewal of hostilities.

“This negociation, like the former one, failed to produce any beneficial result. Teerut Sing's illness was alleged in excuse for his non-attendance; but our officers had every reason for believing this to be a fabrication, and they were only met by chieftains of inferior note. Objections to the different articles of the proposed treaty were made; and to the most important one, which stipulated for the surrender of Teerut Sing, it appeared certain they would never subscribe. On this occasion it was that the chiefs, in justification of the catastrophe at Nungklow in 1829, mentioned the insolent tone and oppressive conduct of the inferior officers and servants belonging to our establishment at that time, and which, if not strictly guarded against, would, in the opinions of Captains Lister and Rutherford, inevitably create fresh cause of disturbance. Unable to effect any satisfactory arrangement, our officers returned to Churra, and a renewal of hostilities appeared inevitable.

“Before the expiration of the period for which a truce had been granted, Sing Manick again waited on Mr. Robertson, at Churra Poonjee, accompanied by Jeedur Sing, a relation of the fugitive Rajah Teerut, and one of the most influential persons among them, who had been actively opposed to our authority. In the interview which took place on the 25th of October, the principal object of Jeedur Sing

appeared to be the attainment of the Raj, forfeited by the misconduct of Teerut Sing, to which he affirmed the latter had consented, on the ground, that 'he had virtually ceased to live, from the moment that Mr. Scott's existence was terminated.' Large as was the prize at stake, Jeedur Sing steadily refused to purchase it by the surrender of Teerut, or the payment of an annual revenue, levied upon those villages in the hills over which his sway might be established; the one act would have effectually destroyed his popularity with the inferior members of his clan, and to taxation, he said, they would never submit.

"On the following day, the conference was renewed, when the friendly negociator, Sing Manick, denounced Rajah Bur Manick, Dewan Sing Dobashee and Ojee Kconwur, both of Churra and Oolung, a servant of the Rajah of Jynteeah, as the secret fomenters of the existing quarrel, from an apprehension that the surrender of Teerut Sing would be followed by a disclosure of the treacherous part they had been acting. This conference terminated with an assurance of protection to Jeedur Sing, if he accepted of Mamloo and its dependencies, on a tribute of Rs. 1,500 annually. He was allowed a further period of ten days for the purpose of going back to negotiate with the other members of his party; and he announced his intention of either returning with them or sharing the dangers to which their continued hostility might expose them.

"At the expiration of the ten days, nothing further having been heard from the party, measures were immediately taken for coercing the refractory chieftains, and instructions were issued by the Governor General's Agent, Mr. Robertson, to Captain Lister, in which he was desired to respect the territory of Sing Manick, whose conduct had lately evinced so friendly a spirit; but he was directed, if necessary, to apprehend the neighbouring chief Bur Manick, who, there was every reason to believe, had not only originally counselled the atrocious massacre at Nungklow, but had ever since secretly fomented the spirit of disaffection. Measures were adopted for opening a friendly communication with the chiefs of Mahran and Dwara (from whom petitions to that effect had been received), on the western frontier of the Cossya territory; and to enable such detachments as might be stationed along the foot of the hills to co-operate with the parties acting against the insurgents above.

"The consequences of this comprehensive and vigorous policy were very soon apparent. Teerut Sing, hemmed in on every side and unable longer to elude the vigilance of his pursuers, renewed his overtures for surrender; and on the 9th of January 1833 deputed Jeet Roy, his confidential Muntree, to treat with Mr. Inglis, who commanded the post of Oomchillung. The only condition required was, that the life of his master should be spared, and this having been promised, and ratified by the Khasia oath, of eating salt from the blade of a sabre, the 13th was the day finally determined upon for his surrender; the place to be named two hours before meeting, and Teerut Sing and Mr. Inglis to be each attended by only two unarmed servants.

"On the day appointed, the Rajah Teerut Sing met Mr. Inglis at Nursingare, a mile east of Oomchilling; but instead of the unarmed attendants, which by the terms of the agreement were the only persons who should have accompanied him, he was escorted by a party of 30 bow and spear men, with 11 musqueteers. This was complained of by Mr. Inglis as a breach of the agreement, but he was assured by Teerut Sing's wily counsellor, that it would not have been respectful in his master to come attended by a smaller retinue, and was necessary to convince the people that he had not been made captive, but had voluntarily surrendered. Mr. Inglis, to allay the suspicions of the Rajah, at his request, repeated the ceremonial form of oath he had before taken, and Teerut Sing was conveyed to Myrung, from whence he was taken to Gowhattee in Assam, and eventually confined in the jail of Dacca, where he remains a State prisoner for life.

"The submission of Teerut Sing was almost immediately followed by a general pacification; the other chiefs had, with few exceptions, previously adopted the sagacious policy of withdrawing from an unprosperous cause, and the few who had supported him were glad to avail themselves of the opportunity afforded by his surrender to throw themselves on the clemency of the paramount power.

"As, however, there had been a marked difference in the conduct of the various chieftains, it became necessary to distinguish those who had been friendly from the guilty participators in the crimes of Teerut Sing. To have inflicted capital punishment upon the culprits, would have involved nearly all the principal leaders of the different clans in one common execution, which, though perhaps demanded by inflexible justice, was repugnant to the considerate mercy of a Government more anxious to reclaim than destroy.

"The more humane and hardly less effectual measure was adopted of subjecting all those who were proved to have participated in the murders and plunderings which had been perpetrated, both on our subjects in the hills and the villages in the plains, to the payment of pecuniary fines; this description of punishment was sanctioned by immemorial usage amongst themselves, and from it, a fund, it was anticipated, would accrue, which could be devoted to the improvement of the country, in the construction of roads, bridges, and other works of public utility. Subject to the previous sanction of the Government, this plan has been adopted with the best effects, and individual crime has been made an instrument of public benefit.

"Though grossly outraged by the wanton murder of its servants and subjects, the policy of the Government had been uniformly dictated by a wish to conciliate the misguided inhabitants of these hills; and the great obstacle to its accomplishment having been removed by the surrender of Teerut Sing, measures were shortly afterwards adopted for restoring the district of Nungklow to some member of the same family, who was undefiled by participation in the massacre of 1829.

"Rujun Sing, the nephew of Teerut Sing, a lad of between 13 and 14 years of age, fulfilling this condition, and being the heir apparent, according to the established Cossya law of succession, it was determined to confer the dignity upon him, and he was installed by Captain Jenkins, the Agent to the Governor General at Nungklow, on the 29th of March 1834, on the following conditions, which had been previously prepared and submitted for the approval of Government by Mr. T. C. Robertson, the preceding Agent :

1st. "That the British Government shall have a right to carry a road in whatsoever direction it may think proper across the whole extent of country lying between Sylhet and the plains of Assam.

2nd. "That the Government shall be at liberty to construct bridges, and to erect halting bungalows, stockades, guard-rooms, or store-houses, at any point along the line of road.

3rd. "That the Rajah and his Muntrees shall engage to furnish as many workmen as shall be required to assist in the completion, and keeping in repair, of roads and other works, above detailed.

4th. "That the Rajah and his Muntrees shall engage to furnish, on being paid for the same, the undermentioned articles for the use of any establishment, which Government set on foot at any place within the country ceded to him: timber, stone, lime, fire-wood for building, and such other articles as may be procurable in the country.

5th. "That the Rajah and his Muntrees shall engage to furnish grazing land for as many cattle as Government may deem it necessary to keep on the hills. The Rajah and his Muntrees to be responsible for the proper care of such cattle as may be sent to graze on their lands.

6th. "The Rajah and his Muntrees shall engage to arrest and hand over to the British authorities any person accused of committing an offence within the limits of any British post, and to assist in apprehending any convict or other person who shall abscond from any of these posts.

7th. "The Rajah and his Muntrees shall engage to pay such fines as may be imposed upon them by the Governor General's Agent for any breach of the preceding conditions of which they may be convicted."

To these articles, which had been prepared by Mr. Robertson, the following was added by Captain Jenkins :—

8th. "On condition of Rujun Sing agreeing to and fulfilling the several articles already stated, the Government promises to continue his stipend of Rs. 30 sicca per month for one year after the date of this agreement, which will tend to settle his country in a quiet and comfortable manner; the above Rs. 30 being given him for his support."

These conditions were signed on behalf of Rujun Sing by eight of his principal counsellors, and Nungklow has ever since remained under his authority.

“Of the remaining chieftains, who contribute to the formation of the confederated Cossya States, the only authentic account, at present obtainable, is found in an official report from Mr. T. C. Robertson to Government, dated the 14th of December 1832, where the principal amongst them are said to amount to seven, and are thus described.

“‘Sing Manick, the ruler of the country of Kyrim, is one of the most powerful, and apparently the most friendly of these mountain chiefs. He has lately done his utmost to effect an accommodation between us and the hostile party, and is perhaps the only man of influence connected with the hills (excepting the ruler of Churra), against whom there is not clear evidence of participation in the massacre at Nungklow. Circumstances enable him to exercise an authority by far more despotic than is enjoyed by most of the Cossya Rajahs, who generally have a council, without whose sanction no business of importance is undertaken. A feud of long standing between Sing Manick and the Rajah of Jynteeah renders it of importance to the former to obtain our countenance; but the immediate objects at which he aims are the possession of a rich village, called Sooparpoonjee, lying between Churra and the plains, and the recovery of Moosae, a strongly situated village, placed by Mr. Scott under the charge of the Rajah of Jynteeah, in consequence of some hostile chiefs having, though without Sing Manick’s privacy, taken refuge in it. The armed force at this chieftain’s command must be nearly commensurate with the adult male population of his domain, and that I have no means of very accurately computing. That he is friendly in his disposition towards us I have already said; but it would be a mere delusion to expect any active co-operation from him, excepting, perhaps, in the case of our wishing to put down his neighbour of Jynteeah.’ The number of villages subject to his authority is said to be seventy, his armed followers to about 3,000 men, and he pays no contribution to Government.

“‘Bordering upon Sing Manick’s domain and forming a part of the Province of Kyrim, stands that of Bur Manick. A large, and from what I saw of it near Moleem, I should say, for the hills, a fertile tract of this territory was reserved to the Government, when Bur Manick, after having been carried as a prisoner to the plains, was restored by Mr. Scott to a portion of his former possessions. The disposition of this chieftain is decidedly hostile, and I reckon upon it as probable that we shall soon have to treat him as a foe.’ Twenty-eight villages acknowledge subjection to this chieftain, and his armed followers amount to between four and five hundred. He pays no contribution to Government, and lately compounded for a fine of Rs. 5,000 levied upon him by Mr. Scott, by agreeing to pay Rs. 1,000 immediately, and constructing for the remainder a good road from Churra, *via* Moleem, to Myrung.

“ ‘The Rajah of Churra, with whom Mr. Scott treated, has long been dead, and his sister’s son, Churra.

Soobha Sing, according to the Cossya law of succession, now occupies his place. It is difficult for one in the habit of seeing this little chief, inferior as he is in appearance to many a menial, to elevate him to the dignity of an ally of Government. As such, however, he has been, and is still recognized. The disposition of the Rajah and his councillors may be called friendly, because they know our power, and fear to provoke us, and are so sensible of the benefit of a connection with us, that they are anxious to debar all others from sharing in it. Their conduct, however, has, on one or two recent occasions, been so equivocal, that I should not feel much surprised at their ere long striking, by some folly of their own, their chieftain’s name out of a catalogue, in which it is so much their advantage that it should continue.’ Twenty-five villages are dependent upon Churra, whose population is estimated at 30,000 souls, of whom 2,000 may be assembled as armed followers. Nothing is contributed by this petty State to the Government.

“Omeer Sing, of Nurtung, is the next on the list. Of this chieftain, Mr. Robertson says—“he Nurtung.

has large possessions in the direction of Goalparah, where he, last year (1831), made an inroad, in consequence of which several of his villages on that frontier were taken from him and annexed to our dominions. But little is known of the state of the interior of his domain.

“The Kala Rajah of Nuspung, to whom about 20 villages are subject; the Oolar Rajah of Nuspung, Muriow, and Murram.

Muriow, whose sway extends over twenty-five, and the Omrap Rajah of Murram, who has twenty-four villages, are the only other chieftains meriting particular notice, and of these, little more than the sites they severally occupy appears to be known.

“ ‘Among the many peculiarities’ (says Mr. Robertson) “ ‘apparent

Constitution of the Khasi States. in the form of society and government, existing among the Cossyas,

the absence of any recognized organ of supreme power is very remarkable. The nation or horde presents the appearance of a congregation of little Oligarchical Republics, subject to no common superior, yet of which each member is amenable, in some degree, to the control of his confederates. It was, he adds, to an oversight as to this feature of their political system that the massacre at Nungklow may perhaps be traced, since Teerut Sing seems to have been merely an instrument on that occasion, of executing the will of the confederates, who were displeased ‘at a treaty which he had without their sanction entered into.’ A treaty in this case was, in my opinion, a superfluous formality; for such were the aggressions annually committed by the Cossyas, on the districts of Sylhet and Assam, that the British



Government, when possessed of both of these countries, became entitled to take possession of the hills as a measure of retaliation, and the only means of securing their subjects on the plains from molestation.

'In alluding to the subject of tribute, Mr. Robertson adds— "It may be as well to observe that the revenue of the hill chieftains appears to arise from duties on bazars in the plains, on the borders of their territory, from fines imposed for offences, and in some parts from offerings of various articles of consumption. As an example, I may mention that I am informed by a native officer, who was at Nungkloom during the late conferences, that while he was there, Sing Manick imposed a fine of Rs. 300 on one of his subjects for speaking disrespectfully of one of his female relatives.'

"All opposition having been at length overcome, and the principal chieftains having tendered their submission to the British Government, it was resolved to place the whole mountain tract under the superintendence of the officer, whose skill and gallantry had so largely contributed to its pacification; and Captain Lister was shortly afterwards appointed Political Agent for Cossya affairs, over which he exercises a general control. The judicial customs, which prevailed among the tribe, previous to the establishment of our supremacy, continue to be observed with such occasional modifications, as experience proves necessary to temper the sanguinary nature of their penal enactments; and there is now reason to hope that the tranquillity they at present enjoy will be productive of a more extended intercourse with the inhabitants of the plains than has hitherto been practicable; and that conscious of the advantages to be derived from so intimate an association with superior civilization and wealth, the Khasia will carefully avoid the commission of any act likely to interrupt the existing harmony.

"That they can yet view us with any but feelings of apprehensive jealousy, is most improbable; and the lamentable catastrophe at Nungkloom clearly shows that they are subject to sudden ebullitions of feeling against which it will always be necessary to be prepared; and that the most prompt and energetic measures, in checking any future exhibition of a refractory and hostile spirit, will be no less necessary than a mild and conciliatory policy to those who are more amicably disposed.

"One of the most important objects contemplated by Mr.

Description of the Hills and Plateau. Scott in establishing a post at

Nungkloom was the acquisition of a salubrious spot, to which the European inhabitants of the plains might occasionally resort for the renovation of health, and the eventual establishment of sanatory depôts for invalid soldiers. His own experience, derived from a residence of some duration, on the lofty table-land of these hills, in the cold weather of 1826, appeared to confirm the favourable reports that had been made upon it; and the most extensive schemes were rapidly formed for the improvement of this hygiean land of promise, and the civilization of its wild and independent tribes.

"The tract of country, in which the various scenes that have been described were enacted, forms an irregular parallelogram, the length of which, from north to south, may be assumed at about 70 miles, and its average breadth at 50, giving an area of about 3,500 square miles: on the north, it is bounded by the plains of Assam; on the south, by those of Sylhet; on the west by the Garrows; and on the east, by the central portion of Kachar. This area consists of three portions of unequal breadth and diversified character: the first or most northern is a closely wooded tract, rising from the Assam Valley, and stretching by a succession of gentle undulations for 20 miles, to the heights on which stands the village of Mopea, 2,746 feet above the sea, and from which, the northern crest of the more elevated central plateau is seen, resting at an elevation of between four and five thousand feet above the same level.

"From Nungklow, which stands on the edge of the northern crest, to Moosmye, which is similarly situated on the southern verge of this elevated region, the direct distance is about 35 miles: and it is within these limits that the region is included, whose salubrity has been so much extolled by its friends, and so much questioned by its opponents.

"Between Moosmye and Tara Ghaut, at the foot of the hills, a distance of about seven miles, is comprised the third division of this mountain tract, which consists of the steep face of the range, and like that on the Assam side, is densely wooded, and at certain seasons of the year, highly insalubrious. Viewed from the country below, it appears to spring almost perpendicularly from the plains to an elevation of five thousand feet; in some places, deep chasms are seen penetrating far into its massive flanks, forming the natural channels of numerous torrents, which reach the open country by a succession of rapids and falls, over rocky beds, of considerable depth. In other spots, during the cold and dry seasons of the year, the sites of numerous cataracts are marked by a thin silvery line, extending in some instances from the very crest of the elevated central plateau, nearly one-fourth down the perpendicular face of the ascent; and in the rains these attenuated and glittering lines become foaming cataracts, which pour a vast column of water over the rocky ledges of the table-land. The one most celebrated is situated near the village of Moosmye, where there is an unbroken perpendicular descent of one thousand feet, through which the column of water is precipitated, upon the rocky masses below.

"The groves or plantations, from which the whole of Bengal is supplied with oranges, occupy a belt of from one to two miles in breadth, at the sloping base of the mountains, and in a soil formed of the detritus of the limestone, which constitutes the principal rock on this side of the range; limes and pine-apples, the jack-fruit and mangoes, betul-nut and plantains also grow luxuriantly, to an elevation of nearly 2,000 feet above the plains, when the character of the products indicates a change, from a tropical to a more temperate region; and the wild raspberry and strawberry are detected, on the borders of the numerous small springs, which issue from fissures in the rocks.

"Throughout the whole of this ascent, from the base of the mountain to the crest of the table-land, the most luxuriant vegetation is seen ; and the road, by which the more elevated regions are attained, has been so much improved, that the whole distance from Teerea Ghaut to Moosmye may now be traversed on horseback with perfect safety. The country at the foot of the ascent is during the rainy season almost entirely inundated and remarkably unhealthy ; but even at an elevation of about 1,300 feet, this character of insalubrity ceases to exist, and the inhabitants of Soopar Poonjee appear to be altogether exempt from the diseases, which prevail in the country immediately below them.

"On the Assam side, the inferior hilly tract, which unites the lofty table-land and the plains, is covered with dense jungle, as far as the village of Oongswye, where it becomes more scanty, and is succeeded by a more open tract, in which the fir begins to appear, extending from the village of Mopea to the Sari or Bor Panee, which rushes over its granitic bed, at the foot of the ascent, leading up to Nungklow, on the northern crest of the central plateau. This tract, extending from Ranagaon to Mopea, is so decidedly insalubrious, that it can only be traversed with safety between the months of November and March ; and this, which, from a very early period, was fatally manifested, almost entirely neutralized the advantages anticipated by the residents of Assam, from the vicinity of so elevated and temperate a region.

"The superior facility of access, and the shorter distance from the plains to the table-land, where alone health was to be obtained, soon marked the southern side of the range, as the one best adapted for the object in view ; and Nungklow ceased to be considered more than a convenient intermediate post, for those, who, anxious to escape the evils of a protracted residence in Assam, were proceeding in search of health to Churra or Myrung.

"The central tract, which for want of a more appropriate word has been called "table-land," is very imperfectly described by such a designation ; for though unmarked by any very lofty elevations, still it is so much undulated, and diversified, by numerous hillocks and knolls, valleys and chasms, that it resembles much more strongly the troubled surface of the ocean, than the flat extended plateau indicated by the term "table-land," but which, for want of a better, we shall probably still continue to use.

"Within the limits which have been examined from Nungklow to Moosmye, and from the road through Jaintiah, to the domains on the west, of the Oomap and Oolar Rajahs, the elevation of this lofty region appears to vary from four to six thousand feet above the sea ; which would give an annual mean temperature of from 59° to 65° of Fahrenheit, or from 19° to 13° lower than that of Calcutta, which is nearly 78°. At such an elevation, and with such a temperature, the change, from a residence in the plains, to one on the hills is,

during the hot and cold seasons of the year, the most delightful it is possible to conceive. In the month of May, when the exhausted inhabitants of Calcutta were panting under a temperature which fluctuated from 90° to 100°, the parties which were pursuing the Cossyas, over this elevated region, found woollen clothing essential to comfort, and fires were almost invariably kindled at night, with the same object. During the rains, the climate, from excessive moisture, has been considered far less salubrious than was anticipated, from an experience of its effects at other seasons of the year : but I am inclined to think, that a conclusion so completely at variance with the opinions of men unquestionable talent and observation, has been deduced from imperfect data ; and that a judgment condemnatory of the whole tract has been pronounced from a few observations made at Cherra Poonjee, situated almost on the southern verge of the table-land, and peculiarly exposed, from this circumstance, to the unmitigated severity of the south-west monsoon.”(1)

At the present day the Government recognizes twenty-five petty States in the Khasi Hills, fifteen of the first class presided over by “Siems”\* who, though taken always from one family, are chosen by popular election ; one confederacy under elected officers styled Wahadadars ; five under Sirdars ; and four under Lyngdohs, both of

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\* The native title was first officially recognised in 1867—cf. Political Proceedings, March 1867, No 14.

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(1) The following are the principal references to the earlier records for the period treated by Pemberton :—

Secret Proceedings,	5th September	1828, Nos. 11-14.
Secret Proceedings,	20th June	1829, No. 2.
Territorial Cons.,	14th April	1829, Nos. 27-28.
Political Proceedings,	7th May	1830, Nos. 49-50.
Political Proceedings,	18th June	1830, No. 52.
Political Proceedings,	11th February	1831, Nos. 26-32.
Political Proceedings,	25th February	1831, No. 39.
Political Proceedings,	22nd October	1832, Nos. 60-61.
Political Proceedings,	3rd December	1832, Nos. 100-101.
Political Proceedings,	5th November	1832, Nos. 56-58.
Political Proceedings,	12th February	1833, Nos. 24-28.
Political Proceedings,	30th March	1833, No. 110.
Political Proceedings,	13th June	1833, Nos. 83-84.
Political Proceedings,	5th September	1833, Nos. 71-72.
Political Proceedings,	10th September	1833, Nos. 3-6.
Political Proceedings,	12th December	1833, Nos. 85-93.
Political Proceedings,	10th April	1834, Nos. 135-138.
Political Proceedings,	8th May	1834, Nos. 61-76.
Political Proceedings,	14th August	1834, No. 79.
Political Proceedings,	30th October	1834, Nos. 25-27.
Revenue Proceedings,	7th March	1835, No. 110.
Revenue Proceedings,	14th July	1835, Nos. 6-10.

which classes of offices are entirely elective. The names of the States as now settled are these :—

*A.—Under Siems.*

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|--------------------------|---------------------|
| 1. Bhawál, or Warbah ;   | 8. Máoióng ;        |
| 2. Cherra, or Sohrah ;   | 9. Máo-syn-rám ;    |
| 3. Khyrim, or Nongkrem ; | 10. Myllem ;        |
| 4. Lyngkin, or Langrin ; | 11. Nong-soh-phoh ; |
| 5. Malái-Soh-Mat ;       | 12. Nongkláo ;      |
| 6. Maháram ;             | 13. Nongspung ;     |
| 7. Máriao ;              | 14. Nongstain ;     |
| 15. Rámbrái.             |                     |

*B.—Under Wahadars (4 in number).*

1. Shellá.

*C.—Under Sirdars.*

- |                         |              |
|-------------------------|--------------|
| 1. Dwára Nong-tyr-men ; | 3. Máolong ; |
| 2. Jirang ;             | 4. Máodon ;  |
| 5. Nonglong.            |              |

*D.—Under Lyngdohs.*

- |               |                 |
|---------------|-----------------|
| 1. Lynióng ;  | 3. Nong-lywái ; |
| 2. Máoflang ; | 4. Sohíong.     |

The constitution of the States is democratic, the chiefs being in no sense territorial sovereigns, but merely elected heads of village confederacies. The appointment of the chiefs and headmen is in every instance subject to the confirmation of the Government, which reserves to itself the right of removing them in case of oppression and misconduct. The States of Cherra, Khyrim, Nongstain, Lyngkin, and Nongspung were originally classed as semi-independent, having always been friendly or never having been actually coerced by a British force. In practice, however, no important distinction has been recognised between their position and that of the dependent States.\* Up to the year 1858 it was the custom to report to the Government of India only the succession to the State of Cherra. In that year it was arranged that successions to the five semi-independent States and the four principal dependent communities (Myllem, Maharam, Mariaio, and Nongklao) should be reported for confirmation. This was the practice until 1878 when it was decided that the sunnuds<sup>(1)</sup> of succession should in all cases be granted by the Chief Commissioner of Assam. The form of sunnud prescribed in 1878 binds the chief to be subject to the orders and control of the

\* The Nongstain Chief in 1861 asked to be treated as entirely subject and to receive by sunnud the title of Rajah Bahadur. (*Political Proceedings, February 1861, Nos. 86-88, April 1861, No. 12, May 1861, Nos. 28-30.*)

(<sup>1</sup>) *Political Proceedings, (India) May 1878, Nos. 60-68.*

Deputy Commissioner of the District, who will decide any dispute between the chief and the chief of any other State. It empowers the chief to adjudicate and decide all civil cases and all criminal offences, except those punishable under the Indian Penal Code with death, transportation, or imprisonment for five years and upwards, which may arise within the limits of the State and in which only subjects of the State are concerned. Cases excepted as above and cases concerning subjects of other States are to be referred for the orders of the Deputy Commissioner. The Government of India is declared at liberty to occupy rent-free lands required for sanitarium, cantonments and posts. The right of Government is recognized in all lime, coal, and other mines, metals and minerals, in all wild elephants, and waste lands subject to payment of half profits to the chief.<sup>(1)</sup> The chief is bound not to mortgage State property: and is to set apart reserved areas for forests as Government may require. He is declared liable to punishment at the pleasure of Government for violation of the conditions of his sunnud, using any oppression, or acting contrary to established custom.

In 1853 the results of our occupation of the Khasia and Jaintia Hills were thus summarized:—The simple character of the Khasias had to some extent become corrupted by civilization and increased wealth; civil wars which continually distracted the country in old times had been put down; trade had been augmented; an increasing demand for hill products had set in; the condition of the people, materially, had vastly improved; education had taken a start; while we had also reaped the benefits of our position in having obtained an entire cessation of the murderous inroads which these mountaineers constantly made into the plains, murdering our subjects and pillaging our villages.

Since that date the trade of the hills has gone on increasing; the Khasias have become altogether reconciled to our rule, and the district is now one of the last in which Government would expect to hear of any outbreak or disturbance beyond the management of the local police.

It will be remembered that when the Rajah of Jaintia was deprived of his possessions on the plains, he preferred to give up entirely the tract in the hills which was nominally subject to him, and to become a pensioner of Government. This hill tract contained nineteen petty districts, fifteen of which were each under a Dolloie or headman elected by the villagers; the other four being managed by thirteen hereditary Sirdars.

The only tribute derived by the Jaintia Rajah from the hills was one he-goat from each village, with a few seers of parched rice, and firewood for his annual religious ceremonies. The villages were also bound to cultivate by turns the Raj lands. It is possible that dues levied on hill produce imported to the plains formed a further source of income.

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(1) Political Proceedings, August 1867, Nos. 25-26.

On the resumption of the hills by the British Government, from 1835 to 1855, the Sintengs, as the Jaintias are called, were left almost entirely to their own devices. The Dolloies heard all civil cases,—at first without exception, and after 1841 up to a certain limit,—and all criminal complaints not of a heinous character in which only people of their own villages were concerned. Their administration was, however, flagrantly corrupt: and they managed to secure for themselves most of the Raj lands of which no accurate inventory had been taken by Government. No taxes of any kind were imposed by us in the Jaintia Hills for many years. The tribute of he-goats continued to be annually paid, and in 1853 credit was given to the officers at Cherra for effecting a slightly more favourable sale of these offerings than had been usual theretofore. In that year Mr. Mills, a Judge of the Sudder Court, who had been deputed

Mr. Mills' deputation.

to enquire into certain abuses in the Khasia Hills, judicial administration, drew attention to the state of the Jaintia Hills. He pointed out that in 1849 Colonel Lister had suggested the imposition of a house-tax "in consequence of the disposition evinced by some of the people to assert their independence." This had, however, been negatived by Government. Mr. Mills strongly urged that the error should be repaired, and a more intimate knowledge of the people acquired by the English officers. He also advocated the establishment of a Police Thannah to check the lawless proceedings of the Dolloies. Lord Dalhousie quite concurred in these views. In neighbouring Hill Tracts house-tax was paid, and we were acting unwisely and inequitably in exempting Jaintia. The Agent was directed to proceed into the Jaintia Hills and prepare a full report on Revenue, Civil, and Criminal Justice, and all other matters connected with the Jaintia Territory. On receipt of these orders a thannah was established at Jowai, but not much else was actually done at this time to give effect to them, so far as I have been able to discover.

In 1858 Mr. Allen, another high official from the Presidency

Mr. Allen's proposals.

deputed to enquire into local matters, submitted another elaborate report upon the Khasi and Jaintia Hills. After the fullest consideration he came to the conclusion that the Sintengs should be required to contribute something in acknowledgment of the supremacy of the Government. He said—"I am of opinion that a light and judicious taxation would contribute to the preservation of tranquillity and good order in the Jaintia Hills. A moderate taxation had a very beneficial effect upon the savagery of the Lurka Coles of the Singhbhoom district of the south-west frontier agency. It was found to make them less turbulent and aggressive, and more thrifty, diligent, and submissive to the authorities; and I am disposed to think that a very moderate taxation, fixed for a term of years, would improve the condition and strengthen the peaceful and industrious inclinations of these wild mountaineers also." He proposed a moderate house-tax, to be collected through the village

authorities. Enquiry was also suggested into the condition of the Raj lands, and the allotment of waste to European settlers was discussed. But Mr. Allen insisted strongly on the necessity of stationing a European Civil Officer in the centre of the tract to administer justice to the people, and be to them a visible representative of that Government of which they then knew almost nothing. Unfortunately, the proposal to levy a house-tax was adopted, while the Sintengs were left as before to the management of their Dolloies.

In 1860 the house-tax was imposed, and, within a few months,

Sinteng rebellion, 1860.

the people were in open rebellion. Fortunately, a large force of troops was close at hand, and before the revolt could make any head, it was stamped out, and the villages were awed into apparent submission. It was supposed at the time that the ex-Rajah had been in some way mixed up with this movement in the hills, but to this idea little weight should be attached. For five and twenty years the Sintengs had been content to pay their tribute of he-goats to the British officers. They never respected the Rajah while he did rule over them; and they had openly affronted his family more than once since his abdication.

On the suppression of this partial rising measures were taken for the improvement of the administration. The Civil Officer at Cherra was empowered to remove the Dolloies for misconduct, while at the same time the powers of those functionaries were increased. All crimes were to be reported by them to the Police, who were not, however, to interfere vexatiously in village affairs.

Scarcely had the agitation of this disturbance had time to settle,

The income tax.

when the necessities of Imperial Finance imposed the income tax throughout British India. The local officers applied to Government to know whether this new impost was to be levied in the Khasi and Jaintia Hills: and if the last named tract was to be affected by it, whether the house-tax was also to be maintained. It was ruled that the house tax was not to be given up on account of the income tax, the incidence of the two being different, and that the income tax "was to be introduced only in those parts of the hills where taxes had been previously levied, *i. e.*, in the Jaintia Territory, and those other villages near the station of Cherra Poonjee which belong to the British Government." It seems to have been the belief at Calcutta that, practically, the tax would be inoperative in the hills. Fortunately, the whole of the Khasi States escaped it, and the loyalty of their chiefs was not tried by this severe and practical test.

In the Jaintia Hills 310 persons were taxed, on whom the whole amount assessed was Rupees 1,259. The highest rate levied, and that only in one case, was Rupees. 9. One person paid Rupees 5; twenty-seven paid Rupees 4-8 each; and the rest were taxed the minimum amount, Rupees 4 each per annum. The tax for 1860-61 was paid without a murmur. The Deputy Commissioner travelled through the hills in 1860-61, and again in November 1861 without



detecting a sign of disaffection. But the material was all there. The mass of the people had been subjected to the house tax in 1860. The leaders were further brought under the income tax in 1861. There were rumours of pān and trade taxes in the air.\* What spark actually began the conflagration it is hard to tell. Whether it was the rash talk and interference of some bullying policeman, or an injudiciously executed order against the use of arms, we do not clearly know. There is some evidence to show that the Police had made themselves very offensive at Jowai, by getting restrictions imposed on the burning of the dead near the station house, and by interfering with some religious ceremonies. There were doubtless many concurrent causes. The small number of troops then available gave an opportunity which had been

Second rising, 1862.

wanting in 1860; and on the 20th of January 1862, the Sintengs rose in fierce rebellion. "A people who had neither been left to their own guidance, nor yet fairly brought under ours; upon whom our yoke had pressed with just sufficient force to gall, but not to break into order; who had been denied the boon of having our rule represented among them by an English Officer, and of all our institutions, who had known only our system of Police as illustrated by a thannah on the Bengali model, and our latest experiments in taxation; who, just after they had been taught the lesson that they could only be compelled to pay an obnoxious tax by the application of military force, are straightway further taxed, the means of compulsion being at the same time withdrawn, when such a people rise in rebellion" (said the Commissioner *ex-post facto*) "it may not be difficult to explain its origin and object, without searching after recondite causes."

Into the history and progress of the rebellion there is no need to enter. Crushed apparently in four months after its outbreak, it again almost immediately burst out afresh, and it was not till November 1863, when every glen and jungle had been searched out by our Troops and Police, that the last of the rebel leaders surrendered, and the pacification of Jaintia could be said to be complete.

It fell to the lot of Sir Cecil Beadon who had inherited this rebellion, as well as various other disturbances on the frontiers and elsewhere, from his predecessors, to re-organize the Hill Administration. The policy laid down by him was thus represented—

"A main principle to be adopted in dealing with these people when they have been made to understand and feel the power of the Government and have submitted to its authority is not to leave them in their old state, but, while adopting a simple plan of Government suitable to their present condition and circumstances, and interfering as little as possible with existing institutions, to extend our intercourse with them, and endeavour to introduce among them civilization and order."

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\* See Bengal Record Selections No. XXXIX for a full account of these disturbances.

An English Officer with full powers was accordingly posted to the Jaintia Hills, where he was personally to reside. He was to visit every village in his jurisdiction at least once a year, and, with his subordinates, was required to qualify in the Khasia language sufficiently to dispense with all interpreters. The village Dolloies were to be chosen by the people, subject to the civil officer's approval, and to hold office during good behaviour. With other village officers they were to form punchayets, by whom specified civil and criminal powers were to be exercised, subject to the revision of the British officer in important or heinous cases. The Dolloies and Sirdars were to be responsible for the Police of their respective jurisdictions, and the Regular Police were only to interfere to repress disturbance or support the authority of the Dolloies. Proceedings were to be *vidæ voce* as far as possible. Education was to be liberally encouraged; the Welsh Mission already established in the hills being made the instrument of its extension. The country was to be thoroughly opened up by eight lines of road, aggregating in length 218 miles. The income tax had been virtually withdrawn by the Act repealing it on all incomes below Rs. 500 a year. The house tax was to be retained, due care being taken that no inequality or injustice was allowed in its assessment.

On these general principles the administration of the Jaintia Hills has been reformed, and the policy of direct management, by resident European Officers, has, here, as in the Naga Hills, proved successful. Their history has for years past been uneventful. A complete and detailed settlement of the land in Jaintia has recently been carried out, due care being taken to avoid overassessment.

The head-quarters of the Chief Commissioner of Assam have been located at Shillong in the Khasi Hills. The station is on a plateau 4,000 feet above sea-level and 67 miles south by road from Gowhatty on the Brahmaputra. It is conveniently situated between the Assam valley districts on the one side and those of Cachar and Sylhet on the other. The climate is mild and equable, the rainfall averaging 83·65 inches in the year. The District Officer of the Khasi Hills moved his head-quarters there from Cherapoonjee\* in 1864 to avoid the excessive

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\* David Scott lies buried at Cherra Poonjee. The following is the inscription on his tomb :—

*In Memory*

Of David Scott, Agent to the Governor General of the North-East Frontier of Bengal, and Commissioner of Revenue and Circuit in the District of Assam, North-Eastern part of Rungpore, Sheerpore, and Sylhet, died 20th August 1831, aged 45 years and 3 months.

This monument is erected by order of the Supreme Government as a public and lasting record of its consideration for the personal character of the deceased, and of its estimation of the eminent services rendered by him in the administration of the extensive territory committed to his charge. By his demise the Government has been deprived of a

rainfall of the latter place, where although only 30 miles south of Shillong the average rainfall is 368 inches and in 1861 amounted to as much as 805 inches. The transfer to Shillong has been from every point of view advantageous, and the Chief Commissioner of Assam has perhaps the most desirable head-quarters of all the Local Governments.

most zealous, able, and intelligent servant, whose loss it deeply laments, while his will long be held in grateful remembrance and veneration by the Native population, to whom he was justly endeared by his impartial dispensation of justice, his kind and conciliatory manners, and his constant and unwearied endeavours to promote their happiness and welfare.

## CHAPTER XIX.

## THE GAROS.

West of the Khasi are the Garo Hills. There appears, however, to be little or no intercourse between their inhabitants. Our communications with the Garos have been entirely from the sides of Goalpara and Mymensing, and they are the first of the Assam mountain tribes with whom we came in contact. Our knowledge of them dates from our occupation of Rungpore and Mymensing.

The chief earlier sources of authentic information in regard to the Garo Hills are—

- (1.) A paper by Mr. Elliot in the 3rd Volume of the Asiatic Researches.
- (2.) Reports<sup>(1)</sup> on the Rahdari duties of Sherepore and Shoo-sung by the same gentleman, dated 1789.
- (3.) An account by Dr. Buchanan, the substance of which appears in Volume 3 of Martin's Eastern India.
- (4.) A Report<sup>(\*)</sup> by Mr. Sisson in 1815.
- (5.) A Report<sup>(2)</sup> by Mr. Scott in 1816.

Under the Moguls the whole of the north-east parts of Bengal were divided into great estates, held for the most part by their original

owners, who, while paying a small tribute to the Muhummadan Foudjar of Rungamatty as acknowledgment of fealty, were, to all intents and purposes, independent. They were bound, in fact, merely to supply a certain number of elephants, or a small quantity of aghur (a precious wood), to support certain petty garrisons, and to contribute to the maintenance of the Dacca Artillery park. Their estates were never subjected to a land revenue assessment. They paid what they did pay to the Supreme Government from 'Sayer' or miscellaneous revenues and not from 'Mal' or land revenue. The Foudjar generally made advances on account of cotton to the *Choudries*, as these Zemindars were called, and received from them yearly consignments of that article; but as no account was ever taken of the Foudjar's collections so long as he paid the stipulated assignment at Dacca, the transactions were carried on mainly for the benefit of himself and the Choudries.

The Choudries of Kurribari, Kaloomaloo para, and Meeaspara (or Mechpara) in that part of Rungpore now called Goalpara, were the

(1) Revenue Consultation, 30th September 1789, Nos. 26-30.

(\*) Criminal Consultation, 25th April 1815, Nos. 17-18.

(2) Criminal Consultation, 18th February 1816, Nos. 15-16.

chief landholders of this kind at the time of our accession to the Dewani. They held all the low country under the Garo Hills on the Assam side, and it was their principal duty to repress the incursions of the savage tribes of the uplands, who even then were a source of terror to the cultivators of the plains. As all the cotton, then the staple of the internal eastern trade, came from these hills, the Choudries had established at the principal passes *hâts* or markets guarded by their retainers, to which the low country merchants, with their permission, resorted; and at which they extorted from the merchants engaged in the Garo trade dues either in kind or cash, which formed one of the main sources of their income. It would appear that at this early period the Choudries had not attempted to secure any footing in the hills, save perhaps on those outlying and lower spurs which intersected their own estates. The Garos of the upper hills only came down annually to trade after the people of the villages near the foot of the hills had given hostages who were detained in the hills till the fairs were over. The Garos stipulated that these hostages should be always *smiths*—that the hillmen might have their services to make weapons in case war broke out.

After our accession to the Dewani, things continued on much the same footing as before. A *Sezawal* was annually appointed, who contracted to pay the Government demand, making his own arrangement with the Choudries. This left them as independent as before, and up to the year A. D. 1787-88 we find that their revenue was always paid in cotton. After 1788 the collection of Sayer dues or miscellaneous cesses was made illegal, Government compensating all Zemindars for any consequent loss of revenue. The Choudries of the Garo frontier received compensation just as others did, and Government was for some time under the impression that the dues formerly levied at these Garo fairs had been given up, but as the Government did not itself proceed to realise them, the Zemindars continued to levy them illegally here, as they in fact levy illegal dues to this day in all parts of Bengal.

In 1775-76 the Choudries of Meeaspara and Kurribari, to avenge some Garo raids of more than usual severity, invaded the hills bordering on their respective estates and entered on a career of conquest. They remained two or three years in the hills, and brought the tribes of a large tract entirely under their control. They maintained their authority over the hillmen apparently for many years. Even the great Chief of the southern part of the hills (Renghta) became in course of time subject to Kurribari. This, however, brought the Choudrie of Kurribari into conflict with the Choudrie of Sherepore in Mymensing, for Renghta's people had been in the habit of trading at the markets of Sherepore and Shoosung. The Zemindar of Kurribari, Mohendronarain Choudrie, was not the man to brook Sherepore interference. He built forts in the passes on the Mymensing side to stop the Garo trade, and arrested Renghta himself when on his way back from a visit to the Sherepore *hâts*. Mr. Elliot, who was at that time (1789) on the Mymensing frontier, got Renghta released, and he and all his people then offered to become Government ryots, provided they were protected from the

**Kurribari Zemindar.** Mr. Elliot, eager to avail himself of the great trade advantages promised by such an arrangement, strongly supported the proposal. The Commissioner of Cooch Behar reported that the Kurribari Zemindar had no rights in the hills save those he maintained by force. The Government in 1790 accordingly directed<sup>(1)</sup> that Renghta should be made a Zemindar under the Company, and that the Kurribari Choudrie should be forbidden to molest him, but be offered a remission of revenue should he be unable, in consequence, to pay the Government demand. This interesting negotiation fell through, owing to the unparalleled audacity of the Kurribari Choudrie, who simply arrested the messengers sent to Renghta to conclude the arrangements. The Choudrie occupied all the passes leading to Mymensing and defied the Company's Officers to their face. In 1798 Government had to send troops to realise his arrears of revenue. In 1794<sup>(2)</sup> and again in 1805 he even invaded Sherepore itself. All attempts at this time to define the boundaries of his Zemindari were defeated by him. At last in 1809 the estate was sold, by the orders of the Board of Revenue, for arrears of revenue, but the auction purchaser was ruined in the attempt to get possession. Mohendronarain threw himself into the hills, and set up a claim to hold free of revenue the greater part of his estate in the plains. It was not till April 1815 that Government succeeded in arresting him.<sup>(3)</sup> The estate had to be attached and managed by Government Officers, as the purchaser could do nothing with it.

Meantime the Garos had not ceased to make incursions into the plains<sup>(4)</sup> to avenge themselves on the Choudries for the extortion and oppression suffered at their hands, and in 1816, after a particularly atrocious raid in which the hillmen had invaded Kurribari, and burnt the Zemindar's residence, the passes were closed to trade, and Mr. Scott was deputed by Government to visit the frontier. That gentleman gives the following account of the position of the four principal Zemindars and of the Garos on their estates at the time of his visit:—

1. *Kurribari*.—The Choudrie of this estate having been the most vigorous and least under control had reduced nearly all the Garos actually living on his estate to the condition of ordinary ryots, but

(1) Revenue Consultation, 15th June 1790, No. 179.

(2) Judicial Consultation, 21st November 1794, Nos. 7-8.

(3) Criminal Consultation, 16th February 1816, Nos. 15-16.

(4) Criminal Consultation, 2nd October 1807, No. 14.

Criminal Consultation, 22nd April 1808, No.

Judicial Consultation, 9th April 1811, Nos. 22-3.

Judicial Consultation, 28th May 1811, No. 37.

Judicial Consultation, 18th June 1811, Nos. 15-16.

Criminal Consultation, 31st December 1811, No. 9.

Revenue Consultation, 14th November 1812, No. 8.

Criminal Consultation, 17th July 1813, Nos. 7-8.

Criminal Consultation, 7th February 1815, Nos. 19-21.

Criminal Consultation, 1st March 1816, Nos. 12-15.

a few of the frontier Chiefs still remained merely tributary, subject to the provision of cotton on terms highly favorable to the Zemindar, and paying sums of money on the occasions of Hindu festivals. Of these the chief was Renghta, who had been prevented as before shewn from emancipating himself from the Choudrie's supremacy.

2. *Kaloomaloopara* had been in feeble hands. The Garos on its borders were virtually independent, though some paid a nominal cotton tribute.

3. The *Mechpara* Choudrie had in 1776-77 effected large conquests, but was succeeded soon after by a minor, and now only a few outlying Garo villages in the plains remained in the condition of ordinary ryots' villages, and in these the Regulations of Government were current. But in the Hill Tracts the Garo Chiefs were merely tributary, paying cotton on terms favorable to the Zemindar, and occasionally admitting him as their criminal Judge.

4. *Hubraghat*.—Here the Garos on the first ranges of hills had been reduced to unconditional submission, but had been liberally treated, and their Sirdars transformed into Jaghirdars, charged with the defence of the passes against the tribes of the interior. They were quite under the Regulations of Government.

The problem Mr. Scott had before him was to make arrangements for bringing to reason the Tributary Garos, who had committed all the late raids. He found that the cause of the raids had been the fact,

Mr. Scott's proposals for settlement.

that, in spite of the orders of Government repressing all internal duties levied by Zemindars and Sayer of all kinds, the Zemindars on this side had continued to exact them from Garos frequenting their markets. A system of exacting cotton in return for advances forced on the Garos also prevailed, and was defended on the ground that it was a sort of rent, although none of these Tributary Garo villages appeared in the Collectorate Registers of the estates. These pretensions were shown to be groundless, and it was urged that the Zemindars, now no longer Government Officers, had no claim, on the grounds of proprietary right, to exercise any interference with the Hill Garos. Mr. Scott accordingly proposed to separate all these Tributary Garos from the Zemindars' control, compensating the Zemindars if they could show any claim to consideration, but bringing the Garo tract under Government management; the Chiefs to pay a slight tribute as acknowledgment of our supremacy. The frontier markets were also to be brought under Government control, and the Garos were to be permitted to trade there only on entering into engagements to keep the peace. Those Garo Chiefs who had been receiving a black mail from persons on the plains, as a bribe not to attack them, were to get annual presents instead. Light duties were to be collected at the markets from *independent* Garos, but not from tributaries. Other custom duties, then levied by Government, were to be managed by Government Collectors.

The Governor General in Council accepted<sup>(1)</sup> Mr. Scott's suggestions, on the grounds of the 'absolute necessity of effectually preventing the recurrence of the oppressive practices on the part of the Zemindars which had led to the most violent acts of revenge and bloodshed,' and appointed him to the direct charge of the country east of the Berham-pooter to enable him to carry them out. The Government said the Zemindars had already received liberal compensation for loss of Sayer, and as the Tributary Garo villages were not among the assets on which their land revenue had been settled, they were entitled to nothing more now. The Government was clearly of opinion that the only relation between the Zemindars and Tributary Garos was the payment and reception of Sayer, which was abolished in those estates in 1813, and for which (including all taken from Garos) compensation had been given in that year.

It further suggested for Mr. Scott's consideration—

- 1st.—The introduction of a plan of internal management of the Garo Hills like that successfully adopted by Cleveland in Bhagulpore.
- 2nd.—The raising a local corps of Garos to hold the frontier passes, &c.
- 3rd.—The appointment of a permanent Officer to have separate charge of these eastern parts of Rungpore.
- 4th.—The regulation of the frontier trade.

All the arrangements so far as they concerned the Tributary Garos were carried out by Government without any hint of legislative sanction being necessary. The arrangements were looked upon as political, and as affecting only a tract of country in which the Regulations were not current. The first hint of

#### Legislative proposals.

legislation is found in a letter of 9th September 1817, where the Government directed Mr. Scott not to scruple to separate from the estate of Kurribari, and treat exactly as the Tributary Garos were being treated, any Garo villages nominally under the existing Laws and Regulations. "It will of course" (ran the letter) "be ultimately necessary formally to recognise arrangements of the latter description (affecting villages within the permanently-settled estates) by a legislative enactment," but before this could be done, a survey and settlement of boundary was absolutely required. Legislation was also said to be necessary to frame a procedure for judicial trials of the Tributary Garos. Mr. Scott, in reply, urged that the whole Garo Frontier should be treated on the same plan. He said—"the Regulations are evidently inapplicable to the existing state of society amongst them, a people in general entirely ignorant of the Bengal language or any other dialect understood in our Courts. If the plan of separation from Zemindars (he urged) prove

<sup>(1)</sup> Criminal Consultation, 16th February 1816, Nos. 15-18.



acceptable to the Garos, in the tracts, where on account of the raids\* it is necessary to introduce it, we shall have, if any exceptions are made, the Garos of the excluded parts committing similar atrocities to bring themselves within the pale."

Accordingly paragraph 24 in the Draft Regulation framed by Mr. Scott ran as follows:—

The authority of the Special Commissioner shall extend from the Berhampooter eastward over all lands occupied by Garos or other hill tribes formerly considered as tributary to, or dependent upon, the Zemindars of Hubraghat, Mechpara, Kaloomalopara, and Kurribari. The Governor General in Council will, however, exercise his discretion in releasing the inhabitants of any of the above villages from the control of the British Government. He will also exercise similar discretion in extending its authority over other Garo communities which may be at present independent. A proclamation to that effect by order of Government shall suffice without any further special enactment.

The Regulation was not passed in the precise shape submitted by Mr. Scott, but sufficient discretion to meet all cases that could arise was left in the hands of Government by Regulation X of 1822, which is here reproduced:

*A Regulation for exempting the Garo Mountaineers, and other rude Tribes on the North-Eastern Frontier of Rungpore, from the operation of the existing Regulations; and for establishing a special system of Government for the tract of country occupied by them, or bordering on their possessions: Passed by the Governor-General in Council, on the 19th September 1822.*

1. There exist in different parts of the territories subordinate to the presidency of

Preamble.

Fort William, races of people entirely distinct from the ordinary population, and to whose circumstances, therefore, the system of government established by the general Regulations is wholly inapplicable. Such were the mountaineers of Bhaugulpore, for the reclaiming of whom to the arts of civilized life special arrangements were made by Government with the Chiefs, some time before the introduction of the present system. These arrangements still subsist, having been incorporated into the code by the provisions of Regulation I, 1796, under which an entirely distinct system has been established for the administration of justice amongst the inhabitants of that mountainous tract. Savage tribes, in some respects similar, exist on the north-east frontier of Rungpore, of which the race denominated Garos, and occupying the hills called after them, are the principal. As yet little has been done to reclaim or civilize these people. The reciprocal animosity which subsists between them and the inhabitants of the cultivated country prevents any extensive intercourse of a pacific nature; while, on the contrary, their mutual injuries have produced feuds leading frequently to disturbance and bloodshed. The Zemindars of the frontier have, there is reason to believe, usually been the aggressors, by encroaching on the independent territory of the Garos and similar rude tribes, until, despairing of other resource, the latter are driven to seize occasions of private revenge and retaliation. These encroachments having

\* I extract here a statement of Garo raids between 1807 and 1819.

						Villages burnt.	Persons killed.
1807	...	...	...	...	...	8	27
1810	...	...	...	...	...	...	2
1811	...	...	...	...	...	...	8
1812	...	...	...	...	...	...	5
1813	...	...	...	...	...	2	24
1814	...	...	...	...	...	...	3
1815	...	...	...	...	...	2	15
1816	...	...	...	...	...	150	94
1818	...	...	...	...	...	...	8

been of long standing, several Zemindars were, at the time of the perpetual settlement, in the receipt of incomes derived from cesses of various kinds levied from the tribes, and hence a portion of the tract of country occupied by them has been considered to lie within the operation of the general Regulations as forming part of the zemindari. This, however, instead of conducing to reclaim the tribes to civilized habits, has rather had a contrary effect, the system being totally inapplicable to their savage and secluded condition, and being calculated to leave them at the mercy of the Zemindars, rather than to offer any substantial means of redress. The condition of the Garo Mountaineers, and of the other rude tribes on that frontier, has, for some time past, attracted much of the attention of the Governor-General in Council, and the circumstances which have conduced to check the progress of civilization amongst them have been fully investigated and ascertained. With a view, therefore, to promote the desirable object of reclaiming these races to the habits of civilized life, it seems necessary that a special plan for the administration of justice, of a kind adapted to their peculiar customs and prejudices, should be arranged and concerted with the head men, and that measures should at the same time be taken for freeing them from any dependence on the Zemindars of the British provinces; compensation being, of course, made to the latter for any just pecuniary claims they may have over them. Preparatory to the execution of measures adapted to this end, it has been deemed indispensable to suspend the operation of the existing rules for the administration of civil and criminal justice, and generally of the Regulations of Government within the tract of country comprised in or bordering on the hills and jungles occupied by these tribes, and to appoint a Commissioner with full power to conclude arrangements with the Chiefs, and to conduct the entire administration of the tract in question, subject only to such orders and instructions as he may receive, from time to time, from the Governor-General in Council. The following rules have accordingly been enacted, to take effect from the date of their promulgation, in the manner and within the limits therein described.

## II. The tract of country now comprised in the thannah jurisdictions of Gwalpara,

Separating the tract of country comprised in the thannahs of Gwalpara, Dhoobree, and Kurreebaree, from the jurisdiction of the district of Rungpore, and declaring the operation of the existing Regulations to be suspended, except so far as provided hereafter.

Dhoobree, and Kurreebaree, in the district of Rungpore, is hereby declared separated from the said district; and the operation of the rules for the administration of the police and of civil and criminal justice, as well as those for the collection of the land revenue, customs,

abkaree, and stamp revenues, together with all other rules contained in the Regulations printed and published in the manner prescribed by Regulation XLI, 1793, are suspended, and shall cease to have effect therein from the date of the promulgation of this Regulation, except in so far as may be hereinafter provided.

## III. The administration of civil and criminal justice, the collection of the revenue,

A Civil Commissioner appointed for the north-east parts of Rungpore above described, vested with the powers of administering civil and criminal justice, the collection of revenue, and the superintendence of the police in the manner prescribed in this Regulation.

the superintendence of the police, and every other branch of Government within the tract above described, are hereby declared to be vested in an officer appointed by the Governor-General in Council, and denominated the Civil Commissioner for the North-Eastern

parts of Rungpore; the said officer shall conduct the same agreeably to the principles and spirit of the existing Regulations, subject to the restrictions and modifications hereinafter provided, and to such other alterations and amendments as may from time to time be ordered by the Governor-General in Council.

## IV. First.—In the administration of criminal justice, the Commissioner shall be

Commissioner to exercise the functions of Magistrate, and to have criminal jurisdiction in the trial and sentence of persons charged with offences to the extent of a *circuit* Judge; but no *futwa* to be required.

competent to exercise all the functions and authorities now exercised by Magistrates in respect to the apprehension and trial of persons charged with offences; and further to hold trials and pass sentence to the extent

permitted by the Regulations to a Judge of *circuit*; but without reference of the proceedings for *futwa* to a Mahomedan law-officer.

## Second.—In the exercise of the powers and authorities above conveyed to the Commis-

Commissioner, and other Officers acting under his control, shall ordinarily conform to the principles and spirit of the Regulations applicable: But shall obey and conform to all special rules and orders of Government.

sioner, he shall ordinarily conform to the principles and spirit of the Regulations applicable to such subjects; so likewise the Police Officers, and all other Officers acting under his control; provided, however, that the Commis-

sioner and all such Officers shall be bound to conform to any special rules or orders that may

from time to time be issued by the Governor-General in Council for regulating the process before trial, or the forms of trial to be observed in the case of different classes of the population, and the same shall be to all intents and purposes legal and valid. Moreover, it shall be competent to the Governor-General in Council to extend, limit, or modify any part of the authority to be exercised by Police Officers, and likewise to confer on the Commissioner the power of granting conditional pardon to accomplices without previous reference to the Nizamut Adawlut, as required by the existing Regulations, or in any other way to extend or modify the magisterial and judicial functions vested in the Commissioner by the preceding clause of this section. An order or resolution of Government, under the official signature of a Secretary to Government, shall be sufficient authority for such modification; anything in Regulation XLI, 1793, or in any other Regulation of Government, to the contrary notwithstanding.

Reservation to the Governor-General in Council of the power of regulating sundry matters connected with the Commissioner's criminal jurisdiction.

Officers, and likewise to confer on the Commissioner the power of granting conditional pardon to accomplices without previous reference to the Nizamut Adawlut, as required by the existing Regulations, or in any other way to extend or modify the magisterial and judicial functions vested in the Commissioner by the preceding clause of this section. An order or resolution of Government, under the official signature of a Secretary to Government, shall be sufficient authority for such modification; anything in Regulation XLI, 1793, or in any other Regulation of Government, to the contrary notwithstanding.

*Third.*—If the Commissioner shall deem an offender brought to trial before him to be liable to a punishment exceeding that which by the existing Regulations a Judge of *circuit* is competent to adjudge, without referring the case to the Nizamut Adawlut, he shall not pass any final sentence thereon, but shall transmit to the Nizamut Adawlut the record of the proceedings held on the trial, together with a full English report of the circumstances of the case, and of his opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the prisoner or prisoners tried, as likewise an explanation of any special custom of the parties or witnesses that may be necessary to the proper understanding of the proceedings.

V. Upon the receipt of any trial referred by the Commissioner under the preceding section, the Nizamut Adawlut shall, without submitting the proceedings for the *futwa* of their Law Officers, proceed to pass a final judgment, or such other order as may, after mature consideration, seem to the Court requisite and proper, in the same manner, with exception to the requisition of a *futwa*, as if the trial had been sent up in ordinary course from a Judge *on circuit*.

VI. In the exercise of the duty of administering civil justice within the tract defined in Section II. of this Regulation, the Commissioner shall hold a Court, and proceed, in cases wherein persons not of the race of Garo Mountaineers, or other rude tribes, are exclusively concerned, according to the existing Regulations, subject to the modifications provided for by this Regulation, observing as far as practicable the rules prescribed for Zillah Judges holding and presiding in the Adawluts of the country; provided, however, that there shall be no limit to the amount for which a suit shall be cognizable by the Commissioner, and an appeal from his judgment shall not lie to the *Provincial Court*. If the stake or interest involved (calculated according to the rule contained in *Section XIV, Regulation I, 1814*) do not exceed in amount or value the sum of five thousand sicca rupees, the decision passed on the case by the Commissioner shall be final. If the interest involved, calculated as above, exceed in value or amount the sum of five thousand rupees, the Commissioner shall be competent to grant a special appeal in cases of a less amount than five thousand rupees, should there appear, either on the face of the decree, or from circumstances established to the satisfaction of the Court, substantial reason for concluding that there has been a failure of justice in the award of the Commissioners.

Substitute B, Schedule B, Regulation X, 1820.

Suits exceeding in amount Rs. 5,000 to be appealable to the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut.

an appeal shall lie in such cases direct to the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut, who will proceed in the hearing and adjudication thereof in the same manner as in the case of appeals entertained by the Court from judgments of the *Provincial Courts of Appeal*. The Sudder Dewanny Adawlut shall likewise be competent to grant a special appeal in cases of a less amount than five thousand rupees, should there appear, either on the face of the decree, or from circumstances established to the satisfaction of the Court, substantial reason for concluding that there has been a failure of justice in the award of the Commissioners.

Special appeal allowed, if under Rs. 5,000.

VII. If the parties in a civil action be Garo Mountaineers, or of any other similar rude tribe, or if either of them be of that description, the form and process that may be sanctioned and prescribed by the Governor-General in Council shall be adopted in the trial and adjudication of the matter at issue, and in the execution of the award; and any civil judgment that may be passed according

to such form shall have full authority and effect in the same manner as a decree passed by a competent Court of final jurisdiction.

**VIII. First.**—In the conduct of the revenue duties of the tract of country placed under the Commissioner, as well as those relating to the customs, abkaree, stamps, and other miscellaneous items as to the land revenue, the Commissioner shall observe the rules and principles of the general Regulations, with such limitations and restrictions as to the authority to be exercised by himself, as may be provided in the instructions he may receive from time to time from the Governor-General in Council; provided, however, that it shall be competent to the Governor-General in Council to direct the separation, temporarily or permanently, of any tract of country occupied by Garo Mountaineers or other rude tribes from the estates of any neighbouring Zemindars to which the same may now be claimed to be attached; also to discontinue the collection by Zemindars or others of any cesses, tributes, or exactions, on whatsoever pretence the same may be levied from such people, and to make arrangements either for the remission of the same, or for their collection direct by the officers of Government, making such compensation to Zemindars or others justly entitled thereto for the relinquishment of the same, as may to him seem most equitable and proper.

**Second.**—No suit or action shall be entertained by any Civil Court having jurisdiction, or that may hereafter have jurisdiction, within the tract of country subject to the authority of the Commissioner, on account of any act of the above description done under the authority of the Governor-General in Council.

**IX.** In all matters connected with the tract of country specified in Section II. or with the races of mountaineers and rude tribes above described, if from the want of any special provision, or from doubts as to the applicability of the rules in existence, any difficulty shall arise as to the course to be pursued, a reference shall be made to the Governor-General in Council, to whom it shall be competent to prescribe, by an order under the official signature of a Secretary to Government, what specific measures shall be adopted in the particular instance, as well as to annul, modify, and explain any existing rules or orders.

After the passing of that Regulation, Mr. Scott proceeded to conclude engagements with the independent Chiefs, and no fewer than 121 of those living west of the Soomasiri are said to have entered into terms with him.\* The dues at the Garo hâths were in future to be levied on behalf of Government only.

\* A proof of the lively interest taken by Mr. Scott in the Garos will be found in the following correspondence :—

*Extract of letter from Scott to W. P. Bayley, Secretary to Government, dated 27th April 1825.*

"In reply to a Commission that I sent to my Agent in London for one or more Missionaries of the sort suited to convert the Garos, I have been referred to the Bishop of Calcutta by the person, probably a friend of his, whom my brother consulted. Would Government have any objection to my applying to the Bishop on the subject? I am satisfied that nothing permanently good can be obtained by other means, and that if we do not interfere on behalf of the poor Garos they will soon become Hindoos or half-Hindoos, retaining and acquiring many of the bad parts of both their present and improved creeds. I would greatly prefer two or more Moravian Missionaries of the old school who along with religion would teach the useful arts. If Government would ensure them subsistence only in the case of success or of my death, I would willingly take upon myself the expense in the first instance, and £300 per annum would suffice. Of success I have no more doubt than that, if allowed, you could make Christians of the Hindoo boys; and the great error of the Missionaries appears to me to be that of directing their attention to polished natives

The breaking out of the Burmese war stopped Mr. Scott's work, as he had to take a prominent position in the affairs of Assam Proper, being appointed Governor General's Agent for North-Eastern frontier on 20th November 1823.

But little is known of what went on in the hills between 1824 and 1836. I may however notice briefly certain disturbances in Sherepore on the Mymensing border in 1826 and 1833, in which the lower Garos were to some extent implicated, though it does not appear that the upper clans had anything to do with them.

'Sherepore,' says a report<sup>(1)</sup> of 1826, 'the extreme pergunna of Mymensing, is bounded on the west and south by the Great Berhampooter, on the south and east by the old

The 'Paghul' riots in Mymensing. Berhampooter and Pergunnas Alapsing and Soosung, and on the north by Sersung and Kurribari Hills inhabited by Garos. From north-west to south-east it runs about 30 to 40 miles, and from north to south about 20 or 25 miles. The belt of country which unites the plains of Sherepore with the foot of the Kurribari Hills, called Gird Garo, or the Doon, is contested as hereditary property between the Zemindars of Sherepore and the Chiefs of the Kurribari Hills. The soil is rich, but the cultivators oppressed. This tract is inhabited by highlanders—truthful, industrious and superstitious, and also by lowlanders, destitute of moral qualities as well as of religion.' The tract of Sherepore, with the corner of Alapsing to the north of the Brahmaputra, had been long in a disturbed state. About 1775, a Muhummadan Fukir called Kurreem, had set himself up as a reformer and soothsayer. The Shoosung Raja allowed him to live in Loterkandi where he got together a band of followers called by their neighbours Paghuls or Fools, and among themselves Brethren (Bhai Sahib). About 1813 Kurreem had died, and been succeeded by his son Tippoo. Tippoo and his mother (called 'Mah Sahibah' or 'lady mother' by the Paghuls) both according to local belief possessed miraculous powers. Under their spells wooden guns and swords became in the hands of the 'Paghuls' effective weapons. English artillery fire had no effect against them. The 'Lady Mother' had only to blow on her clothes, and shake her under garment, to call a hidden army into existence; and to her alone was restricted the power of seeing into the future. It was perhaps from the want of this power, and a failure duly to consult the powers of his mother, that Tippoo ceased to be a mere religious fanatic, and betook himself to more dangerous courses. He gradually formed a following of armed men, acquired much wealth by

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instead of rude tribes who are still in that state of national childhood which enables the stranger priest to enact the schoolmaster and to teach them what he likes. There are many instances of success in cases of the latter description in modern times, but not one by fair means in those of the former since the age of miracles or very near it."

To this the Secretary replied demi-officially, approving generally. "The Government could not however give a salary to the people who might be employed in their capacity of Missionaries, but they might call them schoolmasters, and give assistance in that shape."

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(1) Revenue Consultation, 9th March 1826, No. 2—(Report by R. Morrison).

plunder, and perpetrated many crimes. In the state of the country, racked by the feuds of conflicting Zemindars, he formed a centre of intrigue for all the discontented ryots. The Sherepore Zemindars had never carried out the permanent settlement rules, and always collected cesses from their tenants at their discretion. In November 1824, when called on by Government to provide supplies for troops passing to Assam to fight the Burmese, they made this as usual the excuse for imposing heavy exactions on the ryots. The ryots appealed to Tippoo who promised them a time when they should only pay nominal rents. On this the peasantry took up arms and entered into closer alliance with the Paghuls, and began to refuse to give the customary tale of labour or pay rent. These ryots were many of them Garos, who had settled on the low lands under the hills. The rent of Gird Garo, the lowland tract cultivated by these settled Garos, was put down in the settlement of 1793 at Rs. 20. In 1825 it was paying Rs. 20,000 to Zemindars. In view of an enhancement of rent like this we cannot wonder that these half-civilised cultivators rose in arms. In January 1825 a body of 700 men assembled to attack the Zemindars at Sherepore, and serious fighting took place. The district authorities intervened, and after some trouble Tippoo was caught and put into jail. Instead of keeping him there, the Magistrate very soon released him, and for months the Paghuls carried on a desultory warfare along the border. Tippoo was the only person who benefitted by the troubles, and of him we read that he built himself a Palace, and styled it the "Royal Court of King Tippoo Paghul." But eventually the police and sepoy got the best of it, and Tippoo and his principal adherents were finally shut up in jail. The grievances of the Gird Garos were met by a resettlement of the tract, which was held not to be within the permanently settled estates of the Zemindars, and for some time the district was quiet. In 1833 however the Paghuls are again heard of as stirring up a peasant insurrection, but nothing serious came of this. The rent grievance had been killed by the action of the revenue authorities.

In July 1836 the independent Garos of Seebkujora tried to stop our collecting tribute from dependent villages, and the Commissioner of Assam recommended our subduing by force every Garo village that shewed a turbulent spirit. "Scott's

Revival of troubles on the Assam side,  
1836.

plan<sup>(1)</sup> had (the Commissioner said) been to march into a village and give notice that if the Chief did not surrender himself in two days and pay tribute, the village would be burnt and cultivation laid waste." This had succeeded, and the Commissioner wanted liberty to try the plan again. Government sanctioned the proposal; but in December he visited Singamari, where most of the Garo Chiefs of that quarter came to meet him; and then enquiry proved that most of the Garo disturbances had arisen from the oppressive conduct of our own Native Officers at the frontier markets. If Scott had inflicted sharp punishments, he had still more relied on kind demeanour and personal intercourse. When Scott

(1) Political Proceedings, 25th July 1836, Nos. 45-46.

was called away to Assam, no one took his place, and until a special assistant was given to Goalpara for Garo work, as had recently been done, no one even visited the markets or Chiefs. Hence the disturbances. The old policy was now to be reverted to. An expedition sent up early in 1837, under Mr. Strong, effected its object without any bloodshed. He collected easily all arrears of tribute and received the voluntary submission of many Garo villages.<sup>(1)</sup>

In July 1839 the Commissioner proposed an expedition to the hills, to punish the Garos of Dumra Dwar for outrages and contumacy. Mr. Strong who had been in the habit of making yearly tours among the clans had, he reported, done much good, but had not sufficient power. Hence Captain Jenkins now proposed a survey<sup>(2)</sup> of the hills on which the Zemindars had, he said, encroached much, and the appointment of a special Officer to manage all the Garos. The Governor General in Council did not think the Garo race of sufficient importance to call for the services of a special Officer to superintend their affairs in connection with the Zemindars<sup>(3)</sup> and the people of the plains. The expedition was nominally allowed, but did not come off for want of troops. Government was not very ready to find these for such expeditions at this time.

The unwillingness of Government to punish the crime of a few by an indiscriminating military raid was expressed<sup>(4)</sup> in the following year when a murder by the Garos of Dwar Dasanni was reported.

In August 1844 there were fresh Garo murders. Government again refused<sup>(5)</sup> to allow a display of military force, but in 1848 the contumacy of a tributary clan called the Dasanni Garos led to more active measures.

The Dasanni Garos had been in arrears since 1834. In February 1847 they murdered one of their Lukmas<sup>(6)</sup> with all his family for demanding their tribute. Small parties of troops were sent up but failed to secure the murderers, and a stronger expedition was at last in 1848 proposed and sanctioned. The Dasannis were subdued after some opposition.\*

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\* For an account of the Dasanni Garos by Captain Reynolds, reference may be made to Political Proceedings, 21st October 1848, Nos. 22-24.

(1) Political Proceedings, 10th April 1837, Nos. 114-15.

(2) Political Proceedings, 24th July 1839, Nos. 95-97.

(3) Political Proceedings, 24th February 1840, Nos. 132-33.

(4) Political Proceedings, 27th April 1840, Nos. 142-43.  
Political Proceedings, 7th September 1840, Nos. 95-96.

(5) Political Proceedings, 16th March 1844, Nos. 17-21.  
Political Proceedings, 2nd September 1843, Nos. 124-26.

(6) Political Proceedings, 24th April 1847, Nos. 46-48.  
Political Proceedings, 29th May 1847, Nos. 29-30.  
Political Proceedings, 24th December 1847, Nos. 78-80.  
Political Proceedings, 7th April 1843, Nos. 145-46.

In 1845-46 and 1846-47 visits to the Garo Hills were paid by Sturt and Dalton<sup>(1)</sup>, but no very noteworthy additions were made to our knowledge of the tribe.

Between July and October 1852 seven Garo raids took place on the Goalpara frontier, in which forty-four persons were killed. The local authorities proposed an expedition to demand the surrender of the principal offenders, to levy a fine on their village, or burn it in default of payment, to exact hostages and written engagements from the Chiefs, and to survey the hills. They also urged the construction of a road through the hills, and the education of Garo children.\* The Government of India approved<sup>(2)</sup> generally of these proposals with the exception of that in regard to taking written engagements which it considered useless in the case of such savages. An expedition was accordingly despatched which burnt a village, but the road was never made, and the survey was not begun. As no overtures were made by the Garos for the surrender of the raiders, the Commissioner next proposed to Government the closing of the frontier markets. The objection to this plan in the case of the Garos was, that no blockade however rigid could prevent them from getting supplies from Mymensing, while the innocent inhabitants of the plains, who depended for their livelihood on the cotton trade carried on with the Garos, were the principal sufferers. Still, if the blockade could be made tolerably severe, it might have some

effect on the hillmen, and it was determined to try it. Lord Dalhousie's views on Garo policy. Lord Dalhousie recorded at this time the following Minute on the subject:—

I have already said that I deprecate these extreme measures, while anything else remained untried. But as these savages will neither treat, submit, nor rest, it is due to our own subjects, whose lives and property are in jeopardy, that we should have recourse to punishment, which, though severe, is the only thing that they comprehend or feel. I consider that further Military operations would be a waste of life uselessly.

It is probable that the exclusion of the Garos from the plains will be effectual. It has been so when tried on the hill people on the opposite frontier to the north-west.

I request, therefore, that they may be rigidly excluded from the plains, and that the Chiefs may be informed that the exclusion will be continued till satisfaction is made by the delivery of the murderers. They are at the same time to be informed that, if they are found in the plains while thus in resistance to the Government, they will be seized and disposed of as the Government may think fit.

I am aware that these measures will probably inflict injury on the innocent while punishing the guilty. I regret it, but individual interests must yield to the public interests, when there is, as in this case, no alternative.

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\* The education of Garo children had been carried on at Government expense for many years, not with any great success; an attempt to secure upland Garos for the Frontier Police had also failed.

(<sup>1</sup>) Political Proceedings, 12th December 1846, Nos. 36-39.  
Political Proceedings, 17th July 1847, Nos. 22-24.

(<sup>2</sup>) Judicial Proceedings, 20th January 1853, Nos. 126-29.



The measure did to some extent prove successful. It was found <sup>(1)</sup> that the trade in cotton had become so material a source of profit to the Garos, that the closure of the hâts was really felt as a severe punishment. They gave up some of the offenders and promised to arrest and deliver over the others.

Colonel Jenkins, the Commissioner, was, however, strongly of opinion that our only hope of securing permanent tranquillity lay in our taking military possession of the hills. Mr. Mills, then on tour in Assam, remarked <sup>(2)</sup> on this, that—"unless a European functionary could reside in the interior and superintend the administration, which it was known he could not do, we should not attempt to extend our rule over unprofitable hills. All past experience showed that we cannot trust to native agency in the management of wild tribes." The climate was supposed to be deadly and such as no European could survive. Mr. Mills advocated severe treatment of villages concerned in raids; the opening of a road as had been before proposed; and the maintenance of more frequent intercourse with the Garos by the European Officers of Goalpara. Nothing, however, was done on his report (1853).

Up to the close of 1856 <sup>(3)</sup> there seems to have been a break in the story of Garo outrages. In that year, however, they again recommenced, and were numerous and atrocious on both the Goalpara and Mymensing frontiers. It is not necessary to enter into details. On each occasion attempts more or less futile were made to procure the surrender of the offenders, but no comprehensive policy was laid down, nor was any vigorous effort made to change the nature of our relations with the hillmen. The post of Garo Serbarakar, an Officer through whom our communications with the Garos had for many years been managed, was abolished, and various changes effected in the establishments kept up at the Garo hâts and in the Garo Frontier Police: but no radical reform of policy, such as the circumstances called for, was undertaken. Between May 1857 and October 1859 nine raids were made by Garos into Goalpara and 20 heads taken. The offer of rewards, closing of hâts, and summons to Chiefs, had no effect in getting surrender of offenders.

(1) Judicial Proceedings, 30th June 1853, Nos. 142-46.

Judicial Proceedings, 6th September 1853, Nos. 173-76.

Judicial Proceedings, 16th February 1854, Nos. 92-98.

Judicial Proceedings, 12th January 1854, Nos. 203-6.

(2) Judicial Proceedings, 21st June 1855, Nos. 120-25.

Judicial Proceedings, 22nd November 1855, Nos. 225-31.

Judicial Proceedings, 12th June 1856, Nos. 162-66.

Judicial Proceedings, 12th January 1854, No. 139. (Mills' Report.)

(3) Judicial Proceedings, 2nd January 1857, Nos. 251-52.

Judicial Proceedings, 16th June 1857, No. 245.

Judicial Proceedings, 9th July 1857, Nos. 279-80.

In 1859 the Commissioner of Assam reported<sup>(1)</sup> that Garo raids were on the increase, and the policy of closing the hâts had proved ineffectual, inasmuch as it was never followed up by a Military expedition to demand the surrender of offenders as had in the old days been usual. The Commissioner strongly recommended a return to the old policy, which had been abandoned with no good result, and urged the re-appointment of a Garo Serbarakar. Pending the sanction of Government, a small expedition was sent into the hills, and though it did not succeed in arresting the offenders in the late raids, its advance was said to have had a good effect. Government approved of the re-appointment of the Serbarakar, but took no further steps and laid down no definite policy for the future. Further raids in Mymensing followed close upon this. The Commissioner of Assam was called<sup>(2)</sup> upon to suggest a remedy. It was at length determined to send a strong expedition into the hills in the cold weather of 1860-61 to re-open communications with the upland Garos by annual visits of the Principal Assistant at Goalpara, and to increase the establishment of the Serbarakar.

In the beginning of 1861<sup>(3)</sup> the following proposals were laid before Government by the Commissioner of Assam intended further to secure the peace of the Garo frontier:—(1.) It was found that the Mymensing Zemindars had by encroachments on the hills irritated the independent Garos and led to many raids and murders. It was therefore proposed to bring the hill villages over which they claimed jurisdiction under the direct management of Government, as had been done on the Goalpara side, by Regulation X of 1822. (2.) A good road connecting the markets all along the frontier was suggested. (3.) The raising of a frontier Militia was advocated. (4.) It was proposed that a special Officer should be put in charge of the Garo Hills and Frontier, who should, however, reside on the plains. (5.) The re-imposition of the old duty on cotton at the Garo markets was to provide funds to meet the cost of these measures. Government approved only of the first proposal, and negatived or postponed all the rest. The appointment of a special Officer to the Garo Hills "could not," it was said, "be entertained."

The expedition to the hills in the early part of 1861 was made from both Mymensing and Goalpara, and was very successful. The troops remained a month in the hills, during which time they succeeded

(1) Judicial Proceedings, 22nd March 1860, Nos. 30-39.

(2) Judicial Proceedings, 22nd March 1860, Nos. 81-82.  
Judicial Proceedings, 14th June 1860, Nos. 72-73.  
Judicial Proceedings, August 1860, Nos. 263-66.

(3) Judicial Proceedings, September 1860, Nos. 371-76.  
Judicial Proceedings, November 1860, Nos. 234-85.  
Judicial Proceedings, January 1861, No. 359.  
Judicial Proceedings, March 1861, Nos. 267-69.  
Judicial Proceedings, April 1861, Nos. 254-56.  
Judicial Proceedings, July 1861, Nos. 277-82.

in reaching and punishing almost all the offending villages, in realising revenue from many of the dependent Chiefs who had withheld it for years, and in obtaining the submission and fealty of such of the independent Chiefs as were disposed to be friendly. The offenders in the Mymensingh raids were arrested. In submitting the report of this expedition the Commissioner again urged the appointment of a special Officer, and the construction of two roads, one round the base of the hills, and the other right across them. This road, the Commissioner said, would do for the Garos what the road from Gowhatty to Cherra had done for the Khasias, reclaim the country. The proposal was Orders of the Home Government on referred to the Public Works Department. The Secretary of State Garo policy. recorded the following remarks on these proceedings :—

However necessary it may be to teach the inhabitants of these wild districts that they are not inaccessible to the power of Government, it is very clear that we cannot hope to reclaim them from their savage habits, or to induce amongst them a higher state of civilization by the mere display of Military strength.

These objects can only be effected by peaceful means and by gradually increasing our intercourse with them, and I have therefore read with regret the statement of Colonel Jenkins that, 'although the Garos have been nearly a century under our jurisdiction, it is not on record that we have ever had a single Officer who could converse with them in their own language.' This unfavorable state of things will not, I trust, be of longer continuance, and I shall be glad to learn that the proposed annual visits of the Principal Assistant Commissioner, of which I fully approve, and of which a report should, from time to time, be submitted, have established the desired influence with the Chiefs. Should this not be the case, it will be for you to consider whether the permanent location in this territory of a special and carefully selected Officer will not be necessary.

I shall await with interest the decision of the Public Works Department as to the expediency of opening the two roads recommended by Captain Hopkinson. Should the funds necessary for the purpose be available, it should not be forgotten that, independently of the importance of lending every possible aid to the cultivation of cotton in a district favorable to its growth, there is nothing which will tend more to the general improvement and civilization of the country than the increase of its commerce.

The Garos were at this time grouped under three classes :—  
 (1.) Zemindari Garos, those living within the acknowledged boundaries of the great zemindaries and treated by Government under Regulation X of 1822. (2.) Tributary Garos, who admitting our supremacy pay a small yearly tribute. (3.) Bemulwa or Independent Garos, over whom we exercised no control. The collections made from the Garos of the first two classes were realized through the Luskar or Headman of each village; and so long ago as 1824 Mr. Scott, the Commissioner for the north-eastern parts of Rungpore, had disbursed annual money rewards to certain of the principal Luskars who had maintained the peace in their respective jurisdictions. In 1865 proposals for extending and modifying this system were laid before Government<sup>(1)</sup>. The raids and murders by which our frontier had been harassed were as often as not the work of so-called Tributary Garos; and the want of any adequate Police machinery made it very desirable to adopt some means of securing delivery of offenders. It was proposed

(<sup>1</sup>) Judicial Proceedings, July 1865, Nos. 101-3.  
 Judicial Proceedings, February 1866, Nos. 18-20.  
 Judicial Proceedings, March 1866, Nos. 77-79.

therefore to appoint Zimmadars, who might be sometimes also Luskars, for villages and groups of villages, who should for an annual stipend be responsible for the arrest of offenders in their several jurisdictions, and should be vested with powers similar to those of the Dolloies in the Jaintia Hills. This was all approved by Government and settled at a meeting of the Chiefs.

These arrangements did not, however, extend to the Mymensing side of the hills, and early in 1866 <sup>(1)</sup> a most murderous raid was made

Raids of 1866.

by Garos, supposed by us to be Independent, on the plains of that district. An expedition entered the hills and burnt the offending villages. But enquiry showed <sup>(\*)</sup> that the main cause of the raid had been an attempt on the part of the Shoosung Rajah, a Mymensing Zemindar, to levy rents in the hills.

The existence of this chronic irritant on the southern border of the hills, and the fact that a dread of creating blood feuds prevented the Zimmadars from acting of their own authority against independent villages, made it clear to Government that something more was required. Appointment of a special Officer to the Hills. The Lieutenant-Governor accordingly in April 1866 proposed <sup>(2)</sup> to the Government of India the appointment of a special Officer to the charge of the Garo Hills. Sanction being accorded to this, Lieutenant Williamson, who had shown special aptitude for dealing with these tribes, was established on the Toora Mountain as Lieutenant Gregory had been established at Samoogoodting. Similar arrangements were made for roads, buildings, and Police as in the Naga Hills. <sup>(\*)</sup> The offices of Luskar and Zimmadar were at the same time amalgamated, and a rough judicial system inaugurated under Lieutenant Williamson's control.

The success with which this experiment was attended was more immediate and complete in the Garo than in the Naga Hills. Hearty aid was at once given by many Garo Chiefs to Lieutenant Williamson. Relieved by the presence of a strong body of armed Police from the dread of retaliatory feuds, the Headmen became more ready to discharge their duty. Raids ceased, and numerous villages hitherto independent voluntarily became tributary. It was at the outset the policy that no attempt should be made to coerce any neutral independent clan, but all voluntary submission was frankly accepted.

<sup>(1)</sup> Judicial Proceedings, February 1866, Nos. 39-41.

<sup>(2)</sup> Judicial Proceedings, August 1866, Nos. 54-62.

<sup>(\*)</sup> Judicial Proceedings, April 1866, Nos. 48-61.  
Judicial Proceedings, August 1866, Nos. 63-74.  
Judicial Proceedings, December 1866, Nos. 20-28.

<sup>(\*)</sup> Judicial Proceedings, November 1867, No. 185.  
Judicial Proceedings, October 1868, Nos. 156-57.

The history of the administration from this point is one of steady progress in the extension of our rule over the independent clans. In

order to secure this it became necessary to prevent effectually the interference of the landholders of the plains, and this was effected by the passing of Act XXII of 1869 which took the place of Regulation X of 1822. The provisions of the Act were these :—

*An Act to remove the Gáro Hills from the jurisdiction of the tribunals established under the General Regulations and Acts and for other purposes.*

Whereas it is expedient to remove the territory commonly known as the Gáro Hills

Preamble.

from the jurisdiction of the Civil, Criminal and Revenue Courts and offices established under the general Regulations and Acts, and to provide for the administration of justice and the collection of revenue in the said territory; It is hereby enacted as follows :—

Short title.

1. This Act may be called "The Gáro Hills Act, 1869."

Commencement of Act.

Bengal shall, by notification in the *Calcutta Gazette*, direct.

3. On and after such day, Act No. VI of 1835 (so far as it relates to the Khási Hills therein termed 'Cosseyah' Hills), and

Repeal of enactments.

Proviso.

the Bengal Regulation X of 1822 shall be repealed: Provided that such repeal shall not affect any settlement of land-revenue or other matters made under the latter enactment with zamindárs or other persons in any place to which this Act applies.

4. Save as hereinafter provided, the territory known as the Gáro Hills, bounded on the north and west by the District of Gawálpára, on the south by the District of Mymensingh as defined by the Revenue Survey, and on the east by the Khási Hills, is hereby removed from the jurisdiction of the Courts of Civil and Criminal Judicature and from the control of the offices of revenue constituted by the Regulations of the Bengal Code and the Acts passed by any legislature now or heretofore established in British India, as well as from the law prescribed for the said Courts and offices by the Regulations and Acts aforesaid;

And no Act hereafter passed by the Council of the Governor General for making Laws and Regulations shall be deemed to extend to any part of the said territory unless the same be specially named therein.

5. The administration of Civil and Criminal justice and the superintendence of the

Administration of justice and settlement and collection of revenue vested in certain officers.

settlement and realization of the public revenue and of all matters relating to rent within the said territory, are hereby vested in such officers as the said Lieutenant-Governor may, for the purpose of tribunals of first instance or of reference and appeal, from time to time appoint. The officers so appointed shall, in the matter of the administration and superintendence aforesaid, be subject to the direction and control of the said Lieutenant-Governor and be guided by such instructions as he may from time to time issue.

6. Any person liable to be imprisoned in any civil or criminal jail, or to be transported

Place of imprisonment or transportation.

beyond sea, under any order or sentence passed by any officer or Court empowered as provided in this Act, may be imprisoned in any civil or criminal jail, or transported to any place, which the said Lieutenant-Governor may direct.

7. The said Lieutenant-Governor may prevent, by such means as he shall think fit,

Power to prevent private collection of cesses.

the collection by zamindárs or other persons of any cesses, tributes, or exactions, on whatsoever pretence the same may be levied, from the inhabitants of the said territory, and may

make arrangements either for the remission of such cesses, tributes and exactions, or for their collection direct by the officers of Government, making such compensation to zamindars or others justly entitled thereto, for the relinquishment of the same, as may to him seem proper.

8. The said Lieutenant-Governor may, from time to time, by notification in the *Calcutta Gazette*, extend to the said territory any law, or any portion of any law, now in force in the other territories subject to his government, or which may hereafter be enacted by the Council of the Governor General or of the said Lieutenant-Governor for making Laws and Regulations,

and may on making such extension direct by whom any powers or duties incident to the provisions so extended shall be exercised or performed, and make any order which he shall deem requisite for carrying such provisions into operation.

9. The said Lieutenant-Governor may, from time to time, by notification in the *Calcutta Gazette*, extend, *mutatis mutandis*, all or any of the provisions contained in the other sections of this Act to the Jintia Hills, the Naga Hills, and to such portion of the Khási Hills as for the time being forms part of British India.

Every such notification shall specify the boundaries of the territories to which it applies.

10. Whenever a question arises whether any place falls within the boundary of the territory described in section four or within the boundary of any of the territories to which provisions of this Act may be extended under section nine, such officers as the said Lieutenant-Governor shall from time to time appoint may consider and determine on which side of the boundary such place may lie, and the order made thereon by such officer shall be final.

It is perhaps desirable to give a fuller account of the circumstances which led directly to the passing of this Act, and the action taken under it, and the following extract from the Bengal Report of 1870-71 may here be reproduced :—

In the course of the revenue survey of Mymensing in 1857, it became necessary to lay down the northern boundary of that district, and, after due consideration, it was ruled that a line running along the foot of the Garo Hills should be accepted and laid down as the boundary of pergunnahs Shoosung and Sherepore, and that the burden of proving that any part of the hills was included in his zemindary should devolve on the Shoosung Zemindar. The Rajah disputed this order of Government, claiming a considerable tract beyond the survey boundary, as forming part of his permanently settled estate; and his case passed through several revenue and civil courts with varied success. At last it was decided by the full bench, High Court, that the Rajah had not established his title to the land specified in his plaint, but that on the other hand the boundary laid down in the survey map was not the true boundary of his estate, and that he was not bound by that map or by the order of the Collector on the point and the subsequent proceedings based thereon.

From this decision the Government appealed to the Privy Council. But the question involved a political difficulty which in the meantime demanded the serious attention of Government. The cause of many bloody raids committed by the Garo mountaineers, which had often disturbed the peace of the country, had been traced to the interference of the zemindars of the plains with those rude and savage tribes, and it was absolutely necessary, on grounds of public policy, that the zemindars and their agents should be strictly prohibited from having any direct relations with the Garos, and that the whole of the Garo Hills, including all such parts of it as were claimed by the Mymensing zemindars, should be administered by the officers of Government, and the revenues be collected by them. It was clearly with a view to secure these ends that Regulation X of 1822 had been passed, but that Regulation had now failed in its object. The decision of the High Court in the Shoosung Rajah's case declared that the powers given by it affected only the tract specified

in section 2, viz. the thannah jurisdictions of Dhoo bree, Goalpara, and Kurribari, and that the latter part of section 8, which empowered the Governor-General in Council to separate from the zemindar's estate any tract of country inhabited by the Garos, applied only to estates within the tract above described.

Under these circumstances, the Lieutenant-Governor considered it expedient that a new law should be enacted to give effect to the intention of Regulation X of 1822, and also to empower the Government to appoint a commission with final authority to ascertain the actual rights of the Shoosung Rajah beyond the boundary of Shoosung, as laid down by the survey, and to award to him adequate compensation for the resumption of these rights; and that after such award, all right, title, and interests of the Rajah in the country beyond the boundary laid down by the survey should absolutely cease, the Rajah being bound in the interim not to attempt to exercise any authority or collect any revenue beyond the said boundary, under the penalty of being proceeded against under section 188 of the Penal Code, and of forfeiture of all claims to compensation.

The Government of India agreeing generally in these views, Act XXII of 1869 was passed. This Act repealed Regulation X of 1822, defined the Garo Hills "as bounded on the south by the district of Mymensing, as defined by the revenue survey;" removed this territory from the control of the civil and criminal courts and Regulations and Acts; empowered the Lieutenant-Governor to prevent the collection therein by zemindars and others of cesses, &c., on any pretence whatever; and authorized him to make such compensation to those zemindars as he might deem proper. It also provided that in case of boundary disputes the matter should be decided by such officers as the Lieutenant-Governor might appoint, whose decision should be final.

After consultation with the Commissioner of Cooch Behar, it was notified in the Gazette that the Act should take effect from 1st March 1870. The Rajah of Shoosung then appealed to the Secretary of State to disallow the Act. His Grace replied in September that he could not accede to the Rajah's prayer, but he desired that the pecuniary losses which the Rajah or any others might sustain in consequence of the policy enforced by the Act, might be compensated for in a liberal spirit.

Meanwhile, in June 1870, the Commissioner of Cooch Behar had been appointed to investigate the claim of the zemindar of Shoosung and other zemindars to compensation. In October following he submitted a preliminary report, which was mainly devoted to proving the utter worthlessness of the Shoosung Rajah's claim on its merits in the light of the fresh evidence which he had obtained. Several frauds practised by the Rajah were exposed. Looking, however, to the position in which Government had been placed by the acts or negligence of its servants, the Commissioner proposed to close the case without further investigation, by offering the Rajah, as compensation, the sum at which he had valued his suit originally, viz. Rs. 99,000, for his subsequent claim under Act XXII was for 21,00,000! But the Lieutenant-Governor was not satisfied with the grounds for the recommendation, and could not consent to a proposal which was utterly inconsistent with the Commissioner's own statement of facts. His Honor was quite prepared to give the Rajah a liberal compensation for the suspension of any rights which he might prove himself to have possessed, but, in justice to the public, nothing more could be given; and His Honor was therefore clearly of opinion that the Commissioner must fairly face the difficulties of the question, and decide the case upon the facts and evidence that might be forthcoming. The Commissioner was accordingly desired to proceed regularly with reference to Act XXII of 1869, and to report on certain specified points. His Honor considered it necessary that some award be arrived at, determining definitely which of the Rajah's claims were tenable, and to what extent; and that the Commissioner should then make an estimate for compensation that should be fair and at the same time liberal.

In September 1870 the zemindar of Sherepore also sent a memorial to the Secretary of State to disallow the Act. His Grace having already declined to comply with a similar request, it was not considered necessary to send this memorial to him, as it contained no grounds for disallowance which had not been urged with greater force by the Rajah of Shoosung. The Commissioner of Cooch Behar was, however, desired to report specially and fully the extent to which Sherepore was affected by the Act. From his report it appeared that there was no ground to modify the boundary line to which the zemindar of Sherepore objected, nor did it seem that the zemindar had established any claims to compensation. He was informed accordingly, and was further told that if he was dissatisfied he must present a formal claim under section 7, Act XXII of 1869, to the Commissioner of Cooch Behar, the officer appointed by Government to consider and adjudicate upon such claims.

The proposed appeal to the Privy Council in the Shooasang Rajah's case referred to above was abandoned on the advice of the law officers of Government, who were of opinion that Act XXII of 1869 having been passed, there was no object in proceeding with the appeal any further.

In 1872 a raid by the independent Garos upon the dependent village of Damukchiqui led to the adoption of more active measures for subduing the independent clans. I quote from the Bengal Report for 1872-73 :—

In consequence of outrages committed on our dependent villages by communities of independent Garos, the Lieutenant-Governor drew the attention of the Government of India to the absolute necessity which existed for thoroughly reclaiming that part of the Garo Hills which was still independent of control. It was stated that since the policy of direct management of the hill communities had been introduced in 1866, village after village had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner in charge, voluntarily enrolling themselves as British subjects, and proving the genuineness of their action by regular payment of the trifling dues imposed on them. It was shown that a considerable portion of the hills had been thus brought within the pale of regular government. It was explained that the Lieutenant-Governor would have been quite content to wait for the gradual submission of the remaining independent Garos had they on their part been content to live at peace with their neighbours now under our protection; but they had chosen to commence active hostilities by raiding on dependent villages, and frequently gave protection to criminals who had offended against our laws. Conduct like this threatened disturbance, not only to the peace of the Garo district, but danger to the plains of Goalpara and Mymensing, in which on more than one recent occasion the Garo raids had caused considerable panic. The Lieutenant-Governor proposed therefore to put an end to the independence of the savages inhabiting this nook in the midst of British territory, bringing them under the direct control of the Deputy Commissioner, and opening paths through the centre of the hills along which our police could patrol.

The Lieutenant-Governor's proposals met with the approval of His Excellency the Governor-General in Council, and the necessary preparations for an expedition were at once taken in hand. The Lieutenant-Governor, after consulting with Colonel Haughton, the Commissioner, considered it expedient to allow no possible chance of miscarriage in such an enterprise, and provided for the collection of at least 500 armed police, supported on the side of the Khaasi Hills by three companies of regular troops. It was also decided not to commence active operations till the middle of November, by which time it was hoped the country would become tolerably healthy for men from the plains.

The expeditionary force was divided into three columns. One column, under Captain Davis, entered the hills from the Goalpara district on the north by the Nibari Dwar; a second, under Mr. Daly, entered from the Mymensing district on the south, the third or main column, under Captain Williamson, the Deputy Commissioner, marched from Toora, the head-quarters of the Garo Hills district. It was arranged that each column should follow a prescribed route through the independent tract, visiting and enforcing the submission of all villages on its way; and it was hoped that all would meet at a central rendezvous at about the same time. Lieutenant R. G. Woodthorpe, B. E., Assistant Superintendent of Survey, was deputed to conduct survey operations in communication with Captain Williamson.

The expedition was singularly successful. Captain Williamson occupied without opposition Dilmagiri, the leading independent village, which had been concerned in the recent raids, and received the submission of all the hamlets in the neighbourhood. Mr. Daly joined him on the 14th December, after repulsing, without loss of men on his side, an attack which the Garos made on his camp. He, too, had received tenders of submission from most of the villages on his route. Establishing themselves at Rongrengiri, Captain Williamson and Mr. Daly, while waiting for the arrival of the northern column under Captain Davis, visited all the Garo villages within reach, and after receiving their offers of submission, arranged for the payment of the usual small house-tax, occasionally inflicting and realizing fines where opposition had been offered or orders disobeyed, and insisting on the surrender of all skulls kept as trophies of raids.



Captain Davis's column was longer on the road, and did not join the others till the 2nd January. He had, however, visited all the independent villages on both sides of his line of march, and though he had been twice attacked, he had been able to repulse the Garos and punish the offending communities without much difficulty.

During January the remaining independent villages were visited, and submitted. The Garos, convinced apparently that resistance was hopeless, accepted the terms offered them by Captain Williamson, and have, under his directions, been engaged in opening out paths across the hills in several directions, which they will be required hereafter to maintain. The survey had also completed its duty and filled up the blank which has hitherto disfigured the maps.

Captain Williamson has appointed Luskurs, or village representatives in the newly acquired tracts, who will be responsible for management on the system already in force in the dependent villages. The hills have been again traversed by him from end to end with a small guard, and found to be perfectly quiet. A strong police post has been established in the heart of the country hitherto independent; the new state of things has been accepted with a considerable amount of cheerfulness, and great eagerness for trade is manifested on all hands. The expeditionary force has been broken up, and men and officers have returned to their own districts.

Although the success which has been achieved has been rapid and is likely, as the local officers believe, to prove lasting, the Lieutenant-Governor was desirous to leave nothing to chance. The ordinary police force of the Garo Hills number 150 men. These are used solely as military guards, the administration being based on the village system of Luskurs already alluded to. The armed police has now been raised to 300 men, and posts have been so arranged that the authority of Government may be visible and beyond doubt.

Money has been granted to complete the system of roads across the hills, towards the opening of which much has been already done, and no effort is being spared to establish markets and develop trade. Roads and markets ought very speedily to create a social revolution in the hills. Liberal assistance has been promised for educational purposes.

There is much reason to believe that the country is rich in many natural products. Its cotton trade has always been considerable, and was known even in the days of the Moguls; and the Lieutenant-Governor hopes that instead of our having to burn large quantities of cotton in punishment of outrage, as was unhappily necessary in a few instances, we may find here a new source of supply to Manchester. The Deputy Commissioner is now doing what he can, by the introduction of improved seed and by encouraging trade, to develop this cultivation. The timber of the hills is also expected to prove valuable, and, while preserving all reasonable jungle rights of the Garos, Government may expect a fair return from judicious forest operations. Wild elephants are said to be very numerous, and probably khedda operations would prove profitable at an early date.

Since the close of the expedition the Deputy Commissioners of the Garo and Khasi Hills have succeeded in laying down a boundary between their districts, which will moreover soon be connected by a good hill road. The boundary between the Garo Hills and Goalpara is also in need of adjustment, and will in all probability be resurveyed and settled during the ensuing cold season.

The Assam Reports on the Garo Hills district are uneventful until we come to that for 1881-82, from which I take the following extract:—

Later events.

Some disturbances occurred towards the close of the year among the Garo villages in the neighbourhood of Randupara. The tract affected lies between the Didak river on the east, the Roumpani river on the west, the plains of Goalpara on the north, and the villages of Ribugiri on the south.

The immediate cause of the outbreak was the demand for labour to open out a new road from Tura to Bangalkhatin. The jungle clearing necessary for laying down the first trace was obtained without difficulty; but when the earthwork was taken in hand, the inhabitants of a group of some eighteen villages round about Randupara, who had been little visited by European officials, and had never been accustomed to contribute labour for public works, combined to make a strike against the demand for labourers, and threatened further

to injure any other villages which might obey the orders of Government. In consequence, all work was stopped, and some alarm was excited among the Hajong and Rabha inhabitants of the plains villages near Bangalkhata, many of whom left their homes. The Deputy Commissioner of Goalpara, however, pushed forward 50 police towards Bangalkhata, and confidence was restored. On the 18th March, the Deputy-Commissioner of the Garo Hills marched from Tura with 100 police, and in three days reached Ribugiri, the most southerly of the disturbed villages. Only the Lakma, or head of the village, and three men were found here, the rest having run away. The insurgents had expected him to march by the new road, and had assembled in numbers between 200 and 400 to resist his advance, but finding that he took the direct and little-travelled path through Ribugiri they dispersed. Next day Randupara, the head-quarters of the disturbance, was reached. On arriving at the first hamlet which was that of the Lakma Marsin, a man of much influence in this neighbourhood, and one of the ringleaders in the combination, only he and a few men were found seated in the village. No resistance was offered, but when called upon to give up their arms, the men disappeared into the jungle: but subsequently they gave up their arms. At this place the Deputy-Commissioner was joined by the Goalpara police, under Mr. Goad, District Superintendent of Police. Information was next sent to the remaining two hamlets, and the villagers were directed to bring in their arms; but no notice was taken, and on the following day these hamlets were visited. They were found to be perfectly empty, every article, including grain, having been removed; and, as the villagers still refused to come in and give up their arms, the village was fired.

On the 21st March the village of Hamongiri was visited, and here again, as every effort to induce the Lakma and people to come in with their arms proved unsuccessful, the village was burned. After this the remaining villages came in, and the whole combination collapsed, two others of the ringleaders having given themselves up, and a fourth having been arrested. These men have since been released without further punishment, subject only to the condition of reporting themselves periodically to the Deputy-Commissioner, and satisfying him that they are behaving peaceably and well. A stockade has been erected by the Deputy-Commissioner on the Rangai river, three or four miles south of Bangalkhata, to give confidence to the people of the plains.

The Deputy-Commissioner reports that the Lashkars, the fiscal officers in charge of circles of villages, and the Lakmas, or village headmen, have behaved well on the whole. The Lashkars, it is pointed out, have not at present very much influence or authority, but the Deputy-Commissioner is of opinion that in time this may be acquired.

A careful examination of the forests in the Garo Hills has been made, and proposals for the reservation of forests have been submitted.

By a Regulation passed as I of 1876, power was taken to prevent the entry into the hills for trading purposes of unlicensed persons, and to control the acquisition of land within the Hills District. These provisions were necessary to prevent complications and in view of the fact that the Inner Line Regulation could not be applied in a tract like this entirely surrounded by settled territory. Regulation I of 1879 gave legal effect to the finally-delineated boundary between the hills and Goalpara, and Regulation II of 1880 enabled the Chief Commissioner to cancel the operation of any law in force in this and any other uncivilized frontier district.

Considering the character of the Garos, there is wonderfully little crime among them. Many troublesome cases still arise out of old blood-feuds and existing customs which can only be decided of hillmen. The most remarkable of these customs is that of 'compensation.' Under this custom the village headmen demand large sums for the privilege of wearing the 'Tar'—an iron ring on the arm, which is regarded as the badge of respectability. The villagers

are now-a-days very unwilling to pay these fees. "Every Garo's life" (says the Deputy Commissioner) "is spent in giving (or refusing), and demanding 'dai.' A man accuses another *bond fide* of some offence; the accusation is not proved, the accused demands 'dai.' A man's great grandfather was killed 50 or 100 years ago, he demands 'dai' from the heirs of the murderer, and if it be not paid, his heir will demand it in turn, and so on for ever until it is paid. In fact every, even the most frivolous pretext is seized on as an occasion to demand 'dai', and in this way much ill-blood is caused." The Chief Commissioner has said that these fees and fines should be ascertained, recorded, and regulated, care being taken not to give authoritative recognition to customs which are in themselves mischievous and showing a tendency to die out.

## PART III.

## CHAPTER XX.

## HILL TIPPERAH.

Having now completed the survey of the tribes dwelling around the periphery of the Assam Valley, I pass on to notice the hill tracts lying between Sylhet and Cachar on the north and Chittagong on the south.

South of Sylhet we find on the map a considerable tract of hill country marked out as the territory of an independent Ruler—the Rajah of Hill Tipperah. To the east this territory merges into hills inhabited by tribes of Kookies, now known as Lushais, who extend from Cachar on the north to Chittagong on the south—impinging on the east on the confines of Manipur and the Burmese Empire. Of them a full account is given in the next Chapter.

So little is known of the principality of Tipperah, that a sketch of its history,—if history it may be called,—will not be altogether without interest. There have also been discussions in past years in connection with its boundaries a notice of which may be useful for local purposes.

The kings of Tipperah were in their day conquerors and rulers of some consequence. Their glories have been sung in epic verse by the Brahmin bards of their court; and the oldest\* Bengali poem extant is the history of their state. Sprung from the lunar race of Indian princes, Kirát (*the hunter*), exiled by his father Yajáti, founded the city of Tribeg, on the banks of the Brahmaputra. To him succeeded Tripurá, from whom the raj took name, and who is execrated by the Brahmin historian as the opponent of Siva worship, which was then alluring the imaginations and exciting the passions of the people. Tripurá's efforts to suppress the rites of Siva were ineffectual, and to reward the devotion of the people, the deity of the Lingam vouchsafed to Tripurá's widow a son, named after himself, Trilochun, devoted to the worship of the fourteen gods, who increased in wisdom and stature, and presented the unmistakable royal marks.† Blessed with such heavenly favour he of

\* The Ráj Málá, or Annals of Tripurá, very fully analysed by the Reverend J. Long in Vol. XIX of the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*. To this I am indebted for the account of Tipperah before our accession to the Dewani. According to Elphinstone Tipperah was formerly called Yajungger. This name is not however locally known.

† To wit.—A medium height; a moderate nose; a rounded body; well-shaped ears; a deep chest; a modest paunch; elephantine neck; plantain tree legs; with arms turned like the stem of a palm.

course grew great, and neighbouring kings offered him at once their homage and their daughters. In due time Trilochun chose for himself a wife, and married with much pomp and prolonged ceremonies the daughter of the Hindu monarch of Kamrup, which at that time included Hiramba or Cachar. By her he begat twelve sons, after which he lived many days and died in the odour of sanctity and the arms of the Brahmins. Fifty-seven kings, whose names alone are chronicled, succeeded in due course: and the only fact to note in this part of the tradition is, that from the beginning we read of the Kookies in close connection with the reigning Rajah, some serving and some opposing him, just as we find them at the present day.\* On the occasion of a visit paid by one of the kings to the abode of Siva, it would seem that the Kookies brought trouble even into the celestial mansions; for we are told that Siva conceived a violent passion for a Kookie woman in the Rajah's retinue, and that her neck was thereupon broken by a divine kick delivered by Parvati, the jealous spouse of the enamoured deity.

Jajárpá, the seventy-fourth Rajah, invaded Rungamati (Udipur), and in spite of the valour of Nikka, its king, made conquest of the country and fixed there his capital. From this he attacked Bengal, and extended his dominion as far as Amarapura, in Burma. Ratnáfah, the hundred and first Rajah, was a younger brother, who obtained the throne by the aid of 4,000 Mahomedan troops lent him from Gaur. This was probably about 1279 A. D. Ratnáfah received from the king of Gaur the title of Manik, by which all succeeding Rajahs have been known.

In 1512 we find Rajah Chachag Manik conquering Chittagong, and the history becomes full of the contests that raged between the Tripurás and the Mahomedans of Gaur and Dacca. Then we read of Braja Manik, who seems to have exacted fealty from both the Khasi and Sylhet Rajahs, against the former of whom he despatched an army of 1,200 Hárís, or scavengers, armed with hoes (*kodalis*),—a novel idea in warfare, but in this instance of undoubted moral effect, for rather than be defiled by conflict with such base opponents, the Khasi Chief made humble submission. Braja Manik, we are told, employed 1,000 Pathan horsemen, and his successor led an army of 26,000 infantry and 5,000 horse against Bengal. Such was the warlike consequence of the state as recorded in its ancient annals. In 1587 Tripurá came into collision with the Mughls of Arracan and their Portuguese mercenaries. This was the beginning of troubles. Udipur was taken and the Rajah died by poison self-administered. Then came up again the Mahomedans under Futteh Jung Nawab, by order of the Emperor Jehangir, who wanted horses and elephants for his court and camps. Disaster befell the arms of Tripurá, and Jashadhur Manik was sent captive to Delhi. There he was offered his kingdom, if he would pay tribute like many greater princes, and do homage to the peacock throne, but the chronicle tells us he would none of their favors, declaring that his country had been so

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\* A quaint description of the habits and manners of the Kookies, as reported to our officers of last century, will be found in Vol. II of the Asiatic Researches.

harassed by their ravages that no fresh burden could be borne by it. Jaashadpur died an exile at Brindaban, 'meditating on the excellency of Vishnú.' The imperial troops were meantime plundering and impoverishing the Tripurás till pestilence compelled them to desist. In 1625 Kalyán Manik obtained the throne, propitiated Siva and the Brahmins, and defied the Emperor of Delhi. Against him came the Nawab of Moorshedabad with a Mahomedan host and a leather cannon, only to be ingloriously defeated and turned back. Kalyán's successors, however, became subject to the Nawab, and though they ever and again made fierce attempts to shake off the yoke, they never long succeeded. The Mahomedans were able to regulate the succession and exact tribute, and converted the raj into a simple zemindari. The very name of Tripurá\* was changed to Roushanabad. One of the puppet kings set up by them, Bijai Manik, was allowed indeed only a monthly salary of Rs. 12,000, the whole remaining revenues of the country being sent to Dacca. For twelve years after him a Mahomedan, Shumsher Khan, was the virtual ruler, but his oppressions became so great, and his remittances so uncertain, that the Nawab of Dacca, acting with strict impartiality, had him blown from the mouth of a gun.

In 1761 the contumacy of Kishen Manik, the Raja who succeeded,†

Annexation by the British.

led to the last phase in the history of the kingdom. On the 20th January of that year, Governor Vansittart, representative of the Company now entering on its strange career of empire, writes from Calcutta to the President and Council of the Factory at Islamabad as follows: "With regard to the Tipperah Rajah, as the Nawab's Foujdar has been obliged from his ill behaviour to take up arms against him, we desire that you will use your endeavours to reduce him to his due state of obedience to the Government of Islamabad, acquainting us then what advantages may accrue to the Company from the possession of that country, and we will answer any representations the Nawab may make on the subject." In accordance with this order Mr. Verelst, the chief at Islamabad (Chittagong), despatched Lieutenant Mathews with 200 sepoys and two guns to Tipperah, where the Nawab's Dewan

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\* The conquest of Tippera by the Muhammedans is thus described in Stewart's History of Bengal, page 427, on the authority of Muhammedan writers:—"The Moghul Troops crossed the Burhampooter and entered Tippera before the Raja was aware of their intentions; and having the young man with them whose cause they had espoused (a refugee nephew of the Raja's:) he pointed out to them the road by which they should advance. Aided by such a guide they reached the capital before the Raja could make any preparation to oppose them: he was obliged to flee to the mountains: and the nephew was raised to the *Raj* upon condition of paying a large portion of the revenue to the Governor of Bengal. The whole country in consequence quietly submitted, and thus the province of Tippera which, from time immemorial had been an independent kingdom, became annexed to the Moghul empire; and in order to support the Young Raja against his uncle and at the same time to secure his fealty, a considerable number of Muhammedan troops were left in the country under the command of Aka Sadik who was nominated Foujdar."

† See the case of Ramgunga Deo, *Appellant*, vs. Durgamoni Jubraj, *Respondent*, in the Select Reports of the Sudder Dewani Adalat for 1809, where a complete pedigree of the Tipperah kings from Kalyán Manik downwards is given.

was already operating with Mahomedan troops. The Dewan had reported that "he had obliged the Rajah to take to the mountains, and had got possession of every fort in his country." On the arrival of our troops the Rajah at once put himself in their hands. A collector of revenue was dispatched from Chittagong with instructions to inquire into the resources of the country and demand payment of the expenses of the expedition. The collector found the province desolated by the Nawab's troops, and was compelled to take payment by instalments "as the Rajah was very low in cash." The revenue for the first year was fixed at one lakh and one sicca rupees.

Not a word is found in these old papers recognising the independence of the Rajah in any part of his dominions. In fact, no reference is made to the hills in connection with the arrangements. The officers of the Company had more regard to substantial advantages than to theoretical symmetry. The paying part of Tipperah lay on the plains, and appeared in the Mahomedan revenue roll as *pergunnah* Roushanabad. For this of course a settlement was made. We found it a *zemindari*, and as such we treated it. But of the barren hills that fenced it on the east we took no cognizance. Covered with jungle and inhabited by tribes of whom nothing was known, save that they were uncouth in speech and not particular as to clothing, the hills were looked upon as something apart. The Rajah claimed to exercise authority within them, but did not, as it seemed, derive much profit from them. Accordingly the hills became 'Independent Tipperah,' and the Rajah who is an ordinary Bengali *zemindar* on the plains, reigns an independent prince over 3,000 square miles of upland, and was for many years a more absolute monarch than Scindia or Puttiala,—owning no law but his sovereign will, bound by no treaty, subject to no control, safe in his obscurity from criticism or reform. And yet nothing can be more certain than the fact that the Mogul Government, through whom our paramount title comes, would have recognized no such vital distinction between the highlands and lowlands of the Tipperah State. It may be true that they never carried their armies in victorious march through the bamboo thickets of the hills, or harried with fire and sword the wattled wigwams of the Kookie tribes; but when they appointed whom they would as Rajah, both hill and plain passed with the one *sunnud* which they gave. They would have scoffed at the idea of independence in any fragment of the entity they conveyed. Indeed the chief object of their invasion having been to secure horses and elephants for purposes of state or war, to have excluded the hills from the periphery of their conquest would have cut them off from the very source of these\* supplies.

The Company sought rupees, not elephants, and so the hills were left to their native ruler, and no misgiving seems to have cropped up that trouble would hereafter result from such a course. Trouble did result, not so much from the actual independence of the Rajah as from

\* For elephant-catching in Tripurá, see Volume III. of the *Asiatic Researches*, 1792.

a want of definiteness in our relations to him, from the absence of any means of knowing what went on in his territory, and from the denial of that salutary control and advice, without which our best feudatories come to certain grief.

Kishen Manik, the last Rajah appointed by the Moguls, died in 1780. Rajender Manik who succeeded him was invested by the British Government, but not till 1785. He appears to have been in trouble for the greater part of his reign. The zemindari was taken into *khas* or direct management by the Resident. The Rajah was in 1783 sent prisoner to Chittagong on a charge of harbouring dacoits, and it was not till 1792 that he was admitted to settle for his estate on the plains. He was from the outset, however, undisturbed in his possession of the hills, where he married a daughter of the Manipur Rajah, and was victorious over the outer Kookies who made a savage inroad into his territory. As he grew old he became devout, made an image of eight metals for the shrine of Brindabun, and died in 1804, an ascetic of the holiest grade. From 1804 to 1810 the affairs of Hill Tipperah were the subject of constant debate in the Council Chamber of Government and in the Courts of law. The succession was disputed, and *quoad* the zemindari the disputants were referred to the ordinary tribunals, the strongest meantime seizing on the highlands and making the most of the opportunity which law delays allowed him.

The correspondence of the time and the proceedings in the courts throw a curious light upon the Disputed successions, customs and internal economy of this little State. It is the prerogative of the reigning Rajah to devise the succession by appointing in his own life-time a Jubráj, or crown prince, who may or may not be his own son, but must be a scion of the royal house. He also appoints another of the stock to be Burra Thakur, who would succeed in default of a living Jubráj at the time of the Rajah's death. Rajender Manik had so nominated Durgamoni, descended from an elder branch, to be Jubráj, and Ramgunga, his own son, to be Burra Thakur. On the death of the Rajah, Ramgunga seized on the *guddi*, or cushion of sovereignty, and had he been able to seize also Durgamoni, would have speedily made himself *de jure* as well as *de facto* rajah. Durgamoni, however, escaped, and lost no time in gathering together men and means for the expulsion of the usurper. All the feelings of the people turned to the anointed Jubráj. Ramgunga was disliked for the sacrilege of his conduct, and the tyranny and suspicion which he evinced upon all occasions. Durgamoni was soon able to advance on his expedition, but the British authorities interfered, and insisted on his bringing a suit to establish his right to the zemindari, promising at the same time to postpone recognition of the Rajah until the case was concluded. Durgamoni acquiesced in this decision. Ramgunga was, however, permitted to remain in possession of the zemindari, though his authority was not acknowledged in the hills beyond Agurtolla. The evidence of the principal officers of the raj was taken by the Court of Circuit at Dacca, and was entirely in Durgamoni's



favor. Ramgunga avenged himself by loading with indignities and chains the families of the witnesses which he had in his power. He also oppressed the Poitoo Kookies in such fashion as made them ready allies of the other malcontents, who at length, in 1808, made a determined attack on Hill Tipperah from the side of Chittagong. The local officers, at Ramgunga's request, lent him troops and police, and but for this assistance he would assuredly have been expelled, for we are told the whole country not occupied by our arms was hostile to him. The invaders not understanding our action boldly charged us with inconsistency, for we had told them, they said, some years before that 'the Company had no concern with the Tipperah territory.\*' The Council at Calcutta were not, indeed, even now altogether satisfied that its local officers had done well in preventing revolution and bloodshed. At any rate they forbade the adoption of further active measures against the insurgents, and deputed a Special Commissioner to enquire into their grievances and endeavour by arbitration to restore quiet. In 1809 the Sudder Dewanny Adalat gave judgment in Durgamoni's favor, declaring the zemindari an integral portion of an impartible raj, to which he, as nominated Jubraj, should succeed. The Government accordingly invested him with the insignia of kingship as regarded the hills, while the courts gave him possession of the lands on the plains.†)

No one can fail to see how inconveniently the fiction of independence worked in this case. Years of misery to the people might have been avoided, had Government assumed the paramount position which it historically occupied, and which the application for investiture virtually recognized. The zemindari and the raj being treated as impartible, Government might well have decided forthwith whom it would accept as heir. But the case was too petty to demand a policy, and the succession of the Tipperah raj has three times been disputed in our courts.†

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\* How much doubt as to our position existed is seen from the fact that in 1800 offers were made to the Board for a farm of the mountains of Tipperah. In rejecting this the Board say that 'they conclude that the mountains form a part of the estate of the Raja of Tipperah, and that they are included in his existing engagements executed by him for the general settlement of his zemindari.' In reply to this the Collector reports that "on a reference to the tahood, &c., executed by the Raja for the general settlement of his zemindari, it does not appear that the mountains of Tipperah are included, but they have always been considered as constituting his property; neither does it appear from the records that he ever paid any revenue to Government for them for the last twenty-two years (since the time of Mr. Campbell)."

In 1827, Sumbhoo Chunder Deb Thakur, a relative of the Raja's, offered to farm the hills at a jumma of Rs. 25,000. This offer was rejected, as they had been so long unassessed, and had come to be looked upon as independent territory.

† Now that an appeal lies also to the Privy Council, the delay in the settlement of opposing claims is very great. Birchunder Manik succeeded in 1862, but was only invested in 1870.

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(†) Judicial Proceedings, 15th October 1808, Nos. 1 to 10.  
 Judicial Proceedings, 4th November 1808, Nos. 6 to 10.  
 Judicial Proceedings, 6th January 1809, Nos. 50 & 51.  
 Judicial Proceedings, 8th February 1809, No. 22.  
 Judicial Proceedings, 11th February 1809, Nos. 11 & 12.

The visits of Europeans to the interior of the country were until lately so few and far between, that it is interesting to note the description given of its internal economy by the Special Commissioner in 1808. The territory was, he says, 120 miles in length, and varied in breadth from 20 to 80 miles. The inhabitants were of two very distinct classes: One 'which doubtless originally came from China, but was now of the Hindoo persuasion; the other, a people called Kookies or Coccis.' The former lived in the valleys, the latter on the hills. "The persons composing the Government or possessing the chief management of the country (says the narrative) are Hindoos. Among the Kookie vassals, however, as well as amongst the Hindoo inhabitants, a distinction of rank prevails. The chief men among the Kookies are called Roys, Ghalims, Chuppiahs, and Gaboors; those of the Hindoos are called Senaputty and Burroahs. The persons holding the rank now mentioned are called Sirdars or petty Chiefs, and they, in all classes, are the intermediate authority and sole connection between the Government and the inferior vassals. The power or influence of these Chiefs over the vassals within their respective jurisdictions is of the strongest kind. A person who has influence to bring over all these Sirdars to his party has actual possession of the country." (This referred to their attachment to Durgamoni.) For the protection of the country there were three or four military or police posts. The fighting men numbered about 1,000 Hindoo matchlock men and 3,000 Kookies, armed with spears and bows, all under the command of their respective Sirdars. The officers of the raj were four in number. First, the Soobah who acted as Commander-in-Chief; second, the Vizier in charge of the revenue; third, the Nazir, who managed the police; and, lastly, the Dewan, who controlled the accounts. These offices, though in the Raja's gift, were practically hereditary.

In 1813 Durgamoni Manik died, and as he had appointed no Jub-ráj, Ramgunga, his former antagonist, succeeded, as being the Burra Thakur named by Rajender Manik. His title was disputed\* in the courts, but was affirmed by the Sudder Dewanny Adalat in 1815. So strong appears to have been the reverence entertained by the people for the custom of their kingdom, that Ramgunga had now no difficulty in securing their allegiance, and we hear of no disturbances in his territory down to time of his death in 1826. He was succeeded by Kashi Chunder Manik, his brother, who died early in 1830, and was succeeded by another brother Krishen Kishore Manik. In 1850 Ishan Chunder Manik, son of Krishen Kishore, came to the throne, and his application to be let off payment of the succession fee (111 gold mohurs) was refused by the Government. In 1862 Ishan Chunder died and was

\* See Select Reports, Sudder Dewanny Adalat, for 1815, Vol. II., page 177, Urjun Manik Thakur and others vs. Ramgunga Deo.

succeeded by Bir Chunder Manik, the present Rajah, whose title was, as we have noted, finally affirmed in 1870.<sup>(1)</sup>

It would seem that as soon as the Tipperah Rajahs had assured themselves of the mild character of our Government, and realized the fact that in some part, at any rate, of their ancestral territory they were to be completely free from control, they diligently set themselves to enlarge the borders of their independent kingdom on its further sides. They carried on a desultory warfare with the various Kookie tribes living on the east of their State and reduced many villages to subjection. The various septs of Poitoo Kookies to this day acknowledge a sort of allegiance to Tipperah, which varies according as the Rajah is strong or weak, but which drags him into their quarrels with the outer tribes, and has more than once involved in disaster neighbouring villages in British territory. Until very recently Tipperah would admit no definite limit to its territory on the north-east.

During the war with Burma much correspondence took place regarding the topography and routes of the north-east frontier.<sup>(2)</sup>

Notices of Tipperah in 1824.

At the request of Government the Tipperah Rajah garrisoned, or said he had garrisoned, all the passes leading through his hills to Cachar and Sylhet to repel any possible invasion of the Burmese.

There was, indeed, a very general fear that Tipperah would suffer as did Cachar and Manipur. Other elements of danger and disturbance was also present. In June 1824 intelligence<sup>(3)</sup> was received that Sumbhoo Thakur, brother of the Rajah, whose claim to succeed had been rejected by the Sudder Dewanny Adalat, had set up the standard of rebellion in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, and prohibited the Joomea cultivators from paying revenue to Government. A reward of Rs. 5,000 was offered for his apprehension. His property, both in Hill and Plain Tipperah, was ordered to be confiscated; and if caught, he was to be summarily tried by martial law.

It has been mentioned that one of the Tipperah Rajahs married a daughter of the Manipuri stock. This fact seemed to indicate a means of direct communication between those kingdoms, and Government caused efforts to be made to discover the line of route. It was

(<sup>1</sup>) Secret Proceedings, 30th March 1826-27, Nos. 17 to 20.  
General Proceedings, 28th November 1849, No. 77.  
Political Proceedings, April 1862, No. 22.

(<sup>2</sup>) Secret Proceedings, 14th May 1824, No. 10.  
Secret Proceedings, 18th June 1824, Nos. 28-29.  
Secret Proceedings, 3rd September 1824, No. 28.

(<sup>3</sup>) Secret Proceedings, 18th June 1824, No. 40.  
Secret Proceedings, 2nd July 1824, No. 46.

found that a road did exist, but instead of passing into the interior right across the Tipperah Hills, it ran along the outer margin of the hills on the north-west through parts of Sylhet into Hylakandy, in Cachar, and thence through "a Kookie village called Thanghum" into Manipur.<sup>(1)</sup> There were disputes between the Cachar and Tipperah Rajahs as to the possession of parts of Hylakandy, and the Tipperah Rajah set forth claims to the all egance of all the Kookies lying south of Cachar. Thanghum mentioned above was on the right bank of the Surmah, three days' journey from Bansbandi, in Cachar. In an interesting report submitted to the Secret Department in 1824, we find that the Poitoo Kookies, numbering 50 to 60 thousand, and occupying the whole of the eastern and part of the northern hills were said to be the most turbulent and formidable of the tribes: and the Rajah to reduce them to obedience was anxious to establish a thanna at Thanghum, the inhabitants of which place were described by him as orderly and obedient. Government, while raising no objection to his doing so, declined to associate British troops with his guards on that frontier. It is very clear that the authority exercised over the Kookies was more nominal than real, for in every case we find the roads from post to post take long detours so as to pass through the plains, and not across the hills; the reason given being always "for fear of the Kookies." In this same report the Raja is described as a weak and stupid man, entirely in the hands of one or two Bengali amlah.

In 1828 representations<sup>(2)</sup> were made from Manipur that the Tipperah Rajah was about to attack Tanghun or Thanghum, although the Manipur Chief had a thanna in the place. Enquiry was made by the Commissioner in Sylhet, who found that, though originally attached to Tipperah, Tanghun had been held by Manipur for four or five years. A report by Pemberton showed that it was a village of Khonjais, lying west of the Surmah or Barak in the bend of that river and close to Manipur. This shows how far Tipperah reached at one time. Government refused to let the Tipperah Rajah march men to Tanghun.

On the north the Raj was for a long time almost equally aggressive. From the main cluster of hills lying south of Sylhet, branches and spurs run northward into the plains, enclosing valleys of varying breadth, whose drainage falls into one main stream, having its sources well to the south and flowing northward into the Sylhet rivers. Long before the Musulman conquest these valleys were under cultivation. They belonged to Tipperah in its palmy days: and even now one stumbles on ruined palaces and ghats and tanks, attesting the civilization of a former age. But the country had long since lapsed to jungle; and when the British took possession of Sylhet, there interposed between that district and Tipperah a broad belt of deadly forest into which

(1) Secret Proceedings, 30th July 1824, Nos. 6 & 7.

(2) Secret Proceedings, 18th July 1828, No. 8.

Secret Proceedings, 17th January 1829, Nos. 5 to 10.

the Joomea\* went annually with trembling to raise a scanty crop, thankful if ravenous beasts and savage men permitted him to return in safety. Cultivation under our rule began to extend once more into these valley bottoms: and from the earliest years of our records we find that they were held to belong to the Sylhet District. Large tracts were permanently settled with lowlanders in 1790. As their possession became an object of value, attempts were made by the Tipperahs to encroach upon the plains, and pretensions have been from time to time up to a very recent date advanced, which have given much trouble to Government, chiefly from the fact that our record rooms serve only as the tombs of past transactions, for which there has hitherto been no resurrection.

In 1809, on the Sylhet frontier, a bitter enmity subsisted between the land-owners of the plains and the Rajah's people. Every outlying hill was claimed as belonging to the Rajah. Small properties were bought by him at auction or by private contract, and occupied by bands of armed Tipperahs, who bullied their Bengali neighbours and produced a state of terrorism now-a-days unknown. The Government had to interpose in the most determined manner, and one or two resolute Magistrates soon restored order. In 1819 things had again come to a crisis. The chronic irritation subsisting between the Hill Tipperahs and the outer Kookies led to frequent depredations, in which British villages were sacked and plundered, and orders were at last given for laying down a definite and easily recognised boundary which would enable Government to fix upon the Rajah the responsibility of keeping order in his own markets, and preventing the passage of marauders to the defenceless plains. An attempt was at the same time to be made to gain a knowledge of and conciliate the tribes taking part in these attacks. In three years' time such a boundary was laid down by Lieutenant Fisher.<sup>(1)</sup> The Rajah was, however, dissatisfied with it, though it had been settled in communication with his own agents, and its declaration was immediately followed by a murderous attack upon a party of cultivators going into the British hills to joom, the perpetrators of the outrage being undoubtedly Tipperahs.<sup>(2)</sup> The Rajah, when applied to, of course threw the blame on the independent Kookies, and took no real pains to discover the murderers. He was startled from his apathy by receiving a letter from Government, worded in the most peremptory terms, stating at

\* The Joomeas cultivated by cutting down and burning the forest and sowing mixed seeds among the ashes. For correspondence regarding "Joomka. Jummas" in Sylhet reference may be made to—

Judicial Proceedings, 8th May 1823, No. 22.

Judicial Proceedings, 5th June 1823, No. 15.

Judicial Proceedings, 21st August 1823, No. 31.

Judicial Proceedings, 9th April 1824, Nos. 1 to 5.

(<sup>1</sup>) Judicial Proceedings, 22nd May 1822, No. 42.

Judicial Proceedings, 6th June 1822, No. 44.

(<sup>2</sup>) Judicial Proceedings, 6th June 1822, Nos. 39 & 40.

Judicial Proceedings, 15th May 1823, Nos. 7 to 12.

length the proofs of the complicity of his people if not of himself, and containing the following remarkable passage :—

You seem to have adopted the plan of committing these murders and other acts of violence as a means of taking revenge on the zemindars and ryots of this Government who have opposed you. Considering the very strong presumptions against you, resulting from the above circumstances, the Governor General in Council was prepared to have ordered you personally to be called in to be put on your trial in the courts of Government for instigating the murders in question. In his consideration however for you, he has now ordered that you shall in the first instance be called upon by this letter, through the Magistrate of Tipperah, to state whatever you may desire to urge in explanation, within twenty days from the receipt of this.

The Rajah's defence consisted in a reiteration of his former excuses. The proof against him, though morally strong, was not legally perfect, and the Government was content to drop the case with a solemn warning as to his future conduct. At the same time he was told that, if he could shew to the satisfaction of the civil courts that the boundary line was incorrect, Government would alter it; nay, further, if he could prove that he had any right to collect dues from the Joomeas within British territory on the ground of protection afforded them, or for any other reason, these rights should be acknowledged. He was at the same time permitted to purchase any lands he chose, but was warned that in these he would have no sovereign rights.

The Rajah at this time had not, it would appear, any efficient control over the Kookies to the eastward.

Relations with the Kookies.

He did, indeed, lay claim to their homage and tribute, but it is doubtful whether he was strong enough to coerce any who did not choose voluntarily to give these. The hill ranges over which his nominal supremacy extended ran southward from Sylhet, and were inhabited by Poitoo, Thanghum, and other Kookies, who visited the plains for purposes of trade and barter, and were in the habit of receiving yearly presents from the frontier zemindars either as a sort of blackmail, or as an inducement to bring down their forest products. Wood-cutters going into their hills also, no doubt, made them payments of some kind as the price of safety. Failure to acknowledge their claims invariably led to bloodshed. In September

Kookie murders in 1826.

1826, a party of Sylhet wood-cutters was massacred by the Kookies under a Chief called 'Buntye' in the hills above the Simla River, ten miles to the west of the Dullessuri. (1) Messengers sent up by the Magistrate visited the village of 'Buntye,' three days' journey into the hills on the Lungai River, and ascertained that the alleged cause of the outrage was that the zemindars of Pertabgur had withheld the annual presents. Two of the messengers were detained by Buntye. The third, after being favoured with a ghastly inspection of the wood-cutters' heads, was allowed to return to bring up the blackmail due. He was not allowed to communicate with the 'Linden' and 'Laroo' Kookies living further up the stream, but was sent back hot-foot into the plains. Government to save the lives of the two unfortunates left in Buntye's hands authorized the payment of the ransom demanded, but ordered the closure of the markets to all Kookies, and directed enquiry as to the possibility of

(1) Judicial Proceedings, 15th February 1827, Nos. 30 to 32.  
Judicial Proceedings, 22nd February 1827, Nos. 30 to 32.

reaching Buntye with troops. The Tipperah Rajah was also called upon to help. Nothing however came of this. In the records the story ends as abruptly as it begins.

The apathy with which the Rajah of Tipperah, notwithstanding repeated warnings, treated every demand made upon him for assistance either to redress outrage or surrender offenders, save when his own interests were threatened, is again well illustrated by the following case : In July 1836, Ram-kanoo Thakur, a relative of the Rajah,\* at the head of a band of Mughis, Chuckmas, Kookies, and Tipperahs, numbering some three or four hundred men, attacked the homestead of Meroki Choudri, a substantial land-owner of Kundul, in Zillah Tipperah, killed fifteen persons, wounded others, plundered the premises, and burnt them to the ground. This was a most atrocious massacre. The leading perpetrators were well known. Their band had been got together in the Rajah's territory. The Rajah was fully able to give the most effective assistance in their apprehension. To the demand for this he sent merely a curt return that they were not resident in his jurisdiction. This was known to be false. Fortunately for the ends of justice, it happened that at this time the Commissioner of Chittagong raised several important questions as to the proper limits of the Raja's territory, and his right to levy certain dues within his zemindari. No sooner had this matter also come before Government, than the Rajah, to improve his position with the authorities, sent in Ram-kanoo Thakur, who had been residing quietly in a village of Hill Tipperah from the very time of the outrage.<sup>(1)</sup>

So anomalous has the position of Hill Tipperah been, that it is only of late years that the principles of the extradition law have been applied in our dealings with that State. We find that sometimes British subjects were surrendered at the Raja's request; at others our courts were directed by the Government to inquire into cases beyond the border when it was doubtful whether either of the parties were British subjects. No treaty existing to define the limits or conditions of extradition, the demands both of the Hill Tipperah and of the British authorities have extended to all classes of criminals. But in every instance it has been the monotonous and never ceasing complaint of our Magistrates that real and hearty assistance was never to be looked for from Agurtolla.

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\* Every rebellious member of the Raja's family sought refuge among the Kookies and incited them to outrage. In May 1843 Bugwan Chunder Thakur, son of Shumboo Thakur, who had intrigued against the Raja, brought down a band of Kookies and burnt the village of Burmatooa, in Thannah Chagalneya, Zillah Tipperah. Though the Raja could not be held responsible for the acts of his enemies, it is certain that had his police been at all efficient, war parties of savages could not have passed across his territory and down the ghâts ostensibly held by his posts, without due notice having been given and some attempt being made to stop them. This view of matters was strongly pressed upon him but without much ultimate effect.

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(1) Judicial Proceedings, 18th September 1836, Nos. 43 to 46.  
 Judicial Proceedings, 25th October 1836, No. 86.  
 Judicial Proceedings, 8th November 1836, Nos. 35 to 37.  
 Judicial Proceedings, 25th November 1836, No. 71.  
 Judicial Proceedings, 16th May 1837, Nos. 66 & 67.

I may notice here a very interesting discussion as to the nature and extent of the Rajah's privileges as an independent chieftain which arose in 1836.<sup>(1)</sup> It had always of late years been the policy of the Rajah's advisers, European and Native, to insist on the absolute independence of his hill territory as never, according to them, having been subdued by the Mogul. They urged accordingly that in treating with him the British Government should be guided only by the law of nations, and they repudiated, so far as they were able, the existence of any paramount authority or any real control over the actions of their master in the hills. Now, in the years 1790, 1791, and 1792, the Government had abolished throughout Bengal all those internal transit duties and cesses which, under the generic name of *sayer*, were a fruitful source of revenue to the zemindars. Regulation XXVII of 1793 consolidated and perpetuated the policy of Government on this subject. Compensation and remissions of revenue were given to all zemindars affected by this order, and among others the Rajah, as proprietor of 'chuckla Roushanabad', got a remission of Rs. 28,000 from his annual jumma on this account. In 1836 the Commissioner of Chittagong found that duties similar to those abolished were levied on bamboo, cotton, and other articles of hill produce, under the Rajah's orders, within the permanently-settled estate of Roushanabad. The Rajah's contention was that these duties were not those for which he got compensation forty years before; that as an independent prince, he was entitled to impose what taxes he pleased in his own kingdom; and that the collection of these at the frontier of his zemindari was a mere matter of convenience, with which he prayed that Government would not interfere.

The nature of the duties was thus described in 1788 :—

The Sair Noornugger and Sen Ghât principally consist of a variety of ghâts, chowkhies, and phandies along the foot of the hills, from one extremity of the province to the other, an extent of about 100 miles. At these ghâts, &c., are collected duties upon every article brought out of and carried into the hills. The interior parts of the hills are cultivated by those uncivilized tribes of people called Tippieree, Kookie, Lushia, Ruang, &c., who are subjects of the Raja and entirely independent of the English Government. The chief produce of the hills is cotton, rice, pepper, and different kinds of turkarry. The cotton is cultivated for the purpose of bartering it for the different necessities of life with which they require to be furnished from the low countries, such as salt, tobacco, dried-fish, earthen pots, spirituous liquors, &c. This, of course, induces numbers of beparees to carry those articles into the hills. In return they bring down cotton; and as they are obliged to pass these ghâts, &c., they are taxed highly not only for what they carry up, but also for what they bring down. The rates of taxes vary upon each article at every different ghât, of which there are no less than fifty-two. Upon an average, fifteen and twenty thousand maunds of cotton are brought down yearly, which is purchased in common seasons for Rs. 2 and Rs. 2-4 per maund, and the duties collected are nearly equal to the prime cost of the cotton. Dependent on the Sair Noornugger and

(1) Judicial Proceedings, 11th October 1836, Nos. 92 to 94.  
 Judicial Proceedings, 26th October 1836, No. 35.  
 Judicial Proceedings, 15th November 1836, Nos. 57 to 61.  
 Judicial Proceedings, 6th June 1837, Nos. 70 to 79.  
 Judicial Proceedings, 15th August 1837, Nos. 38 to 41.  
 Judicial Proceedings, 27th December 1838, Nos. 71 to 74.  
 Judicial Proceedings, 12th June 1843, Nos. 28 & 29.  
 Judicial Proceedings, 14th August 1843, Nos. 52 & 53.



Sen Ghât are numbers of *assamies*,\* who are taxed with an unceasing jumma; that is to say, they are obliged to bring down yearly a certain quantity of cotton the duties of which, according to the established rates, should amount to the jumma with which they are respectively charged, and they are obliged to pay the amount of the jumma, whether they have brought down the cotton or not; and they have no way of ridding them of the burden but by flying the province. This custom has existed from so long a time back, that it is impossible to trace its origin. Any person carrying on a traffic in the hills for two or three years together renders himself liable to it. It is customary also for the farmers of the *sair mehals* to exact arbitrary fines from those whom they detect smuggling any goods past their ghâts. This also is a source of great oppression, but the practice has existed from time immemorial. Timbers, bamboos, ratans, and straw, pay also a heavy duty as they pass by the ghâts of the *sair mehal*. Besides these ghâts, &c., within and along the hills, there are several situated in many of the *pergunnahs* which are also dependent on the *sair mehals*, and nothing passes them without paying a duty. This is also levied at times on passengers and on ready money.

Upon this, Government in 1788 authorized the abolition of such part of the *sayer* duties of Noornugger and Sen Ghât as were levied in the ghâts and roads leading to the hills and came under the description of *chelunta* or *rahdari*, and likewise the remission of such portions of the jumma of the *sayer* as on inquiry might be deemed adequate to the amount realized from the collections. In reply to enquiry upon this point it was reported that "the whole of the duties were *chelunta* or *rahdari*, and they fell heaviest on the Tippieree, Kookie, Lushai, Ruang, &c., all inhabitants of the hills; for if it was not for the high duty with which their cotton is charged, they would get a better price for it; and again, if it was not for the duties with which the goods they receive in barter were charged, the *beparees* would be able to sell them cheaper." The Government resolved accordingly to abolish the whole of these duties as oppressive from their nature and the mode in which they were levied, the object avowedly being the protection and welfare of the inhabitants of the hills, as well as of their more immediate subjects. As already stated, when Rajender Manik was admitted to settlement he got a remission of Rs 25,000 from his jumma on this account.

Now, however, the Rajah claimed to levy as independent Chief that portion of these duties which was imposed on the produce of the hills. The Government at first held that the Raja could have no claim to enjoy at the same time the remission in perpetuity granted in 1792 and the proceeds of the duties then forbidden to be levied. It decided that he was neither as chief nor as *zemindar* entitled now to impose such.

Subsequently this decision (of Lord Auckland's) was reversed by his successor on grounds which are fully set out in a letter printed in the Appendix.

I have already referred to the need which had been felt for a proper determination of the boundary between Hill Tipperah and the adjoining District of Sylhet. We have seen that in 1822 the Rajah objected to Lieutenant Fisher's survey, although this had been made in company with his own agents. Government had, however, adopted the line so laid down, informing the Rajah that, although he could not himself be sued

\* "Byots," "dependants."

in the courts of Sylhet, yet he was at liberty to sue the Government and the zemindars jointly in those courts, if he thought he could establish his claim to any lands outside the line, and Government would honour the decision of its own tribunal and make over to him any lands he might prove to be his. No advantage was taken of this offer till 1832, when he instituted four suits in the Sylhet Court in the manner suggested. The cases were pending many years. The local court at first held that it could not try the suits, inasmuch as to assert jurisdiction therein assumed the case against the plaintiff at the outset. On appeal the Sudder Dewani ruled by summary order that, as the question of sovereignty and jurisdiction had not been raised, the cases should be decided on their merits. The District Judge then proceeded to hear them, and ultimately gave judgment upholding in the main Fisher's boundary line, but decreeing certain minor points in favor of the Rajah. The Rajah appealed, but while the case was pending in the Sudder, arrangements were made in 1846 between Government and the plaintiff to refer the whole question to arbitration; no allusion being made to the zemindars, who were also defendants in the suits. When the arbitrators went to Sylhet and applied to the Judge for the necessary papers, the zemindars intervened and protested against the proceedings as undertaken without their consent. The Sudder Dewani held that in their absence the arbitration could not proceed, and the case was restored to the file. The question of jurisdiction was then taken up by a full bench, which ruled, on the 19th September 1848, that questions affecting the boundary of two independent powers were not properly cognizable in municipal courts, and the Rajah's suits were dismissed after being sixteen years pending. Of this, the Rajah naturally complained: and Government determined again to have recourse to arbitration, excluding therefrom however all minor claimants and confining its scope to the settlement only of the question as between State and State. The principle laid down for the arbitrators was that "all land included within the decennial settlement had been, and shall be, within the Company's territories." Any evidence on this point therefore which the zemindars could adduce should be heard and considered. Further, it was ordered that the mere fact that any land had not been settled in 1790 should not alone be proof that it belonged to the Tipperah State. Mr. George Yule, Collector of Dinagore, was appointed arbitrator for Government, Mr. Campbell, the Rajah's Agent, acted for his master, and Mr. Coull, a planter of Mymensing, was referee. Mr. Campbell found the Rajah's claims established throughout: Mr Yule admitted them only in one case: and the whole thing had to be left to the referee, who came to the same conclusion as Mr. Yule on nearly every point. The record of their very careful enquiry is preserved, and is in itself a convincing proof of their fairness and painstaking. In submitting his report to Government in January 1851, Mr. Yule described the country thus finally declared to be British territory, as consisting both of hill and plain covered for the most part with swamp and jungle. The hills however produced cotton, the cultivation of which might be greatly increased; while the plains bore here and there rich crops of rice not liable to inundation; and also mustard and sugarcane. Much

of this land was not included in any existing settlement; and Mr. Yule strongly urged that colonies of Manipuris or others should be encouraged to take it up on lease, and that effectual measures should be adopted for protecting such settlers from the incursions of the Kookies over whom he thought the Raja had no real power.<sup>(1)</sup>

On the side of Tipperah the boundary between the hill territory and the plains was quite as ill-defined as it had been on the Sylhet frontier; but this had not given rise to the same amount of mischief, as the zemindari of Roushanabad belonged to the lord of the hills, whose interests were identical on upland and lowland. In 1848, doubts were entertained whether the general indebtedness of the Rajah would not speedily bring the settled estate to the hammer, and in view of this contingency a speedy demarcation of the boundary line was urged upon Government. The measure was sanctioned, and the survey was ultimately carried on till the whole boundary between Independent Tipperah and the British Districts of Tipperah, Bulloah, (or Noakhali) and the remaining portion of Sylhet had been laid down. It was completed in December 1852, and arbitrators were immediately appointed to settle all disputed lines. Every obstacle was thrown in the way of a final settlement by the Rajah's native agents, and it was only when Lord Dalhousie peremptorily ordered the adjustment to proceed whether the Rajah were represented or no that any actual progress was made and the Rajah's arbitrator attended. In January 1855 the results were reported. It had been discovered that no definite boundary between the hills and the plains had heretofore existed; but as the Government arbitrator liberally gave the Raja the benefit of every doubt, no application to a referee was found necessary. Agurtolla, the Rajah's place of residence, was by the line now laid down included in the hill territory.<sup>(2)</sup>

Notwithstanding all that had been done, we find in 1861 disputes pending between the Tipperah Rajah and Government regarding the boundary between his territory and some parts of Sylhet not affected by the proceedings of Mr. Yule. The nature of the country made it extremely difficult in places to identify the line laid down by Lieutenant Fisher, and fresh demarcation had to be undertaken. In all the operations connected with the re-survey of Sylhet and Tipperah, Government

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- (1) Revenue Proceedings, 23rd September 1846, Nos. 37 to 43.  
 Revenue Proceedings, 17th March 1847, Nos. 12 to 40.  
 Revenue Proceedings, 31st October 1849, Nos. 62 to 73.  
 Revenue Proceedings, 10th April 1850, No. 16.  
 Revenue Proceedings, 12th June 1850, Nos. 54 & 55.  
 Revenue Proceedings, 26th February 1857, Nos. 40 to 44.  
 Revenue Proceedings, 21st September 1857, Nos. 77 & 78.  
 Revenue Proceedings, 31st March 1853, Nos. 2 & 3.
- (2) Revenue Proceedings, 30th May 1849, Nos. 28 to 34.  
 Revenue Proceedings, 20th January 1853, Nos. 47 to 51.  
 Revenue Proceedings, 17th March 1853, Nos. 18 to 21.  
 Revenue Proceedings, 2nd November 1854, Nos. 8 & 9.  
 Revenue Proceedings, 16th March 1855, Nos. 3 to 5.  
 Revenue Proceedings, 1861 to 1863.

firmly declined to re-open questions already settled ; the only point for discussion being the marking out of the line long since determined upon. The Raja was induced to consent at this time to a topographical survey of his dominions.

I have now described the settlement of the relative boundaries of the Tipperah State and the neighbouring British districts in all quarters save one. Between Hill Tipperah and Chittagong the Fenny River had always been considered the line of demarcation. The question of the Chittagong boundary. The question whether the river itself lay in Tipperah or Chittagong gave rise to some trouble. In 1848 an affray with murder took place at Ramghur, high up on the Fenny, at which the Raja had established a toll house. The Magistrate finding that in Tassin's map the river is included in British territory, forbade the levy of any such duties on the south bank of that river or on the river itself, on the ground that such exactions had led to disturbance and bloodshed. In February 1849, the Magistrate punished for assault certain servants of the Rajah, who had forcibly taken tax upon the river from people bringing down bamboos cut in British territory <sup>(1)</sup> The Judge reversed the order as illegally convicting Tipperahs of an offence committed out of British territory, at the same time declaring that the Rajah had a right to levy tolls at his ghâts on the Fenny. Upon this the matter was referred to Government, which pointed out that the right claimed for the Rajah was not merely that of levying tolls on goods brought to his side of the river or within his own territories, but of imposing duties on all traffic passing up and down a stream, which was either neutral or British. Further reports on the claim so put forward were called for accordingly. On receipt of this, the Government decided that the Rajah had not established any prescriptive or other right to hold undivided possession of the river. It was to be free and open to the subjects of both Governments without let or hindrance. The river was thus declared neutral territory. The Rajah kept up his toll houses on the north bank ostensibly to tax produce brought from his hills, but no doubt boats passing down were also taxed. In 1853 we hear of outrages upon such boats, and of affrays attended with murder, in which the offenders were farmers of the Tipperah ghâts. The Rajah persisted that, so long as the produce forming the cargo of the boats came from his hills, he had a right to stop them for toll. On further consideration Government laid down the following principles : first, that the Rajah had a right to levy toll on all persons and things within his own independent territory, either on the banks of the River Fenny, or on the river itself above the point at which it becomes the boundary between his territory and Chittagong ; second, that westward from the point where the river is common to both countries, the Rajah has a right to levy tolls on boats or produce belonging to his own subjects only ; third, that for any attempt to levy tolls

(1) Judicial Proceedings, 29th May 1850, Nos. 83 to 89.

Judicial Proceedings, 10th February 1853, Nos. 19 to 22.

Judicial Proceedings, 1st September 1853, Nos. 81 & 82.

Judicial Proceedings, 8th September 1853, Nos. 116 to 127.

Judicial Proceedings, 20th April 1854, Nos. 126 to 129.

on, or detain boats or subjects of the British Government, the Rajah would be held responsible, whether the acts of his agents were done with or without his knowledge and consent ; fourth, that if it proved practically difficult to let him thus levy tolls on his own subjects and produce on the river, the right must be foregone.

It will thus have been seen that the boundaries of Hill Tipperah had been in course of years tolerably clearly defined on the north, west, and south where they marched with cultivated British districts. But the precise limits of the territory to the east were still quite conjectural. In Pemberton's\* Report we find that all the Lushai country east to Manipur was once considered to belong to Tipperah. It is certain, however, that the Tipperah Rajah had never anything like settled or absolute authority over the tribes of this tract. What the British Government has had to do with them we shall see in the following chapter.

In 1871, on the suggestion of the Bengal Government a separate Political Agent was appointed to Hill Tipperah to reside at Agurtollah and assist the Rajah with advice. The appointment was abolished in 1878, the conduct of our political relations with the State being entrusted to the Magistrate of Tipperah and an officer of the status of a Deputy Magistrate being stationed at Agurtollah. This arrangement has worked satisfactorily, and will continue to do so as long as the Rajah adheres to his present policy of not interfering in any way with the Kookie tribes outside what is now recognized as his eastern limit. Under the advice and direction of British officers marked improvements have taken place in the internal management of the Tipperah State. Rents are no longer collected at the point of the bayonet, as the Magistrate of Tipperah reported to be the case in 1863. Civil and criminal justice is now fairly administered ; schools have been started ; and some road making has been done. The population of the Hills according to the last census is 95,637 ; and the revenue raised there nearly two lakhs of Rupees.

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\* The south-eastern and southern boundaries of each are thus given by Pemberton in 1835 :—

" From the sources of the Jeeree River along the western bank, to its confluence with the Borak ; thence south on the western bank of the latter river to the mouth of Chikoo (or Tipai) nullah, which marks the triple boundary of Manipur, Cachar and Tripurah. On the south the limits have never been accurately defined, and we only know that on this side the line is formed by the northern foot of lofty mountains inhabited by the Poitoo Kookies and by wild and unexplored tracts of territory subject to Tripurah. This densely wooded and mountainous region appears to commence at a distance of between 40 and 50 miles from the southern bank of the Soormah."

The southern extremity of the Suddashur Hills was the south-east corner of Cachar. It would appear from this that the narrow hilly tract running down between Hill Tipperah and Manipur, and represented in our most recent maps as part of Cachar, was in Pemberton's time considered to be part of Hill Tipperah.

## CHAPTER XXI.

## THE LUSHAI OR KOOKIE TRIBES.

From a very early period the plains of Cachar were subject to inroads from the southern Hill tribes known as Kookies or Lushais. Of late years it has been discovered that these are more or less intimately related to the Howlungs and Syloos whom we encounter on the frontier of Chitagong. But it will be most convenient to leave the latter for separate treatment and to bring together here all that is known of the Lushais viewed from a Cachar standpoint. In a report on the district by Colonel Lister in 1853, the following account is given of these tribes :—

I have the honor to state first, with reference to the southern portion of the district, that for many years back, and long before we obtained possession of the province, the inhabitants of the plains to the south were in constant alarm and dread of the tribes of Kookies who resided both within our boundaries and without to the south and south-east, in the independent Tipperah Hills and in the Manipur territories. They used to come down and attack the villages in the plains, massacre the inhabitants, take their heads, *loot* and burn their houses. These aggressions used principally to be made after the death of one of the Kookie Rajahs, when the having human heads to bury with him is in the idea of the Kookie a matter of great consideration.

The principal tribes then known were the Cheeloo, Rankul, Tangune, Chansen, Tadoé or Tewtangs and the Poitoo Kookies, and in consequence of the aggressions made by some of them at different times, some of the inhabitants towards the south deserted their villages, left their lands and homes, and settled in some of the more northern pergunnahs of the district, and the lands which they deserted have not in some places up to the present time been resumed, they being now jungle.

It would appear that the tribes to the south have been gradually driving one another in a northerly direction ; for, first, some Nagas that were located in the Boobun Hills and in southern Cachar were obliged by the Tangune Kookies to flit and to take up their abode in the hills north of the Borak, when the Tangunes took possession of their ground, and they having in their turn been driven up by the Chansen and Tadoé tribes, the Tangunes were also afterwards obliged to vacate and to move on into the northern hills, and after them the Chansens were obliged to do so likewise ; and the Tadoés, who had been driven up by the Luchyes, a very powerful tribe, first settled about seven years since within eight and ten miles south of this station, and became Company's ryots, and made themselves useful by cutting timber, bamboos, cane, &c., which they used to bring to market, but after having been located there for some four years, the Luchye Kookies in November 1849 attacked them, burnt three of their villages, killed several of the inhabitants, and took away several of them into slavery, and then the whole of the Tadoé tribe flitted, left the south and settled down in the northern hills.

About the same time that the Luchye Kookies attacked the villages in Cachar, they committed other atrocities in Sylhet and in Manipur. It was the first that had ever been heard here of the Luchyes, and from the inquiries I made, it appeared that they were a very powerful, warlike, set of people, consisting of Luchyes, Chillings, and Gattaes, and who were said to be also well armed and independent, and residing from eight to ten days' journey south of this. And to the south of them again there are the Poe Kookies, who are said to be still more powerful than the Luchyes, and who it is said exact a kind of tribute from them.

The Poitoo Kookies who are located towards the south-west used also to be very troublesome, and made many descents in the southern portion of Pergunnah Hylakandy, and they too drove the inhabitants away from thence, and caused lands that were under cultivation to run to jungle.

After the British Government obtained possession of the district, in order to protect the natives to the south, there were two small out-posts established, one at Caseedur, in Pergunnah Bundraj, and the other to the south of Hylakandy, with a detachment of the Sylhet Light Infantry at each, posted in a guard, surrounded by a stockade, but these out-posts used to be occasionally withdrawn and again replaced when necessary.

About the years 1834 and 1835 a Manipuri Prince, "Tribowanjee," who was unsettled and inclined to be troublesome, got a considerable grant of land at Jafferbund, in south Hylakandy, and tagavie advances were with the sanction of Government made to him to the extent of Rupees 2,686, with a view to causing him to settle down, and he undertook with his Manipuri ryots to keep the Poitoo Kookies in check, and for which purpose twelve muskets were made over to him, and he on one or two occasions attacked the Kookies in their own villages, and during his time no attacks were made on that part of the district; but in 1841 he and his brother, Ram Sing, made arrangements with some of their countrymen and attacked the Rajah of Manipur, and in his endeavour to obtain possession of the guddee of that country he lost his life, and so did also his brother.

In order that he should be remunerated for the protection he afforded the people, he was permitted to levy a toll on all timber, bamboos, &c., coming down the Dullesur River, and his estate having after his death fallen into the hands of two of his other brothers, they continue still to levy a toll, as they say, from those only who agree beforehand to pay them, for giving them protection during the period they are cutting the timber in the hills.

This was what Colonel Lister knew about them at the date of his report. The earlier records contain more detailed information of their raids upon Cachar.

I have already in the preceding chapter noticed a massacre of British subjects belonging to Sylhet by Kookies, which took place in 1826. The next raid of consequence was also on the Sylhet frontier and occurred in 1844.

Laroo, whose name was mentioned in connection with the massacre of 1826, appears to have been a chief of some importance among the Poitoos. In the beginning of 1844 or end of 1843 he died, leaving his son Lal Chokla to lead his tribe.<sup>(1)</sup> Now no Kookie Chief could go on his last long journey unaccompanied by attendants to do his bidding in the unseen world. The affection of his clansmen was not, however, put to too great a strain. They had not themselves to go away before their time, so long as they could supply Bengali slaves, whose heads piled round the corpse of the Chief were earnest that their ghosts were keeping company with his. But slaves were scarce in the hills since the British Government had discouraged this trade; so Lal Chokla and his cousin, Botai (not the Buntye of 1826), hung their great relative's body in the smoke, and set forth on the war path to slay the

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(1) Judicial Proceedings, 11th May 1854, Nos. 81 to 88.  
 Judicial Proceedings, 27th May 1844, Nos. 103 to 109.  
 Judicial Proceedings, 29th July 1844, Nos. 46 to 49.  
 Judicial Proceedings, 3rd September 1844, Nos. 42 to 45.  
 Judicial Proceedings, 16th October 1844, Nos. 46 & 47.  
 Judicial Proceedings, 13th November 1844, No. 88.  
 Judicial Proceedings, 8th January 1845, Nos. 192 to 194.  
 Judicial Proceedings, 12th February 1845, Nos. 104 to 106.

prescribed number of victims. Spies sent before marked out as the doomed village, the Manipuri colony of Kochabari, in Pertabgur. On the night of the 16th April, 200 savages surrounded it, and amid the horrors of darkness the bloody work went on, till twenty heads were secured and six live captives taken. One eye-witness escaped by clinging to the thatch of the inner roof, while the ghastly struggle went on below him. Once the ropes gave way and he fell, but, favoured by the darkness, regained his place and there remained till all was still. The Magistrate was informed of the tragedy, and the Tipperah Rajah was called in to aid, with the usual result. 'He had no authority over the tribe in question.' But a grave suspicion arose not only that this excuse was false, but that the Kookies had been actually directed to the Manipuri village by the emissaries of the Rajah who had a dispute with the colonists about the land on which it stood. Further remonstrance induced him to despatch a Darogah and ten burkundazes to arrest the murderers,—a proceeding in itself a farce. Panic spread along the frontier. The cultivators deserted the neighbouring Government estates, and troops and police had to go down in numbers to restore confidence.

At this time the Magistrate of Sylhet bethought himself of applying to Mr. J. P. Wise, who managed the Rajah's affairs on the plains. This gentleman took up the matter warmly and brought all his influence to bear on his employer. It was discovered that some connection did exist between Hill Tipperah and these Kookies, for Lal Chokla had, it appeared, applied to the Rajah to protect him against any measures of retaliation on our part. At last it was ordered that if the Tipperah Chief could not secure by force or negotiation the surrender of the offenders before the 1st of December, British troops should enter the hills, and with the co-operation of the hill police—if such there were—inflict summary punishment on Lal Chokla and his tribe. The effect of this decision was curious. Before the date fixed, the Rajah sent in four Kookie prisoners and twenty-seven witnesses, with depositions taken in Hill Tipperah, proving the defendants to have been concerned in the raid. When brought before the Magistrate, the witnesses one and all denied any knowledge of the affair. Next he sent in 'Botai,' declaring at the same time his own conviction of his innocence. All this and the Rajah's earnest entreaties did not avail

Blackwood's Expedition.

to stay the departure of our troops. Captain Blackwood led a party of the Sylhet Infantry into the hills on the day fixed. But little assistance was received from the Rajah. He himself professed to be anxious to help, but his people did nothing,—a fair index to the real wishes of their master. Mr. Wise's Assistant, Mr. Watt, ignored court intrigue and gave substantial help, and a valuable auxiliary turned up in the person of Lallmee Sing, himself a Kookie Chief and cousin of Lal Chokla. Lal Chokla's village was surrounded, his supplies cut off, and on the 4th December he surrendered himself into Captain Blackwood's hands. The fact of the raid he admitted freely, but declared that he attacked the Manipuris, not knowing they were Company's ryots, and



to avenge injuries done to his father Laroo by two Manipuri adventurers, Ramsing and Tribonjit, who, in 1841, tried to penetrate into the Manipur valley through these hills with a view to attack the reigning Chief. The story was a doubtful one. The Kookies knew well that Kochabari was under British protection. Lal Chokla was tried and transported. Botai, against whom there was no proof, was released, and for some years the frontier was undistributed.\*

It seems to have been a common practice of the tribes on this frontier to make the villages of any emigrants from their midst into British territory a special object of attack. In June 1844 the Thadoe

Kookies living under Manipur attacked a Kookie village in Cachar, and carried off eight heads. The people murdered were emigrants from the attacking tribe. The Rajah of Manipur professed to have these tribes under control, and he was appealed to in this case, but with what success does not appear.

In 1847 Colonel McCulloch, Political Agent in Manipur, drew Reports from Manipur, 1847. attention to the increasing power of the Lushais, whose conflicts with the Changsels and other Kookies living under Manipur had attracted his attention. He speaks of raids in which two and three hundred persons were captured or killed. He also notices the presence among them of persons dressed like "Burmese," armed with muskets, and said no other tribe could stand before them. No military posts could, he thought, protect Manipur from their attacks, and therefore, as they were understood to belong to Hill Tipperah, he urged that they should be restrained from thence. The Rajah of Tipperah was asked what he knew of them. He replied that he had heard of them, but knew nothing more about them, as they were not his subjects.

In June 1847, the Magistrate of Sylhet reported<sup>(1)</sup> a series of massacres by Kookies in what was alleged to be British territory. Upwards of 150 persons had been killed, and the case wore a most

\* In the papers we find the following account of the connection of the chiefs in this quarter *inter se*: "Sheeb Boot, a chief subordinate to Tipperah, declared himself independent and took away 25,000 householders. He was succeeded by his son Chung Polun and his grandson Lal Koleem. The latter had two sons. One Kojasir, the father of Botai, to whom Lal Koleem gave 4,000 households as dependents; the other, Lal Poose May, who took the rest of the 25,000 houses. Lal Poose May had three sons—Lindoo, father of Lal Holun; Laroo, father of Lal Chokla; and Bontai, father of Lallmee Sing."

(1) Judicial Proceedings, 28th July 1847, Nos. 101 to 107.

Judicial Proceedings, 4th August 1847, No. 105.

Judicial Proceedings, 25th August 1847, Nos. 109 to 111.

Judicial Proceedings, 17th May 1848, Nos. 61 to 141.

serious aspect. The Rajah of Tipperah, however, declared that the outrage had taken place in his jurisdiction, and protested against any interference on the part of the Magistrate. The Sylhet authorities persisted that the spot was within the district boundary as laid down by Captain Fisher, and a detachment of troops was sent out to protect the neighbourhood. The persons murdered were themselves Kookies, and there was no doubt that they held a lease of land from the Sylhet Collector; but the Rajah alleged that the pottah had been procured by the relatives of Lal Chokla to injure him and Lallmee Sing for having assisted in the capture of the first-named Chief, and that the lands were really far within the Tipperah Hills. The so-called massacre was the result of a fight between Lallmee Sing and Dokunipor, a son of Lal Chokla. It will give some idea of the confusion prevailing as to the boundary in this quarter when it is stated that four local investigations—one by the Magistrate of the district—made out the scene of the slaughter to be within British territory. But when matters became more serious, the troops having been attacked by large bodies of Kookies, aided, it was said, by Tipperahs, and Colonel Lister was ordered to the spot with reinforcements and a professional surveyor, it was discovered that Fisher's boundary line lay far north of the place. The troops were withdrawn and nothing was said of the attack on them.

In November 1849, the Magistrate of Sylhet reported a further series of Kookie outrages on the Simla River, and within British territory. Wood-cutters returning from the hills had been attacked, a village of Halams, a class of Tipperahs living within our border, had been cut up, and another village plundered. The assailants were said to be of the tribe of the Khojawul Chief, and as usual subject to Tipperah. Almost at the same time reports were received from Cachar that Lushai Kookies, subjects of Lalingboong Rajah, had attacked a settled Kookie village ten miles south of Silchar, belonging to one Seyahpow. Here they killed twenty-nine persons and took forty-two captives. After this they attacked the villages of Leelong Rajah and Augum, Kookie settlements in the vicinity of the station, burnt them and went their way.

The Government resolved on this occasion to take active measures. The Rajah of Tipperah was called upon to deliver up the guilty Chiefs and their followers, and to restore the captives. He was informed that, if he was unable to comply with this demand, Government would march a force into his territory, as it was impossible to allow such bloody and wanton outrages to pass unpunished.

The management of the whole business was placed in the hands of Colonel Lister, Commandant of the Sylhet Infantry and Agent for the

**Khasi Hills.**<sup>(1)</sup> He was instructed, as regards the Sylhet outrage, not to be deterred by any claims the Rajah might make to the site of the massacre. If it was *de facto* in our possession and rent paid us for it, he was to proceed to ascertain the guilty tribes and punish them if possible. Inquiry showed that the scene of the Sylhet outrage was far within our territories, and it was alleged in Cachar that the raids, both in Cachar and Sylhet, were the work of Lushais. Lalingboong, it was reported, had sent out his two sons, Barmoolal and Lalpor—the one east, the other west—to plunder and slaughter.

Meantime the Magistrate of Sylhet had not been idle. Friendly Kookie scouts were employed to follow up the trail left by the raiders on that district, and the result of their reports was stated to be that the attacking party belonged to the Khojawal or Kachak tribe, living two days' march south-east of Chutterchoora. It was supposed to be established by cross-examination that this was only another branch of the Lushais, who were, it was said, ruled over by three Rajahs, Lalingbhoom, Khojawal, and Sookpilal. The scouts offered to conduct an expedition to the villages of the tribe, and were forwarded to Colonel Lister to be made use of as occasion served. The information thus given, as to the mutual relations of the tribes, we know to have been incorrect; and it is only mentioned to show how impossible it is to place full reliance on any statements made on such subjects on this frontier.

On the 13th January 1850, while the expedition was actually preparing to start from Cachar, a further raid was committed in Sylhet, in Thannah Latoo, at one of the points in the boundary disputed by the Rajah of Tipperah. It was at first set down to the same tribe who committed the former massacre. But later reports implicated subjects of Hill Tipperah. The enquiry was not, however, followed up.

Colonel Lister's force marched from Silchar on the 4th January 1850, and on the 14th arrived at a village belonging to a chief called Mullah, consisting of from 800 to 1,000 houses full of grain, cotton, and other stores. This they carried by surprise. On the 16th they burnt the village and retired for reasons shewn in the following extract from Colonel Lister's Report, which also sets forth his recommendations for future action:—

The Lushais are a very powerful tribe under the Government of six sirdars, of whom one is the acknowledged chief. They all have their separate cantonments with a

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(1) Judicial Proceedings, 5th December 1849, Nos. 106 to 117.  
 Judicial Proceedings, 2nd January 1850, Nos. 84 to 86.  
 Judicial Proceedings, 13th February 1850, Nos. 137 to 140.  
 Judicial Proceedings, 27th February 1850, Nos. 33 & 44.  
 Judicial Proceedings, 6th November 1850, Nos. 91 to 93.  
 Judicial Proceedings, 27th November 1850, Nos. 90 to 93.  
 Judicial Proceedings, 17th April 1850, Nos. 96 to 98.  
 Judicial Proceedings, 29th May 1850, Nos. 74 & 75.  
 Judicial Proceedings, 26th June 1850, Nos. 163 & 164.  
 Judicial Proceedings, 14th August 1850, Nos. 90 to 93.

number of dependent villages attached. In these cantonments the fighting men reside ; in the dependent villages are located their *ryots*, who are merely used as coolies, and for tilling the soil. They consist, in many instances, of the captives they have brought away in their different expeditions, a great part of them probably taken as mere children and gradually reconciled to their captivity.

The fighting part of the Lushai population are composed, first, of Lushais, who appear to be a cross between the Kookies and Burmese ; secondly, of a certain number of true Burmese, entertained for the purposes of warfare ; and, thirdly, of refugees and outlaws from Manipore and our own frontier.

The chief who is now at the head of these tribes, by name Barmooceelin, is said to have 800 Burmese in his service. His head-quarters, which lay to the south-west of Mullah's village, I could see plainly with a telescope. It appeared to be a cantonment laid out with the utmost regularity, and containing, I should say, not less than three thousand houses. The whole of the sirdars are said to be able to raise from five to seven thousand fighting men, and from what I saw, and the information I have received, I do not consider this beyond the mark. The Burmese portion of the force are armed with muskets and *dows*, the remainder with spears and *dows*.

I have before remarked that the Lushai are a cross between the Kookies and Burmese, and this opinion is strengthened by the belief universally prevalent, that a part of the Burmese army which occupied Telyne and its neighbourhood in 1824 never returned to Ava, but settled in the jungles to the south of Cachar. Almost all the other Kookie tribes are migratory in their habits, changing their residence every two or three years ; but from the substantial way in which the Lushai villages are built, I am convinced that they are a stationary tribe, and this stamps them as different from the other Kookies, who one and all entertain a great dread of them.

His Honor will probably remark on the facility with which I gained possession of a large village in the face of this powerful people. But to explain this I have only to state that with very few exceptions the whole fighting population of this village were absent on one of their marauding excursions, added to which they were taken completely by surprise, as the path by which I approached the cantonments they believed to be known only to themselves ; and as all their look-outs were posted on the main road, they were in utter ignorance of my movements.

On reaching the village, however, and discovering the description of country I had got into, the distance from any supports, and the difficulties of the road, I considered that I should be compromising the safety of my detachment by remaining a longer time than would suffice to give the men necessary rest.

The nature of the country is such, that a few stockades thrown up at certain points would serve to cut off all communication, and these, expert as the Kookies are with the use of the *dow*, would have been the work of a very few hours. I heard from my spies that Barmooceelin's village was full of men, and they could have intercepted me at any point along the road. Indeed, although I was only one night in Mullah's village, yet in that interval they had commenced stockading the direct road, with a view to cutting me off, though, probably not anticipating my so speedy return, the works were not complete, and no attempt was made to defend them. No doubt a short delay on my part would have enabled them to raise the whole country to intercept my line of march. Even as it is, I have some reason for thinking that they expected me to return by the path I had taken in going, and had I chosen that route, I should probably have met with some opposition. It is not their muskets or other offensive weapons that are to be dreaded, but their expertness in the use of the *dow*, and the facilities which their jungles afford, both in materials and position, for throwing obstacles in the way of an advance or retreat.

There can be no doubt that Mullah was the chief whose people committed the outrage on the Roopa Cherra in November last, and to confirm this, an *abkarree* *perwannah* was found in his house, bearing the name of a man belonging to the Tripoorah village, which was plundered on that occasion, and dated 1849. Lalpoo, the chief who conducted the expedition into Cachar, had died a few days before I reached the Lushai country.

One gratifying circumstance attending the expedition I have now to record, which is, that during the confusion caused by the destruction of his cantonment, 429 captives made their escape from the villages dependent on Mullah, and succeeded in finding their way into Cachar. This, and the loss consequent on the destruction of all his property, will probably cripple him for some time, but he is only one of the petty

chiefs, and I cannot but feel assured that my expedition will have had little real effect on the tribe at large, further than shewing them that it is possible for us to penetrate their jungles.

I am of opinion that to put down these people effectually would employ a well appointed force of not less than three thousand men. From 500 to 1,000 of these would be required for keeping open the road from Cachar and protecting the various depôts (since there are several bye-paths leading on to the main road easily passable for the Kookies), and the remainder for carrying on operations in the country. A portion of this force ought to consist of Europeans, as a great deal of stockade work might be expected from the great abundance of materials, and the ease and rapidity with which these people run up stockades, to which may be added the well known character of the Burmese for this kind of warfare.

From the nature of the country (all the ranges of hills running north and south), I feel convinced that an attack from any other quarter, except Cachar, would be attended with the greatest difficulty, and, indeed, is in my opinion impracticable. Towards the Chittagong side the ranges rise higher and higher, and both from that direction and from Sylhet or Comillah numerous ranges of hills, as well as difficult swamps and unfordable rivers, would have to be crossed; whereas from Cachar a chain of hills runs down unbroken into the enemy's country, and along this a good practicable road might be constructed by a couple of companies of Pioneers aided by bildars and Kookies to cut the jungle. The road might be commenced on the 1st November, and it could be completed in a month. Depôts for provisions would have to be formed along the road. All supplies must come from Cachar, and very extensive Commissariat arrangements would of course be necessary.

It will be for his Honor to decide whether such considerable operations should be entered upon. I can only state my views that, unless something decisive is done, the whole of Cachar south of the Barak, and probably a great extent of country south of Sylhet, will become a desert. The Lushais have been getting bolder, and extending their ravages further every year, and I feel convinced that they are the authors of all the massacres committed on the frontier from year to year.

Even allowing that small detachments could penetrate into their country from time to time, and destroy one or two of their villages, this would be at very considerable risk, and would only have the effect of inciting them to fresh outrages from a spirit of revenge. Unless their independence as a powerful tribe is quite broken, the frontier will never be free from their attacks.

That they acknowledge no allegiance to the Tipperah Rajah is certain: but whether as is reported, he or his ministers have any means of communicating with them, I cannot say. Certainly he must be powerless to *prevent* their ravages. Should he, however, have any means at his disposal, I think that he as well as the Rajah of Manipore should be invited to co-operate in whatever measures may be taken for effectual putting down of these miscreants.

As a temporary measure, I venture to suggest the arming with muskets of a few hundred Kookies (could they be got to serve) under a young, active, and enterprising European officer. These I would have taught to fire with accuracy; nothing more: and I would post them in stockades along the frontier, at the most frequented passes into Sylhet and Cachar. Many of the Kookies who accompanied me expressed their willingness to take service, and said that armed with muskets they would have no dread of the Lushais.

I would further suggest that all condemned muskets belonging to the Sylhet Light Infantry should be handed over to the Superintendent of Cachar for distribution among the frontier villages, and I would recommend that that officer be authorized to indent for ammunition, to be served out at his discretion.

The Government<sup>(1)</sup> upon this, while admitting the force of Orders of Government on Lister's Report. Colonel Lister's suggestions, deprecated any extended military measures unless further outrage rendered this necessary. It suggested an

(1) Judicial Proceedings, 1850, 18th November, No. 105.  
Judicial Proceedings, 1850, 30th November, Nos. 54-5.  
Judicial Proceedings, 1850, 27th November, Nos. 108-4.

attempt to open up negotiations with Barmoeelin, who must, it was thought, be impressed with the fact that his country was no longer inaccessible, and would, it was hoped, be ready to enter into friendly relations. The affairs of the Cachar and Sylhet frontier were placed under Colonel Lister, and his plan of raising a Kookie levy was favourably received. The opening of a road from Silchar was also considered advisable. At the very outset, however, the Superintendent of Cachar recorded his opinion that the Lushais would only be emboldened by the partial result of the expedition. He tried to get Kookies of other tribes to settle in the south of the district, promising to arm and support them to be a shield to the cultivated part of the country from the Lushais. The Western Kookies, however, were far too careful of themselves to consent to this. The captives released from the Lushais were all of them Tadoe Kookies, and their stories did not give confidence to their clansmen settled under our protection. They had, it appeared, been forced by Lalingboong, now dead, to settle among the Lushais, and never had an opportunity of breaking their involuntary connection till Colonel Lister came. The jungles south of Cachar had formerly been joomed by Tadoes, most of whom had been driven into our territory by dread of the Lushais, and others carried south and compelled to cultivate for that tribe. After Colonel Lister left Mullah, the Lushais butchered twenty of the chief men among the Tadoes then living with them, in revenge for the loss caused by the exodus of the captives already described. Some, however, escaped, and among them a chief named Manji-how. Meantime steps were being taken for raising a levy of 200 men, but it was determined that only half that number should be Kookies, the rest being Cacharies and other more trustworthy races.

In October 1850 the Lushais<sup>(1)</sup> made overtures of peace, and a muntri or agent of Sookpial's and messengers from four other chiefs, Barmoeelin, Boottai, Langroo, and Lalpoo, came into Silchar. After some talk with the Superintendent they agreed to fetch their chiefs. They said they

Negotiations in 1850-51. wished to become our ryots and pay tribute to get protection from the

Pois, a tribe to the south, whose advance they dreaded, to whom they paid tribute, and through whom they got arms, and who were supposed to live in the province shown in old maps as Yo Pye, east of Arracan. Colonel Lister, in anticipation of the arrival of the chiefs, proposed to ask for hostages, young Chiefs who might be sent to school; to lay down a boundary which the Lushais should respect; to bind them over to give up offenders, but to reject all overtures to become our subjects. The Government did not approve of anything of the nature of a treaty or of asking for hostages. The Lushais were to be told

(1) Judicial Proceedings, 1851, 2nd January, No. 28.

Judicial Proceedings, 1851, 15th January, Nos. 121-2.

Judicial Proceedings, 1851, 5th February, Nos. 88-7.

they would be unmolested, but they must respect our border, and would be invited to friendly relations with us. In December the Superintendent reported the arrival of Sookpikal with a few followers. The other Chiefs had not come in. They admitted the enmity subsisting between them and our Kookies, but said they wished to be friends with us. The following account was given by Colonel Lister of Sookpikal's statements and of the negotiations with him :

He states that the Lushye territory extends seven days' march to the south of his village, and that there are in all ten rajas, of whom he is the acknowledged chief. If this be true, the chieftainship must be an hereditary dignity, and not depending simply on the power of the individual exercising it, as he acknowledges that both Boottai (the chief of the most southern village) and Barmooeslin can bring more fighting men into the field than himself.

All the rivers running into the Barak from the south take their rise far in the Lushai country, and are, with exceptions, navigable for small boats to a considerable distance. The Dullasuree, for instance, to within one march of Sookpikal's village. Strange to say, they know nothing of any rivers running towards the south.

Their fighting population is almost entirely composed of men whom they call Chillings, belonging to the country to the south end of their position, distant about seven days' march from their most southern village, and extending, as they report, to the frontier of Burmah. The people of this country, which they call Poe, are described as a powerful tribe, to whom they pay a yearly tribute and acknowledge a sort of allegiance. Two of these Chillings accompanied the raja ; they were stout, well-made men, strongly resembling the Burmese and very unlike the Kookies. They were armed with good serviceable flint muskets, apparently of American manufacture, with the name of G. Alton on the locks. The Bengallee interpreter, Gobind Ram, states that there was one of these muskets in each house in the raja's village. They procure them from the Poe people, giving them in exchange slaves, at the rate (as the Lushais themselves stated) of two muskets for a slave 4½ feet high. All their dealings in trade appear to be carried on with this people, with whom, however, they are not always on friendly terms.

Paragraph 7 of your letter No. 244 of the 21st of February last was fully explained to the raja, and he promised on the part of himself and the other rajas that no overt acts of any description against the Company's subjects should for the future be attempted ; but said that previous to our attack of last year they were in ignorance that any Kookies were under the protection of our Government. The raja, in token of submission, presented an elephant's tusk, in return for which some coarse woollen cloths were given him. He states that the other rajas were afraid to come in, being apprehensive of meeting the fate of Lal Chokla, who, having given himself up in 1844, was subsequently transported.

The raja promises that on his return to his village he will cause search to be made for any of our subjects who may still be in captivity in his country, and that if any such are found, they shall be sent back into the British territory.

The raja took his departure on the morning of the 18th, apparently well satisfied with the reception he had met with, and earnest in his promises of future good behaviour, in which he is, no doubt for the present at least, sincere.

In 1855 the question of disbanding the Kookie levy was raised, but the local authorities strongly urged its retention, as it was of real service in checking and procuring information in regard to both the Lushais and Nagas.

In 1855 Sookpikal sent in to claim assistance from the Superintendent against some neighbouring Kookie embassies between 1855 and 1861. Chiefs who had attacked him.<sup>(1)</sup> He grounded his claim on his being a tributary to Government by having

(1) Judicial Proceedings, 12th April 1855, Nos. 95 to 101.  
Judicial Proceedings, 5th July 1855, Nos. 244 to 247.  
Judicial Proceedings, February 1861, Nos. 189 to 220.

sent elephant's teeth as presents to Cachar. His muntri or representative urged indeed that Sookpial had twice visited the Superintendent and had on two other occasions sent embassies with presents. He was told Government could not interfere in the internal quarrels of tribes living "beyond British territory." The Chief of Mullah also about this time sent in a deputation, and, at the request of the Superintendent, and to prove his sincerity, released the son of a Tadoë Kookie Chief he had taken prisoner in 1849. He begged the Superintendent to procure the release of an uncle of Barmooeelin who was a prisoner in Manipur. The Lushais had, it appeared, been making constant inroads on the Manipuri Nagas, and negotiations were on foot for an exchange of prisoners. These the local officers expressed themselves willing to advance. Again in 1861 Vonpial, Chief of Mullah, sent an embassy to Cachar asking help against Lalpitary, a Chief to the West, and against the Pois who were pressing on him from the South. Assistance was of course declined.

Sylhet and Cachar seem to have been tolerably free from disturbance

Raids of 1862.

up to the beginning of 1862. In January of that year a series of three outrages by Kookies was reported from Sylhet.<sup>(1)</sup> The first reports received were by no means very precise, and as usual some said the Tipperah Rajah's people were concerned, while the Rajah alleged that they were his villages that had suffered. The facts, as ascertained by careful local enquiry, appeared to be these. Three villages (1) Ramdulal's Bari, (2) Rammohun's Bari, and (3) Chundraipara in the jurisdiction of Thannah Rajnugger, Sylhet, were, on the 22nd January, plundered and burnt, and a large number of the inhabitants massacred or carried off. These villages lie close together, about eight miles from Adumpore: and this has come to be known as the Adumpore massacre. About the same time a village called Lungaibaree had been destroyed, and an attack made on a party of men about half a mile east of Kolingat. The Chundraipara group was shown to be in British territory, the other two localities in Hill Tipperah. A suspicious circumstance in connection with the affair was, that the people of Chundraipara were emigrants from Hill Tipperah who had settled on the estate of a zemindar with whom the Tipperah Rajah had a standing feud. On the other hand, the Rajah's own villages had suffered, but he had made no enquiry in the case. The evidence taken on the spot went to show that the Kookies who committed the raids were dependents of Murchoiloo (or Murchoi Locee), a son of that Lal Chokla whom we made prisoner in 1844. It was stated that Murchoiloo was an actual subject of the Rajah of Tipperah and on good terms with him. Government ordered (in November 1862) a strong post of armed Police to be established

(1) Judicial Proceedings, April 1862, Nos. 432 to 436.  
 Judicial Proceedings, June 1862, Nos. 5 to 7.  
 Judicial Proceedings, November 1862, Nos. 208 to 206.  
 Judicial Proceedings, January 1863, Nos 173 & 173.



where on the Sylhet Frontier,\* and at the same time warned the Tipperah Rajah that these outrages on villages situated in the neighbourhood of his territory could not be any longer tolerated; that Government looked to him at once to organise such a Police in those places as would prevent the occurrence in future of similar aggressions, and that, in the event of his not reporting without delay the completion of satisfactory arrangements for that purpose, he would be himself held personally responsible for the acts of the people of his estates, who appeared to take advantage of the consideration with which he was treated by Government to commit outrages such as those complained of.

The Commissioner of Dacca was, however, strongly of opinion that the real raiders were Lushais, not subject to the Rajah at all, and for some time nothing more was done.

In April 1863 four women who had been carried away from Chundrapara made their escape to Cachar and were forwarded to Sylhet. From their statements<sup>(1)</sup> it appeared that the raid had been led by four Chiefs, (1) Mischoey Lail (= Murchoilo), (2) Lookpilal (= Sookpilal), (3) Rungbhoom, and (4) Lal Hoolien. The first was, as before shown, the son of Lal Chokla, and undoubtedly to some extent under the Tipperah Rajah; the second was said to live on the banks of the Dullessury among the Seedashun Hills, some days' journey south of Cachar, and to be virtually independent; the other two were related in some way to Murchoilo.

A new Rajah had at this time been installed in Tipperah, and he was called upon to give all the information and assistance he could with a view to recovering the captives, of whom there were said to be many in the villages of the abovenamed Chiefs.<sup>(2)</sup> The Sylhet Authorities urged the sending of an expedition against them in the cold weather of 1863, but Government did not at once consent to this for the following reasons: It was incidentally mentioned, in a survey report of Cachar, that Sookpilal had ever since 1849 maintained friendly communications with the Cachar Authorities, sending in frequent deputations with presents, &c. This being the case, the Lieutenant-Governor, before attempting force, directed the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar to endeavour to induce Sookpilal to give up the captives in his possession, and to undertake the protection of the Frontier by restraining his own people from committing raids, and by refusing countenance and encouragement to other chiefs in any like attempt. An annual money payment for this service was to be offered to him and the other Chiefs on the Sonai and Tipai, and return annual

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\* Fifty men of the Kamroop Regiment were actually sent to Adum pore.

(<sup>1</sup>) Judicial Proceedings, April 1863, Nos. 374 to 379.

(<sup>2</sup>) Judicial Proceedings, November 1864, Nos. 4 to 8.

Judicial Proceedings, December 1864, Nos. 98 & 99.

Judicial Proceedings, November 1864, Nos. 167 to 169.

presents were to be taken from them as acknowledgment of allegiance. It was feared that a hostile expedition might bring down the Kookies on the tea gardens which were now spreading fast into the Hills.

Captain Stewart, the Deputy Commissioner, upon this opened communication with Sookpikal taking advantage of the scarcity then prevailing in the Hills to conciliate him by a present of rice. In October 1864 Sookpikal sent a Muntri and his half brother to meet Captain Stewart. After some fencing the Muntri admitted the facts of the Adumpore massacre, but said some of the captives had been sold to the Pois in the south. Captain Stewart said, if Sookpikal would come and meet him and bring the captives, and swear friendship, he should receive Rs 50 a month, subject only to an annual nuzzur to Government. The Muntri promised that Sookpikal would send his heir, Lalongoor, to Cachar, as he was too ill to move himself, and agreed to all the other conditions. He did not recognise the other Rajah concerned in the raid as Murchoilo but called him Gnoor-shai-lon (clearly the same name). Gnoor-shai-lon had married Sookpikal's sister, and on the occasion of the marriage the Adumpore raid was made. "They did not know the village belonged to the Sirkar, and wanted to make up the price of the bride." Sookpikal and Gnoor-shai-lon had since quarrelled.

At this time the Rajah of Tipperah, whose succession was threatened in the Courts, in order to create a favourable impression, volunteered to try and arrest Gnoor-shai-lon, and also said he would make an effort to seize Sookpikal who was, however, not so easily to be got at.<sup>(1)</sup> These offers were rejected, as the negotiations with Sookpikal promised fairly, and any attack upon Gnoor-shai-lon apart from him would excite his suspicions.

Soon after his communications with Sookpikal, Captain Stewart received a deputation from Vonpikal, Chief of Mullah, and made similar arrangements with him.<sup>(2)</sup> Vonpikal's messengers expressed great dread of the advance of tea gardens up the Sonai, which Captain Stewart endeavoured to allay by showing how advantageous to the Hill Tribes the vicinity of a garden would prove. On this being reported to Government, Captain Stewart was asked to explain how the country of the Lushais could be considered open to British enterprise in the way indicated. He replied—"The Lushais have always been looked upon as an independent people, but it is not certain that they occupy independent territory. The southern boundary of Cachar is indefinite, and may be pushed as far as it is thought proper. The natural boundary is the water-pent of the hills between this and the sea, and this the Chutta Choora, a peak which is sometimes talked of as the

(<sup>1</sup>) Judicial Proceedings, December 1864, Nos. 96 & 99.

(<sup>2</sup>) Judicial Proceedings, March 1865, Nos. 79 to 81.

Judicial Proceedings, September 1865, Nos. 4 to 6.

boundary, is supposed to be. If this be the case, all the Lushais, that we have any communication with, are within the district, as they all drink from waters that flow into the Barak." This theory amounted practically to claiming as district territory the whole of the Lushai country up to the Chittagong water-pent, and has never received any recognition from Government.

In December 1865, the Deputy Commissioner reported<sup>(1)</sup> that Sook-

Proposed Expedition, 1865-66.

pilal had not sent in the captives, and had, in reply to messengers sent by Captain Stewart, alleged as his reason, that three of his tribe had been murdered a year before by a Kookie Settlement in Cachar. It was doubtful whether this was a fact or a mere subterfuge on the part of Sookpilal. It was determined to send an expedition to compel him to give up the captives, and Police were got together in Cachar for that purpose, but before they set out the rains began and operations were postponed. While they were waiting orders a deputation from Vagnonien, a Lushai Chief to the south of Manipur, came in and had a friendly interview.

During the rains of 1866, Captain Stewart was occupied in finding out as much as was known about Sookpilal's position and its accessibility. It was supposed that no communication could be opened with him from Chittagong, and that the smallest force that it was advisable to send from Cachar would be 400 fighting men. In view of these facts, the idea of an expedition was given up and negotiations re-commenced.

Before, however, any messengers had left Cachar an embassy arrived from Sookpilal himself bringing the annual presents originally settled, but no captives.<sup>(2)</sup> Captain Stewart insisted on these being brought in, and sent a messenger back with the Lushai party. After much trouble four boys were given up, and it was said that Gnoor-shailon had prevented Sookpilal from sending the others. He and Sookpilal were now friends, and Gnoor-shailon kept his brother-in-law supplied with muskets through Hill Tipperah. Many of the captives, it was also stated, were married to Lushais, and unwilling to leave them. The identity of Gnoor-shailon and Mischoey Looee appears now to have been lost sight of, for the Rajah of Tipperah was applied to for information in regard to him, and his denial of all knowledge of him was tacitly accepted.

Here matters rested in 1867, and it was hoped that Sookpilal would at any rate remain friendly for the future.

(1) Judicial Proceedings, January 1866, Nos. 34 to 36.  
 Judicial Proceedings, March 1866, Nos. 25 to 29.  
 Judicial Proceedings, April 1866, Nos. 103 to 106.  
 Judicial Proceedings, June 1866, Nos. 79 to 82.  
 Judicial Proceedings, November 1866, Nos. 125 & 126.  
 Judicial Proceedings, January 1867, Nos. 79 to 83.  
 Judicial Proceedings, March 1867, Nos. 17 & 18.

(2) Judicial Proceedings, April 1867, Nos. 130 to 134.

In November 1868, the Governor General's Agent at Manipur reported that the Lushais had attacked certain Naga villages belonging to that State. This did not appear intimately to affect us, but it was really the first symptom of a general outbreak all along the frontier. Towards the close of December the Magistrate of Sylhet reported that a village near Adumpore had been attacked by Kookies, and the Commissioner thought this movement might be connected with that on the side of Manipur. A few days later further reports came to hand, from which it appeared that Sookpilal had attacked villages in the Hill Tipperah State, and that a Chief called Rungbhoom fleeing from Sookpilal had taken refuge in Sylhet. Almost simultaneously it appeared that a large party of Manipuris under Kanhai Sing, a refugee prince of Manipur, had assembled near the east frontier of Cachar to make a raid into Manipur, while the Lushais were threatening the tea gardens in the south. Kanhai Sing was reported to have considerable influence over the Kookies on the Tipperah side, as was indeed not unlikely, for many villages near Adumpore were colonised by Manipuris, and in them Kanhai Sing had raised the force with which he made a former raid in 1865. On the 15th January the Lushais burnt the tea garden of Loharbund in Cachar, and next attacked Monierkhall. After which they were said to be in full march for Manipur. Kanhai Sing was seen with them, and the local officers were strongly of opinion that the attacks upon Sylhet and Cachar were intended to draw off our attention, while a vigorous attempt was made to enter Manipur. Sookpilal and Voupilal were supposed to be the Chiefs implicated in the Cachar raids.

The Deputy Commissioner of Cachar lost no time in taking measures for the protection of other outlying gardens.\* An expedition was organized for the purpose of following up the marauders to their villages. Instructions were given to inflict all possible punishment upon them in the event of their refusal to submit and surrender all captives and refugees. The policy enjoined by Government was that none but the actual offenders should be attacked; that the operations should be completely finished before the early rains; and that on no account should anything be done which would involve operations again in the next year. It was decided by the Commissioner, Mr. Simson, in concert with Brigadier-General Nuthall, that two columns of troops, consisting of the 44th and 7th Native Infantry, and a portion of the Eurasian battery of Artillery, should advance—one along the course of the Dullessury to Sookpilal's villages, and the other along the Sonai to

\* The Proceeding volumes of the Bengal Government in the Judicial Department from January 1869 up to June 1873, and in the Political Department from July 1873 up to the separation of Assam, teem monthly with correspondence regarding the "Kookies" and "Lushais". As the narrative in the text is a very condensed one, taken from those prepared by myself and others for the Administration Reports, detailed references to the Proceedings are only given for the more important letters.

Vonpikal's villages, while a detachment of the 7th Native Infantry and police should make a feint by marching from Sylhet towards Rungbhoom's friendly villages, and endeavour to effect a junction with the Dullessury column. It was also arranged that a body of the Manipur Rajah's forces should act in co-operation, and that the Tipperah Rajah should afford aid to the party from Sylhet. Tidings, however, received on the 10th February that another raid had been committed by Lushais on the Manipur territory at Kala Naga, prevented the despatch of the Manipur Contingent.

The central column, commanded by General Nuthall, advanced along the Dullessury as far as Pukwa Mookh and the Boolungang River, when it was detained by heavy and incessant rain for seven days, which rendered the route impracticable, and compelled its return on the 7th March. The Sylhet Detachment under Mr. Baker, accompanied by the Magistrate, Mr. Kemble, reached with some difficulty the River Gootur on the 16th March within sight of the villages of Sookpikal and his sister Bamwitangiri, situated on opposite heights. An advance was made towards them, and was opposed by the Lushais, who were, however, easily beaten off; but in consequence of want of supplies, and finding no signs of General Nuthall's column, the party was forced to retire.

The east column, under Major Stephenson, accompanied by the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner, also experienced heavy rain, but surmounting all obstacles reached Bazar Ghât, on the Sonai River, on the 12th March. Here they were met by messengers with presents from the Lushai villages of Vonpikal and his mother Impanoo. The death of Vonpikal a few days before was announced, and assurances were given that his tribe had not been engaged in any of the late raids. The attacks on the Sylhet border were ascribed to Sookpikal, and those at Nowarbund and Monierkhal to the people of another Chief, called the Deota Rajah. It was decided, therefore, that no hostile measures could be taken against Vonpikal's villages, and that it was too late in the season to advance against the more distant tribes; but, in order to make a more effectual demonstration, it was resolved that the Deputy Commissioner, with part of the force, and the battery under Lieutenant Brough, should go on to the villages, a day's march distant, and there conclude negotiations. The nearest village of Moizul was reached in spite of certain angry manifestations, and the chief muntries having presented themselves and tendered their submission on behalf of Imapnoo and the infant son of Vonpikal, promising to use all endeavours to procure the restoration of the captives and refugees, the whole party returned.

The expedition having failed in its principal objects, the punishment of the tribes concerned in the outrages of 1868-69, and the rescue of the captives taken, it was suggested by the Lieutenant-Governor

to the Government of India that a fresh expedition should be carefully organized and sent into the Lushai country early in the cold weather of 1869-70. Sir W. Grey was of opinion<sup>(1)</sup> that the Lushais would never appreciate our friendship until they had been made to feel our power. He did not wish to raid upon their villages, but to send into their country a force strong enough to overcome all opposition, which should remain there long enough to show that it could go where it pleased, and until the Chiefs were brought to see that their interests lay in keeping the peace. While the country was thus occupied temporarily in force, the question of permanently locating an officer to have charge of the tract as in the Naga and Garo Hills should, he urged, be taken up and considered. This was, in Sir W. Grey's opinion, the only course likely to prove permanently successful.

The Government of India, however,<sup>(2)</sup> objected to any renewal of active military operations against the Lushais. The jungly and wild nature of the country; the unfavourable climate, which renders active operations impossible, except for a short period of the year; the difficulty of inflicting a retribution sufficient to produce a lasting effect on savages possessed of little or no property; and the time that had elapsed since their outrages, were considered in themselves reasons why a military expedition should not be resorted to. The Government of India, moreover, declared itself averse on principle to move bodies of troops and armed police in order to effect reprisals for outrages on any part of our extended frontier, or to admit that when such aggressions or outrages take place, it is imperative to chastise the offenders by following them up for days, and even weeks, within their own fastnesses and hills. The plan which the Government of India wished to see carried into effect towards wild tribes like the Lushais was that which the Lieutenant-Governor touched upon at the close of his proposals, viz, to place a carefully selected and well qualified officer in charge of any difficult tract of country which the ordinary authorities were unable to superintend, who should have the entire control of our relations with the tribes in subordination to the Commissioner. This officer should have means at his disposal to resist sudden attacks, and should encourage the villagers to resist aggressions. He should confer with and take engagements from the Chiefs of wild tribes, demand a nominal tribute, require them to refer quarrels to him, and so place our intercourse with them on an improved footing. Meantime our frontier posts should be strengthened and patrols established. In a demi-official correspondence which passed between the Viceroy, Lord Mayo, and Sir W. Grey in October 1869, and which was afterwards brought on official record, Lord Mayo expressed the strongest objection to any more military expeditions against the Lushais; and suggested settling down protected communities of that tribe outside our Cachar border, arming them and utilising them to repel incursions from beyond. Lord Mayo also advocated placing a Political Agent in Hill Tipperah.

(1) Judicial Proceedings, August 1869, Nos. 222-23.

(2) Judicial Proceedings, November 1869, Nos. 289-305.

While the details of the measures necessary for giving effect to this policy were under consideration, messengers from some of the leading Lushai Chiefs arrived in Cachar to confer with Mr. Edgar, the Deputy Commissioner of that district, with the object of bringing about a better understanding. Mr. Edgar proposed to return to the Lushai country with these messengers, and endeavour with their help to procure a personal interview with some of the principal Chiefs. This proposal was approved, and it was arranged that Mr. Edgar should be attended by a small guard for strictly defensive purposes, and accompanied by Major Macdonald, Officiating Superintendent of Revenue Surveys, Lower Circle, for the special duty of defining the southern boundary of the Cachar District, and obtaining some topographical knowledge of the country beyond.

Mr. Edgar started on this expedition on the 20th December 1869, and returned after an absence of nearly three months. The most southern point reached by him was Bepari Bazar, a place not far from the village of Sookpilal. At this place he was met by Sookpilal, accompanied by his son. The instructions to Mr. Edgar strictly enjoined him to do nothing likely to entail risk of a collision with any of the tribes. No demand, therefore, was made for reparation or satisfaction for past offences, but Sookpilal was induced to listen to reasonable proposals in respect of our future relations, and he seemed satisfied with the interview and really anxious to cultivate a better understanding. Interviews were in like manner held by Mr. Edgar with several other Chiefs.

A great deal of useful information was acquired regarding the Chiefs and the country generally. Parts of the country, which were hitherto supposed to be almost impassable, were found to contain wide, well-beaten tracks, for the most part traversable on horseback, and extending almost to what was then is shown in the maps as the boundary of the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Mr. Edgar's account of his tour and 'Notes on the Tribes' will be found in the Appendix.

In concurrence with Mr. Edgar's recommendations, the following measures were sanctioned for the improvement of our relations with the Lushais.<sup>(1)</sup>

Mr. Edgar being of opinion that the proposed location of a British officer among the Lushais would be most distasteful to the tribes, excite their jealousy, and destroy their confidence in our good intentions, the project was superseded by a proposal that the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, or one of his subordinates, should annually visit the Lushai country, see as many of the Chiefs separately as

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(1) Judicial Proceedings, March 1870, Nos. 83 & 84.  
 Judicial Proceedings, April 1870, Nos. 83, 66 to 68.  
 Judicial Proceedings, May 1870, Nos. 216 to 219, 246 & 247, 279 to 282.  
 Judicial Proceedings, July 1870, Nos. 117 & 118.

possible, hear grievances, use his influence for the adjustment of quarrels, and give small presents to the Chiefs, specially rewarding any Chief who has behaved particularly well. To give effect to this policy it was decided that Mr. Edgar himself should re-visit the Lushais during the cold weather of 1870-71. One of the principal objects of his visit was to settle with Sookpilal, or some of his people, a boundary from the borders of Manipur to Hill Tipperah, where ordinary British civil jurisdiction should cease; the tribes making themselves responsible for the peace of the country beyond it.

Other measures which were approved were:—

1. The grant of sunnuds to the Chiefs, specifying the conditions on which they would be left in the undisturbed possession of their lands.
2. The levy of tolls by the Chiefs on people going up to trade with the Lushais. Eventually it was hoped that the tribes would be induced to frequent periodical fairs within the British boundary.
3. The settlement, if possible, of villages along the frontier between our outposts and the present sites of the Lushai villages.
4. The appointment of a Political Agent in Hill Tipperah. One of the reasons for this measure was the general belief that disturbances on our own frontier had frequently arisen from attempts on the part of the hill Chiefs to retaliate for wrongs done to them by the people subordinate to Hill Tipperah.
5. The opening out of two paths, one from Monierkhal to Bongkong, and the other from the Dwarbund road as far as the Rengto range. It was believed that if the tribes were properly managed there would be no difficulty before long in opening a safe bridle-path from Cachar to Chittagong.

The Government of India in its orders upon Mr. Edgar's proposals now disapproved altogether on general grounds of the location of an officer among the Lushais; and suggested that a policy of a defined boundary between the tribes and our territory, not to be crossed by our officers save for occasional friendly visits, should be tried on the Chittagong side as well as on that of Cachar.

Before any of the arrangements suggested by Mr. Edgar could be

Raids of 1871.

carried out, and while he was actually at Sookpilal's village discussing matters with him in January 1871, a series of raids were committed by the Lushais, in concert with the Howlongs and Syloos, Kookie tribes well known to us on the Chittagong frontier, on a more extensively organized scale, and of a far more determined character, than any previous incursions of the kind.

On the morning of the 23rd January, the Cacharee punjes of

Raids on Cachar.

Ainerkhal in the Hylakandy Sub-division of Cachar was burnt, and about 25 persons were killed and 37 taken prisoners. On the same day the Alexandrapore tea-garden was destroyed; Mr. Winchester, a planter



living there, being killed, and his child, a little girl, captured. A few hours later, Cutlicherra, the adjoining garden, was attacked. Messrs. Bagshawe and Cooke, who were in charge of the garden, opposed the raiders most gallantly and drove them away. Another party commenced to attack the lines, but was dispersed by Mr. Cooke with the aid of some coolies; they had, however, killed five and wounded others. Mr. Cooke then, with two Cabul fruit-sellers who happened to be there, and some others, went over to Alexandrapore, recovered Mr. Winchester's body, and brought back some wounded coolies.

On the 24th a second attack was made on Cutlicherra by some 80 Lushais, 15 of whom were armed with guns. Messrs. Bagshawe and Cooke, assisted by some policemen who had arrived the previous night, and some armed servants, fired at and disabled two of the raiders, on which the whole body rapidly retreated.

On the 27th January, a body of Lushais having surprised some sepoy and police of the Monierkhal garden, shot one sepoy and wounded another with a *dão*. The head constable in command of the stockade fired upon them and was wounded. They then commenced an attack on the stockade, while a party plundered the coolie lines. The fight lasted all day. Next day the District Superintendent of Police, Mr. Daly, arrived with some sepoy and police. Two sorties from the stockade were unsuccessful; but the Lushais left on the night of the 28th, and their loss was afterwards reported to be 57. Mr. Eglinton, a planter, displayed great gallantry on this occasion, for which he received the thanks of Government, and ultimately the reward of a grant of land.

While the attack was being made on Monierkhal, a party of Lushais went on to the adjoining garden of Darmiakhal, which they plundered but did not burn. All the coolies escaped.

An attack on another garden, Nugdigram, was also made on the 27th, when about 11 persons were killed and 8 carried off. Here, on the following morning, the rear guard of the party of troops and police that had been sent to the relief of Monierkhal was attacked by the raiders. The guard consisted of 8 sepoy, and a constable in charge of coolies carrying provisions. The sepoy made a stand and gave time for the constable and coolies to escape. Eye-witnesses reported that their conduct was most admirable. Eventually they were overpowered, and six of them were killed and one wounded.

On the same day some wood-cutters, on the bank of the Bukni, were surprised by 10 or 12 Lushais. They swam across the river and gained the opposite bank, one of their number being wounded by a spear.

There was then an intermission of raids on this side of the district for more than three weeks, but on the morning of the 23rd February an attack was made on the coolie lines at Julnacherra by a party of Lushais, said to be about 120 in number, who crossed the

river from the west. A patrol of one head constable and four constables was in the lines at the time; they at once fired on the raiders and repulsed them, but not till the latter had killed four persons and wounded three.

In Sylhet some villages near the Chagolla frontier post were attacked. On the 23rd January a village named Cacharipara was almost entirely burnt, more than 20 persons being killed, and some young women carried off. On the 24th a large body attacked a village exactly opposite to the outpost, not further from it than forty or fifty yards, and killed two men. The guard immediately turned out and commenced firing. The raiders returned the fire, but after an hour they were defeated and retired in confusion into the hills.

On the 27th February a village near the Allynuggur outpost was attacked. A party of sepoys and constables was sent out just in time to prevent the raiders escaping into the hills. In the skirmish which ensued several of the Lushais were wounded, but, as usual, were immediately carried off by their brethren. One man, however, was killed, and the police succeeded in bringing in the dead body, to assist in identifying the tribe to which the raider belonged, together with two dâos and ten or twelve guns. Two other corpses were afterwards found in the jungle.

In the latter part of January a party of Lushais made their appearance in Hill Tipperah, burning villages and killing and wounding the villagers. On the 21st the khedda people, who were engaged in elephant-catching some distance south of the Sylhet outposts, were fired on and dispersed; and a village named Pooyashari was plundered and destroyed. On the 22nd another village, named Boongbari, was burnt. The khedda people said that the assailants were from 200 to 300 strong.

On the 2nd March a hundred men armed with guns and dâos made their appearance on the Goomtee, about 40 miles east of Comillah. They fired on a party of wood-cutters, of whom three were afterwards missing.

About the same time 500 Kookies were reported east of the Chagulniah Thannah in the Tipperah District, but they never came into our territory, and appear to have done but little damage to life, and only to have burnt and plundered the deserted homesteads of the Tipperahs.

The Political Agent at Manipur reported on the 25th February that an attack had been made on a village in the hills, south-east of the valley, on the night of the 15th. The village had been destroyed, 40 persons decapitated, and about 20 carried off. Although the raid was made further to the east than any former attack by the Lushais, the Manipuris felt almost certain that the raiders were of that tribe. The Political Agent thought that the raid was on account of Vonolel's death.

From the time when reports of these events first reached the Government,

Identity of raiders.

continual instructions were issued to the local officers, impressing on them the necessity for exerting themselves to obtain information of the movements and doings of the hill tribes, and especially to collect evidence as to those implicated in the raids committed. The reports received of the identity of the tribes concerned in these several outrages were however for a long time various and conflicting.

Mr. Edgar, Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, who, whilst these disturbances were going on was in the heart of Sookpial's country on the Dullessury, and was to all outward appearance treated with great friendliness by Sookpial himself, received warning that a party of Syloos from Savoonga's villages, with Lenkam, son of Vonolel, had gone to raid in the direction of Adumpore. His return to Cachar was fortunately effected without encountering any of the armed parties.

On the 5th February Major Graham, Deputy Commissioner of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, reported that a messenger of his had come back from the Kookie country, bringing information that a large body of Howlongs, under the Chiefs Lal Savoola and Seipaya, had been concerned in the Cachar raids; whereas on the 9th March the Commissioner of Dacca reported that Mr. Edgar's information with regard to the same raids implicated Vonolel's sons Lalboora and Jongdong, in eastern Cachar, and Savoonga and Lungboong, Syloos, on the west. This latter intelligence was in a measure confirmed by a portion of the plunder from the Alexandrapore factory having been brought for sale in the Kassalong bazaar on the Chittagong side by some of Savoonga's men, although it was given out by them, most probably falsely and designedly, that they had bought the articles from Sookpial, with whom they were on known terms of enmity. Subsequently, information was received that Mary Winchester had been seen by Rutton Poa, a friendly Chittagong Chief, in a village belonging to Savoonga, and a negotiation for her ransom was set on foot, but failed.

On the 20th February the Agent at Manipur reported that a numerous body of Lushais had been met about the middle of January by a khedda force of Manipur sepoy, that they had apparently intended raiding in Manipur, but meeting an armed force had turned westward. They said they belonged to the villages of Vonpial and his mother Impanu.

Subsequently, a woman who was carried away in the raid on Manipur, escaped and gave information implicating Vonolel and his sons, Vonpial and Poiboi, also Lenkam and Impanu; and a Lushai woman belonging to the village of Vonolel's brother Thoial, who was ransomed from another tribe, gave very similar information, adding that the others named were under the guidance of both Sookpial's and Vonpial's people.

These and other particulars, so far as they could be reconciled with the known relations of the clans among themselves, led to the conclusion that the sons of Vonolel, certain of the Howlong Chiefs, and certain of the Sylloo Chiefs, acting in concert, committed the raids in Cachar.

The information as to the raids in Sylhet was more doubtful. The Magistrate of Sylhet was of opinion, from the evidence of a Kookie captive, and from private information, that the raid on the 27th February at Alynugger was committed by people of Sookpial, as two of his sons, and also some followers of his sister Vanaitang, were said to have been recognised.

This was also to some extent confirmed by a Tipperah woman, who was taken captive and contrived to make her escape; but Mr. Edgar and the Commissioner considered the connection of Sookpial with these raids to be improbable, for many specious reasons. Although, therefore, Sookpial's complicity was quite possible, and in fact reconcilable with his friendly behaviour to Mr. Edgar, on the supposition that the District of Sylhet was regarded by the Lushais as a distinct territory, such as Manipur or Hill Tipperah, yet, in consideration of the disposition evinced by Sookpial in his conduct towards Mr. Edgar, and other circumstances in his favor, it was considered undesirable, and politically inexpedient, to treat him as an enemy on mere suspicion.

The question of the measures which should be adopted to punish the tribes concerned in these atrocious raids, to recover the numerous British subjects who were captives in their hands, and to prevent, in the most effectual manner, a repetition of their incursions for the future, engaged the most earnest attention of Government.

The occurrence of the raids, which took place in spite of the efforts of friendship by the frontier officers, seemed to prove incontestibly that the policy of conciliation alone was utterly powerless and insufficient to protect our frontier from outrage by the remoter tribes. The policy unanimously recommended by the local officers was that raids like those of 1871 should be met by condign punishment, in the shape of a military occupation of the offending villages during as long a period as possible, the seizure of their crops and stored grain, and the forced submission of their Chiefs; after that, by the steady endeavour of the frontier officers, to influence them and promote trade; and, finally, by a system of frontier posts, combined with a line of road running north and south from the Cachar frontier to that of Chittagong.

In a Minute dated the 18th May 1871, the Lieutenant-Governor explained his own views on the subject, which were in favour of a military exploration of the country rather than of measures of pure retaliation. Certain points should, Sir G. Campbell thought, be secured as a convenient location for troops to be posted in the centre of the Lushai country, and to establish the means of maintaining communication with them. If the people submitted, we should treat with them and demand surrender of our captive subjects; and if a fair amount of

success were attained in that way, we should enter into friendly relations with them: but if they resisted, we should use force and compel respect.

After a full discussion the Government of India decided that an armed expedition should be made into the Lushai country during the ensuing cold weather.

Expedition of 1871-72.

The following were the orders of the Governor General in Council, dated the 11th July 1871:—

**RESOLUTION.**—The Viceroy and Governor General in Council considers that these papers show that, in the opinion of all the authorities who have been consulted, an armed expedition into the Lushai country during the ensuing cold season will probably have the effect of preventing the recurrence of the outrages committed in British territory last spring, and would be one effectual means for permanently establishing the security of our frontier.

2. While His Excellency in Council fully agrees in this opinion, so clearly expressed and sustained by such convincing arguments, he has arrived at the conclusion, that armed intervention in these districts is necessary, with great regret. The general policy of Government towards the tribes who inhabit the country lying between the Cachar and Chittagong Districts and to the east of Hill Tipperah, as described in the papers noted below,<sup>(1)</sup> is unchanged. But the cruel raids that have been perpetrated for some years on various parts of the frontier, more specially on the tea gardens in the Cachar District, show that the friendly intentions of Government have not as yet been understood or fully appreciated by many of the tribes; and there is some reason to suppose that the leaders of the raids and their followers may have imbibed the idea that we are either unable or unwilling to take active measures for the punishment and repression of such outrages.

3. The information as to the actual perpetrators of the raids is as yet extremely incomplete. The tribal divisions do not appear to be very decidedly marked, and it is difficult to trace particular outrages or raids to particular tribes or villages. There is, indeed, little or no room to doubt that the most prominent offenders came from the country of the Howlongs and Syloes; but these names are used with much indefiniteness, and it appears that although the names of some of the leaders are known with tolerable certainty, their followers most probably did not belong exclusively to any one particular section or tribe, but were attracted by a love of plunder from various parts of the country to the Chief whom they may have followed. Under these circumstances, His Excellency in Council is of opinion that the object of the expedition, which it is necessary to send into the country, cannot be one of pure retaliation, and that much discrimination will be needed in dealing with the different Chiefs.

4. If, during the progress of the expedition, guilt can with certainty be brought home to any particular villages, punishment must follow. The surrender of Chiefs who, like the Howlong Sungbongah, are known to hold or to have lately held British subjects in captivity, should be demanded, and, in the event of non-compliance, their houses and property should be destroyed. The restoration of the captives should be insisted on, and every effort made for their deliverance. When it is ascertained that particular inhabitants of a village have taken part in a raid, without complicity on the part of the village as a whole, the infliction of a fine on the village, and the surrender or punishment of the guilty individuals, would probably be sufficient. In some cases it may appear desirable to take and detain either the leading Chiefs or others as hostages for future good behaviour. His Excellency in Council does not anticipate any formidable armed resistance to the advance of the troops; but if hostility is met with, resisting villages should be attacked and burnt, and the surrounding crops destroyed.

(1) To Government of Bengal, No. 1338, dated 18th September 1869.  
To Government of Bengal, No. 6A, dated 29th October 1869.  
To Government of Bengal, No. 1126P., dated 30th June 1870.

5. It must, however, always be borne in mind that retaliation is not the only object of the expedition. The main end in view is to show these savages that they are completely in our power; to establish friendly relations of a permanent character with them; to make them promise to receive in their villages, from time to time, Native agents of our own; to make travelling in their districts safe to all; to show them the advantages of trade and of commerce; and to demonstrate to them effectually that they have nothing to gain and everything to lose by placing themselves in a hostile position towards the British Government.

6. With this view it will be necessary that the expedition should be attended, as far as practicable, by Chiefs belonging to friendly tribes; and that such use should be made of their people and followers as the circumstances of the case will admit. Rutton Poa and Sookpial may be instanced as Chiefs whom it may be found expedient to influence and employ in this manner.

7. The details of the expedition, the strength and composition of the force to be employed, and the special equipment in arms and clothing, if such be deemed necessary, will be carefully considered and determined in the Military Department, in direct communication with the Bengal Government; but the papers appear to the Viceroy and Governor General in Council to call for the following general observations:—

I.—His Excellency in Council is of opinion not only that a large force is not required, but that its employment would be objectionable both in a political and military point of view; he would therefore deprecate the moving of troops from a distance. But while he wishes the utmost possible economy to be practised, he desires that nothing should be omitted in the organisation of the force which the Military Department may consider necessary to make complete success a certainty.

II.—It appears clear that whatever be the strength and organization of the force, the larger portion of it must advance from the south, and must start from Chittagong. The hills to be invaded are nearer and can be more easily reached than from Cachar. The sea forms the easiest mode of carriage for troops, munitions of war, and stores. The routes from the side of Chittagong are better known than those from the north. There is excellent water communication by the Karnafooli, and by it supplies can be forwarded to within a few days' march of the Syloo villages. The force from Chittagong should be accompanied by Majors Macdonald and Lewin. The capacity in which the first-named officer can most usefully be employed will be considered in the Military Department.

III.—It is, in the opinion of His Excellency in Council, most desirable that, unless objections exist of which His Excellency in Council in this department is not aware, a Madras regiment should form part of the expeditionary force. Cuttack, Vizagapatam, or the Presidency Town would easily supply an efficient battalion.

IV.—At the same time that the main force is despatched from Chittagong, a smaller body should start from the Cachar side, to be accompanied by Mr. Edgar, leaving in the post on the Cachar border a sufficient number of soldiers and police to provide for the security of the district during the absence of the expeditionary force.

V.—The two forces should endeavour to reach, on a particular day, positions from which they would be able to maintain uninterrupted and easy communication with each other. They should start, if possible, by the middle of November, but not later than the 1st December, and the country should be completely evacuated by 10th March.

8. His Excellency in Council leaves it to the Military Department, in direct communication with the local authorities, to decide to what extent police should be employed in all the duties connected with the expedition, and also to what extent, and in what manner, use should be made of co-operative action on the part of the Rajas of Manipur and Tipperah. He will merely at present remark that as much use should be made of the police as is possible, and that it is desirable that the Rajas whose frontier territories have been devastated by the raiders should co-operate. The Raja of Manipur is bound by his engagement to "assist the British Government with a portion of his troops in the event of anything happening on the eastern frontier of the British territories." His Excellency in Council considers it necessary that the Political Agent in Hill Tipperah, whose appointment was sanctioned in October 1870, should be nominated by the Lieutenant-Governor and required to take up his duties before the military operation commences.

9. For various reasons His Excellency in Council considers that it would be inexpedient to hamper the expedition with the task of laying out and clearing a road between Chittagong and Cachar.

10. One or two officers of the Survey Department should accompany the force, both from Chittagong and Cachar, and they should be instructed to make as careful and complete a survey of the country as circumstances will permit. His Excellency in Council also considers it a matter of much importance that advantage should be taken of the expedition to acquire all the information necessary to enable the Bengal Government to submit to the Foreign Department specific proposals (as called for in the letter to the Bengal Government, No. 17C.—P., dated 11th March 1871) regarding the best line of frontier posts to be established on the Chittagong border.

11. The Governor General in Council has lastly to observe that it is an object of primary importance that the preparations for the expedition should be conducted with as much secrecy and with as little bustle as possible. It cannot be looked upon as a campaign, but rather as a military occupation and visitation by detached bodies of troops of as large a portion of the Looshai country as possible, for the purpose above explain and also to show the Looshais that there is no part of their hills to which our forces cannot penetrate.

In accordance with these views two columns were organized—the right or Chittagong column under the command of General Brownlow, C.B., with Captain Lewin as Civil Officer, and the left or Cachar column under the orders of General Bouchier, C.B., accompanied by Mr. Edgar in a civil capacity. By the orders of the Governor General in Council the entire political and military conduct of the expedition was placed in the hands of the military commanders; they were specially instructed that the object of the expedition was not one of pure retaliation, but that the surrender of the British subjects held in captivity should be insisted upon; that they were to establish permanent friendly relations with the savage tribes and convince them that they had nothing to gain and everything to lose by placing themselves in a hostile position towards the British Government.

From the very commencement of the preparations for the expedition it had been seen that success depended more upon the efficiency of arrangements for carriage. Carriage than any other contingency.

A committee appointed in Calcutta to consider the question proposed the formation of two corps of 600 men each to accompany each column, and to be under the charge of sirdars and mates appointed from their own body. Each coolie was to receive Rs. 8 a month and Rs. 2 batta while on actual service, and the mates and sirdars Rs. 10 and Rs. 12 each with Rs. 3 batta. They were also to get free rations from the Commissariat while on service. In spite of these liberal terms, the utmost difficulty was found in enlisting coolies in Western Bengal. The proposal to organize a separate corps of these Danghur coolies was therefore abandoned; and when the Government of India ordered that the strength of the two coolie corps should be raised to 4,000 men, including the Commissariat coolies, advantage was taken of the existing Commissariat agency in the Upper Provinces to recruit coolies for the expedition. The Darjeeling Hills were known to be a very favourable ground for obtaining Nepaulese coolies, and Captain Hedayat Ali was deputed there to recruit and organize a corps of hill

coolies, which he very successfully did, with Rs. 2 batta when on actual service. The Nepaulese corps enlisted by Captain Hedayut Ali was intended to accompany the Cachar column, and on or about the 14th November some 800 of them with their mates and sirdars were embarked on board the *Success* and her flats at Doobree. After leaving Goalundo cholera appeared among them, and medical advice was taken at Dacca as to whether they should under the circumstances proceed. The decision was favourable to their continuing their journey; but unfortunately between Dacca and Chuttuck the disease broke out with all its fury, and on reaching the latter place it was found that from deaths and desertion the corps had been reduced from upwards of 800 to 601 men with 6 sirdars and 24 mates. A body of 316 Nepaulese was also got together for service with the Chittagong column. Among these also cholera broke out when *en route* for Chittagong, and they lost 40 of their number. Of other coolies 4,618 were collected throughout the country—a number which from rejections and desertions was reduced before embarkation to 4,403 men. Of these, 1,924 were sent to Cachar and 2,479 to Chittagong; including therefore the Nepaulese coolies, the strength of the corps assigned to the left column was 2,764 men, and of that attached to the right column was 2,791 men. Taking into consideration certain conditions on which men supposed to be missing were really accounted for, the mortality on the Cachar side may be placed at 113, or 5·9 per cent., and among those who went to Chittagong at 109, or 4·3 per cent. The coolies locally available were reserved to meet the contingencies which constantly arise, and both on the Cachar and Chittagong side very much was done by the men thus supplied.

As regards the active part of the campaign, it will be convenient to follow the operations of each column separately, and a commencement will be made with the left or Cachar column.

This force consisted of half a battery of Artillery, a company of Sappers, and 500 men each of the 22nd Punjab Native Infantry, 42nd

Assam Light Infantry, and 44th Assam Light Infantry; a coolie corps, together with 178 elephants, and 1,200 coolies for commissariat purposes, were also attached to the column. Tipai Mookh, the junction of the Tipai and Barak Rivers, had been fixed upon as the starting place and advanced base of operations, and by the 15th December the greater portion of the force was collected there.

They then marched through a very difficult country, constantly exposed to attacks from enemies who rarely showed themselves, until on the 2nd February they reached Sellam, the Chief Poiboi's stronghold. Before arriving at this village a somewhat spirited encounter took place between the troops and the enemy on the Moorthlang range. The route lay above and parallel to the bed of a nullah about a mile-and-a-half from the camp. The advanced guard was fired into, and presently on all sides a sharp fire was opened. The enemy were found in considerable force, but were attacked by the 44th Native Infantry



and severe punishment inflicted on them; finally, they were pursued up a precipitous mountain side and two of their stockades stormed. One satisfactory result was that the English ammunition found on the slain proved that they had been the raiders last year at Monierkhal and Nundigram. On the 12th January a small portion of the column, carrying only just so much supply as was absolutely necessary, started from Sellam for Lalboorah's locality, distance or whereabouts of which no one knew. They met with no opposition, and on the 17th February entered Chumpai, Lalboorah's chief village, which they found deserted. In the centre of the village was the tomb of Vonolel, an elevated platform, on every point of which were hung skulls of different wild animals, while in the centre, on a pole, was a fresh slain head with the hand and foot of the victim. The village, consisting of 500 houses, was burnt. The tribes of Vompilal, Poiboi, and Vonolel had now been subdued, and the capital of the latter destroyed. The General therefore set out for Chumsin, the village of Vonolel's widow, where he dictated the terms on which alone it and the other villages of Lalboorah would be spared. These terms were (1) that agents from the Government should have free access to Lalboorah's villages and transit through his country; (2) that three hostages should accompany the column to Tipai Mookh; (3) that the arms taken at Monierkhal and Nundigram, or an equal number of their own, should be surrendered; (4) that a fine of two elephants' tusks, 1 set of war gongs, 1 necklace, 10 goats, 10 pigs, 50 fowls, and 20 maunds of husked rice should be delivered within 24 hours. There was difficulty about the arms, but eventually everything was delivered before morning, except a small portion of rice. The possibility was then considered of forming a junction with General Brownlow, and signal rockets were fired, hoping that they might attract his attention, but without success. The column then set out on its march home, and the General Commanding reached Cachar on the 10th March, having advanced 193 miles from Cachar and 110 from his first base in the enemy's country at Tipai Mookh, until he reached the stronghold of Lalboorah, the most powerful of the Lushai Chiefs.

Nor were the operations of the right or Chittagong column less successful. This force, of about the same strength as that starting from Cachar, was chiefly composed of Goorkha regiments. Its advanced base was at Demagiri on the Kurnafooli, where the force assembled at the end of November. The tribes which General Brownlow had to reduce to submission were the Syloos and the Howlongs, the latter being the most distant, and Mary Winchester, who had been carried off from Alexandrapore in 1871, being a captive in their hands. At Burkhal the Chief Rutton Poa came in. It had been doubtful whether he would give in his adhesion to us or not, but the prospect of a large force assembling at Demagiri in the neighbourhood of his own village no doubt influenced him greatly and induced him to cast in his lot with us. From Burkhal he acted as guide to a force that marched from that

place to Demagiri by land, and subsequently throughout the whole expedition, he was of the greatest possible assistance in carrying on negotiations.

A move was first made on the 9th December against the Syloos; the troops marched in a north-easterly direction, occupied the hill mark Syloo Savoonga on the map, and thence penetrated to Laljeeka, the village of one of Savoonga's sons. In reaching this point, the force had to march through a most intricate country, being obliged in places literally to hew their way through the jungle. They succeeded, however, in striking severe and rapid blows as they passed; Vanhnoyah's, Vanshumah's, Vanunah's, and Vanhoolen's strongholds were all captured and the stores of grain in them burnt. From Laljeeka the General returned to Savoonga, intending thence to make an expedition into the Northern Howlong country. As, however, Rutton Poea and Mahomed Azeem, the police subadar, had been sent on a mission to the Howlongs, it was deemed expedient to await their return before any hostile occupation of the latter tribe's country was attempted. In the meantime Captain Lewin had despatched two messengers to Benkuia, the principal northern Howlong Chief, in whose hands Mary Winchester was, and he at once gave up the girl, reserving, however, all questions as to submission and his other captives. On their journey back these messengers met Rutton Poea and the subadar, and the latter having taken charge of Mary Winchester brought her to Rutton Poea's village near Demagiri, whence she was sent to Chittagong. Rutton Poea continued on his way to Vandoola, the Chief of the Southern Howlongs.

On the 12th February General Brownlow started with a portion of his force against the northern Howlongs, having first left a sufficient garrison at Syloo Savoonga. The force crossed the Dullessury, and on the next day some of the enemy were seen; they were communicated with, through some of Rutton Poea's men, and evinced a desire to submit. The march was, however, continued, until definite information was received that Benkuia and Savoonga were advancing to tender their submission. They arrived on the 16th February, and without hesitation accepted the terms which were imposed on them. These were the surrender of all captives, an engagement on their part to live amicably with all British subjects from Manipur to Arracan, with free right of access to our people through their whole country. A day or two afterwards Lalboorah, Jatoma, and Lienrikoree, the remaining Chiefs of the northern Howlongs, came in and agreed to similar terms. On the 23rd the force commenced its march back to Syloo Savoonga; and there Lal Gnoora and Laljeeka, sons of Savoonga, Vanhnoyah, Vanloola, and three other Chiefs, representing the whole of the Syloo tribe, made their submission on the same terms as the Howlongs. There only remained now the southern Howlongs, and, to commence proceedings against them, it was necessary to return to Demagiri; and starting from that place a show of force was made in the direction of Sypoea and Vandoola, whose villages were said

to be from three to five days' marches east of Rutton Poa. An advance was made to Sypoea's village, a distance of 40 miles, and he immediately submitted. On the 12th Vantonga came in with a number of captives, and next morning Sangliena, Vandoola's eldest son, followed, and his submission was accepted on behalf of his father; he agreeing that his captives should be given up. The submission of the tribes being now complete, the force marched back to Chittagong, the last of the troops reaching that place on the 24th February.

The operations of this column were decidedly successful. It advanced 231 miles from Chittagong and 83 miles from its first advanced base into the Howlong country; it disabused Benkuia of the idea that his village was inaccessible, and its progress was only arrested by the submission of that Chief and his tribe. The following is a complete list of the Chiefs who submitted to, and came to terms with, General Brownlow:—

Tribe.	Name.	REMARKS.
Sylao ...	Savoonga ...	Represented by his sons.
	Lal Ngora ...	
	Laljeeka ...	} Sons of Savoonga.
	Vanhnoya and two brothers ...	
	Vankunga ...	} Step-brother to Rutton Poa.
	Vanhndua ...	
	Vanhoolen ...	} Subject to Savoonga.
	Dowtyeyva ...	
	Vandula ...	
	Vanshuma ...	
Howlong (north) ...	Lalhleera ...	} These Chiefs are brothers. The former has married Rutton Poa's sister.
	Sangbunga ...	
	Benkuia ...	
	Vansanga ...	} Subject to Sangboonga.
	Chongmama ...	
	Lien-u-koom ...	
Howlong (south) ...	Lalbura ...	} Brothers: independent.
	Jo-homa ...	
	Vandoola ...	} Represented by his son Sanghena.
	Vantonga and two brothers ...	
	Sanghena ...	
	Saipoiya ...	} Eldest son of Vandoola.
		} Brothers of Vandoola and brother-in-law of Rutton Poa.

A survey party accompanied each column of the expeditionary force, and in the short season available for their operations they topographically delineated 6,500 square miles of new and difficult country, and contributed most materially to fill up the gap which had hitherto separated the survey of Chittagong from that of Cachar.

The southern party, under Major J. Macdonald, pushing north from Chittagong, succeeded in completing a triangulation of 2,300 and

topographical mapping of 1,700 square miles connected with the eastern frontier series of the great trigonometrical survey. The tract thus explored lies between  $22^{\circ} 30'$  and  $23^{\circ} 45'$  north latitude, and  $92^{\circ} 30'$  and  $93^{\circ}$  east longitude, and its survey has determined a considerable extent of the water-shed between the Cachar and Chittagong and Akyab water systems. Forty well defined geographical points have been established, and the heights of 37 of these obtained with mathematical accuracy.

Captain Badgley, in charge of the northern party, started from Cachar and accomplished about 600 square miles of triangulation, with nearly 200 linear miles of route survey and 4,500 square miles of topography. The region thus surveyed extends to  $93^{\circ} 30'$  east longitude, and nearly to  $23^{\circ}$  north latitude, and includes the whole course of the Tuiri and its tributaries, which pour their waters into the Barak at Tipai Mookh.

Major Macdonald was not able to push far enough north to determine the upper course of the Dullessury and the Sonai, more westerly affluents of the Barak, and owing to the two parties not having been able to effect a junction, there remains a blank in longitude between these two portions of the survey which overlap in latitude; and also another gap in latitude between the northern limits of the tract surveyed by the Chittagong party and the southern boundary of surveyed Cachar.

Leaving for further consideration the question of the policy to be followed in future with the Lushai Chiefs, the Bengal Government contented itself on the close of the expedition with placing a line of strongly-manned posts along the whole southern frontier of Cachar and Sylhet.

The question of policy was afterwards taken up by the Local and Supreme Governments; but as most of the debateable points arose in connection with the Chittagong side, it will be most convenient to notice the result in the following chapter. The more important papers will also be found in the Appendix.

Effect of the expedition. The Lushais have given no serious trouble since this expedition.

Some of the Chiefs visited the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar during 1873-74, and some of them sent down their muntries, or agents, with small presents. Large numbers came down in December 1874 to purchase cattle in North Cachar with cash, which they had obtained from the sale of rubber. During the cold weather of 1874-75 large numbers of Lushais came down to cut rubber on both banks of the Barak. When they were forbidden to cut more, they disappeared

from the neighbourhood of the guards and gardens, though, possibly, they continued to cut rubber in places where they were not seen. In January 1875 Sookpial's agent reported a great scarcity of rice in that Chief's country. Supplies were sent up, and Native dealers were induced to send up more. Three bazaars had been established of recent years in the Lushai country, beyond our border, which were supplied with goods by Native traders from Cachar. They are located on the three principal streams flowing out of the Lushai country, at Changsil, formerly Bepari Bazaar, at Sonai Bazaar, and at Tipai Mookh. They increased for a time in size and importance; but their growth was checked by the exactions imposed on the traders by the Chiefs, and lately they have fallen off seriously owing to the failure in the supply of rubber brought in by the tribes.

A very important question in connection with these tribes brought to notice in 1875-76 is an apparently gradual advance of the Lushais northwards towards our southern boundary.<sup>(1)</sup> They are, it is supposed, closely pressed on the south and east by the Saktis and possibly by other tribes; and the southern tribes, in consequence, appear to be coming north and the eastern tribes coming west. This movement, if not watched with care, may contain the germ of future complications. The Chief Commissioner has forbidden altogether the settlement of parties of these border tribes within our boundaries, except after permission duly asked and obtained, and on sites specially assigned to them for the purpose. These sites are to be invariably at a considerable distance within our frontier, in order to prevent raids on the settlements, and to obviate the chances of disputes arising between communities settled at short distances from one another across the border, which might lead to our becoming involved in their feuds.

For the rest the policy of sending one of the Cachar officers to visit the principal Chiefs in a friendly way from time to time has been followed. Our frontier posts are carefully maintained, and very recently the military branch of the Police in this, as in other parts of the Province, has been placed on an improved footing. In the Appendix will be found papers showing the proposals devised to this end and the way in which the defence of Assam is now provided for.

In February 1875 Sir R. Temple, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, put forward a proposal to appoint a Political Officer to have sole charge of the relations with the Howlongs, Syloos, and other hill tribes of Chittagong, and to make over to this officer also the control of Sookpial's country and the tribes of Hill

Sir R. Temple's proposal to control Sookpial from the south.

<sup>(1)</sup> Assam Proceedings, June 1876,

**Tipperah.<sup>(1)</sup>** The Chief Commissioner of Assam objected to the scheme on the following grounds :—

The changes proposed which affect this Province are—

(1) The control of Sukpila's country from the Chittagong side, instead of from the Cachar side.

(2) The abolition of the appointment of Political Agent to Hill Tipperah.

On the first point I am to observe as follows :—

Politically, Sukpila's country may be described as bounded on the north by the Districts of Cachar and Sylhet ; on the west by Hill Tipperah ; on the south by the country of the Howlongs, Syloos, and Shindoos ; on the east by the State of Manipur and the country of the Soktees. Although this tract is not wholly under the authority of Sukpila, still his relations and friends bear rule over almost the whole of it, and it is probably what Sir R. Temple intends by the expression "Sukpila's country." This tract has no definite boundaries. On the north side Sukpila has agreed on a certain line, as dividing his country from that of the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar ; but the Deputy Commissioner and his people have much influence to the south of this line, while Sukpila and his people have much influence to the north of it. On the other sides, the boundary of the tract varies with the fortunes of its inhabitants : When their star is in the ascendant, they encroach upon Hill Tipperah, the Syloos, &c., and, indeed, upon Cachar and Sylhet ; when they are weak, their neighbours encroach upon them.

Geographically, this tract may be described as consisting of a series of parallel rivers running from south to north, with the watersheds between them. The chief of these rivers are the Dallessur, the Sonai, and the Tipai, on which are situated the trading places of Bepari Bazaar, Lushai Haut, and Tipaimukh. To these trading places traders from Cachar and Sylhet habitually resort.

Neither politically, nor geographically, nor commercially, has the tract in question up to date had much connection with the Chittagong Hill Tracts ; its connection has always been with Cachar and Sylhet. This connection is a natural one, and arises partly from the position of the tract to the north of the watershed dividing the waters which flow into the Surmah from those which flow into the Fenny, Kurnufule, &c. ; partly from the fact that the people inhabiting it are continually pressed northwards and westwards by the hostile tribes to the south and east of them, and are thus brought into recurrent contact with the border populations of Cachar, Manipur, and Sylhet. The Chief Commissioner would not disserve a connection so natural, and which has subsisted so long, without very strong reason being shown.

The practical difficulties which are likely to ensue if Sukpila's country is controlled from the Chittagong side are these : Tea-planters and others are constantly being brought into contact with Sukpila's people. Hardly a month passes but Colonel Keatinge has to settle some question of frontier policy in Cachar and Sylhet. The reference of all such questions to Calcutta will seriously detract from the advantages which the establishment of this Province was expected to confer. Communication between Sukpila's country and the Chittagong Hill Tracts is difficult, that is, the tribes of the Howlongs and Syloos intervene. On the other hand, communication between Sukpila's people and the people of the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar is so constant that it is probable that, if Sir R. Temple's scheme is accepted, the Superintendent of the Frontier will communicate with Sukpila *via* Cachar. Finally, the object of Sukpila and his people being naturally to encroach on Cachar, Sylhet, and Hill Tipperah, it seems probable that they might find means to play off their new controller of the Chittagong side against the Deputy Commissioners of Cachar and Sylhet.

Lastly, I am to point out that, though Sukpila is still an important personage and has much influence with his relations and friends who bear rule in various parts of the tract above described as "Sukpila's country," still it must not be supposed that that country could be controlled by communication with Sukpila alone. There are many other leaders and chiefs with whom the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar and the Manipuri authorities are in constant communication, who, though they may be influenced, are certainly in no way controlled by Sukpila.

(1) Assam Proceedings, April 1875.

On the second point, in which change is proposed, I am to point out that it is very necessary to Cachar and Sylhet that their right flank should be efficiently protected. The Chief Commissioner cannot recall to mind any raids of Kookies through Hill Tipperah into Chittagong, whereas they have been not unfrequent upon Sylhet. Strength in Hill Tipperah is consequently of more importance to the districts in the Surma Valley than to those on the Chittagong side. Tipperah will be stronger, the Chief Commissioner thinks, with a Political Agent than with an Assistant Political Agent.

Colonel Keatinge regrets that he is unable to support Sir R. Temple's scheme, in so far as it affects this Province. He has always held that the present division of control over the savage tribes lying between Cachar and Chittagong was the most convenient one. Indeed, when he took up the administration of this Province it was strongly urged upon him by the late Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal that he should undertake the control of the whole eastern frontier. His answer was, that the Syloos, Howlongs, &c., and other tribes in connection with Chittagong, could not conveniently be controlled from the Cachar side; that the controlling authority should have possession of the Chittagong District as a base. In the same way, he holds that Sukpila's people and other tribes in connection with Cachar could not conveniently be controlled from the Chittagong side; that the controlling authority should have possession of the Cachar District as a base.

The project was accordingly dropped.

In January 1877 Mr. H. Luttman-Johnson, then Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, accompanied by Mr. Johnson's tour, 1877.

Extra Assistant Commissioner Hari Charan Sarmah, Rai Bahadur, and by Mr. Savi, Assistant Superintendent of Police, in command of 50 men of the Frontier Police force, entered Lushai territory at Changeil Bazar, on the Dullessury River.<sup>(1)</sup> From thence the party marched through the hills to Sonai Bazar, and then proceeded to Kulicherra Mukh, on the Barak River, at which point they took boat, returning to Silchar by way of the Monierkhal outpost. Mr. Johnson spent altogether about three weeks in the Lushai Hills, experiencing much hospitality from those of the inhabitants with whom he came in contact. He was unfortunately unable to arrange an interview with either Sookpilal or Khalgom, now the most powerful of Sookpilal's sons, these Chiefs excusing their non-attendance on different grounds. The Deputy Commissioner, however, paid a visit to, and received a visit from, Sailengpoi, who is said to be the favourite son of Sookpilal. Sailengpoi evinced during the interviews a most friendly disposition. The tour was, on the whole, most successful, an issue due to a great extent to the caution and tact displayed by Mr. Johnson.

In March 1877 a very unsatisfactory report was received as to the state of the frontier posts supposed to be maintained by Hill Tipperah. The Rajah had three posts along his northern (Sylhet) border, at Kamalpur, Koilaspur, and Furnah Dharmnagar. Between this and Ekshurra on the Goomty (a day's journey from the Chittagong Hill Frontier), no posts were placed.<sup>(2)</sup> Then full two days' journey from Ekshurra down the Goomty was a post at Udaipur. On the south, close to Noakhali, another at Rishyamukh and on the west posts at Khadlamadla and Agartalah. In most cases the Political Agent found the sepoy's pay in

<sup>(1)</sup> Assam Proceedings, May 1877.

<sup>(2)</sup> Assam Proceedings, August 1877.

arrears and no ammunition provided for their muskets. The Government of India gave orders insisting on the Rajah's carrying out his engagements in this matter of frontier defence.

It was reported in 1876-77 that an expedition had been undertaken by Sookpilal's son, Lempong, and Laljeeka in October 1876 against Pugrying, a Syloo village, in which the village was plundered and several of the inhabitants carried away into slavery. Afterwards news was received that fighting has broken out between Khalgom, and the eastern Lushais under Poiboi. The quarrel is said to have originated through Khalgom having *joomed* land to which Poiboi laid claim. Poiboi and Lalhai would appear to be often guilty of acts of oppression towards the weaker Chiefs. In 1875-76 Tantow, a petty eastern Chief, having been attacked and robbed by Poiboi, came and settled near Tipai Mookh. The Chief Commissioner, considering his location in this place objectionable, ordered him to return to Lushai territory, or to move to a safer spot,—he adopted the former course. Subsequently, twenty-two families of Tantow's village came into British territory, and asked for protection, saying that they could no longer tolerate the constant oppression they suffered at the hands of Poiboi and Lalhai. They stated that Tantow himself had lately been seized by Poiboi, and placed in confinement, but had been released at the instance of Lengkam. These refugees were located for the present in the Kookie village of Akhai Punji, on the west bank of the Barak River, opposite the mouth of the Jhiri River.\*

In July 1877 hostilities broke out between the eastern Chiefs, Lengkam, Lalbura, Chunglen, and Bungte, and the western Chiefs, Sookpilal, Khalgom, his son, and Lenpoonga. These hostilities originated in a dispute about some *joom* land.

Sookpilal and the other western Chiefs, shortly after this outbreak of hostilities, sent a deputation to the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, asking for assistance against the eastern Chiefs. Their request was of course refused. In August following the eastern Chiefs sent a similar deputation, chiefly with a view to find out what answer had been given to Sookpilal. It was explained to them that the British Government would not assist either side, and they were advised to make peace with the other party. They then asked that the traders who had deserted the Tipai Mookh Bazaar on account of the oppression exercised by some servants of Lengkam's might be induced to return. They were told that the matter would be taken into consideration if proper explanations were tendered.

Towards the end of September, Lengkam attacked Khalgom, and carried off fifteen heads, in revenge for the theft from some of his people of some salt which they were carrying through Khalgom's country from Sonai Bazaar. In October thirty-five of Lalhai's people fled from the Lushai country through fear of Poiboi.

\* I give the names of the Lushai Chiefs as they appear in the papers; but new names are constantly cropping up without explanation of their connection or location. Some Cachar officer should prepare a 'Key' to the Annual Reports.



In November Sookpibal's muntries again sent a petition to the Deputy Commissioner, asking him to mediate between the eastern and western Chiefs. They were told in reply that, if both sides joined in the application, the request might be entertained, but not otherwise.

In January 1878 Lengkam's muntri with other agents of the eastern Chiefs made restitution to the traders who had left Tipai Bazaar, paying them Rs. 30. They also, on the part of the eastern Chiefs, again asked for the mediation of the British Government. The Chief Commissioner being informed that both parties were desirous of mediation on the part of the British Government, directed that they should be advised to make peace, and that a safe meeting-ground in Cachar should be offered to them.

Nothing of importance occurred to disturb our relations with any of the tribes in 1868-79 till October, when the bazar at Changsil, which is under Sookpibal's protection, was plundered by a party of Lushais, who could not be identified. The merchants came down with the muntries of Sookpibal, and some of his neighbours who tried to throw the blame on the eastern tribes. On investigation, however, this appeared highly improbable, and Sookpibal was called upon to pay the losses of the traders and 25 per cent. damages, and with this view the muntries were sent back to him, with a message to the effect that no merchants would be allowed to go to Changsil until the money was paid.

About the same time six Lushais from Sennong, one of Poiboi's villages, came down to ask for assistance against Lalhai; they further reported that Poiboi was about to send down his principal muntries after the rice crop was cut. Advantage was taken of this opportunity to remind Poiboi and Khalgom of their obligations regarding the safety of their respective bazars.

On the 6th December a robbery of rubber from some Nepaulese woodcutters by a party of Lushais was reported. Investigation was made, but the thieves were not discovered.

On the 8th December some muntries and others from Khalgom came down to ask for assistance against the eastern tribes. They were told that Poiboi's and Lengkom's muntries were expected shortly, and that, if they waited till Sookpibal's muntries came down also, there would be some chance of making a peaceable arrangement between the tribes here.

The Bengali messenger the Deputy Commissioner sent with the returning muntries to Sookpibal came back on the 15th January, and reported that Sookpibal had made a thorough investigation into the robbery at Changsil, but without success. He declined to pay any damages or compensation, but promised to send his muntries in a fortnight to treat for the re-opening of the Changsil Bazar. The promised muntries came down in February, and, after long consultation and debates, agreed that Sookpibal should pay a fine of Rs. 1,000, and remit bazar dues to the same amount, on the condition that the Changsil

Bazar should be re-opened. Meanwhile, the muntries from the eastern side had arrived in the station. From what they all said, the state of enmity between the tribes was highly unpopular, and solely due to the jealousy of the Chiefs. Even they, it seemed, would be glad to make peace, were it not that each party was unwilling to incur the shame of making the first advance. The Deputy Commissioner recommended them to make simultaneous advances, and told them to say that the advances were made by his advice. The muntries all went away about the 8th of March.

Sookpial first endeavoured to raise the amount of his fine by the imposition of a house-tax; but this attempt was abandoned in consequence of the opposition it encountered at the hands of his people, who contended that, as the Chiefs themselves realized handsome profits from the bazar, they, and not the community at large, were the proper persons to make good the sum demanded by Government. Sookpial then obtained contributions of Rs. 100 from each of the tributary Chiefs Sailengpui, Lengpunga, Lengkunga, and Baniyatungi, and Rs. 60 from his son Khalgom; this money, together with Rs. 100 contributed by himself, he paid to a Native officer who had been deputed to Changsil to realize the fine. He promised to arrange within one month for the payment of the balance Rs. 440, but the Native officer, being seriously ill and having nearly exhausted his supplies, returned to Cachar. The Chief Commissioner remitted the balance of the fine, in consideration of the deference paid by Sookpial to the order of the Deputy Commissioner.

On the 30th April 1879 it was reported that a party of Sookpial's tribe under the command of his sons, Labruma and Lengpung, had started to attack the villages of Poiboi and Lengkam, and of their subsidiary Chief Chungleng, the object of the expedition being to retaliate for the burning by Lengkam of some *jhum* huts. It was further stated that another party had gone south-east to raid on Lalbura's people. These reports were afterwards corroborated by information received from the Deputy Commissioner of the Chittagong Hill Tracts. No collision, however, occurred, the contending parties being induced to abandon for the present their warlike designs by the friendly offices of the grandmother of Poiboi, a Rani whose territory lies between the villages of the two belligerents. In June 1879 a report came down from the Sonai Bazar that Sailengpui and other Chiefs had started to renew the attack on Poiboi, Lengkam, and Chungleng; but a rumour having reached them that troops were being despatched from Cachar to Tipai Mookh, the project was abandoned.

In the following month the Lushais came down from Senong Punji (a village 14 miles south-east of Tipai Mookh Bazar), presented an elephant tusk to the Deputy Commissioner, and represented that their community was in great distress for want of food. With the approval of the Chief Commissioner, 35 maunds of paddy were purchased and sent to relieve the distress.

In addition to these internal disputes, the Eastern Lushais are threatened by some of the Kookie clans living still further to the eastward. It was reported that in April 1879 some Paites, nominally subject to the Maharajah of Manipur, attacked the village of Bontonga, brother of Lalbura. The result was the loss of one life. No retaliatory steps were taken by the Lushais, who had been recently further disturbed by a demand made on them for tribute by the Soktes (or Sooties), which demand they determined to resist at all costs.

During the year the muntries of Sookpilal, Sailengpui, and Lengpung visited Cachar, and presented *nazars* to the Chief Commissioner. The muntries of Poiboi and Lengkam not having attended as usual to pay their respects, the Deputy Commissioner caused inquiries to be made of those Chiefs, and was informed that the cause of this neglect was the attitude of the Soktes, which rendered it inadvisable for the headmen to absent themselves from their villages.

In April 1880 a party of Lushais who had come down to collect rubber fell in with some woodcutters in the Inner Line forest reserve, and demanded rent from them. On the matter being reported to the Deputy Commissioner, he sent a remonstrance to Sookpilal, whose subjects the offenders were said to be. Sookpilal took the matter up promptly, and summoned the principal offender, one Lalapa, Muntri of Mintang Punji, whom he fined and personally chastised. He also expressed a hope that any Lushais who interfered with British subjects in our territory might, if arrested, be punished by the Deputy Commissioner. In the month of May a letter, received from the Changsil Bazar, stated that Sookpilal was seriously ill, and wished, if possible, to have an interview with Rai Hari Charan Sarma Bahadur before his death. Major Boyd, therefore, with the sanction of the Chief Commissioner, despatched that officer, with an escort of 10 men of the Frontier Police, to the Changsil Bazar, whence he proceeded to Sookpilal's village. He found Sookpilal very ill and anxious that a medical man might be sent to him.

Owing to barbarities committed by Khalgom, Sookpilal's son, upon his people, several families sought refuge in Cachar and were settled at a distance from the border.

On the 13th January 1881 Major Boyd started on tour in the Lushai country, and was absent a month from the district. He was able to meet seven Chiefs, exclusive of the infant son and heir of Sookpilal. News of the death of the last-mentioned Chief reached him after his departure from Silchar.

From time to time during the year reports were received of petty raids committed by the several Chiefs in pursuance of the quarrel between the eastern and western Chiefs. Had Sookpilal lived, it is possible arrangements might have been made to effect an amicable settlement during the Deputy Commissioner's tour in those hills;

but the death of the most powerful of their opponents has encouraged Poiboi and Lengkam to prosecute the quarrel.

The death of Sookpila was to be regretted, as his great influence had of late been steadily exerted in favour of the maintenance of friendly and conciliatory relations with our Government. During his tour Major Boyd had frequent opportunities of noticing how thoroughly the conviction of the paramount importance of retaining the favour of Government was entertained by the chiefs and their headmen, and as the pressure of the less-civilized tribes on the flank and rear of the Lushais increases year by year, so will the urgent need for the continuance of amicable relations become, it is thought, to these latter more and more apparent.

In the early part of the year 1881-82 there were incessant hostilities among the chiefs inhabiting the eastern and central tracts. In

Events of 1881-82.  
the beginning of April Lengkam, Chunglena, and Poiboi attacked and burnt the village of Thangula, which contained about 450 people, killing 150 of them and taking 39 prisoners. The Deputy Commissioner gives the following account of their subsequent proceedings :—

The raiders carried with them forty heads of the slain as a trophy, and it is curious to note what they did with these heads on their return to the *punjis*. They all assembled in the village of Chunglena, and there the heads were arranged in a row, and an earthen vessel filled with rice, curry, and boiled eggs, and a bamboo "*chungga*" containing liquor, were placed by each head, while the victors drank and danced round them. This food was given, not out of derision, but in order that the disembodied spirits might not haunt the victors, but travel in peace to the city of the dead that lies in the far south. Subsequently, a small tree was planted in front of the Raja's house, and the heads hung on its branches, the soldiery then proceeded to dance round the tree, firing blank ammunition at the heads. After this, the fighting-men who had actually brought away the heads were publicly decorated, each man's hair being bound with a thick white cord, at the ends of which knots of black and red thread were fastened. These threads are highly esteemed by the Lushais, and are carefully preserved and transmitted to their descendants as proofs of the prowess of their ancestors.

Directly after this Lengkam attacked a village of Darkang's, and killed many of inhabitants: 23 people from this village and 22 from Thangula's village took refuge in the Cachar district, and were assigned an asylum in two Kookie villages, which were willing to receive them. In October Khalgom made an abortive attack on Lalhai; but, these wars not being relished by his people, 400 of them immigrated into the Cachar district, and were settled there. Shortly after this the pressure of famine began to be felt, and the three principal chiefs, Poiboi, Khalgom, and Lalhai, met and agreed to a cessation of hostilities, and proceeded to send men into the Cachar district to obtain supplies of food.

The famine arose, according to the concurrent testimony of all persons concerned, from the depredations of rats. In the previous season

The Lushai famine.  
the bamboos had seeded, and the supply of food thus provided caused an immense multiplication in the number of rats, who, when they had

exhausted the bamboo-seed, fell upon the rice crops and devoured them. The earliest indication of the distress was the immigration of some eighty families from the village of Khalgom, followed by other subjects of eastern chiefs first, and afterwards of the western chiefs. But, though they were later in immigrating, it was the western villages which suffered most, and by far the largest number of refugees came down the valley of the Dullessury past Jhalnacherri. At first, their advent created considerable alarm among the tea-coolies and some managers of the gardens near their route; but it was soon found out that they were peaceably inclined, and were only anxious to earn a livelihood, either by the sale of bamboos and forest produce, by labour, or by begging. In order to facilitate the former end, the duty charged at the forest toll-stations on foreign timber and produce was taken off; and employment was offered both by the Forest Officer on clearing forest boundaries and by several Tea Managers on cutting down the jungle on their grants. The Lushais, though not accustomed to hoeing or road-making, are skilful in jungle-clearing, and accepted work readily when offered them on high wages. But, besides this form of relief, it was necessary to make provision for supplying food in Lushai-land to those who were unable or unwilling to emigrate. Traders were encouraged to send up rice to the two chief marts of Tipaimukh in the east and Changsil in the west; the protection of a body of Frontier Police was promised them; and two Government store-houses were opened at Tipaimukh and Guturmukh, a place rather lower down the river Dullessury than Changsil, and to the north of it. These store-houses were not to compete with traders in selling, but to act as reserves in case the traders' stores fell short, and from them loans were to be made to the chiefs, or to men for whom the chiefs guaranteed that they were unable to buy from the traders.

One visit was paid by the Special Extra-Assistant Commissioner, Rai Hari Charan Bahadur, to Tipaimukh, and two (on the second of which he was accompanied by Mr. Place, Sub-Divisional Officer of Hailakandi) to Guturmukh. In the course of these visits it was ascertained that the eastern part of the country had suffered least from the famine: partly no doubt from natural causes, and partly because, being stronger and more warlike, the chiefs had stores of plunder to fall back upon. These chiefs resented the posting of a guard at Tipaimukh, and professed to be afraid that it would lead to the annexation of the country: so, after ascertaining that the traders were not alarmed for their own safety, the guard was withdrawn, only a head constable and a native clerk being left to keep the accounts of the store-house and to register traffic and report events. On the western side the chiefs and their people were poorer and the scarcity more severe; and here much gratitude was expressed for the assistance given by Government, and much friendliness shown towards Mr. Place, who was asked to enter and visit the villages, an

Visits to Lushai-land by Government officials,

invitation seldom given to an Englishman, whose visit is believed to be generally followed by cholera. It was ascertained that the Lushais of this tract prevented the Howlongs, who live to their south, from visiting Guturmukh or Changsil, and were making a profitable trade by carrying rice to them and retailing it at a higher price.

As the season advanced, there was no increase in the pressure felt, but the contrary, and many of the Lushais who had entered Cachar and settled temporarily in Kookie villages there began to return in order to prepare their own lands for cultivation. Cholera broke out in the spring near Tipaimukh, and carried off one of the chiefs, Chunglena; and his village, thus weakened, was afterwards raided on by some Manipur Kookies. There has been a considerable emigration, too, from this part into Manipur territory. These events, however, did not affect Cachar, neither increasing the number of fugitives into it nor preventing the return of the famine-immigrants to their own country. It is estimated that not more than 1,000 of these now remain in Cachar.

The quantity of rice and paddy exported to Lushai-land in 1881-82 was about 18,000 maunds and 2,000 maunds respectively, while nearly 1,000 maunds of rubber and 425,000 bamboos were brought down. The value of the imports is estimated at Rs. 61,800, and of the exports at Rs. 42,700, the difference between the two figures being covered by the cost of freight and the profits of trade. Besides this, Government purchased and sent up about 2,500 maunds of paddy, which was either sold to traders or advanced to the chiefs and persons vouched for by them.

The total expenditure incurred by Government on famine relief was Rs. 2,240; of this Rs. 1,100 was for purchase of paddy and rice, and Rs. 1,040 for boat-hire, *i.e.*, freight of the paddy and visits of supervising officials. Rs. 1,040 were recovered from the sales to traders, leaving Rs. 1,200, the net expenditure of Government. Some of this but not much may be recovered from the recipients of loans. The policy of giving grain only in the form of a loan, and on the guarantee of a chief, was adhered to, not so much in the hope that much money would be received back, as with the view of preventing too indiscriminate application for help from being made.

In January 1883 a small party of Sokte Kookies under a chief, Thangkoyam, succeeded in making their way to Tipaimukh Bazar and plundered the Bazar, carrying off also a boy captive. The Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, Mr. Wight, was actually close to the Bazar at the time, but not with force sufficient to prevent the outrage. These Kookies came from a village 10 days south of Manipur and managed

to evade all the hostile Lushais on their route. The captive lad, all the plunder, and a fine of Rs. 450 were subsequently recovered through the agency of the Raja of Manipur.

Late in December 1883 the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar reported that disturbing reports had reached him from Lushai land. Apprehension at present time, January 1884. Khalgom and the western Lushais were said to be much excited about the alleged murder of four of their people by Kookies living in our territory near Arkai Punji. Khalgom had sent in a deputation to demand reparation, headed by Rutton Sing (a notorious character, formerly a coolie on a tea garden, who has been mixed up in every mischief that has taken place on this frontier of recent years). It was ascertained that a great Council of the western chiefs had been held, and as raids might very possibly follow, troops have been hurried up to strengthen the frontier posts and patrols. The Deputy Commissioner has told the Lushais that he will make enquiries into their allegations, and that any raid on British territory will lead to their utter destruction.

## CHAPTER XXII.

## CHITTAGONG FRONTIER TRIBES.

To the east and south-east of the district of Chittagong stretches a tract of hill and forest, which, though now a British district, was not very long ago an almost unknown territory even to those who were nominally in charge of it. Lying between latitude  $21^{\circ} 25'$  and  $23^{\circ} 45'$  north, and longitude  $91^{\circ} 45'$  and  $92^{\circ} 50'$  east, it was for long years entered in the collectorate records of Chittagong as the kapas or cotton mehal of that district, a land of impervious jungle

The Chittagong Hill Tracts. and malarious climate, into which no Bengalee might venture and live. We now assume to govern and protect 6,796 square miles of upland. European officers dwell amid its forests, and a yearly increasing revenue is derived from its people and its products. It is bounded on the south and south-east by Arracan; on the north-west the Fenny divides it from Hill Tipperah; west of it lie the swamps and plains of Chittagong; while eastward its limits are undefined, and its ranges merge in the wild, unexplored high-lands that lie between British India and North Burmah. The tract is roughly divided into four great valleys by chains of hills running from the south to the north-west in nearly parallel lines, till they reach the water-shed between Chittagong and Cachar. Flowing south, the Sungoo and Matamori rivers water two of these main valleys. The other two are drained by north-flowing affluents of the Karnafuli, which itself cuts through the ranges from east to west. It is a country rough and primeval: the abode of nomad cultivators, who have a hard struggle to maintain life against the savagery of nature and their more barbarous neighbours. The habits of the people and the characteristics of their home have been pleasantly and rosily described by the Deputy Commissioner (Captain Lewin) lately in charge of them.\* It is not my intention here to go over ground already so recently traversed; nor do manners and customs fall specially within the scope of my present task. On the history of the Hill Tracts and the policy of Government therein, Captain Lewin has hardly touched; and it is still open to me to examine this. I shall first, however, and with due acknowledgment, condense from Captain Lewin's work a very brief account of the various tribes inhabiting the Hill Tracts.

Captain Lewin divides these into two classes: (1) the Khyoungtha, or children of the river; and (2) the  
 Lewin's sketch of the Hill peoples. Toungtha, or children of the hills.  
 The former are of Arracanese origin, immigrants from the south, and by

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\* The Hill Tracts of Chittagong and the dwellers therein—Calcutta, 1869.



religion Buddhists. The latter are of mixed origin, dwell chiefly in the outer hills, and are, in fact, for the most part savages of various clans. The Khyoungtha dwell together in village communities, each under a *roaja* or headman, through whom they pay revenue either to Government direct or to some chief. The whole country south of the Karnafuli is nominally subject to the head of the Phru family, called at various times the Poang and the Bohmong Rajah. Most of those living north of the Karnafuli acknowledge a chief called the Mong Rajah. Distinct as to language and race from the ordinary Khyoungthas are the Chukma, or Tsakma tribe. Branches of this tribe are known as Doingnak and Toungjynyas, and much discussion has taken place as to their origin and history, for which I must refer to Captain Lewin's pamphlet and the Asiatic Society's journals. The chief of the Chukmas was until within the last few years a woman known as Kalindi Rani, and the tribe jooms north of the Karnafuli towards the Penny river. The Toungthas, or sons of the Hill, *i.e.*, the tribes who cultivate the higher hills in preference to the river bottoms and lower ranges, are divided by Captain Lewin into three sets:—

(a) Those who are tributary to us and subject to our control, to wit (1) the Tipperahs or Mrungs; (2) the Kumi or Kweymi; (3) the Mrús; and (4) the Khyengs:

(b) Those who pay us no revenue, but are subject to our influence, *i.e.*, (1) the Bunjogis; and (2) the Pankhos: and lastly

(c) The independent tribes of (1) Lushai or Kookies, and (2) Shindus or Lakheyr.

The Tipperahs are merely emigrants from Hill Tipperah, to whom our rule has seemed more settled and endurable than that of their own chief. At one time, as we have already seen, the Kingdom of Tipperah probably embraced a large part of Chittagong, and this fact may also help to account for the numbers of Tipperahs we find here. There are about 15,000 settled in our Hill Tracts divided into four classes: the Pooran, the Nowuttea, the Osmi, and the Reang. The first two live near the Penny; the third is small and scattered. The Reangs live on the eastern verge of the district, near the Lushai Kookies, and were a great source of trouble to us when first we entered on the government of the hills.

The Kumis dwell on the Koladyne river in Arracan, and on the upper part of the Sungoo. Living as they do near the outer tribes, they are more warlike in their habits than the Tipperahs and Khyoungtha, and stockade their villages for purposes of defence.

The Mrús are found to the west of the Sungoo and on the Matamori. They were originally driven out of Arracan by the Kumis. There are only 1,500 of them in all within the district, and they pay tribute to the Bohmong in common with the other tribes of the south.

Of the Khyengs, Captain Lewin only reports that they are few in number in the Hill Tracts, and inhabit the spurs of the great hill range separating the district from Arracan.

The Bunjogis and Pankhos are of common origin ; but the former, with the Shindus and Kumis, knot their hair over the forehead, and are with them classed as *Poe* ; the latter, with the Tipperahs and Lushais, wear it *en chignon* at the back. Together, these two tribes number about 3,000 souls, and live, a few on the Karnafuli, but most to the east of the Sungoo. They are in many points like the Lushais, and have the same love of plunder and slaughter.

Of the Lushai tribes bordering on Cachar, I have already treated in detail. Those found on the verge of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, though connected with the clans to the north, were long believed to be distinct, and politically at any rate, may be considered apart. The Burmese call them Lankhé, and they are divided into three great septs. The Howlong, estimated at 12,600 ; the Syloo, at 10,800 ; and Rutton Poiya's clan at 2,580 souls. They are all independent, warlike, and aggressive. They inhabit the hills to the north-east.

The Shindus are a formidable nation living to the north-east and east of the Blue Mountain. All the country south of the Karnafuli has for many years been exposed to their ravages. Of their position and internal relations we know much less than we do of the Lushais. The whole aim of our frontier policy has of late years been the protection of the other tribes already named from the raids of the Chittagong Lushais and Shindus. The whole history of this frontier is indeed the story of their outrages and of the efforts to prevent, repel, or avenge these.

These are the tribes with whom the Government has to deal in this out-lying part of its dominions. But it is only of late years that such a complete classification of them could have been given. When Chittagong first fell into British hands, no attempt was made to bring any part of the hills under direct administration. The authorities had cognizance of only two hill chiefs : the one called the Phru, living 52 miles east-south-east from the station of Islamabad ; the other, whose residence was 35 miles to the east-north-east, being the head of the Chukmas. The chiefs had paid a tribute in cotton to the Muhammadans, and continued to do so to the British. But the amount appears to have been uncertain, and the Kapas Mehal, as it was called, was farmed out yearly to some speculator, who contracted to realize the tribute, and enjoyed a monopoly of the staple in which it was paid. The system of cultivation common to all the hillmen is that known as 'joom'. A village settles down in a favourable site, and yearly, in the month of April, each family proceeds to fell the jungle and to clear enough ground for purposes of tillage. The timber and bamboos so cut down are fired in May, and thereafter, on the first token of the approaching rains, holes are dibbled in the ground, into which five or six kinds of seed are thrown together,—cotton, rice, maize, pumpkin, or what not, calculated to mature in regular sequence. While the crops are ripening, the whole village bivouacks on the jooms to protect them

from beast and bird. Two years of such cultivation exhausts the soil, and when all the good land round a village has been worked out, the people move *en masse* to another site. Among the wilder tribes the greater part of the jooming operation is performed by slaves—captives of many a raid and border foray, which are indeed mainly undertaken to procure such labour. It is obvious that under such a system of cultivation the joomea can acquire no rights in the soil itself, and that no practical means of assessing his clearing could in such a country exist. Hence, even the chiefs claim no property in the land or in the forests. Each claims the men of his tribe wherever they wander, or in whatever part of the country they may settle for the time to joom. Generally speaking the joomeas of each clan confine themselves within certain rough limits, but there is no real local jurisdiction vesting in any of the chiefs. The forest outside the State Reserves is free to all.

The tribute paid by the chiefs to Government was originally realized in kind through the roajas or headmen from the several families of the village. In 1789 the Government converted the cotton tribute into a money payment, and the chiefs now in turn demand from their joomeas a cash contribution. This is usually fixed at Rs. 3 or 4 for each married man. Bachelors, priests, hunters, and some other classes are exempt. Money payments introduced direct settlements with Government—contractors being abolished—and brought the Hill Tracts into administrative relations with the paramount power. The Government revenue was fixed upon a rough idea of the number of joomeas subject to each chief, and it has always been held liable to enhancement on the ground of increase in their numbers. As first settled, the whole revenue of the Hill Tracts was Rs. 5,703-13, of which the Chukma chief, Jan Buksh Khan, paid Rs. 1,852 and Kumla Phru Rs. 703, the balance being paid by various headmen, who managed to obtain direct settlements either through intrigue or as being really the representatives of distinct communities. In 1846 the revenue had risen to Rs. 11,803.

The earliest notice of these tribes which Captain Lewin discovered dates from the year 1777, when Ramoo Khan, probably a Chukma chief, rebelled against the authority of our cotton farmer and called in to his assistance "large bodies of Kookie men, who live far in the interior part of the hills, who have not the use of fire-arms, and whose bodies go unclothed." The rising appears to have been starved out by closing the markets to the hill people for a time. Tribes called Kookies were then, we gather from other contemporaneous notices, wont to raid upon the plains. There can be little doubt, however, that the raiders of the eighteenth century were the tribes who now inhabit our Hill Tracts, and are themselves sufferers from the encroachments of the more distant clans.

From 1790 to 1840 the Phru family, which ruled from the Karnafuli to the Naaf, had been under one head, Satung Phru.<sup>(1)</sup> Some time before his death Satung made over the management to his brother, Om Phru; but this Chief was so unpopular that the family, which had hitherto lived together at Bindabun, broke up and moved to different parts of the hills. In 1846 Om died, and his son, Komalagnio, kept possession of the family seat, though at first he had no influence over the rest of his relatives. From 1840 a state of anarchy prevailed owing to the family quarrels of the Phrus which first drew the serious attention of Government to the internal condition of Hill Tracts. During the two years preceding Satung Phru's death we had heard from time to time of sanguinary attacks upon villages subordinate to the Phrus. In 1830, in 1834, and again in 1835, such raids had taken place; the attacking parties being Mrungs, Kumis, or Bunjogis. Before 1830 our records are almost blank, recording nothing but the payments of revenue at the appointed times. Now, however, the dissensions of the Phrus and the anarchy which followed brought about a series of outrages, of which few details reached the ears of local officers at the time, but of the reality of which there was an ample evidence discovered afterwards. The fact appears to have been that the various members of the Phru family took up different positions in the hills, and perpetrated constant forays upon each other's villages, calling in the outer tribes to assist in the bloody work. This threatened the security of our revenue and demanded peremptory interference. Besides this, however, it would seem that now for the first time was Government made aware of the nature of these hill raids. In 1846, at any rate, we get very full details in regard to them from Captain Phayre, the Principal Assistant Commissioner of Arracan. The Chittagong authorities knew little of the tribes. Most of the marauders were Kumis or Shindus from the Koladyne, and all efforts to recover captives or punish raids were for many years made from the side of Arracan. The first expedition to punish an offending tribe was planned by Captain Phayre, then in charge of Arracan, for the cold weather of 1846-47 against Kumis of the Koladyne, who had raided upon certain Mru immigrants from Arracan, now tributaries of the Phrus. Komalagnio Phru had obtained a sort of pre-eminence over the rest of his family, and to him Government applied for information as to the nature of the arrangements made by him for the defence of his joomas.

Proposals for defence of country by the Phrus.

(1) Judicial Proceedings, 1846, 26th August, Nos. 190 & 191.  
 Judicial Proceedings, 1846, 23rd September, Nos. 99 to 102.  
 Judicial Proceedings, 1845, 14th October, No. 82.  
 Judicial Proceedings, 1847, 24th February, Nos. 25 to 29.  
 Judicial Proceedings, 1847, 28th April, Nos. 137 to 139.  
 Judicial Proceedings, 1847, 22nd September, Nos. 109 to 118.  
 Judicial Proceedings, 1848, 12th January, Nos. 150 & 151.  
 Judicial Proceedings, 1848, 24th February, Nos. 163 to 175.

It was found that his predecessors had established certain stockades in the south on the principal lines of route from Arracan, and these the Bohmong Rajah (to give the Phru his later title) now expressed himself willing to repair and man. The Magistrate of Chittagong strongly impressed with the impossibility of effecting much by offensive measures in such a country, and believing that failure must attend any attempt on the part of Government to establish a cordon of out-posts adequate to the protection of the tracts, recommended that the Bohmong should receive a remission of Rs. 1,000 from his revenue on condition of his undertaking the defence of his own estate. This sum, however, the Bohmong pronounced utterly insufficient even for the maintenance of the four forts he had, viz., Toba Cherra, Paindal Cherra, Purdah Cherra, and Capabtye Cherra. There was this further difficulty. Komalagnio Phru had not been formerly recognized as sole Chief and head of the family, and the dissensions ensuing on the death of Satung Phru had not yet altogether subsided. Any arrangement made with him might only cause difficulty from the jealousy of the other Phrus. Under these circumstances Mr. Henry Ricketts, the Commissioner of Chittagong, was deputed to inquire into and report upon the whole subject, and the scheme which he submitted was eventually approved. It has been printed at length in No. XI. of the Selections from the Bengal Records. The following is an abstract of its provisions.

Mr. Ricketts held that as we had, from the inaccessible nature of the country, no hold upon it save through the Phrus, it was politic to ignore the connection which any of them might have had with the recent raids. We must manage through them, or not at all. Of course, if everything failed, we might remove the whole family to the plains, and try to work through the *rajas* or village headmen; but for many reasons such a plan was to be deprecated. We had therefore first to adjust the family feuds. This could only be effected by insisting on treating the chieftainship as an impartible heritage, subject only to liabilities for the support of the rest of the family. A little pressure brought the Phrus to consent to this. It was agreed that Komalagnio should be manager and chief; the others taking office under him as *tehsildars* or revenue collectors for certain clans, but all were to live together at Bindabuu. On these conditions the revenue payable to Government was reduced to Rs. 2,918—a remission of Rs. 1,645. Mr. Ricketts proposed that it should be formally notified to them that Government acknowledged no right on their part to the soil of the forests, the whole of which belonged to the State; that their revenue should not be enhanced for twenty years, and no separate engagements be taken during that period from new *joomeas* south of the Karnafuli; that they were to undertake the defence of the frontier against marauders; that, should forays take place, or family quarrels arise, the management of the tract and the frontier defence should be taken up by Government, and the Phrus be deported to the plains. One argument

brought forward to justify these concessions to the Phrus is worth noting. It was the fact that for many years raids upon the actual plains had been unknown. Whatever, therefore, they had done or failed to do, they had been able to keep their own tribes under control, and had proved an effectual screen to the people of the lowlands. It was only through our more intimate connection with the hill joomeas, owing to the nature of the revenue settlement, that we had any cognizance of the existence of raids. But where we realised revenue, we were bound to give or procure safety. Mr. Ricketts first at this time pointed out the anomaly of considering the Kapas Mehal as part of the regulation district of Chittagong. For thirteen years, however, things were left in this respect in *statu quo*.

In the year 1847 we first hear of the Shindus raiding in Chittagong. They are described as a very powerful tribe of the far interior, over whom the Arracan authorities exercised no control. Some proposals were indeed at this time made with a view to preventing forays from the side of Arracan, but they were not very promising, and nothing seems to have been done. The Akyab Police had, it was reported, full authority over all the tribes on the banks of the Koladyne to a point hundred miles from its mouth, where a thanna was situated. For about fifty miles further up, they exercised a less perfect but still appreciable control. But this was confined to the immediate neighbourhood of the stream. At the furthest point to which our officers had penetrated (the junction of the Kolak with the Koladyne), debouched the most northerly of the four routes known to exist between Chittagong and the Koladyne Valley. Here it was proposed to establish a stockade. Between this and the thanna, fifty miles below, supporting posts would be required; one at the junction of the Kooshai and the Koladyne, where was the head of a path leading to the Phrus villages in seven days' march. But all these sites were so fearfully unhealthy that the idea was abandoned, and the policy of attacking offending villages, when this was possible, was advocated instead. As the Arracan authorities attributed the frequency of raids to the ease with which slaves were disposed of to "the Chittagong Rajahs," the Government made the abolition of slavery a condition in the arrangements concluded with the Phrus. The establishment of a school was also suggested by Government as a desirable step.

The cold season of 1847-48 was marked by two sanguinary raids, the one on the Kalindi Rani's subjects, the other on those of the Phru. The marauders, it was clearly shown, came from the Koladyne. Mr. Ricketts was anxious to send a party of armed burkundazes on their trail to follow on till they reached the Koladyne, there to co-operate with the Arracan police and local levies. But this plan was deemed impracticable, as no available force could be safely despatched through a country so difficult, so hostile, so unknown.

## THE NORTH-EAST FRONTIER OF BENGAL.

The expedition which Captain Phayre had planned for the cold

Hopkinson's Expedition, 1847. weather of 1846-47 was carried out

by Lieutenant Hopkinson, then Principal Assistant Commissioner of Akyab, in December 1847.<sup>(1)</sup> It was designed as already stated to punish certain villages of independent Kumis living far above the Koladyne Thannah for outrages committed on the Mrus both in Chittagong and Arracan. I have reproduced in the Appendix copious extracts from Lieutenant Hopkinson's journal, because they contain the best description I have come across of the nature of the country and of the difficulties such an expedition has to encounter. The conclusion come to by the local authorities on a review of all the information obtained by that officer was that, however troublesome the Kumis or the Khons or other petty tribes might be, the state of disquiet in which the Upper Koladyne was constantly kept was due entirely to the Shindus. Until this tribe was punished and brought to terms, there could be no hope of permanent tranquillity; and yet no feasible plan suggested itself by which this object could be attained. Lieutenant Hopkinson's expedition only succeeded by a series of happy accidents. The men composing it were prostrated by the mere toil of the march. Had they been attacked either in the advance or the retreat, they would never have returned to tell the tale. The Commissioner of Arracan wrote that while seeing the evil he was utterly unable to suggest a remedy. Nature was stronger than man. "Every expedition (said he) that has penetrated into the mountain ranges seems to have met with more difficulty than the one that preceded it; and having overcome all the inferior tribes, and established a very improved state of things as far as their conduct is concerned, we appear to have arrived near the frontier of a tribe, or rather perhaps tribes under the generic appellation of Shantoo (Shindu), who perhaps stretch as far north as Cachar and Manipur, and east to the Burmese territory." Scarcely had Lieutenant Hopkinson reached Akyab, when the Shindus harried the friendly villages at which he had stayed on his visit to their neighbourhood. Lord Dalhousie, on receipt of these reports, seems to have been more impressed by the hazards the force had run than by the gallantry with which it had met them, and in the most cogent terms impressed on the Arracan officers the folly of attempting to carry reprisals into the jungles and fastnesses of the hills, where there was little to gain and much might be lost.

In the cold season of 1849-50, the Shindus raided in the Phru

Baids of 1849-50. country.<sup>(2)</sup> At the first Lushais

got the credit of the outrage, as they did of every similar attack along the Cachar, Sylhet, and Chittagong frontier at this time: and Colonel Lister, Superintendent on the Cachar side, was instructed to procure information as to the tribe

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(1) Judicial Proceedings, 1848, 16th August, Nos. 182 to 186.

(2) Judicial Proceedings, 1850, 27th March, Nos. 94-95.

concerned, and endeavour to recover the captives. It is certain that the southern Lushais, who were never reached by Colonel Lister, did raid this year upon the Chukma villages north of the Karnafuli, nor was there wanting an alleged cause, the Magistrate of Chittagong having recorded his opinion that the whole of the outrages in the north of the Hill Tracts were due to the encroachment of the Mugh Joomeas upon the territory belonging to the hill tribes. No boundary had been settled to the east, and it was urged that this want of definite limits led the Joomeas to take up sites far within the hills, on the strength of a protection which it was impossible for us adequately to afford. The Magistrate proposed that the Chingree Nullah running north and south to Rungamuttea, and between Rungamuttea and Kassalong the Karnafuli, and southward thence a nullah without a name, should be our eastern line of frontier, along which we should place stockades, and beyond which we should not go. The idea was approved by Government but left for future consideration. The whole question of repressing the predatory habits of the tribes in this quarter was fraught with difficulty. Captain Phayre, now Commissioner of Arracan, protested that there was no way of checking the Shindus but by marching a force into their country.<sup>(1)</sup> This, however, he did not recommend, as the task presented difficulties of unparalleled magnitude. All that he could suggest for practical adoption was to endeavour to educate the tribes by missionary enterprise. A good beginning had been made among the Kumis, and the banks of the Koladyne, as far as Talakmé were fast being peopled by settlers from the neighbouring hills. Nothing, however, of the kind was possible in Chittagong, where the country was wilder and the savage tribes less accessible.

In January 1850 an attack was made by about 400 Kookies on a village of Joomeas, belonging to Kalindi Rani's tribe, on the Chingnia, a river in the Chittagong Hills falling into the Karnafuli below Rungamuttea.<sup>(2)</sup> It was conjectured at first that the assailants came from Mullah's village, from which, as noted in the preceding Chapter, Colonel Lister found all the fighting men absent when he captured it; but this idea was ultimately abandoned on consideration of distance and on other grounds. The commissariat officer, who was superintending kheddah operations in that very neighbourhood, reported that the Kookies of the Chittagong Hills never injured his people on hearing they were 'Company's servants,' and said that they were led to attack the Kalindi Rani's people by the impositions and frauds practised on them when trying to barter their hill produce for salt and other articles brought from the plains.

In the cold season of 1850-51, attacks upon wood-cutters felling bamboos and timber in the jungles were reported from time to time, and there were not wanting circumstances making it matter of suspicion

(1) Judicial Proceedings, 1851, 30th April, Nos. 169-71.

(2) Judicial Proceedings, 1850, 26th June, No. 156.



that some connection existed between these outrages and certain quarrels then subsisting between the Phru and the Kalindi Rani.<sup>(1)</sup> In the police report for the year 1850, we find the first suggestion that the direct management of the hill tracts should be assumed by Government officers. Radical suggestions of this kind crop up at intervals in regard to most of our hill tracts only to be dropped after a desultory call for report. In 1853 Messrs. Currie and Colvin inspected the eastern districts; and the result was a revival of Mr. Ricketts' report of 1847, and of his suggestion to separate the hill tracts from the regulation district.

A very full report was submitted in 1854 by the Superintendent of Police,<sup>(2)</sup> reviewing the whole history of the tract for the last twenty

Discussion of policy. years, so far as this appeared from the local records. During the last seventeen years there had been nineteen raids in which 107 had been slain, fifteen wounded, and 186 carried captive. The whole of these forays were believed to be the work of Shindus or tribes from the south, and the Superintendent exonerated both the Phru Chief and the Chukma Rani from all complicity. The Bohmong or Poang had stockaded six posts, in which he kept squads of ill-armed retainers. But it did not appear that they had ever prevented a raid or punished raiders. Efforts had been made through the Arracan authorities to ransom the captives from the Shindus, but without success: and it had been proposed to establish a line of frontier posts garrisoned by one Mugh battalion; also to create a Joomea police under the hill Chiefs, well armed and located at central thannas, who should protect their neighbours from forays by the outer tribes. But to this there was the great objection of the expense, which the returns from the Kapas Mehal would be quite insufficient to cover.

A careful local enquiry by an officer of experience was what the Superintendent most recommended.

Views of Government in 1854.

He was opposed to a separate judicial administration for the tract on the ground of the difficulty of dealing with offenders in the absence of all the usual appliances of such administration; no jails; no lock-ups; no communications. The following extracts from a letter to the Commissioner show the views taken by Government at this time (1854):—

It appears that during the two years which immediately followed the agreement which was concluded by Mr. H. Ricketts with the Phru family no attacks were reported, but that after that period they re-commenced; and that during the last four years there have been no less than ten of these attacks. Notwithstanding that measures have been promptly taken on all these occasions to track or apprehend the marauders, these efforts have been entirely without success.

(1) Judicial Proceedings, 1850, 11th December, Nos. 76-78.

(2) Judicial Proceedings, 1854, 13th April Nos. 136-39.  
Judicial Proceedings, 1851, 29th January, Nos. 163-65.  
Judicial Proceedings, 1851, 26th March, Nos. 87-92.  
Judicial Proceedings, 1852, 29th January, Nos. 337-94.  
Judicial Proceedings, 1853, 19th May, No. 40.

From the facts stated it clearly appears that the Pirus have altogether failed to keep that part of the agreement made with them in 1847, whereby they undertook to protect the Mugh population of this tract of country from aggression and plunder; and that other measures must now be concerted for the attainment of this object.

On the question of marching troops into the hills for the purpose of retaliation, and of thereby punishing the tribes concerned in these outrages, there appears to be but one opinion; all the officers who have considered the subject having condemned any such project, as not only in all probability fatal to those engaged in the expedition, but utterly useless in its results, from the impossibility of reaching the authors of these crimes in their remote and inaccessible fastnesses. His Lordship fully concurs in this opinion, and is decidedly opposed to any military expedition being attempted.

With regard to the proposal that a boundary line should be drawn out and demarcated between the settled parts of the Chittagong District and the Joom tract, and that the Government should then declare itself responsible for the protection only of those living west of that boundary. This is not a project which His Lordship thinks can be entertained, inasmuch as the Joom tract is, and has always been, a part of the British dominion, and the responsibility of the Government cannot be shaken off, even if it were desirable to do so; while, on the other hand, it would be a work of extreme difficulty and expense to lay down such a boundary.

Another proposal which has been made in reference to this object is that an Act should be passed excluding this tract of country from the operation of the civil and criminal regulations. Besides the anomaly, however, of having two different laws prevailing in the same district, and the difficulty just stated of defining a boundary between the two jurisdictions, His Lordship concurs with you in considering that the practical inconvenience described in the closing paragraphs of your report would render any such special legislation unadvisable.

It must always be a matter of extreme difficulty to determine the best mode of dealing with savage hill tribes, who regard plunder and murder as lawful and commendable pursuits, and dwell in inaccessible fastnesses within a climate so deadly as to defy approach. The plan of subsidising the Chiefs, and enlisting the men as soldiers or policemen, formerly adopted in the case of the hillmen of Bhaugulpore, and more recently in that of the Kookees, has always answered best; and there seems to be no reason why this plan should not succeed with the Sindoes and the other tribes on the Chittagong frontier. The Commissioner of Arracan will accordingly be desired to make an attempt to open a negotiation with the Chiefs of the Sindoo tribe, for the purpose of ascertaining whether, by means of this kind, an effectual stop cannot be put to these periodical forays.

This, however, is not a measure of which the success can be counted on with any degree of certainty. The suggestion which was made by your predecessor, Mr. Plowden, and in which you concur, that an armed police force consisting of Joomeas, armed with muskets, should be organised for the purpose of watching the passes which lead to the Sindoes country, and of protecting life and property throughout the whole of the Joom tract, appears to His Lordship to be worthy of immediate adoption: and you are accordingly requested to submit a detailed plan for carrying out this object. The Chiefs must still be responsible, as heretofore, for giving the police every assistance in the prevention of crime and the apprehension of offenders; but as the Government will by this measure take upon themselves the duty, for the performance of which the Chiefs were allowed a remission in the amount of the jumma formerly paid by them, it will now be necessary that the full amount should be exacted for the purpose of meeting the expense of the new police.

Like all the half-considered plans which preceded it, this would seem to have fallen through: for more than a year later in August 1855, we find that fresh forays from the south had occurred, and that no frontier police had yet been established. The year after<sup>(1)</sup> we read of the Akyab authorities ransoming a captive for Rs. 190, and duly presenting the bill at the Chittagong Collectorate. It is little to be

(<sup>1</sup>) 1855, 23rd August, Nos. 434-5.  
1856, 23rd October, Nos. 104-7.  
1856, 18th November, Nos. 76-82.

wondered at that a feeling of shame at such a confession of weakness led both the Commissioner and the Government to consider afresh the propriety of offensive expeditions.

In the Appendix is reproduced a review of the whole question by Colonel Hopkinson, then Commissioner of Arracan, in which the various plans from time to time submitted are set forth and analysed.

After considering all the facts, the idea of any expedition was abandoned; but still the raids went on, and always were the raiders reported to have come from the Koladyne. More and more frequent they became as impunity was found to attend each fresh attack.<sup>(1)</sup> At last in despair the Commissioner made the following proposals:—

1. To send military expeditions into the hills every cold weather to punish the obnoxious tribes by fire and sword.

2. To establish combined military and police out-posts on both the Chittagong and Arracan frontiers, a local levy being raised to man them.

3. To supply the Poang (the Phru Chief) with arms and ammunition, and let him take retribution for every outrage on his ryots if he could.

Upon this Government, after consulting Mr. Ricketts, ordered as follows:—

The Lieutenant-Governor is entirely averse to the first of the three plans proposed by you, viz., that military expeditions should be sent into the hills; for, in addition to the extreme unhealthiness of the climate, there would be great difficulty in distinguishing between those tribes who are in the habit of committing these periodical depredations and those who are favourable and friendly to our rule. Indeed, with the almost total want of anything like perfect or reliable information as to the actual perpetrators of the atrocities which it is proposed to punish, the Lieutenant-Governor is disposed to think that the adoption of your scheme for sending "military expeditions into the hills" would be very likely to lead to an indiscriminate slaughter of friends and foes; one of the consequences of which would be that our valuable elephant-hunting grounds would be continually disturbed, and our hunting parties always attacked. The probability of such a result is increased by the fact that the raids appear to be for the most part committed by the distant tribes; while those nearest to our frontier, who would be the first met with and attacked, are generally believed to be friendly.

Equally weighty objections exist in regard to the "establishment of military and police posts." From the great extent of country to be protected, such posts would necessarily be at considerable distances from each other, and each would, therefore, have to be made of sufficient strength to defend itself unaided against any force that might be brought against it. When, therefore, it is considered that the country in question is a forest between two and three hundred miles in length, and nearly the same distance in breadth, and that the attacking parties sometimes number more than 300 men, it is clear that the establishment of posts would involve such an expenditure of men and money, and require such a length of time to mature, as to render the scheme most difficult of adoption, if not altogether impracticable.

Again, even supposing the posts to have been established, the greatest difficulty would be experienced in keeping them supplied, in consequence of their distance from the frontier; for to be of effectual service the nearest of them should be placed beyond

(1) 1856, 18th December, Nos. 216-9.  
1857, 2nd January, Nos. 169-70.  
1857, 2nd April, Nos. 90-1.  
1858, 9th September, Nos. 277-85.

all the villages which acknowledge our supremacy. The objection on account of the climate also is even of greater weight against the establishment of posts than in the case of merely temporary military expedition.

The last plan suggested by you is to "distribute to the Poang Raja arms and ammunition, and to give him free permission to exact his own retribution for every wrong done to his ryots by the hill tribes." This appears to Lieutenant-Governor a more feasible plan than the other two, and to a certain extent His Honor is decidedly in favor of its adoption. The Lieutenant-Governor would furnish the Poang and any others of the Native Chiefs on whom reliance can be placed with arms, money, and men, and by advice or intimidation, if requisite, would always continue to act through them, so long as they shewed any willingness to afford their co-operation. The fact of the forays having ceased during the years 1848-49 and 1850 speaks much in favour of the policy of working through the Native Chiefs introduced in 1847 by Mr. Ricketts, the former Commissioner of the Chittagong Division; and His Honor is of opinion that it would be unwise to abandon this policy until a change of system shall have shown itself to be absolutely necessary. But at the same time it is necessary that the nature and extent of the services to be rendered should be distinctly understood by the Poang, rather than that he should be vested with such an indefinite amount of authority as he would possess under the present terms of your proposal.

The arrangements made with the Phrus for administrative purposes were not found to work satisfactorily; and in 1859, the interference of Government again became necessary, and with a view to protect our hill

Creation of the Hill Tracts District. subjects from the aggressions of the frontier tribes, the Lieutenant-Governor recommended that the whole country east of the cultivated plain country of Chittagong should be removed from the operation of the General Regulations, and that an officer, to be called the Superintendent of the Joom Tract, should be appointed.

The Lieutenant-Governor was of opinion that, at present, it was out of the question to attempt really to administer the government of these hills. The administration should be left wholly to the hill Chiefs, the only object of the measures now proposed being to prevent such raids as the Commissioner complains of, and to do so through the Chiefs. For this purpose the single officer proposed would, it was hoped, suffice.

Any such complete system of administration as has been established in the Sonthal country was not at present to be thought of for the tract in question. The excessive expense of that system, as compared with the wealth and population of the tracts administered, was in itself a bar to such a scheme in regard to the Chittagong Hills; for the expense of the Sonthal system, in proportion to the population and the fiscal value of the country, was enormous, though the Sonthals pay a revenue which is more than nominal. The Chittagong Joomeas paid only a nominal revenue, and nothing was known of the hills at any distance from the plain country.

The Lieutenant-Governor was further of opinion that any middle course between the thorough administration of the affairs of a country, in a way suitable to the circumstances of the people, and the leaving of the administration to its own Native Chiefs, was most objectionable. Such middle courses, as was the case with the Sonthals, were sure, sooner or later, to end in disaster.

of the hills bordering the plain country.

In that case such portion, if taken in hand, should be thoroughly administered, somewhat after the Sonthal system; but the heavy expense of that system was a reason for doing this to as small an extent as possible. The administration of the rest of the country might be left entirely in the hands of the hill Chiefs, under the general supervision of a Superintendent, who should interfere as little as possible, except to insist upon the people near the plains, who are practically our subjects, being defended from the inroads of more distant savages, and being prevented from making raids or committing other great atrocities themselves. Whatever was resolved upon, the first step was to be the taking of the Hill Tracts of the Chittagong District from the operation of the General Regulations, which are intended only for people in a high state of civilization. Such discordance between theory and practice as appears when a country inhabited by semi-barbarians, ignorant of all laws, and without a semblance of courts of justice among them, is represented as subject to and influenced by a refined system of judicial administration, was hardly creditable to the Government of the country.

Act XXII of 1860 was accordingly passed, which enabled the Government to give to the Hill Tracts the administration suited to its condition.

Before, however, the appointment of a Hill Superintendent was actually made, there took place that very extended series of raids, which

#### Great Kookie Invasion of 1860.

is known as the 'Great Kookie Invasion' of 1860. In December 1859, rumours had reached the local officers of the Tipperah District that the interior of Hill Tipperah was in a very disturbed state. The Rajah's affairs were generally known to be greatly involved. He had been compelled to dispense with the little armed force he formerly kept up, while his family and kingdom were distracted by the intrigues of the various candidates for the succession, or of discontented exiles beyond the border. The Rajah, besides, either could not or would not meet the expense consequent on the nomination of a jubraj, or heir apparent, while he left all his affairs in the hands of his Bengali spiritual guide. Early in January 1860, reports were received, at Chittagong, of the assembling of a body of 400 or 500 Kookies at the head of the River Fenny, and soon the tale of burning villages and slaughtered men gave token of the work they had on hand. On the 31st January, before any intimation of their purpose could reach us, the Kookies, after sweeping down the course of the Fenny, burst into the plains of Tipperah at Chagulneyah; burnt or plundered 15 villages, butchered 185 British subjects, and carried off about 100 captives. Troops and police were at once hurried to the spot, but the Kookies had only remained a day or two on the plains, retiring to the hills and jungles by the way they came. It was at first supposed that this extended movement on the part of these tribes

was directed by certain near relatives of the Tipperah Rajah, and was intended to involve that Chief in trouble with the English Government. But it was afterwards ascertained, with considerable certainty,\* that the main instigators of the invasion were three or four Hill Tipperah refugees, Thakurs who had lived for some time among the Kookies, and who took advantage of the ill-feeling caused by an attack made by the Rajah's subjects upon some Dôptung Kookies to excite a rising that unfortunately became diverted to British territory. Driven by the Rajah from his dominions, these men had formed alliances among the various Kookie tribes of the interior, and, year by year villages, supposed to be friendly to the Rajah, had been attacked and plundered, vague rumours of which disturbances had reached our ears. Some of

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\* The following extracts from a Report, by Mr. J. D. Gordon, will show the state of Judicial Proceedings, November 1880, Nos. 245-42.      affairs in Hill Tipperah, and the causes of the raid :—"I wrote at length concerning an

attack made by the Rajah's people upon the Dôptung Kookies. I am still of opinion that that occurrence led to the disturbances in the hills which terminated in the massacres at Ramghur and Khundul. The Thakoors no doubt used their endeavours to extend the disturbances, and many disaffected Beangs, subjects of the Rajah, joined the Kookies. A good number of these men, Beangs, left the Rajah's Territory two or three years ago with the Thakoors. They, it is believed, returned with them to plunder at Khundul. But, independent of these, there were numbers of the Tipperah Rajah's subjects, men I mean who are avowedly his people, paying him rent, who secretly joined the marauders. Mr. Steer has ably described the disorganized state of the hills. The fact is, that there are few of the hillmen who do not suffer much from the Rajah's misgovernment. Their rent, of late years, has been enormously raised, and they are, at all times, liable to oppression of some kind. They were in a state, then, ready to join in any expedition that had plunder in the foreground and possible release from the Rajah in the distance.

"I must mention that it seems to have been a very general belief that the Government would at once make 'Khas' the hill territories, if outrages were committed on its people. It has created much surprise that this has not been the result of the massacre at Khundul, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that the hillmen felt a hope that it might turn out so. They are, many of them, in constant communication with our subjects, and the security and comfort which the latter enjoy can hardly have failed to appear in advantageous contrast with their own position.

"Many of the hillmen, too, owed money to our subjects, and so they too would have an incentive to join in robbing and destroying them. It is an exceedingly difficult matter to write positively of doings in the hills, which are indeed veiled to even our Native subjects. The best informed can give, or will give, but little valuable information, whilst the hillmen, to Bengalees, are cunningly close as to affairs relating to themselves. Under these circumstances I can hardly give a very decided or valuable opinion. But I think that to revenge the raid on the Dôptungs by the Rajah's people was the object of the rising of the Kookies; that the disaffected Beangs and Chukmas (the Kalindee Rancee's people), headed by the Thakoors, caught up the spirit, and caused plunder and murder on all sides.

"I would, in concluding this report, add a few remarks upon a subject bearing directly upon the future state of our Frontier.

"The state of Independent Tipperah calls for our interference. I do not mean with a view to annexation, for that would be opposed to our present policy. I allude to the disorganized state, in consequence of the *weakness* of those in power in Tipperah.

"If internal disorganization exists to the detriment only of those residing within an Independent State, we are not bound to exercise interference, though this has repeatedly been the *sole* ground for such interference by civilized nations with barbarous; but if that disorganization *directly* affect the lives and property of our subjects, interference, on our part, rests no longer on a question of policy—it becomes a necessity.

"Such is the case with the internal state of Tipperah.

the Rajah's own subjects, moreover, exasperated† by his constant exactions, were believed to have invited the Kookies to ravage his territories.<sup>(1)</sup>

The hillmen who had perpetrated this attack in the Tipperah District were reported from the first to be the followers of Rutton Poa, whose clan was known to live far up between the upper sources of the Fenny and Karnafuli.

In July (1860) the newly appointed Superintendent of Hill Tracts Expedition against Rutton Poa. was told that his first duty would be to gain as much information as possible to facilitate the advance of a military expedition to punish the offending tribes. Government was determined to read them at once a severe and salutary lesson.<sup>(2)</sup> In January 1861, a large body of military police, under Captain Raban, marched against Rutton Poa's village. No sooner had they appeared in sight than the Kookies themselves set fire to the place and fled to the jungles. A good deal of damage was done to them in various ways, but beyond proving to the savages that their fastnesses were not inaccessible, it could not be said that much else was effected. At the very time that this expedition was on its march, a large body of Kookies made a fierce attack upon Hill Tipperah near a thannah of the Rajah's called Oodoypore. The few miserable

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"During the time of the late Rajah a semblance of order existed. The present Rajah does nothing himself, but has for the last seven or eight years given the whole and sole management of every matter in his territory to his Gooroo.\* This man once had but one

aim, the restoration of the Rajah's finances. The Rajah was much in debt to the Mohajuns, and the Gooroo was determined to wipe away these debts. This he has in a great measure done, but not in the legitimate way of curtailing extravagance, and putting a stop to unnecessary expenditure, but by sweeping away also establishments absolutely necessary. Now that the Rajah's debts are nearly cleared off, and he has gained entire influence over his master, and unlimited control in money matters, the Gooroo does not hesitate, I learn, to spend large sums on his own account.

"Independent Tipperah will not become settled so long as he remains in power. He is a Bengalee, and gives offence, at every turn, to the Princes and Chiefs of the hillmen. He respects no one, and seems to study to estrange the hill people from him. He is faithless, incompetent to rule, and utterly unscrupulous.

"I would urge the Lieutenant-Governor as strongly as I can, consistently with respect, to insist that that man shall no longer be Rajah of Tipperah, for such he is in all but name. His name or title is even upon the seal, and our officials here have constantly the mortification of knowing that they are in reality conducting business with this Bengalee (not with a worthy officer of the Rajah) of whose want of faith they have constant proof. Our Government should demand, not only that he be removed from office, but from the Rajah's dominions, for a time at any rate."

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† Rs. 13,700 were paid as compensation to the inhabitants of Khundal who had suffered: of this half was exacted from  
(a) Judicial Proceedings, 14th June 1860, No. 124. Tipperah. (a)  
Judicial Proceedings, July 1860, Nos. 31-32.

(<sup>1</sup>) Judicial Proceedings, October 1860, Nos. 396-8.

(<sup>2</sup>) Judicial Proceedings, December 1860, No. 418.  
Judicial Proceedings, March 1861, Nos. 15-23.

Burkundases there stationed fled forthwith, and, after burning and destroying three populous villages and a wealthy mart, the invaders retired eastwards. The same party, on their return journey, burned several villages on the Kalindi Rani's Estate, and attacked one of our police posts (Kurkurea), from which, however, they were beaten off. They also suffered considerable loss from a bold attack made upon them by a small body of military police under a Native Officer. Government ordered the deputation of a confidential officer to confer with the Tipperah Rajah and compel him to adopt proper measures of defence against the Kookies. In July 1861, Captain Graham, Hill Superintendent, undertook the duty and got the Rajah to come down and meet the Commissioner at Comillah.<sup>(1)</sup> He then undertook—

- (1) to establish 5 frontier posts of 20 men each connected by roads ;
- (2) to establish a stockade of 150 men on the Fenny connected with the posts by a road ;
- (3) to entertain 6 drill instructors for his men ;
- (4) to admit a topographical survey.

The establishment of strongly fortified posts served to secure, for a time, the northern frontier of the Hill Tracts ; but in March we find the Kookies attacking the Poang Rajah's villages to the south, and advancing to within eight miles of Brindabun itself. The Poang Rajah, to whom the defence of this part had been for years entrusted, was called upon to strengthen his posts. But anything that he could do was lamentably insufficient. During the whole year the frontier was in a state of constant panic : large tracts of country were deserted by the Joomea cultivators, and it seemed as if nothing that our police and troops could effect would secure them from attack. The wild and unknown country from which the savages came, the trackless jungles and rock-strewn torrent beds from which they would suddenly emerge, and into which they would, on the first symptom of attack, re-plunge, rendered helpless the best efforts of our men to pursue them, as it was also impossible to foresee their advance.

At length in September, Rutton Poa, who had more than once<sup>(2)</sup>

Submission of Rutton Poa.

made overtures of friendship, came in and tendered a complete sub-

mission. Dreading probably the advance of a formidable force in the approaching cold season, this wily individual attached himself to our interests and offered his aid to us in any attempt we might make to

(1) Judicial Proceedings, February 1861, Nos. 119-24.

Judicial Proceedings, March 1861, Nos. 113-14.

Judicial Proceedings, November 1861, Nos. 9-11.

Judicial Proceedings, November 1861, No. 252.

(2) Judicial Proceedings, November 1860, No. 238.

Judicial Proceedings, December 1861, Nos. 70-71.



reach the tribes beyond him. Advantage was taken of his overtures to open friendly communications with the Syloo and Howlong tribes, of whom at this time we knew nothing.

Button Poa's clan, and the other two just named, are all described in the papers of the time as Lushais. The Howlongs were said to be under three Chiefs: "Lootpore" (father of Bandoolah) and Kosai and Vangsang. The Syloos were also under three Chiefs: Saboong (father of Lal Moorah) and Lal Poitang and Sunghoonja. All these names are of very uncertain orthography.

At first it seemed as if the negotiations with these remote clans would be successful. Scarcity was Defiance of the Howlongs and Syloos. pressing them close, and it was essential to them to get supplies from the British Territory of Chittagong. They had apparently no communication with Cachar. The outturn of a good crop, however, rendered them insolent and boastful. In September (1862) they sent to say that, though they had no intention of attacking Europeans, they considered they had a right to cut up other tribes, such as Bengalees, Chukmas, Tipperahs, and Mughs, and we had no right to interfere. Our troops, they said, were paid by money obtained from country traders (Mahajuns), and that sort of thing could not last. On the withdrawal of our troops they would lay waste the country. To a further message, they replied that we must be content with their promise not to attack us—but that they would not come in to see the Superintendent.

On the 20th January 1863, Sir Cecil Beadon took up the question of our frontier policy in this quarter, Sir C. Beadon's policy. in the same spirit in which he had approached it elsewhere. It was said:—

This correspondence has convinced His Honor that our relations with the hill tribes on the Chittagong frontier are carried on upon a wrong principle, and that, so long as our policy rests upon the assumption that the Kookies of certain tribes cannot be trusted until they have been made to feel our power, we shall be in danger of embroiling ourselves with them in another unsatisfactory and profitless contest.

Every endeavour should be made to induce the Chiefs of the unfriendly tribes not to come in, as it is called, that is, to present themselves before the Superintendent, either at Chittagong or at any other place at a distance from the frontier, but to consent that he should meet them at some spot equally convenient to both parties, and then to enter into written engagements for the future maintenance of peace on the border.

If a meeting of this kind could be arranged in such a manner as not to wound the natural savage pride of these Chieftains and their followers, and if they could once be made to feel confidence in our pacific intentions, the Lieutenant-Governor has no doubt that they would willingly enter into any reasonable engagements we might dictate, that all hostile incursions and the apprehension of these would cease, and that the tribes instead of being a source of terror to those who live under our immediate protection would become the reverse.

One of the best means of conciliating the good will of tribes, like the Kookies, is to arrange an annual gathering of Chiefs at some convenient place in the hills, on which occasion the Superintendent, representing the British Government, should receive trifling offerings from each Chief, and bestow on him a present in return, and take the opportunity of hearing and redressing all complaints and grievances, and of encouraging free and friendly communication between the different tribes, and between them and the people of

the plains. To attend at such meetings, and to receive a token of friendly disposition from the Superintendent, would soon come to be regarded as a privilege, and the general good feeling of the tribes would be enlisted against any one of them who held aloof.

A small police allowance, either in money or in kind, might be given to each Chief to enable him to keep the peace within his own limits, and to prevent his people from attacking their neighbours, and this would also serve as a security for his own fidelity and allegiance.

To enable you to see what may be effected by a policy of this kind, I am desired to forward to you the accompanying copy of a Report from Major Bivar, Deputy Commissioner of Luckimpore, in Assam, detailing his negotiations with the Abora, a wild tribe who had for a long time given us much trouble on that frontier, and of the engagement he has concluded with them. The Lieutenant-Governor desires that the policy which has apparently been so successful in Assam, may be followed out in respect to the tribes on the frontier of your Division. If this be done, it will most probably remove all ground of complaint as to the insufficiency of the means at your disposal for coercing these people; and the utmost cost of subsidizing them, and making them serve as their own police, will be far more than covered by the reduction which will thus become practicable in our own Military and Police Establishments.

In accordance with these instructions, Captain Graham, the Superintendent of Hill Tracts, proceeded to Rutton Poa's village, and that Chief, with nine other leading Chiefs of the Lenchew Range, entered into binding engagements to keep the peace. Messengers sent thence to the Howlongs, brought back a document signed by their principal Chief (now called "Vandoolah"), his brother 'Sayah,' and three other Chiefs, in which they agreed to keep quiet and to meet the Superintendent at Kassalong in January. Vandoolah sent in an elephant's tusk in token of amity. Vanoah, one of the Sylloo Chiefs, also offered friendly presents. It was found that many British subjects were held captive by the Howlongs, and the Lieutenant-Governor directed that no payments of police subsidies were to be made to any tribe so long as it retained such captives. The agreement signed by Rutton Poa and others is reproduced in a foot note.\*

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\* "The Kookies hereby acknowledge all persons of the following descriptions living in the hills and plains to be British subjects, namely, Mughhs, Bengalees, Tipperahs, Chukmas, and such other classes as the Superintendent may from time to time point out. Judicial Proceedings, July 1863, Nos. 152-53.

"The Kookies engage to take measures for preventing any parties from amongst their clansmen from molesting residents in the British Territory, or trading, cultivating, or travelling in the hills.

"All traders shall have access to the Kookie villages, and shall be carefully protected from all injury.

"The Kookies shall have access to the markets of Kassalong and Rangamatiee at present, and to such other places as the Government may hereafter approve, and their trading parties shall only carry daos.

"Any Kookies settling in British Territory shall pay the same revenue to Government as the other hill tribes residing there.

"In event of the Kookies having any grievance, or in case of any dispute arising between them and the British subjects, the Kookies will refrain from taking the law into their own hands, but they will in all cases appeal to the Superintendent and abide by his decision.

The following payments, half in money half in kind, were sanctioned :—

Rutton Poa's tribe	...	Rs.
Syloo Kookies (if they agreed to terms)	...	400
Howlongs ( ditto ditto )	...	800
	...	800

At the close of 1863, the Commissioner had a very satisfactory interview with most of these Chiefs at Kassalong, when presents were interchanged and feasts given.

In February 1864 an attack was made upon the Poang's country by armed Kookies. Rutton Poa had previously sent in to warn our post at Kassalong that a band of Bunjogi Kookies had passed southward. This seemed to be the same band. The attack was beyond our posts. The party passed away, and nothing more seems to have been heard of them.

In December 1864 the annual meeting was held, but none of the great Chiefs came down. Representatives from Rutton Poa and the Syloos attended. Under these circumstances presents were sent, but money payments not made. It appeared that December was too early in the cold season for them to leave their cultivation. Instructions were upon this given by Government to the effect, that as the payments were for police service and for keeping a quiet frontier, a fixed and convenient pay day should be agreed upon, and the money given to any deputation of relatives the Chiefs might send, if they could not come themselves.

In April 1865 another meeting was accordingly arranged, at which deputations from the three great clans attended; and as they had preserved peace for a year and given information of the marauding Bunjogis, the payments were made in due course.

In August 1865 the unhappy state of the tract of country, which the Poang was supposed to protect, was brought to the notice of Government. When introducing a few months previously the new

"That annually, about the time of the full moon of the month of January, a meeting of the Chiefs and the Superintendent shall be held at Kassalong, at which the Chiefs shall receive such presents in money or kind as may be determined on by Government in return for which the Kookies agree to prevent all marauding in the hills and plains, and to use every effort to capture offenders and maintain the peace.

"In event of the Kookies failing to act up to the provisions of this engagement it will be null and void.

"The original of this engagement, which is drawn up in English, will remain with the Superintendent, and a counterpart or copy will be furnished to the representatives of the Kookie communities aforesaid.

"That the Kookies of the tribe be allowed to purchase annually lbs. powder, flints lbs., lead and muskets in presence of the Superintendent, or such persons as he may appoint, and in return for this the Kookies will abstain from purchasing ammunition or arms from unauthorized persons, and will give any information which may come to their knowledge concerning such illicit trade.

"In ratification of the above engagement, contained in ten paragraphs, the Superintendent puts his hand and seal, and the representatives of the Kookie communities affix their marks or signature this day of 18

police into the hills, we had added four Government posts to the five kept up by the Poang, but it was now resolved to extend the system of connected posts which already encircled the northern part of the hills, and to take, if possible, effective steps to secure the whole of the frontier line. From November to May bands of Shindus, Kumis, Arrungs, and other tribes east of the Koladyne and Sungoo annually came down from the interior hills and ravaged the villages of our subjects. No attempt was ever made at self-defence. The appearance of these marauders was the signal for instant flight to the jungles.

In January 1866 the Shindoos attacked a Mrung village on this frontier half-a-day's journey from our furthest post (Chima). It was found that the Poang's guards had not gone out that season for want of arms! The Lieutenant-Governor ordered arms to be at once supplied, and sanctioned a force of 130 extra police with officers to take up the new Government posts to be established to the south.

Just at this time<sup>(1)</sup> the Lieutenant-Governor received an account of an adventurous journey undertaken in the south-east hills by Lieutenant Lewin, the District Superintendent of Chittagong. A clear idea of the extent and results of this tour will best be gained by a perusal of the Government orders thereupon which are here reproduced :—

From this report it appears that Lieutenant Lewin, after penetrating to the sources of the Sungoo and Matamoree, crossed the boundary between Chittagong and Akyab at Modho Tong on the crest or water-shed of the dividing range of hills, and thence descended into the valley of the Peekyond, a tributary of the Koladyne, and that all his subsequent adventures occurred in the Akyab District, where, latterly, he appears to have acted with the sanction of the Chief Commissioner of British Burma. The Lieutenant-Governor does not, therefore, feel called upon to notice this part of Lieutenant Lewin's proceedings; but His Honor remarks that in this direction and for some 60 or 70 miles north of the Modho Tong Pass the Chittagong Hill Tracts are bounded by the Akyab District, and that protection from Shindu raids must be sought for in this quarter rather from the action of the authorities in British Burma than from any measures which can be taken by this Government.

It is stated by Lieutenant Lewin that Colonel Phayre contemplates the appointment of a Superintendent of the Hill Tracts in Akyab, and it seems probable that this measure, if adopted, would have a salutary effect.

A copy of Lieutenant Lewin's report and diary will be sent to the Chief Commissioner of British Burma for his information; and Colonel Phayre will be asked to favour the Lieutenant-Governor with an expression of his opinion as to the measures he would propose to adopt with a view to bringing into subjection the Sindhu tribes in the upper valleys of the Koladyne and its tributaries, and preventing them as well as the kindred tribes on the north and north-east of the Akyab District from penetrating into the Chittagong Hills and committing outrages on the villages among those hills.

The police arrangements in this part of the frontier must, therefore, be regarded only as temporary and provisional, until effectual measures are adopted by the Administration of British Burma to prevent the upper valleys of the Koladyne in the Akyab District

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(1) Judicial Proceedings, April 1866, Nos. 24-26.

from becoming the resort of lawless Shindus, and a base from which they can carry on their predatory operations into the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Vigorous action should be taken for putting a stop to a state of things, under which an adjoining British district has come to be regarded and watched by this Government as a hostile territory. At present it is necessary to maintain establishments for the protection of the Chittagong hillmen against the attacks of other tribes, who ought rather to be, and could more effectually be, coerced and kept in order on the other side of the Arracan boundary. When proper measures have been taken to relieve the frontier police of this duty, Lieutenant Lewin's plan of substituting a local watch for the present organized police may, the Lieutenant-Governor thinks, be fitly considered.

In regard to the hill tribes who inhabit the mountainous country to the north of the Akyab District and north-east of Chittagong, it should be the endeavour of the Superintendent of the Chittagong Hill Tracts to cultivate friendly relations with them, and to induce them to refrain from predatory habits. If with this object some understanding could be arrived at with recognized chieftains, who would undertake in return for a small annual pecuniary allowance to keep the peace in the border, to restrain their own people from making incursions into British territory, and to prevent the more distant tribes from traversing the intermediate country for such a purpose, the arrangement is one, which, if recommended by you, the Lieutenant-Governor would be disposed to adopt.

The Superintendent should be directed to make every endeavour to ascertain the tribe to which the people concerned in the raid\* on Yong Thong Roajah's village belong, the place whence they came and the route they followed both in coming and going. It is quite clear to the Lieutenant-Governor that they must have crossed over the boundary ridge dividing the waters of the Koladyne from those of the Sungoo, and that it is only by the action of the Akyab authorities that they can be effectually reached.

The Chief Commissioner of British Burma will be asked to take such action as he may think practicable and proper, with a view to the punishment of the offenders and the rescue of the captives; and the Superintendent of the Hill Tracts should be desired to co-operate for this purpose with the officers of the Akyab District in any measures that may be taken under the direction of the Chief Commissioner.

It seems to the Lieutenant-Governor to be established by the correspondence in this case that, under the peculiar circumstances of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, the officer, who superintends the civil administration of the district, ought himself to have direct charge of the police, and that the present arrangement under which the police of the Chittagong District and of the Hill Tracts is under one District Superintendent of Police subordinate both to the Magistrate of Chittagong and to the Civil Superintendent of the Hill Tracts is essentially faulty. His Honor is therefore inclined to think that the best plan would be to put Lieutenant Lewin in charge of the Hill Tracts with full administrative and police powers, having his headquarters at Chundergon, and with an Assistant exercising similar powers, whose headquarters should be at some convenient and suitable spot on the Sungoo, more accessible to the hillmen than the sub-divisional head-quarters at Cox's Bazar.

These proposals were approved by the Government of India.

The Chief Commissioner of British Burma, however, reported that nothing could be done during the present season to reach the Shindus, and indeed he deprecated any hostile movement against them in our present ignorance of their country, but stated that he had recommended

\* That mentioned above.

the appointment of a Superintendent of Hill Tracts and the establishment of additional police posts \*

On the 9th July 1866 a raid was committed close to Khokheong,

Raids in 1866.

where the Poang should have had a guard but had not, in which three villages were cut up and eighty captives taken. This was an event unprecedented in the rains, and was supposed to be the work of Lushai Howlongs. Two minor raids by sections of apparently the same band were at the same time reported; one from Kwasa Khung, a village to the south-east; and the other from the Kaptai valley on the north-west. An attempt was made to intercept the raiders on their return home, but it was unsuccessful. It was at first believed that these attacks were perpetrated by, or at the instance of, Bunjogi refugees from the Poang's villages who had fled to the Lushai country of Rutton Poa to avoid the exactions of the Poang. A messenger was sent up to Rutton Poa's village and brought back information, which made it clear that the Howlongs had been the actual raiders; and that Rutton Poa was much disturbed between his wish to keep friends with us for the profit thereof, and his unwillingness to break with his brother-in-law Vandoolah. The Lieutenant-Governor called for all the information necessary to enable Government to send a punitive expedition into the hills in the cold weather, directed the police to be raised to full sanctioned strength, and sites for posts to the south to be at once selected and occupied.<sup>(1)</sup> The information obtained was, however, so scanty, and the position of the tribes and their strength so uncertain, while the force estimated by the local officers to be required for an expedition was so great, that the Lieutenant-Governor did not ultimately feel himself justified in proposing the enterprise to the Government of India. There was much to do in the way of strengthen-

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\* The following extracts from a letter from Colonel Phayre to the Government of India will show what the Authorities of British Burma knew at this time of the Shindus and other tribes—(See also Asiatic Society's Journal, Vol. XXI) :—

"The subject of our relations with the various hill tribes inhabiting the country on the north and north-east of Arracan, being the District of Akyab, has for years been one of great difficulty. Those tribes are very numerous. Though all are found in the same general social condition, and all apparently of the Indo-Chinese race, their languages differ so much that they can only communicate with each other by means of a foreign tongue. The one used for that purpose is Burmese, which a few of the men in each tribe generally understand. They, for the most part, may be said to live in a state of constant warfare. A very considerable portion of the Akyab District is inhabited by these races. The principal are the Khyengs, Kumis, Kamis, Khons, and Shindus. There are others, as Mrus, Mroongs, and Khyans, which have now lost their former position and power, so entirely that they may in this communication be disregarded.

"Of the Khyengs, Kumis, and Kamis, some clans or communities who live in the lower hills are in every respect subject to British rule. Others, though within the nominal boundary of the Akyab District, are practically independent. Among these latter are the Shindus, regarding whom I have now more particularly to speak.

"I have known all the tribes personally, except the Shindus, for many years. The Shindu tribe has always been spoken of as powerful, and as being much feared. They

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(1) Judicial Proceedings, November 1866, Nos. 97-112.

ing our own position, and meantime the following instructions were given to the local authorities :—

If any further dacoities or raids should be committed in the Hill Tracts by any of the wild tribes inhabiting the frontier, the marauders should be followed at once, provided there be any chance of overtaking them, and provided the local officer of police have at his disposal a sufficient force for the purpose of attacking and arresting them, and of recovering any persons or property that may be carried away. In that case the pursuers should go no further than they can clearly go with safety, and must run no risk of surprise or discomfiture. Indeed, except under special circumstances, they should not advance further than to admit of their return to their post within two days. In every case careful enquiry should be immediately made, evidence should be recorded, and all the circumstances promptly reported.

seem to extend not only for some distance within the nominal British Territory, but far beyond it. Their attacks upon the lower tribes, that is upon those residing nearer the plains, have of late years been more frequent, more bold, and more destructive than formerly. They have also been directed more against the tribes within the Chittagong District, and not against those in Arracan. I am unable to account for this change. I am not aware of any Shindu clans who either pay tribute, or are, in the slightest degree, controlled by any British authority.

"The reason of this extraordinary state of affairs of the existence of tribes, virtually independent at our very doors, is partly the physical difficulty of travelling in the hilly country inhabited by these tribes, and partly the unhealthiness of the country, during all but about four months of the year, for all races except the hill people themselves.

"In former years I have myself been a good deal among all the hill tribes except the Shindus. With continued intercourse, personal influence among them is readily acquired. But this intercourse must be constant, and it must be personal. If from any cause it be interrupted, the wild and fickle people soon forget their promises, and a chief of whom one may have formed good hopes, will perhaps next be heard of as heading a raid on a neighbouring tribe and killing all who are not fit to be sold as captives.

"It must be acknowledged that it is, in some measure, a reproach to the local administration that so little has been accomplished in repressing disorder and inspiring these tribes with confidence, so that outside tribes might be awed into quietude, and inside tribes be forced to respect law and order. But the fact is, that a district officer generally has not time; even if he possessed the special aptitude necessary for gaining the confidence of wild savage tribes he has not the time necessary to be devoted to acquire the knowledge, which is absolutely necessary, before his personal influence can be brought to bear upon such people. The changes also which occur in the charge of a district necessarily increase the difficulty. In my late tour up the Kuladyne River of the Akyab District in the conferences, I had been with the hill chiefs as noticed by Lieutenant Lewin in his journal. I discovered from their statements many circumstances which shewed that a separate administration for these people was essentially needful. It is also necessary to shew the chiefs and tribes who profess to acknowledge British supremacy that they are closely watched, and that while their grievances will be redressed, their faults and crimes will not be overlooked. It is likewise necessary to overawe those, principally Shindus, who are now practically beyond the arm of authority, and who require to be impressed with the danger of provoking vengeance by their predatory incursions.

"Before proceeding to state distinctly the measures which I propose in order to carry out the above-mentioned objects, it will be proper to mention my views in regard to the punishment of the offending tribe in the case now immediately referred by the Honourable the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. The case is that of a Mru village, in the hilly portion of the Chittagong District, attacked by a party of Shindus, in which four persons were killed and thirty-four were carried away. It is with much regret that I report that, until some special agency has been provided, I see no possibility of effecting either the punishment of the offending tribe, or the rescue of the captives. The Shindu tribe appears to be more numerous as a people than any other Indo-Chinese hill race which I know. It extends over a large tract of country. The clans are independent of each other as long as they have power to maintain independence. Their

If the local police be unable to effect an immediate pursuit, but if there still be a probability of surprizing the marauders, or of being able to retaliate upon those who may have been concerned in, or may have instigated the crime, the Deputy Commissioner may, at his discretion, follow the marauders with a sufficient body of police, but should not, as a rule, go beyond two days' march from the most advanced outpost. The same circumspection must be used in this as in the former case, and the expedition should not be undertaken without good information as to the strength of the party to be attacked, the place where they are to be found, and their means of resistance. With these precautions the plan should be to arrange quietly for a surprise; but measures of retaliation should be confined to the arrest of persons implicated in the crime or the abetment of it, and to the seizure or destruction of property belonging to them. All proceedings taken in pursuance of these instructions should be reported immediately for the information of Government.

In August of this year the Poang was relieved entirely of the duty of keeping up frontier guards, his posts being taken over by the

predatory expeditions appear to be organized, as indeed they frequently are, among the Kumeis and Khyengs, by persons of influence, whether Chiefs or not, who collect individuals among several clans into a war party. We have not the means for gaining sufficient information to fix responsibility in the present case on any particular clan or village among the Shindus; and to gain that information, as well as to take really effectual measures to rescue the captives, requires the very agency that is now wanting, and which I am about to propose. To attempt to punish these people at the distance they are, and in the country where they live, I know from my own past experience to be futile. To rescue the captives is a work of time.

"Before stating what I propose, I will request the attention of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council to the map of the District of Akyab. It shews that more than one-half of that district consists of hilly country, which, I may add, is covered with the densest jungle. To the west is the District Chittagong, which is now the point most threatened. To the north and north-east is country similarly wild inhabited by like tribes, nominally subject to the Burmese, but partially as independent and as little known as the tribes of Central Africa before the days of Burton, Speke, and Grant. The question is, how are we to control such tribes, how to make them sensible that those of them who are within, and adjoining British Territory, must abstain from attacks upon each other, and respect all that are British subjects?

"This must be accomplished, in the first place, by the exhibition of the power to punish, but no plan can be successful with these people which does not exhibit, resting on the basis of force, the moral influence of personal intercourse by the European Officer direct with the influential men of each tribe.

"As regards intercourse with the Shindus and other tribes practically independent, I should recommend that the Superintendent (to be appointed to these hills) be directed to endeavour to enter into communication with them in order to discover the following points:—

"*First*.—Whether any captives now among them can be recovered by ransom or otherwise. The means of doing so peaceably might be left to the Superintendent's discretion. He might be authorized to pay reasonable sums to liberate captives.

"*Second*.—With a view to the future, what means should be taken to restrain the Shindu and other tribes from making attacks?

"It is known that all these tribes depend mainly upon communication with the sea-coast for their supply of salt, and it may be possible by arranging to supply them regularly with that article, and taking measures to prevent their being supplied with that necessary of life except through the Superintendent, that a very strong pressure might be brought to bear upon them. This measure would probably require the co-operation of the Commissioner of the Chittagong Division. Every facility should be given for their cotton and other produce being brought to a depot at Talakmé, or elsewhere, for sale by fair barter or purchase. Powder and fire-arms should be strictly excluded. Here also the co-operation of the Chittagong authorities will be required. With these general instructions I consider that the Superintendent should be left to accomplish the great objects in view by such conciliatory means as his experience will suggest to him. If he ever considers coercive measures necessary, he should, as a general rule, apply for instructions, unless he considers an immediate example is required."



Police. The remission of revenue (Rupees 2,600) which he had received on account of this duty was, however, allowed to continue, contingent upon his giving ready aid and co-operation in checking the inroads of savages and meeting the views of Government.

In November, Rutton Poea warned us<sup>(1)</sup> that the Howlongs meditated another raid, and steps were immediately taken to defend the frontier; three new posts being established at Khokheong (relieving the Poang's guard), at Matamoree, and at Singopha. Reserves from other Districts were ordered up, and all our posts were put on the alert. The Howlongs did not, however, at this time come down.

In December (1866) it was reported that the Bunjogis of the Poang's country, who had suffered much from the Howlongs, had sent a war party of 300 men against them, which had been beaten back and was being followed up by the Lushais in force. The people north of the Sungoo were abandoning their villages in fear of what was to follow. The Poang or Bohmong was ordered to explain how such an expedition left his territory without sanction, and every available Policeman was thrown across the line the Lushais might be supposed to take. Rumours soon began to pour in that the Howlongs in three great bands were in full march for the British Districts, but no actual attack followed, and it is probable that panic had exaggerated the facts.

On the 7th December Captain Lewin held the annual meeting with the chiefs. The result was not satisfactory. Eleven chiefs had come in, six of whom left before the day of the meeting: conduct which indicated a lamentable want of confidence in our intentions.<sup>(2)</sup>

The Lieutenant-Governor was by these events rendered the more anxious to place the Police of the Hill Tracts on a serviceable footing and deputed a Special Officer to examine locally and report what

Captain Bowie's deputation. arrangements would best serve to secure the safety of the district. At the same time the Commissioner was called upon carefully to review the policy hitherto adopted towards the Kookie tribes, and to ascertain, if possible, why it was the measures adopted to secure tranquillity had failed of success. The utmost endeavours, it was said, should be made to open negotiations with the Chiefs of the Howlong and Syloo tribes, with a view to ascertain the causes of the present movement, to settle any feud or difference there may be between them and the tribes inhabiting the Hill Tracts under our jurisdiction, and to induce them to enter into engagements such as that already made with Rutton Poea, for assisting our Police in keeping order and preventing the recurrence of these attacks. Every encouragement should at the same time be given to the Chiefs in the Hill Tracts to adhere to their engagements, and to co-operate with the Police in repelling their forays and pursuing and securing the offenders.

(<sup>1</sup>) Judicial Proceedings, December 1866, Nos. 153—62.

(<sup>2</sup>) Judicial Proceedings, January 1867, No. 22.

The early part of 1867 was much disturbed by raids and rumours of raids. Towards the close of January a marauding party appeared between the posts of Chima and Khokheong and cut up several villages, retiring as usual before they could be got at by the Police. The Sungoo Valley was the point on which the Howlongs generally at this time advanced—and in February Rutton Poa warned us again that a war party was out in that direction. Our posts were at once strengthened and patrols thrown out. No attack followed on our villages, but the Kookies passed on and attacked the Shindus of Arracan. A band of 500 Howlongs was about this time induced by Rutton Poa to turn back when *en route* for British territory, and to divert their attack to Hill Tipperah. For this service Rutton Poa received Rupees 500 reward. The raid on Hill Tipperah was also frustrated, it is not very clear how.<sup>(1)</sup>

In March 1867, Captain Bowie, the Officer who had been specially deputed to report upon the Police of the Hill Tracts, submitted the result of his investigations. He proposed to throw back to the eastward the line of posts for the purpose of covering the Sumbhooting and Sungoo Valleys—to mass the force in three main posts of fifty men each with connecting posts of twenty men each; a reserve of 100 men being stationed at the Deputy Commissioner's Head Quarters—that a road traversable for elephants should be made from post to post along the whole line;—and that various subsidiary arrangements, calculated to improve the efficiency of the force, should be carried out. These suggestions were generally adopted. Myamee, Kassalong, and Kungo Tong were made the principal stations, while the intermediate out-posts were placed at Kurkuria, Saichul, Pharoo, Plumdoo, and Chima. Besides these, there were Executive Police posted at Rumghur Manikserrai, Golabaree, Rungamattee, and Pola Kheejee. The line of posts did not go further south because the Arracan Hill Tracts were now under a British Officer whose duty it is to prevent raids from that quarter.

In December 1867 the friendly chiefs of the Rutton Poa clan held their annual meeting with the Deputy Commissioner at Kassalong. This was a most successful gathering. Seventeen chiefs and deputies attended, and what was more encouraging, both the Howlong and Syloo clans sent in before the meeting to make offers of friendship and alliance with the British Authorities. After the meeting, Captain Lewin set out for Rutton Poa's village to meet the Howlongs. Arriving there, he succeeded, after some negotiation, in exacting a solemn oath of friendship, which was ratified by sacrifice and feasting, and in which fourteen chiefs or their representatives joined: lump sums of money were given as presents to each chief, and it was settled that

(<sup>1</sup>) Judicial Proceedings, January 1867, Nos. 150—6.  
Judicial Proceedings, March 1867, Nos. 190—1.

these should be in lieu of all annual payments. Early in February eleven chiefs of the Syloo clan sent representatives to Kassalong with presents, and entered into similar arrangements. Immediately on the conclusion of these negotiations, the Kookies of the Syloo and Howlong tribes flocked in great numbers to our bazars from which, for many months, they had been conspicuously absent. At the end of March Captain Lewin went to meet the Syloo chiefs near their own hills to ratify the friendship by oaths and sacrifice as in the Howlong case. The Lieutenant-Governor approved of all that had been done, and directed the establishment of an annual fair, to which all the Hill Tribes should be freely invited to come.

In January 1869 an attack was made by a large body of strange

Raids in 1868-69.

hillmen on the police post of Chima, a portion of the guard stationed

there having been previously drawn off to another quarter by a report of Kookies having appeared in that direction. Of the ten men left behind, seven were killed and two wounded, and the women and children of the whole guard were carried off into captivity, together with a considerable quantity of arms and ammunition. A similar outrage was committed in February in the Mrung village of Khijaparrah by a marauding party, which was afterwards shewn to have come from Arracan. An attack was also made on the village of Lahak, on the Koladyne, in which many persons were killed or carried away. Enquiries made it almost certain that the atrocities at Lahak were committed by the Howlongs. Twenty of the captives taken from this village were found in possession of a Howlong chief, who readily admitted his complicity in the outrage. There was some reason to believe that the Howlongs were also implicated in the Chima raid.

It was impossible to reach these tribes with any hope of inflicting on them any real punishment, except by a very expensively organized expedition, which the requirements of the case did not seem to justify. The Lieutenant-Governor Sir W. Grey, with all the local authorities, was in favour of establishing a strong advanced post in a position to enable the European Officer in charge of the Hills to exercise a controlling influence over the tribes around (Rutton Poa and the Syloos especially) in the same way as the Naga and Garo Hills had been occupied in 1866. The Government of India would not, however, listen to any such proposal, on the ground that it would necessarily lead to minute interference and an extension of jurisdiction which was not desired.

In 1869-70 the raids were repeated on villages in the Koladyne

Raids in 1869-70.

valley and on a Mugh village close to Chima. These renewed attacks

led the hillmen of the outlying villages to take measures for their own defence, and 5,000 rounds of ball cartridges were served out to them by Government. The head quarters of the district were moved from Chundagonah to Rungamatta, and the whole question of frontier defence was once more taken up.

In 1870-71 there was but one raid in this district which was committed on the 31st of December 1870, by a body of about 150 men described as Lushais, on a village at Gulungea, on the left bank of the Sungoo, about half-way between the Chima and Pyndoo police outposts. This was the earliest of the series of Lushai raids which marked the cold season of 1870-71—most of which were on the Cachar side and have been already described.

## Raids.

But although the Chittagong Hill Tracts enjoyed this year comparative immunity from the attacks of the border tribes, the disturbed state of the frontier generally, and the unusually extensive and organized raids committed on adjacent districts, rendered it necessary to strengthen the frontier defence of this district. A small detachment of troops, as well as a detachment of police from Calcutta, were accordingly sent to occupy and guard the most important positions, and three hundred muskets were distributed to trustworthy and influential men among our border subjects for purposes of self-defence. It was also deemed necessary to increase the police force, and the sanction of the Government of India was accorded to the addition of 200 men to the permanent police of the district, and the whole force was reorganized as a frontier guard. The Local Government again raised the question of an advanced post, proposing now to station it at Rutton Poa's village and to patrol the ridge running north and south of that station and so protect the country inside. The Government of India would only allow a post to be established if it was finally decided that the permanent line of frontier defence and British jurisdiction was to be drawn through the site selected.

## Frontier defence.

Previous to the raid above mentioned, viz., in the month of December, the Officiating Deputy Commissioner, Major Graham, undertook an expedition into the Lushai country with a view to open, if possible, a communication through it with Beparj Bazar, which Mr. Edgar was expected on a certain date to reach from the Cachar side. The expedition failed in consequence of the opposition of Vandoola, a Syloo chief, who refused to allow it passage through his country. The main object of the undertaking was thus frustrated, though some valuable information was obtained in regard to the strength and locality of the leading chiefs of the Lushai tribe, as also in regard to the configuration of the country, the position of important land-marks and the direction of the principal routes. Lemsilong, a minor Lushai chief, who had done all he could to assist Major Graham in his expedition, had his house plundered, and his village destroyed by order of the Howlong chiefs. He was compensated by some handsome presents, and assured that he would receive assistance from the British Government whenever practicable.

## Reconnaissance of the Lushai country.

An outrage committed on a British village near Sooboolong, in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, by Rutton Poea. Poea was reported in the beginning of the year. The village was plundered, and the three sons of one Loll Khan, who was formerly a subject of Rutton Poea, but left him in 1866, and ever since resided in British territory, were forcibly carried off. One of them contrived to escape from custody; the two others were subsequently released on two guns being pledged as security for the payment of the sum demanded as ransom. It appeared from inquiries that the cause of this outrage was that Loll Khan had complained of a cattle theft to the Deputy Commissioner of the Hill Tracts instead of to Rutton Poea: in fact, this was admitted by Rutton Poea himself, who contended that he was justified in punishing "his own dogs" for complaining to the "saheb" instead of to him, who would have done full justice in the case. A question was raised whether hill custom authorized a joomea to transfer himself from one chief to another, but Government did not think it necessary to consider it. It might be that in the hills members of a tribe were supposed to be under allegiance to the chief of the tribe, wherever they lived; but the position of Government was not that of an ordinary hill chief: it was bound to insist on the inviolability of our territory, and to protect from seizure, on any pretence whatever, any persons who chose to settle within our boundaries. Rutton Poea was accordingly informed that, for the outrage which had been committed, Rs. 100 would be deducted from his allowance for the year, and that, if all the property taken were not restored within a month, his allowance for the year would be altogether withheld. At the same time the Deputy Commissioner was instructed to take care that desertions from the villages of independent hill chiefs were not encouraged by him in any way.

Rutton Poea expressed his willingness to submit to the orders of Government, and to bring in what he admitted had been carried off from Loll Khan's village; but he made a different communication to Loll Khan himself, and the Deputy Commissioner doubted if he really intended to make restitution of the plundered property as he promised. The Commissioner instructed the Deputy Commissioner to confer on the matter with Rutton Poea, and to try and convince him of the folly of his quarrelling with us about property of such trifling value compared to the amount of the present he annually received from us for good behaviour; and these instructions were approved by the Government, in the hope that by a quiet and firm insistence on the necessity of conforming to the orders of Government, the Deputy Commissioner might induce Rutton Poea to submit himself to them.

In other respects relations with Rutton Poea continued to be friendly, and he often evinced his good disposition towards the Government by giving timely information of war-parties sent out to attack British subjects. As might be expected, however, his alliance with us

had created him enemies among the powerful savage tribes by whom he was surrounded, and he was so apprehensive of the effects of their hostility that towards the end of the year he applied for a guard to be placed in his village. A guard of forty men under a sub-inspector of police was accordingly sent thither for several weeks, the responsibility of housing and provisioning the men being assumed by the chief. To this, as a temporary arrangement, the Government of India raised no objection, but adhered to its view of the policy advisable as regards this frontier generally.<sup>(1)</sup>

As regards this it will be remembered that in the preceding chapter it was stated that in 1870 the Government of India ordered the adoption of the same policy on the Chittagong side that it had approved for Cachar—the policy, that is, of laying down a fixed limit for our regular jurisdiction, confining ourselves to that, and only dealing with the tribes beyond by friendly visits of our officers, while maintaining strong posts to repel attack. The local officers and the Government of Bengal pointed out<sup>(2)</sup> that the circumstances were different in Cachar and Chittagong. On the Chittagong side no boundary question arose: a wide gap lay between our frontier posts and the hostile tribes: and there was no indication as in Cachar of their tending to press up to the border. It was undesirable therefore to raise any question of boundary here. We never contemplated occupying the Howlong and Sylloo villages, and therefore to give them sunnuds guaranteeing them their villages would also create misapprehension. For the rest the policy of friendly intercourse had been regularly tried and would be persevered with. But what the local officers all advocated, as I have noted above, was the taking up of a strong advance post from which touch of the outer tribes could be maintained. In forwarding the views of local officers the Lieutenant-Governor said—

In Chittagong, on the other hand, we are ourselves in possession of a large tract of hills, drawing revenue from the tribes there dwelling, and bound therefore to give them protection, while we prevent their engaging in conflicts with the other tribes outside. The country is of the most difficult and untraversable nature; and along its eastern face dwell numerous powerful and savage communities, whose very sites are only vaguely known to us, who have never been visited by us owing to the hopelessly inaccessible character of the mountains they inhabit, and who have for generations been habituated to war and plunder. We here come in fact on the flank of the races whose steady pressure from the south causes the frequent outcropping of new tribes on the Cachar frontier. For the last fifty years or more these outer tribes have been in the habit of committing raids on the villages of our hill subjects, who for many years were left by us to the protection of their own chiefs, and allowed to take such retaliatory measures as they were able to carry through. It was only in 1847 that the question of duly protecting our hill tracts began to be mooted. But no measures that could be devised proved effectual, until it was determined in 1860 to place a European officer in the heart of the hill district. This measure was carried out almost simultaneously with the occurrence of a most formidable incursion of the southern Loochais, who, marching right across our hill tracts, ravaged the plains of Tipperah itself. An expedition was thereupon sent out to punish the offending tribe, which was ascertained to be under the leadership of a chief called Button Posa. With infinite difficulty his deserted village was reached and burnt.

(1) Judicial Proceedings, September 1870, Nos. 190-191.

(2) Judicial Proceedings, December 1870, No. 172.

A series of posts was at the same time established for the protection of the hill tracts north of the Kurnafoolie, and it is a fact that no raiding party has since that time entered the country north of that river. Up to 1866, the defence of the hill tracts south of the Kurnafoolie was left to a native chief, a subject of our Government, and this tract was constantly ravaged both by the Looshai tribes and by the remoter Shindoes and other hill robbers. Since 1866 a few posts have been established there, but the Lieutenant-Governor would emphatically declare his belief that till a complete cordon of posts is established south and east of the Kurnafoolie, there can be no safety for this part of our territory. It is futile to talk of conciliating tribes whom we cannot even get at. The Shindoes and other cognate communities must be met by the policy of vigorous defence approved by the Government of India in your letter No. 6A. of the 29th October last.

With the Looshai tribes to the east and north of the hill tracts, we have had, as Lord Ulick Browne points out, much more communication. Rutton Posa came in and formally submitted soon after the expedition returned from his village, and up to the middle of 1866 we hear of no raids by the other two great sects of Howlongs and Syloos. Constant efforts have been made to bring them into amicable relations with us, and both Captain Lewin and Major Graham have spared no trouble to place matters on a satisfactory footing, and to secure the good-will of these clans. The Lieutenant-Governor cannot but feel that very scant success has attended these efforts. Since 1866 the Howlongs have raided repeatedly, passing at first down the east face of our hill tracts to attack villages in Arracan, and now at last, emboldened by impunity, even assailing our police posts south of the Kurnafoolie. The Lieutenant-Governor concurs with the unanimous opinion of the local officers, borne out as it is by our whole experience of the north-east frontier and of savage tribes all over India, that to overlook or condone outrages of this description is sure to be misconstrued by the offenders into weakness or indifference.

In the face, however, of the objection entertained by His Excellency in Council to punitive expeditions, the Lieutenant-Governor had to consider how best to carry out the policy of vigilant and vigorous defence which at that time met with the approval of the Government of India. His conclusions were embodied in my letter No. 6569, dated 17th December last, and nothing which has since occurred has in any way, he thinks, made the measures then proposed less necessary than before. The advanced post under a European officer at Rutton Posa's village would indeed be the best possible agency for effectively bringing home to the Looshai tribes in its neighbourhood the conciliatory policy upon which the Government has always acted in these hills. It would do this, moreover, in the way best calculated to prevent misconception, while the presence of such a post at the spot suggested would probably do more to prevent raiding in Arracan than any other measure which could be suggested.

In the near approach of the cold season—the season of raids—the Lieutenant-Governor would again press upon the Government of India the urgent need of strengthening the hill police, and establishing the posts proposed in my letter above quoted.

The orders of the Government of India were as follow :—

His Excellency in Council desires me to remark that these proposals appear to be based on what seems a partial misunderstanding of the policy of the Government of India in respect to the frontier tribes as described in previous correspondence. His Excellency in Council is not aware that he has ever committed himself to the statement that "Government will not punish for raids," as the Commissioner of Chittagong appears to believe. Government is certainly\* "averse

\* To Government of Bengal, No. 1338, dated 18th September 1869.

on principle to move bodies of troops and armed police in order to effect reprisals for outrages on any part of our extended frontier, or to admit that, when such aggressions or outrages take place within our own villages, it is imperative to chastise the offenders by following them up for days and even weeks, within their own fastnesses and hills." But His Excellency in Council has nowhere stated, nor is he prepared to admit, that circumstances may not occur under which military expeditions may be necessary or desirable as the best means of preventing inroads into our territories. Past experience, however, has shown that a system of reprisals which has been tried for years on various parts of our frontiers has failed, as it probably always will fail, if unaccompanied by other and more humane measures.

His Excellency in Council is quite prepared to admit that the circumstances of the frontier tribes of the Chittagong hills are to some extent different from those of Cachar, and he is glad to learn that the system, to which he attaches so much value, of free intercourse between the district officers and the tribes, has been so long tried with considerable

success on the Chittagong side. His Excellency in Council fully appreciates and commends the exertions made by Captain Lewin, who has laboured so successfully to win the confidence of the tribes. Captain Lewin's previous labours will make it all the more easy to give full effect to the policy which Government desires to carry out.

It is far from the wish of His Excellency in Council authoritatively to prescribe one unvarying and rigid policy in all its details over a frontier extending from Assam to Akyab. The policy to be observed must necessarily vary in its details with the varying circumstances of the country and the tribes bordering such an extended frontier line. If, therefore, it be impossible or inexpedient to establish trading marts in the Chittagong hills, or to issue sunnuds to the chiefs similar to those approved for Cachar, these measures need not be attempted. But while fully recognising the necessity for such variations in details, His Excellency in Council can see nothing in the state of things described by the Commissioner of Chittagong to lead him to believe that the policy adopted in Cachar on the one side, and in Arracan on the other, is in its broad features inapplicable to the intermediate hills in Chittagong.

The Commissioner states that "there is not, and never has been, any boundary question on this side, and the causes which seem to have created such a question on the Cachar side have no existence on the east of the hill tracts." If the Commissioner's remarks apply to the general boundary of the Empire, they are true, but quite inapplicable to the question under discussion. Neither in Cachar nor Chittagong, nor yet in Arracan, is there any question of the actual boundary of our Empire. But between that actual boundary as shown in the maps and the narrower limit to which our real authority is felt and obeyed, there is in Chittagong, as in Cachar and Arracan, a great belt of unexplored and unsettled country, including Rutton Poa's country, and also a large tract occupied by the Syloos and Howlongs, over which it appears to His Excellency in Council impolitic to attempt to extend our direct jurisdiction.

To advance a post to Rutton Poa's village among people over whom it is impossible to exercise any real jurisdiction will sooner or later lead to attempts to extend our direct influence further east. Indeed, the Commissioner of Chittagong's first proposal was to place the post considerably to the eastward of Rutton Poa's village, and in your letter of 17th December 1869, No. 6569, the position at the village is spoken of as "our first advance." Instead of attempting to establish a direct authority so far to the east, His Excellency in Council is decidedly of opinion that it would be preferable to withdraw to a line commencing from the termination of the Arracan line north of Talukmée, as sketched in the papers forwarded with my docket No. 1564P., dated 2nd September 1870, and running by the most convenient line in front of our present police posts to the border of Hill Tipperah. To the country west of this line our civil jurisdiction should be limited. The police posts should be strengthened and held by an organized police guard. They should be connected, as far as practicable, by cleared jungle paths, which should be constantly patrolled. Beyond this line the tribes should be left to manage their own affairs; and while nothing should be done to give rise to the inference that the limits of the British Empire do not extend to the boundary shewn in the maps, no attempt should be made to establish our civil jurisdiction or direct authority beyond the line in front of the outposts. Great vigilance must be exercised to prevent the perpetration of outrages within this limited jurisdiction, and any raiders and offenders caught red-handed should be summarily punished. Should outrages occur, it will be for His Excellency in Council to decide, according to the circumstances of the case, whether military operations are to be undertaken or not. To the east of the line the district officers should confine their efforts to frequent and friendly intercourse with the chiefs and tribes, occasional friendly visits, the distribution of presents, friendly arbitration to settle differences, and other measures of the kind calculated to establish a permanent personal influence among them.

What the best line would be is one of the points to which Major Graham and Major Macdonald should give special attention during their present tour.

To enable His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor satisfactorily to carry out this policy, His Excellency in Council will give instructions in the Home Department for the increase and reorganization of the police as a frontier guard in the manner proposed by the Lieutenant-Governor at a total cost of Rs. 94,500, being an increase of Rs. 31,152 over the present cost, as shown in Schedule C. of the enclosures of your letter No. 4709, dated 21st October. It is desirable that, as far as may be practicable, the police should be recruited from the hill tribes, and influential men of the tribes enlisted as officers or in the ranks.



While the expedition of 1871-72 was in the field, the local officers and the Bengal Government once more pressed the proposal to take up an advanced post near Rutton Poa's village to protect that chief and Van Poa, who had committed themselves thoroughly as our partisans, and also to serve as a permanent check upon the tribes reduced by the military operations. The Sirthay range offered, it was said, an admirable site, and that range with the Oheepoom range running south would, it was urged, afford an admirable line of defence and patrol. Captain Lewin pointed out the disadvantages under which the local officers had hitherto lain in being entirely dependent upon Rutton Poa for their communications with the tribes beyond. In an advanced position he would get better opportunities of making the acquaintance of the outer tribes. The Government of India would, however, only sanction the grant of temporary protection to our allies as heretofore, awaiting an expression of the whole views of the Lieutenant-Governor on the frontier question as affected by the expedition.<sup>(1)</sup>

In 1871-72 there was only one attempt at a raid—the Shindoos attacking the frontier post of Lyndoo, but being beaten off. A stockaded post was established on the Oheepoom range overlooking the Lushai country.

With the close of the Lushai expedition, of which an account has been given in the preceding chapter, it became necessary to

consider the future policy of Government towards those tribes, and the measures necessary for the permanent defence of Cachar and Chittagong. The more important papers bearing on this subject will be found in the Appendix. Here it may be briefly stated that as regards policy the Government of India adhered to the system of exercising political influence only, without direct interference or control, coupled with the definition of a precise boundary line beyond which ordinary jurisdiction should on no account extend. This line was to be guarded by a chain of posts, and beyond it only political relations with the tribes were to be cultivated. In order to the ascertainment of the best line to adopt, it was decided, as already shown in the preceding chapter, to have a careful survey made of the country between Cachar and Chittagong along the eastern frontier of Hill Tipperah; the idea being that the chain of posts, after being carried from east to west along the southern frontier of Cachar, should turn south along the eastern border of Hill Tipperah, and thence be carried along some one of the hill ranges till it met the advanced posts of the Chittagong hills, and so down the eastern face of the Hill Tracts district till it reached Arracan. It was held to be very important to define this eastern boundary of Tipperah, and it was proposed to entrust its defence to the Rajah of that State. The eastern face of the Chittagong Hill Tracts was also to be carefully surveyed in order to the selection of a range suitable for the establishment of posts and opening of patrol paths.

(1) Political Proceedings (India), April 1872, Nos. 169—197.

For the survey of the Tipperah frontier and the country between

Cachar and Chittagong, Captain  
 Survey operations. Badgley and Mr. Chennell of the

Topographical Survey were deputed. They were assisted by Mr. Power, the Political Agent of Hill Tipperah, who accompanied them throughout, and but for whose indefatigable exertions and tact the undertaking would probably have been a failure. The party entered the hills from Sylhet, and after an exploration of the Jampai and Hachik ranges, Mr. Chennell was left to survey the interior of Hill Tipperah, while Captain Badgley and Mr. Power pushed across the hills to Sirthay, where the Deputy Commissioner of the Chittagong Hill Tracts had established a dépôt of provisions in anticipation of their arrival. After a few days' rest they again started north, and made their way across the ranges to the point marked as Peak Z and Bepari Bazar on the Cachar side of the watershed, and thence to the Cachar district, passing by the villages of the Lushai chief, Sookpilal, and being the first party that had crossed the country between Cachar and Chittagong. The Lushais offered no opposition to their progress, though they were not by any means cordial.

The survey on the Chittagong side was conducted by Mr. Cooke, in company with Captain Lewin, the Deputy Commissioner. They explored thoroughly the Oheepoom and Saichul ranges, the two most promising lines of possible defence, and Captain Lewin was also met by the Deputy Commissioner of the Arracan Hill Tracts, who worked his way across from Talukmai to discuss the question of how best to link on our line of defence with that of British Burma.

The results of these surveys, and the proposals based upon them

by the Lieutenant-Governor, may  
 be briefly stated as follows. It was  
 1873. ascertained that the eastern part of

Hill Tipperah is quite uninhabited, and that a chain of posts along either the Hachik or Jampai would be enormously expensive, and in such a country quite ineffective. The Lieutenant-Governor therefore abandoned the idea of carrying a chain of posts down those ranges. He proposed to maintain the present posts on the frontier of Cachar and Sylhet, and encourage as much as possible the development of trade with Bepari Bazar and other Lushai marts. The reports showed that Sookpilal, the leading chief of the Western Lushais, had been moving his villages southward and nearer to our Chittagong Hill Tracts, from whence the Lushai country is much more accessible than on the Cachar side. It seemed therefore advisable to attempt to reach and influence him and the neighbouring tribes from the south rather than from the north. During the cold season, while the surveys were going on north and south, the police of the Chittagong Hills were establishing themselves at Sirthay in the immediate vicinity of Rutton Poa and the Syloo tribes of Lushais. The effect of this measure was most marked and gratifying. Captain Lewin was able to establish the most friendly relations with the Syloos, who were utterly cowed and broken by the expedition. They were said to

have become a perfectly friendly and subservient clan, grateful to us for our aid when they were starving from loss of crops, and anxious to settle under our protection. At the request of one branch of the clan under a chief Lalljeeka, a guard of 50 police was stationed in their midst to protect them from the Howlongs, the whole cost of feeding this guard being voluntarily borne by the tribe. There had also been a good deal of friendly intercourse with the Howlong clans, and they have referred some of their quarrels to the arbitration of our officers. The Lieutenant-Governor, in concurrence with the local officers, believed that it was only by maintaining posts in somewhat advanced positions that we could hope to bring political influence to bear upon the Syloos, Howlongs, and other Lushais. He would work upon Sookpial and the Western Lushais by throwing out an advanced post from the Chittagong side somewhere among the Syloos, as was done last season. This post would dominate Sookpial, protect any trade route opened between Bepari Bazar and the Hill Tracts, and form a centre of political influence in the manner desired by the Supreme Government. To protect our own Hill Tracts from raids by Southern Howlongs and Shindus, it was proposed to establish a system of posts and patrols along the northern part of the Oheepoom and southern part of the Saichul ranges. The local officers desired that British Burma should advance the Arracan Hill Tract posts and patrols to meet ours. It was understood that the Chief Commissioner of British Burma thought the Chittagong Hills should depend entirely on its own arrangements for defence. The fact, however, was that the southern portion of the Hill Tracts was chiefly exposed to raids from Shindus, a tribe only approachable from the side of Arracan, and of whom we know nothing. Looking to this and to the fact that the Sungoo valley was inhabited almost exclusively by tribes of Arracan origin and connections, the Lieutenant-Governor was disposed to think that this portion of the hills, and also the Cox's Bazar Sub-Division of Chittagong, mainly inhabited by Mughls, should be made over entirely to Arracan, which could then make its own arrangements for defence and patrol. The Government of India generally accepted the Lieutenant-Governor's proposals, it having been discovered by the survey that the ranges to which the local officers proposed to advance the posts offered the only suitable sites for a proper line of defence. The idea of dominating Sookpial from the side of Chittagong was afterwards found to be impracticable; and the southern portion of the hills were not transferred to Arracan. The most important part of the correspondence will be found in the Appendix.

As regards the eastern boundary of Hill Tipperah, the Lieutenant-Governor proposed to prescribe a river rather than a mountain boundary. In these countries the tops of ranges are generally occupied and cultivated, and unsuited for that reason to serve as boundaries. It was suggested that the Lungai river, running between the Jampai and Hachick ranges, should be taken as the boundary line up to its source at Betlingsib. The line would then run across the watershed to Dolujuri, and thence along the recognised Hill Tipperah border by

Surduing to the Fenny. These proposals were accepted and the boundary notified accordingly.

The year 1873-74 was uneventful. In 1874-75 there was only

Subsequent events.

one attempt at a raid by the Shindus which was prevented by a fortunate

accident. Since that year no attacks upon our territory have been reported; but the Howlongs chiefs have maintained a generally isolated and dubious attitude, though large numbers of the tribesmen come into the annual meeting with the Deputy Commissioner. In 1875-76 Rutton Poa died, and in 1879-80 Benknia, the head chief of the Howlongs and our bitterest enemy, also died. The frontier police have now established a line of patrols from the border of Hill Tipperah to Arracan. The Tipperah Rajah has at last organised guard posts to protect the frontier line of his territory and our settled districts beyond, and altogether the arrangements for defence appear to be on a complete and satisfactory footing. The year 1881-82 was marked by an extraordinary invasion of rats, vast troops of which came up from the east devouring the crops of Howlongs and other tribes, thence passing through a corner of our own Hill Tracts northward to the Lushai Country and Cachar. The sufferings caused by the devastations of these rodents here, as on the Cachar side, were very serious, and the Government was obliged to supply rice in large quantities both to our own hillmen and to the Howlongs, to be repaid in labour or cash. The assistance given at this time by the State has had, it is believed, a good effect upon the sentiments entertained towards the British Government among the frontier clans.



## CHAPTER XXIII.

## CONCLUSION.

In Chapter VIII. I very briefly reviewed the policy of Government towards the tribes of the Sub-Himalayan Border, the northern frontier of Assam. While that Chapter was in the Press steps were being taken to call the Akas to account for the petty foray committed by them to which reference is there made. Full information as to its nature and origin has since been received. The predisposing cause must be sought apparently in certain forest and boundary grievances; but the raid, as a matter of fact, arose directly out of the Calcutta Industrial Exhibition. The papers contain more precise accounts of recent intercourse with the Akas than were before available to me, and I take

The Aka Expedition of 1883-84.

advantage of this to set out the facts more fully. Taghi, the famous Chief of the Kapachors, was succeeded by his son Midhi, who like his father is a convert to Hinduism. When a grant of land was made to the Hazari Khawas in 1873, as related at page 25, a similar grant was made to the Kapachors to be devoted to the maintenance of Cachari priests. The Kapachors were not satisfied with their grant; in 1875 they demanded much more, and this was summarily refused. They have, therefore, never taken possession of their grant. It has already been stated that they objected to the boundary line laid down in 1875, though they afterwards professed to accept it. This boundary line cut them off from a tract of land claimed by them between the hills and the Bhoroli River. Present at the demarcation on behalf of Government was one Lakhidar, the Mouzadar or native Revenue Officer of Baleepara. The tribe has also by the extension of forest reserves been deprived of what it doubtless considers its ancient right to tap rubber trees at pleasure. They had further been forbidden to catch elephants within the reserves, and threatened by the forest officers with the loss of one of their paths to the plains which runs through what is now a Government forest. Such being the state of things, the Deputy Commissioner of Durrung deputed Lakhidar to procure for the Calcutta Exhibition specimens of agricultural and other implements of the Akas, and to persuade some individuals of the tribe to come down to be modelled. Now, hitherto none but the regularly recognised *Kotokies* or clan-agents had ever sought to penetrate into the Aka Hills. Lakhidar, however, took with him 12 village elders and ryots of Baleepara and a private servant, and went straight to Midhi's village. The Akas declare, and the evidence of one of the Mouzadar's companions supports the statement, that Lakhidar said he had been sent to take down to Calcutta a 'Rajah and a Rani with all their ornaments,' for which he was

## THE NORTH-EAST FRONTIER OF BENGAL.

ready to pay. The Akas professed to be furious at this demand, alleging that, when they had given ornaments on former occasions, they had only been partly paid; while the idea of sending a 'Rajah and Rani' to the show was intolerable to them. Any way after some days palaver, charging the Mouzadar with being the man who had robbed them of their land, they sent him and his servant under guard to another village. The rest of the party they kept for a week, and then let them go. Meantime they had despatched to the plains Chandi, Midhi's brother, the lad who had been educated at Baleepara School, with a party of over 100 of the young men of the tribe. These came down to Baleepara on the 10th November last, and went frolicking about the bazar and tea gardens, getting liquor and chaffing the shop-keepers in a good-natured way. In the afternoon, however, they seized the Forest Clerk and the Forest Ranger, two guns and some money, and carried all off to the hills. They plundered none of the shop-keepers, save one opium-seller whose house they ransacked. 'Never', wrote the local officer, 'was a raid conducted so peaceably'. Unfortunately the Akas were not content with calling attention to their grievances in this emphatic manner. When the return of the captives was demanded, they sent down four very insolent letters in Bengali, dictated to the Forest Ranger, making preposterous demands for miles of land and forest on the plains, and a lakh of rupees compensation, announcing at the same time the death from fever of the Mouzadar. Frontier police were hurried up to the spot, and a military expedition to recover the captives was speedily organized. On the 17th December 1883 an advanced party of the troops crossed the frontier. The Akas had on the 10th declared to a messenger that they would surrender the captives in twelve days; but instead of this, they attacked the advance camp on the night of the 23rd December in great force, killing one sepoy and wounding seven. When the troops advanced to the Tengapani they found it strongly held by the Akas, whose clouds of poisoned arrows the sepoys much dreaded. It was found necessary to wait for the arrival of the main body and mountain guns. On the 8th January Midhi's village, strongly stockaded, was attacked and taken. The Akas could not stand artillery fire and fled. A few days after this the captives were surrendered. The Akas have been told that, if they will come in and submit absolutely, agreeing to pay any fine imposed, their villages will not be destroyed. Their *posa* will probably be kept in suspense for a year or two. The Hazari Khawa Akas have remained perfectly friendly all through.

The experience of the expedition has shown that the difficulties of the Aka country are enormous. 'All is well that ends well'; and there is of course a strong presumption that an expedition recommended by the local authorities, and carried to a successful issue, was properly undertaken. I cannot, however, for my part lay aside the doubt whether under any circumstances, save to avenge serious and widespread massacre, an expedition into the unexplored and almost impracticable fastnesses of these Sub-Himalayan tribes is a wise or necessary measure. We might possibly effect all our objects by shutting the offending tribe and its neighbours for some distance on either side out from the

plains' markets until submission was made. In that case we should probably see the neighbours turning upon the offenders and compelling them to do exactly what we want them to do. On the Sebsaugor frontier we have seen this result follow the adoption of the plan suggested. In any case it appears probable that the Akas have substantial grievances which will doubtless be looked into, and the lesson has been learnt not to send native Assamese officials into the hills to exploit the tribes for Exhibition or any other purposes.

In Parts II and III of this volume I have given the history of our dealings with the tribes to the south of the Brahmaputra and Surmah Valleys and to the east of Chittagong. Of them in 1869 I wrote as follows in closing my "Memorandum on the North-East Frontier ;"—

"The history of our intercourse with the Angamis and Garos is a tale of often repeated outrage on the one side, and long suffering forbearance on the other. Succeeding on the Naga Frontier to an effete Native Government, unable to protect its subjects, far less to coerce its enemies, it was the work of time to convince the mountaineers that the murder of a Bengali ploughman was more to the British Government than frontier dues,—the blood of a Cachari swineherd, a thing that cried for vengeance. But never, in the most troubled days of our relations with the Nagas, did the Government deliberately, or even indirectly, set before it a policy of reprisal. The ever reiterated command to frontier Officers and Commandants was this :—"Conciliate these savages if you can. Be persistent in demanding surrender of murderers, but endeavour so to approach the tribes, that a basis may be opened for friendly intercourse in the future." The majority of the so-called military expeditions into the Angami Hills were designed, not mainly or primarily to burn, destroy, and slay, but to bring our Officers with safety into and out of a position in which they could personally negotiate with the Angami chiefs. And when at length it was thought that all our efforts had been in vain, and outrage heaped on outrage had culminated in Bhogchand's murder, after the one short sharp lesson of punishment, the policy adopted, not wisely perhaps but in all sincerity, was a policy of absolute non-interference—a withdrawal from all intimate relations with incorrigible savages. They might attend our markets if they came in peace, but we would not enter their hills or intrude on their quarrels. Such moderation was of course misunderstood. It was too thoroughly English to be appreciated by ignorant Nagas. It would be viewed with astonishment by many more polished nations.

"It failed as a policy—signally failed. Fate seems determined to prove that there shall be no rest for the English in India till they stand forth as the governors or advisers of each tribe and people in the land. As regards the Nagas, this fact, doubtfully at times foreseen,—this policy, dimly now and again foreshadowed,—was grasped firmly and



carried forward persistently by the late Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. Direct control, personal influence, conciliatory intercourse,—supported at the same time by adequate strength,—these were the measures Sir Cecil Beadon never ceased to advocate as the only possibly successful policy in dealing with hill tribes. Among the Angamis this system has hitherto promised well; and though it is too much to hope that all our difficulties are over, there is still sufficient encouragement to Government to persevere. There is sufficient precedent to warrant such attempts elsewhere.

“It would be a mistake to suppose that to inflict condign punishment for exceptionally gross outrages is any departure from a general policy of conciliation. To submit to outrage is not to conciliate, but to provoke to further attack. But punishment has never, with the sanction of Government, taken the form of mere reprisal. Government has never sent out raiding parties to burn indiscriminately Naga villages. Its first aim has always been to discover the actual parties concerned in the raids on British Territory, and then it has endeavoured to confine the punishment to those so offending. The policy of a Government is not to be learned from any single incident in its history. It must be viewed as a whole in the light of its acknowledged aims and motives.

“Among the Garos the task of management was not less difficult than it had been among the Nagas. We found them exasperated by years of conflict with the great Choudries of the plains; eager to trade but resentful of injury; not very apt to discriminate between the griping chicanery of the Bengali tradesman, and the dealings of that Government whose Police kept order in the marts. The low-land villages had for generations supplied them with slaves and heads—the spoil of their bow and spear; for without these the souls of their heroes passed unhonoured away on the long journey to Mount Chikmung, from which there is no return. To check the custom of raiding on the occasion of the death of a chief, was to change the cardinal doctrine of a religion, and tamper with the dearest feelings of a Garo's heart. The central fastnesses of these hills too were more impenetrable, and their bordering jungles supposed to be more deadly than those of any other such tract of country. No British troops had marched across, no road had ever been carried through them; and the people themselves were held to be more uncouth and fierce than any other of our border tribes. But here, too, the Lieutenant-Governor held that a British Officer living in their midst, able to repress outrage, and ready to redress complaints, would do more to secure the safety of the plains than any number of stockaded posts and armed patrols.

“It is noteworthy, moreover, that the one occasion of all others upon which the Bengal Government has set aside all considerations of seniority, all questions of service, has been when it has had to select officers for these Hill Tract Districts. The best man for the work has invariably been sent there.

"In the Garo Hills\* there is now a fair resemblance of order. Raids have ceased. Feuds are vanishing. And the dead chieftain sets out on his last journey, with store of food and weapons by his side, but with his faithful dog as his sole companion. We have scotched a superstition, and shall in due time kill it.

"The Khasias, who might, from their warlike character and tribal organisation, have given us more trouble than any other hill people, have, as we have seen, been for years the most peaceable of our subjects.

"In the Jaintia Hills the Sintengs have received that attention which their peculiar system of village administration demands. These hills are now a tranquil and very ordinary sub-division.

"In North Cachar we see large communities of hillmen living as Government ryots, paying cheerfully the trivial dues demanded from them, and under the surveillance of only a small police post. There is every probability, indeed, that even this will be removed, and the people left to the control of their own headmen under the direct supervision of the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar.

"When we turn to the Chittagong Hill Tracts, we find ourselves face to face with a state of things which has no parallel elsewhere in Bengal. It must not be forgotten that, as regards the hills within our own acknowledged boundary, our administration has been as successful here as it has been elsewhere. The development of prosperity among the subjects of the Kalindi Rani, the Mān Rajah, and the Bohmong, is as truly due to the British Government as is the flourishing condition of any district on the plains. It is on the outer verge of our own hill tracts that we come upon a disturbing element. Tribes, over whom we can exercise no control, come surging up against our outposts from the unknown mountains of Burma and from valleys yet unsurveyed. Of the causes that press them forward we know nothing. New names crop up. A raid by savages of a strange fashion of hair tells us a tribal change has taken place across our frontier, and we have nothing for it but to strengthen our outposts, increase our patrols, and watch to see what follows. On the north, within our own nominal territory, we have still the anomalous tract of the Lushai Hills; and it is open to us either to repudiate it politically, or to enter in and dwell there. One way or other the decision must ere long be made."

There is nothing in all this which further experience would lead me to withdraw or qualify. The policy of the Government to the tribes on its North-East Frontier has, I again assert, been throughout in its main features a policy of conciliation, and not a policy of repression or devastation.† It was, indeed, in the opinion of those best qualified to judge, for many years far too conciliatory to be either strong or altogether successful. Even after our officers were located in the Naga and Garo

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\* The words should have been inserted—"So far as our influence extends."

† I speak of the policy of the Government as such.

The action of local authorities may not always perhaps have been in full accordance with this.

Hills, it was long ere they were formally allowed to assert themselves as representatives of a paramount power, to repress intertribal massacre and outrage, and enforce a regime of civilization and police. Their duty was declared to be the prevention, as far as possible, of raids upon the plains, and the cultivation of friendly relations with the independent savages around them. It must be confessed that the Bengal Government had not in 1869 fully realized the limitations placed upon the system of direct management which both Sir Cecil Beadon and Sir William Grey had strenuously advocated,—Sir W. Grey even more decidedly than Sir Cecil Beadon. It was only in 1870 and 1871 that the Supreme Government declared in unmistakeable terms its desire to assert no positive jurisdiction over communities not actually within the limits of our settled districts. In the Garo Hills, surrounded as these were on all sides by British territory, departure from this policy had almost immediately to be sanctioned. The Supreme Government had there allowed, to start with, acceptance of submission voluntarily offered, and in 1872 events compelled the frank adoption of measures of complete subjugation. But in the Naga Hills it was for years reluctant to undertake anything like coercion, or even to sanction a policy of gradual absorption. In 1874 Captain Johnstone's action in extending protection to communities which tendered revenue was very reluctantly approved; and then only with repeated warnings to avoid engagements to villages at any distance from his head-quarters. With the establishment of the Chief Commissionership of Assam and the immediate subordination of the Assam Administration to the Supreme Government, the views of the local officers began to carry greater weight, and the advocates of a forward policy obtained a more favourable hearing: until, in 1877, both the Government of India and the Secretary of State came finally and resolutely to the determination to advance the head-quarters of the Political Officer in the Naga Hills to a central and dominating position in the midst of the warring Angami clans—and to do away absolutely and for ever with the state of tribal anarchy that disgraced the so-called Hills District, and formed a standing menace to the peace of Cachar, Sebsaugor and Nowgong. Those of us who long ago contended that in no other way could permanent security be won, may rest content with the eventual triumph of their views; but we may perhaps be pardoned a passing expression of regret that so many lives should have been lost and so many valuable years been wasted, while the vain endeavour was being made to shirk the full burden of responsibility imposed on us by local circumstances and by the high necessities of our paramount position. Even now it cannot safely be assumed that the arbitrary line which bounds our present jurisdiction to the east of the Angami country will long suffice. We have left outside the sphere of our direct control not a few tribes of Nagas, who may still prove troublesome to both hills and plains; and I for one believe that we shall only find permanent peace when we have brought under our sway the whole of the Naga border up to the very summit of the great water-pent which bounds the British territory to the south of the Assam Valley. There is no need, however, now to hurry matters

unduly. We have secured and strongly occupied the navel of the hills; we have settled the limits of Manipuri interference; and we have, it may be hoped, effectively protected the tea planters and cultivators of the plains from outrage and plunder. For the rest we can afford to wait, until the consolidation of our rule over the Angami villages warrants the extension of supremacy, of police, and of civilisation, among the tribes that are for the present left outside the Hills District.

As regards the Lushai country, on the information available in 1871, it seemed to many of us desirable even then to treat it precisely in the same way as the Naga, Khasi, and Garo Hills. This view was almost naturally suggested by a consideration of the striking analogies between its local position and theirs. It did not appear tolerable that a tract of unexplored barbarism should permanently thrust itself up between the British districts of Cachar and Chittagong and the two protected States of Tipperah and Manipur. The Government of India preferred, however, on the knowledge of the country gained by the expeditions of 1871-72, and by the attendant or subsequent surveys, to confine itself for the present to a strictly defensive policy. The Lushais themselves both north and south received at that time a salutary lesson which they have not yet altogether forgotten. On the Chittagong side our posts and patrols were at last advanced to a position where they form an effective defensive line as against the outer tribes to their east and south, and are also within striking distance of some at least of the tribes living between Chittagong and Cachar. The frontier of Sylhet and Cachar is strongly garrisoned by a chain of protective stockades, while considerable progress has been made in the opening of a frontier trade and in the extension of intercourse with the nearer chiefs and clans. But the situation is still I venture to think very far from satisfactory. The communities that we know are being pressed upon from the south-east by communities of which little or nothing is known. The history of the past tells us that they must, sooner or later, be driven up to or across our border; and there is among them no paramount chief or dominant tribe that we could recognise and support, or entrust with the task of consolidating the scattered clans, to form an effective outwork against this growing movement from the south. It is not, therefore, beyond the bounds of possibility that we may ere long have ourselves to go in and occupy in force this land of the Lushais, in order to superintend effectively the settlement of the various tribal units, to prevent a regime of tribal massacre upon our border, and to obviate all risk of outrage upon the settled district of Cachar. The task ought not after all to prove either difficult or costly; and no one can look at the map and fail to see that the Port of Chittagong is destined to be some day the proper outlet for the teas of Cachar and the products of Manipur, and the source from which the Surmah Valley must draw those supplementary supplies of food which its yearly growing population will more and more require.



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## **APPENDIXES.**

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## APPENDIX A.

## WELSH'S REPORT ON ASSAM, 1794—(PAGE 3).

From CAPTAIN WELSH, to EDWARD HAY,  
Esq., Secretary to Government, dated 6th  
February 1794.

In obedience to the orders of the Honourable the Governor General in Council, I lose no time in replying to the questions proposed in your letter of the 6th ultimo.

The information transmitted is, I may venture to say, correct in the most material points.

## 1st Question.

"What form of government subsisted in Assam previous to your arrival there. In replying to this query you are to specify, as far as may be in your power, the relative degree of authority possessed by the Rajah and the different Chiefs."

Notes by Mr. D. Scott.

## Answer to 1st Question.

At the period in question a subversion of all regular government had taken place, but the question involves the ancient form of government and the most important alterations which it may have experienced. At present the outlines of the system will suffice for the information of the Board; it deserves a minute detail at a period of more leisure.

The right of conquest had vested the dominion of this Kingdom in the race of Surjee Deo and the descendants of the principal associates of Sookapah, the original conqueror. The form of government was consequently monarchical and aristocratical.

The monarchy was possessed by the descendants of Sookapah, being partly hereditary and partly elective. It was hereditary in the fraternal line. In failure of brothers in the direct line of the Monarch's sons; in failure of these in the sons of the brothers next in seniority. Beyond this line, the aristocracy exercised a latitude of election among the nearest relations of the late monarch with some attention to the claims of nearer consanguinity, but more to those of personal merit.

In early times the succession appears to have gone generally to sons except in cases of deposal. The circumstances of the succession one to another of the four sons of Moodra Singa is said to have originated in the death-bed injunction of that Monarch. It was not unusual for the reigning King to appoint a successor, and it was the practice to disqualify other members of the family from reigning by causing a slight wound to be inflicted upon them which was considered as an insurmountable bar to the acquisition of the regal office.



The Monarch was the first executive officer and presided over every department of the State. He distributed honors, titles, and offices, without the concurrence, but not without the council of the aristocracy. He was not lord of the soil, but would alienate lands for the legal tenure of which the possessor had no written documents. All uncultivated land was entirely at his disposal. He possessed no power over the lives and property of his subjects. He could not make peace and war without the concurrence of the aristocracy. He treated with foreign powers by his own ambassadors and in his own name, but with the previous concurrence of the aristocracy. In the public councils, he possessed the privilege of a casting voice. In executing sentence of death on a criminal his order alone would sanction a form by which the criminal's blood might be shed. He alone coined money. His person was sacred.

The aristocracy, or Patrah-Muntree, was composed of three Gohains and the two Prime Ministers of State. The three Gohains or Patrah were the Burh Patrah Gohain, Burh Gohain, and Boorah Gohain. They were permanent and hereditary counsellors of State little inferior to the Monarch in rank. On all occasions their counsel, and on all important affairs their concurrence, were indispensable. They proclaimed the Monarch and could depose him in the instance of incapacity or great delinquency. Some doubt, however, exists of their legal power of deposition.

In the provinces allotted to each, they exercised most of the independent rights of sovereignty. In the execution of sentence of death, their order could not sanction a form in which the blood of the criminal might be shed, but they could authorise his death by drowning. In the event of war or the construction of public works they furnished their proportion of militia or men. They likewise supplied some trifling articles for the King's stores, but paid no other revenue. They ruled their provinces on the principles of the general system. The pre-eminence

*Notes by Mr. D. Scott.*

2. With exception to Royal grants and the khats or farms of individuals, usually of small extent, there is no division of the land in Assam amongst a comparatively small number of individuals such as seen in the feudal countries of Europe and in Bengal, and the cultivated soil may be considered as the property of the pykes or peasants owing service to the State to whom it is allotted. Waste land might be reclaimed by any one who had the means of bringing it into cultivation, and a property in the soil might thus be acquired, subject, however, if held without a grant from the King, to an agrarian law which rendered the whole of the transplanted rice lands (*roopees*) liable to division amongst the pykes, on a new census taking place, in case there should be an insufficiency of waste land for their support. Gardens, tanks, groves, &c., which are formed upon the higher description of land, were not subjected to this law, nor was ground that had been occupied for a great length of time and inherited or transferred from one party to another for a valuable consideration. Land of the latter description called *roopeesick*, or ancestral, was not subject to the payment of revenue until the reign of Kamollesur, when a tax in kind was imposed on it equal to from 5 to 8 annas per Bengal beegah. It is believed that no estate of this kind exists exceeding in extent 200 Bengal beegahs, and that no individual in the country is possessed altogether of 900 beegahs of such land of *roopees* quality.

3. The authority of the King was in practice probably much more despotic than is here represented, and it would not appear from the history of the country that the aristocracy had any legal means of preventing the execution of his wishes, the only remedy seeming to have consisted in the actual exercise of their power of deposing him in case of gross misconduct and neglect of their advice. It is to be regretted that the historical work to which I have had access treats with great brevity of those reigns in which no troubles occurred, and in which the Princes may be supposed to have acted in constitutional manner, but when it does afford any insight into difference of opinion between the King and his Counsellors, we usually find one or other of these parties exercising unlimited sway, the Prince in some cases dismissing and putting to death the Gohains, and the latter frequently treating their master in the like manner.

4. For examples of the exercise of this power Vide pages 23 to 45 of the accompanying extracts of these precedents. Only three—the depositions of Booram Pha, Sooching Pha, and Soonyut Pha—can be considered as having anything of the character of deliberate acts of the great Council of State; while from the circumstance of all of these instances having occurred within a period of thirty years, and two of them in the time of the same Booram Gohain, there seems to be some ground for the doubts here expressed as to the legality of the proceedings in question.

5. The Gohains had altogether allotted for their own use 10,000 pykes equal, at the old assessment, to Rs. 20,000 per annum, which, according to the relative value of money in Assam and Bengal in former times, may be considered as equivalent to treble the amount in the latter country.

*Notes by Mr. D. Scott.*

was possessed by the Gohains who obtained from the Monarch the title of Roye and the additional services of 2,000 men.

If the son of a Gohain was incapacitated by youth, want of abilities, or other causes, he was excluded from the succession.

The Monarch, with the concurrence of the two Gohains, conferred the appointment on the late Gohain's brother or his brother's son. In failure of incapacity or delinquency of the nearest claimants a greater latitude was allowed, but in every instance the vacancy was supplied from five families descended from the associates of Sookapah. In the event of delinquency a Gohain might be removed from his office by the Monarch with the concurrence of two Gohains.

The Prime Ministers, or Muntree, were the Burra Burwah, and the Burra Fogon. Their offices were not hereditary, but they were chosen from four families, the descendants of the associates of Sookapah. The Ministers were removable at the Monarch's pleasure with the concurrence of the Gohains.

The Burra Burwah commanded the forces, received the revenues, and administered the justice of the upper provinces from Suddes on the eastern confines to Koliabar in Deonpah and Derung in Ooterpah with an exception in favour of the provinces under the Government of the Gohains. He could not sanction the execution of a criminal by any form of death. The Burra Fogon's office was considered of higher importance, though of later creation than the former. The jurisdiction commenced at Koliabar and Derung and included the whole of the kingdom to the western confines. His jurisdiction was similar to that of Burra Burwah, but its distance from the seat of Government rendered it necessary that he should possess the power of executing sentences of death by drowning. Appeals from his judicial decisions were scarcely practicable, and were only made on very important occasions.

The civil establishment was composed of the officers who superintended the various arts, sciences, trades, sources of public revenues, employments of the King's household, and numerous other departments. About 13 Fogons and 30 Burwahs were allotted for these offices, and were chosen from the nine families of hereditary nobility. They were amenable for their conduct to the Monarch only.

6. It does not appear that the Gohains could be selected except from three families—one furnishing a Bur Putra Gohain, another a Bur Gohain, and a third a Boora Gohain.

7. The members of twelve families are now eligible to these offices upon the strength of past precedents. These twelve families are distinct from the preceding three from which the two Ministers could not be chosen—a rule that was probably enacted with the view of preventing the two great accumulation of power in particular families.

8. The Bar Booroon had the command of 14,000 pykes but they were bound to perform service to the King, and the Prime Minister's perquisite consisted in an allowance of 7 per cent. for his private use and in the fines levied from them for offences committed or on the appointment to the inferior offices of Hazarkasya, &c.

9. These offices were filled from the fifteen families of hereditary nobility already mentioned, and each of them as did not involve military service could also be held by the higher classes of the aboriginal inhabitants of the country, but not by foreigners or their descendants for three or four generations.

In the Department of Justice, the Neey Khodah Fogon represented the Sovereign, and received appeals from the Burra Burwah and Burra Fogon. Every officer under Government was a Judge in his department, with an appeal to his superior officer, and ultimately to the Monarch's representative. In the Gohain provinces no appeal was allowed from the decision of the Chief. In the administration of justice, witnesses were examined and written documents received in evidence, the Judge decided according to the customs of the country and to the best of his judgment, as no written laws existed previous to the introduction of Braminical religion. The Monarch would authorize any person of consequence to take cognizance of particular causes in any part of the Kingdom.

The army was a militia, and organized in the following manner:—  
**Military Establish-  
 ment.**

Every family furnished the Sovereign with one man in four as a permanent militia or standing army. When the public service required an additional force, two men, and in cases of great emergency either of war or public works, three men. The first was denominated Mool, the second Dowal, the third Tawal. The fourth who remained to cultivate the soil, and the four are termed Ghote Pike Officers.

Twenty men were commanded by a Burra, one hundred by a Khotkea, one thousand by a Hazaree, three thousand by a Rajekoar, and six thousand by a Fogon. The Burra Burwa and Burra Fogon as Commanders-in-Chief, had each the particular command of a body of twelve thousand men. The Fogons, Rajekoars, and Hazarees were nominated by the Monarch, but with the advice and concurrence of the Gohains. The Khotkeas and Burras were appointed by their respective Fogons and Rajekoars. The privates might demand through the regular channel the the dismissal of their Burras and Khotkeas, and the appointment of an officer of their own nomination. Each officer administered justice to the men under his command with an appeal to his superior officer, and ultimately to the Neey Khodah Fogon.

From these services were exempted the descendants of the hereditary nobility, unless in the event of delinquency, and all who possessed offices under Government.

*Notes by Mr. D. Scott.*

10. This officer exercised jurisdiction in the absence of the King only, and in the palace or fort.

11. No record was kept in criminal trials, but in civil cases a summary of the proceedings was drawn out and delivered to the successful party called Siddhant Pattir. Trials were conducted before the Bur Boorwa or other delegate as President, and a certain number of Khattakeas, Khagistees, Ghunucks, and Fundits as assessors, by whose opinion the Judge was usually guided. The administration of justice is said to have been speedy, efficient, and impartial in former times, but a good deal corrupted since the commencement of the disorders occasioned by the Moamaris insurrections. No Wakeels were employed, the parties or one of their relations appearing personally. From the Bur Boorwa's Court not even the three Gohains were exempt.

12. After this, a force consisting of mercenaries from the western provinces was introduced, and by that means the late Boora Gohain was enabled so long to usurp the whole power of the State.

13. The pykes are now chiefly employed as labourers; or a revenue is derived from the commutation of their services for a money payment varying from 6 to 18 rupees per Ghote. A considerable number of the inhabitants are exempted from personal service on the score of their caste or rank or by purchase, but by far the largest portion still continue to work, in a most unprofitable manner, for the Government.

14. Since the loss of a great number of pykes in the reign of Rajeswar Sing, the number of men forming a Ghote in Upper Assam has been reduced to three. All persons below the age of 15 years and above 60 years are exempted from service.

15. This is one of the most important rights the lower orders possessed, and it extended usually to the Hazarkoeyas, and in case of proof of maltreatment to the higher ranks placed over them. When a dispute occurred between the retainers of two different Commanders, it was decided by the officer of highest rank.

16. The descendants and frequently the collateral relations of nobles guilty of treason, and particularly of shedding the royal blood, were stigmatised and degraded so as to be incapable of holding any office.

*Notes by Mr. D. Scott.*

Military stores were under the superintendence of the Kargorish Fogon.

It is only necessary to observe that the Ecclesiastical. Braminical religion has prevailed since the time of Rooder Sing, who reigned about 70 years ago.

The creation of three lesser Gohains from the same families as the former appears to have been the principal legal alteration in the Civil and Military Departments. The office of Burra Fogon was of later creation also. The recent Gohains are the Sudea Koa Gohains, Governor of the eastern confines or Sudea; the Moorung Koa Gohain, Governor of the confines towards Naga and Kossaree; the Solal Gohain, Governor of Kolleabur.

In a lapse of centuries every possible deviation from regular Government might be enumerated, but it will be proper to confine the discussion to those illegal innovations, which proved the first source of the late troubles.

The sacred regularity of succession to the Throne was violated by the power of the Burra Burwah, in the instance of Rajah Swar Sing who superseded his elder brother Mohun Mala Deo.

The rights of the hereditary nobility were superseded by the appointment of Roop Sund, and at a later period of his son Chiste Sund, the grandfather of Joinath, to the high office of Burra Burwah. Joinath is the dismissed Burra Burwah.

The power of the State and the direction of the Royal Councils were now completely diverted from the lawful channel of the Gohains. The secret machinations of the latter co-operating with the general struggle for power under a weak and vicious administration and with the discontents of the people seem to have excited the Maran and Maimaria insurrections.

The execution of the Gooroo or High Priests of the Momarias and of his son, suspected, probably with great justice, as the principal authors of the troubles, was the chief cause of the subsequent insurrections.

Mohun Meela Deo's death by Moran poison had rendered legitimate the latter part of Luckee Sing's reign, but the sons of his elder brothers possessed a right to the succession superior to that of Gourinaut Sing; the expedient of mutilation, however, had left Gourinaut (the present Rajah of Assam) without a rival, and he became lawful Sovereign at an early period of life.

17. This office is now held by a family of Kamptees who settled in Assam about 70 years ago.

18. This is accounted for in page 57 of the historical extracts. It appears that the elder son was disqualified for the succession in consequence of his being marked with the small-pox, any personal blemish, whether natural or artificial, being considered as an insurmountable bar to the attainment of the regal dignity in Assam.

19. The Mosmarias still possess some power in the upper part of the country. They are united under the command of their elected chief the Bur Sinaputtee. In any arrangement that may be made for the future settlement of Assam, it will be necessary to consult the interest of this numerous body. If attached to the Government, they might become as full as a militia, but the exorbitant pretensions of their priests may render it difficult to satisfy them. Of late years it was usual with the Assam Government to keep the High priest at Court, and after under restraint. His influence is now supposed to be on the decline.

*Notes by Mr. D. Scott.*

The debauched minority, the ignorance, imbecility, caprice, execrable cruelty, and oppression of Government, whose ministers and low favorites were the dread, detestation, and shame of the great, the scourge, and execration of the people, involved the whole Kingdom in confusion.

The Burh Gohain and his five sons were murdered. Adasooria, Burra Burwah of hereditary nobility, and numerous adherents suffered mutilation.

All the men of consequence were divided in opposite interests; but the whole seemed united in sentiments against the vile favourites of Gourinaut.

Every kind of oppression was practised on the people. The Momarias succeeded probably by the connivance of the King's Generals—certainly by their supineness. The Boora Gohain may with great justice be suspected of having favoured the insurrection. The King fled from his capital on the approach of the insurgents and repaired to Gowhatty. The Boora Gohain and other persons of consequence, many petty Chiefs of districts and towns, and some adventurers, with a very few followers, assumed independence in various parts of the country.

The same crimes and oppressions afflicted the vicinity of the Monarch's residence wherever he fled. It is probable that the Diga Rajah, of Derangh, was provoked by similar oppressions to rebel, yet there is some reason to think that his principal motive was the opportunity to assert independence which the times afforded. He perished by the hands of the executioner. His son, deprived of the succession, seized Derangh and Kamroop with the assistance of the Burkan-dases.

The Rajahs of the Noaduwar esteemed the times favourable to their personal independence, which was accordingly asserted, without any apparent provocation. A bold adventurer, with two or three hundred men, advanced to Gowhatty, and Surgee Deo fled to Bengal.

This question has been partly answered. Relative authority of It remains to notice the the Rajah and the western Rajahs of different Chiefs. Doomriah, Derangh, Beltola, Rannygong and Noaduwar.

Surgee Deo founds his title of Sovereignty over these Chiefs on the right of conquest or voluntary submission.

With the concurrence of the Patrah, or Potrah Muntree, he could dismiss a Rajah, and appoint his brother to fill the vacancy, or his son in failure of the fraternal line. It is doubtful whether he possessed the lawful power to put a Rajah to death.

20. The whole of these Chiefs are now in subjection to Assam as far as their possessions in the plains extend, but they are nearly independent in the hills. There is every reason to believe that they are particularly well disposed towards the British Government, and the principal person amongst them, the Rajah of Burdewar, is now actively engaged in improving the road through his territory which extends nearly to Pandwa in Sylhet.

21. Of late the Bar Phookin exercised the right of dismissing and appointing the above Rajahs with exception to those of Derang and Beltola without previous reference, but subject to an appeal to the King.

The Rajahs were Judges in their own districts, but with an appeal to the Burra Fogon and the Monarch. They must attend personally with their complement of men, when summoned by the Surgee Deo. All the Rajahs, except the Rancee, pay an annual revenue, in addition to the number of men they might furnish on any emergency.

Confines. Suddia, Miree, Duffala Orika, Botan, Naga, Koparee, Jointa, and the Garrows paid tribute to the Monarch of Assam.

*Notes by Mr. D. Scott.*

22. The powers of the Rajahs have since been much curtailed, at present they exercise judicial authority in minor cases in common with the chowdries by sufferance only, but the facility they possess of escaping into the hills, when pursued by the officers of Government, has often induced them to assume still higher powers, and to mutilate and put persons to death for which a fine was usually accepted as an atonement under the Assam Government. Nothing of this kind has occurred since the full establishment of the British authority.

23. The Duplas, Bhootesyas, and Ankas pay a nominal tribute, and in return levy black mail to a very oppressive and continually increasing extent in the districts north of the river. Cachar and Jyntia long before this period had regained their independence. Twelve of the Singpho Chiefs were also nominally subject to Assam, but did not pay tribute.

*2nd Question.*

"How far Surgee Deo, Rajah of Assam, has been restored the exercise of his legal authority? You are desired to signify particularly whether any of his subjects still refuse submission to, or continue to act independently of, him, and, if any should come under this description, it is wished that you should communicate their names, quality, force, and situation, with the grounds of their disaffection as far as you are acquainted therewith. It is also desired that you should state your opinion whether any and what measures are necessary to be pursued for establishing obedience to the Rajah's authority, and the period required for carrying those measures into execution."

*Answer to 2nd Question.*

The limited degree of authority which the Surgee Deo at present enjoys, he derives from the countenance of the Company's troops.

The different Chiefs and Rajahs profess submission and obedience to the authority of the Surgee Deo, but seem all inclined to act independently of it. The grounds of their disaffection are enumerated in my reply to the first question, and their military force appears to be extremely despicable.

I am clearly of opinion that to establish obedience to the Rajah's authority, it is only necessary that the mediating power should more decidedly interfere, and declare its determination to support, the Government of Assam in all its constituent parts.

*3rd Question.*

"Whether you think there is any probability that the principal Rajahs or Chiefs

*Notes by Mr. D. Scott.*

will soon be prevailed upon to accept your and the Rajah's invitation to assemble for the purpose of concerting a form of government, and in that case how long it will be before such an assembly can be formed, and admitting them to meet, whether you have any hopes from your knowledge of the characters and views of the individuals that they will be induced to agree on a plan for the settlement and tranquility of the country."

*Answer to 3rd Question.*

By proceeding to the capital I shall have an opportunity of requiring the personal attendance of all those Chiefs who are stationed in our route, and who only agreeably to prescriptive rules are necessary to establish the original form of Government. Convinced of the impossibility of prosecuting with success their ambitious designs, and of being protected by the mediating power against the tyranny of the Surgee Deo, they will, I doubt not, unite and agree to a plan for the settlement and tranquillity of the country. The period required to effect this depends upon adventitious circumstances.

*4th Question.*

"The late Ministers having been dismissed and the Rajah's incapacity for the government of his country being asserted, whether you know any person or persons of sufficient ability, weight, and authority in that country for supplying the places of the dismissed Ministers. If you do, you are desired to name them, and to deliver your opinion how far their appointment could be made with the Rajah's consent, and would be acceptable to the principal people. It is also wished that you should specify how far the Minister lately elected by the Rajah appears to you to possess the requisite qualifications for the trust committed to him."

*Answer to 4th Question.*

On my arrival at the capital I shall have an opportunity of consulting the three Gohains, whose concurrence is necessary in the appointment of Ministers. I cannot yet venture to recommend any one to fill the important office of Burra Burwah.

The nomination of the late appointed Burra Fagon appears to be generally acceptable to the people, and I have reasons to think that he possesses the requisite qualifications for the trust committed to him.

24. Although very illiterate, there are nevertheless several persons amongst the Assam nobility who, with considerable talents, possess a sufficient knowledge of business to enable them to conduct the affairs of the country until it may be determined, who is to be raised to the throne. It is of course impossible to say whether or not any particular individual could be appointed with the Rajah's consent, but, under the altered circumstances of the case, the British Government would no doubt be justified in exercising the most decided interference in regard to the selection of the higher officers of State.

*Notes by Mr. D. Scott.*

*5th Question.*

"Whether Kisanarain since his admission to the Raj of Derangh has behaved with proper submission to the Surjee Deo, and whether you can rely upon Kisanarain's assistance, if required, in supporting Surjee Deo."

25. The Rajahs of Durang have been reduced to complete subjection since the date of this report, and at present they do not possess the means of disturbing the peace or assisting the Government. They are appointed and dismissed like the other officers of State, an individual of the same family being, however, always chosen. There is at present one Rajah in possession and three ex-Rajahs, all of whom entertain bitter enmity against each other.

*Answer to 5th Question.*

Kisanarain, since his admission to the Raj of Derangh, has behaved with proper submission to the Surjee Deo, or rather has acted in compliance with my wishes, in every instance. I do not think his regard for the interests of the Surjee Deo would induce him to contribute his assistance, but I can rely upon Kisanarain's affording his services, whenever required by me.

*6th Question.*

"What are the reasons in your opinion of the Rajah's delay in proceeding to his capital, and whether any and what obstacles occur to this measure."

*Answer to 6th Question.*

The late Ministers, and other interested advisers, represented to their infatuated Monarch the danger of returning to his capital, and to their successful attempts to awaken his fears I partly attribute the delay. But the Rajah's extreme indolence and impotence, both of body and mind, would naturally render him averse to a measure, which must be attended with some degree of personal exertion. He is now, however, on his way thither.

*7th Question.*

"Whether the Commercial Regulations settled between you and the Rajah are considered to be in force, whether any and what benefit has resulted from them, and whether you think they admit of any, and what, alterations, with a view to the improvement of the commercial intercourse between the two States?"

*Answer to 7th Question.*

The Commercial Regulations settled between the Rajah and myself are in full force, but the principal benefit which has arisen from them is the demolition of an iniquitous monopoly, which ultimately must be productive of great pecuniary advantage, and in the meantime removes the distresses of the people. Resulting from the collections at the Candahar chowkey the sum of Arcott Rs. 12,012-2-9 has been received



*Notes by Mr. D. Scott.*

during the space of nine months, after defraying incidental expenses, and from this source the Rajah is to receive annually Rs. 12,000, and the overplus is destined to defray part of the expense of the detachment.

I am of opinion that this commercial compact will admit of considerable alteration with a view to the improvement of trade between the two States. But as the efficacy of such alteration depends, in the first instance, on the restoration of order, and, in the second, on the degree of influence the Honourable Board may be desirous of obtaining in the affairs of Assam. Before I can give a decisive answer on this subject, I beg I may be indulged with some time to be assured of the former, and to be informed of the latter.

*8th Question.*

"Whether from your knowledge of the Rajah's character you are of opinion that, after the return of the Detachment, he will observe the stipulations he has entered into, or may further agree to."

*Answer to 8th Question.*

From a knowledge of the Rajah's character, and the views of many individuals in power and favour, whose personal interests are affected by the stipulations entered into with him, I am decidedly of opinion that none would be observed, supposing the detachment and all control on the part of the British Government is withdrawn.

28. This opinion was completely verified by the result. On the detachment being withdrawn, the Rajah ceased to observe the commercial treaty and a virtual monopoly was again established.

*9th Question.*

"Whether you think it probable, in the event of your detachments being recalled, that the Government of the country will be so regulated as to admit of a beneficial commercial intercourse between the two States, and to what extent, and in what articles you suppose such a commerce may be carried on. In your answer to this query you will state such information as you may have obtained relating to the productions and actual commerce of Assam."

*Answer to 9th Question.*

This query may be considered under three distinct heads, viz. :—

- 1st.—The consequences of the recall of the detachment, with respect to commerce which will be noticed in my reply to the 13th query.
- 2nd.—The articles of commerce.
- 3rd.—The probable extent, and actual state of commerce.

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*Notes by Mr. D. Scott.*

### IMPORTS

Articles of Commerce. From the eastern confines or Suddea, copper, cotton, springsalt, fir trees.

From the northern confines Miree supplies copper, munjeet, ouka ; and Duffala supply munjeet, long pepper, ginger goomdan, Maytoon, an animal of the kine species. Botan supplies musk, blankets, cowtails, small horses, gola borax, rock salt, Nainta, kind of cloth, Goom, Sing, an embroidered cloth, Daroka, a silk of a mixture of green, red and yellow colours.

From the southern confines, Naga supplies cotton. Luckibilla, a silk cloth, Toatbund, a silk cloth, Narakapore, an embroidered silk, red hair, (?) and Nagazatee spears. The Garrows supply cotton, copper, iron, coarse cloth.

From the western confines or Bengal, copper and other metals, red lead, woollens of Europe, chiefly of the coarser kind, cottons of Bengal, chiefly of the coarser kind, chinty particularly kinkhobs, cloves, nutmegs, mace, cinnamon, blue vitriol, assafoetida, alum, darmook, orpiment, a variety of drugs, salt.

27 This statement still exhibits the principal imports. The quantity of goods of European manufacture is as of late increased, and it is probable that there may hereafter be a considerable outlet for woollens at a sort of annual fair held on the confines of Durung, to which merchants from Thibet and the intermediate country resort.

### EXPORTS.

The exports to Bengal only will be noticed here, they are divided into—

1st.—The produce of the other confines.

2nd.—The produce of Assam.

1st.—Cotton in considerable quantity, munjeet in doubtful quantity, fir trees probably in any quantity, ginger probably in some quantity, gold in considerable quantity, borax probably in considerable quantity, musk in considerable quantity, small horses.

2nd.—The merchantable produce of Assam may be considered at more length under three heads of vegetable, mineral, and animal productions.

Sugarcane thrives in every part of Assam.

Vegetable produce. The cane of the best quality affords a granulated sugar, on experi-

ment superior to the cane of Rungpore. The natives convert the juice into a substance (ghoor) unfit for granulation, and of little consequence as an article of export. But in respect to this article it may be confidently asserted, that proper encouragement would render it very valuable.

Pepper vine is cultivated in Kazroop, Derungh, Basadayungh in larger quantity, Biswenath and other provinces of the kingdom possibly, in no great abundance anywhere, although the soil in many parts would seem extremely favourable to its cultivation.

Poppy grows in luxuriance in most of the Lower Provinces. The natives, however, are as yet unacquainted with the manufacture of merchantable opium, which might be procured in considerable quantity.

Indigo is cultivated in various parts of the kingdom, but in very inconsiderable quantity. Encouragement would probably render this a very valuable export.

Mustard seed. The plant is cultivated in great abundance. The seed and oil are articles of export, the latter, of universal consumption, within the kingdom.

Tobacco was procured in luxuriance in the Lower Provinces and of a superior quality in the higher. It was formerly an article of export.

Sooparee was produced in great quantity everywhere; the consumption among the inhabitants was enormous, yet it was formerly an article of export.

Ginger is produced everywhere in abundance.

Rice was, and is, produced in very great abundance. It is asserted positively that a scarcity has never been known to happen from natural causes. The nature of the seasons in Assam confirms the assertion. It might prove an invaluable export in times of famine in Bengal.

Gold is found in considerable quantity among the sands of the Mineral production. Burrampooter and other streams which flow from the northern and southern mountains. It was formerly a source of considerable revenue to the monarch.

Iron might be procured at Boesadayungh, as well as from the Garrows, in considerable quantities.

*Notes by Mr. D. Scott.*

28. This article thrives well, and the quantity would admit of being greatly increased. The price formerly used to be from ten to fifteen rupees per maund it is now much enhanced.

29. A great quantity of opium is produced and used by the inhabitants. In point of purity it is probably equal to that of Patna or Benares, but it is prepared in a different form, being reduced to a dry state by exposure to the air, spread on narrow slips of cloth, which are afterwards rolled up into small bales, and called Kance or Kappa.

30. The Burmese invasion has proved very destructive to the Sooparee groves; immense numbers having been cut down and still more destroyed by wild elephants after the villages were abandoned. This article is now one of import.

31. The quantity of gold would probably admit of much increase by the adoption of improved means of washing the sands containing it, which is at present done by the hand and apparently in a manner involving a great deal of unnecessary labor. The gold-dust is found in conjunction with a black sandy ore of iron, probably produced from the disintegration of granite. The gold is ultimately separated in the usual manner by long washing and subsequent trituration with mercury.

*Notes by Mr. D. Scott.*

Saltpetre was procured everywhere in the Upper Provinces in considerable quantity, and might probably in time prove an article of export.

Lac—The quantity usually exported in favourable times, has not been ascertained, but we may presume, that it was not very inconsiderable from the actual produce, which we have lately observed.

Moongah silk seems to offer a most valuable and extensive article of export with proper encouragement, as the several trees on which the worm feeds, were cultivated in the utmost profusion, throughout the whole extent of the kingdom, with few exceptions. A coarser kind of silk is produced by worms which feed on the castor-oil trees.

Elephants' teeth have always been an article of export, and in the present desolated condition of the country might be procured in any quantity. Increase of population will necessarily diminish the possible quantity of this export.

Rhinoceros's horn was a trifling article of export.

Buffalo's hide has not hitherto proved an article of export.

Deer's skins—The animal abounds in Assam.

Until the geography, and other particulars of this and the neighbouring countries, be more particularly known, no decided judgment can be offered relative to the probable extent of the future commerce with Assam. It is certain, that an intercourse of some kind has existed with all the neighbouring nations, particularly with Jainta, Kossaree, and even Sylhet, with the people of Moogio, now in the possession of the King of Burma or Ava. It is possible that a communication with all the neighbouring nations might be rendered beneficial to commerce, with proper encouragement, during a considerable lapse of time, hitherto, we may suppose it has been very inconsiderable, unless, perhaps, in the single article of Bengal salt.

Commercial intercourse is much facilitated by the number of navigable streams, which intersect Assam in every direction, especially in the season of the rains, including a period of seven or eight months. Some of these flow from the mountains on the

33. The quantity of lac annually exported, previously to the late troubles, amounted to about 8, or 10,000 maunds. It might be increased to a great extent, but not very speedily. The trees upon which the insect feeds requiring a long time to grow to the requisite size.

33. This is an article of great value and importance, and which will probably prove a useful material in many of the mixed stuffs manufactured in England from its superior strength and durability to silk. The quantity at present exported is small, but it may be expected to increase very rapidly. Extensive plantations of the trees required for the support of the worms being everywhere to be seen abandoned by the proprietors during the late troubles. This tree also grows wild in the upper part of the country.

34. The quantity of salt imported during the year 1834-35 was only 23,000 maunds. The consumption of this article in Assam and the adjoining parts of Bungalow is much less than might be expected, with reference to the population, chiefly in consequence of the inhabitants very generally preferring an alkaline seasoning for their food, prepared from the ashes

northern and southern confines. Beyond the eastern confines, the great stream flows to a very great distance; but whether there be any navigation or commerce on that river beyond the limits of Assam is doubtful.

Commerce could never have been very considerable in Assam, under the discouraging restraints imposed by a Government particularly jealous of strangers. The subversion of all regular Government, and the desolation of the country, reduced it to nothing. The actual commerce is therefore very inconsiderable, though reviving, and it would be unreasonable to doubt, that it might in time, under the influence of the British Government be rendered extremely beneficial to both States.

*10th Question.*

"How far the pecuniary commutation proposed by you to be made by the Chiefs in lieu of the supplies of men has been carried into effect, and to what extent the supplies furnished in consequence of such commutation have contributed to defray the expenses of the detachment".

*Answer to 10th Question.*

The pecuniary commutation in lieu of the levy of men proposed by the Rajahs of Derung and Beltola in June 1793 is so far carried into effect, that since the period before mentioned, the service of men has not been exacted from them; and of the stipulated annual sum of Rs. 51,600 to be paid by them and appropriated towards defraying the expenses of the detachment, I have received Rs. 10,000.

*11th Question.*

"What is the amount of expenses of the detachment in consequence of the service in which they are employed over and above the ordinary expenses attending it, and whether you know any mode by which these extraordinary expenses may be defrayed.

*Answer to 11th Question.*

In making a calculation of the extraordinary expense attending the detachment and deputation, I have been careful not to omit any allowance, which I conceive to be incident to their situation. I have supposed the European officers to be on an average entitled to full batta, and the Non-Commissioned Officers, and Privates, to half time of full and half, of half batta.

*Notes by Mr. D. Scott.*

of plants. Potash and soda are both used for this purpose, the latter being manufactured by burning certain aquatic plants, some of which are found in a wild state, and others cultivated for this express purpose.

35. The river is not navigable much beyond Suddeeya, nor is there any trade of consequence carried on in that quarter.

36. This arrangement was not adhered to. The commutation for services would be most acceptable to the peasantry, and, with some restrictions rendered necessary by local circumstances, and the habits of the people, it might be adopted with much advantage.

37. The future defence of Assam will involve no expense that could otherwise be avoided, and the security of our own Provinces would on the contrary be most easily and effectually provided for by occupying the country as far as the 93 degree of East Longitude which would bring the troops on the Burhampootur into communication with those on the Soornah.

*Abstract of the monthly extra expense attending the detachment and deputation to Assam.*

European officers, &c., &c.	Average of half month, half batta to the Troops, exclusive of European Commissioned Officers.	Expense of the detachment in Assam support, full batta to be the average for European Commissioned and half batta for half month for the Troops.	Expense of the detachments in Assam or double full batta.	Extra expenses incurred by the detachments and deputation.
<b>16th Battalion.</b>	<b>S. Rs. A. P.</b>	<b>S. Rs. A. P.</b>	<b>S. Rs. A. P.</b>	<b>S. Rs. A. P.</b>
1 Captain ... ..	.....	415 0 0	385 0 0	180 0 0
8 Lieutenants ... ..	.....	2,286 0 0	2,064 0 0	708 0 0
1 Adjutant, including his staff allowance ... ..	.....	389 0 0	465 0 0	95 0 0
1 Sergeant Major ... ..	2 8 0	5 0 0	.....	3 8 0
1 Quarter Master Sergeant ... ..	2 8 0	5 0 0	.....	3 8 0
The different Banks and Departments of the Battalion.	784 12 0	1,469 8 0	.....	734 12 0
Allowance for Harkarras and Guides ... ..	.....	.....	.....	180 0 0
Probable amount for boat allowance to 9 Subalterns 16th Battalion.	.....	.....	.....	720 0 0
<b>Detachment, 27th Battalion.</b>				
2 Lieutenants ... ..	.....	574 0 0	706 0 0	193 0 0
The different Banks and Departments of this Detachment.	234 13 0	469 8 0	.....	234 12 0
Probable amount for boat allowance to 2 Subalterns	.....	.....	.....	160 0 0
<b>Detachment Staff.</b>				
1 Adjutant's staff allowance, &c. ... ..	.....	367 0 0	465 0 0	198 0 0
1 Quarter Master ... ..	.....	.....	.....	157 0 0
1 Assistant Surgeon ... ..	.....	267 0 0	263 0 0	95 0 0
1 Quarter Master Sergeant ... ..	2 8 0	35 0 0	.....	22 8 0
Quarter Master's Establishment... ..	.....	.....	.....	156 4 0
1 Tindal and 9 Lascars of Artillery ... ..	63 4 0	74 4 0	.....	11 0 0
Boats for the transportation of the Troops on an average.	.....	.....	.....	2,200 0 0
<b>Expenses incident to the Deputation.</b>				
Captain Welsh's salary Sicca Rs. 1,500 ... ..	.....	.....	.....	267 9 1
Ditto average of contingent bill for Durbar charges.	.....	.....	.....	650 0 0
Captain Welsh's probable boat allowance ... ..	.....	.....	.....	200 0 0
Ditto ditto ditto for transporting public servants.	.....	.....	.....	60 0 0
Assistant to the deputation, his salary Sicca Rs. 200.	.....	.....	.....	209 0 2
Assistant to the deputation, his probable boat allowances.	.....	.....	.....	145 0 0
Mr. S. P. Wade, his salary Sicca Rs. 100 ... ..	.....	.....	.....	104 8 4
Ditto, his probable boat allowances	.....	.....	.....	60 0 0
Total amount of extra expenses attending the detachment and deputation monthly.	.....	.....	.....	2,459 5 4
Total ditto ditto annually...	.....	.....	.....	1,12,673 0 0

*Abstract of the sums to be paid annually for the purpose of defraying part of the expense of the detachment, &c.*

	<b>Rs. A. P.</b>
By the joint-Rajahs of Derung in lieu of the levy of men	50,000 0 0
Do. the Beltolah Rajah ditto ditto ... ..	1,600 0 0
Do. Bismarain, from Kamroop ... ..	51,000 0 0
Do. Collections of the Candahar Chokey, an overplus of the sum of Rs. 12,000 to be paid to the Rajah, the amount not yet ascertained ... ..	0 0 0
<b>Total amount</b> ... ..	<b>1,03,600 0 0</b>

*Notes by Mr. D. Scott.*

The Surgee Deo has promised that on his arrival at the capital, the arrears due on account of the detachment, &c., shall be discharged, and mode adopted for the regular payment of the expense attending it, which I have represented to him, as amounting annually to about 8 lakhs of rupees, and the resources which may contribute to produce this sum are abundant.

*12th Question.*

"You are further desired to state generally what in your opinion is still necessary or proper to be done for the arrangement of the affairs of Assam, considering that arrangement as concluded by the establishment of the Rajah's authority, combined with the general assurances which you were authorised to make in conformity to the instructions of Marquis Cornwallis."

*Answer to 12th Question.*

In the progress to the establishment of the Rajah's authority throughout his kingdom, I am of opinion that the original form of government, in all its parts, should be preserved as nearly as possible. The little intercourse the natives of Assam were formerly permitted to have with strangers, has rendered them bigotted to the forms and customs of their own country, and innovations which would even prove beneficial to them must be introduced, with some degree of caution. They are naturally of a distrustful and jealous disposition, and it will require time to get the better of their prejudices.

All that appears to me necessary for the arrangement of affairs in Assam, is to effect the union of the Chiefs, without which energy cannot be restored to the Government, and as the Rajah is incapable of either judging or acting right, it is proper that the Government of his country should be vested in the aristocracy; and to prevent the conflict of opinions and interests among the Chiefs which would inevitably produce factions and civil discord, it appears to me advisable that the British Government should continue its mediating and controlling influence, as the only means of preserving order and tranquillity.

*13th Question.*

"What in your opinion would be the consequence of recalling the detachment from Assam without further measures or interference on the part of this Government."

38. In the present state of society in Assam, the ancient constitution would not admit of much improvement. That it is fully adequate to insure good government it would be too much to affirm, but if means were taken to raise the character and qualifications of the nobility by an improved system of education, it can scarcely be doubted that with all its imperfections this system would prove greatly superior to the simple despotism of Cooch Behar, and other subordinate States, where the Chief too often delegates his authority to servants who have anything but the interest of his subjects at heart and who are suffered without check or control to carry oppression and misgovernment to an extent that under other circumstances would not be compatible either with the safety of their Sovereign or the continuance of their own power.

*Notes by Mr. D. Scott.*

*Answer to 13th Question.*

The contest for influence, power and independence, would revive among the first officers of State, the dependent Rajahs and the petty Chiefs of districts and towns. The same confusion, devastation and massacre would ensue. Assam would experience a state of desolation, greater in proportion to the temporary restraints, which the British influence had imposed on the inhumanity of the monarch, the ambition and resentment of the Chiefs, and the vengeance of the people. Kissnarain would either abandon his country or recall his Burkandasees, for in defiance of any possible stipulation in his favor, he might reasonably expect and would certainly fear private assassination. The obnoxious ministers and favorites would be immediately restored to their offices. Every individual, who had been observed to cultivate the friendship of the British, would flee the country, with the well-grounded apprehension of destruction from the ministers, or their connections. Commerce would again be suppressed by the confusion prevalent in the country, and the monopoly would revive in its pristine vigour. The monarch, whose person is too sacred for assassination, would probably be compelled to abandon his kingdom again.

Such would be the consequences of a cessation of the British influence, until a long course of regular administration shall have operated an entire revolution in the habits of the principal Chiefs, and in the minds of the people and in predicting the evils which would result from the recall of the detachment. I have been guided not by my own opinion alone, but by that of the most respectable natives, with whom I have had intercourse; the Rajah himself has repeatedly declared that with the detachment he would quit his kingdom. Sindoorah Hazaree has the charge of 1,000 Ghot Pykes, and is one of those petty Chiefs who taking advantage of the confusion of the times, asserted his own independence and became the leader of a faction. Lieutenant MacGregor invited him to attend at Kalliabar, which he evaded doing by frequent excuses, and considering his attendance necessary to effect the object of his deputation, Lieutenant MacGregor detached Deen Diall, Naick with orders to bring Sindoorah Hazaree to Kalliabar.

*P. S.*—Omission under the head of monarchy.

To absolve the monarch from the lesser, and to assist him in the greater cares of Government, two executive officers were added to the monarchy, viz., the Teepaum and Seringh Rajahs. Their titles are derived



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*Notes by Mr. D. Scott.*

from the districts annexed to their office, their jurisdiction in their respective districts was similar to the Gohains..

Their rank next to the monarch, their duties to communicate the deliberations or decrees of the aristocracy to the monarch, to receive, promulgate, or carry into execution, his consequent orders. On less important occasions the decrees of the aristocracy might be promulgated by these officers, without application to the monarch.

The two brothers next in succession to the throne, became Teopaum and Seringh Bajahs, and in failure of brothers the senior nephew according to the usual course of succession to the throne.

The aristocracy who possessed a legal power of deposing an unworthy monarch might certainly have exercised a similar power, in the instance of the two presumptive successors.

This was not however always the case. Princes who had been disqualified by mutilation being frequently appointed to those offices.

## APPENDIX B.

## NOTIFICATIONS DEFINING THE "INNER LINE" OF BRITISH JURISDICTION IN FRONTIER DISTRICTS—(PAGE 56).

*I.—Notification by the Government of India, Foreign Department, No. 681 P., dated the 8th March 1876.*

Under the provisions of Section 2 of Regulation V of 1873 (*a Regulation for the Peace and Government of certain Districts on the Eastern Frontier of Bengal*) the Governor General in Council hereby notifies that the line described below shall be the "Inner Line" under that Regulation in the District of Durrang :—

From the eastern boundary of the district of Kāmārp, that is, from the pillar No. 98 on the Bor Nadi, the line shall follow, in an easterly direction, the southern boundaries of Bhutān (including the countries of the Kariapāra and Charduar Bhutias) and of the Akha and Duffa Hills, as defined by the Revenue Survey in the years 1872-73-74-75, and demarcated by pillars Nos. 98 to 160 inclusive. From pillar No. 160 the line shall run in a south-easterly direction to the point where the Balum River cuts the northern boundary of the Singlijan waste land grant No. 18. Thence the line shall follow the eastern boundary of the Singlijan grant No. 18 to the point where the boundary cuts the Duffa Gar.\* Thence the line shall follow the Duffa Gar to a point on the Mera Sema River, being the north-westerly extremity of the "Inner Line" of the Luokhipur District, as notified in the *Gazette of India*, page 452, of the 4th September 1875.

Under the provisions of the section above quoted, the Governor General in Council is further pleased to prohibit all British subjects from going beyond the "Inner Line" hereby notified, without a pass under the hand and seal of the Deputy Commissioner of Durrang.

*II.—Notification by the Government of India, Foreign Department, No. 2427 P., dated the 30th September 1875.*

Under the provisions of Section 2 of Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation I of 1873 (*Regulation for the Peace and Government of certain districts on the Eastern Frontier of Bengal*), the Governor General in Council hereby notifies that the line described below shall be the "Inner Line" under that Regulation in the District of Luokhipore :—

From the eastern boundary of the District of Durrang, that is, from a point on the Mera Sema River, the line shall follow the course of the Rajghur Alii to the Subansiri river. It shall deviate from the Rajghur Alii, so as to follow the western, northern and eastern boundaries of the Harmati No. 95 and Joyhing No. 65 waste-land grants. From the Subansiri to a point on the Sema River, marked by a masonry pillar, it shall follow a line, to be hereafter marked out, along the foot of the Abor Meree hills. From the masonry pillar on the Sema River, it shall follow the patrol path to the Dimu out-post ;

\* The Duffa Gar is a high embanked road running along the frontier, which as the Rajghur Alii is continued along the Luokhipore border. The Regulation was suspended in 1879 in favour of the Trading System in respect of districts of Durrang crossing the line for purposes of the Bhutan trade. (*Political Proceedings (India)*, March 1879, Nos. 516—2, July 1879, Nos. 2—6.

thence along the patrol path to the Pubha out-post. From the Pubha out-post it shall follow the patrol path to the confluence of the Lalli and the Brahmaputra Rivers; thence it shall follow the right bank of the Brahmaputra and Dibang Rivers to the junction of the latter river with the Sessiri opposite the Sessiri out-post. From the Sessiri out-post to the Dikrang out-post, the line shall follow the patrol path; thence to the masonry pillar on the right bank of the Brahmaputra River it shall follow the patrol path. From the said masonry pillar it shall run along the right bank of the Brahmaputra River to the confluence of the Noa Dihang with that river; then it shall follow the left bank of the Noa Dihang River to its confluence with the Kherampani River; thence along the right bank of the Kherampani and Dihang Rivers to the confluence of the latter river with the Namsang River; thence along the left bank of the Namsang River to a masonry pillar near the Hukanjuri tea garden; thence it shall follow the path connecting the Hukanjuri with the Taurack tea garden to a masonry pillar on the right bank of the Disang River, near the latter garden. Then along the right bank of the Disang as far as the Luodolgarh Alli.

Under the provision of the section above quoted, the Governor General in Council is further pleased to prohibit all British subjects from going beyond the "Inner Line" hereby notified without a pass under the hand and seal of the Deputy Commissioner of Luchimpore.

*III.—Notification by the Government of India, Foreign Department, No. 1486 P., dated the 21st June 1876.*

Under the provisions of Section 2 of Regulation V of 1873 (*a Regulation for the Peace and Government of certain districts on the Eastern Frontier of Bengal*) the Governor General in Council hereby notifies that the line described below shall be the "Inner Line" under that Regulation in the District of Seebsaugor:—

The line shall follow the southern Revenue Survey boundary of the district from its eastern limit, namely, a point on the Disang River, to its western limit, namely, a point on the Doyang River.

Under the provisions of the section above quoted, the Governor General in Council is further pleased to prohibit all British subjects from going beyond the "Inner Line" hereby notified, without a pass under the hand and seal of the Deputy Commissioner of Seebsaugor.

*Notification by the Government of India, Foreign Department, No. 830 E. P., dated the 24th February 1882.*

In modification of the Foreign Department Notification No. 1486 P., dated the 21st June 1876, and under the provisions of Section 2, Regulation I of 1873, the Governor General in Council is pleased to notify that the line described below shall be the Inner Line under that Regulation in the District of Seebsaugor:—

2. The line shall follow its present course from the Doyang River to the Desoi River, up the Desoi River to the foot of the hills, thence skirting the hills till the River Jhansi is reached, down this river to the point where the present line intersects it, and thence along the course of the present Inner Line to the Disang River.\*

\* The effect of this amended notification was to push the Inner Line out to the foot of the hills, and take in tracts covered with valuable forest, not in the actual occupation of Nagas. The local officers were cautious, however, against rash reservation of forests in the tract thus included, and against creating needless apprehensions of encroachment on supposed Naga rights. (Political Proceedings, India, August 1877, No. 319—25, March 1882, Nos. 36—46.)

*IV.—Notification by the Government of India, Foreign Department, No. 2299 P., dated the 20th August 1875, as modified under G. O. No. 1246, dated 19th June 1878.*

Under the provisions of Section 2 of Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation I of 1873 (a Regulation for the Peace and Government of certain districts on the Eastern Frontier of Bengal), the Governor General in Council is pleased to notify that the line described below shall be the "Inner Line" on the southern frontier of the District of Cachar:—

A line commencing from the site of the out-post established during the Lushai Expedition of 1871-72, a few miles north of the Chatter Choor Peak, and running thence to the out-posts of Jhalnucherra along the track cut by the police to connect the out-posts of Chatter Choor and Jhalnucherra; thence along the Dullessur River, in a southern direction, to the south-west corner of the Jhalnucherra grant, as revised after survey in 1872; thence along the southern boundary of the Jhalnucherra grant, across the Jhalnucherra Khall to the top of the range of hills immediately to the east of that Khall; thence along the said range in a northern direction to Barooucherra grant: thence along the southern and eastern boundaries of the Barooucherra grant, to the north-eastern corner of the grant. From the north-eastern corner of the Barooucherra grant, along the ridge which leads from that grant for a distance of two miles to a pucca pillar. Thence in an easterly direction to the Rengti Pahar range (this line being marked by three pucca pillars); thence along the ridge of the Rengti Pahar range in a northern direction, as far as the point where that range bifurcates into two smaller ones, the one leading to the Claverhouse, the other to the Bara Jalanga grant. From the point of bifurcation the line follows the ridge of the western branch of the Rengti Pahar, as far as the source of the Jalanga; then along the Jalanga River to the south-east corner of the Sonacherra grant; and along the eastern boundaries of Sonacherra and Nowarband grants to a point where the police road meets the latter. Thence it follows the police road to the Rukini River and then runs in a south-easterly direction to the western boundary of the Monierkhall grant; and follows the west and south boundaries of that grant to the River Sonni along which it runs to the north to the opening of the police road to Mynadur, which it follows to the western boundary of that grant. It then runs along the west and south boundaries of Mynadur grant to the River Barak.

Under the provision of the section above quoted, the Governor General in Council is further pleased to prohibit all British subjects from going beyond the "Inner Line" hereby notified without a pass under the hand and seal of the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar

*V.—Notification by the Government of Bengal, dated the 30th June 1879—(Political Proceedings (India), March 1879, Nos. 149—62).*

With the sanction of His Excellency the Governor General in Council, it is hereby notified, under the provisions of Section 2, Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation I of 1873 (a Regulation for the Peace and Government of certain districts on the Eastern Frontier of Bengal), that the line described below shall be the "Inner Line" of the Chittagong Hill Tracts:—

This line of boundary commences at the hill station marked S, south of Belling Sib 2234, on the Jampoi range of hills forming the Hill Tipperah eastern frontier; it then runs along the whole course of the "Tulenpu" or "Sujjuk" River to its junction with the Karnafuli River, a little north of Demagiri; thence it continues eastwards along this stream up to the junction of the "Tui Chong" River, after which it follows the whole course of this river to a point immediately to the south-east of the hill station of the Chipum No. 5; then turning westwards, crosses the Ohipum range of hills, and joins the Thega Khall at a point midway between the hill stations of Saichal, Nos. 2 and 3, after which it follows the course of the Thega Khall River to its source; then again turns south-westwards and follows the water-shed of the Weybong range of hills, until it meets the southern hill station of Keokradong on the south-eastern boundary of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, following the water-shed until it meets the frontier of that portion of the Arracan Hill Tracts in which order and regularity are maintained.

2. It is further notified, under the provisions of Section 2 of the said Regulation, that all British subjects except the Lushais of the Thanglaw and Sylao clans and the members of the frontier police while on active duty, are strictly prohibited from going beyond the inner line without a pass under the hand and seal of the Deputy Commissioner of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, or of such other officer as he may authorize to grant such pass.

3. The following form of pass is prescribed under Section 4 of the said Regulation :—

This pass is granted to \_\_\_\_\_, son of \_\_\_\_\_, resident of \_\_\_\_\_. It authorizes him to go beyond the inner line of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, and will remain in force from \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_.

The holder of this pass shall not collect any forest produce or tap India-rubber or kill any elephant whilst within the Lushai country.

He shall produce this pass whenever called on to do so by any officer or private of the Frontier Police Force in charge of a frontier post or on patrol duty.

4. A fee of one rupee shall be payable on each pass, and no pass shall remain in force for more than six calendar months.

## APPENDIX C.

## THE SEESSAUGOR NAGAS IN 1873—(PAGE 98).

*From P. T. CARNEGIE, Esq., Assistant Commissioner of Jorehaut, to the Deputy Commissioner of Seessaugor,—No. 415, dated Jorehaut, the 10th July 1873.*

In compliance with the request expressed in your demi-official letter lately received, I have the honour to submit such information as I possess regarding the Naga tribes inhabiting the hills lying on the southern boundary of the Jorehaut sub-division. The tribes of whom we have any actual knowledge inhabit merely the outer edge of the hills which extend from the southern boundary of the Assam valley to Burma; none of the people we see come from villages more than three days' journey from the plains. We know scarcely more of the real Naga than we should do of the Khasi Hills were our communications from the Assam side cut off at Nungpo, and there was no way into them from Sylhet. Of the tribes beyond, who are called Abors, but who are, of course, Nagas, we know nothing; none of them, so far as I am aware, having ever been seen in the plains; nor would it appear did Colonel Brodie succeed in getting any of them to come into his camp when in these hills. They are prevented from doing so by our friends who know what the advantage of holding trade in their own hands is, and carefully exclude their more remote neighbours from intercourse with us. With regard to them also they are very chary of giving information, always when questioned saying the Abors are wild savages who know nothing and try to kill every one who goes near their villages, but they cannot deny that most of the cotton and other things they bring down comes from the Abor villages, and that the Abors who consume most of the salt and rotten fish they take away, *also buy the dhaoes*.

2. In the cold season of 1844 Colonel Brodie, then Deputy Commissioner of the Seessaugor District, made a tour through the hills, marking from the Dikhoo to the Doyang, and in the course of it passing through a number of the villages lying between the Janjhee and Kakodonga, the eastern and western boundaries of this sub-division, he met with no opposition and took agreements from the different chiefs, in which they acknowledged the supremacy of the British Government, and undertook to abstain from making war on each other. These agreements, however, do not appear to have been strictly observed at any time, and very soon became a dead letter. So far as I am aware, Colonel Brodie was the first British officer who visited this tract of country and the last. Soon after his time the policy of Government with regard to the treatment of the hill people changed, and our officers were discouraged from interfering with them or visiting the hills, while no occasion has ever arisen for sending any expedition into their country. As Colonel Brodie found the different Naga communications in 1844, so I believe they will be found now. Progress there has been little or none, and their history has been one series of petty raids and broils, each tribe keeping up one or more blood feuds with some of its neighbours, or the still wilder tribes beyond. But they have made no raid into the plains since our occupancy of Assam, nor so far as I can ascertain for a long time before it, though they appear to have received "black-mail" in former days from the Assam rulers. These tribes are neither so strong nor so well organized as the tribes to the east of the Janjhee. The difference in the latter respect exists now, with a few exceptions, as it did when Colonel Brodie made his journey. He on this point says:—"The Nagas come down here to Samsha in very large numbers, and I was somewhat fearful of an outbreak, for a great many of the chiefs were in a state of intoxication and appeared to have very little control over their followers. We saw a marked difference in this respect here and as we went on westward. Hitherto we had found the chiefs sober and their orders readily obeyed, but henceforward we were to meet with nothing but drunken rabbles. In each village there are dozens of aspirants for power, and we had daily to witness brawls between them that threatened to be serious, and perhaps lead to collision with us. By great forbearance, however, on the part of my escort things went on as well as could be hoped for, and we completed our tour without any untoward occurrence."

3. These Nagas, like those to both west and east, are armed with spear and dhao, the latter being by all accounts the weapon on which they mainly depend for real hand-to-hand work. They sometimes use the shield and sometimes not. They, so far as I

know, do not use fire-arms to any extent, though a certain amount of old muskets must have found their way into the hills. Since I have been here one trader has been convicted of selling fire-arms to Nagas, but they were Angamis from Samagooting, who are superior in intelligence to our Nagas, and more fitted to make use of fire-arms efficiently. As things are, I believe fifty good men, well armed, could go wherever they chose and take any village in these hills. The fighting which goes on at present is nearly all of a sneaking and desultory kind, there being few or no attempts at open attack. Every village is constantly prepared against surprise, parties of their men keeping continual watch and ward over the village gate-ways.

4. The people of all the tribes known to us are great traders, and parties of them are continually to be met with in the cold season, when they bring down cotton, chillies, ginger, &c., and take away salt, iron, dhao, fish, and pariah pups. It is, I believe, their appreciation of the value of this trade that makes the Nagas peaceable neighbours to us. By the stoppage of it they would not only lose much profit, but be pressed by the Abors from behind, who just now are satisfied with getting what they want; but if supplies were cut off would insist on pressing forward to trade for themselves direct. In 1872, when the Mekilai and Jongpay doocars were blockaded, they began to complain that the Abors were threatening them because their salt was stopped. From this trade the different tribes must have amassed a large amount of material wealth, especially of late from rubber, on the purchase of which large sums have been spent, but in this respect, at all events, it appears that for the present they have killed the goose which laid the golden eggs, for the two latest parties who were here complained that their trees had ceased to yield rubber; to which their Kotogis added that it was no wonder, for they had been chopping them all over from the roots to the upper branches. Unfortunately, too, much money is now squandered by Nagas on opium, and many of them, particularly from the nearer tribes, are confirmed eaters of the drug. Some opium is grown in the hills, but not enough for the consumption there, so considerable quantities of Government opium are taken away by Nagas. The Nagas who have regularly taken to opium are miserable specimens of humanity, and it is a great pity that this evil habit should ever have taken root amongst them.

5. Intercourse with the different tribes is maintained through interpreters or Kotogis residing in the plains in some village near their paths. The Kotogis are in possession of the land held by each tribe or group of tribes and make what they can out of it in return entertaining the Nagas when they come down. It is the custom also for the Nagas to leave their spears at their Kotogi's house as they come down from the hills on trading expeditions, and to reclaim them on their return. In every tribe on this border, however, some men are to be found who have learnt Assamese, and are spokesmen for the rest when brought in contact with the plains people. In dealing with the tribes these men are very useful. I have always found them very sensible in their ideas, considering what their opportunities for acquiring knowledge are, and they are not such great liars as the Kotogis, though quite bad enough in that respect.

6. The Nagas we have to deal with here are divided into three main groups accord-

#### *Bartolla Doocars.*

Lakootee,  
Akhook.  
Akotat.  
Mekilai.  
Jongpay.

#### *Hattigur Doocars.*

Bordoobija.  
Mookkegaon.  
Japhoo.  
Mooswing.  
Samaha.  
Roorsgaon.  
Holaburea.

#### *Assyringia Doocars.*

Nowgong.  
Assyringia.  
Lassoo.  
Kampoongia.  
Dekho Hymong.  
Bara Hymong.

ing to the paths or "doocars" they use. These are—beginning at the west corner of the subdivision—first, the Bartolla doocars which are the paths debouching near the Kakodonga stream (the west boundary of the sub-division); second, the Hattigur doocars or paths coming out where the Desoi flows from the hills, and the place where the great elephant trap of the Assamese kings ended,—hence the name of Hattigur; third, the Assyringia doocars, which include the paths between Debrapar and the Janjhee River, the eastern boundary of the sub-division. In the margin is a list of tribes using each doocar, taken according to situation from west to east. The group of Naga communities using each doocar speak the same language, or at all events dialects so much alike as to be easily understood by all. The language of the different groups differs entirely, the men from Bartolla and Assyringia meeting cannot understand each other in the least.

7. The Lakootes and Akhook tribes are not properly Jorahaut Nagas, as they live in the hills overhanging Mukrung and Gilladhares in Golaghaut, but they occasionally use the Bortolla dooar, and are in alliance with the Jongpays, through whose village they pass and repass. Both villages are strong and large for this part of the frontier. They were estimated by Colonel Brodie to contain 200 and 300 inhabitants, and these numbers have not, so far as I can learn, decreased, as the tribes have not for years been seriously cut up and have had additions to their populations by runaways from the Jongpay Sures and Malusee tribes. Lakootes is the strongest village of the two, and is under two Chiefs who have more control over their followers than is usual amongst the Jorahaut Nagas. One of these Chiefs is a young and energetic man, who, when we were blockading the Sonarigaon tribe in 1872, offered to go and clear out the Sonarigaon village if Captain Blathwayt would give him a dozen old muskets, and was believed to be

\* This village is at an elevation of about 4500 feet, and the highest of all now referred to. in earnest and ready to do what he offered.\*

Coming down to Bortolla from Lakootes and Akhook the Jongpay village is passed, though this belongs to a weak and rather miserable tribe of about sixty families, who are supported almost entirely by trading, and do not grow enough grain for their consumption. When their dooar was blockaded in 1872 they were very hardly put to it, and when the blockade was raised were just on the point of abandoning their village and going off to join the Mekilais *en masse*. The Jongpays are a comparatively harmless set, but are allies of the Mekilais, and most of them have taken heads either from the Hattygurias or Abor tribes in the usual sneaking way. Jongpay lies low and only about five hours' journey from the foot of the hills. The people are physically very poor specimens of Nagas.

8. On the same range as the Jongpays, and using the same dooars, but further to the east, lie two villages named Tunee and Malusee. They were attacked and destroyed by the Hattygurias in their great outbreak, and suffered considerably. The remnant of the Sures, numbering some sixty fighting men, immigrated to Lakootes. The Malusees struck south into the hills about two days' journey; and on the border of the country held by the Abors at a place named Akookot they found a small tribe with whom they coalesced, and they now represent their village as containing about 200 houses. These Nagas are great traders, and are, so far as can be learnt from them, just now at peace with all their neighbours.

9. On the eastern flank of the country held by the Akookot people lies the Mekilai tribe, about a day and half's journey from the plains. The village was visited by Colonel Brodie, and is described by him as "a very large and strongly-stocked village." It is the strongest and most populous of this group, and has been the barrier against the Hattygurias, who but for its existence would have cleared out all the country up to the Kokodonga. The tribe numbers, so far as I can learn, about 500 fighting men, and though they have had many losses in war, their numbers have been pretty well kept up by men from weaker tribes joining them. There was in Colonel Brodie's time a village called Mohom lying between them and the plains, the inhabitants of which have gone over to Mekilai *en masse*. The Mekilais have been at continual feud with the Hattygurias in general, and the Bordoobyas clan in particular, for many years, and there have been continual losses on both sides. The clan have a bad name for turbulence, but have given us no real trouble. They have had several squabbles with the owners of the Borhola garden, but it has never gone further than words, except on one occasion, some seven years ago, when they cut down some tea bushes in an out garden which they declared to be on their land. The police went out, but the Nagas had of course gone off long before their arrival. Some time after an attempt was made to burn down the Borhola factory, but that was the work of a drunken man, who was severely thrashed by his own friends for it.

10. The Mekilais, like most of the other tribes, have no particular Chief, but are, when sober, guided to a certain extent by four or five middle-aged men, who have earned a reputation as warriors.

11. To the east of Mekilai and in sight of it is Bordoobyas, the most westerly of the Hattygur group and the strongest on the Jorahaut frontier. The Bordoobyas number, so far as I can learn, some 600 or 700 fighting men, who were, until about three years ago, kept pretty well in hand under one Chief. This Chief, Lalong, had much influence and must have been an able man. About three years ago he fell into an ambush and was killed; a party of Mekilais were lurking near a stream under Bordoobyas on the look-out for heads one morning, and had an extraordinary piece of luck, for Lalong, accompanied



by only two followers, came down to look at a fish-trap, and was, of course, killed. The Mekilais are exceedingly proud of this fact, and it was acted in pantomime before me with great *elal*. The Naga story goes that after the Bordoobyas Chief was down, but still alive, one of the Mekilais commenced cutting off his head, but in a bungling way, when the Chief reviled him for carrying a blunt dhao, and said "take my dhao which is always sharp and cut my head off properly." Some years after Colonel Brodie's visit the Bordoobyas suddenly attacked the Samsha village, one of considerable size, and took it. Those of the inhabitants who escaped fled to the plains for shelter, and the tribe has never recovered since; some of them are now ordinary ryots in the plains and a few live on a hillock just over the Honwal tea garden in an open village. They have never been molested by the Bordoobyas, and are quite friendly with them now. The origin of the attack was, I believe, a dispute about jhoom land, the Samshas having taken up a piece which had been previously cleared by the Bordoobyas. It was after the attack on Samsha that the Bordoobyas pressed on to the west and destroyed the Sures and Mainsee villages. So far as I ascertain, the tribe has only given us trouble on one occasion since Colonel Brodie's visit to the hills, that was about twenty years ago, when they lifted a number of cattle from Moreeanee mouzah. A guard was then sent out to their dooar, and after a little pressure the cattle which had not been eaten were returned, and compensation received for those that were. About eight years ago a murder was committed by one of the clan near the Honwal factory. The murderer was given up, and on conviction sentenced to transportation. The murdered man was a shop-keeper who had cheated the Naga about the sale of some opium, and he in revenge came down and killed him. In addition to their Mekilai feud the Bordoobyas say they have much fighting with the Abors to the south, and I have no doubt this is true. They are physically good specimens of Nagas for this frontier.

12. None of the other villages forming the Hattygur group are of such importance as Bordoobyas. Kolabona is the next largest, and the others are comparatively small. All lying further to the east and north than Bordoobyas have that village as a sort of Bulwark between them and the Abors and Mekilais; all are in alliance, and join on great occasions in raids. They have always been peaceful so far as we are concerned. The villages are none of them nearer the plains than the second range of hills. Bordoobyas and Moonsing lie on the third.

13. The tribes using the Debrapar dooars nearly all live on the ridge between the plains and the Tiros, a tributary of the Janjhee. The hills are from about 1,500 to 2,500 feet high, and immediately overhanging the Terai and visible from them. The villages are all small, numbering from 40 to about 120 houses, and well disposed to us. In the cold season numbers of these Nagas come down and work for the planters at jungle-cutting. They also supply the factories with mats. The villages are all strongly stockaded, however, and they indulge in raiding and counter-raiding with tribes beyond. The Rampoongya people call themselves disciples of the Dukhinpat Gossain, and every year some of them pay him a visit and make some offerings. Their conversion to Hindooism, however, is only in name. They say the Gossain did once explain a great deal about religion to a deputation from the tribe, but that what it was all about they have altogether forgotten. They, however, pretended not to eat beef, but that is only a pretence. One Chief, Ambugoo by name, has more hold over them than is the case with the other tribes. He considers himself very civilized, and is very fond of wearing a beaver hat and dress coat, with which a European gentleman presented him. The Rampoongya village has been twice visited by Mr. Begg of Deeshingapar factory (the second time about four months ago), who has always been very hospitably received. He describes the village as very difficult of access, the situation having been skillfully chosen so as to allow of only two very narrow approaches. The village itself, however, is commanded by another height within easy rifle range, so that it could not be held for any time against an attack by well armed troops. The strength of all these villages lies in the difficulty of access; but I fancy that as it is with Rampoongya, so it is with most, and that they could not be held against well armed men.

14. To the south of these villages and on the higher ridge between the Tiros and Janjhee lie the two Hymang villages; these are larger than Rampoongya and the other villages near it, but far inferior in strength to the better organized tribes east of the Janjhee. The Dekho Hymang village was during the past cold weather visited by Mr. Clark of the Seebaugor American Mission. He met with a hospitable reception and good treatment, and I believe a large number of the tribe expressed a wish to become Christians. They have had indeed a catechist amongst them for some time. The Kansingias are in the habit of bullying and levying black-mail from these villages, and

in 1871, when I was at Gabhuroo Purbat, a party had just been down selling some property to make up a sum of sixty rupees in cash, that being the sum the Kamengias had demanded with the alternative of attack in case of refusal.

15. There is no marked physical difference between the Nagas of different tribes on this frontier except that the men from the lower-lying villages near the plains are inferior in size to those coming from the higher tribes. In dress, such as it is, all are pretty much alike, only each clan has its own tartan. Generally, in their own villages, all the men and women wear a very small piece of cloth secured by a string round the waist, and very often, the men at least, dispense with that. The women when they come down to the plains wear a short kilt. Every one except the very poorest has a cloth in addition. This cloth is of cotton, dyed black, and dark shades of red, blue, and green, arranged in stripes differing with different tribes. This cloth is worn over the shoulders. The spears carried by the different tribes also differ in pattern, though all are of the ordinary Naga kind, the difference is in the length of the shaft and situation of the ornamental tufts of red and black goat's hair on it.

16. The Nagas on this frontier do not tattoo their faces as a mark of manhood, but when one of them has taken his first head he is entitled to wear the Kapantali, that is a slip of bamboo about eighteen inches long and an inch and a half broad covered with fine cane work, dyed yellow and red, and fringed with red and black goats' hairs, or in some cases human hair. They they wear strung round the neck exactly like the piece of stick villagers tie round their goats' necks to prevent them getting through fences. On taking a second head the man assumes a collar of boar's tusks round his neck, which he wears ever after; and for a third head he is entitled to wear on great occasions an apron covered with cowrie shells, and is looked upon as a great warrior, and keeps a tally of heads taken on his cloth. This tally is on a white stripe let into the middle of the sheet, and is kept in a pattern painted on it. I have counted up to twenty-five heads on a Mekilai's cloth. All these he declared were taken with his own hands, and included those of men, women, and children indiscriminately. Some of these heads were, no doubt, taken in fair fight, but the majority were those of wretched old women surprised out on the "jhoom," or at some spring. The full moon is the usual time chosen for head-hunting expeditions, when smaller or large parties start off. They practice divining before going out, and if the omens are bad will not start. The mode which they have shown me was a very simple one. The leader of the intended war party simply cuts two thin chips of wood about the size of the thumb nail, and holding them lightly together between his finger and thumb lets them fall on the ground from a height of eighteen inches or so; if the chips fall and lie close together on the ground, the omen is favourable and the party start. If the chips fall apart, then they put off the expedition to another day. I believe they have other modes of divination which they would not show as they were evidently averse to talking on the subject, and very reluctantly explained their chip system.

17. Even when enemies, the different tribes seem to intermarry. This was even the case between the Bordoobyas and Mekilais until a short time ago, when a party of men from the latter tribe escorted a woman of their village to the home of a man of Bordoobya who had taken her to wife. These men were hospitably entertained and made drunk, then when on their way home again were set upon and killed. This was considered even by Nagas as a very black piece of treachery.

18. So far as I can make out these Nagas have no particular sense of religion, but dread the influence of evil spirits, and endeavour to propitiate them in times of sickness or misfortune by sacrifices of animals, from cocks up to buffaloes, according to the emergency of the case.

19. The Assamese accuse the Nagas of cattle-stealing, and I have no doubt a good many stolen cattle find their way into the hills, but I question if, except in very rare instances, the Nagas are the actual thieves, though they are always ready to buy cattle without any questions asked. In only one instance, since I have been here, have the Nagas been caught actually taking away stolen cattle. That was not long ago, when the owner of the cattle, with the aid of the Kotogi, followed some Kamgpoongias into the hills and recovered his property peacefully. In this case the cattle had been sold to the Nagas by an Assamese for about their full value, and there was no proof that they knew they were purchasing stolen property.

20. There has not, so far as I know, been any Naga outrage approaching in atrocity to the late attack on the Bor Lungees committed so near our rent-paying lands; indeed, there seems a sort of tacit agreement among the tribes here about not to interfere with

each other's trading parties. They, no doubt, see that were a system of cutting up these parties to a rise, all their trade would be paralyzed, and they are too prudent to risk that. The cutting up of the Bor Lungees, though it took place on the west bank of the Janjhee, was the handiwork of people coming from the eastern side.

21. The Nagas of the Jorehaut country, in common with those living farther, talk very big about "their land," but they have no particular line up to which they claim. Generally it is where the land begins to rise, i. e., from the plain to hill. In other parts they say their land comes well out into the Terai, but in no case do they actually claim any ground under cultivation by Assamese ryots nor any tea gardens, the Mekilais apparently having given up their claim on the Serelle garden as hopeless. When talking to them on the spot, they said they merely wanted their right of way kept up through part of it, and to that the manager of the concern had no objection.

22. With the tribes inhabiting the hills to the east and west of their own, the Jorehaut Nagas have very little communication, and know very little about them.

## APPENDIX D.

## ORDERS OF 1838 ON HILL TIPPERAH TRANSIT DUES—(PAGE 282).

To J. J. HARVEY, Esq., Commissioner of the Chittagong Division,—No. 121, dated the 27th December 1838.

I am directed by the Honourable the Deputy Governor of Bengal to acknowledge your letter (No. 22) of the 2nd May last, together with its enclosures, upon the subject of the claim of the Rajah of Tipperah to levy transit duties within his independent territory.

2. The correspondence in this case, which is voluminous, commenced on the 10th October 1836 with a letter from Mr. Dampier, in which complaint was made of the Rajah of Tipperah levying "sayerat" duties within his seminary on cotton and other produce, although, at the time of the perpetual settlement, a remission to a large amount was granted on the jumma of his estate as a compensation for the abolition of the *sayer mehal* and the collection of such duties has been expressly prohibited by law."

3. Notwithstanding this, Mr. Dampier stated, the Rajah levied duties at 28 *ghats* and 29 *phaurees* within the *Tipperah seminary* in the Company's territories, and also at the passes leading from the hill territory of the Rajah to the Company's territory. Both levies were, in Mr. Dampier's opinion, irregular and illegal. The former (that within the territory of the Company) the Commissioner considered himself competent to prohibit forthwith; the latter he left for the consideration of Government. He suggested at the same time that the opportunity should be taken to ascertain the correct boundary between the Rajah's hill territory and his seminary, as it was believed that the Rajah, in his independent capacity, had made many encroachments on the latter territory.

4. On an attentive consideration of Mr. Dampier's report, and the documents appended to it, it appeared to the Government of Bengal that, upon representation by the local authorities of the evil effect of the *sayerat* levied by the Rajah in his seminary, and continued by the Collectors while the seminary was under *khas* management, the Government of 1788 had resolved to abolish the collections, in the seminary, of *sayer* duties from the inhabitants of the hills and others, and thus gave up collections averaging Rs. 30,762 per annum. When in 1792 the seminary, heretofore held *khas*, was restored to the Rajah at the decennial settlement, the sudden jumma engaged for by him was *Sicca* Rs. 1,37,001, being about Rs. 28,000 less than it had been before the abolition of the above duties.

5. But, it was remarked, the Rajah has two capacities—one that of seminary within the pale of the permanent settlement, the other that of an independent prince in his own hill territory, and it was clear, from a petition presented by his attorney, that the Rajah now claimed to levy transit duty on produce within his own territory, it being stated to be his only source of revenue.

6. Concerning the levy of *sayerat* in the settled seminary, His Lordship came to the conclusion that it was clearly and absolutely illegal and improper, and it was therefore prohibited by my predecessor's letter No. 2038 of 15th November 1836. Further the impression upon the Governor's mind was, that the Rajah had no right to levy these duties at all at any station. This impression was founded upon the following considerations:—

7. The duties levied by the farmers of the British Government up to July 1788 comprehended all those which the present Rajah claims a right to exact. Mr. Buller wrote in that year that—"besides cotton, timber, bamboos, ratans, straw, and every other article pay a heavy cess as they pass by the *ghats* of the *sayer mehals*;" and Mr. Bignell, the Rajah's Attorney, states that—"the produce of the Tipperah mountains consists chiefly of cotton, bamboos, wood, grass and canes;" and that—"upon the exportation of this mountain produce—the Rajah had always been in the habit of levying a moderate duty."

Indeed, it was clear, on comparing Mr. Buller's reports of 1788 with Mr. Bignelli's letter of the 10th October 1836, that the nature of the demand, and the manner of its realisation, corresponded exactly as far as the produce of the hills was concerned.

8. But as no trace could be found that the then Rajah levied any duty as chief of the hills, or that he claimed any right to impose such a tax (which, in all probability, the traffic in question could not have borne whilst saddled with the impost of the British Government), the conclusion to be deduced from Mr. Buller's reports was that no such pretensions were then advanced, and that the duties were considered to belong to the British Government exclusively—a conclusion which was further corroborated by the same officer's letter of the 17th March 1788, of which a copy has been furnished to the Rajah. Indeed, His Lordship thought it was not likely that the Government of that year would have given up a revenue averaging Rs. 80,000 per annum, for the benefit alike of the inhabitants of the hills and of the plains, if they had anticipated, or even thought it possible, that the Rajah of Tipperah would take advantage of the concession to impose just as burdensome and vexatious imposts upon one part at least of the trade.

9. But beyond this it appeared to Lord Auckland that the Rajah had already received and enjoyed since 1792 (in which year the ancestor of the present Rajah was admitted to engage for his seminary) an ample compensation for these duties, the demand against him as semindar of Tipperah having been reduced to the extent of Rs. 28,000, at Rs. 80,000 per annum, the boon to the people having been accompanied by the order for "remission of such portion of the jumma of the sayer (to the malgoosar) as Mr. Buller upon enquiry might deem adequate to the amount realized from the collections," and this order having been carried into effect by the remission of the whole jumma.

10. Upon these premises, His Lordship was inclined to think that the levy of all duties upon the traffic carried on between the hills and the champaign country should be absolutely interdicted, and it was urged to the Rajah, in my predecessor's address before quoted, that he could have no equitable claim to enjoy at the same time the peaceful immunities of a semindar under the shield of the permanent settlement, by which the remission above quoted had been guaranteed to him in perpetuity, and the extreme rights of an independent sovereign prince. The Rajah was also informed that the Government could not, so long as all conditions on his part were fulfilled, re-impose upon his estate in the plains the amount of the remitted revenue, he being a British subject protected by the laws of 1793. But, being so protected, and having enjoyed since 1792 the advantages of a large and profitable seminary, rendered far more valuable than it formerly was by the abolition of the duties in question (which must have greatly impoverished his own ryots, the principal customers and suppliers of the hill tribes), the Governor could not think that he had any right to levy any of those same duties as Rajah of the hills. It was also endeavoured to show the Rajah that he would be benefited rather than damaged, even in a pecuniary point of view, by the entire interdiction of the imposts which he claimed a right to exact; for as his tenants, both of the hills and plains, would be the chief gainers, it was probable that it would place him indirectly in the enjoyment of a larger revenue, by giving him much more quiet, thriving and peaceable subjects and ryots, than he could hope to possess, were they subjected to the vexation and extortion inseparable from the levy of the cesses to which he laid claim.

11. Accordingly, on the date already quoted, the Rajah was called upon to reply to the arguments against his claim to levy transit duties in his own territory as above detailed, and generally to show cause why he should not be prohibited from collecting the duties in question as well on the hills as on the plains.

12. To this call the Rajah replied at great length on the 6th March 1837. Assuming that the right of an independent chief to levy taxes within his own dominions would not be disputed unless some compact could be adduced in proof of the abandonment of the right, he proceeded to argue that in the present instance no such compact could be shown; that the duties abolished in 1788 did not include the *sayarat within the hills*; and that the compensation received by the Rajah was not on account of these duties, but on account of the *sayarat* duties, formerly levied in the seminary, and abolished in 1778, when the seminary was under the khas management of the officers of Government.

13. Accordingly he stated these duties had always been levied since 1793 up to the present time as was acknowledged by Mr. Dampier himself, and the onus of proof of the absence of right to levy these duties should, under such circumstances, be upon the Government. He contended that the duties were altogether distinct from the duties for

which compensation was made at the time of the decennial settlement, and affirmed that no proof had been attempted to the contrary, while the fact itself was capable of the most complete demonstration.

14. He went on to state that, on the 14th August 1789, a proclamation, consequent on the orders of 1788 for the relinquishment of the sayer duties in the seminary, was issued by Mr. Buller at Tipperah. This advertisement was addressed to the inhabitants of chukla Roshunabad, and prohibited the levy of duties on cotton in *that chukla*. That on the 19th December of the same year, Mr. Buller issued a notice to the inhabitants of Noornugger, Besolghur, Dhurumpore, Gopynatpore, Ootter Gunganugger, Chumpanugger, and other pergunnahs included in chukla Roshunabad, "*except pergunnah Kolaysheer*." All these pergunnahs, he stated, were notoriously in the seminary, while that excepted was as well known to be in the hill territory. This proclamation states that the sayer mehal of Kolaysheer had never at any time been united to that of Noornugger, but that on a former notice its name had, by mistake, been inserted. But that in Kolaysheer the Rajah was absolute or independent, and the former customs must therefore continue in force there. He adduced a similarly-worded perwannah to the inhabitants of Kolaysheer bearing Mr. Buller's signature.

15. Other proofs of this nature are brought forward in this reply, all tending strongly to support the Rajah's right to the duties, and to show that his hill territory is distinct from the seminary in the plains, and was not included in the measures of 1788 for the abolition of sayer duties in the latter.

16. This reply being forwarded to Mr. Dampier was answered by that officer on the 3rd May 1837. He stated that the exception made in Mr. Buller's notices and perwannahs of pergunnah Kolaysheer or Kaleesheer was owing, not to the cause assigned by the Rajah, but to the circumstances of that pergunnah being in Sylhet and not in Tipperah, and that Kaleesheer was not in the hill territory but in the seminary, as could be proved by certain settlement papers referred to. Mr. Dampier observes, upon the Rajah's admission, that the collection of duties was always made at places within the seminary, and not within the hill territory, and thus infers that the sayer duties abolished in 1788 were inclusive of the hill duties as well as those of the plains. Mr. Dampier argues that as the engagement for the seminary at the decennial settlement was signed by the Rajah as for pergunnah Roshunabad, dakilla khod, *Sirkar Odeypore*, which Odeypore was the original place of residence of the Rajah within the hills (since removed to Augurtollah), and these engagements bind him as semindar not to collect sayer duties; the Rajah is therefore bound not to collect them anywhere, whether in the seminary or in the hill territory. In short, Mr. Dampier continues, the tahoods of the settlement and other papers extant clearly prove that the territory called independent is not in fact so, but is part of the settled seminary of Roshunabad, or that at any rate that Augurtollah, where the Rajah now resides, is not within the hill territory but is part and parcel of the seminary. He concludes by recommending that a local investigation should be made with a view of fixing more clearly the boundary between the settled estates of Tipperah and the hill territory, since he has reason to think that much of what is now claimed as part of the latter should in fact belong to the former.

17. In a subsequent letter, dated 23rd May, Mr. Dampier continues the subject of the Rajah's territorial encroachments, and forwards documents to establish the fact. These are processes of the Tipperah authorities previous to the decennial settlement, directed to Odeypore and other places within what is now termed the independent territory—processes which could not have been issued if those places had in fact been within that territory.

18. On the 2nd August 1837 Mr. Dampier submitted a further letter on the subject, with documents, to prove that Augurtollah and Odeypore, now said to be part of the hill territory, were in reality portions of the seminary, and to show that Kaleesheer or Kolaysheer was excepted from the notice of Mr. Buller, because it was in the Sylhet district, and not because it was in the hill territory.

19. These papers were made over to Mr. Bignell, the Rajah's Attorney, who, on the 4th November 1837, replied to them at large. Referring to Mr. Dampier's statement that Kolaysheer or Kalasheer, commonly called Ootter Kalasheer, was in the settled seminary, as proved by certain settlement papers of 1788-89 (when the seminary was held khase), in which it stands third on the list, Mr. Bignell says that the settlement papers of that year, obtained by him from the Office of the Secretary to the Bengal Government, agree in the *third item* on the list with the jumma quoted by Mr. Dampier,

viz., Rs. 5,201, but that the name is not Ootter Kalasheer, but *Ootter Balissur*, a place well known in the present day, as within the zemindary, and distant 40 or 60 miles from Kalasheer. Respecting Mr. Dampier's explanation of the exception of Kalasheer in Mr. Buller's notice, which Mr. Dampier contended was only occasioned by the circumstance of Kalasheer being in Sylhet and not in Tipperah, Mr. Bignell observes that Mr. Buller who must have known the reasons for the exception better than Mr. Dampier, can now know them, expressly stated in his notice and perwannah that it was because Kalasheer was in the independent territory. In fact, says Mr. Bignell, no part of the zemindary was ever in Sylhet, and if even it were, it would not alter the case, for the *whole zemindary*, wherever situated, was in 1788 held khas, and it was respecting the zemindary so held khas that the orders for the abolition of the sayer were issued.

20. On a certain document marked I, brought forward by Mr. Dampier, he remarks that it appears not to be authentic, and at any rate is unintelligible, and he points out the circumstances in the document which induce him to think so.

21. He brings forward a paper of 1810 in which Mr. Patton, then Collector of the District, acknowledged Kalasheer to be in the independent territory; in which also, he adds, it was included by Captain Fisher in his survey of 1822.

22. He recurs to the proof afforded on the former occasion, by the production of a perwannah from the Magistrate of Sylhet, and showed that the duties there spoken of were levied, not in the district of Sylhet, but in the Rajah's hill territories.

23. He says that Mr. Dampier, admitting that the Rajah had no other source of revenue in the hills *but* these duties, had endeavoured from that very circumstance to prove that the allowance of Rs. 1,000 per mensem, given to the Rajah by Government when the zemindary was held khas, was a demonstration that he was not at that time supposed to levy any duties, or to derive any revenue within the hill territory.

24. But, continues Mr. Bignell, a letter on this subject from Mr. Buller, dated 1787, completely refutes this, for in that letter, referring to certain balances due from the zemindary, it is stated—"the zemindar may be made to liquidate this from *the produce of his territory or possessions on the hills*, which, I understand, is something considerable."

25. Mr. Bignell denies that the Rajah had, in any part of the discussion, *admitted*, as supposed by Mr. Dampier, that, previous to the decennial settlement, the duties in the hills and the duties in the plains were both collected at ghats in the plains, and he concludes this part of the argument by asserting that the allegations against the Rajah's claims have now been completely refuted.

26. Upon the boundary question, Mr. Bignell, after objecting strongly to the manner in which it is brought forward, proceeds to observe that Mr. Dampier may be challenged to produce any witness, Native or European, who can assert that Odeypore and Augurtollah, the late and present residence of the Rajah of Tipperah, were ever situated, or held to be situated in the Company's territory.

27. Mr. Bignell shows reasons, derived from the history of the Tipperah family, for the use of the words "Sirkar Odeypore" in all their deeds and instruments, merely as expressions of form and prescription, conveying no meaning capable of topographical application.

28. That the ghats of Odeypore and Augurtollah are within the Company's dominions may be, Mr. Bignell says, and probably is correct, but that fact is no proof that the towns of those names are in the plains; the real truth being that these two towns are notoriously within the hill territory.

29. Mr. Bignell quotes Mr. Buller's correspondence with the Board of Revenue in 1786 as expressly calling Augurtollah the Rajah's place of residence in the hills; and in the matter of the processes issued by the local authorities into Augurtollah, he adds, that the Rajah actually confined the messenger, and quotes various letters to show that Augurtollah, in those days at least, was considered *without* the zemindary, and within the hill territory. Mr. Bignell then proceeds to notice shortly the other documents brought forward by Mr. Dampier, and opposes them by arguments similar to those already alluded to. He especially remarks that the measurement papers of the estate, which are considered of sufficient importance to weigh heavily in resumption cases, do not contain the names of Odeypore and Augurtollah.

30. On the 9th January 1838 all the papers in the cases were transmitted to you for your opinion as to the right of the Rajah of Tipperah to levy transit duties within his hill territories; this call was answered by you on the 2nd May last in the letter now under consideration.

31. It appears that, not content with the arguments, proofs, and illustrations contained in the papers made over to you, you sought for additional information in the records of the Chittagong and Tipperah Offices. You arrived by these means at the conclusion (far beyond the question proposed) that the Rajah of Tipperah had no independent territory whatever. To prove this you quoted the following papers:—

32. A letter from Mr. H. Vansittart (Governor of Fort William), dated 20th January 1761, and addressed to H. Verelet, Chief of Chittagong, in which notice is taken of the refractoriness of the Rajah of Tipperah, and the Chief is instructed to reduce him to obedience, and to report the advantages likely to accrue to the Company from the possession of his country.

33. On the 17th March 1761 Mr. Verelet replies to the above. He notices the detachment of 206 sepoy and two guns under Lieutenant Mathews for the reduction of Tipperah, and the consequent flight of the Rajah to the mountains, leaving every fort in his country in the possession of the British. He goes on to state that Lieutenant Mathews was reinforced and directed to proceed, and had reached "Nunagar, the capital of Tipperah"; that the Rajah had submitted and joined the troops in the way; that Mr. Marriott was about to proceed to administer the civil government of the country; and that it was hoped that it would turn out a valuable acquisition.

34. The instructions to Mr. Marriott, from Messrs. Verelet and Rumbold, were to proceed to Tipperah, settle the revenues of the province, cause the Rajah to reimburse the Company all expenses, and report on the resources of the country.

35. Mr. Marriott proceeded accordingly, and reports "*Komeella*" (Commillah of the present day) that he had been to Nunagar, the place of residence of the Rajah, and had settled with him for the revenue and expenses.

36. On the 5th April 1761 Mr. Marriott again writes from "*Komeella*" on the subject of the revenues and the amount of the Rajah's payments, and states that, according to his information, the country formerly paid three lakhs of rupees to Moorshedabad.

37. You next advert to certain documents procured by you from the Office of the Sudder Board of Revenue, showing that, in consequence of rebellious practices long subsequent to the above transactions, the reigning Rajah, Kishen Manick, had been dispossessed of the zemindary of Roshunabad, and Bulram Manick appointed in his stead.

38. In 1785 a sunnud of investiture was made out under the orders of the British Government in favour of Rajdhur Manick, and this document, you state, was addressed to the canangoes, &c., &c., of the pergunnah of Roshunabad, &c., commonly called Tipperah, in the Sirkar of Odeypore, in the Province of Bengal; and the Resident of Tipperah reports that he invested Rajdhur Manick accordingly at Augurtollah.

39. This man, you observe, is shown by other papers to have been, in the year 1783 or 1784, apprehended and sent to Chittagong to answer a charge of harbouring dacoits.

40. From all this you infer that no independence was left to the Rajah; that the whole country, including his capital, Nunagar, was taken possession of; that no distinction was drawn between hill territory and plain territory; that the Rajahs submitted to investiture at the hands of the British Government; and that one of them was actually apprehended and tried by British officers of justice. It is also plain, you remark, that Odeypore, which the Rajah now claims as part of his hill territory, gave a name to one of the Mogul divisions of the country, and that *therefore* the town of Odeypore must have been within, and subject to, the Mogul Empire. "I find," you proceed to say, "every proof that the Rajah of Tipperah was as dependent as any zemindar in the Company's dominions, and that too to the Mogul Government as well as to the British."

41. It is impossible, therefore, you argue that he can claim any independent power and, of course impossible, that he can have a right to levy in any part of the country sayar duties which have been expressly prohibited by the British Government.



42. Accordingly you proceed to recommend—

First.—That as forming a part and portion of the British Empire in the east, provision should be made for the administration of justice in the hills (hitherto supposed independent).

Secondly.—That provision be made for levying a revenue from this new acquisition, which you divide into two kinds—revenue from the plains, not hitherto settled; and revenue from the hills, not hitherto settled. The right to revenue from these lands, you conceive, should, without delay, be asserted.

43. As for the duty on cotton, which all the authorities from Mr. Buller downwards have so strongly objected to, it would seem that, considering it as a due of Government, and not of the Rajah, you rather approve of it than otherwise, and recommend that it be kept up, collected by the Rajah, and appropriated by Government.

44. It will be observed that, in the original question between Mr. Dampier and Mr. Bignell or the Rajah, the independence of the latter within the hill territory was an admitted point. The question was simply, being as he is independent in other matters, is he or is he not bound by a special contract to refrain from levying sayer duties within his independent territory. But you incline to believe that in fact both parties are wrong; that the Rajah is not independent at all; and that, whatever might be the expediency of the duties on cotton, bamboos, &c., &c., when enjoyed by the Rajah, they clearly are very fit and proper duties (that on cotton at least) to be levied and enjoyed by the British Government.

45. Upon this the Deputy Governor remarks, in the first place, that by prescription at least the Rajah of Tipperah has a claim to independent possession of a certain territory, exclusive of the zemindary in the plains or district of Tipperah, of which he is the recorded proprietor: whatever may be the origin of this possession, it is admitted by all, and it is indeed matter of notoriety for that, a great number of years, extending certainly as far back as the decennial settlement, the possession has been enjoyed without challenge, and, until your last letter, no one ever thought of challenging the right. Under such circumstances, His Honor deems it undeniable that the burthen of proof lies with the challenger and not with the Rajah.

46. Now it appears to the Deputy Governor that you have proved absolutely nothing. You have proved that in 1761 the British Government took possession of the Province of Tipperah, and commenced administering its revenues on its own behalf. There is nothing in your report to show what was included in this province, and what was taken possession of and administered, can only be inferred from the circumstances since known to exist. These circumstances are, as has been observed, that the country administered by the British Government is that below the hills heretofore known as the sillah of Tipperah, exclusive of a certain territory in the hills held independently by the Rajah. *Why* the British Government did not take possession of the rest is not known, though it may be supposed that they refrained, partly in order to conciliate the Rajah, or from generosity to a foe in their power, and partly because the hill territory was not worth taking.

47. That the British forces proceeded to Nunagur, would be (even if that place were, as you assume, within the hills) of no value in proof of your position, since subsequent events show that the British forces, if they *did* reduce the hill country, nevertheless afterwards withdrew from it and left it to the Rajah. But the Deputy Governor is disposed to think that *Nunagur* is in fact nothing more than the corrupt mode of writing *Noonaggur*, the name of a town in the plains, situated within the zemindary and sillah of Tipperah, and at present the head quarters of a Moonsiff.

48. The only other fact brought forward by you to prove that the Rajah ought rightly to have no independent territory is, that the Rajah, after 1761, or at least in 1785, received investiture as Rajah from the hands of the British Government, and that he was once apprehended and sent to Chittagong a prisoner to answer a charge of harbouring dacoits.

49. To this argument His Honor cannot attach any weight. If the investiture of the Rajah *per se* was symbolical of the conveyance of his independent territory to the British Government, what would become of the chiefs and Rajahs and jagoirdars all over in India, who habitually receive investiture from the paramount government without ever supposing that, by so doing, they are making over their independent territories to territories to be brought in judicial and revenue matters under the general laws and regulations?

50. The history of India, from the days of Timour downwards, is full of instances

\* *Note*.—An ancestor of this very Rajah, in 1706, A. D., received investiture from Moorsheed Kooly Khan without relinquishing, or being supposed to relinquish, his independent jurisdiction. The circumstance is mentioned by Stewart (History of Bengal, page 572), and it is distinctly stated that no encroachment on the Rajah's rights was attempted, though the "khillut" was annually renewed. In fact, the Province of Tipperah was not conquered and added to the Mogul Empire until 1783, when it was overrun and subdued by Meer Habbesh, Dewan of the Nalib Nazim of Dacca. (Id., page 427).

of investiture by the paramount power of inferior princes, Rajahs, soobadars, jagheendars and others; but there is nothing, His Honor thinks, that can bear out your supposition that, by receiving a khillut of investiture, the right of administering the raj or jagher of the inferior feudatory passes in effect into the hands of the superior State.\* It is notorious, indeed, that the very contrary has been the case; and that the practical exercise of power by the inferior is in reality confirmed and corroborated by the ceremony in question.

51. In the case of the Rajah of Tipperah there was a special reason for investiture by Government. The most valuable possession of the Rajah was his estate in the British territory; as a semindar of that estate he was a subject of the British Government. Succession to the estate was of course regulated by the general laws of the British territory,

and enforced by the British tribunals. As a matter of course, therefore, the succession to one property carried with it succession to the other, and in effect this has always been the case.\*

52. The Rajah had therefore two capacities—one as a subject and semindar of the British Government, the other as an independent Rajah in the Hills. But as the succession to the latter was nearly certain to depend on the succession to the former capacity, he might very well be disposed to receive investiture and do homage at one and the same time, and in one or both capacities, to the ruling and paramount government.

53. As for the arrest of the Rajah in 1783-84 the case explains itself. As semindar, and as a British subject, the Rajah was and is answerable to the British tribunals. In these days, when forms are more attended to and minute distinctions more carefully kept up than in 1783, the apprehension of the Rajah for a crime committed by the semindar would, of course, be conducted with more regularity, more attention to technicalities, and less confusion of departmental authority; but it would not less certainly take place (if necessary) now than in 1783, though no one would suppose that the Government, by exercising jurisdiction under the regulations over the semindar, necessarily enforced the same jurisdiction over the independent Rajah.

54. On the other hand, besides the notorious fact of independence, there is the testimony of good authority to the existence of the Rajah's right since the accession of the British.

55. "The manik or semindar of Tipperah," says Hamilton, speaking of the year 1801, "is an independent sovereign of an extensive territory in the hills, but usually resides in the town of Comillah, which is the head-quarters of the Judge and Magistrate."

56. Again in 1806 Mr. Melvill, Second Judge of the Dacca Provincial Court, under date 9th October, is found reporting to Government on the subject of disturbances that had taken place in the hill territory of Tipperah, and throughout the letter speaking of the territory as independent as to jurisdiction, though held according to custom by investiture from the British Government as successors to the Mogul. Still more strongly the same functionary writes a few days afterwards (19th October 1808). He gives an account of the inhabitants of "the Tipperah independent territory," which he also describes as "the hill territory comprehended within the boundaries of Tipperah Proper, or the country subject to the authority of the Tipperah Rajah." This territory, he goes on to say, "is in length about one hundred and twenty miles and in breadth seventy to eighty miles." He explains the customs of the territory, the officers of the government and their functions, *military, judicial, and revenue*, and he describes the army entertained by the Rajah, of whom, he says, "a number are of course at Augurtollah, the seat of the Rajah."

57. He elsewhere mentions Odeypore as a place within the territory, where the "soobah" (defined by him as "commander-in-chief") had assembled forces during the disturbances on which he was reporting, and in the following passages he announces distinctly the real circumstances of the Rajah's tenure of the territory in question.

"The Tipperah hill territory is certainly independent of the delegated judicial authority; but although it pays no tribute, that it has a certain dependence on the sovereign or supreme power of the State, is established by tradition as well as by the

testimony of witnesses. The inhabitants perhaps consider themselves dependent on their chief only, but they know he holds his authority under a superior, and that the confirmation of the Bengal Government is necessary to the validity of his title to that authority.

"It appeared, on judicial investigation from the most remote period to which the produced records or tradition ascended, that the hill territory of Tipperah, and the estate or seminary of Roshunabad, were always held by one or the same person; the Rajah of that hill territory was uniformly the zemindar of Roshunabad.

"In investigating, therefore, the claims to that seminary, the Dacca Court of Appeals, although they could pass no order relating to the disposal of the hill territory, were (as it was a point of fact disputed, and still undetermined), under the necessity of ascertaining if the claimant was or was not the person (by local custom respecting the succession) entitled to be considered Rajah of Tipperah, as on that depended his right to be zemindar of Roshunabad.

"That the circumstances of the hill inhabitants, having been a considerable time without an acknowledged local superior, and in a state of uncertainty respecting the person to whom they were to look to as their immediate chief, may have somewhat unhinged their relative situations, and have produced something like a feeling of irritation amongst them, will readily be admitted.

"The right to the succession to the Tipperah Rajah has remained undetermined for a period of four years, and on the recurrence of similar cases—and instances will frequently occur, particularly in the Cuttaok and other provinces—it may perhaps be found more expedient, as judicial proceedings are necessarily dilatory, that Government should, on an authenticated report of relative circumstances, give the investiture of the hill territory to the person they might consider entitled to the possession, and leave the claims to estates within the Company's provinces to be subsequently decided by the courts of justice."

Still more to the purpose is the following :—

"I cannot, however, in any case recommend, as a temporary measure, even the assumption of the management of the hill territory, as in my communications I could perceive a positive embarrassment in the hill people, lest by too great an exposure of the faults of the existing authority Government might be induced to take the internal management into its own hands, and deprive them of the immemorial privilege of being ruled by a chief of their own, and in retaining which privilege their pride and prejudices seemed deeply interested." And lastly, the reply of Government to this report is altogether decisive of the question.

"The right to the succession to the zemindary of Tipperah, situated within the limits of the British possessions, being at present under investigation by the courts of judicature, the Governor General in Council is unwilling to adopt any measures with respect to the succession to the independent territory while that case is depending. But whenever the Sudder Dewany Adawlut shall have passed its decision on that suit, Government will of course issue such orders as may then appear to be necessary and proper, with respect to the succession to the latter territory. Nothing can be farther from the intentions of Government than to assume the internal management of that territory."

58. It is obvious, therefore, that your proposition for taking possession of the Rajah's territory, and your plans for the administration of justice and revenue within it, must fall to the ground.

59. The questions at issue between the late Commissioner, Mr. Dampier, and the Rajah, are of two kinds—

1st.—Whether the Rajah has, under present circumstances, any right to levy duties at discretion in his own territory, or has surrendered the right by special compact?

2nd.—Has the Rajah, as an independent chief, encroached upon the Company's territory, and wrongfully taken from it and added to his own the towns of Odeypore and Augurtollah?

60. The first of these questions is in a great measure decided by the result of the enquiry into your propositions. It has been shown that the Rajah has an independent territory; and it follows that *within that territory* he may levy such duties as he pleases, unless there be any special compact to the contrary. Mr. Dampier endeavoured to prove that there was such a compact. He stated that the Government of 1788, having at that time the management of the Rajah's property in the plains, and being convinced that the

levy of duties, such as then existed within that property, was impolitic, abolished them, thereby giving up Rs. 30,000 per annum, which was the average produce of the duties when they were abolished.

61. This sum of Rs. 30,000 has been represented as a remission granted to the Rajah in lieu of the duties; and from the decided objections expressed by the Government of that time to the levy of transit duties, it has been argued that the Government would never have given up, or in a manner paid over, to the Rajah Rs. 30,000 per annum if they had supposed that the consequence would have been the levy of the same or similar duties in the neighbouring hill territory; therefore, it has been concluded the Government must have intended the remission as an equivalent for the levy of these duties in the hills as well as in the plains.

62. This argument appears to the Deputy Governor untenable.

63. The case, it may be gathered from the correspondence, and from the documents brought forward on both sides, is this. The Rajah, previous to 1788, certainly had the right of levying any duties he thought proper in his hill territory. He had also the right (possessed by all zemindars at that time) of levying sayer duties within his zemindary. He might therefore, in this double capacity, either levy a portion of the duties in the hill territory, and another portion in the plains, or he might levy all in the hills, and none in the plains; or lastly, he might levy the duty in the plains, and forego it in the hills.

In his choice between these three plans, at a time when the distinction between the dependent and the independent territory was not so clearly marked as it subsequently became, the Rajah would of course be guided by convenience and economy. Accordingly, he seems to have placed all his chowkies in the plains, and, in consequence, not to have levied any sayer duties in the hills.

64. The chowkies so placed seem to have yielded on an average about Rs. 28,000, or Rs. 30,000 a year, and they were clearly in those days a legitimate portion of the assets of the zemindary. His sudden jumma to Government on the zemindary was at this time about Rs. 1,65,000 of which about Rs. 28,000 was assessed on the sayer assets; and this, be it remembered, was a circumstance common to all zemindaries before the abolition of the sayer duties; their sudden jummas being all made up of the two items of land and sayer revenue as in the case of the Rajah of Tipperah.

65. Things were in this state when the estate was taken into khas management by Government, as happened to a great many zemindaries in Bengal, particularly in the eastern districts: and in this zemindary, as in others, the sayer assets as well as those of land revenue came into the khas management of Government. While, under that management, the Government, objecting to the nature of the sayer assets, abolished them, and the jumma of the zemindary became in consequence Rs. 1,65,000 minus Rs. 28,000 or Rs. 1,37,000, and therefore, when the zemindary came to be restored to the Rajah, he engaged for the lesser jumma, as a necessary consequence of the diminution of the assets by the hands of the Government itself. This was no compact, such as it has been sought to prove. Still less was it a remission to the Rajah of Rs. 28,000 or Rs. 30,000 per annum, as has also been imagined, and not being a compact of the kind sought to be proved, it can have no possible effect upon the admitted right of the Rajah to levy within his hill territory such duties as he might think proper.

66. If there be any doubt of this, let it be supposed, for the sake of argument, that the Government in 1788, while managing the zemindary *khas*, had chosen of the two assets, land revenue and sayer revenue, to abolish, not the *last* but the *first*; and that, retaining the sayer, they had, at the conclusion of their khas management, restored the zemindary to the Rajah at the jumma which such an arrangement had brought about, *i. e.*, at Rs. 1,65,000, minus land revenue, or Rs. 1,37,000=28,000.

67. Would anybody have argued that this was an annual donation to the Rajah of Rs. 1,37,000? Or that this measure for ever bound the Rajah to abstain from levying a land revenue on neighbouring and independent territory?

68. Would anybody, in short, have talked of a compact? Surely not; yet the two cases are precisely parallel. Or take another illustration. Suppose that in 1788, when the right of levying sayer duties was allowed to every zemindar, a given zemindar, A, had possessed two contiguous zemindaries, of which one in the year in question was in the khas management of Government, and had assets equal to Rs. 2,000, of which Rs. 500 were derived from sayer duties; then suppose that the Government chose in this one

secondary to abolish sayar duties, thereby giving up Rs. 500 of the assets, and making the assets, when the estate came to be restored, to A only Rs. 1,500 instead of Rs. 2,000, would any one imagine that by this measure A had become bound to give up the sayar duties in his second secondary? Would any one talk in such a case of a compact? Assuredly not. Yet this, like the last, is a perfectly parallel case to the one now under consideration.

69. This of itself would suffice to show that the Rajah is under no engagement, expressed or implied, to refrain from the levy of sayar duties within his hill territory; and when considered in connection with the strong arguments produced by the Rajah himself, through Mr. Bignell, will fully warrant the opinion to which, after due consideration, His Honor has arrived, that there is no ground whatever to interfere with the Rajah's right of levying, within his own hill territory, whatever taxes or duties he may think proper.

70. For the decision of the second question, whether the Rajah has or has not encroached on the Company's territory, the data produced do not appear sufficient. But the Deputy Governor is clearly of opinion, both that such an invidious enquiry should not be prosecuted without some *prima facie* evidence of its necessity, and that in the present instance no such *prima facie* ground for enquiry has yet been shown.

71. To conclude, therefore, His Honor decides that the Rajah has an independent hill territory; that your propositions for its resumption are totally inadmissible; that the Rajah has a full right within his hill territory to levy any duties he pleases; and that there is no ground at present for setting on foot an enquiry into supposed encroachments by the Rajah on the Company's territory.

## APPENDIX E.

PAPERS REGARDING THE LUSHAI COUNTRY AND  
POLICY—(PAGES 317—364).

## I.—MR. EDGAR'S NOTES ON HIS TOUR AMONG THE LUSHAIS IN 1871.

*Part I.*

In my report to the Commissioner of Dacca, sent in from Changail, I gave an account of our proceedings up to the time we left that place.

In the 12th paragraph of that letter I mentioned that reports had been brought to me by Lushais of raiding parties, which I believed to be imaginary. It turned out that I was utterly mistaken that these reports, though not absolutely correct, were in the main true, and that the information, if properly understood and believed by me, might have been of the greatest possible value. I feel deeply the greatness of the blunder I made, and am fully aware that any attempt to justify it would be useless. At the same time it is likely that a full account of what I heard, what it really meant, what might have been done if I had understood and believed it, how I interpreted it, and the arguments which I thought at the time almost conclusive of its untruth, may be of use in forming an estimate of the past and deciding on the line to be adopted for the future.

On the 9th January messengers from Sookpila came to inform me that a party of Howlongs were going along the Hachuk range, and that Sookpila feared they were going to attack a part of the Sylhet District lying to the west of the Lunglai stream. They asked me to give information at once to the Magistrate of Sylhet, and I wrote to Mr. McWilliam to telegraph to Sylhet and Dacca, which he did on the 16th, seven days before the attack on Kutlecherra. But I showed in my letter that I doubted the information. The Lushais (as I then understood them) told me that the Howlongs were led by Savoong, who was going out for heads on account of his father Lulpitang. Now I knew that Savoong was a Syloo, and that he was not son of Lulpitang. I afterwards learned that the leader's name was Sangboong, who is son of Lulpitang, but the imagined inaccuracy made me doubt the whole story. These Howlongs had never made raids in this direction, and from what I could learn of the line of country they were said to have taken, I thought that, if they had gone anywhere, it must have been towards the south-west. The maps I had with me were very imperfect, and in some respects misleading, and at the time my idea of the line of the country to the south-west of Changail was very confused. Still since I had a view of it for the first time from the high range that we crossed in the end of January, I have been surprised that I did not see that movement described to me might threaten Kutlecherra and Alexandrapoor. It was then too late to do anything, but I now see that if I had at this time clearly understood the information received from the Lushais, precautions might have been taken, which, though not averting the raids, would have saved much of the loss of life and property which occurred in south-west Cachar, and made it probable that the raiders would meet with severe punishment. When I saw Sookpila on the 16th, I asked him about the raiders, and he told me that he had thought at first that they were going to attack him, but that they had passed him by and turned off to a range to the west. I now think he meant the Jampi, but at the time I believed it to be in the direction of Hill Tipperah.

Next morning, after Sookpila had left, a messenger came in from Eibuk, whose village was south-east of Changail, to inform me that a party, five hundred strong, led by Lenkom, son of Vonolel, were on the east side of the Sonai with a declared intention of attacking Bengallee villages, but that the Chiefs were trying to turn them back. I sent information of this to Mr. McWilliam, but I doubted the report very much. Vonolel had never been concerned in any raids on Cachar. At the time I heard the news I was anxious to get the Lushais to guide me to Sonai by the route which we followed eventually, and I thought they appeared unwilling. It seemed possible, therefore, that

the story was made up to induce me not to go. But my chief suspicion arose from a belief that Ruttun Posa had made money by giving information of imaginary raids to the authorities of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, and that Sookpial might be trying to play the same game.

Contradictory rumours came pouring in during the next few days, till on the 19th, at night, several Lushais came to me and related that the raiding party had made a detour and crossed the Sonai higher up, and that they had got on to the Bengti Pahar.

My first idea was to follow them with the force I had, but I found that if they had gone at all, they must be too far north for me to overtake them. Then when I questioned the Lushais more closely as to the route the supposed raiders were said to have taken, their account seemed to me irreconcilable with what we knew of, and what the map showed, as the natural features of the country. The suspicion so caused was increased when the Lushais suggested that I should go down the river on a raft and allow them to guide Inspector Dost Mahomed and his men to a point where he could intercept and cut off this returning raiders. I looked upon this as a proof of the unwillingness of the Lushais to guide me along the route I wanted, and I said that I should myself go to the top of the hill to intercept the retreat. The Lushais asked me whether I had sent information to Cachar when I got news from them. When I said yes, they said that it would reach in time, and that they hoped I have taken precautions to strengthen the guards in the direction of Nowarbund. I at once wrote a letter, which I sent by express, and which reached Cachar some days before the attack on Monierkhall, advising the local authorities to strengthen the guards at Nowarbund and Monierkhall, and to send an European officer to one and one best Native officer to the other place. While expressing doubts of the story, I said that, if the raiders really had gone up, I could intercept the return by taking a post on the range. This was literally true, though not in the sense I meant at the time. The fact was that we had all an entirely erroneous idea of the conformation of the country between the two streams; for, owing to the density of the jungle on the hills over which we passed last year, we were never able to get a clear view of the country. This year we went over cleared hills of considerable height, and have been able to form correcter ideas than we could hitherto of the direction of the ranges. I then found that the range upon which I had contemplated intercepting the raiders did not extend so far south as Changsil, and that if I had gone to a point known to us since last year upon the main range and waited there, we should have taken the raiders at such a disadvantage as to be able almost to annihilate them. We had close on fifty guns all told; the number of the raiders was greater; but they would have been taken in an extremely unfavourable position, hungry, weary, with their powder all spent, and encumbered with their wounded.

I lost the opportunity however, and besides this my evident scepticism so hurt the Lushais that they did not give me any information for some time. After the 21st, when they told me that the raiders had left the Bengti Pahar, which was true, as we afterwards found out. I hope I have succeeded in showing that the information given to me by Sookpial and his people was early enough if believed, and correct enough if properly understood, to have enabled us to provide more efficiently than we did for the protection of the frontier and to inflict far severer punishment on the raiders than they suffered. My ignorance of the country and suspicion (right and prudent in itself, but carried too far) of the good faith of Sookpial were in fault. It is manifestly of great importance to keep this in view in forming an estimate of the conduct of the Lushais among whom I was and in judging of the sincerity of Sookpial. I shall now take up the account of our proceeding from the 26th January, the day on which we left Changsil on our way to the Sonai.

On that morning two elderly men from Mehtong's village came in, and said that they had been directed to accompany us across to the Sonai. We had besides a Muntree from Pibuk and one from Sookpial with us. We went during that day in a south-east direction for some mile, over a capital path, until we got to the top of a pretty high hill situated some way to the south-east of our last year's camp of Beparri Basar. East of us, across a valley, about three miles off, we could see the village of Mehtong on a steep hill, but much lower than our position. Behind rose the steep base side of Sakkor Moe (the horse's mouth), a high precipitous peak on the Nungvai range. The position of this peak is shown incorrectly in all the maps.

During our day's march we found several well worn paths branching off from the main route. One of these led, as we were told, to Beparri Basar, and from there, of course, to Sookpial's village. Another would take one by a somewhat circuitous way to the village of Lalchung. Another went to Vompial's village.

Soon after we arrived in camp, the headman of Mehtong came over with some armed men to see, as he said, that we did not want for anything. He spent that night in camp. Next morning, after going a little way south, we descended the east face of the hill to the jumes below.

As we got opposite the village, we could see a number of men in it, and some fired shots in the air. After we had passed the village, we reached a very pretty jume, from which we had a good view of much of the country north and south of us. Here I began to see that all previous representation of the direction of the ranges was erroneous, an opinion fully borne out by all we saw subsequently. While we were going down the jumes on one side, a troop of women and children had appeared out of the jungles on the other, and we found them in the jume houses. They seemed to be very friendly, and we spend some time talking to them. We then went on for some time to the north-east along uneven ground till we came to a stream with a salt spring flowing into it. There were some men working there, but we were told that the manufacture had decreased considerably since the trade in rubber had commenced. From this place we went, at first along a well worn level path, and afterwards up the bed of a stream, till we reached our halting place early in the afternoon. Our coolies were very heavily laden, and our marches were, consequently, unusually short, in order to let the rear guard get up in good time. Next day our road was almost entirely up hill, the direction still being to the north-east, till we got to the site of the village of Morah or Moolah burned by Colonel Lister in 1849-50. This is a hill about 3,500 feet high, perfectly cleared from heavy jungle, so that we could see in all directions. On one side was the valley of the Dullesur; on the other, the valleys of the Sonai. South-west a high hill was pointed out as Eyek Thlang, the site of Sookpilal's village. Many miles further, in the same direction, was a still higher hill on which the village of Saveong, the Chief of the Syloo, was said to be situated. South of us, beyond Sakkor Moe, we could see Dar Thalang and Mote Thalang, where are the villages of Pibuk, Sookpilal's mother, and of his sister, Ruttungpi. Further south the hills inhabited by the Howlongs were pointed out to us, and east of them villages said to belong to Pois. North of these, and a little to the north-east of the Howlongs, we were shown hills that were said to belong to Bhuta. Further east in the far distance the country of Vonolel and his sons; north and north-west of which we saw the ranges of Poiboi, Vonpilal, and Impanes. Due north of us was the great round Peak of Nisapui, which shut out our view of Lang Mohr, the hill identified by Major Macdonald with Peak Z of the Great Trigonometrical Survey.

We halted for the night at this place, and next day, after a little marching, we came upon a large party of Lushais cutting a new path through the jungle. The headmen of the village of Dhurmongpi, who had met us a little before, proposed that we should take this path. I said it was too steep, and we continued on the old route, which in a very short time took us right up to the village. From here we sent on our coolies to get ready our camp, and remained for some hours in a shady grove outside surrounded by men, women, and children. As I passed by the village I remarked several guns in almost every house that I went near, and I think that many of them must have belonged to other villages, for Dhurmongpi is a poor village and not likely to have the number I saw. After we left we went over the shoulder of Visapai and halted in a cleared jume. We had not been long there when we were followed by a crowd of women and children. After these left, I remarked that there were many armed men in the neighbourhood of the camp. I asked the Muntries about them. They said some were men who had been hunting, some had been sent to the eastern people and were now returning, and that some had come down with us. Next day we met many more along the path as we went down. I was puzzled at this at the time, for I saw that their presence was connected with us, and it was quite evident from the way in which they were placed that they could not have contemplated either attacking us or defending their village from us in case we had attempted to attack it. Afterwards when I knew what had happened in Cachar, I began to think that these men had been posted to protect us if we should happen to be in danger.

Next day went down some steep descents to the Sonai, which we reached at a place called Pangoengkai. This was on the 30th. I thought this a suitable place for our permanent camp, and finding that boats could come up resolved to halt there.

Next morning I sent down a Manipuri trader who was with me, one constable, and two coolies, to order our boats up from Lushai Bazar, and sent two of the Lushais who had come with us to announce my arrival to the eastern villages. The Manipuri messenger did not return. It was he who took into Cachar the story about meeting



five of Vonolei's people carrying heads. The Lushais came back in three days. They said that Vantang, son of Bhuta, had burned a village of Hraltie Kookies, which I had seen two years ago, a few miles to the north-east of Moizol; that the whole of the eastern village were in confusion; and that Mora Impanee's Muntree, who had gone south to make enquiries, would come to me in a day or two and tell me every thing. We now began to get uneasy about the non-appearance of our supplies.

On the 4th February we told some Lushais who were going towards the village of Dhurmongpi that we should like to buy some rice, as we were very near the end of our supplies.

Next day Mr. Burland went down to Lushai Bazar by a path along the hills to the east of the Sonai. He found that our hut of the previous year had been burned, and some of our men reported that they saw marks of blood there, and the remains of a kind of litter which had been tied with cane that grow only in the plains.

Our position now looked very nasty; our supplies were nearly consumed, so that if we attempted to make our way into Cachar overland, which I consider would have been the only safe way in case of opposition, we should have run a risk of something like starvation. On the other hand, the delay in the arrival of our boats, the mysterious and shadowy rumours flying about, the absence of all the representatives of the eastern villages, and, above all, the suspicious circumstances reported from Lushai Bazar seemed to point to as much risk in staying as in going. Fortunately, however, on that day, while Mr. Burland was away, people had come in from Dhurmongpi bringing rice, edible roots, fowls for our table, which were very welcome, as all our private supplies were fast disappearing, and I think a small pig. The Lushais refused to take any payment for these things, and promised to bring more. I then resolved to remain where I was for the present, to send fresh messengers down the river to get all the rice I could from Dhurmongpi to save as much of this as we could, so as to accumulate enough to take us down in case of an emergency, and meantime to find out all I could about the state of things in the east.

I therefore, on the morning of the 6th, sent Rajkissen, a reliable man, with five constables and some coolies down the river on rafts, while Rowa, Sookpila's Muntree, went to the villages of Wollong and Kholel on the 7th. I also sent up ten rupees to Dhurmongpi with a message to say that, as the village had taken no payment for the things sent, I gave the money *pour boize*. It was returned next day with another present of rice, and a message to the effect that they could take nothing in return for what the village gave, but that henceforth individuals would come in and trade regularly in rice and other articles of food. Next day considerable quantities came in and were bought by us.

At first the Lushais took in exchange for their rice, red cloth, brass vessels, &c., but our stock of such things was quickly exhausted, and then we persuaded them to take money. But the rupees were not supposed to be accepted as final payment. They were looked upon as tokens that so much cloth or some particular brass vessel was owed by us to the holder. Some people preferred having their names and the amount due to them written in a book to the trouble and risk of taking away money. Our debts were to be paid on the arrival of our boats.

In this way we got considerable quantities of rice, and were able to lay some up for our return journey. Our coolies also poisoned the stream with the bark of a tree which, when pounded and thrown into the water, had an intoxicating effect on the fish. We got several maunds in this way, which our people dried over wood fires. We were thus able to keep off anything like absolute privation. But at one time we feared that we should suffer from want of salt. There was a scarcity of this article in Dhurmongpi's village, and though they gave us what they could spare, the supply was still insufficient. But when our coolies heard this they made light of the want. "Why," said one, "any one can make salt," and they burned split bamboos to ashes which they collected in a bamboo tube with a small hole in the bottom. This was then filled with water, which was allowed to drain through the hole into a pan placed below. The water when evaporated left a deposit of salt which formed a substitute, though not a pleasant one, for common salt. Every day we had parties of coolies in the jungle searching for edible roots, leaves, &c., which the forest supplied in great quantity and variety. Meantime Mr. Burland did what he could to make our camp safe from a sudden attack by clearing the jungle round it and piling up the cut bamboos about breast high on the sides exposed to attack, in this way forming a barrier which could not be crossed without cutting the bamboos. Of course this made a surprise impossible. On the 10th I sent a head constable and

five men down the river with directions to go as far as he could that day and return the next, carefully noting all traces observed along the bank. They came back late on the night of the 11th, and reported that they had been a considerable way down the stream without observing anything suspicious, and that they had put a mark on a bamboo to show how far they had gone. This was the mark which frightened the scouts who were with Captain Lightfoot. On the morning of the 11th, Mora, a Muntri of Dailong, the village of Impanee, Vonpial's mother, came in with several people of his village. They said that they had not come in before, because they had gone down to the village of Lalboorah, son of Vonolel, to get back, if possible, 13 captives who had been taken from Tangtiloon, the Hralte village, which, as mentioned above, had been burned by Vantang, son of Bhuta. He said that he had succeeded in recovering three, and that ten were still kept by Lalboorah and Vantang who were represented as being closely allied. This story seemed probable, as a few days before some of the Hraltes who had escaped from the village had passed through our camp with a few things which they had saved from the raiders. They were going to seek a temporary asylum in Dhurmongpi's village. They told us that they had lost twenty-one killed and thirteen prisoners, who, they thought, had been taken to Vonolel's village. While we were talking over all this and similar things with Impanee's people, I could see from their manner that there was something else which they had scarcely courage to tell, but at last they informed us that the rumours which we had heard were true that an attack had been made on Cachar, and that three British subjects were captives in Lalboorah's village. During that day and the next we learned much more from them, and by degrees we were able, by comparing various bits of information, learned, as was stated, from the people of Lalboorah's village, to put together a tolerably intelligible account of what happened. Many points, however, were obscure, and much was incorrect as I have learned since my return, but, on the whole, the account is not without value. I shall give it nearly as I wrote it down in my diary at the time, merely adding some further information which I acquired afterwards while still at Panchengkai. Lalboorah, son of Vonolel, and Tangdong, his cousin, led a party of about four hundred men against Cachar towards the end of January. This was the same party about which I had received information while at Changsil, but my informants were in error in saying that it was led by Lenkom. The latter, who is Lalboorah's brother, led a party which is said to have destroyed some villages in Manipur. The villagers on the Sonai tried to turn the raiding party back, but it broke into two, and one party under Tangdong crossed the Sonai and made for a hill on the Rengti Pahar range with the intention of attacking Nowarbund and other gardens south of the Chatla. They, however, failed to get the path along the top of the range, and got into the low land lying on either side of the Rukni. They seem to have found much difficulty in getting along through this, and mention is frequently made of the way in which their legs and bodies were torn by thorns as they pushed through the dense cane brakes. At last they fell in with a newly-out path, along which they went until they came to clearances near the mouth of the Rukni. Here they got six prisoners; but while they were carrying them off, elephants came up and soldiers to kill them. They were forced to let go three of their captives, and they made off with three, two Naga girls and a man. They then thought it dangerous to remain any longer, and they made for Bongkong, where they were joined by Lalboorah returning from Monierkhall. The latter had found the bungalow and coolie lines deserted, and were met with a heavy fire from the stockade. They attempted to plunder some boats filled with rice which were at the ghât, but were prevented by the guard, which also drove them from the bungalow. They talk of a gun in the stockade which did great execution, and seems to have frightened them much. While the main body was attacking the Monierkhall stockade, another party got to a new garden, which they also found deserted; here, however, they got some plunder; my informants say that they were shown in Lalboorah's village a gong, several hoes, and three boxes of papers said to have been taken there. They were going to set fire to the bungalow and lines, but seem to have got frightened and retired to Monierkhall. Next day they seem to have made another attack on the stockade, but were apparently repulsed, after which the guard rushed out and fired at them as they were making their retreat into the jungle. Some of the Lushais, however, choosing what they call a good place waited till they got the troops well within range and then fired a volley which killed five men. Upon this, they say, the troops fell back, and the Lushais rushed upon the bodies to get their heads and weapons, which they secured at least partially. Then Lalboorah said they could do no more, they therefore buried as many of their dead as they could find, and went off to Bongkong. Next day they went to Liningthlang, where some of their wounded died. Another died at Basar Ghât, which they reached two days after, and some more died in the village. The total loss they put down at fifty-seven killed in the raid, or dead since

of their wounds, besides many wounded, but still alive. On their return they found that Kamhow, Chief of Molbhem, had taken advantage of their absence to attack Tangdong's village, which he burned after killing many people and taking many prisoners, among whom was the wife of Tangdong. It is evident that the above story is a confused and inaccurate account of the attacks on Nugdigram and Monierkhall. Of course we could not expect accuracy of detail from people who professedly were not eye-witnesses, and who allege that the head people of Lalboorah's village attempted to conceal the real facts from them. But there are two points on which their evidence is important, if true—the number of the dead, and the identification of the villages to which the raiders belonged. All the Lushais whom we saw agreed in stating that the loss was over fifty, and all who pretended to give an exact number put it at fifty-seven, and this came to us not only directly from the people who said they had been to the village, but in a round-about way from traders, who said the report had reached their villages. There can be no doubt that the loss was heavy. The amount of independent evidence in corroboration of the charge against Lalboorah and Tangdong is very great. Munnoo Sing, the trader whom I sent down on the 31st, arrived in the station on the 8th. He stated that on his arrival at Bazar Ghat on the 31st he met five of Vonolei's Lushais, one of whom had some heads in a basket. They told him that their Chief was coming down the hill and would kill him if he was found there. The constable who was with Munnoo Sing says that he saw five Lushais with bloodstained baskets, in one of which was something like heads.

There can be no reasonable doubt that these men belonged to the raiding party, and I can see no reason not to believe Munnoo Sing's identification of them. He has for many years traded on the Sonai. He knows all the people living in its neighbourhood, and he could scarcely be deceived about the village to which the people he saw belonged. On the other hand, he could have had no imaginable reason for telling a wilful lie, and could not have known that the accusation against Lalboorah would be made some days later to me. Lalboorah is now the head of Vonolei's village, consequently he must have been the Chief mentioned as coming down the hill.

I have been informed by the Quarter Master General that he heard from Colonel McCulloch that some time since Kamhow of Molbhem sent four heads to the Rajah of Manipur with a message to the effect that hearing that Vonolei's son had taken all his fighting men for a raid in the west, he with his Soktees had attacked and destroyed the Lushai village, killing many people and carrying off 300 prisoners.

Now Tangdong's village is frequently described as one of Vonolei's, and he is often called the son of that Chief, though really his nephew. It can be shown that if he committed a raid on the west, it must have been in the direction of either Cachar or Tipperah. The story heard by Colonel McCulloch, therefore, may be considered fully to corroborate so much of what I heard as related to Tangdong. But this is not all. A Manipuri trader, who had just returned from Tipai Mukh, where he has been among the people of Poiboi, another nephew of Vonolei, state that he heard there of the raid on Monierkhall made by Lalboorah and Tangdong, and a very inaccurate version of the attack on the latter by Kamhow, who was said to have carried off one hundred and six prisoners. The Lushais said that Poiboi was every much annoyed at the conduct of Lalboorah and Tangdong. But such assurances are a matter of course, and not of much value by themselves.

The statement that Lenkom, the brother of Lalboorah, attacked Manipur villages has been confirmed by the Political Agent. There is, therefore, independent evidence in corroboration of the charge made by the Lushais who were with me against each particular Chief, who, they said, was connected with the raids on Manipur and East Cachar, and I think that there is considerable reason to believe that no other Chief was directly connected with them. When I first heard of the raids, however, all this was, of course, unknown to me, I suspected that the villages on the Sonai might have had more to do with the outrages than they acknowledged, and I thought that the safest and worthiest course for me was not to conceal that suspicion. I talked the matter over with Mr. Burland, who took nearly the same view that I did. I then called up the Muntris and told them that I suspected all the villages east of the Sonai, because they had not either prevented the raiders passing through their country, or sent warning into the station. They said that they could not have opposed the raiders successfully, for one of their own villages had been cut up by an ally of the Chief who had attacked Monierkhall, and that they did not send information to the station because Pibuk, Sookpial's mother, had sent me news of the intended raid. I said that the good conduct of the people on the west of the Sonai was no excuse for their failure to do their duty, and I told them

that until they could clear themselves from the suspicion I should not enter into friendly relations with them. I added that there were three British subjects, on their own showing, kept in captivity in a village east of the Sonai; that until these were accounted for, I should not allow any traders of either the Sonai or Barak, and that hereafter it would be of no use for any Chief to say that these captives had been sold to the Pois or other eastern tribes, for when the time came we should accept no excuse of this kind. I also refused to receive some Muntries from Kholel, the nearest village to those of Vonolel's family, until I was satisfied that its people, and above all, a Hindoostani, named Eutton Sing, who resides in it, had nothing to do with the raid. Upon hearing all this the Lushais said that they would go away and collect all the chief men of their villages in order to devise some means of forcing Lalboorah to give up his captives and the plunder. I said that they might do what they liked, but that the one thing they should keep in mind was that some time or other the captives must be accounted for. The safety of these captives was the thing I was most anxious then to secure, and I think that I took the best measures in my power to attain that object. I may mention here, though out of chronological order, that several days afterwards some Lushais tried to find out whether I should be willing to make terms with Lalboorah who was said to be frightened at the loss suffered in the attack in Monierkhal and in Kamhow's raid. I at once refused even to listen to any such proposals, unless the captives and plunder were previously restored. Then I said, I might hear what they had to say, but they must distinctly understand that I did not promise that the result would be favourable even then.

On the 13th the eastern Lushais went away, saying that they would inform all the villages which they represented as friendly of my views.

At this time thinking that possibly a force might have been sent overland to look for us, I sent letters to the villages of Fibuk, Mehtong, and Dhurmongpi, recommending them to the protection of the officers in command of the party if it should reach any of them on its way to where we were. On the evening of the 15th I determined after great hesitation to send two constables and two coolies with a letter to the station. I had already sent down six out of our little force, and it seemed almost folly to reduce it still further under existing circumstances.

Besides, I was very unwilling to risk the lives of the little party, for I had heard that there were ten raiders unaccounted for, and if they were lurking in the jungle, they might have overpowered the two constables. However, I could not send more men, and the suspense and anxiety for news were fast becoming unbearable. Meantime each day people came in from Dhurmongpi's village with rice, fowls, roots, and now and then a little salt. Some of these brought in a rumour, at first shapeless and intangible, of the capture by Savoong of an European. By degrees we made out that a party of traders from one of Sookpial's villages had been down to trade among the Syloos, and had there heard that a little girl had been taken captive in the west, but were Dhurmongpi's people could not tell, neither did they know by whom the raid had been committed. But they said that they thought the child had been probably carried to the village of Savoong, the great Chief of the Syloos. On the 16th, Tangapa, an old Lushai, on whom we placed much reliance, started off for the south to get what information he could about the western raid, and to find out if there were any chance of recovering the little girl.

We now felt our position getting more uncomfortable every day. The continued delay in the arrival of news from Cachar made us fear that our messengers might have been attacked and killed, or taken captives on the way down. We knew that this was in the highest degree improbable, but we could not account for the delay by any other hypothesis. If this conjecture were correct, we should have in all probability to fight our way down if we went by river, in which case the chances were that none of us would have escaped alive. On the other hand, I had not sufficient food for the land route. Besides this, if we had gone down, then the Lushais would have thought that we did so either through fear, an idea I was very unwilling they should conceive, or with the intention of returning in a hostile manner, in which case their best policy would have been to cut us off, if possible, on the way down. We had every reason to believe in the friendliness of the people of Dhurmongpi and the other villages on the west: they were bringing in supplies daily, and we felt that somehow or other we must in the long run get intelligence from Cachar. All these things were in favour of our remaining where we were.

## APPENDIX.

On the other side was the knowledge that Vonol's tribe was hostile, and that we had thought it necessary to defy in a kind of way the other eastern clans. There was the cruel uncertainty about what had happened in the west, of which we knew scarcely more than that it must have been something very bad. We could not tell what pressure the south-western tribes might be able to bring on Sookpial to betray us, or whether they were not strong enough to attack and cut us up, or (what I personally feared more) take us prisoners in spite of him. These seemed reasons for attempting to get back to Cachar at any risk.

I confess that I felt at this time considerable anxiety about our position. Fortunately I had three as brave and prudent advisers as a man could wish for in a case of difficulty in Mr. Burland, Inspector Dost Mahomed, and Baboo Hurry Charan Sarma. I talked over our position with them separately, and then resolved to wait for intelligence till the 22nd, and, if we got no news by that time, to send for the headmen of the villages round and inform them that we were going down to find out why intelligence and supplies had not come up, and then get back to Cachar as quickly as possible. On the 20th, however, people from the eastern villages came in. With them was the Muntri of Sookpial, who had left us on the 7th. He said that he had gone to the village of Lalboorah in the hope of being able to get back the captives; that he had failed in doing so then, but that he thought they would be sent to me if I went across to Tipai Mukh. He said that Lalboorah was anxious to make terms, but I refused, as I mentioned above, even to listen to any overtures while our subjects were in captivity. The Muntris said that all the other eastern people were very anxious that I should go through their villages to Tipai Mukh, and that they would do anything I chose to demand in proof of their fidelity. They said that Khalkom, Sookpial's son, would come to me at any place or time I chose to fix. On the same day some of the people I had sent to the south came in to say that they had ascertained that the little girl had been taken from a tea garden on the west of the Dullesser; that the attack had been made by Bhenkeri and Songboong, sons of Lalpitang, a powerful Howlong Chief; that the people of the Syloo Chief, Savoong, had been concerned in it, and that it was in all probability organized by Gmushailon, or Mischailal, son of Lalchokla, transported in 1845, a Poitoo Chief, who is said to be at present living on the lands of Ali Ahmed Khan, a Sylhet zemindar. Their chief reasons for suspecting him was that two of his Muntris were known to have gone down to the Chittagong Chiefs a short time before the latter started on the raid.

The child was said to be in the village of Bhenkeri's mother, the widow of Lalpitang, and to be treated with some kindness. It was also said that there were rumours that the Chiefs were debating about sending her either to Rutton Poa or to Sookpial, in order that she might be either taken to Chittagong or brought into Cachar, but it was thought that either Chiefs would be unwilling to have anything to do in the matter lest he should be suspected of complicity in the raid. I sent down at once to Sookpial to ask him to give any assistance in his power to recover the child, and if he could get her, to send her down to Cachar as quickly as possible on a raft. While I was still discussing these points with the Lushais, five messengers from Captain Lightfoot made their appearance. They had left him before he had met my messengers of the 16th. Captain Lightfoot's men were led by Raoya Muntri, a Thlanguni Kookie, who had done me right good service all through this tour. He had gone down with Rajkissen on the 6th, and had now, when Captain Lightfoot had found a difficulty in getting a man to take a letter to me, volunteered to make an attempt with four of my Mikir coolies, who had also gone down on the 6th. On learning all that had taken place in the district, I resolved to give up my plan of crossing to the Tipai and to return to Silchar as quickly as possible. I sent information of this to all the villages round, and sent to ask Khalkom to meet me at Lushai Bazar on the way down.

On the 21st Captain Lightfoot arrived, and we decided to start for Cachar on the morning of the 24th, as all my arrangements could not be completed before the evening of the 23rd.

On the 22nd I got intelligence that a small party of Howlongs, without the consent of their Chiefs, had started on a plundering expedition, and that it was probable they would attack some of the gardens east of the Dullesser in South Hylakandy. I sent off news of this to the station at once.

We started on the morning of the 24th and reached Lushai Bazar during the afternoon. That evening, after dinner, Khalkom came into our camp and talked with us for a couple of hours. He said that all we had heard about the perpetrators of the eastern raids was correct, but that in addition to Bhenkeri and Sangboong there was a third

Chief, a second Lalboorah, nearly related to Vandoola, engaged in the raids on the west. He said that Savyong's people were almost certainly concerned in the raids, but he did not seem so satisfied of the complicity of Gnurshailon as all the people to the west apparently were.

Khalkom said in reply to our questions that the chief object of the raids was plunder, and that all other causes were merely secondary. We asked him what turn he thought affairs would now take. He said that he could not say much about the Howlongs or Syloos, but that he thought that Lalboorah was frightened at the position he was in, and that he would be glad to come to terms with us. In case we wished this, he said, we should find Poiboi useful, for he was friendly to us, and had weight with Lalboorah. But Khalkom's own opinion was that we should not succeed in making any arrangement of a permanent nature with either the eastern or southern Kookies until we had thoroughly frightened them as he expressed it. In the event of our resolving to attack Lalboorah, he offered to accompany the force in person and to supply guides and fighting men if required. He said that the routes from Tipai Mukh to the villages of Vonolel's sons are not difficult, and that elephants could get along them. He advised us to take the route along the Hachuk if we intended to attack the Howlongs and Syloos from the Cachar side, but he seemed to think that these tribes could be more easily reached from Chittagong, and he said that we should find a difficulty in getting water in some parts of the Hachuk range. If, however, we chose to attack from the side, he undertook that his father and brother would supply us with guides. He informed me that if one force were to start from Tipai Mukh and work down in a south-westerly direction through the villages of the sons of Vonolel, and another were to take a north-easterly line through the Howlong villages from the Chittagong Hill Tracts, they would meet in the villages of Bhuta. Before he went away I asked him again whether he had not heard some details of the western raids. He said that he had heard scarcely anything except the names of the leaders, and that Savyong, and possibly Gnurshailon, had assisted in it.

If the statements made to me on this subject were true, the authorities of the Chittagong Hill Tracts ought by this time to have heard something in corroboration of them. At present there is very little independent evidence. In a memorandum of the Commissioner of Chittagong, dated 14th January 1871, he states that a party of Howlongs under two Chiefs, Mongpoon and Seipooya, had started through the Syloo country to make a raid on the north west. I cannot find the name of Mongoon in any list of Howlong Chiefs. Seipooya is stated in one list to be the younger brother of Vandool, and it is possible that the southern Lalboorah may turn out to be his son. In a later telegram it was said that Syloos who were seen selling forks and other things in one of the Chittagong marts said that they had got them from the people of Sookpial and Lalboorah who had themselves obtained them in a raid on Cachar. From this account it is impossible to say which Lalboorah is intended, whether the son of Vonolel, or the kinsman of Vandoola. The Lushais I saw stuck all through to their original statement that the head of the western raiders was son of Lalpitang. The day after I left Changail a trader with salt arrived there from the station. He remained at Changail for seventeen days. During that time he saw great numbers of people from the villages of Sookpial and the neighbouring Chiefs. Some of these people told him that a raid had been made by people of a Chief living to the south-west. He thinks they said that the name was Lalpitang, but he does not remember accurately.

The direction in which he says they pointed is certainly that of Sangboong's village, as shown to me from the site of Morah's Poonji. They told him that they did not know exactly where the raid had been made, but that they thought it was in the direction of Sylhet.

Since I came back to the station I have got a bit of intelligence which I am inclined to connect with Gnurshailon. Mr. Stuart of Anworkhal tells me that some time before the raid on Kutlecherra four Kookies, apparently, from Mr. Stuart's description, Paitoos from Sylhet, had asked Mr. Bagshawe to allow them to look for a site for a new village on the range behind. He gave them permission, and they spent several days in the jungle exploring. A short time before the raid they are said to have appeared and said they could not settle there unless supplied with guns. Upon Mr. Bagshawe's refusal they went away. After the raid it was discovered that a new path had been cut from the high range to the vicinity of one of the garden roads, and that the raiders had come by this path. This matter will be enquired into most carefully. It may turn out that the story is incorrect, or that the circumstances had nothing to do with the raid. At present, however, I cannot help connecting it with the statement that two of Gnurshailon's

Muntri went down to the southern Chiefs just before the raiders started. This man has been in some way mixed up with all the frontier troubles for years back, and I do not think it is likely that he has been idle this year. Khalkoth directed a Muntri of Sookpial and two from the eastern villages to accompany us to Cachar and to remain with me until I gave them leave to go back. They are here now.

Nothing worthy of notice occurred after Khalkom left us. I hurried on ahead of the escort and reached Mouierkhal on the evening of the 27th.

It may not be out of place here to give some information of the position and internal relations of the people to the south of Cachar. This information is not, however, new, for it may be found scattered through various reports made by me from time to time during the last three years. In describing the position of the various clans, I shall begin from the west, and work east for convenience sake.

East of the district of Comillah is a hill tract known as Independent Tipperah or Hill Tipperah, as it has been the fashion to term it for two or three years back. This is inhabited partly by Tipperahs and partly by Kookies under Chiefs of the Poitoo family. The best known and most influential of these is named Mischoilon or Gnurshailon or Mischoial. There are several other versions of the name. He is son of Lalchokla, a Chief who surrendered in 1845 to Captain Blackwood on a promise of pardon. According to the Kookies, Lalchokla was, however, tried and transported for life, and his dubiously named son is said to have sworn to take vengeance on us, a vow which he has religiously observed.

East of the Poitoo are the villages of the Syloos. Their most powerful Chief is Savoong. Majors Graham and Macdonald got to some of their villages last December.

The Syloos swore friendship with Captain Lewin in 1868; but, as shown above, there is reason to believe that they were concerned in the recent raids. Savoong's village is said to be on the west bank of the Gootur on a hill which was pointed out to me apparently thirty miles south of Beparri Bazar. On the east side of the Gootur are the villages of the sons of Lalpitang, who has been always considered by us as the most powerful of all the Lushais. I extract a passage from a Report of Major Stewart dated 10th April 1862:—"Between the villages of Ruttun Poa (Captain Raban's opponent) and (the Cachar) Lushais, there are other villages of Lushais at war with them, the Chief of these is Lalpitang, three days' journey south of Sookpial. \* \* \* Of Lalpitang all that is known is, that it is numerically equal to the three tribes north of it."

In a previous paragraph Major Stewart had stated that the number of the three tribes was 27,500, therefore he considered Lalpitang's villages to number 27,500 more. This I consider to be an enormous exaggeration. East of the villages of Lalpitang's sons are the villages of their cousin Vandooka or Vandullah. He is considered by the Chittagong authorities to be head of the Chiefs, whom they call Howlongs, and probably he is now the most influential among them, but we in Cachar have always considered Lalpitang to be the more powerful of the two.

To sum up what I know of the southern tribes. North, east, and south-east of the villages inhabited by Tipperahs are Poitoo and cognate Kookie villages. East of them and apparently west of the headwater of the Gootur are Syloos, among whom the leading Chief is Savoong. East of them and south of Mote khlang (shown in Major Macdonald's map) are the Howlong Chiefs, among whom the most prominent are Vandullah and the sons of his cousin, Lalpitang.

Ruttun Poa is further south, and practically may be said to be in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. East of all these are villages of different tribes called Poi by the Lushais. These northern Poes are said not to be Lakhayr Poes (Shindoes), but probably they are closely connected with them. If we return again to our frontier, we find to the south-west of Cachar and north of Savoong the villages of Sookpial. His own village lies between the Gootur and the Dullessur on a high hill called Ryek, which I cannot identify with certainty on the map, but which is probably the hill marked D, south of Tongpial. North of Sookpial is the village of his sister Vanatang, reached by Mr. Kemble in 1869. The village of Tongpial, an inferior Chief, is further east. To the west are villages of Sookpial's brother, Thumbum, and his son, Garack. East of the Dullessur and a little to the north of Sookpial's latitude are the villages of his mother, Pibuk, and a sister, Ruttangpi; further north are Mehtong and Dharmoungpi. East of the Sonai are Khalkom, a son of Sookpial, Impanee, and some smaller villages; further south, close on to the Howlongs, are the villages of Bhuta, who himself is said to live on

a hill called Kotuloon, a peak of the Kanthong range from which the Sonai rises. Going to the north and north-east across the Tipai, we get to Kholei, the village of Vonpilal's son, Lalhi. This is two days' journey south of Tipai Mukh. One long march further on towards the south-east is the village of Poiboi. Two days further on his Gnoupa, a village formerly inhabited by Labroom, brother of Poiboi and by his grandmother, Vonolei's mother. One day and a half more in a south-easterly direction one gets to the village of Lalboorah, better known as Vonolei's village. Tangdong, who attacked the rear guard at Nugdigram, lives one day further on a hill to the north-east.

South-west of Lalboorah are his brothers Lenkom and Deoute; further east are Pois; and north of them, in or on the watershed of the Irrawaddy, are the Soktees or Pytes whose great Chief is Kamhow. The above is a rough and possibly incomplete account of the position of the chief villages between Tipperah on the west and the Great Burma range on the east, and between Sylhet, Cachar, and Manipur on the north, and the Chittagong Hill Tracts on the south. I shall now try to give an idea of the internal relations of these clans, a knowledge of which is, I think, of the greatest importance to us. Probably the best way to do this will be to relate what I know of the history of the family of Lalul, which is the one that has had the closest connection with Cachar for many years back.

When we first took possession of the district the hills to the south were occupied by various clans of the tribe called Kookie by Bengalees. Villages under Poitoo Chiefs held the Hachuk range up to the Gootur. East of the Dullessur were Thado Chiefs. There were Changails on the range which runs south of the Bhubuns, which were held by Thlangums.

The Saihroom Chiefs were east of the Tipai. Besides these there were many other clans, such as Hraltes, Warpies, &c. All these were people of the same race, speaking dialects of the same language, wearing the same dress, and having the same customs, form of polity, and religious belief. But they were constantly at war with one another, and when one Chief became more powerful than any of his rivals, the latter used to move up into Cachar, taking with them as many people as remained faithful. But the majority of the clan generally went over to the village of the stronger Chief. It was just as if in a feud between the Campbells and the Macgregors, the former had proved better men and had driven the Macgregor Chief with some of his clan to take refuge in the low lands, the Campbells taking all the clan lands and inducing the greater number of the Macgregors to remain on them and acknowledge the head of the Campbells as their Chief. About sixty years ago a Chief, named Lalul, of the Lushai clan, whose village was then situated far to the south-east, began to get formidable to his neighbours, and he pushed his village on towards the Cachar frontier forcing the Chiefs that he dispossessed to move north. He had five sons, Lalingvoo, Lalsavoong, Mongper, Bhuta, and one whose name I don't know. Each of these when grown up started a village on his own account, and so successful were they that twenty years ago Mongper had driven out the Poitoos and moved his villages up to the Pakwa, north of Chutterchoora. Lalingvoo had all the country between the Dullessur and the Tipai, the Thado Changail and Thlangum Chiefs having taken refuge in Cachar. Lalsavoong had completely broken up the Saihrooms and got their hills east of the Tipai, while Bhuta had got the lands, which he still holds, to the south of Lalingvoo.

Mora, the son of the latter, made a raid on a Thado village in Cachar in 1849. This was followed by an expedition under Colonel Lister, who burned the Lushai village. Soon after this Mora died leaving a son, Vonpilal, during whose boyhood the affairs of the clan were managed by Impanu, widow of Mora. Vonpilal died a couple of years ago, aged twenty, leaving an infant son, Lalhi. The consequence of the early deaths of Mora and his son is that the clan has grown very weak. It has almost lost the land between the Dullessur and the Sonai, which has been annexed by Sookpilal, son of Mongper.

Impanu, in order to strengthen herself, some time since invited Bhuta to move a village north to a hill south of Dallong and about due east of Mehtong between the Sonai and Tipai. Bhuta was anxious for this, but Impanu changed her mind and allowed Khalkom, son of Sookpilal, to settle there instead. To avenge this, Bhuta's people plundered Impanu's village last year, and burned Thangtiloon, a small village of Hraltes belonging to her, this year. In spite of this Khalkom holds on, and now the villages of Sookpilal and his sons extend from the Gootur to the Tipai.



Two of Laksavong's sons, Lalpung and Vonolei, became great Chiefs. The son of the former is Poiboi, whose village is south of Tipai Mukh. Vonolei's sons are Lenkom, Deoute, and Lalboorah, who has succeeded to his father's village. Vonolei had a second brother, whose name was, I think, Thangchao. He is now represented by his son, Tangdong, whose village, however, is always considered to be one of Vonolei's. In the last mentioned villages, besides the usual mixture of Kookie clans, there are great numbers of Pois. People of this tribe took an active part in the attack on Monierkball, and I have been informed that five of them were killed. The village of Lalboorah is said to contain about two hundred and fifty houses, but there are several small villages near which contain about three hundred more. Tangdong's is said to have contained about two hundred houses before it was destroyed by Kamhow. One account gives Lenkom one hundred and fifty, another not more than ninety. Deoute is said to have had a large village once, but it has dwindled down to about forty houses. Possibly these may be understated, but I have generally found the tendency to be toward exaggeration. One of the greatest foes of the eastern Lushais is Kamhow, who is said to have burned Tangdong's village and carried away his wife while Tangdong was making his raid on us.

It is probable that if we knew more than we do of the Howlong and Syloo Chiefs, we should find that their history and position resemble those of the family of Lalul, who is said by the Lushais to have been of the same stock as Vandool, Lalpitang, and Savoong, and I dare say that careful enquiry would show that the villages of the latter, like those of the former, are to a great extent composed of a motley collection of people from the various clans dispossessed from time to time by the Howlong and Syloo Chiefs.

This accounts for the constant fluctuations which we observe in the relative power of different Chiefs. If a man is dissatisfied with his Chief, there is nothing to prevent his moving to the village of another Chief. Consequently, when any Chief is unfortunate or unpopular, his village and, with it, his general influence dwindle away, as his people desert him for luckier or more popular Chiefs. I think it is of the utmost importance that these circumstances should not be overlooked either in shaping our future policy or in the dealings of local officers with the Lushais, and I believe that, if we know how to take advantage of the relations of the people to their Chiefs, we shall find in them a most valuable auxiliary force, not only in our immediate work of securing our cultivated frontier, but also in the attempts which, as I fervently hope, we shall make hereafter to elevate and benefit the hill men themselves.

J. WARE EDGAR.

CACHAR;

The 9th March 1871.

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#### MR. EDGAR'S NOTES ON THE LUSHAI AND OTHER KOOKIES.

##### Part II.

The importance to us of thoroughly understanding and realizing the composition and internal relations of the Kookie tribe is even greater than it seems at first sight. There are Kookie Chiefs settled in Manipur, Cachar, Sylhet, Tipperah, and possibly in the Hill Tracts of Chittagong. These Chiefs and the people with them have been driven out of the hills south of Cachar, as I pointed out in the previous part of these Notes, by other Kookie Chiefs of the clan known to us by the name of Lushai. We, seeing this and hearing complaints from time to time of outrages committed in our territory by the people of the Lushai Chiefs on the people of the ejected Chiefs, are apt to look upon the latter as a distinct race from the former, separated by them by impassable barriers raised not only by years of feud, but by difference of blood, of customs, and of language. Closely connected with this belief is an idea that our hill men are always in dispute with the Lushais; that in all frontier matters we can depend implicitly on their fidelity; that their peaceful habits, gentleness, and truthfulness offer a sharp contrast to the turbulence, cruelty, and treachery of their opponents—much in the way that the friendly Indians of Cooper's Novels are represented to possess all the imagined virtues of the uncorrupted child of nature, while the hostile tribes are incarnations of all kinds of wickedness. An accurate knowledge of the composition of the tribe and of the relations of its clans to one another shows that all this is exactly the reverse of the real facts.

The people who live in the village of a Thado Chief in Cachar or a Poitoo Chief in Sylhet or Tipperah differ in no respect from the people who live under a Lushai Chief. Probably there will be a greater proportion of people of the Lushai family under the latter, a greater proportion of Thados or Poitoos under the former, but the elements are precisely the same in both cases. Again, people from Lushai villages constantly come and settle in villages within our jurisdiction, while people from our hill villages from time to time join the Lushai Chiefs. More than this, whole villages with their Chiefs occasionally move from one jurisdiction to another, or leave our districts for the tracts outside.

These Chiefs, when not openly on bad terms with the Lushai Chiefs, are generally engaged in intrigues with them, which sometimes result in raids in our territory, sometimes in attacks made by one clan upon another. A brief sketch of the history of one family, that of Gaurshailon, some at least of the Chiefs of which are now settled in our territory, may show, perhaps, better than the above general remarks that the present position of the Kookie subjects of our Government as well as of those of Tipperah and Manipur is full of danger to the safety of the frontier. Most of the facts will be found in Mr. Mackenzie's memorandum on the North-East Frontier, others I have learned lately.

When the Lushai Chief Lalul began to push towards the north and west, the hills east of the Dullessur were occupied by villages under a family of Poitoo Chiefs, the most influential of whom was named Laroo. These Poitoos are also sometimes called Kachoks, but the latter name seems to be used by Kookies as a general term to describe all other clans of Kookies but that to which the speaker belongs. Laroo was driven out of the hills between the Dullessur and the Gootur by Mongper, father of Sookpial, and then seems to have taken a position north of Chatterchoora, where, however, he was very hard pressed by the Lushai Chiefs. At length, after a very severe raid, the Poitoos asked for the help of two Manipuri Rajputras, Ram Sing and Tribhubhanjit, who were at that time settled in south Hyakundy. These Chiefs are said to have collected their retainers, and, under the guidance of the Poitoos, to have surprised Mongper's village and taken him prisoner. They released him, however, on his promising not to molest any of the Poitoo or Manipuri villages near the frontier. This agreement was kept until 1841 when Tribhubhanjit was defeated in an attempt made by him to get possession of the Manipur State. Immediately on this Mongper attacked Laroo, and drove him with some of his people from the Chatterchoora range to the south of Kailashur in Sylhet. Mongper then moved his village to the north of Chatterchoora, where he was joined by many of the people of the Poitoo Chief.

Some time after this Laroo died. His son, Lalchoka, became reconciled to Mongper, and immediately committed a raid on the Manipur village of Kochobbari, where he killed twenty people and carried off six prisoners. Lalchoka afterwards said that he did this in revenge for injuries done to his father, Laroo, by Tribhubhanjit. But this was untrue, and the story was evidently suggested by the attack on Mongper, made, as described above, mainly to protect the Poitoos. Probably the raid was suggested, if not aided, by Mongper.

The Kochobbari outrage took place in May 1844, and in December of the same year some troops led by Captain Blackwood were sent from Kailashur against Lalchoka. They were assisted by a cousin of the latter, Lalmi Sing, who led them to the village. They there obtained possession of all the year's crops, and in a few days Lalchoka surrendered, as all the Kookies say, on being told by Lalmi Sing that he would not be put to death or kept in captivity. Of course, Captain Blackwood did not know of this promise, but from what I know of the Kookie character I have little doubt that it was made by Lalmi Sing.

However, Lalchoka was tried at Sylhet, and transported for life. He left a son, Gaurshailon, who is said to have taken an oath to avenge what he considers our breach of faith with his father.

In 1840 simultaneously with the raid on Cachar made by Lalingvroom's son, Mora, some of our wood-cutters were massacred to the south of Sylhet and a Tipperah village burned. The perpetrators of these outrages were described at the time as Kachaks, and there is little doubt that they were Poitoos of Gaurshailon's clan. The matter, however, does not seem to have been carefully enquired into at the time. Probably about this time Gaurshailon married Vaniatang, a daughter of Mongper, and sister of Sookpial. He then settled in the Sylhet District, and had a large village there partially peopled by Lushai and other adherents of his wife.

In course of time, however, Vaniatang and her husband quarrelled, and she with her people left him and returned to her brother Sookpilal, near whom she established a village, the one seen by Messrs. Baker and Kemble in 1869. Gnurshailon seems after this to have left Sylhet and taken his village into Hill Tipperah. This separation led to an unintelligible dispute between Sookpilal and his brother-in-law about the price of the bride, which was patched up in 1862 on a proposal made by Gnurshailon that they should join and make a raid on Sylhet. This led to the Adampoor massacre in 1863 in which Sookpilal, Gnurshailon, and two relatives and dependants of the latter, Rungbhoom and Lal Hoolien, were concerned. At this time Gnurshailon was supposed to reside in Hill Tipperah, and is said to have been under the protection of the Hor Thakoor who was supposed at that time to favour the pretensions of Nilkiano, the unsuccessful claimant to the Raj. The present Rajah offered to give up Gnurshailon, but we did not accept his offer, and when he was asked about him in 1867 he denied all knowledge of him. For some time after the Adampoor massacre Gnurshailon remained quiet, and we thought he had disappeared from the scene. However the dispute between him and Sookpilal was somehow reopened, and about 1868 he made an alliance with the Syloo Chief, Savoong, who has been long on bad terms with Sookpilal. Meantime Rungbhoom, and possibly other Poitoo Chiefs, had moved into Sylhet from Tipperah and were attacked there by Sookpilal's people in 1869. They afterwards accompanied Messrs. Baker and Kemble to the Lushai villages. These are the people to whom we suppose the four men who were at Katlicherra in November belonged, and whom I suspect of having got up the raid on our western gardens. Yet I am informed that all these Chiefs, Gnurshailon, Rungbhoom, and Lal Hoolien, are at present residing in the Sylhet District under the protection of Ali Ahmed, a Sylhet Zemindar. The Magistrate has been asked to enquire into the truth of this, but whether it is the case or not, the really dangerous thing is that it should be probable or even possible. The fact is that the state of the law and the ease with which these people move from one jurisdiction to another make it almost impossible to deal with them effectually. I think that wandering tribes like the Kookies should be exempted from the operation of Sections 25 and 26 of the Criminal Procedure Code and Section 4 of Act VIII of 1859, and that the jurisdiction over them should be made to depend on their race, not on their geographical position, at any given time. In other words, I should propose to treat them on somewhat the same principle as that theoretically adopted by the Government of the United States in dealing with the Indian tribes. This would require some legislative action, a special agency, and special tribunals. There might also be some difficulty in getting such a system to work in districts like Sylhet and Cachar without clashing with the jurisdiction of the existing courts, but I think that this difficulty might be got over with a little care and trouble. Of course, the above remarks apply mainly to our own districts. The Rajahs of Tipperah and Manipur should be pressed to put all matters connected with the management of their subject Kookies into the hands of the Political Agent in each State, who could then work in close connection with our own frontier officers.

If the system above indicated or some similar one could be carried out, we should have taken the first step towards protecting our cultivated frontier from Kookies external to it by getting a real control over the Kookies settled in our districts in Manipur and in Tipperah. But, of course, any measures of this nature would have no effect by themselves, and it is of more immediate importance to settle on the direct action to be taken with regard to the Lushai Chiefs and their villages. I have seen many propositions for the defence of our frontier and for the prevention of outrages like those committed in 1869 and this year, but I think they may all be classed under one of three heads.

The first of these may be called the policy of pure defence. It is to have as few relations as possible with the tribe, and, in the words of Lord Dalhousie used of another frontier, "to confine ourselves to the establishment of effective means of defence on the line of our own frontier."

A second line of policy is the permanent occupation of the Lushai Hills and the more or less complete subjugation of their inhabitants.

A third course is to refrain from occupying the country or from exercising any direct control over the people, and to attempt to gain an effectual influence over them by conciliatory measures by doing all in our power to extend trade and other humanising influences, while making the Chiefs and their followers clearly understand that we had both the power and the determination to inflict severe punishment for any misbehaviour on their part.

The first plan has, perhaps, the merit of being the most consistent with our general frontier policy, and it would apparently lead to fewer complications than either of the other two. But I think that practically it would be found the most difficult and in the end by far the most expensive course that could be adopted.

It must always be borne in mind in considering this question that our exposed tea gardens and villages are as yet mere specks of cultivation in a vast expanse of marshes, hills, and forests, and that to give effectual protection to them by means of guards and outposts we should require a line that could not be slipped through with safety, extending from north-east of the tea gardens on the Jeri round the south of Cachar and Sylhet and probably through Hill Tipperah, to the north-west of the Chittagong Hill Tracts and along the north of that district to Arracan. The difficulties and cost of establishing such a line of posts are questions of a military nature, and I do not feel competent to discuss them. But I may point out how, under certain contingencies, the network of roads which would necessarily form part of the line of defence might become a serious danger to the frontier.

It would be impossible to keep up the guards during the rains except at a great sacrifice of human life, and it is likely that in very unhealthy seasons it might be absolutely necessary to withdraw them altogether, in which case, if the Lushais were unfriendly, they might make use of the roads in attacking our villages and gardens. Hitherto we have enjoyed a practical immunity from raids during the rains. But this has not been, because the Lushais cannot get about at this season. On the contrary, this is their best time for collecting rubber, and they constantly come during the rains in pursuit of game along the high hills almost up to our cultivation. But they fear the low hills that surround our gardens with their rank and in the rainy season almost impenetrable vegetation, and the treacherous streams and strips of marsh that intersect them. Our paths would enable them to overcome the difficulty and would, when the guards were withdrawn, deprive us of the protection which we now have for eight months of the year.

This danger would, of course, be equally great if instead of thoroughly defending the whole of the exposed line, we were to select for complete protection certain portions of it, while during the cold weather attacks would be almost certainly diverted to the positions left imperfectly defended. Such are a few, and only a few, of the considerations which would lead me to reject the policy of pure defence if a more hopeful one could be devised. The permanent occupation of all the hills lying west of the watershed of the Irrawaddy, if accompanied by the complete subjugation of the tribes inhabiting them, would have the great advantage of almost completely protecting the south frontier of Cachar and Sylhet as well as Hill Tipperah, and in some measure the Chittagong Hill Tracts. In other words, it would have the effect of pushing the line to be defended some eighty miles, perhaps more, east of Hill Tipperah. I have no doubt that all the villages west of this line could be brought under subjection. Of course a strong military expedition at the outset would be necessary, and even after that the work would be troublesome and very costly. Still the thing could be done, and the only question to be considered is whether the advantage would outweigh the disadvantage.

If by subjugating the people of these hills we should deprive them of the power of injuring us, we should at the same time deprive them of the power of defending themselves against attacks from outside, and we should take upon ourselves the duty of protecting them from such attacks. We do not know with anything like an approach to certainty how far east lies the portion of the watershed of the Irrawaddy, connecting the Yuma range east of Arracan with the Laimatohk range west of Manipur, nor do we really know what people we may find in addition to the Lushais west of this line. For instance, it is not impossible that some at least of the Sokte villages and some of the people called Poies by the Lushais are on this side of the watershed. We should therefore in occupying these hills undertake to defend a country about the extent and inhabitants of which we know scarcely anything. But we know still less of the people from whose attacks we should have to defend it. The hills east of the watershed are supposed to be subject to the Burmese, but their inhabitants are described by Sir Arthur Phayre to be "practically as independent and as little known as the tribes of Central Africa before the days of Burton, Speke, and Grant."

The little that is known of these tribes seems to show that they are more numerous, fiercer, and more untractable than those nearer our present frontier.

It is, therefore, possible that after we had with great difficulty and expense subdued every Chief up to the watershed, we might find that we have to defend a more difficult frontier than the present one from more formidable assailants than we now have to deal with, and that too at a much greater distance from the cultivated districts which must always be the base of any operations whether defensive or offensive. In the above remarks I have taken it for granted that the whole country up to the nominal Burmese frontier would be occupied, and effective measures at once taken to establish our authority over the inhabitants. It might be urged that the occupation of a portion of the hills, say, of all to the west of the Tipai, would be sufficient, or that instead of employing at once sufficient force to reduce all the villages to submission, we might, while declaring that our jurisdiction extended over the whole territory, take our own time in reconciling the facts with this theory, and, as opportunity offered, extend our actual rule to one village after another.

As one of the objects of the occupation would be effectually to protect Cachar, I think that no boundary short of the watershed would be sufficient. The clans who attacked Monierkhal and Nugdigram this year came from the east of the Tipai, and their conduct at the Monierkhal stockade showed that they are a more formidable enemy than we have had to deal with hitherto. The occupation of the hills west of the Tipai would directly put any restraint on them, and might have the effect of making them attack us more furiously than before by exciting their anger without depriving them of the power to hurt. The Chiefs too of the villages occupied by us would not fail to increase the danger by their intrigues, and they would possibly attempt to divert suspicion from themselves by inducing the eastern clans to attack the exposed gardens on the Jeri and the Barak which are, perhaps, the most difficult of all for us to defend. The objections to a gradual and at first merely nominal occupation of country are the same in kind, but far stronger.

Even if we were eventually to succeed in extending our authority to all the villages, and success would be by no means a certainty, there would be a long intervening period during which the danger of attacks on Cachar would be, perhaps, greater than it is now, and such attacks, if made by people nominally our subjects and theoretically within our jurisdiction, would have a worse moral effect than even unpunished outrages committed by wild tribes whom we do not pretend to govern. In Eastern Bengal, with its dangerous Mussulman population and its colonies of intriguing Manipuris and wild hill-men, it is of vital importance that every man should feel that our rule is a real one wherever we choose to extend it, and that the power of our Government is sufficient to enforce unqualified submission from every one living within the limits of our territorial jurisdiction. Besides this, if we should eventually succeed in bringing all the villages up to the watershed by degrees under our rule, we should then have to face the difficulty of defending them from the tribes beyond. So that after many years of possible suffering to our subjects, and of danger to the internal peace of our districts, we should be in no better position than if we were to occupy and subdue the country at once. I have not said anything of the cost of administering the hills after our authority had been once established in them, because I believe that their wealth in forest products would be great enough if properly managed to do more than make the district self-supporting, that is, if in addition to the expense of the internal administration we should not have to take costly precautions against the inroads of the tribes to the east.

On the whole, if we were confined to the alternative of merely defending our cultivated territory or of permanently occupying the hills west of the Irawaddy watershed, I should, for the sake of my own district, prefer the latter. But I consider that the third line of policy mentioned above is in many ways better than either of the others.

I believe that by a just and prudent course of action we could bind the Kookies to us by ties so strong and lasting that the tribe, instead of being a source of difficulties and danger to us, would become our strongest frontier defence. But while I think that this can be done by conciliatory measures, I am convinced that we cannot hope to succeed unless we make the tribe feel that we can, and when occasion requires shall, not hesitate to punish for misbehaviours with unflinching severity. There would be no need of adopting a policy of reprisals in order to bring this home to the minds of the hill-men, and nothing but absolute necessity could justify such a policy. But it seems to me that a distinction should be made between a more system of counter raids and measures taken deliberately for the punishment of known offenders.

In the one case, perhaps, a year after the commission of an outrage a few troops or Police would be hurried into the hills, the first village reached, possibly an innocent one, would be burned, and the force would then hurry back to the plains pursued by angry hill-men like a swarm of hornets after an unwary intruder into their nest. After this nothing would be done till the next outrage, which would be followed by another miserable attempt at a reprisal, and so on in a monotonous and humiliating alternation of raids and counter raids. I can see no resemblance between such a system and a carefully organised and well conducted expedition, undertaken after grave deliberation, to inflict punishment of a defined character on known Chiefs, whose guilt had been established by careful enquiry, and who had previously rejected all the friendly advances made to them, such an expedition would be merely a break in the policy of conciliation, which could be resumed again immediately after the successful ending of the expedition with a certainty that hereafter, for a long time at least, there would be no danger of our friendship being despised or our motives misunderstood.

If the above views are correct, the only points we have to consider are whether the circumstances under which the recent raids were committed are such as to call imperatively for punishment, whether we have proof enough of the identity of the guilty parties to take action in the matter, and whether there is a reasonable probability of our being able to carry out a successful expedition.

I think an affirmative answer may be given to all these questions. The attacks on our gardens and villages were unprovoked, and were avowedly made for the sole object of getting plunder and prisoners. The raiders on one side were completely successful without apparently any loss to themselves, but after killing one European and many Natives they carried off much plunder and a large number of prisoners. The party attacking Monierkhal were not so fortunate, but though they suffered severe loss and did not get very much booty, still they did a great amount of mischief, besides killing a number of our troops and Police. Besides this they think that we were prepared for them in consequence of the information I sent in from Changail and naturally hope to do better another time. Even if Cachar stood alone, punishment seems to me to be imperatively called for, but the outrages in Manipur, Sylhet and Tipperah make the case very much stronger.

There can be no doubt that the raids on Monierkhal and Nugdigram were committed by Lalboorah and Tangdong. The Manipur Political Agent seems to think that Poiboi was also concerned in them, but I have not been able to get any evidence of this. Indeed, all that I have heard favours an opposite view. The evidence against Bhenkuia and Sangboong seems to be strong enough to justify hostile measures, and Vandool and Savoung will probably find much difficulty in clearing themselves.

I have not noticed a statement made by some Kookies, who said they recognized one of Sookpila's son at Allinuggur. In the first place, because I do not know any further particulars and cannot tell how far we can depend upon the Kookies; and secondly, because I hope to get some reliable information from people who are going out with the three Lushais who accompanied me to Cachar. Meantime I may point out that before the last raids the Chittagong authorities warned us that Howlongs were on their way down the Dulloi to attack Cachar. Now the Dulloi runs near Allinuggur, and people working through the hill above it would probably come out at that place. Anyhow we may assume that the deplorable outrages at Katlicherra, Alexanderpoor, and the Anwar-khal Cachari village were committed mainly by Howlongs, and surely they ought not to go unpunished. Lastly, there is now better chance of conducting an expedition to a successful end than there has been hitherto. We now know the character of the country, and that it does not oppose any insuperable obstacles. We also know generally the direction of the villages we want to get at, and the way to reach them. Above all the information collected lately on this side and at Chittagong makes it possible to estimate the amount of oppositions we are likely to meet with and to form a definite plan for an expedition. Taking all these things into consideration, I have come to the conclusion that we ought to take measures to inflict punishment next cold weather on the perpetrators of the outrage of this year, and I should propose to send one force from Cachar to the villages of Lalboorah and Tangdong, and another from either Chittagong or Tipperah to the villages of the sons of Lalpitang. Of course I do not presume to make any definite suggestions about the strength of the force to be sent in, its organization, or the way in which it should be conducted. There are, however, some points upon which the knowledge I have gained in the hills may be useful. If an expedition should be decided

on, it is of the utmost importance that preparations should be commenced as early as possible. Supplies, carriage, &c., should be collected at Cachar during the rains and sent by the Barak to Tipai Mukh before the 1st of November, or at all events within a week after the cessation of the rains. I have assumed that Tipai Mukh would be adopted as the starting point, because it is nearer to Lalboorah's village than any other place that can be reached by water. The river up to it has been surveyed, and is navigable for boats of 200 mounds up to the very end of the rains, and although there are some shoals which impede the navigation in the dry season, still even then it is every way superior to either the Sonai or the Dullesur. From Tipai Mukh there are paths leading to the villages, but I am inclined to think that a little higher up the Barak there are better paths leading from a place at which some Manipuri traders have established a mart. Between Tipai Mukh and Lalboorah's village are the great villages of Kholei (Voupilal's) and Seilam (Poiboi's). It is almost certain that the former would side with us, and more than probable that the latter would follow its example. But it would be advisable to leave a strong guard near, but not in each. This would ensure the fidelity of the people, and when they found that we had no intention of injuring them, their women and children would probably return to the villages from their hiding places in the jungle. Of course if these people should prove friendly, the utmost care should be taken to protect them from any kind of injury or annoyance. Lalboorah's village would probably be found deserted, perhaps burned. The force should, however, establish itself there and send out parties to get possession of the grain in the Jumes, to make prisoners any women and children they could find, and disperse any parties of armed men they could get intelligence of. The clan on finding that the force did not meet to hurry back to the plains in the usual manner would probably take to offensive measures. It is not likely that they would venture to attack the main body or any of the securing parties, but it would almost certainly attempt to interrupt communications and cut off supplies. Besides attacking weak parties coming up from the rear, they would probably stake the paths leading from the base to the main body. They would, however, soon tire of this and attempt to negotiate. The surrender of the Chiefs concerned in the raids should be insisted on as a preliminary step. They would give themselves up if promised their lives and liberty on complying with our demands. A very heavy fine of elephants' tusks, metnass, gongs, and amber necklaces, should be imposed upon them, and they should be compelled with their people to assist in making a good path up to the place in which a junction with the Chittagong force should be effected. The latter expedition should *mutatis mutandis* proceed on the same principles as that from Cachar. In returning both should be accompanied by the Chiefs and headmen of the offending villages. This would prevent any attempts at annoyance on the way back.

In the foregoing remarks I have assumed that the force would not meet any resistance in its advance, but that the supports would require to be very strong in order to provide against annoyance after the villages had been occupied. From what I know of the Lushais and their ideas about fighting, I think that this is the most probable course of events. But there may be opposition, other clans may make common cause with those against whom our force would be directed, and these last might elect to stockade and defend their villages. In either case a strong force would be necessary, and above all things it should be thoroughly organized and equipped. It would be well, too, to post strong parties on Chatterchoora, Rengtipahar, and Bongkong, and to get the Rajah of Manipur to send a large force to some points south of Moirang. This measure would prevent Kamhow from giving any aid to the Lushais even if he were willing, which seems unlikely. Mr. McWilliam is at present engaged in collecting all available information about the relative position of the several Lushai villages and about the routes from Tipai Mukh. We shall then compare this with what I have learned during my tour in the hills, and then show the result of our enquiries as correctly as possible on the existing maps. As in this matter fullness and accuracy of information are of greater importance than haste in submitting it, we shall not send the final maps and reports of routes until we are satisfied that we have exhausted all means of adding to our knowledge or of correcting our present views. As soon, however, as I can get a copy of the Eastern Frontier map, I shall put down on it roughly the position of the chief villages and send it demi-officially. One very important point on which we hope to gain information is the supply of water along the route. It is possible that in some places there may be difficulty in getting water enough for the force, but this can be overcome by the use of Norton's pumps where the water rises from a considerable depth, and by carefully accumulating and economising it when it is dependent on mere surface drainage.

The question of carriage is very difficult. I should advise that elephants should be employed as much as possible on account of the difficulty of feeding coolies, and the danger of their breaking down. We should not be able to supply many elephants from this district or from Sylhet. They should therefore be sent up here, if possible, before the rains. The Mahouts should be all picked men, and great attention should be paid to the gear of the elephants. On this point more than anything else would their efficiency as a means of carriage depend.

After the termination of the expedition I think that we should again adopt those measures of conciliation which were interrupted by the outrages of this year. Chief among these is the development of trade. The history of our relations with the tribes on the North-Eastern Frontier abounds with examples of the eagerness of hill-men to trade, and of the beneficial influence which we have been able to exercise by taking advantage of it. But in all previous cases that I know of (with the doubtful exception of the Coseyah Hills) the trade has been of a comparatively unimportant description. Now the Lushais have not only an intense desire for many articles which they can only get from us, but also what is for the present a practically unlimited supply of a valuable staple, India rubber. The trade in this article may be said to have begun after the expedition of 1869. It has been hitherto confined to a few villages near the Cachar streams. By far the greater portion of the vast forest of caoutchouc trees are still untouched, yet the amount of rubber imported into Cachar since March of last year has been more than thirteen hundred maunds, said to be worth in Calcutta sixty-five thousand rupees. From the enquiries I made when in the hills, and from what I myself observed, I do not think that this was one-tenth of the possible outturn from the hills between Cachar, Manipur, and the hill tracts. The forests near the villages of the Howlongs and Syloos are described to me as of far greater extent than those to the north. But strange to say, although people from the southern villages have been for years back trading in the Chittagong marts, they do not seem to have discovered the value of their rubber. I do not find India rubber mentioned among the articles from the hill tracts in the appendix to Captain Lewin's Report, and it is not noticed in the advertisement of the Mela at Chittagong. I have heard, however, of Lushai traders taking salt to the Howlong or Syloo villages and exchanging it for four times its weight in rubber, that is for about forty times its intrinsic value, if the price of rubber be really so high as I have been told it is.

There are also said to be great forests of caoutchouc trees east of the Tipai which have scarcely been touched as yet. Even in the forests from which the rubber imported during last year was collected, a comparatively small proportion of the trees seem to have been tapped. Rude measures have also been taken for the preservation of the trees, and the Lushais with whom I have been have promised to plant out suitable portions of their jume lands, as they abandon them, with caoutchouc trees. This last, of course, is meant as a precaution for the future. At present there seems to be as much rubber as the Lushais can collect, and as the demand for the article seems to be steadily increasing, it is probable that the price will long continue at least as high as it now is. The Lushais therefore have the means of obtaining by trade far more wealth than they could possibly acquire by a long course of the most successful plundering, and they will come to realize this fact after a few years of intercourse with us, for they are not wanting in intelligence. But as they become rich, as their villages get filled with all the articles that hillmen covet, the danger to them of attacks of tribes still further east will be a constantly increasing one, and this must make them the more inclined to rely upon our good-will.

We shall be able to aid them by advice and probably eventually to give material assistance. Thus by degrees forming them into a barrier against the encroachments of the tribes beyond. In this way the rubber trade may have very valuable political results. I have dwelt on this article, because it is undoubtedly the most important; but besides rubber, cinnamon, lac, ivory, wax, cotton, and some other things of less value can be supplied from the Lushai Hills. I have also heard of something which I conjecture to be sandal-wood found in the Eastern Hills, as well as a pine yielding turpentine. I have attempted to introduce the cultivation of the potato among the people I have come in contact with, but I do not expect it would be likely to become an important export. Indeed, it is not impossible that after a time the clans nearest to us may find it more profitable to buy food from the plains than to produce it themselves. But it is not easy to forecast all the changes that the discovery of the caoutchouc forests will eventually produce in the internal economy of the clans inhabiting the Lushai Hills. While relying



mainly on trade as a means of influencing the Lushais, I should not neglect education. I do not mean so much instruction in book knowledge as in the simpler mechanical arts. At present some people in each village can work roughly in wood and iron, but the great intelligence which they show in all matters connected with mechanics makes me think that they could be taught to do much better.

Some of the people I have seen seem anxious to have their children taught to read and write Bengali. I think that this desire should be encouraged, and that we should do all in our power to gratify it. But I am adverse to forcing any kind of education on hillmen when there are no traces on their part of a spontaneous desire to learn. To my mind the most valuable school for the youth of the tribe would be some such Levy as one proposed by me in 1869 in a letter to the Commissioner of Dacca dated the 3rd of April of that year.

As I still hold the views then expressed about the usefulness of such a Levy, I shall here quote some passages from the Report :—

"The Kookie Levy was raised in 1850 at the recommendation of General Lister, partly as a force to be used against the Lushais, and partly to give employment to the youth of the Kookie tribes whose love for fighting, it was hoped, would then be legitimately gratified in defending our frontier instead of in murdering their neighbours, as had been their custom from time immemorial. How this project succeeded, what the Kookie Levy was, and what it might have become, may be learned from the Report of Major Stewart to Mr. Allen of the Board of Revenue, dated 25th September 1857. Major Stewart commanded the Levy for some years, and I know of no man whose opinion on the subject ought to outweigh his. The Levy was amalgamated with the new Police in 1863, and now in 1869 the Officiating District Superintendent of Cachar has stated in a report, which I have just received, that Kookies are unfit to defend outposts. I believe that I can account for the apparent degeneracy of men whom competent judges like General Lister and Major Stewart thought singularly brave.

"The Kookies, like most of the other tribes upon this frontier, are of a low civilization, even for hillmen they are dirty in their habits, and they eat the most revolting kinds of food; they are at the same time sensitive to praise or blame, submissive to their superiors, and always ready to yield to any one possessing a higher civilization than themselves. The effect of the organization of the police force and of the duties constables have to perform is to render men of such a character perfectly worthless as fighting men. They find themselves looked upon by the Hindoos and Mussulman constables as unclean savages, scarcely worthy to be called men. They see that their ignorance and incapacity to learn practically shut them out from promotion to higher grades in which a knowledge of reading and writing is required; when they go into the district to serve summonses or to perform other similar duties, they cannot help perceiving that they are regarded by the people with contempt as hillmen with hatred as policemen. The consequence is that the Kookie Constable is one of the meekest and most inoffensive of men, but in becoming so he has lost the pluck and love for fighting which used to excite the admiration of Major Stewart. In this way we are unable under the present system to make any real use of the classes most suited for the work to be done on the frontier, while the same objections that exist to the employment of regular troops, whether Seikhs or Hindoostanees, may be urged with equal force against the employment of Policemen of the same races in jungles so unhealthy as those of Cachar. But there is a point of view even more important than the defence of the frontier against hostile tribes from which I regard the project of reorganizing the Levy. It might be made the most powerful means of binding them to us by ties of friendship and loyalty. If I were allowed to reform the Levy, I should do all I could to induce Lushais, Angamies, and, in fact, men of all the neighbouring tribes to enlist in it, and I should, above all things, endeavour to get unmarried youths of the most warlike villages to spend in the Levy the years that are now employed in the commission of acts of the most revolting kind. During the time of their service we should have an opportunity of teaching them to see, however dimly, the value of the civilization superior to their own, and we might be able to foster a desire to share in its benefits. But should we fail in this (and I confess that I am not very hopeful about it), still I am certain that European officials in a few years of kindly intercourse could get such a hold on the affections of the young men that they would on their return to the villages do all in their power to keep up friendly relations between their tribes and us."

There can be no doubt that great advantages would be gained if we could see our way to recognizing any one Chief as head of the entire Kookie tribes, but this seems to me out of the question. I do not think that even among the limited number of Chiefs who claim descent from Lalul there is any one who could undertake to conduct the affairs of the whole family. The efforts of frontier officers might, however, be profitably directed to an attempt to form a kind of confederacy of villages for the common object of defence against the tribes to the east. They might be also taught to look upon our good-will as a sort of band connecting all the clans with which we maintained friendly intercourse, and be induced eventually to submit internal disputes to our officers for arbitration. Of course before we could gain an influence of this kind over the hillmen, we should have to make them feel that we were really friendly and disinterested, and they can scarcely be made to understand this until they realize that we have the power to hurt them. If they think that our friendly advances are merely made to purchase their forbearance, they will be inclined to distrust and perhaps to despise them; and I fear that after the events of this year they would put such a construction on any further efforts at conciliation, unless preceded by the punishment of those Chiefs whom we know to be the worst offenders.

I have not gone into the subject of the precautions to be taken for the immediate protection of our cultivated frontier line, as the matter has been put into the hands of the Military authorities.

Before concluding I have to make some further remarks in connection with some of the topics mentioned in these notes.

The three Lushais who accompanied me from Punchung Kai start on their return to-day. They all go back by the Dullessur. I send with them a very intelligent Bengali, ostensibly to trade, but really to get what information he can pick up about the raids, and above all to do all that he can to get back the daughter of Mr. Winchester carried off from Alexanderpoor. Four Cacharies are going up at the same time in the hope of recovering the captives taken from the village near Anwarkhal which suffered so cruelly. They asked me to allow them to go, and I felt that I could not refuse them. Rowa, Sookpial's Muntri, has made himself answerable for their kind treatment, and promises that he will do all in his power to find out the captives and get them back. Mora, the Muntri of Impanu, says that he will go across to the village of Lalboorah and see whether anything can be done for the three captives taken from Nugdigrain. It is possible that we may succeed in getting back some of these unfortunate people, but I am not very hopeful of getting this.

I am making all the enquiries in my power into the story told by Mr. Bagshawe of the four Kookies who went to his garden last November, and into the alleged identification of Lalchung with the Chief of the Allinugger raiders. For this purpose I have sent Hurry Thakoor, who has proved of so much use to me in all my dealings with Lushais, and Roipa Muutri, a Thlangum Kookie, to make local enquiries. I have heard that Lilkriso, the half-brother of the Tipperah Chief and unsuccessful claimant to the succession, is somehow mixed up in the outrages of the present year. The Magistrate of Tipperah has been written to about this. In a copy of a letter lately received from the Political Agent at Manipur to the Foreign Secretary, dated 5th March 1871, some captives who escaped from the Lushais are said to have incriminated Vonol, Poiboi, and Vompilal. I think that their statements should be looked at with some suspicion.

There is no doubt that the sons of Vonol were the chief perpetrators of the raids on Manipur and East Cachar. But the guilt of the villages of Poiboi and Vompilal is at least doubtful.

It is worth noting that the only village named by any of the escaped captives was Sumfai, by which Chumpai, the village of Lalboorah, is evidently meant. The woman who said that she was taken off by one of Vompilal's people escaped on the road, it is said, near the salt springs of the village. Now Vompilal's salt springs are west of the Sonai, and the woman could not by any possibility have been taken there. The woman Bongloo said she was taken to one of Poiboi's villages, but she did not know its name. She said that she saw some people going on a raid supposed by Dr. Brown to be on Monierkhal. She said that these were Poiboi's people. If they were the Monierkhal raiders, this is incorrect, for there is not the slightest doubt that the latter were mainly Vonol's people led by his son, Lalboorah, and nephew, Tangdong. Of course some of Poiboi's people may have been with them, but it is more probable that they were not,

for during the raids there were men of mine at Tipai Mukh who say that the fighting men of Poiboi were engaged in bringing down rubber for sale at the very time the Naga woman says that they were going off to attack Cachar. I am inclined to suspect that the Manipuri officials who have shown on more than one occasion an unmistakable inclination to do mischief to both Poiboi and Vompil have on this occasion tampered with the escaped captive and possibly may have misinterpreted their statements to Dr. Brown.

General Nuthall has promised me to enquire most fully into this. The conduct of the Manipur authorities in the whole affair seems very suspicious.

It appears, for instance, that Dr. Brown at the time of writing his Report of the 5th March knew nothing of the story of Kamhow's messengers to the Rajah which had reached Colonel McCulloch on the 18th February, as mentioned by me in the 1st part of these notes. Desire on the part of the Manipuris to make out that the people of Poiboi and Vompil were as guilty as the people of Vonoel may be accounted for by the fact that the former have more than once complained to me that the Manipur Rajah levies tolls on timber cut and carried away from their own village lands.

The people about the Rajah are undoubtedly hungering after the rich rubber forests near Tipai Mukh, and they would like to use our paw to pull the chesnuts out of the fire.

I am very anxious, on the other hand, to keep on good terms with Poiboi and the people of Vompil.

If we are to have an expedition, the active assistance, or even friendly neutrality, of these villages would be simply priceless.

If any other policy be adopted, we should find their good-will of great use.

The fidelity of Sookpilal is at present of far less importance, for if it should be found that he was concerned in any of the outrages, we can get at him with ease, while if the Howlongs and Sylcos were the perpetrators, as I at present think they were, they can be punished by us from the Chittagong side without his aid or even without his being able to help them if he felt inclined. In my Report to the Commissioner of Dacca, dated March 6th, I mentioned the admirable way in which I was supported throughout my tour by Mr. Burland, but I feel that I did not do him justice. I am very anxious that the Government of India should know that I firmly believe that if I had been accompanied by almost any other man I know, we should scarcely have got out of our difficulties as we did.

The situation must have been a more trying one for my companion than for myself. He could not have understood the motives that led me to act as I did on many occasions, and if he had shown any distrust of me, or any difference of opinion from me, all might have been lost.

In my Report I omitted to notice the excellent conduct of a young Manipuri Rajpootra, son of Kanhai Sing. I keep this lad about me in order that I may see that he does not fall into mischief. When I went on my late tour he volunteered to accompany me. I allowed him, and have been delighted at the excellent spirit he displayed. It would be difficult to overpraise his courage, faithfulness, and cheerfulness amid our worst difficulties and privations. For his sake I should be rejoiced if the Government of India were to see its way allowing his father, Kanhai Sing, the choice of residing at Brindabun instead of Hazareebagh, and at the same time I think that such an offer made to Kanhai Sing and Gokul Sing would have a very good effect on our Manipuri colonists in Cachar and Sylhet.

I have just heard that after the capture of Kanhai Sing, his nephew, Kairukpa, went down to Gnurshailon's village. This was a little before the raids on Chatterchoorah. Information of this was given to Mr. McWilliam before my return by some one from the south of Sylhet, but as there seemed no reason at that time to suspect Gnurshailon, the significance of the fact (if true) was overlooked.

Hurry Thakoor will enquire into it now, and I shall report if we find out anything of importance. The story confirms my opinion of the advantage of letting the Rajpootras go to Brindabun if they wished. Their adherents here would know that their Chiefs were well off, and would be disinclined to intrigue lest we should punish the latter by sending them back to Hazareebagh.

CACHAR;

J. WARE EDGAR.

The 20th March 1871.

## II.—REPORT OF THE POLITICAL OFFICER WITH THE LEFT COLUMN OF THE LUSHAI EXPEDITION.

*From J. W. EDGAR, Esq., Civil Officer with the Cachar Column of the Lushai Expeditionary Force, to the Commissioner of Circuit, Dacca Division,—No. 548, dated Cachar, the 3rd April 1872.*

I have the honour to submit to you the general report on the political aspects of the Lushai Expedition, called for in Mr. Junior Secretary Mackenzie's letter No. 1896 of the 20th ultimo, forwarded with your No. A of the 25th idem.

2. Of course my review will be in the main confined to the operations of the Cachar column and its dealings with the tribes with which it was brought into contact; but I shall have incidentally to take notice of the political results of the action of the Manipur Contingent, and the present and future relation of that State with the tribes on its southern frontier. I shall also give a brief preliminary sketch of so much of the history of the Lushais since we first came in contact with them, as may help to explain the objects at which the Commander of our column aimed, and to show the amount of success he has had in attaining those objects.

3. From the earliest times about which there are any traditions in Cachar, the high ranges of hills to the south of this district and Manipur have been inhabited by tribes who, though very wild in some of their characteristics, and constantly engaged in fierce disputes amongst themselves, or with cognate but still more ferocious tribes living east of them, seem to have long ago advanced far beyond a state that could fairly be called savage. These tribes seem to have been practically independent as long as they were able to maintain their position in the higher hills. The Rajah of Tipperah indeed claims supremacy over all the villages west of the Tipai, but practically his authority was never acknowledged east of the Chatterchoora Range, up to which he used to exact a partial and, probably, fitful obedience. Neither the Cachar nor the Manipur chief had the slightest authority in the hills south of Tipai Mukh, and it is evident from all the early Cachar traditions that they did not claim any. But from time to time some village or group of villages grew stronger than its neighbours, and reduced the latter to subjection, or forced them to take refuge in the hills, which were acknowledged by all to belong to Manipur, or Cachar, or Tipperah. The new-comers theoretically became subjects to the State within the limits of which they had taken refuge, and in the case of those who took refuge in Cachar and Manipur hill territory previous to the Burmese invasion, the facts agreed pretty well with the theory; but as mentioned above, this does not appear to have been the case with Tipperah. It seems to have been the custom with the conquering villages, at least for many years back, to encourage families of the wilder tribes to the east to settle down in the places vacated by the refugees, and in this they seem to have been tolerably successful. Meantime the old feud did not always cease when the weaker chief and his people took refuge in a neighbouring State; he was often followed up and attacked in his new position. Less frequently he was able to make a successful raid and do much harm to the stronger villages. But it is probable that previous to the Burmese invasion both Cachar and Manipur were able to protect their own people, and possibly to assist them in attacking their enemies; but for many years previous to the death of Gobind Chunder, Rajah of Cachar, in 1830, neither State was able to afford any protection against the independent hillmen. Each movement of the tribes in the direction of Cachar or Manipur was followed by horrible massacres of the refugees, and at last the Bengali settlers in the south of Cachar were attacked and driven out of the cultivated low-lands near the hills.

4. During the entire period of which we have any record or reliable tradition, the tract above-mentioned, at least as far south as the present northern boundary of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, has been held by families of the great tribe known to us as Kookies. Colonel McCulloch indeed states that there are traditions both among the Kookies and Nagas which seem to indicate that the latter tribe at one time occupied the southern hills, but I have not been able to find any corroboration of this tradition. The name "Kookie" has been given to the tribe by the Bengalis, and is not recognized by the hillmen themselves; and I have never found any trace of a common name for the tribe among them, although they seem to consider different families as belonging to a

single group, which is certainly co-extensive with what we call the Kookie tribe. This tribe is again sub-divided by the Cacharis and Bengalis of this district into "old" and "new" with reference to the time at which the people of this district first came in contact with each family of hillmen. The "old Kookies" are democratic communities with very doubtful traces of having been once organized under chiefs. The "new Kookies" are subject to chiefs whose families are regarded as almost sacred, and whose power is only limited by the possibility of a malcontent transferring his allegiance to a more popular chief of the same or some other semi-divine race. The difference between the political organization of the "old" and "new" Kookies probably accounts for the fact that the former communities were driven out earliest, and that there are now no traces of them in the villages of the Lushais and other new Kookies who occupy the hills from which they were driven. On the other hand each family of "new" Kookies that took refuge in Cachar or Manipur left behind many of its members in the villages of its conquerors, many of whom again, when their turn came, had to submit to live under some chief still stronger than their own.

5. When we took possession of Cachar, and for many years afterwards, the families whose feuds attracted most attention, and from whose raids we suffered most, were the Thlangums, Changgels, Thadoes and Poitoos. But somewhere about 1840, the Lushais, (a new family) made its appearance, which by degrees has reduced to submission, or driven out all the others, and for the last twenty years has kept possession of all the southern hills. The first chief of this family, of whom we have any mention, was named Lalul; his village seems to have been originally further south than most of those of his descendants, and he is said to have come of the same stock as that from which the Howlong and Syloo chiefs are descended; but all the earlier traditions are very vague. We know, however, that he had at least four sons—Laling Vhoom, Lalsavoong, Mongpir, and Bhoota. The last, who was probably the youngest, is said to be still alive, and it is likely that at his father's death he succeeded to the original village, as often happen among the Kookies. Previous to this the elder brothers had each started a village on his own account, and being undoubtedly brave and capable men had widely extended the influence of the family. At this time (about 1840) Mongpir's villages were situated on some of the spurs of the Chatterchoora, from which the Lushais were rapidly pushing out the Poitoo chief who had previously occupied the hills on each side of the valley of the Gootur. Laling Vhoom's villages were situated on the hills east of the Dullessur, a considerable way south of Peak Z of the great trigonometrical survey: all the hills north of this and west of the Sonnai were held by Thadoes, who however were beginning to be hard pressed by him. Lalsavoong had pushed further east, and was struggling with the Singsoi Thadoes for the Chumfai valley and the range to the north of it.

6. About this time the Poitoos applied for assistance against Mongpir to two Manipuri Rajpootras, who had been settled by us some years previously in South Hylakandy, to protect that part of the district against the Poitoos themselves. In consequence of this application, the Manipuris with their armed followers made a sudden and successful raid on the village of Mongpir which was then situated on a hill near the Pukwacherra, somewhat to the south of the Chatterchoora range. The chief was taken prisoner by the Manipuris, but released on his payment of a ransom, and making a promise that he would not attack Cachar, or again trouble the Poitoos. After this the Lushais withdrew towards the south, but they kept up friendly relations with the Manipuri Rajpootras, and after the death of the latter, with their descendants. This seems to have been the origin of the connection between the Lushais and the exiled Manipuri Rajpootras, about which so much was heard in 1869 and again last year. The promise to refrain from attacking the Poitoos was possibly not without some effect. For although they were ultimately driven by Mongpir and his son Sookpilal to take refuge in Sylhet and Hill Tipperah, still there have always since been relations between Mongpir's family and that of the Poitoo chiefs of a kind different from those existing between the other Lushai chiefs and the chiefs dispossessed by them. A more detailed account of this matter will be found in my report C. of the 18th March 1871.

7. Meantime Laling Vhoom, Lalsavoong, and Vonolei, son of the latter, were prospering even more than Mongpir. Lalsavoong, having driven out, or subdued, all the chiefs north of the Chumfai Valley, died before 1849, leaving at least three sons, all of whom became powerful chiefs. One of these, Lalpoong, was head of the great village of Sellam, and the other villages now belonging to his son Fyrbol; but he seems to have been to some extent subordinate to his brother Vonolei, was undoubtedly the ablest and

most powerful Chief that the family of Lalul has yet produced. In his youth he seems to have been constantly fighting, and always apparently more or less successful. He fought various tribes to his south known to the Kookies by the general name of Poi, and carried off, or induced to accompany him, numerous families of those villages, whom he settled down either in separate villages or in the villages of his own Kookies. He followed the same policy towards the Soktes, another family of Kookies, whose head is Kamhow, the powerful Chief of Mubhem, and we found hundreds of Sokte families settled among the Lushais in whose villages we have lately been. He made numerous attacks on the Naga villages under Manipur, until, somewhere about 1850, Colonel McCulloch, who was then Political Agent, by judicious management induced him to come to terms, which I believe he kept faithfully as long as Colonel McCulloch remained in Manipur. He seems to have avoided quarrels with the other chiefs of the Lalul family over whom, however, he had great influence, and by whose people he was invariably spoken of as the "Great Chief."

8. In 1849, Laling Vhoom was the Chief next in influence and importance to Vonolel. He had driven the Thadoe Chiefs from the Rengti and Noongvai ranges, and had made a village for himself a little way south of the great bluff of Nisapwee (Peak Z). This seems to have been a larger village than even Vonolel's. He is said to have been preparing to occupy the sites from which the more northern Thadoe villagers had been driven, when he died in 1849. His death was followed by a raid, conducted by his son Mora or Moollah, against the Thadoes of Kaimong, a Chief whose village had been situated on the hill south of Bongkong, but who had some years previously taken refuge in Cachar, and settled about ten miles south of the station. He had taken with him two sets of gongs claimed by the Lushais, and it was on account of this dispute that his villages were chosen for attack. Lieutenant-Colonel Lister, Political Agent in the Khasi Hills, was directed by Government to find out and punish the perpetrators of this outrage; and some others that were committed at about the same time in Sylhet and Tipperah.

9. It is needless here to give any detailed account of Colonel Lister's operations which are described by Mr. Mackenzie in his memorandum on the North-East Frontier. It is sufficient to mention that his little force marched under the guidance of refugee Kookies along the Rengtipar range to a point a little north of its junction with the Noongvai range. From here Colonel Lister, with a portion of his force, made a rapid march eastward crossing the Roorki near its source, and surprised Mora's village. Most of the inhabitants however had time to escape, but some were killed, and the village burnt. Colonel Lister remained for some little time on the range; but the Lushais after their first fight commenced to annoy him in the way that the same clan tried to annoy us last December at Kholel. But in his case their tactics proved successful to a certain extent, for Colonel Lister, thinking his position untenable, destroyed a large quantity of stores, which were in his advance depôts, and retreated rapidly to Cachar, followed by parties of Lushais, who killed any of the coolies or guides they found straggling.

10. In spite of this, the effect of the destruction of Laling Vhoom's village, which was at that time probably the largest Kookie village in existence, was very great. Next cold weather messengers came in, who stated that they had been sent by Vonolel or Barmoilone, as it was then written, his brother Lalpoong or Lalpow, Bhoota, Sookpial, and another Chief of little note, to ask for our friendship and assistance against the Pois. Probably their more immediate, though unavowed, object was to find out whether any further operations against Mora were contemplated. They all seem to have come from Sookpial's village, and the Chief among them was a Manipuri, who had settled among the Lushais. He went back after a short stay in Cachar, and returned in December with Sookpial himself, who spent some time here. I may remark that this visit is denied by all the Kookies, and after reading all the correspondence on the subject, I think it possible that the Manipuri finding that the Superintendent of Cachar refused to give any presents, except to Sookpial in person, got some one to personate the chief. However rather friendly relations were formed by degrees with Sookpial's people; messages and presents were frequently exchanged, and when tea gardens were first opened in South Cachar, the Lushais from time to time came down and worked upon them, while traders and wood-cutters from Cachar made annual visits into their country. We had less communication with Mora's villages; but there was considerable trade with them, and occasional messages of a friendly character were interchanged.

11. But while the Lushais showed some desire to keep on good terms with the Cachar authorities, they perhaps accidentally followed a line of conduct which looked as if they suspected and feared us. Sookpial, who before 1849 had advanced north of

Chatterchoora Peak, moved his own village by degrees southward to his present position close to the Sylhoos. Mora died sometime after the destruction of his village, leaving an infant son, Vompil, whose mother, Impanoo, eventually removed the chief villages to the site that we call "old" Kholei which is practically very much further from what was then our cultivated frontier Nisapwee. The intention of taking up the village sites abandoned by the refugee Kookies was given up; but what the Lushais called guard villages were established on points commanding the different routes from our frontier to the chief Lushai villages. All intercourse between our Kookies and the Lushais was discouraged by the Chiefs of the latter, and traders and wood-cutters were obliged to go by water to certain points fixed by the Lushais, from which they were occasionally allowed to go to the villages of the Chiefs. In this way, in course of time, the Lushais succeeded in putting between our frontier and their villages a tract of forest which was not only unexplored by us, but to a great extent unknown to any of our Kookies, except a few old men who had not been over the grounds for years. It was a mistake on our part to allow this to happen, particularly as for many years after 1849 we had in the Kookie Levy an instrument which, if properly used, would have been admirably suited to break down the barrier which the Lushais were putting up between themselves and us.

12. For some years after Colonel Lister's expedition, there were no raids on either Cachar or Sylhet. But in 1862, Sookpial made a raid on Hill Tipperah and some villages in the south of Sylhet, in which several British subjects were killed or carried off. He was instigated and assisted by Gnoorshailon, a Chief of the Poitoos, whose father had been transported for a similar outrage about 1845, and by two of his relatives, named Rungbhoom and Lal Hoolien. Sookpial's complicity in this raid does not seem to have been suspected until 1861, when four of the captives escaped into Cachar from his village. During the three following years many attempts were made by the Cachar officers to induce Sookpial to give up remainder of the captives, and more than once a hostile expedition was thought of. Finally, however, Sookpial gave up four of the captives, stating that of the remainder, some had been sold to tribes on the south and south-east, and some were unwilling to leave, having married in the Lushai villages.

13. In the course of these negotiations an agreement was made with the representatives of Vompil and Sookpial, that each of these Chiefs was to receive an annual sum of Rs. 600 on his agreeing to do his utmost to preserve peace on the frontier, and to send each year certain specified articles by way of tribute. Some time after this proposal was made to the Lushais, some people, who represented themselves as sent by Vompil, came in to say that Vompil had informed the former Chief that he must pay a share of the tribute, the amount of which was greatly exaggerated. The messengers were informed of the real state of the case, and went away apparently satisfied. About the same time some messengers from Vompil complained of the extension of tea gardens to the south as likely to encroach on their hunting grounds. Their real objection clearly was that the advance of our cultivated frontier sensibly narrowed the belt of seemingly impenetrable jungle between them and us. Major Stewart told them that tea cultivation would doubtless extend as far as the streams were navigable, but pointed out that the Lushais would benefit greatly thereby. The general result of these negotiations was however thought very satisfactory, but it came out afterwards that our principal agent in dealing with the Lushais—a Kookie named Manjihow—had all through grossly deceived both parties for his own purposes.

14. In the beginning of 1867, Major Stewart, who was then Deputy Commissioner, tried, without effect, to induce Sookpial to meet him at the Polycherra tea garden on the Dullessur. In 1867-68 the Sonai was surveyed as far as it is navigable, and an attempt was made to survey the northern part of Sookpial's country with his consent and assistance; but one of Manjihow's people, in a drunken squabble, wounded one of Sookpial's people, and the survey party was in consequence withdrawn to avoid possible complications. The uneasiness which this affair caused was somewhat allayed by the reports brought down during the rains by traders who had gone up the Dullessur and Sonai; according to them, both Sookpial and Vompil were most anxious to remain on good terms with us. I believe that they meant to tell the truth, but subsequent events showed that their information was very incorrect. The truth is, that in spite of all these negotiations and messages and trading, payments of tribute and police allowances, we knew much less about the Lushais and what they were about in 1868, than we did ten years previously, while they were in a much more dangerous state, as far as we were concerned, than they had been at any time since Colonel Lister's expedition. I do not

think that the district officers were altogether to blame for this state of things. Doubtless we had made mistakes. The local officers did not act wisely in recommending to Government to do away with an establishment of Kookie scouts kept up since 1869, for the purpose of collecting intelligence connected with the Lushais. I think that Major Stewart was wrong in the way he treated the objection made to the advance of tea cultivation, and I am convinced that I allowed my desire to get information about the country to influence me most unfortunately when I tried to push the survey further than was safe or judicious at the time, particularly as I was unable to accompany the survey party, owing to my presence being still more required in North Cachar; but I feel that our chief fault was in not boldly and persistently calling the attention of Government to evils which we saw clearly. I think a right understanding of this question is so important that I shall go somewhat minutely into the evils alluded to.

15. Almost all the officers who have had any practical knowledge of this frontier,—Colonel Lister, Colonel McCulloch, Major Stewart and myself,—have all agreed in thinking that we should keep a constant watch over the Kookies in our territory and Manipur, and, above all things, that we should spare no trouble to get correct information about any dealings they might have with Lushais, and of all they learned of what was going on beyond the frontier. This was one of the chief objects of the Kookie levy; it was the leading principle of Colonel McCulloch's Kookie policy: and Major Stewart has often told me that both he and Colonel Verner had always felt the necessity of looking well after our own Kookies. But I remember perfectly that when I came to the district in the end of 1863, he complained to me that the Kookies were slipping out of his hands. The abolition of the establishment of Kookie scouts in 1860 had been the beginning of a series of changes, all which tended to weaken our hold over the Kookies, and lessen our means of finding out what they were about. Then the Kookie levy had been taken over from him and made over to the police, then, practically, an almost independent department, with results which I shall describe lower down; lastly, owing to the occupation of the waste lands of the district by persons actually engaged in, or far more often purposing to commence tea cultivation, and the action of Government in remitting the house tax payable by hillmen living on grants, the control of our own Kookies was passing from the official head of the district to grantees of waste lands.

16. The question of the inclusion of villages in grants has been lately discussed so fully that I shall not say more of it here; but I may in passing suggest that it may be worthwhile to consider whether we ought not to take some kind of tribute from all hillmen settled in Cachar, whether they live in grants or not. At present, owing to the cordial support we get from tea planters, we are able to a certain extent to look after the Kookies living on grants; but in 1863 the general attitude of the non-official community was markedly hostile to the district authorities, and a large number of planters were inclined to look with dislike and suspicion on any interference with Kookies settled on their gardens. Some went so far as to encourage and support their Kookies in disobeying extra judicial orders given by the Deputy Commissioner, and generally no Kookie living on a tea grant was allowed to perform any service for us, unless we had first asked for and obtained the permission of the planter. The result of all this was, that in a few years we entirely lost sight of the majority of the Kookies. In South Cachar, villages moved from garden to garden without our knowing anything of it. In spite of the discouragement of the Lushai Chiefs, there was considerable intercourse between their people and our Kookies; parties of the latter often met parties of the former in the uninhabited jungle while hunting or collecting rubber, and heard from them news of what was going on in their villages. Our Kookies occasionally went by water to the Lushai villages, and several Lushais from time to time came into Cachar and settled down in villages on tea gardens. Nothing of all this, however, ever reached our ears till after the raids of 1869. But if our relations with our own Kookies had remained what they had been for some years after 1849, we should either have got the intelligence direct from the Kookies themselves, or our scouts would have found out all about it. The case of the alleged murder of three of Sockpilal's people by Kookies of a village at the time situated on one of the Kunchunpore Company's grants shows very clearly how little was then known of the doings of the Kookies living on tea gardens. Worse even than our ignorance of what was going on between Kookies and Lushais was the exclusive reliance we were ultimately forced to place on Manjihow. As the other Kookies slipped away from us, and after the abolition of our fixed scouting establishment, we were obliged to depend upon him in all matters connected with Lushais, and I have since his death found out that messengers who had been sent by the Chiefs to complain against him have been of necessity put under his care while in the



district, while he and his people interpreted what they had to say. Besides this, the information obtained from the traders, Bengalees or Manipuris, imperfectly acquainted with the Kookie language and entirely ignorant of Kookie politics, was never sufficient to enable us to check Manjihow's representation; or even if they did bring down any suspicious intelligence, he with his superior knowledge was able to give it any appearance that suited him.

17. There was another result of the passing of the influence of the district authorities over our Kookies to the grantees of waste lands, the extent and importance of which I am not yet able to measure, and which it is very difficult to indicate owing to the enormous chasm between our mode of thinking and that of the people about whom I am writing. The Kookies, as I have more than once pointed out, seem to be unable to conceive any political system differing in essence from their own, and they look upon the district of Cachar, for instance, as a group of villages held together by the superior power, natural or supernatural, of the European head of it. The formation of tea gardens on unoccupied ground by Europeans would appear to them analogous to the formation of new villages by the sons of Chiefs, and they would instinctively look on the owners as rather dependent on the great central chief than subject to him. More than this they could without difficulty believe that a planter could make his garden independent, or even grow so powerful as to change places with the great Chief of the district and reduce him to dependence. Now when the planters forced the Deputy Commissioner, by some means which the Kookies could not comprehend, to relinquish his claim to tribute from hillmen settled in grants, the deduction drawn by the Kookies was, that each planter had to a certain extent made himself independent, though it was clear that as yet he was weaker than the Deputy Commissioner. Still it seemed to the Kookies that the power of the latter, which he thought very great after 1849, was decreasing, and the race is very quick indeed to take advantage of the decline of a great Chief's supremacy. Of course the Lushais would very soon learn, either during their visits to Cachar or from what they heard in other ways from our Kookies, of the imaginary change in the power of the Deputy Commissioner, and of the rise of so many apparently independent Chiefs on the frontier. It was from this point of view that I think Major Stewart's answer to the objection against the extension of tea gardens was so dangerous. The meaning the Lushais attached to it was, that he was *unable* to prevent the formation of fresh tea gardens in the southern hills, that is, that he was unable to protect the Lushais from the encroachments of planters.

18. I have several times since 1867 pointed out the mistake which I consider we made in amalgamating the Kookie levy with the police, particularly in my report C, dated 13th March 1871. I need not here repeat what I then wrote, but I must correct a too sweeping accusation of cowardice against the Kookies in the police. We had some very brave Kookie constables with us on the late expedition, and one Panek, the lad who was wounded at Kholel, distinguished himself very much. But while I gladly bear testimony to the courage and good conduct of all the constables who accompanied us, I feel bound to point out that they were completely useless for scouting, the work for which they ought to be most fitted, and for which they were expressly brought to the front.

The utter worthlessness of the police as scouts necessarily comes out very prominently in my work. It was of course my duty to get intelligence about roads, and I frequently accompanied General Bouchier and Colonel Roberts when reconnoitring. We tried in every possible way to utilize the Kookie and other constables who were with us, but could make nothing of them. Still more conspicuous was their failure when employed in an attempt to "stalk" the sharp-shooters who gave us so much annoyance after our attack on Kholel. It seems to me that this is the result of the disproportionate importance attached by some police officers to drill and uniform, and their desire to give their men the set-up and finish of regular soldiers. I do not think any attempts have ever been made here to keep up and strengthen those habits of the war trail which every Kookie recruit has learned in his boyhood.

Even if it be really necessary that the police on the frontier should be highly trained soldiers, I do not think that such necessity should prevent our having a body of hillmen well and suitably armed, trained as nearly as possible in their own manner of fighting, in scouting, in tracking fugitives, in hunting out water and paths, and in all the other accomplishments of jungle warfare, with just so much military discipline as may be needed to keep them together, and as little as possible of a soldier's dress or equipment.

19. But the abolition of the Kookie levy was not the only mischief which it brought about. The introduction of the new police system into Cachar entailed. Whatever may be thought of the policy of depriving the magistrate of all control over the internal organisation of the police in other districts, I am convinced that it worked mischievously in Cachar; for while the entire management of the political work of the district was still left to the Deputy Commissioner, he was made practically powerless to regulate the machinery on which he had mainly to rely to carry out the work. I pointed out this in reporting on the state of North Cachar in 1868, and I think it desirable to state here that my opinion on the subject is still unchanged, although I hope that the recent changes in the relations of the police force to Magistrates will do away with many of the evils and difficulties to which I allude.

20. Meantime there were very important changes going on almost unperceived by us in the midst of the Lushai community. I mentioned above that Mora's widow after his death removed their chief village to the Kholel hill on the east of the Tipai; she fixed her own village, however, on the range between the Tipai and Sonai, and still claimed superiority over the villages between the Sonai and the Dullessur. When Sookpial's sons grew up however, and started villages on their own account, they found the hills west of the Dullessur too narrow for them and pushed forward towards the Sonai, at first probably with the consent of Vompial's mother. In 1868 Khalkom, the most energetic of Sookpial's sons, had a large village of his own, on the same range as Peak Z, but further south, and had gained considerable influence over the surrounding villages. This was looked on with dissatisfaction by Vompial, who had lately taken over the management of villages from his mother, and married the sister of his neighbour Poiboi, who had succeeded to the villages of his father, Lalpoong. Another son of Lalpoong by a mother of inferior birth, named Lalroom, had gone further south, and managed the village of a very old woman, the widow of Lalsavoong. Vonolel as he grew old seems to have lost some of his great influence, and pressed hard by the Soktes, Howlongs of Lalpitang's villages, and Pois, to have made a kind of treaty with a powerful Chief of the latter, known to us as the Pallam Chief, who agreed to assist Vonolel against all enemies on the payment of a tribute in cotton and some other articles. One of Vonolel's sons, Lenkom, had started a village about twenty miles north of the Champai Valley. Another Deowte had gone off to the west, in the direction of Bhoota's villages. Tongdong, a son of a dead brother of Vonolel, had a village in the direction of Manipur.

21. As might have been expected, all these young Chiefs and the young men of all their villages were eager for fighting, but they seem to have felt that they could not do more than defend themselves against the tribes on the south and east. There were, however, left the Poitoos of Tipperah and Sylhet, with whom Sookpial's people had a standing feud, the gardens of Cachar, and the Naga villages of Manipur. The old people, the women especially, who remembered Colonel Lister's expedition and felt that it somehow differed from one of their raids, advised them to avoid our territory; but the young warriors who had not been born in 1849, or who were infants at the time, were unable to understand their fears. They could not see any difference between what they heard of the expedition and what they saw of Kamhow's or Lalpitang's raids. Besides, they probably thought that the Cachar Chief was not so strong as he had been twenty years before, and they knew that they were much further away than Mora had been, and believed that no force from Cachar could reach them. Then Colonel McCulloch had left Manipur in the end of 1867. He was succeeded by a Civil Assistant Surgeon, quite inexperienced in frontier matters, and unable to control or even to understand the intrigues of the Manipur officials who, though they knew very little more about the Lushais than he did, were resolved that no Political Agent should again keep the entire arrangement of the Kookies in his own hands as Colonel McCulloch had done. The Lushais soon found that the firm and judicious hand which had kept them in order for nearly twenty years was withdrawn, and thought that they might with safety attack the Manipur villages.

22. In November 1868, the Naga village of Menthia, in Manipur territory, was attacked and burned by Vompial and Poiboi, and several captives carried off. In December of the same year some of Sookpial's people encountered and killed some of Bunchhoom's Poitoos in the jungles of Hill Tipperah; they afterwards took Bunchhoom's village, which I think was in Sylhet, but were driven out of it by the men of a neighbouring police guard. On the 10th January 1869, the garden of Nowarbund was plundered and burned, and some of the coolies killed by Lalroom. On the 14th Deowte attacked the garden of Monierkhal, where there was a police guard, which however was unable to prevent his plundering the garden and destroying the buildings.

Early in February a great attack was made on the Kala Naga stockade, which was strongly garrisoned by Manipuri sepoys, by several Chiefs among whom Lenkom was prominent. The stockade was taken, and a Manipuri officer and several sepoys killed. Some Naga villages were attacked and destroyed about the same time.

23. We did not find out who were the actual perpetrators of each raid till long after, but we suspected Vompilal and Sookpikal from the first, and an attempt was made to punish them. The original proposal was to send a small column of soldiers and police up the Dullessur, in the direction of Sookpikal, where it was, if possible, to meet another small force advancing from the south of Sylhet, along the return tracts of the raiders. Another small body was to go up the Sonai to Lushai Bazaar, and then across through Impanoo's village to that of Vompilal, where it was hoped it would meet a Manipuri force working across from the point taken up by the Manipuri contingent this year.

These plans were materially altered and were not carried out successfully in their new shape.

24. The parties sent up the Dullessur were forced by the weather to turn back after having gone three marches beyond our furthest tea garden. The party from Sylhet got within sight of one of Sookpikal's villages, but unfortunately had to retire owing to want of provisions, having had some rather unintelligible dealings with Lushais and having lost two men killed,—it is not clearly shewn by whom.

The Manipuri contingent were prevented by the weather from doing anything. A portion of the force which went up the Sonai got to one of Vompilal's villages and within sight of that of his mother's, the headmen of which, as well as those of Vompilal's village, came to the occupied village and offered to make submission. They declared that Vompilal had lately died; that he had taken no part in the raids; that the raid on Mentha in November had been made by Poiboi alone; and that both he and his mother had always been anxious to keep on good terms with us. We have since discovered that Vompilal was really dead; that he had not taken an active part in the raids on Cachar, but that he, with Poiboi, had committed the outrage on the Manipuri village; and that he was really hostile to us, but had been restrained by his mother who had great influence over him, and dreaded a repetition of the affair of 1849. With regard to all the other raids, the Lushais gave very accurate information, and they promised to do all in their power to induce Deowte, the principal offender, and the other Chiefs of Vonolel's family, to come to terms. They also agreed that they and the headmen of Vompilal's village would meet a Cachar officer, at some place to be appointed by him, during the next cold season, and they would try to induce the other eastern Chiefs to do likewise. They of course denied that they had any captives taken in the recent raids, but they promised to do what they could to get back those that were in the villages of other Chiefs.

25. After the return of the expedition there was much discussion about the measures to be taken for the future protection of the frontier. I have not materials to enable me to describe here all the proposals made, but I shall give an outline of the views which I laid before Government. In the first place, I recommended that an expedition on a smaller scale than, but organized on similar principles to, the one of this year should be sent to attack Sookpikal in the first instance. I had then satisfied myself that Sookpikal had not been concerned in the Cachar or Manipur outrages, and that the attack on the Kookies on the Sylhet frontier was much less serious from a political point of view than the other raids; but Sookpikal was an old offender, and I feared that the results of the two attempts made to reach him would make him more insolent than ever.

I also proposed that while the military expedition was operating against Sookpikal, I should go up the Sonai with a guard sufficient for defence and make an effort to prevail on the eastern Chiefs to make a voluntary submission; and in this I hope to be aided by vigorous pressure exercised by Manipur in communication with me on the villages of Poiboi and Vonolel. If we should fail in our attempts, I proposed that the military expedition should, if it had time after bringing Sookpikal to reason, work eastward, through the villages of Deowte and Lalroom, towards Vonolel. After all the tribes had been reduced to submission, I proposed to carry out fully a policy somewhat similar to that which had been commenced after 1849, but which, as I have shewn above, had not been fairly tried, and to try to obtain influence over the Lushais by inducing them to settle on the uninhabited tract between their villages and our cultivated frontier by fostering trade, by constant communications with the people and Chiefs of all the villages

and by encouraging them to serve in an irregular levy to be composed mainly of hillmen to the frontier. I also proposed to lay down a boundary line between the Cachar and the Lushai hills.

26. The Government of India refused to sanction the expedition, and I now think that this was a most fortunate circumstance. Our knowledge of the country and the real position of the villages were then so imperfect that the expedition would have had very great difficulty in even getting to Sookpial's village, and certainly the whole season would have been occupied in dealing with him. Anything done in his direction would have very little effect upon the eastern villages, who would in all probability have thought they were safe from all danger of retribution if we found it so difficult to reach Sookpial. The proposition to re-organize a Kookie levy was not accepted. This I think is to be regretted, for it might have been very useful during the late expedition. I was permitted, however, to pay a visit to the Lushai hills for the purpose of meeting as many chiefs as possible.

27. I proposed to proceed first to Lushai Bazaar on the Sonai, and to use the influence of Vonpial's people to induce the chiefs of Vonolel's family on the one side, and those of Sookpial on the other, to meet me. If I were successful with the former, I intended to make an effort to work across through their country to Manipur, and I asked the Rajah to do his utmost to help me in dealing with them, as I had found, from the statements of the Lushais who came in to see me at the end of the rains, that the eastern people still looked upon Manipur with some of the feeling with which Colonel McCulloch had tried to inspire them. I also asked the Deputy Commissioner of the Chittagong Hill Tracts to make an attempt to meet if he could spare time, and at all events to do all in his power to open communication with me.

28. The Deputy Commissioner was unable to make any attempt to meet me, but he sent a letter which, strange to say, made its way into Manipur through the Howlongs and Syloos. Some days after we got to Lushai Bazaar, I had a meeting with the headmen of Vonpial's villages, and with Khalkom, Sookpial's son, and some other chiefs. I found that there was no chance of opening direct communication with the chiefs of the family of Vonolel and his brothers, that it would not be safe to attempt to make my way through their hills to Manipur, and that it was more than probable that no real attempt to aid me had been made by that state. Consequently, as Sookpial had shown some anxiety to come to terms, I determined to march across to the Dullesur, in the hope of having a meeting with him. I got across to Bepari Bazaar, and made with him there a provisional settlement of the boundary.

29. It will be seen from the above that whatever may have been the value of the arrangements made with the western Lushai villages, I had entirely failed to do anything with the eastern ones, and the Lieutenant-Governor Sir William Grey, felt great uneasiness about this at the time. It was thought, however, that in forming friendly relations with the nearer portions of the tribe, especially with Sookpial, the object of most immediate importance had been to all appearance attained. I had come to the conclusion besides, that owing to the geographical position of Manipur, and the relations which had previously existed between the Lushai and that state, the Political Agent there was in a much better position than I could be to carry out the wishes of Government; and I at the same time believed that hitherto the action of the Manipur Rajah and his officials had been quite inconsistent with a loyal adhesion to the declared policy of the paramount power. Consequently, although Manipur affairs are overlooked by the Government of India in the Foreign Department, I, with the approval of the Lieutenant-Governor, wrote to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal a letter, the greater part of which I shall quote, because I am still convinced that the views about Manipur are correct, although at the time I under-rated the danger to us from the eastern Lushais.

30. "The Lushais look upon the Tipai as the boundary between the clans, which are, to use their own phrase, 'the Manipuri Rajah's men' and those which are 'the Cachar Saheb's.' It is not easy to define exactly their idea of the relation indicated by this phrase; but the clans west of the Tipai certainly consider that they are in some way connected with Cachar, and those to the east, with one exception, have the same feeling about Manipur. The exception is the village of Kholel, which, though now situated on the east of the Tipai, still is considered to be one of the Cachar villages. East of Kholel, at the distance of about one day's journey, is the village of Poiboy, son of Laispoong. He is at present very much dissatisfied with Manipur, and according to the statement of the Lushai Dorpong, forwarded to the Commissioner of Dacca with my

letter of the 6th, he accuses Thado subjects of the Rajah of having murdered seven of his people this year. In spite of this all the Lushais of his village whom I saw spoke of their making friends with the Rajah ultimately as a certainty, and the Chief and his headmen did not seem to wish to have anything to do with Cachar.

"In the same way whenever I spoke about Vonolel or any of his sons, except Deowte, I was told that they sent Muntries and presents into Manipur, and that they wished to be 'the Rajah's people.'

"But, while I think that Manipur is in a better position than Cachar to gain an influence over the clans east of the Tipai, it is nearly as important for the latter as it is for the former that friendly intercourse should be kept up with these villages. The Chiefs are all nearly related to those south of Cachar; they are continually intermarrying, and their people keep up a constant intercourse for trade and other purposes. The result of this close connection is that the minds of the Cachar Lushais will be unsettled as long as Manipur continues on bad terms with the eastern clans. Dorpong, in the statement alluded to above, mentions that Poiboi had sent to ask the Kholai people to join in an attack on Manipur. It is true that they refused on that occasion, but something might happen at any time to make them change their minds. Even if they were to keep the promises they have made to me of not engaging in any quarrels with Manipur, Cachar might still suffer in the case of hostilities between the Eastern Lushais and the Rajah. For instance, the chief complaint made by the Lushais against Manipur is that some of their people were murdered by Thadoes this year, and as long as the present bad feeling exists, there will probably be many similar occurrences. Now, as a general rule, the Lushais would not find it easy to get at the Manipur Thadoes to make reprisals; but there are several Thadoe villages in Cachar, and the Lushais might be tempted to attack the people of them in revenge for the injuries done by their relatives in Manipur. Again, there are all along the frontier villages of Manipuris, who are our subjects and who owe no allegiance whatever to the Rajah. But if the Lushais were to get exasperated with the Manipuri race generally, they might attack the people living in Cachar without caring whose subjects they were.

"I have long felt the importance to Cachar of a good feeling being kept up between Manipur and the clans to its south, and in 1867 I went in, with the permission of His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor, to confer with Colonel McCulloch, who was then Political Agent, on this subject. At that time the Lushais were apparently on very good terms with Manipur and with the Thadoes and other Kookies living in that state. Messengers were sent from time to time to the Lushai Chiefs nominally from the Rajah, but really from the Political Agent, and presents were sometimes sent down. These messengers were always Kookies, in whom Colonel McCulloch, could put trust. He tells me that he "never allowed any Manipuris to mix in these affairs, fearing their inveterate habit of inventing, which would bring mischief." Occasionally, also, influential Lushais went in to see Colonel McCulloch, and I believe that when his messengers carried his silver-mounted Burmese dao to any of the nearer villages, the headmen looked upon it as the summons to appear before him, which they were bound to obey. The Manipur Kookies used at that time to shoot over the hunting grounds of the Lushais near the great salt spring called Chiboo, and when they killed anything, they left a hind leg at spring for the Lushais, who in their turn, when lucky, used to leave a leg for the Thadoes.

"All this is changed. It was at this very spring of Chiboo that, according to the Lushai story, the Thadoes this year killed Poiboi's men, four of whom were hunting and three making salt. Manipuris were sent down by the Rajah to negotiate with the Lushais. They went back saying, that they had been threatened with death; that the eastern clans had become most boastful and insolent; that they looked upon our tour

in to me spoke as badly of the Manipuris who had been sent to them as the Manipuris had done of them; they also said, frequently, that Poiboi, and the other Chiefs would not come to terms with Manipur until a 'good' messenger were sent to them. When I asked them what they meant by a good messenger, they said one who was honest, who meant really to settle matters, and not one merely sent to spy out the land and find out how most mischief could be done to them. I could not find out exactly what they meant, but I suspect that the messenger had talked in the usual boasting style of Manipuris about the punishment the Rajah meant to inflict on the Lushais, and of the ease with which their villages could be got and destroyed. I was rather surprised to hear the

Agent of the Manipur Rajah in Cachar talking in the same way, for the Manipuris generally think differently, and seem very anxious that both the Rajah and our Government should be friendly with the Lushais.

"I think that the change in the relations of the Lushais with Manipur may be accounted for. After very much opposition Colonel McCulloch, in the time of the present Rajah's father, got practically into his hands the entire management of all matters connected with the Kookies. Of course he always worked in the name of the Rajah and obtained his consent to every thing of importance, but he did not allow the Manipur officials to interfere in any way. The latter have always disliked the arrangement excessively, and when Colonel McCulloch retired, they at once set to work, to prevent his successor getting the same power. I believe they were successful in this. The influence exercised by Colonel McCulloch was not directly connected with his position as Political Agent, and his authority over the Kookies was not conferred on him by our Government. It was based on his great experience, on his power of conversing freely and directly with the hillmen, and on his minute knowledge of their affairs. It was impossible that his successor could be possessed of these qualifications, or that without them he could keep the exclusive management of the Kookies, and consequently the Manipur officials of the Rajah began to interfere. The result is the present unhappy condition of the frontier. The Manipur officials now see that as long as their interference is allowed to continue, the Lushais are not likely to live on friendly terms with Manipur; and as they are unwilling to be excluded from the management of frontier matters, they are doing all in their power to induce the Rajah to take hostile measures and bring the villages into subjection. For some reason or other, they think that our Government is likely to assist the Rajah in doing this, and they seem unable to understand that if we were forced to attack any of the clans, it would be those on our own border which give us trouble, and not those to the far east which are the only ones that Manipur has anything to do with.

"In my opinion the first thing to be done, in order to remedy the existing evil, is for our Government to make an arrangement with the Rajah under which the Political Agent should get, officially, the same position in Kookie matters that Colonel McCulloch made for himself. The Manipur officials of the Rajah should not be allowed to interfere unless when directed to do so by the Agent, and the Rajah should agree to pass no orders and adopt no measures affecting Kookies without first consulting the Agent. The Thadoes should not be allowed to carry on their feud with the Lushais, and occurrences like the alleged murder of the seven men at Chiboo should be carefully guarded against and severely punished.

"Trustworthy messengers might be sent down to the eastern villages not to settle any terms with the Lushais, but to induce the Chiefs, if possible, and if not the Muntries of the eastern villages, to meet the Political Agent. If they could not be induced to go into the valley of Manipur, I think it might be worthwhile to consider the advisability of the Agent going to meet them, say somewhere to the south-west of Moirang or the south of Kowpoom, or even nearer their villages.

"If in such a meeting the causes of the attacks on Manipur of last year could be found out, very much would be done. I think I have been able to discover the circumstances which led to the attacks on our territory, and I am ashamed to have to acknowledge that the latter might have been averted if we had been less ignorant of the Lushais and had taken more trouble to find out and redress their grievances. In the same way it will probably be found out that the eastern Lushais have suffered real or fancied injuries from the hillmen who are subject to Manipur. The Lushais told me that the Rajah had either fixed or promised to fix a boundary between their lands, and those which he claimed for his own hillmen. I hope that this is true. Among all the tribes on the frontier there is a very strong feeling about boundaries. Each village has its limits which are known and respected by the tribes around as long as they are at peace with it, and any attempt made, except in time of hostilities, by one clan to occupy lands belonging to another clan, would be condemned by every one. If the Rajah of Manipur were to fix a boundary for the Lushais and to tell them that it would be respected only as long as they behaved well, he would have no small security for their future good conduct. The effect of this would be still greater if the Political Agent were to go over some of this boundary with the Lushais, and if the Rajah were to give them a sunnud counter-signed by him.

"The Lushais would probably meet the Political Agent with presents, some for the Rajah and some for himself. The Rajah might be encouraged to make some return presents, and the Political Agent might be allowed to give something of small value on the part of our Government.

"When friendly intercourse had once been established, it would not be difficult for the Political Agent to find out if there were any prisoners in the villages of the Lushais, and if there were, to get them released.

"I believe the Manipur Chief would be willing to support the Political Agent in carrying out a consistently friendly policy. He knows that the Lushais are not the only, or even the most formidable of the foes on his southern frontier. Kamhow of Molbhem, the great Sokte Chief who is said to have burned Moirang this year, is much more likely to give trouble to Manipur than the Lushais are, and I have heard that the powerful and savage tribes called by the Lushais Khyrees are creeping up towards Manipur. It would be clearly to the Rajah's advantage to have in the Lushais a strong friendly tribe to break the attack of the outside tribes when they begin to press on his frontier. The selfish and ignorant Manipuris who surround him do not see this, but I think he might be made to understand it."

I do not say that the Political Agent would have been ultimately successful if he had tried vigorously to carry out the policy above indicated; but I think it almost certain that the eastern Lushai Chiefs would not have dared to make the raids of last year if he had gone down to Chiboo with a sufficiently strong guard and taken up a position there in December 1870.

31. Towards the end of 1870 information which I had previously received of the death of Vonolel was confirmed. In December I went down to Changsil, a point on the Dullessur River, where I met Sookpial, and finally settled the boundary fixed provisionally the year previous. After I had seen Sookpial, and just before I started to march across to the Sonai, I heard rumours that some of Vonolel's family were on their way to attack Cachar. I did not believe this at the time. But some time after I reached the Sonai, Lushais came in with intelligence that Vonolel's son, Lalboorah, had attacked the out-post at Monierkhal, garden, had killed several soldiers and police, but had eventually retired with a loss of over fifty killed. I heard also that Tangdong, Vonolel's nephew, had made an attempt to reach the Nowarbund garden; but owing to none of his people knowing anything of the country he had missed his way and came out at Nugdigram, where he got three prisoners, and that during his absence on the raid his village had been destroyed by Kamhow, and his wife and many of his people taken captives. The Lushais also told me that Lenkom had made another attack on Manipur. Some days later news was brought that the Howlongs under Benkuia and Sangboong, sons of Lalpitang, had attacked a garden in South Hylakanday, killed a European and many natives, and taken off several prisoners, among whom was a little girl who, as I understood from the description, was European or of European extraction. My informant said that the Howlongs were even then debating about giving up this child either through Button Poa or Sookpial. I also heard that the Sylhoos and Gnoorshailon's Poitoos were probably implicated in the western raids, but there was nothing more than suspicion against them. During the remainder of my stay in the hills I was employed in collecting information about the perpetrators of the raids, the exact position of their villages, and the easiest way to get at them. As I was on my way back, Khalkom, Sookpial's son, came to meet me at Lushai Bazaar; he corroborated the above statements and promised to assist us if we undertook an expedition to punish the eastern tribes. On the 22nd, just before I started on my return, I heard that some Howlongs were on their way to attack some of the gardens of South Hylakanday.

32. On my return to the station I found that the information given me by the Lushais as to the outrages in this district was to a great extent correct, but that very little was known here about the perpetrators. Whatever had been found out, however, confirmed the statements I had heard, and left no doubt on my mind that the raids on Manipur, Monierkhal and Nugdigram had been committed by the relatives of Vonolel, and those in South Hylakanday, Sylhet and Tipperah, by Poitoos. It would be superfluous for me to give here a detailed account of these raids, but I wish to point out a difference between the character of the attacks on Nugdigram and Monierkhal and those made on Alexandrapore, Cutlecherra and Jhalnacherra, which was not sufficiently brought out in any of the reports made at the time.

33. The people at Alexandrapore were taken so completely at unawares by the Howlongs suddenly emerging from the adjoining jungle in which they were concealed, that they were unable to make the slightest attempt to defend themselves, and Mr. Winchester, who was at breakfast when the attack was made, seems to have been killed before he had time to load his weapon. The bungalow at Cutlecherra is so situated that Messrs. Bagshaw and Cooke had sufficient warning to be able to arm themselves and a few of their people, with whose assistance they not only drove the Howlongs from the garden, but forced them to set free some captive coolies whom they were carrying off. The Howlongs returned to the garden next day, but were again driven off with ease by Messrs. Bagshaw and Cooke, this time aided by nine policemen who had come up during the night. The party which attacked Jhalnacheria, said to be 120 strong, were repulsed by a patrol party of one head constable and four constables who were in the lines at the time; and the Howlongs seem to have been driven across the river, before some more police, sent to the assistance of the patrol party, arrived from the stockade, half a mile distant. The manager of Monierkhall had received a warning of a threatened raid and had taken away his coolies before the attack was made; but he, with two more well-armed Europeans, remained in the stockade, which was held by thirty-seven soldiers and police, who were reinforced next day by Mr. Daly and thirty-nine soldiers. Lalboorah's Lushais, however, besieged the stockade for two days, keeping up such a heavy fire that, as Mr. Daly described it, a man could not show himself outside without getting a shot, and they successfully met two *sorties* made by Mr. Daly, who each time took out about twenty-six men, but was driven back with the loss of seven killed and one wounded. Five men had been wounded on the previous day.

Tungdong's party, after killing some Nagas and Bengalees whom they came upon in trying to find the path they had lost, came out on the Nugdigram road, where they met Mr. Daly's rear guard consisting of eight soldiers and a constable. The soldiers behaved most gallantly, keeping the Lushais in check long enough to allow the coolies they were escorting to get off in safety and then selling their lives dearly, for they are said by an eye-witness to have killed twenty-five of the enemy; but at length they were overpowered,—six were killed and one wounded. The Lushai got possession of thirteen muskets taken from the dead soldiers and police, and I heard in the hills that this was a matter of great exultation with them.

It will be seen from the above that the Holongs, although they carried off great booty and many captives, had shown themselves unable to withstand any armed opposition when met with; while on the other hand, the eastern Lushais got little plunder and only three captives, but had decidedly obtained what they would consider a great triumph over our troops.

34. I have tried in the foregoing paragraphs to show clearly, but without unnecessary detail, the main facts relating to the Lushais, on which were based the advice given by me in the first instance, and the ultimate decision and action of the officer commanding the force; and I shall now quote the original proposition for the punishment of the outrages of 1871, made by me last March.

"There is now a better chance of conducting an expedition to a successful end than there has been hitherto. We now know the character of the country and that it does not oppose any insuperable obstacles; we also know generally the direction of the villages we want to get at, and the way to reach them. Above all, the information collected lately on this side and at Chittagong makes it possible to estimate the amount of opposition we are likely to meet with and to form a definite plan for an expedition. Taking all these things into consideration, I have come to the conclusion that we ought to take measures to inflict punishment next cold weather on the perpetrators of the outrages of this year; and I should propose to send one force from Cachar to the villages of Lalboorah and Tangdong and another from either Chittagong or Tipperah to the villages of the sons of Lalpitang.

"Of course, I do not presume to make any definite suggestions about the strength of the force to be sent in, its organization, or the way in which it should be conducted. There are, however, some points upon which the knowledge I have gained in the hills may be useful.

"If an expedition should be decided on, it is of the utmost importance that preparations should be commenced as early as possible. Supplies, carriage, &c., should be collected at Cachar during the rains and sent by the Barak to Tipai Mookh before the 1st of November, or at all events, within a week after the cessation of the rains. I have



assumed that Tipai Mookh would be adopted as the starting point, because it is nearer to Lalboorah's village than any other place that can be reached by water. The river up to it has been surveyed and is navigable for boats of 200 maunds up to the very end of the rains; and although there are some shoals which impede the navigation in the dry season, still, even then, it is every way superior to either the Sonai or the Dullessur. From Tipai Mookh there are paths leading to the villages; but I am inclined to think that a little higher up the Barak there are better paths leading from a place at which some Manipuri traders have established a market.

"Between Tipai Mookh and Lalboorah's village are the great villages of Kholei (Vonpilai's) and Sellam (Poiboi's). It is almost certain that the former would side with us, and more than probable that the latter would follow its example; but it would be advisable to have a strong guard near but not in each. This would ensure the fidelity of the people, and when they found that we had no intention of injuring them, their women and children would probably return to the villages from their hiding places in the jungle. Of course, if these people should prove friendly, the utmost care should be taken to protect them from any kind of injury or annoyance.

"Lalboorah's village would probably be found deserted, perhaps burnt. The force should, however, establish itself there and send out parties to get possession of the grain in the jooms, to make prisoners any women and children they could find and disperse parties of armed men they could get intelligence of. The clan, on finding that the force did not mean to hurry back to the plains in the usual manner, would probably take to offensive measures. It is not likely that they would venture to attack the main body or any of the scouring parties, but it would almost certainly attempt to interrupt communications and cut off supplies. Besides attacking weak parties coming up from the rear, they would probably take the paths leading from the base to the main body. They would, however, soon be tired of this and attempt to negotiate. The surrender of the Chiefs concerned in the raids should be insisted on as a preliminary step. They would give themselves up if promised their lives and liberty on complying with our demands. A very heavy fine of elephant's tusks, metnaas, gongs, and amber necklaces should be imposed upon them, and they should be compelled with their people to assist in making a good path to the place in which a junction with the Chittagong force should be effected.

"The latter expedition should, *mutatis mutandis*, proceed on the same principles as that from Cachar. In returning, both forces should be accompanied by the Chiefs and headmen of the offending villages. This would prevent any attempts at annoyance on the way back.

"In the foregoing remarks I have assumed that the force would not meet any resistance in its advance, but that the supports would require to be very strong in order to provide against annoyance after the villages had been occupied. From what I know of the Lushais and their ideas about fighting, I think that this is the most probable course of events. But there may be opposition; other clans may make common cause with those against whom our force would be directed; and these last might elect to stockade and defend their villages. In either case a strong force would be necessary, and, above all things, it should be thoroughly organized and equipped. It would be well, too, to post strong parties on Chatterchoora, Reungtipahar, and Bongkong, and to get the Rajah of Manipur to send a large force to some point south of Moirang. This measure would prevent Kamhow from giving any aid to the Lushais even if he were willing, which seems unlikely."

It must be borne in mind that the proposals for dealing with Lalboorah after our arrival at Chamfai were made on the supposition that we should meet with no opposition from the people of Kholei or Sellam; that we should consequently be able to march on Lalboorah as quickly as our transport would allow us; and above all, that we should have no hand-to-hand fighting with any of the Lushais. The choice of Tipai Mookh as a starting point was contingent on the force being directed against the Chiefs of Vonoiel's family.

85. In July 1871 the Governor General in Council decided on sending an expedition into the Lushai country. The main force was to consist of two columns, one starting from Chittagong and one from Cachar; but there was to be a contingent supplied by the Rajah of Manipur. The Government of India in adopting these measures did not allude to the proof produced by me of the guilt of the Eastern Lushais; indeed, it was expressly stated that the most prominent offenders came from the country of the Howlongs and Syloos, and no indication was given of the portions of the Lushai tribe

against whom the Cachar force was intended to act. In the end of September I saw a letter from the Quarter Master General, in which it was mentioned that His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief was inclined to recommend that the point of departure of the Cachar column should be Tipai Mookh as recommended by me, but it was *not* stated in the letter that the attack was to be directed against the eastern Chiefs, and some circumstances had occurred since I had made the recommendation in March, which I thought ought to be taken into consideration. One of these was the arrival in Manipur of some Lushais, who said that they had been sent by some of the Chiefs of Vonokel's family to seek the friendship of the Manipur authorities, and permission to settle in the south of that State, and to ask the Political Agent to visit their villages during the ensuing cold season. About the same time some messengers came down from Sookpilal, who said that that Chief was anxious that we should attack the Syloos from the direction of the Cutlecherra range, and promised that he would assist us in every possible way. It then became a question for consideration whether we ought not to make a junction with the Chittagong force south of Sookpilal's country our first object, and let Manipur attempt to settle the eastern villages, particularly as the Political Agent was then opposed to my idea of the desirability of the Manipur troops working in the direction of Chihoo, and was anxious to take a route south of the Kowpoom Valley, which I thought would bring the contingent into dangerous proximity to a column advancing from Tipai Mookh.

36. I therefore asked to have the question of the point of departure re-opened. The matter was referred for final decision to Brigadier-General Bouchier, who had been selected to command the expedition, and I went up to Shillong to give him personally all the information I could. After a very careful consideration the Brigadier-General came to the conclusion, in which I fully concurred, that we ought to adhere to the Tipai Mookh route.

37. As I have not had hitherto an opportunity of explaining the reasons for this decision, I shall here go into them at some length. It may seem at first sight that we should have obtained some great advantages if we had taken the western route. In the first place, we knew much more about the hills north of Bepari Bazaar and Nisapwi than we did of the country east of the Tipai. Besides this, on the east side there is no water communication further south than Tipai Mookh, while the Sonai and Dullessur are navigable for very small boats as far as Punchunkai and Bepari Bazaar respectively. Then, if Sookpilal could have been relied on, the assistance that we should have got from him and his people would have been extremely valuable. Lastly, we should have had a fair chance of meeting the Chittagong column in the Syloo country. But it seemed to us that these advantages would be wholly or to a great extent neutralized if we could not put implicit confidence, not merely in Sookpilal's friendly feelings toward us, but in his belief that we were able to protect him afterwards from the vengeance of the rest of the Lushais. The route proposed by Sookpilal's messengers had not been explored, and was less known to me than that from Tipai Mookh; besides which it did not admit of our making use of water carriage south of Julscherra. If we had taken either the route along the Rengti or that along the Noongvai range, we should have been obliged to establish the dépôt at Bepari Bazar very much earlier in the season than was necessary at Tipai Mookh, on account of the impossibility of taking large boats up the Dullessur during the cold weather, and, unless Sookpilal could have been depended on to protect the boats going up as well as the dépôt, a considerable portion of the force must have been employed in the jungles at the most unhealthy period of the year. Then, although we knew the country as far as Sookpilal's villages, we had not the slightest information about the hills beyond. None of our people had ever been in them, and all I knew about the position of the Howlong or the Syloo villages had been learned from Sookpilal's people; we should have been therefore entirely in his hands after we got outside the limits of my personal knowledge; and if the southern people could by any means have induced him not to guide us against them, we might have found it almost impossible to communicate with the Chittagong force. Besides this we believed that the villages of the Howlong Chiefs, who were known to be the worst offenders on the Chittagong side, are situated considerably to the east of the Syloos, and thought that the right column would have operated chiefly against them, in which case I considered that we should have had nearly as good a chance of effecting a junction from the east as from the west. It appeared to us therefore that the advantages of the western route were not in themselves so great as to counterbalance the risk of the surrounding Chiefs being able to induce Sookpilal by threats or promises to withhold his assistance, particularly as we knew that he was very much afraid of the Howlongs, and that all the Lushais disbelieved in our

ability to reach the more distant villages. On the other hand, although both General Bouchier and I thought that it would not be safe to allow the success of the expedition to depend in the slightest degree on Sookpial's assistance, we at the same time saw no reason to suspect his friendliness, and considered that an armed visitation of his country was not essential to attain the objects desired by Government.

The rumours of his complicity in last year's raids had been shown to be unfounded. Information brought down by some Cacharies of the Ainakhall Poonjee, who went up to his villages during the rains, made it almost certain that he had none of the captives, and the conduct of his people towards me while in the hills last year showed that he at least desired that we should think him friendly. Then he knows perfectly well that we can reach him at any time, and we calculated that after we had reduced to submission his more powerful neighbours he would not be likely to give trouble.

38. Our position with regard to the family of Vonolel was quite different. These Chiefs had made no direct overtures to us, and there was nothing really tangible in the message sent to Manipur, which was besides taken in by men of no account from small villages dependent on Poiboy. These men did indeed make over to the Rajah one of the muskets taken from our soldiers in the raids, but the fact of this being sent to the Manipur Chief instead of to us was extremely unsatisfactory. Then we knew that Vonolel's people had both in 1869 and 1871 obtained signal advantages over our fighting men and those of Manipur; that in 1869 Lenkom had taken the Kala-Nagas' stockade, though held by a Manipuri force, which, I believe, was superior in number to the attacking party; that Deowte, in the same year, had plundered and burnt Monierkhall in spite of the efforts of the police guard there, and that in 1871 Lalboorah and Tangdong had killed and plundered the bodies of several of our soldiers and police, besides driving before them a European officer and his men. Besides this we knew that they were the remotest and the least accessible of all the Lushais from either this side or that of Chittagong. It seemed to us very unlikely that they, secure in their distant fastnesses, and confident that they were more than a match for our troops in jungle fighting, would be induced to make a voluntary submission by the terror inspired by our punishment of nearer and less warlike tribes than their own. General Bouchier considered, and I fully agreed with him, that the only way in which we could force these people to submit, and to recognize that they must behave properly in future, was to show them that we could reach them, and that we had the power of crushing any opposition they could make to our occupation of their country. I think that the result of the expedition showed that we were right, but I must confess that I for my part did not venture to expect that the Lushais would give us such an opportunity of showing them what our troops can do as they did on the 25th January at Koongnoong.

39. Strong advanced guards were posted on the ranges mentioned in paragraph 34 to provide against any possible wavering on the part of Sookpial, and the Brigadier-General requested the Manipur Political Agent to advise the Rajah to post guards along his south frontier and to advance a small force to Tasclapee, a point south of Moirang, so as to be in readiness to take up a position at Chiboo when the time for such a measure arrived. At the outset there was some reason to hope that we should be able to induce the people of the villages of Lalhi and Poiboy to separate themselves from those of Lenkom, Lalboorah, and Tangdong, and that we might induce them to be friendly or even neutral, in which case it was General Bouchier's intention to advance to Chamfai with as little delay as possible, and to make that place his head-quarters until he had attained the objects of the expedition.

40. But even before we started we found that this would not be so easy as I had hoped, and that it was possible that we should have to fight every village south of Tipai Mookh. In November eight Lushais came in, who represented themselves as sent by Poiboy and the headmen of Kholel to ask for our friendship, to deny that Poiboy had anything to do with the raids, and to offer to bring in Vonolel's sons to make submission to us at Tipai Mookh. In my letter of the 2nd December, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, I mentioned my suspicions about the reality of these assurances, and that I was inclined to think that Poiboy would consider our advance from Tipai Mookh a hostile measure. I had known one of the men, whose name was Dorpong, since 1869, when he belonged to Vompial's village, but he said that he had since left it and gone over to Poiboy, and we afterwards found out that all the men came from Kholel, Chipowee, and Tingreedoong, two villages dependent on Poiboy, but on this side of the great Moothien range. By degrees we learned from these people that the Lushais believed that we

should not be able to advance beyond Tipai Mookh for some time at least, and that they thought it probable that they might induce us to make some terms with them there and then to return. We also gathered from them that at the time they left, the tribe had not definitely decided on its general course of action in the event of our going beyond Tipai Mookh, but that if we should by any chance succeed in getting as far as the great range of Moothilen or Lengtene,—a very unlikely event all the Lushais thought,—and attempt to cross it, it was to be defended with the entire strength of the tribe. In consequence of what I heard from these people I advised General Bouchier on political grounds to advance at once to the Kholei village, as mentioned in my diary for the 14th December. But before describing the political results of this move, I shall attempt to give a slight sketch of the country in which the force operated.

41. An examination of the map which accompanies this report will show that between Luckipore and the Voombhong Hill, on which what for convenience sake we call the new Kholei villages are situated, our route never got out of the uninhabited and uncultivated jungle mentioned in paragraph 11, except when it passed through the Mainadhur and Bhubondhur tea gardens, themselves specks in an ocean of forest. The Barak from Tipai Mookh to Luckipore flows between ranges of high hills which send down innumerable spurs to the edge of the river. The path that did duty for a road was carried over these spurs sometimes on the Manipur side of the river, sometimes on the Cachar side, but always through a country in the highest degree difficult and repulsive. Between Tipai Mookh and the Voombhong range the route was easier and far pleasanter. We ascended gradually a spur of the Senbong range, which is, I think, itself a spur of the great ridge overlooking the Valley of Kowpoom. On our way we passed the sites of villages which had been deserted in consequence of the aggressions of the Lushais, and not occupied by the latter through fear of us. We found exquisitely fragrant limes growing near these sites, and walnut trees, which may have been planted by the former inhabitants of the hills. From the Senbong range, the highest point of which is probably under five thousand feet, we descended to the Tipai, which flows between it and the Voombhong range—a wide mass of hill with sloping sides, from much of which the luxuriant forests had been lately cleared for the villages, and joom cultivation of the Lushais. Of course we had to cross the Tipai to get to these villages, but our route onwards still lay within the curve made by that river in its way to the Barak. After crossing Parbachlung, which is merely a spur of the real Kholei range, we had to ascend the latter, which is, I believe, the continuation of the Kowpoom Hill. Its average height is much greater than that of Senbong, and the highest point on it reached by the survey party was 5,450 feet. The range ends abruptly a little to the south of this peak, round the base of which the Tipai flows. Further south are more, and probably higher hills, some of which belong to Poiboy, some to Vompilal; still further south is Bhoota's country. On the wide sloping side of this peak is the site of Vompilal's village, which is now broken up into the Voombhong group. North of this were the two smaller guard villages of Daidoo and Pachowee, some of the households of which have moved west to Voombhong, but probably more east to Poiboy's villages. The Tipai flows between the Kholei range and the hills to the east, which may be described as a cluster of spurs thrown out towards the south by a great block of hill. On the northern slopes of this block is the Tingreedoong village; that of Chipowee is situated on the first of the spurs crossed by us. We gave the name of Gnowpa to the next spur, which runs far to the south, where it meets a spur of the high Rengteng or Moothilen range. Along the ridge of Gnowpa are the sites of many villages now deserted. Poiboy's people have, however, again begun to occupy this range, and his mother is about to remove her village to a point upon it.

42. After leaving these hills we came on a great range to which I have more than once alluded. I do not know any general name for it, and I do not think there is any; but we used the name of one of three high peaks on it—Soorthlong, Moothilen, and Lengteng, to describe it. It is very steep and rocky, and the highest point on it must be 7,000 feet high. Koongnoong, the village at which we halted after the fight of the 25th January, was 5,500 feet. To the east of this range we could see several lower ranges between us and Chiboo, which was pointed out to our north-east. On these hills were many villages, all dependent on Poiboy, but some of which have since moved to Manipur. To the north-east was Taikoung, the village destroyed on the 26th January. The country to the east and south of Koongnoong differs very much in character from that of the west of Moothilen. The general levels are higher, the climate is colder and pleasanter, there is much less forest, and the flora is of a decidedly different character, pines and rhododendrons replacing as typical varieties bamboos and the great family of ficus. The hills too are more rocky and the soil far less fertile, or at least less suited to grow rice and

other products which flourish in the hills to the west. Between Koongnoong and Sellam, to the north-east of the latter, were two villages, but our route did not pass through them, as we took a more direct road. On our way we met with the first of those curious moor-like patches of flat grassy land of which we found so many afterwards. The next we came to was the valley of the Dinkai between Sellam and Tulcheung, a large village chiefly inhabited by Pois.

43. After we left the latter place we crossed the water-shed which separates the streams flowing into the Barak and with it into the Brahmaputra, from those falling into the Taow, which I think must be the Koladyne. From this water-shed we got into the flat valley of the Toocetow, which flows eastward into the Taow between two great peaks, which we used to call Lalboorah's gates, but the real names of which are Dithlong and Moorthlong. We ascended the latter of these, crossing it at the height of 6,700 feet; at this point was situated the village of Engow, composed entirely of Soktes of Kamhow's tribe. Not far from this is a village of Pois, but I was unable to find out from them anything to identify them with any family known by name to us. From Engow's village there was a pretty gradual descent to the Chamfai Valley. This is the largest of all the flats we actually met; but I think, judging from the little I could see of the valley of the Taow, that the latter is larger still. East of the Taow, but at a long distance, is a very high range of hills, beyond which the Lushais say there is a valley inhabited by Burmese. They mean the Shans inhabiting the southern part of the Kubo Valley, who are governed, I think, by a *Woongye* of their own race living at Khambat, about 60 miles due east of Sellam, or possibly at Kendat, some miles further east; but before getting to these high distant hills it would be necessary to cross many ranges inhabited by Lushais under Tangdong and Lenkom and by the various families of Kookies that look on the Sakti Chief Kamhow as their head. I was unable to make out much about the country to the south and west of us. It seemed to me unusually confused and broken, but I dare say that when the observations of Captain Badgely and those of the survey party with the right column are placed together, a very tolerable reconnaissance may be made out. We saw one or two villages which were said to belong to Lalboorah, and further west, as we were told, are the villages of Lalroom and Bhoota,\* with the latter of whom the Manipur or Cachar authorities have not yet had any relations.

44. I fear that the foregoing sketch may seem meagre and imperfect, perhaps unintelligible; but I hope it will be remembered that the direct distance from Luckipore to Chamfai is 9½ miles; that all the country between consists of hills ranging from two hundred to about seven thousand feet high, and to a great extent covered with dense forests; that the actual length of our route was 167 miles; and that the difficulties of this route are so great and continuous, that even after the road was made Chamfai was twenty-four marches from Silchar and fifteen from Tipai Mookh. When these circumstances are taken into consideration, I think it will be seen that it is almost impossible to give within the limits of a report like this an adequate account of a tract of country so great in extent and so diversified in natural features, or of a route full of difficulties so numerous and so varied in character. I wish very much that Captain Badgely or Lieutenants Leech and Woodthorpe, two very accomplishing engineer officers who accompanied his survey party, could be induced to write an account of the country. They are very much better fitted for such a work than I am, and if they would consent to do it, I should be very happy to help them in any way I could. I may here remark that Lieutenant Woodthorpe has very kindly compiled the map which accompanies this report, and which I think will be found to contain much useful information not to be found elsewhere.

45. The General with a small part of the force marched from Tipai Mookh on the 16th; I accompanied him and took with me Dorpong and the other Lushais who had come to Silchar in November and who now agreed to guide us to Kholel. We did not see any other Lushais till the 18th, when we met a number of men from Kholel, from whose manner and talk we learned that we should very likely have to fight Poiboy, and perhaps the Kholel people as well. That evening Dorpong and six more out of the eight Lushais said they wanted to leave us and go to their own village, as their families would suffer if any collision were to occur while they were with us. The remaining Lushai had determined to return with us to Cachar, and was of course considered a traitor by his comrades. The loss of these men was likely to be very embarrassing to us, and we were

\* Since my arrival in Calcutta, I have heard by telegraph from the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar that Bhoota has resolved to solicit our friendship.

naturally annoyed at their breach of faith, but General Bourchier had determined not to attempt to detain any one who joined us voluntarily if he should afterwards wish to leave us, and so we let the men go. It was most fortunate that we did so. It is probable that all or most of them fought against us at Kholol, but it was Dorpong who, on the 29th December, risked his life to bring us information of the intention of the Kholol people to submit, and from that time till we returned to Tipai Mookh he never ceased to work for us. In this connection I may quote a passage in a letter to me from General Bourchier: "Another man I think deserving of reward is Dorpong, a Lushai of the Lushais; but be he what he may, in his peculiar manner he rendered us immense service and faithfully warned us that we should be attacked." But it is certain that if General Bourchier had attempted to keep this man on the 18th December, he would not have been able to write in those terms of him at the end of the expedition. The policy begun in this instance was followed throughout. Lushais from all the villages with which we were not actually fighting at the time were always encouraged to come into camp, and they were allowed to leave when they liked, of course subject to the restriction that they could not pass the sentries after night-fall without permission from the officer commanding. I am convinced that much of the success of our column was owing to the consistent way in which General Bourchier carried out this policy. It may be thought at first sight that it enabled the Lushais to get information about us which they otherwise could not have got, and which ought to have been concealed from them. This danger was carefully considered by the General, and he came to the conclusion that ordinarily it would be advantageous to let the Lushais know as much as possible about our strength and movements, and that if at any time operations requiring secrecy were in preparation, there would be no difficulty in preventing the Lushais who might be with us from leaving the camp. It is worthy of remark that the almost unrestricted intercourse which we kept up with the Lushais could not have been maintained but for the perfect discipline and order of the head-quarters camp, and the good conduct of all the men we had with us. What seemed to me most admirable in this discipline and order was that it was kept up with no apparent effort. No soldier ever appeared to commit an offence, and there appeared to be no punishments. The conduct of the coolies with us was nearly as good as that of the soldiers.

46. On the 22nd we crossed the Tipai after some altercation with Lushais whom we met at the stream. They were told that we meant to visit their village, but that we did not mean them any injury, as we were going against Vonolel's people. Next day, while we were ascending the hill towards the village, our advanced party was fired upon, and that day was spent in skirmishes with the Lushais and in burning villages and grain. We encamped for the night in a village where we remained until the 26th, annoyed night and day by the Lushai sharpshooters, who kept firing into the village under cover of the surrounding jungle. On the 26th we returned to the Tooeebhoom, and in my diary for that day I have mentioned how admirably the manoeuvre was effected. During the two following days the Lushais, themselves completely protected by the dense jungle, gave us much trouble by firing upon coolies and working parties. An attack was also made on the elephants when out for fodder near Tipai Mookh, in which several mahouts were killed and some elephants wounded. It must be remembered that all this time we had no means of communicating with the Lushais, of learning what they were about or aiming at, or of letting them know our wishes and intentions. This made my position as civil officer a very trying one. On the 29th General Bourchier again ascended the Voombong hill to hunt for more villages. At first there was some firing between our troops and the Lushais concealed in the jungle; but half way up the hill we met Dorpong and some other Lushais who said that the people of Kholol wanted to make submission, as Poiboy had told them he could not help them. From that time there was no more fighting with the Kholol people, although they were not informed that their submission would be accepted for some days after.

47. I shall now try to give the Lushai side of the Kholol affair as far as I could learn it from themselves. Of course many of their statements were not to be trusted, and I have to depend on conjecture for several points on which they could not be induced to give me any information, but I think that the following account is on the main correct. The people of all that are left of Vompilal's villages have been for some time, as I have more than once reported, divided into two factions, one of which adheres to Impanoo, Vompilal's mother, who lives at Dollong, and the other to his widow, who lives at Kholol, and claims to manage the whole community in the name of her son Lalhi. The younger widow is the sister of Poiboy, who of course supports her in her disputes with her mother-in-law. The latter has in consequence sought the assistance of Sook-pilal's son, Khaikom, who has moved his village across the Sonai to the same ridge as that

on which Dollong is situated. When it was found that the expedition was really advancing in the direction of Kholel, and the headmen of all Voupilal's villages had to decide on the course they were to adopt with regard to us, it was found that the adherents of Impanoo were anxious to make at least a pretence of being friends with us, and to help us to get away towards the east, or at all events not to hinder us in any way; while the other party were eager to oppose our advance. There were two reasons for this difference of opinion. The adherents of Impanoo are generally the older people of the different villages, many of them witnesses of the destruction of Mora's village, which they did not wish to have repeated; while the minds of the younger members of the community, who mainly formed the other party, naturally dwelt chiefly on the fact that in 1849 the force had to hurry out of the country.

Then again if the Kholel people were to oppose us unsuccessfully there was danger of our next attacking the rest of Voupilal's villages, which all lay to the west, in which case both Impanoo and Khalkom would have suffered; while it was equally the interest of Poiboy that the force should be opposed before getting as far as his country. The two parties do not seem to have come to any decision, but probably there was a tacit compromise that if we did not attempt to visit the Voombong villages, we should not be opposed, and that in this case the Kholel people would keep in outwardly friendly terms with us unless we met with some disaster ahead, or had to return unsuccessfully, when they might fall upon us with perfect safety. Of course it would have been impossible for us to accept such a situation. It was almost a necessity to make every village behind safe before taking a step in advance. From the position of the new Kholel group of villages, it could have done us more injury than any other, and we could not make sure of this group without visiting it and leaving a party in a position to command all the villages. Of course after matters had been brought to a crisis by the attack on our advance guard on the 23rd, both parties were forced to join and do their utmost to get rid of us, and they were helped by people from Poiboy's villages of Tingreedoong, Chipowee, and perhaps some others. After the General had taken up his position in the village they tried to make it untenable and to force him to retire, as they think they forced Colonel Lister to hurry out of the country by similar measures in 1849, and they thought they had succeeded when we returned to the Toowebhoom on the 26th, leaving several villages and much grain untouched. The owners thought that they were now quite safe, and began to re-occupy their houses which they had deserted and bring back their families from Tingreedoong, Chipowee, Dollong, and other villages, where they had been sent for safety. At the same time they commenced to harass our communications as they did in Colonel Lister's case.

48. On the morning of the 29th they had no idea of giving in, but when they saw General Bouchier marching towards their villages again, instead of hurrying back to Tipai Mookh, as they expected, they were seized with a sudden panic. The owners of property which had escaped the previous destruction, and who had congratulated themselves that they were safe, could not bring themselves to run the same risk a second time; a village council was hastily held, in which they clamoured for instant submission. In this they were supported by the people present from the western villages, who saw that their turn must come next, and Poiboy's people and the people whose villages had been already destroyed had to yield very reluctantly, as I was afterwards told by one of the latter. After they had decided to submit there was a difficulty about letting us know that they had done so, for they knew that it was almost certain that any Lushai seen in the jungle would be taken for one of the sharp-shooters who were annoying us, and shot down before he could make the friendliness of his intentions understood; but Dorpong undertook the risk and came to meet us waving a red cloth, which I had given him. One of the soldiers of the advanced guard was just about to fire at him when Captain Butter, General Bouchier's aide-de-camp, who was most fortunately in front at the time, recognised Dorpong and told the man not to fire. From that day we never had the slightest difficulty in communicating with the Lushais. The terms imposed on the village of Kholel were designedly lenient. Our great object was to get to Chamfai as quickly as possible, and General Bouchier considered that to enable him to do this the safety of his communications was essential. The headmen agreed to make themselves responsible for the safety of our communications between Tipai Mookh and the Toowebhoom, and they gave three of their number to remain with us as hostages until our return from Chamfai.

These men behaved admirably all through the remainder of the expedition, and did us excellent service more than once. We knew that there were no captive British subjects in the village, but I found out afterwards that there were two Naga women who

had been taken prisoners when the village of Mentha in Manipur was destroyed in 1869. One of these was given up while we were in the country and accompanied me back. She is now with her relatives, who have come into Cachar. Another was brought down to Tipai Mookh after I had left, but as she showed a disinclination to come further unless some of the Lushais accompanied her, which they were unwilling to do, Colonel Nuthall, the officer commanding there, did not like to force her or the Lushais in the matter, and allowed her to return on her promising to come down with the next set of Lushais visiting Cachar. I think Colonel Nuthall exercised a wise discretion particularly as cholera had made its appearance between Tipai Mookh and Cachar. On my way back I arranged with the Kholei headmen that they are to meet me or some other officer next cold season at any place that may be appointed, and have promised to get up a fair for them at Tipai Mookh.

49. There was a rumour that Kholkom was wounded at Kholei. I could not find out the truth of it. He was certainly very ill at one time, and no one seemed able to explain his disease. It is quite possible that he may have taken part in some of the fighting at Kholei, and more than probable that people from his village and that of Impanoo did; but there is equal reason to believe that he did not at the outset wish the Kholei people to oppose us, and that his party were eager to submit on the 29th. Indeed, I have heard from the people of Lalboorah and Poiboy that Kholkom had the principal share in bringing about the submission, and they spoke very bitterly on the subject. They also accused him of having induced us to attack them to save himself, and I have heard them say that as soon as we had left the country, all the eastern villages would unite and take vengeance on him. This, however, was before the affair at Koongnoong and the subsequent disintegration of the eastern villages. Kholkom is now stronger than the entire family of Vonolei. But it will be more convenient for me to treat this subject lower down, when I attempt an estimate of our relations with Sookpilai.

50. Our next political object after having settled the Kholei difficulty was to come to such terms with the people of Tingreedoong and Chipowee that we could rely on their not giving us trouble in the rear in the event, which now seemed probable, of Poiboy's joining the sons of Vonolei, and opposing us when we attempted to cross the Lengteng which we should have had to do if we had taken the route we then contemplated. But we were not able to leave the Tooeebhoom till the 6th January, although the road ahead had been pushed on a considerable way previous to that date. On the 10th and three following days 225 Thadoo Kookies, the inhabitants of a village formerly subject to Vonolei, arrived at Cheebo, to which place the Manipuri contingent had advanced. The people of this village, it seems, had taken advantage of the confusion into which the Lushais had been thrown, by the events at Kholei and our threatened advance, to make their escape and take refuge with the Manipuris. There were afterwards more than one exodus of a similar kind, the causes and probable effects of which I shall discuss lower down.

At the same time, although the south-eastern Lushais were getting very uneasy, I am sure that they still believed we should be unable to reach Chamfai; and our own hill men, as well as the Lushais with us, were equally incredulous, particularly when they saw us forced to halt on the Kholei ridge from the 8th to the 17th January, waiting for supplies. However, we did get to Chipowee on the 18th. On the road the Lushais made an impudent attempt to palm off on us a personated Poiboy, a very common trick of theirs, and when we found out the cheat and showed our anger, there seemed to be some danger of a collision. This however was avoided, to my great satisfaction, for a fight at Chipowee, unless it were a real trial of strength between us and all the south-eastern villages, would only have delayed us without doing any good. In the course of a few days, during which we halted at Chipowee, we made very satisfactory arrangements with that village and Tingreedoong, the people agreeing to guarantee the safety of our communications between the Tooeebhoom and Chipowee, and sending with us men of each village as hostages. Among these was the headman of Tingreedoong, whom I suspected of being an arrant old schemer, but I thought that if I had him with us, I might be able to turn his intrigues against us to our advantage. The Chipowee Chief, who was comparatively trustworthy, remained near the Officer Commanding the station as a kind of hostage. These arrangements were very successful; and I may here mention that from the time of our agreement with the Kholei people there was never the slightest attempt made to disturb our line of communications—not even when the south-eastern villages were making their great effort to force us back from Moothelen,—an effort which was mainly directed to the destruction of our means of transport.



The Chipowee people gave up to us two Manipur many years ago. One of them could only speak Lushai, and both refused to leave the village. We kept them with us in camp apart from the Lushais for some time, and did all in our power to induce them to accompany us willingly, but all our efforts failed, and we did not think ourselves justified in forcing them to be rescued; so they were allowed to remain with the Lushais. On our way back several families of Kookies belonging to the village joined us and accompanied us into Cachar, but this subject can be fully treated more conveniently in connection with the exodus of Kookies into Manipur.

51. We left Chipowee on the 22nd. Our original intention was to follow the Gnowpra ridge from No. 11 (Bhomong) as far south as a point due west of Sellam, and then to cross the Lengting by a very steep and difficult ghaut. I have marked this route approximately in blue on the map. It was the one which the Lushais expected us to take, and they had stockaded many strong points on it, and here all the villagers had resolved on making a great stand. For some time previous to our arrival at Bohmong, the information which we received about the intended defence of the Lengting had been getting more and more definite, and we had heard that it was the intention of the Chiefs, if they should succeed in turning our force back, to lose no opportunity of harassing us on our retreat and not to cease pursuing us till we reached the cultivated part of the Cachar District; while I was given to understand that if we succeeded in crossing the Lengting in spite of all the efforts of the Lushais, no further opposition would be offered to our advance on Chamfai. When, however, we got to Bohmong, General Bouchier decided to cross the great range by Soorthlong or Moothelen, and so avoid the very rocky and difficult Lengting. But of course in taking this route it was not his object to avoid any opposition that the Lushais were prepared to make, and it was most undesirable that they should think so. Consequently, immediately on the change of route being decided on, I made it known to the headman of Tingreedoong, who was with us, and told him that he should go ahead of us in the morning with Dorpong and inform Poiboy that he must give up any Manipuri captives that might be in his villages, and come in person to make submission to us. Shortly after dinner the Tingreedoong headman asked to be allowed to send away two young Lushais who were with us to warn the villagers ahead that we are going in their direction. Dorpong gave me to understand that these lads were sent to recall the men stationed on the Lengting. This the General did not think was at all to be objected to, so the lads were allowed to go. Next morning the headman of Tingreedoong and Dorpong were sent on. That evening Colonel Roberts met them on the top of Soorthlong coming from the village of Taikoong. They told him that the surrounding villages were full of armed men. That night there was held at Koongnoong a great Council of all the Chiefs of the families of Vonole and his brother Lalpoong, and their headmen. At this meeting the Lushai plan of operations for the following day was settled, which really was a very well-designed one, and if it could have been carried out successfully, would have been a tremendous blow to us. The Lushai force were to be divided into two parties, one of which was to attack our main body while marching along a very rocky stream flowing between precipitous hills, covered with, I think, the thickest jungle we had met since we left Kholel, and was then to retire slowly up the hill disputing every difficult bit. In the meantime the other party was to steal down the bed of the stream and attack the coolies, who, they thought, would be left unprotected during the pursuit of the party retreating up the hill. They thought that if they could kill a large number of our coolies, the remainder would get so terrified that they would run off into the jungle, whence we should never recover them, and that the force would be starved out of the country. Dorpong, who, with the headman of Tingreedoong, came back to camp on the morning of the 25th, gave me private information of this scheme, chiefly, I think, to spite the old Tingreedoong headman, with whom he had a quarrel, which of course we carefully fostered. The idea of attacking the coolies had probably been originated by the headman, who had more than once been overheard to use expressions implying that he saw that our weak point was the enormous line of coolies that followed the main body. I need not dwell at length on the complete failure of this attempt. In my diary for the day I quoted General Bouchier's description of the fight. I may add, however, that I under-estimated the Lushai loss. Judging from accounts which I got afterwards, I think that there must have been more than sixty killed and wounded. I have heard the names of thirty-two who were killed.

52. This affair at Koongnoong, and the destruction of Taikoong on the following day, made all further resistance impossible. Some of the Chiefs, indeed, would have liked to try once more, but they could not get their people to support them. The Lushais saw

clearly that they had been completely beaten in what they had themselves chosen as a trial of strength, and they frankly accepted the situation. The Chiefs too probably saw that resistance would be unavailing, but they saw also that in any case they were in danger of utter ruin, for after the 25th January entire villages deserted them and went off to Manipur, Kamhow, the Pois, and Sookpial. On the 13th February 373 Sates, with twenty-eight muskets, arrived at Manipur; and on the 14th and 18th, 392 Thadoes and other Kookies. On the 4th or 5th March, 962 men, women, and children, with forty-four muskets, left some of the eastern villages under the escort of a party of Kamhow's people. On the 14th March the whole of Bohmong's village, 672 people with seventy muskets, joined the Manipuris. I have got all these numbers from the Manipur Political Agent, so that they are absolutely correct. Of course I cannot give equally accurate particulars of the numbers of those who succeeded in reaching Kamhow or the Pois or Sookpial, but I know that they were very great. It will easily be understood that the Chiefs, seeing themselves in such a position, might think that they had nothing more to lose and become reckless in consequence.

53. The Tingreedoong headman had been made very useful to us, but I thought it just as well not to let his conduct go unpunished, so I took the opportunity of his leaving the camp without permission on the day Taikoong was destroyed to inflict a heavy fine on him. It was paid at once, and I did not find him out in any more intrigues. General Bourchier and I also thought it advisable to inflict a fine on Poiboi's villages, which was paid before we reached Sellam. We were also very anxious to get Poiboi into the camp; but we found it impossible to get over his dread of us. He followed us to Toolcheng, and evidently made a great effort to summon up courage to meet us there, but he could not do it. Possibly this may have been in some measure owing to my refusing to swear on water poured out of a gun that he should come to no harm. His headman said that if I were to do so they thought he might pluck up courage enough to come in; but I have a strong conviction of the impolicy of a European officer submitting to take oaths prescribed by hillmen, and neither General Bourchier nor I thought a meeting with Poiboi of importance sufficient to warrant me in making a concession of which I so thoroughly disapproved. Ultimately on our return General Bourchier, at the solicitation of the people of the village, dispensed with Poiboi's personal appearance on condition that three of his headmen accompanied us to Tipai Mukh. One old woman belonging to Manipur was given up at this village, and a little coolie child, who had been purchased by Lalboorah from the Howlongs and sent to me in lieu of a little Bengali girl whom I was very anxious to recover, but who, it was said, had died. We cannot find out anything about the identity of the coolie child. The old woman died on the way into Cachar.

54. Since my return I have heard that some of Poiboi's headmen were going into Manipur towards the end of last month, and that it was the intention of the Political Agent to advise the Rajah to enter into an alliance, offensive and defensive, with Poiboi, and to protect him from the encroachment of Kamhow. I hope the Political Agent will succeed in effecting this, for all I have learned during the expedition has strengthened the opinion I had previously formed that the eastern Lushais and the tribes bordering on them can be best managed through Manipur.

There can be little doubt that if the Manipuris had tried to fight the men whom we met at Koongnoong, they would have been utterly worsted; but now that the Lushais have been well beaten and require support rather than further weakening, Manipur can help them, and I do not see how we can. But we cannot depend on the interference of Manipur being beneficial, unless the Political Agent have complete control over the relations of that state with all the Kookie tribe, and unless each Political Agent remain in Manipur for a longer time than Dr. Brown and General Nuthall have done; for the effect of such constant changes must be to lessen the effective control of the European officers over the intriguing Manipur officials. It is essential too that the Political Agent should be brought into much closer relations with the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar than he has been hitherto.

55. Our relations with the people of Sellam, Toolcheng, and Lenkom's villages were in the highest degree satisfactory to the end. The people were clearly anxious to be on friendly terms with us, and always ready to give us any assistance we called for. Of course there was necessarily a difference in the case of Lalboorah's own people. We had always put forward Vonolei's own village as the one which we considered had committed the greatest offences against us, and had all through declared that the immediate object of the expedition was to inflict punishment on that village and force it to give up the

muskets it had taken from our troops. All through our advance we had been getting information which left no doubt that the view we took about Chumfai was right. The Lushais all considered that this village gave the signal for every raid, even for those conducted by the Chiefs of independent villages. The headmen confessed this to me, and they acknowledged that all the guns and uniforms taken in 1871 had been brought to Chumfai in the first instance and then distributed among other villages.

Immediately on our arrival the village of Chumfai itself was destroyed. The villages of Vonolei's widow was spared on the people giving up two of our muskets and ten of their own in lieu of the remainder, some of which they said they had sent to different Poi Chiefs, and some to other Lushai villages, and they had to pay a fine, which, however, was somewhat limited in consequence of our discovering that the effects of the expedition had already weakened the tribes beyond what we considered desirable. They had also to give three of their headmen to accompany the force as hostages to Tipai Mukh. It was impossible for people towards whom we took such an attitude to be on very familiar terms with us, and we had to leave too soon after the payment of the fine to allow a feeling of confidence in the good faith of our assurances of forgiveness to grow up. However, the headmen of this village, and some of those of Lonkom's who accompanied us to Tipai Mukh, seemed to have very friendly feelings towards us when we parted on the 7th of March, the day before I left Tipai Mukh on my way to Cachar.

56. I have already alluded to the swarms of Kookies who during the expedition took refuge in the Manipur territory. The total number who passed over from the Lushais was 2,549 up to the 23rd March, and they took in with them 156 muskets. As my estimate of the advantages of this exodus differs very much from that of the Political Agent, I append to this report two letters from him to General Bouchier on the subject, and my remarks on them. I mentioned in a previous paragraph that a number (in all 54) of Thadoes and Waiphies accompanied our force on its return from Chipooee. A brief account of the antecedents of these Thadoes, and the reasons they assign for so many Kookies now leaving the Lushai villages, may help to illustrate the accounts I have elsewhere given of the composition of the Lushai communities.

These Thadoes say that some thirty years ago they belonged to a powerful village under a Chief of their own family, whom they call Mongpial, and occupied various sites on the hills around the Tipai, but in course of time the Poitoos of Lalchokla's family began to press hard upon them, and at length their Chief took refuge with Toosoong, the Head Chief of all the Thadoes, who was much more powerful than the Poitoo Chiefs. But while some of Mongpial's Thadoes accompanied their Chief to Toosoong's village many more took refuge with the Lushai Chiefs, who were then getting powerful, and who soon after drove the Poitoos westward to the Chatterchoora range. Some time after this when Toosoong, who was father of Koodingmang, the Chief who massacred a Cutcha Naga village last year, was driven to take refuge in Manipur, Mongpial and the people who had accompanied him to Toosoong's village again formed a separate village under the protection of the Lushais, moving about from place to place, until this year, when they left for Manipur. But those of his people who had originally taken refuge among the Lushais remained in the villages of the latter, sometimes living in the villages of Lalpoong, sometimes in those of Mora, until three years ago, when they went to Chipooee. The reasons these people give for the desertion of so many of the people once subject to the Lushai Chiefs are, that the hills have been over-loomed, and no more land fit for cultivation left; that for the last four years, since the younger Chiefs have been able to do what they like, there has been nothing but raiding, and that they are tired of it; lastly, that while their Chiefs were engaged in making raids on Manipur and Cachar, in the course of which the lives of many of their people were lost, Kamhow and other Chiefs were getting more daring in their aggressions on their villages, while the result of the expedition has destroyed whatever faith they had left in the power of the Lushai Chiefs. The Manipur Chief means I believe to settle the people that have taken refuge with him in hills to the south of the Manipur valley, and in the north-eastern portion of the tract marked "uncultivated and uninhabited" in the map. I think that it would have been much better if they had remained under the Lushai Chiefs and settled in that portion of the same tract which lies south of the Cachar boundary, and which is much better suited for cultivation than the more eastern hills. It is quite probable that Kamhow and the Pois will still continue their attacks on these Kookies, and the Manipur State will probably have to take measures for their protection. But it is probable that these people will not be satisfied with the restrictions and burdens of the Manipur supremacy, and that they will follow Kodingmang into the Naga Hills, where

they would be a constant source of trouble both to us and Manipur. There can be no doubt that the villages to the east have of late been pressed hard by Kambow and others,—so hard, that the people have taken to stockading, which they never do unless when they feel themselves weak; but it is to be feared that unless the Political Agent can direct the Manipur policy into a better course than it has followed of late, the Kookies who have this year moved into the Rajah's jurisdiction will not be much less exposed to attacks in future than they had been while living under the Lushai Chiefs.

57. It will be understood from the foregoing paragraphs that I do not now attach so much importance as before to the eastern villages or to our relations with them. On the other hand I think one result of the expedition may, and probably will be, to increase the strength of the villages belonging to Sookpial and his sons, and the influence of that family of Chiefs; in short, to put them in a position in which they will have more ability to help us than they have had hitherto, while at the same time the fright they have all got will make them very anxious to be on good terms with us. But I cannot speak positively of the ultimate effects of the expedition upon Sookpial's power until I know more than I do at present of the dealings of the Chittagong force with the Lalpitang Howlongs. These have been for some years back his chief foes, and although his people boasted a good deal last year about all he was going to do in forcing them to give up the captives, I know that they have very lately dispossessed him of his chief salt springs; and Rowa was no doubt telling the truth when he said that Sookpial had told him to advise an attack on Sangboong and Benkuia, as mentioned in paragraph 4 of Mr. McWilliam's letter No. 132 of the 30th January. Sookpial knew very well that the Howlongs would attack him hereafter if they felt themselves strong enough, just as the eastern Chiefs were determined to attack his son Khalkom. The facts related in that report shew that Sookpial was then really anxious to be on good terms with us; his kindness to the women, his sending them down, and even his attempt to make them tell lies about his having redeemed them and recovered Mary Winchester. We have not heard from him since, but some of our people are with him, and a man of his is still here. Another—Row—unfortunately died of cholera some time ago. The Kookies here are quite satisfied that Sookpial is no longer to be feared by them, and they are very anxious to move down their villages far south of the existing outposts. The Kookies who came in from Chipowee, who probably know the state of feeling among the Lushais, assure me that there is no danger in this, and are themselves going to set up a village between Kolosleep and Chatterchoora.

58. One result of the expedition will be to make Poiboi unable to give any further support to his sister's party in Vompilal's villages; and as both parties are thoroughly frightened, and feel that their villages are absolutely in our power, Khalkom can only hope to retain any influence in them through our acquiescence. The unanimous adhesion of Vompilal's people would probably make the family of Sookpial a match for any of the tribes that border on their villages, for it would eventually give them complete control of all the villages west of the Moothilen range; consequently we may reckon confidently that Khalkom's interests will co-operate with his fears in making him desire to stand well with us. On our return his two chief Muntries accompanied us from Pachoozee to Tipai Mukh, and I expect that he or one of his brothers will come in to visit Silchar at no distant date, as soon as the dread which Rowa's death is likely to cause them has had time to pass away.

59. In the accompanying map an attempt has been made to lay down approximately the western limits of Sookpial's territory, but it is little more than a guess. He says himself that he has no influence west of the range on which Chatterchoora is situated, but we do not accurately know what direction the ridge takes south of that peak. The country to the west of Sookpial's territory is nominally subject to the Tipperah Chief, but the eastern boundary of the territory of the latter is very uncertain. According to Pemberton and all the earlier maps, Independent Tipperah, as it was then called, extended as far as Tipai Mukh. But some years ago the name of Hill Tipperah was in some mysterious way substituted for the older name and all the hills between the south of Cachar and the Chittagong Hill Tracts seem to have been at about the same time silently included in the Cachar district. The boundary between Cachar and Hill Tipperah shewn in the maps of that period is the same as the line I have assumed to be the western boundary of Sookpial's territory, but in the maps published lately a "supposed water-shed and boundary" is laid down west of the supposed course of the Lungai, a little stream flowing into the Sylhet district. I should think that the best geographical boundary between Hill Tipperah and the Lushai Hills would be the continuation of the water-shed that divides Sylhet from Cachar. I

cannot say what amount of authority the Tipperah Chief actually has over the Kookies living in the hills west of Sookpial. That he has some is generally acknowledged; but I should think that it can be little more than nominal. These Kookies belong chiefly to the Dorlong and Poitoo families, the former of whom seem to have settled chiefly towards the south, while the Poytoos are more in the direction of Sylhet. Both families formerly occupied some of the hills in which our column worked, and both were driven westwards by other families, among whom the Lushais were prominent. The Poitoos of Lalchokla's village have been already mentioned in connection with the Thadoos, who accompanied us from Chipowee. This is the Lalchokla who was transported in 1845. But even the above meagre bits of information must not be taken as all absolutely correct. I know very little about the Dorlongs, except what I have heard incidentally from Lushais. I have told all I know of the Poitoos in paragraphs 19, 20, and 21 of my Report C, dated 13th March 1871. It is probable that the civil and survey officers with the right column have collected some information about the south-eastern part of Hill Tipperah, and that the Political Agent's report for last year will add much to our knowledge of the country and its inhabitants.

60. I should prefer to delay my final report on the defensive and protective measures to be adopted on the Cachar side, and the means to be taken to cultivate friendly relations with the tribes until I have had an opportunity of learning all that is known about the Tipperah Kookies mentioned above, as well as about the present and probable future position of the Howlongs and Syloos. I should like also to get some information about the relations of the authorities of British Burma with the tribes on the Koladyne before submitting the report asked for in the correspondence forwarded to me with your No. 57 of the 20th March. I have long had a conviction, which has steadily deepened as my experience in frontier matters has increased, of the impolicy and uselessness of attempting to deal in detail with the Kookie difficulty. We cannot hope for success, or even for safety, if we allow ourselves to be misled by what really are accidents of political geography, and treat the relations of each district or dependent state with the Kookies on its border as a separate question, in dealing with which measures can be taken without any reference to any of the others, even though the measures may be based on principles diametrically opposite, perhaps hostile, to those adopted elsewhere, and may possibly have a most injurious effect on the relations between some other district or state and the tribes without. Looking simply to the interests of Cachar, and if I could with safety leave out of sight the considerations which must influence our treatment of the parts of the question in which other districts are concerned, I should at once submit a detailed scheme based on the principles which I have advocated consistently during the last four years. But I feel that such a scheme could only be a provisional one, and that I might have hereafter to alter all the details possibly even to modify some of the principles, after I had learned all that there is to be known about the Tipperah Kookies, the Syloos, the Howlongs, the Shindoos, and the geography of the tracts which they inhabit.

61. The proposal to keep up the road to Chipowee, on which you called for a report in your No. 64 of the 9th April, is a good instance of the impossibility of dealing with the subject of our future Kookie policy entirely from a Cachar point of view. The expediency of keeping up the road depends entirely on the decision that may be come to on the advisability, firstly, of making a road between Cachar and Chittagong; and secondly, of taking such road through the Chumfai Valley. For, if the road to Chittagong should not be decided on, there would be no possible advantage in keeping up a road as far as Chipowee, unless, indeed, it were contemplated to retain there permanently the European officer and force which would have to be stationed there during the construction of the road. If any other line should be adopted for a road between Cachar and Chittagong, there would obviously be even less advantage in keeping up a road to Chipowee. Now, it is impossible for me to come to a conclusion, either on the desirability of making the road to Chittagong, or of taking such road through the Chumfai Valley, without knowing the exact character of the results obtained by the right column, and the geography of the country in which it operated. Of course, the question of the practicability and expense of completing and keeping up the road as far as Chipowee can be treated independently of the above considerations; but previous to doing so, I wish to point out that the road in its present state is not more than a fair-weather path. The bridges put up by us, even if still standing, will be carried away during the rains, and much of the road will become impassable, and next cold weather will be scarcely better than the original track. If the road is to be kept up, it would be absolutely necessary at the outset to do so much additional earthwork as would be sufficient to keep the road

from falling altogether to ruin during the rainy season, and to put up substantial timber bridges strong enough to withstand the floods, and, as a rule, not requiring renewal more than once in three years.

If the road to Chipewee be undertaken, it will probably be found necessary to divide it into four sections, for each of which separate estimates and specifications would have to be framed. The first of these sections would be from Luckipore to Mynadthur tea garden; the second would be from Mynadthur to Tipai Mukh; the third from Tipai Mukh to the Tooweebhoom; and the last from the Tooweebhoom to Chipewee.

62. I have got two estimates for the section between Luckipore and Mynadthur, one from the Executive Engineer and the other from the Superintendent of Local Roads, both of whom know the present track, and are therefore in a position to state what would be required to make it passable throughout the year. The Executive Engineer estimated for a slightly improved road, six feet wide, with rough timber bridges; the whole to cost Rs. 28,850 at the outset, and to be kept up with an annual outlay of about Rs. 5,000, not including the cost of replacing the bridges every third year. The Superintendent of Local Roads proposes to make the road 8 feet wide, and considerably improved in gradient, with less substantial bridges than those proposed by the Executive Engineer. The cost, as estimated by the Superintendent, would be Rs. 29,943, and the annual expense, including the amount necessary to replace worn out bridges, would be Rs. 6,544. Both these estimates are framed on the assumption that we could get the work done at rates scarcely exceeding those current in the district. But I think it likely that we should have to pay much higher rates, as the people employed would have to camp in the unhealthy and hated forest, while they would have to carry with them sufficient supplies to while employed on the work. The rates would have to be still higher between Mynadthur and Tipai Mukh. Indeed, I doubt very much whether this part could be done with the labour available in the district, which needs some rest after the tremendous strain of the last few months. The Superintendent of Local Roads has however framed an estimate, which he has sent in to me, on the supposition that the work might be done at rates slightly in advance of those now current in the district. The estimate amounts to Rs. 33,022 for the construction of the road, and Rs. 8,350 for its maintenance. If imported labour were employed, this estimate would be very much exceeded. I should add that to the estimated cost of making the road there should be added the expenses connected with a guard of at least fifty police required to give confidence to the people working south of Mynadthur. Exclusive of this item, the entire cost of completing the road from Luckipore to Tipai Mukh would, if the estimate of the Superintendent of Local Roads be correct, be about Rs. 65,000, and the cost of keeping it in repair nearly Rs. 16,000 a year, and I have not the slightest doubt that in reality the work would be found to cost much more than double these estimates. But this portion of the road would be practically unused. For even after all this money had been spent upon it, the road would still be a bad one, scarcely fit to be called a bridle track, and would not at any season of the year bear competition with the river.

63. The third section of the road would be less difficult, and would require very few bridges; but one of these, that over the Tipai, would be very expensive. The cost of the work done on this portion of the road would, of course, be in proportion to the distance from Tipai Mukh, and a larger guard than that required on the second section would be needed. On the other hand, this portion of the road would be constantly used at all seasons of the year by Lushais coming down to Tipai Mukh to trade. Indeed, I think that it would be practicable to induce the Lushais to keep up this portion of the road, and this would be far the cheapest and best way of maintaining it. I may add that, whatever might be the decision on the subject of the Chittagong road, I should recommend that this bit between Tipai Mukh and Voombong should be kept open if the Lushais could be prevailed on to undertake the work. Of course, if it were not to form part of a continuous road between the two districts, there would be no need for the bridge over the Tipai at the mouth of that stream. I think it very doubtful whether the road to Chittagong should adopt our route between the top of Sengbong marked in the map No. 6, and Pachoo-wee marked No. 9. It is even possible that it ought not to pass through Chipewee. It must be remembered that from the time we got to Sengbong, and had from time to time to make a choice between two or more routes, our choice was necessarily guided by military and political considerations. We had to descend to the Tooweebhoom near its junction with the Tipai in order to get at the Voombong villages. After we had settled with them, we had to go to Pachoo-wee on the great ridge before being able to decide on the line to be taken in dealing with Chipewee, and Tingrideong. When we decided

on going to Chipowee, we had to give up an alternative route to the Gnowpa range which seemed much easier. Now, we might have descended from Sengbong to the Tooeetoo much nearer its source, consequently at a higher level, and have got to the top of the Kholei ridge, at a point much further north than Pachoo-wee, thereby avoiding the crossing of the steep Parbachung range. We might then have crossed the Tipai near Tingridoong at a comparatively high level, and got round to the Gnowpa range, without having to make the descent to and ascent from the Saireemloowee. It is probable that the Chittagong road would take this line, which I think would be found shorter as well as more practicable, and far less costly than the one we took. Of course it might turn out on exploring the alternative line that there are difficulties in it of which I have no suspicion at present, but I do not think this likely from what I have heard from the Lushais and what I have myself seen of the country. Finally, we could scarcely hope to gain any political advantages in compensation for the probable physical disadvantages of our route. The people of Chipowee say that they do not intend to remain on the present site of their village much longer, and they talk of settling on Sengbong, while, under any circumstances, the bit of our road between Sengbong and the Tooeebhoom might be kept up.

64. Before concluding this report I wish to put on record my testimony to the very great assistance we received from Mr. McWilliam, the Officiating Deputy Commissioner, who was before as well as during the progress of the expedition indefatigable in collecting coolies and boats, in searching for routes, and generally in attempting to carry out the wishes of the military authorities. But in addition to this he had very hard work in complying with my demands. I had undertaken to supply food to the police who accompanied the column, and to the local coolies whom I was able to induce to serve with it. There were more than five hundred of the latter for whom, as well as for great numbers of boatmen and others, Mr. McWilliam had to provide sufficient supplies from the district resources, and to forward them to Tipai Mukh. He had also to provide carriage, &c. for the advanced outposts on the south frontier. All this was a tremendous strain on a district so small as Cachar, and Mr. McWilliam deserves very high credit for the way in which all demands were met, as well as for his success in distributing the pressure so as not to let it fall with undue weight on any class in the district. His efforts were well seconded by Baboo Ram Rutton Endo, his collectorate nazir, a most useful and deserving public servant, who seems in the present case to have performed the almost impossible task of at once satisfying his superiors and the people of the district. In this connection I may call attention to the good spirit showed by Mr. Harlow, Manager of the Eastern Bengal Company, who once, when asked to supply thirty coolies to carry on food to one of the outposts, sent fifty, and offered to give one hundred twice a month if required. I regret to say that there was very heavy mortality among the hill coolies locally employed, notwithstanding the unceasing care of Dr. Buckle and the medical officers under him, especially Drs. Nicholson, Harvey and Monteath. I am deeply grateful to all these gentlemen for their unremitting and self-sacrificing kindness and attention, to myself and all my people throughout the expedition.

65. Almost all the persons employed under me did well on the whole, but I can only mention here Baboo Hurri Churn Surnah, to whom I owe a great debt of gratitude for the service he did me throughout the expedition. Some passages in a letter from the Brigadier-General commanding the column corroborate so strongly my own opinion of the Baboo, that I must do myself the pleasure of quoting them here. General Bouchier says—"I look upon it that Hurri Thukoor deserves especial notice. He was, as it appeared to me, indefatigable when even in very bad health, and he certainly was devoted to the interests of the column. One of the most difficult parts of your duty was, so to speak, sifting the wheat from the chaff, and discriminating between reports palpably false and others likely to be correct, while you had no means of obtaining information except through Lushais whose aim would naturally be to mislead. From what you have told me I feel sure in this department the assistance Hurri Thukoor gave you was invaluable. I look upon it that a man of his stamp should be liberally rewarded, and I am sure it is the very best policy to bind such men to our interests. He always seemed to me to be of a stamp we so seldom meet among natives, possessing firmness, self-possession, no cringing, in fact a most gentlemanly demeanour." I can add little to this emphatic testimony to the worth of Baboo Hurri Churn. But I may remark that his usefulness was not confined to helping me to collect information. His assistance was invaluable in every department of my work, especially in the management of my coolies and the often difficult task of making the Lushais clearly understand the nature and meaning of the terms imposed upon them. I am very anxious that he should be

permanently relieved from his present appointment of tehsildar of Hailakandy, and put into such a position that I could make use of his services in hill work exclusively. He has, I may add, one qualification for such work in a rare degree. He seems absolutely devoid of physical fear. I have had the opportunity of seeing him more than once under fire, and each time he was as calm and self-possessed as if he had been in his tehsil outcherry.

### III.—REPORT OF THE POLITICAL OFFICER WITH THE RIGHT COLUMN OF THE LUSHAI EXPEDITION.

*From CAPTAIN T. H. LEWIN, Civil Officer, Right Column Lushai Expedition, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal,—No. 22, dated Chittagong, the 26th March 1872.*

In compliance with the directions contained in the concluding portion of paragraph 8, Proceedings of the Government of India, Foreign Department, Political, No. 1645P., dated Simla, the 4th August 1871, forwarded under cover of your letter No. 5244, dated 19th October 1871, I have the honour to submit, as required, the final report on the operations of the right column, Lushai Expedition, in as far as relates to the political aspects of the campaign.

2. The object of the expedition against the Lushais, which has just been concluded, was not solely that of retaliation; for although punishment was, if possible, to be meted out to the guilty participants in the late raids on Cachar, a still more important end to be gained was the deliverance of British subjects carried away into captivity; while paramount to both these considerations was the necessity for conducting our operations with a view to establishing permanently the security of our frontier.

3. At the very commencement of operations in November last year, difficulties of some importance were encountered at the outset; the knowledge we possessed of the Lushais, of their language and customs, was very imperfect; and throughout the whole of the Chittagong frontier line but six men were found capable of acting as interpreters. The information possessed by the civil authorities as to the identity of the actual perpetrators of the raids was vague and incomplete, and our knowledge of the paths and local difficulties before us next to nothing. Never perhaps has an English force advanced into an enemy's country with less knowledge of what was before it, or with more uncertainty as to obtaining in any way the desired information.

4. The causes of this not unforeseen dilemma are easily appreciable. The local officers had no communication with the Lushais save once a year, when some few hundreds of them came to the annual *meta* held at Kassalong. The head-quarters of the Deputy Commissioner of the Chittagong Hill Tracts were from nine to twelve days' journey from the nearest Howlong and Syloo villages; no direct trade was carried on by our own tribes with the Lushais, save such desultory traffic as occurred at Kassalong; the Lushais themselves were strongly opposed to any of our people entering their territory, from the not unfounded idea that new diseases would be introduced among them by closer intercourse with us; and lastly, our ally Rutton Poosa reaped considerable advantages from being the sole intermediary between us and the other tribes; and therefore, by every means in his power, either of indirect opposition or passive resistance, sought to limit our knowledge of and dealings with the Lushai tribes in general.

5. At the commencement of operations, indeed it was a moot question whether the Chief Rutton Poosa would not succeed altogether from his friendly alliance with us and espouse the cause of his friends and relatives, the Howlongs. I had been informed that this course had been strongly urged upon him by his brother-in-law Vandoola, the principal Chief of the Southern Howlong tribes, while it was known to me also that the Syloos, with whom Rutton Poosa was not on good terms, had sent him intimidating messages as to results likely to be incurred by him if he assisted us in any way.

6. Eventually, however, he chose his course and cast in his lot with us, his determination doubtless being somewhat influenced by the imposing display of force that soon began to assemble close to his village at Damagiri, and from that time forth until the close of the expedition he served us loyally and faithfully, accompanying the force personally, with a contingent of his own villagers, during the operations against the



Syloos, and afterwards himself going out among the Howlong villages to urge upon them the desirability of submission. It was indirectly owing to Rutton Poea that Mary Winchester was given up, and I attribute it directly to his influence that, in our subsequent advance upon both the Northern and Southern Howlongs, we were met with confidence by the Chiefs, and a basis laid upon which terms could be imposed and our future relations regulated.

7. It must, however, be remembered that by his loyal co-operation with us, the Chief Rutton Poea has drawn down upon himself the undying resentment of the Syloos, who assert, with some show of reason, that it was he who showed us the way to their country; while even the Howlongs cannot but attribute their humiliation to his agency, and will certainly bear him no good will for the part he has taken in the matter. Indeed one of Saipooea's headmen, in my presence (ignorant that I understood him), charged the Chief with treachery in having brought the English forces to their village contrary to his pledged word.

8. Rutton Poea was fully aware of the danger and delicacy of his position, for, before our advance from Demagiri, he formally represented his difficulties to the General, and it was not until I had assured him (with General Brownlow's concurrence) that at the close of the operations a guard should be left for his protection, that he became wholly and individually our friend.

9. The first advance of the force and head-quarters from its base at Demagiri was made against the Syloo tribe on the 9th December 1871. It was determined that our first movement should be directed against the Syloos for the following reasons: (1) It was the most direct road to Sangbúngá's and Benkúia's, the only two Howlong Chiefs who were positively known to have been concerned in the Cachar raids, and in whose possession was Mary Winchester. (2) There was strong presumptive evidence that the Syloos themselves had been concerned in the same raids. (3) Rutton Poea was not on good terms with the Syloos, and would cordially co-operate in any movement against them, while his aid would probably have been but half-hearted had we in the first place determined to attack his own brother-in-law Saipoiya, who was the nearest of the Howlongs. (4) The route in question was better known, it presented greater facilities for the carriage of supplies, and, from a military point of view, was considered the most eligible for advance.

10. It was of course necessary, before carrying fire and sword through the Syloo country, to endeavour to open communication with them and invite their submission. To attain this end I had relied on two means, viz., the intermediarism of a Chief of the Syloos, one Lemsiloung, who was an old acquaintance of mine, and over whom I believed I had considerable influence; and that of one of Rutton Poea's subsidiary Chiefs, by name Lengoora, who had married the daughter of Savoonga, the head Chief of the Syloo tribe. Some days before our advance Lemsiloung had come in to me, but he had scarcely been a few hours in camp when he was seized by an unaccountable panic, and, starting up, fled naked into the jungles to re-appear no more.

11. On arriving before the nearest Syloo village therefore (that of Vanlola) on the 12th December, I sent Lengoora forward alone to the village, telling him clearly why we had come and what we wanted—to communicate with the inhabitants. He was absent only a short time and returned in some trepidation to inform me that no less than five of the Syloo Chiefs were assembled there with their men, and that they were determined to oppose our advance; he had, he said, faithfully delivered my message, but they had only abused him in return, and he seemed to think he had had a narrow escape for his life; nor on any subsequent occasion could threats, promises or cajolements move Lengoora to serve a second time as our emissary. Within a short time of his return, I was myself fired upon by an ambush close to camp, and the Syloos having thus refused to treat, and thrown down the gauntlet of defiance, there was nothing left but to resort to sterner and more easily understood arguments. The village was therefore attacked and taken on the 14th of December.

12. From this date up to the 25th January 1872 the military operations of the force were continuous. Blow after blow was dealt in quick succession to the leaders of the tribe, and wherever any stand was attempted, our attacks were equally rapid and decisive.

13. From time to time the enemy would from a distance call out to us, sometimes at night to our sentries, at other times to parties of our men out foraging, to the effect that they wished us to discontinue our destroying course, and that their Chiefs were coming in to make terms with us. To such messages a friendly reply was always given, but the parleyers were at the same time distinctly given to understand that our progress could

only be stayed by the appearance of the Chiefs themselves and their speedy compliance with our demands. No Chiefs, however, came; neither did the Syloos, whenever occasion offered, desist from attempts to shoot our men. Under these circumstances the General, much against his will, had no option but to continue his course to the end.

14. Meantime I had sent emissaries of my own, accompanied by some of Rutton Poea's men, to the Chief Benkuia, to demand his submission and the release of Mary Winchester. My messengers were obliged to make a long detour by the rear, as we were fast approaching Benkuia's country, and if they had gone by the front, they saw great risk of being shot from an ambush as spies or enemies before they could have had time to give any explanation of their errand. The Chief Benkuia, whose village was now in sight on a distant hill, had had ample opportunity of marking the steady progress of the column in his direction, annotated, as it was, by burning villages; and on my messengers reaching him, he at once gave up Mary Winchester, reserving, however, all question as to submission or the release of the other captives in his possession. This he did evidently under the impression that Mary Winchester was the main cause of our invasion, and believing that having recovered her, we should not think it worthwhile to advance any farther. He was known, moreover, to have expressed his disbelief in our ability to penetrate so far into the country as his village.

15. We had now reached the village of the Chief Savoonga, and the punishment of the Syloo tribe was complete. The Chief (Rutton Poea) who had accompanied us thus far had, on being pressed with regard to the Howlongs, oracularly replied that upon our arriving at the Tlong Doon (the Dullesur River) he would 'open his mouth in council,' (he also was apparently at one time doubtful of our ability to reach the spot): and we had now reached the appointed place. It was arranged therefore that I, accompanied by the Chief, should advance with a small escort and open communication with the nearest Howlong village.

16. On the 13th January therefore I started with the Chief and made direct for the nearest village to the east. On approaching the place we saw people moving about and hailed them; they responded, enquiring our business. But as soon as they learned who and what we were, they incontinently fired their houses, while the men armed themselves and showed every intention of offering resistance. The Chief, Rutton Poea, seemed much disconcerted at these unexpectedly hostile demonstrations, and strongly urged upon me that under the circumstances it would be unwise to proceed any further, as he said that undoubtedly the whole border land of the Howlongs was now filled with fugitive Syloos, and if by any accident we were brought into collision with the tribes in the Howlong country, or with any of the fugitives, who had sought shelter with them, his future good offices as a mediator would be of no avail, and war once declared we should have no option but to commence a fresh campaign against the Howlongs, with a strong probability of being unable to recover a single captive. On consideration I deemed the Chief's reasons valid, and accordingly returned to camp, where, after consultation with the General, it was agreed to send Rutton Poea round by the south, and thus attempt to open communication with the Howlong tribes. The next day, therefore, the Chief departed on his errand, accompanied by Subadar Mahomed Azim of the police, whom I thought it wise to attach to him as a species of moderator or impeller as occasion might require.

17. A variety of causes combined now to keep us inactive for some days, chief among which was the unaccountable delay in the carrying out of Rutton Poea's mission to the south; but as the event showed, his efforts were well directed and the time not mis-spent. Having at length received intimation of the return of Rutton Poea, and after in vain waiting for the appearance of Chiefs or emissaries from the front, the General determined to advance, and accordingly on the 12th February the force crossed the Tlong Doong and entered the Howlong country.

18. I had instructed Rutton Poea, before his departure for the south, to inform all the Howlong tribes that a white flag was universal sign of a desire for peace, and that any persons bearing such a flag would be respected and allowed safe conduct through our lines. On crossing the Tlong the first thing we encountered was a white flag, which the Howlongs had hung in mid-stream as a token of their desire for peace, and on the day following I was successful in opening communication with them through the medium of some men of Rutton Poea's whom I had retained with me. After this everything went smoothly, Chief after Chief came in, all telling the same story of their desire to submit and make peace. Example was contagious; for even the Syloos, who had lost everything they had in the world, and were past further injury at our hands, made their submission in a body.

19. The names of the different Chiefs, and the dates on which they delivered up the captives in their possession and made their peace with Government, have been from time to time reported in the diaries which I have periodically submitted. The terms insisted upon were alike with all. They were briefly the surrender of all captives; an engagement on their part (ratified in the most solemn and binding manner which Lushai custom prescribes) to live for the future on terms of peace and amity with all British subjects from Manipur to Arracan (including Hill Tipperah), with free right of access to our people throughout their whole country. I append a list of the Chiefs who have submitted to the British arms during this expedition.

20. I did not think it right to insist upon the giving of hostages for their future good behaviour,—1st, as we had no means of ascertaining whether the persons they might offer in pledge were of sufficient social importance to be accepted; 2nd, hostages could not be kept in durance, and these hillmen, wild as hawks, would certainly never voluntarily submit to expatriation; 3rd, any hostages so taken would run great risk of illness and death if removed from the comparatively healthy hill country to the miasmatic terai of the Hill Tracts, and any such death would be sure to give rise to future complications.

21. Neither did I recommend to the General that any punishment should be inflicted upon Sangbunga and Benkuia, although they were known to have been concerned in the raids, for the simple reason that we were not in a position to inflict any. The grain and valuables of these Chiefs had been all removed and placed in safety. We were fully able, it is true, to march through the length and breadth of their country, but beyond the loss of an empty village or two, which they would themselves burn, we could have inflicted no punishment upon them; while, on the other hand, we should not have recovered a single captive, nor obtained the submission of any one Chief.

22. My ideas on this subject were fully justified by after results. The submission of the brothers Sangbunga and Benkuia, who were the first Chiefs to come in, led, I believe, to the subsequent arrangements which were entered into with the whole of the great Howlong and Syloo tribes. When it was seen that two great Chiefs had personally made terms and given up their captives; when it was found that the terms imposed were neither unjust nor oppressive, that the persons of the Chiefs had been respected, and that no treachery on our part was intended, it became then simply a matter of time and distance as to what Chiefs could first come in.

23. The Syloos, on being questioned as to their reasons for having opposed us, and for not having made peace before so much calamity had befallen them, replied that they had been afraid, not knowing our customs of warfare, and being only too well acquainted with our weapons. They said that the first collision at Belkai had been brought on by certain hot-headed young Chiefs, and that the main body of the tribe had nothing to do with it, but that after war had once begun they were powerless to stop it, having, they said, no peace-maker.

24. Operations in the Northern Howlong and Syloo countries being thus successfully terminated, the General then turned his attention to the south, the submission of the tribes there being all that was now required to render the work of the expedition complete. No difficulty was expected in this quarter owing to the intimate relationship existing between Rutton Poa and several of the leading Chiefs. The course of events having been fully detailed in my diaries, it will be sufficient for me to say here that our expectations were fully realized, and after a short expedition, lasting some ten days, the whole of the southern Chiefs made their submission on the same terms as had been previously imposed on the northern tribes.

25. I have the honor to annex a nominal roll of the captives who have been released from durance by the right column, Lushai Expedition. A noteworthy fact is apparent from the perusal of this list. It had originally been supposed that the raids made by these tribes along the whole line of frontier from Arracan to Cachar were attributable, not to any one section or tribe, but to bands of unruly spirits, drawn by inclination and at hazard from different villages, attracted by the desire for plunder or the love of adventure to the leadership of some favorite Chief. Such, however, would seem not to be the case, as the list shows that the captives recovered were, without exception, carried off from such part of British territory as was most contiguous to the villages of the tribe in whose possession they were found. Thus, the raids on the northern Hill Tracts and Arracan are attributable to the Southern Howlongs and the Shindoes; the outrages on Cachar to the Northern Howlongs and to the tribes of Poiboi and Lalbura, with which latter the left column have been dealing; while the inroads upon Hill

Tipperah and the northern Hill Tracts are clearly traceable to the tribes of Rutton Pooa and the Syloo, whose tribal *habitat* is continuous with those parts of British territory.

26. I also append some depositions taken from the captives given up by the Chiefs Sangbunga and Benkua, from which it will be seen that the Cachar raids were committed in concert with other Chiefs to the north. In connection with this circumstance it is deserving of mention that not a single Cachar captive has been recovered or heard of south of the villages belonging to Sangbunga and his brother.

27. A remarkable circumstance transpired with reference to the people held in captivity by the Lushais, viz., that all unite in describing the treatment they received as kind in the extreme. In no case has it been ascertained that any violence had been offered to a female captive, while, as the list shows, many of them have actually married, and becoming incorporated with the tribe, decline positively to be released. The captives given up by the Southern Howlongs had to be brought forcibly into the camp, and clung to their Lushai friends, weeping piteously and entreating that they might not be made over to us. Among the number of these suppliants was the wife and grown up daughter of one of my own interpreters, and he was much disturbed by such an inopportune exhibition of unnatural feeling, ascribing it to Kookie magic. Magic, it is true, but I imagine that it was the white magic of kindness and human sympathy.

28. In addition to the captives actually released, some 250 persons, residents of the Hill Tracts, who had been compelled by menaces and fear of danger to leave our territory and seek the protection of Lushai Chiefs, have taken the opportunity offered by the presence of our troops to return to their old haunts, casting off as it were the Kookie yoke. A considerable number of the Syloo tribe, and one entire Howlong village, have also expressed a wish to settle under my protection in the event of "my village," as they phrased it, being built on the Sirthay Tlang. The principal Chiefs also, in the event of such a contingency, have promised to visit me, and they also asked that, for the greater convenience of trade, a bazaar might be established at Denagiree, alleging that the present market at Kassalong was situated at an inconveniently long distance from their villages.

29. The political results of the campaign have in my opinion been great and manifold, fully justifying the magnitude of the expedition and affording every reason to hope that the permanent pacification of the frontier may be attained. The Lushai tribes have been forced to recognize the existence of a superior power, able alike both to reward and punish; a firm and secure basis has been laid for our future relations with them, whether commercial or political; their whole country is open to us, and I believe that any European could now walk unarmed from one end to the other. The severe lesson that this year has taught them cannot, at any rate for some time, be forgotten, and a wise future policy on our part will render these tribes as innocuous and peaceful as are now the once troublesome inhabitants of the Khasi and Jynteah Hills, or to carry the simile nearer home, our own Chittagong hill tribes. We have gained the entire confidence and allegiance of Rutton Pooa, and we have but to stretch out our hands to obtain in like manner the obedience and subserviency of the other tribes. We have, in short, sown the seed, and it would be a poor husbandman who should omit to reap the harvest.

30. The line of policy which Government has hitherto been induced to follow, viz., the establishment of a line of defence coincident with that of effective jurisdiction, is doubtless a wise and necessary measure on such a frontier as the north-west, where the tribes are pre-eminently warlike and audacious, and where the establishment of a Government officer or soldiers beyond reach of support would be almost equivalent to their destruction; but among the tribes on this frontier such policy would be out of place. The circumstances, the people, the country, their social habits and character, are all different, and our mode of dealing with them should, I think, be different also. Conciliation with these tribes is worse than useless; it merely invites aggression, unless we are in a position to punish as well as reward.

31. I have, in the letters in the foot note, previously discussed at some length the future policy which, in my opinion, should be pursued on this frontier. I have now

1. Letter No. 6, from Civil Officer, Right Column, Lushai Expedition, to Brigadier-General Brownlow, C.M. Commanding, dated 22nd December 1871. Copy forwarded to Bengal Government under memorandum No. 6A, dated 22nd December 1871, from Civil Officer.

2. Letter No. 12, from the Civil Officer, Right Column, Lushai Expedition, to Brigadier-General Brownlow, C.M. Commanding, dated 27th January 1872. Copy forwarded to the Bengal Government under cover of Civil Officer's letter No. 15, dated 21st January 1872.

merely to add that subsequent events have in no way modified, but have, on the contrary, rather strengthened the views therein expressed.

32. In all matters connected with these tribes it should be remembered that they are not a nation but a segregation of villages, a collection of small separate republics having no coherence; we are not dealing with the fagot, but the severed bundle of sticks. The Chief Saipoiya, in conversation with me, himself said that in any future action of Government against them it was hoped that discrimination might be used, and that many might not suffer on account of one. He went on to say—"All our Chiefs are now your sworn friends; if any one of them does wrong, you should punish him; and if he has broken his oath of friendship and is in fault, no one of us will assist him against you."

33. It would I think be a grave error to retire to our former position; we have put forth our foot, and where we have planted it, it should remain. No permanent pacification of this frontier can be hoped for save by bringing these people into closer intercourse with us, by encouraging trade, and by permitting the Government representative to exercise a near and direct influence upon them. None of these ends can be gained so long as our nearest bazaar is nine to twelve days' journey from their villages, and while the frontier officer's intercourse with these tribes is limited to the yearly *mela*, to which comparatively but few Kookies resort, and those only from interested motives. The *mela* is a legitimate means to a good end, but it utterly fails of its purpose on account of its distance from the homes of the people whom we wish to attract. The prime cause of every human fair or festival is amusement: the excuse may be religion or fat oxen, or what not; but from the Roman clamour of *panem et circenses* to the festival of Juggernaut, or the bathos of Greenwich fair, the main reason for the gathering is novelty and destruction. What the children wish to see, will bring the parents in train; where the maidens go, thither are the young men gathered together, but our so-called *mela* at Kassalong attracted none of the Lushais save a few middle-aged men-of-war sent in by their Chiefs, who, leaving their weapons a few miles from Kassalong in the jungle, came in with a motley following to carry away a congeries of articles, which, for some unknown reason or by a providential interposition, fell to their share every year in much the same way as did their harvest, save that this latter crop was not sown nor reaped with toil.

34. Mention has been made from time to time in previous correspondence of the desirability of raising a Kookie levy for the defence of the frontier. I cannot but think this would be a mistake. The frontier force should be as different from the Kookies as possible, for like does not fear like, and the border tribes have learnt a wholesome reverence for the black coats and short rifles of that splendid regiment the 2nd Goorkhas; and for the present at least it would be most inexpedient to instruct these people in any way as to the force of discipline and coherence, it being the want of these very qualities which gives us our greatest advantage over them.

35. It has also been urged that another way of dealing with these people would be to strengthen the hands of some particular Chief, and so consolidate them under one head; but surely it is first necessary to have a more intimate acquaintance with both Chief and people ere any such choice could be made. Indeed, I am disposed to think that such a plan, although possessing many advantages among an ambitious race whose Chief was struggling with Chief for pre-eminence, would fail in practice among these tribes where such a spirit, if it exists at all, is found only in a very modified degree. We are at any rate only just emerging from the utter darkness of ignorance as to all that concerns these tribes, and any such plan can well afford to lie by until perfected knowledge should bring it to maturity. Too much importance, however, cannot be attached to the fostering and encouragement of trade with these people, but all commerce should, I think, for the present, be restricted to certain recognised centres and be subjected to careful supervision.

36. I cannot conclude this report without mentioning how greatly my work has been facilitated by the courtesy and kindness of Brigadier-General Brownlow, Commanding, and his staff. To the advice of the former is due almost entirely whatever political success our expedition has obtained; but although acting in the strictest subordination to him, he consistently assigned me the most prominent place in all negotiations with the Chiefs, and by every means in his power exalted my position in their eyes and added to my influence over them. I regard my association with him in the expedition as most fortunate.

37. Finally, I would beg to bring prominently to the notice of Government the services of Subadar Mahomed Asim of the Hill Tract Police who, by his knowledge of the language and a large experience among the Lushais, combined with an untiring and

fearless soul, has done much to aid the attainment of the objects which we had in view. His long acquaintance with Rutton Posa had given him considerable influence with the Chief, and it is to this circumstance, combined with the Subadar's personal exertions, that the entire and speedy submission of the Southern Howlongs is mainly attributable. I would respectfully submit that the Subadar's services render him worthy of some special mark of favor at the hands of Government.

38. At the close of the expedition, a guard of 100 men (police) was left at Rutton Posa's village for his protection. Pending the final orders of Government on the subject, and to mark his sense of the chief's loyal co-operation and valuable assistance, the General presented him with Rs. 1,000 as an instant token of appreciation. Such also among Rutton Posa's own immediate followers who had rendered special service, or had suffered loss by our occupation of the country, received minor rewards. With these exceptions no gifts or rewards whatever were given to any Chief or Lushai in the country we have just vacated.

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#### IV.—SELECTION OF CORRESPONDENCE SUBSEQUENT TO THE LUSHAI EXPEDITION.

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*From A. MACKENZIE, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal in the Judicial Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 3713, dated Calcutta, the 18th June 1872.*

With reference to the correspondence ending with your letter No. 1207, dated 22nd ultimo, relative to the proposals for the defence of the frontier bordering on the Cachar and Chittagong Districts, I am directed to forward the accompanying copy of a report\* on the subject from Mr. Edgar, the Civil Officer with Left Column, Lushai Expeditionary Force, together with a copy of the map therewith received. This report brings out plainly the great want in the results of the expedition which the Lieutenant-Governor has always extremely regretted, namely, that it has not given us a knowledge of the country between Cachar and Chittagong. His Honor very strongly recommends that we should take advantage of the effects of the expedition, and our consequent relations with the tribes, to send a survey party to explore this country next cold season. The Lieutenant-Governor thinks we should require the Syloos to give the party a free passage to the northern line of exploration of the Chittagong expedition of the past season, and then by arrangement with Sookpial and the Rajah of Tipperah, survey towards Cachar, leaving Bhoota and his country alone, as recommended by Mr. Edgar, unless a specially favourable opportunity should present itself of entering into amicable relations with him and with his consent. In this way we can to a great extent fill up the hiatus at present left between the explorations of the two columns.

2. Till we know the country, it is, the Lieutenant-Governor thinks, impossible to form any definite plan as regards either advanced posts or roads. It is, however, undoubtedly very very desirable to open up, if possible, a line of communication between Demagiri and Bepari Bazar.

3. The Lieutenant-Governor agrees with Mr. Edgar, that it would not be possible to keep up the route by Chumfai without a military occupation of the country. Such an occupation would no doubt be the only complete protection, and any inner line adopted will leave open to the Lushais a route to Cachar. Still, adverting to the financial difficulties, and to the considerations so well put by Mr. Edgar in his paragraphs 6 to 8, it is probable that the Government may not be willing to undertake such an occupation. In that case the Lieutenant-Governor thinks it extremely desirable that an inner line defining the Tipperah boundary should be laid down, cleared, and, in some sense, occupied in concert with the Rajah of Tipperah. This line should be carried along the Jhalnacheras and Hachik ranges, and thence to the Sorphual peak, which seems to have been already fixed as a sort of trijunction point of the Chittagong, Hill Tipperah and Lushai countries, and was so exhibited in the maps made before the recent expedition.

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\* Dated 5th instant.

4. The Lieutenant-Governor would put our frontier post on the best point on the Jhalnacherra range or in advance of it, if a more favourable site be found, and would require the Tipperah Rajah to keep the line of his own frontier.

5. From the Sorphuel peak the Tipperah boundary runs south-west by a zig-zag line, which seems to be already pretty well defined. It would remain to explore the best line from the Sorphuel peak to the head-waters of the Sahjuck and our Sirthay Kiang post, which line would form the boundary between Lushai and northern portion of the Hill Tracts of Chittagong.

6. The Lieutenant-Governor entirely agrees in the propriety of rendering the trade from the Cachar District to the various frontier posts as good as possible, and hopes that either money or military labor may be given for the purpose of developing the necessary arrangements and communications.

7. The above will show His Honor's views as regards the Cachar side of the question and so far sufficiently answers the call for opinion on the Commander-in-Chief's views contained in your letter No. 1207 of 22nd ultimo.

8. As regards the Chittagong side, the Lieutenant-Governor is disposed to agree with General Brownlow, but will write more fully when the opinions of the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner, which have been called for, are submitted.

9. The Government of India will also, he says, no doubt observe that the proposed line south of Sirthay will be connected with the Burma frontier, and the opinion of the Chief Commissioner of British Burma will be necessary before a confident conclusion can be arrived at.

*From J. W. EDGAR, Esq., Civil Officer with Left Column, Lushai Expeditionary Force, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, dated Alipore, the 5th June 1872.*

In continuation of my No. 548 of the 3rd April, to the address of the Commissioner of Dacca, I have the honor to submit a further report on the measures which I think should be taken for the protection of the Cachar frontier and to improve our relations with hillmen to the south and east.

2. I beg, at the same time, to forward a map compiled from the surveys made by the parties who accompanied the columns during the recent expedition, with some rough additions, which I hope will help to make this report intelligible. The southern limit of the Cachar village cultivation is shown by a green line drawn from west to east, and extended into the Muni pore hills, where it shows approximately the southern limit of the joom cultivation of hillmen subject to the Rajah and living between the Manipur Valley and Cachar. South of this line and north of that marked "limit of Lushai village distribution," is a confused mass of broken and irregular hill ranges ranging from 60 to 4,000 feet in height and covered with dense jungle, of swampy cane-brakes, and of streams with steep high banks and muddy beds for the greater portion of their course. This tract is uncultivated and uninhabited, except where clearances have been made for tea cultivation, which I have marked with red crosses. They are all situated on low hills, and are mere specks in the great forests that surround them. These gardens and the gardens and villages lying along the cultivated frontier to their north, are alone exposed to the attacks of the hillmen, who have never been known to advance far beyond the protection afforded to them by the forests. I have marked roughly in red the area so exposed. It will be seen that the operations of the left column were carried on to the south-east of this area, that those of the right column were south of it, and that a line drawn due north from the proposed outpost on the Sirthay Thlong would almost coincide with its south-western corner. These facts must be kept well in view when considering the proposals made for connecting the Cachar defences with those of the Chittagong Hill Tracts. It is worth remarking, too, that the south boundary of the Cachar District runs through the middle of the uninhabited tract.

3. In my successive visits to the uninhabited tract south of Cachar and Manipur, I have become acquainted with five routes from the cultivated frontier to more or less distant points of the hills. One of these, that taken by the left column, I have described in my report of the 3rd April. Of the others, two are by water,—one up the Dullessur to Bepari Bazar, and one up the Sonai to a point a few miles south of Lushai Hat. Both of these are only practicable for very small boats during the cold season, and

difficult even for them. One of the remaining routes was that taken by Colonel Lister in 1849. In spite of some very steep ascents and descents, it is fairly good as far as a point a few miles to the north-west of Peak Z of the great trigonometrical survey, where it breaks off into a cluster of difficult spurs, one of which is supposed to join on to the range to the east, while others go down to the river. Another route is from the lately occupied post of Bong-Bong along the ridge of the Noongvai or Parsonship range. This is perhaps the easiest of the land routes, as far at least as a point some miles south of Peak Z. I have not explored further than this point; but I have always understood that the range continues unbroken as far as the Howlong country. This, however, is not corroborated by anything I have yet seen in the papers of the Chittagong survey. I had hoped that Captain Tanner's diary would throw some light on the subject; but there is some delay in its publication, and I feel that I cannot any longer put off the submission of this report.

4. The hills between Colonel Lister's route and the Chatter Choorā or Hachik range are very broken and confused almost as far south as I have seen them from high points on the more eastern ranges. The low ranges between the Gootur and the Dullesur, however, seem to get higher towards the south, and the Bar-ek has the appearance of a definite ridge near Sookpīlā's villages. This agrees with the description given by Captain Tanner in his memorandum to General Brownlow. Captain Tanner also describes a range, which he calls the Too Rang running between the Footur and the Hachik or Lyseral range. I think that this must disappear somewhere north of his most advanced point on it, for we have no knowledge whatever of it on the Cachar side, and the spurs thrown out from the Hachik towards the east seem to run down to the river. The Hachik is a very well defined ridge, at least on the Cachar side, and it was along this that the Howlongs came last year. It is possible that the Too Rang may be connected with the Hachik by a spur, and that the route may leave the latter for the former range somewhere south of latitude 24°; but it is certain that the recognized land route from Cachar to the western villages of Sookpīlā and the eastern villages of Hill Tipperah lies at first along the Hachik, which is held to be the boundary. Mr. Power, the Political Agent of Hill Tipperah, says in his letter of the 4th April,—"The territory over which the Rajah has a *bona fide* nominal control is bounded on the east by a range of hill running southward from Chutter Choorā to Sorpuhel peak, and from thence in a zig-zag line to Surdaing. On the east of this line, the Lushai land commences, and on the west there is much uninhabited and unexplored jungle." This coincides with all that I have been able to learn about the Tipperah boundary.

5. Before examining any of the proposals made with regard to our future dealings with the Lushais, I shall attempt to estimate our present position and the probable results of the expedition by the light of Colonel Lister's expedition of 1849. Previous to that year there had been a succession of cruel raids on villages that were really within the Cachar District; but we seem to have made no attempt to punish them until the Kookies destroyed a village situated in what was then forest, a few miles from Silchar. The expedition that followed seems to us a failure, and I certainly should not advise a repetition of it; but its rapidity, secrecy and boldness, made such an impression on the Lushais, that Cachar was free from raids for twenty years afterwards, although the line of village cultivation kept steadily advancing during the whole time; and for the last ten years of it tea gardens were opened out in the forest thirty-five miles south of the most advanced of Colonel Lister's frontier outposts. That this freedom from attack during so many years was the direct result of the expedition, there can be no doubt. The Lushais acknowledge it; the Kookies hostile to the Lushais, firmly believe it. It was mainly by a skilful use of the terror it produced that Colonel McCulloch was able to induce Vonol to enter into those relations with him which gave Manipur twenty years' rest from raids.

6. Now, there can be no doubt that the late expedition must have a much greater effect than that of 1849, inasmuch as it was beyond comparison more successful, covered a vastly greater extent of country, inflicted very much severer punishment, remained in the hills for more weeks than Colonel Lister did, and did not retire until it had accomplished all that at the outset had been announced as its object. Again, Colonel Lister's expedition was directed against a single Chief, the villages of whose descendant were reduced to submission by General Bouchier before the end of December, while the recent expedition may be said to have disposed of every Chief at all likely to give trouble on our side. The villages of the perpetrators of the Cachar outrages of 1869, of those at Monierkhal and Nugdigram in 1871, and of the Manipur outrage of both years, have



been reduced to comparative insignificance. It is probable that the same result has followed the operations of General Brownlow among the Syloos.

7. General Bouchier seems to think that Sookpila and his sons did not feel our power during the expedition; but he seems to be unaware of the present state of our political relations with those Chiefs, which are precisely the same as those formed by us with the eastern villages after the submission of the latter to the military force and the payment of the fines imposed on them; while the headmen of Khalkou's villages, who accompanied us as hostages to Tipai Mookh, were men, of rather a superior position to those brought from the villages of Poiboy and Lalboorah. General Bouchier's mistake seems to have arisen from his supposing that Rutton Singh, a Hindoostani who accompanied the headmen as interpreter, was the leader of the party. This was not altogether an unaccountable mistake, for the Hindoostani must have taken the most prominent part in any dealings with the military officers when I was not present.

8. I had at first some doubts about the completeness of the submission of the Howlongs, particularly as none of the Cachari captives taken from the Anwarkhal village seem to have been given up by Sangbunga and Benkuia, with whom we know they had been; but after carefully studying all the papers, I have come to the conclusion that the fright they have got is not likely to be soon forgotten by them, and I think it probable that the Deputy Commissioner of the Hill Tracts will be able to recover the captives next cold weather by putting a little pressure on the villages. On the whole, I think that there is very little danger of our being troubled by the Lushais of this generation at least, and I am convinced that if we use judiciously the opportunity now offered, we may prevent the possibility of such danger recurring in the future. But in the propositions which I am now about to examine, it seems to be assumed that there is nearly as much danger of attacks as there was before the expedition, and I shall for the present accept this assumption for the purpose of my argument, though I firmly believe it to be untrue.

9. General Brownlow, in his letter to the Quarter-Master General of the 1st May, proposes to establish a line of communication protected by strong outposts from Talukmi, in the Arracan Hill Tracts, to a point on the Sirthay range, which I have marked in red and blue on the map, and to extend this line along the Too Rang range to Gootur Mookh, where he would have an advanced outpost from Cachar. I do not venture to make any remarks on so much of the proposition as refers to the line between Talukmi and the post on the Sirthay range; but there are serious objections, both geographical and political, to the proposed, or to any similar, line in the direction of Gootur Mookh. In the first place it is more than probable, as I have mentioned above, that the range gets completely broken up before it reaches the point indicated by General Brownlow, and certainly when that point was reached, there would be no practicable land communication with Cachar. Again, the proposed post would be in the heart of the uninhabited and uncultivated tract, more than thirty miles, as the crow flies, from the nearest Lushai village, about thirty-six from the most advanced tea garden, and nigh eighty from the nearest point on the limit of Cachar village cultivation. It is superfluous to point out that such a post, situated as it were in the air, could not be of the slightest use in protecting Cachar.

10. If in order to get out of the unhealthy low hills, the post were put further west on the Hachik or Lyseral range, and the patrolled road carried along the range as far as practicable, the measure might serve to protect Hill Tipperah from the incursions of the Lushais; but it would be of as little use to Cachar as a post near Gootur Mookh. More than this, it can be shown that on the assumption that we are still in imminent danger of attack from the Lushais, such a fortified line of communication as that proposed, extending from the south-western corner of Cachar, protecting the frontiers of Tipperah, Chittagong and Arracan, and in a manner pressing on the Lushais to its east, would have a tendency to direct attacks towards all the frontier of Cachar lying to the east of the line of defence, and, therefore, unprotected by it. But apart from considerations connected with Cachar, it seems to me very doubtful policy to undertake the protection of the Rajah of Tipperah's frontier, and to take from him all incentive to watch and restrain his Kookies in their dealings with the Lushais on the other side of the fortified line of communications. It must be understood, however, that while opposed to adopting the Hachik range as a line of defence, I am inclined to think it likely to turn out the easiest land route between Cachar and the Chittagong Hill Tracts, and the construction of a road along it by the Tipperah Chief.

11. General Bouchier proposes to adopt our late route as far as Paohowee, then to strike across towards the west, crossing the Sonai at Lushai Hat, and striking the Dullesur at Bepari Bazar, from which place he would take the road through Laljeek's

village to Demagiri. I should here remark that the map on which this route has been traced by General Bouchier is inaccurate, consequently the road, as shown, runs over non-existent hill ranges in a line that is in reality, quite impracticable. Probably the line the road, if made, would have to take would be that taken by Mr. Burland and myself last year, in which case the section between Dollong and Bepari Bazar would nearly coincide with the green line which marks the limit of Lushai village distributed. I have not the slightest idea what course it would take between Bepari Bazar and Laljeeka's village. Although General Bouchier does not contemplate keeping troops or police in the Lushai Hills, still I am of opinion that to make his proposed road of the slightest use as a protective measure, two strong posts at least,—one at Pachuee and one on the Noongvai range, — would be needed. This would virtually amount to a permanent occupation of the country. In my letter to General Bouchier of the 20th April, I mentioned the difficulties of the portion of route known to me; I have certainly not over-estimated these difficulties. I may point out, in addition, that the road between Bepari Bazar and Pachowee would not be except by our patrol parties for people passing to and fro between Cachar and Chittagong would certainly make use of the water route as far as Bepari Bazar in preference to making the enormous detour by Pachuee.

12. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief recommends that General Bouchier's proposal for a cross road be adopted as well as General Brownlow's for connecting Demagiri with Bepari Bazar; also that the existing path from Tipai Mookh to Chumpai should be maintained. If the latter recommendation were adopted, it seems to me that it would be much better to make the cross road from Demagiri to Chumpai than from Demagiri to Pachowee. The distance would be very much less, the difficulties would, in all probability, not be so great; while a large force stationed on the hills over the Chumpai Valley would keep in check the Suktis, the Howlongs, and the Shindus. I need scarcely say that such measures would be opposed to the policy which I have long advocated; but if any kind of permanent occupation be decided on, this, I think, is the form it should take.

13. It seems to me that all attempts to maintain roads of the kind contemplated by the military authorities must involve what is virtually a permanent occupation of the country, and that it is such occupation that in former cases has made roads valuable agents in pacifying similar tracts. The pacification of the Khasi Hills, for instance, was not effected by the construction of a road so much as by the occupation of a commanding position by a force sufficiently strong to overawe all the Chiefs. Of course, the above remarks do not apply to roads made with the consent and aid of the hillmen through their own hills, still less to roads carried along our own acknowledged frontier or that of an ally, like that proposed between Sirthay Thlang and Talukmi, or on which I should recommend the Tipperah Chief to make on his eastern boundary.

14. Whatever may be the decision on the question of the roads, I hope that early measures may be taken to organize some means of transport for the military to be employed in Cachar next cold season. The offer of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to employ military labour in making the roads, would so far relieve the pressure on the civil population of the district; but food and baggage for the troops so employed would have to be carried, and it is absolutely impossible that the resources of the district can bear the strain which, if the recommendations of His Excellency were adopted, would possibly be even greater than it was during the recent expedition. If a road were to be made along the boundary of the Tipperah Chief, I have little doubt that he could be induced to assist, even if he were not in a position to undertake the whole work. But even this assistance would be only partial, and there would be still much labour required for transport, &c., which I should not think the Cachar District is in a state to give. I earnestly solicit attention to the remarks on this subject contained in the 4th paragraph of my letter to General Bouchier, No. 544 of the 20th April.

15. Measures, should I think, be taken next cold season if possible to define the Tipperah boundary. It will be seen from the 16th paragraph of Mr. Power's letter of the 4th April, that the Chief or some of his people wished to advance the boundary to the "range of hills west of Bepari Bazar." This is not very intelligible; but I think that it may have meant the assertion of supremacy over Sookpila's villages between the Gootur and the Dullesur. I think that, under present circumstances, the boundary should be a well-defined range of succession of ranges west of the Gootur, and that we should take Chatter Choora as a starting point and follow the Hachik as far as that range continues to afford a definite and practicable line. This boundary should be actually laid down and surveyed, and the survey party engaged on the work should take the

opportunity of completing the survey of the country drained by the Gootur and Dullessur. The definition and survey of this boundary would incidentally open up direct land communication between Cachar and the Chittagong Hill Tracts, and as I have before remarked, the Rajah would probably find it advantageous to keep the line open.

16. I do not think, however, that it would be the best line of communication between Cachar and Chittagong for purposes of trade and the like. Any such route must, to be of any practical value, avail itself of the water communication to Baipari Bazar; that is to the most southern point at which the Dullessur is navigable. Captain Tanner conjectures this point to be in latitude  $23^{\circ} 30'$ . I believe to be about  $23^{\circ} 42'$ . In either case I believe that the construction of a road from Demagiri to it would have the effect of turning the produce of the Northern Syloo and Howlong Hills towards Cachar, for the depôt of our traders on the Dullessur would be nearer to Laljeeka or Lalboorah than Demagiri, and any trade that depends entirely on human carriage must go to the nearest point where water communication is to be had. At present, owing, as I understand, to the difficulty of the country between the Syloos and Howlongs and Bepari Bazar, very little of their produce comes down to us; but if this difficulty were removed by the construction of a good road, our Cachar traders' dealings with the Lushais would, doubtless, be greatly extended. Of course, I can give no opinion on the practicability of making such a road, or upon the political effects it might be expected to have on the Syloos, and Howlongs; while the Deputy Commissioner of the Hill Tracts is in a position to give an opinion on both subjects.

17. I should not advise any attempt to survey the country to the south-east of Peak Z for the present. The most important Chief in that direction is Bhoota, with whom we have had no direct communication hitherto; but who has lately sent in through Sookpilal to say that he wishes to form friendly relations with us. It would be just as well not to run the risk of frightening him by too much hurry at first; but we should make every possible effort to get into direct communication with him and with the minor Chiefs in that direction. In the course of time, when we had thoroughly established friendly intercourse, a survey officer could accompany the Political Officer in one of the annual visits of the latter and complete the portion now left unsurveyed.

18. I am not in favor of an attempt to get up a big central fair at present, but should encourage, and to a certain extent regulate, the marts which have been for years back established on points of the Barak, the Sonai, the Dullessur and the Gootur. These small marts are the natural channels in which our Cachar trade with the Lushais runs, and I am altogether averse to any attempt to divert its course by artificial means. The mart at Tipai Mookh on the Barak will probably in time become larger and more important than the other three; but that should not be any reason for our discouraging the latter so long as the Lushais wish for them.

19. I think that the posts mentioned by General Bouchier in his 19th paragraph should be kept up, with the exception of that on the Rengti Pahar, of the utility of which I am somewhat doubtful. The point was taken up last cold weather on my strong recommendation. I then wished for its occupation not so much for purposes of defence,—for I do not believe that it in reality defends anything,—but as a kind of check upon Sookpilal, who I expected would look on it as a possible base of operations, from which at any moment another column might advance on his villages in case he showed a disposition to aid the villages we were about to attack. The measure had all the success I expected or hoped from it; but a repetition of it this year might be crying “well” once too often.

20. I quite agree with the Brigadier General in thinking that the tracks between the outposts should be kept open; but I think it is still more important to connect these outposts by thoroughly good roads with the head-quarters at Silchar. I own that I am surprised that so little stress has been laid upon this point by the military authorities. I believe that Government is aware how hard Mr. McWilliam and I have worked on the Cachar roads, and that we have been tolerably successful within the cultivated portion of the district; but beyond it we have found the difficulty of getting labor almost insuperable, and the sections of our roads nearest the outposts in the forests are not in a satisfactory state. But now, as His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has proposed to make use of military labor for road-making, the sections of roads connecting the outposts with the cultivated portion might be completed. I have roughly shown with blue crosses on the map the section which I propose should be constructed by the troops during the cold

season. The first is from a point near the bifurcation of the Khatia Khall and the Dullessur through Outlecherri to Jhulnacherra; I would connect both places directly with the post on the Chatter Choor. The main district road from Silchar to Hylakandy through Chota Jalingha should have a branch from the last named place to the outposts at Laharbund, or to Kolasib, if that post be maintained. The road between Nugdigram and Monierkhal should be completed and continued across the Bhoobuns to Mynadthur.

In all cases, the roads should be thoroughly and well constructed for use in all weathers, and should be substantially bridged. Mere cold weather tracks can be of no permanent value. The bridges could be probably made by the soldiers under the direction of a few sappers, if the latter could be spared. If the troops employed in the construction of the roads above enumerated should have finished their works before the rains, they might be employed in making a road to Kaimong, a point on the Noongrai range south of Bong Bong, where I would place an advanced outpost instead of Kola Sib, if any such post were thought necessary or advisable.

21. In conclusion, I shall enumerate the leading points of the policy in dealing with the Lushais which I have advocated in this and previous letters, particularly in my report C of the 15th March 1871 :—

1st.—The Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, acting always in concert with the Deputy Commissioner of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, and with the Political Agents at Manipur and Tipperah, should aim at being in constant personal communication with Lushais.

2nd.—He should do all in his power to induce them to settle on their portion of the uninhabited tract.

3rd.—He should encourage trade at the marts chosen by the Lushais.

4th.—Efforts should be made to induce their young men to spend a few years in a rough levy, which should be composed exclusively of hill men belonging to the frontier.

5th.—We should endeavour to put within reach of the people means of getting elementary instruction, particularly in handicrafts, for which they show great aptitude.

6th.—We should keep ourselves well acquainted with the movements of all our own Kookies wherever they may be, and, as far as possible, regulate their relations with the Lushais.

7th.—We should connect all our outposts by roads, in the first instance, with the head-quarters at Silchar, and afterwards with one another.

These recommendations may not seem of a very ambitious character; but they agree in the main with the policy devised by Colonel Lister, one of the ablest officers who has ever been on the frontier. That policy, as I have shown in a previous report, was not carried out in its entirety, and was eventually dropped; but it certainly was successful as far as it was applied.

22. In addition to the foregoing general recommendations, I have proposed that the eastern boundary of Hill Tipperah be defined and surveyed during next cold weather, if possible; that an attempt should be made to survey the country drained by the Dullessur and Gootur; that, if found practicable, a permanent tract should be kept open by the Tipperah Chief along his boundary from the south-west corner of Cachar to the north-east corner of the Chittagong Hill Tracts; and that the Deputy Commissioner of the Hill Tracts be consulted on the advisability of his making a road from Demagiri to Bepari Bazar, with a view to facilitate trade between the Howlongs and Syloos and the people of Cachar. I have not made any proposition for my own action during the cold weather; for until I know generally the measures likely to be adopted by Government, it will be impossible for me to lay out definite plans. In any case, I should like to meet, if possible, in the Lushai country the two Political Agents and the Hill Tracts Deputy Commissioner.

*From A. MACKENZIE, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, in the Judicial Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India,—No. 4270, dated Calcutta, the 18th July 1872.*

In continuation of paragraph 8 of my letter No. 3713, dated 18th ultimo, I am now directed to submit, for the consideration of His Excellency the Governor General in Council, reports\* by the Commissioner of Chittagong and Captain Lewin upon the defence of the Chittagong Hill Tracts. It will be seen that both these officers are practically in accord with Brigadier-General Brownlow, and approve, with slight modifications, the measures proposed by him in his letter of the 1st May to the Quarter Master General. Briefly, these measures may be said to consist in the abandonment of the present small isolated posts which, lying among broken hills and dense jungles, are useful neither for protection nor defence, and the occupation of a permanent line of defence further to the east, where the open and continuous summit of the Oheepoom range affords healthy sites for two or more strong posts and facilities for regular patrol.

2. The Lieutenant-Governor is decidedly of opinion that the plan of taking the Oheepoom as our line of frontier to the east should be tried. The anticipations entertained as to the effect of this step may be a little sanguine, our knowledge of the country being at best imperfect, but there is much to be said in its favour, even one season's exploration ought to furnish the means towards coming to a conclusion as to the practical merits of the scheme proposed.

3. Both Mr. Hankey and Captain Lewin in discussing the question have, the Lieutenant-Governor thinks, gone too far, and entered into matters not necessarily involved in the proposal now before Government. His Honor has no idea of keeping up a Deputy and Assistant Commissioner solely as frontier agents, still less of forming a Chittagong district, a hill tracts district, and a frontier district. The work of the present hill tracts district is not from any point of view heavy, and the Lieutenant-Governor simply proposes that the Deputy Commissioner of that district should also occupy himself with the frontier operations generally, control the frontier posts, and establish relations with the frontier tribes. His Honor will not therefore here enter into any question of re-distributing the administrative staff of the hill tracts, or propose any additions thereto. As regards number, that staff is in his opinion sufficiently strong for all the work before it. Captain Lewin has at present four European officers at his disposal including police officers. These have, however, been withdrawn from other districts to meet the demands of the hill tracts, and no sanction has yet been given to the appointment of others in their place. For this there is, however, a really pressing need. Assam being in fact at present seriously under-handed. The Lieutenant-Governor would therefore ask that sanction may be given to the addition of two Assistant Commissionerships on account of the hill tracts; that is to say, that he may be permitted to appoint two of the officers now employed there, Lieutenant Gordon and Mr. Knyvett, to be Assistant Commissioners in the Hill Tracts of Chittagong, one for frontier work and one for civil work, their places being supplied for for work in other districts.

4. The Lieutenant-Governor would also again press for the appointment of a European medical man to the hill tracts district. The grounds for this application were set forth in the letter from this office, No. 259, dated 18th January last, in reply to which your letter No. 365G. of the 24th February called for certain information as to the number of the frontier force usually at head quarters and the distribution of the rest of the force. The question was allowed to lie over, as it was then nearly certain that radical changes in the scheme of frontier defence would very shortly be proposed. Under the plan now submitted for sanction it will be seen that the greater part of a force of 500 men will be stationed in advanced positions cut off during the most unhealthy time of the year from easy intercourse with head-quarters, and in circumstances where a European surgeon is almost a necessity. The great success which has attended the work of the medical officer, Mr. Cooper, in the Naga Hills, induces the Lieutenant-Governor to believe that there too the presence of a medical officer with the frontier force might be utilized and made a most effectual means of establishing friendly relations with the frontier tribes. He hopes that the Government of India will favourably consider the request of the local officers for such an appointment.

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\* No. 387, dated the 21st June 1872, with enclosures.

5. Of Captain Lewin's proposed plan of carrying out the occupation of the Oheepoom, the Lieutenant-Governor generally approves. It will be seen that instead of two posts, of 100 men each, south of Sirthay Klang, as suggested by General Browlaw, he proposes one strong post of 200 men with a smaller intermediate outpost of 40 men. This is matter of detail, and it seems advisable to lay down no rigid orders on such a question beforehand. It is, however, most important that the authorities of British Burma should make a point of opening up communications with the most southerly of our posts on the Oheepoom, and complete the system of patrols on which the success of the whole plan depends.

6. It will not, His Honor thinks, be really necessary to make any very radical change in the constitution of the frontier force. There are at present 242 hillmen in its ranks. With proper drill and good officers there seems no reason to doubt its being generally fit enough for the work it will have to do. At the same time it will not bear any reduction, and for this reason the Lieutenant-Governor trusts that the dak establishment of 32 runners may be separately sanctioned.

7. Captain Lewin's proposal to establish a bazar at Demagiri is very important and has His Honor's entire support. I am to ask sanction to the advance of Rs. 3,000 necessary to enable Captain Lewin to get up and establish there in November next a sufficient number of traders, and to the appointment of a native officer on Rs. 50 per mensem to superintend the bazar, &c. Inquires will be made from the Chief Commissioner of British Burma as to the way in which the Arracan Hill Tracts bazar is managed.

8. The Lieutenant-Governor trusts that the Government of India will now find itself in possession of sufficient information on which to pass early orders, that all arrangements may be put early in train for any measures to be undertaken during the ensuing cold season.

*From C. U. AITCHISON, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal,—No. 1883P., dated Simla, the 4th September 1872.*

I am directed to acknowledge receipt of your letters noted below on the subject of the defence of the Eastern Frontier of Bengal, and, in reply, communicate the following observations and instructions of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council.

2. The general policy of the Government of India on the question of the frontier defence and the friendly communications to be maintained by the officers of the Frontier District with the Lushai tribes, has been explained at considerable length in my letters marginally noted; and as the Lieutenant-Governor has been informed in my letter No. 556P., dated 8th March 1872, it is the desire of the Government of India that the policy prescribed should in all its main features be adhered to. In the Resolution of the Government of India, No. 1453 P., dated 11th July 1871, His Excellency in Council desired that advantage should be taken of the Lushai Expedition to procure all the information necessary for a decision as the best means of protecting the frontier and the line of posts to be established on the Chittagong border. The information now submitted is of great value in the consideration of the subject, and although final orders cannot be passed until more is known of the country between Cachar and Chittagong, His Excellency in Council is now in a position to give such instructions as, it is hoped, will lead to a definite settlement of the question by the end of the ensuing cold season.

3. His Excellency in Council concurs in the objections taken by the Lieutenant-Governor in paragraph 3 of your letter to the Government of India in the Military Department, No. 3713, dated 18th June, to open out and keep up the road through

No. 3837, dated 25th June 1872.  
 No. 3694, dated 16th June 1872.  
 No. 4017, dated 1st July 1873.  
 No. 4270, dated 18th July 1872.  
 No. 2165P., dated 12th December 1878  
 No. 480, dated 1st March 1871.  
 No. 17C., dated 11th April 1871.

Chunfai to Chittagong. Nor does he consider advisable to attempt to construct and maintain the road through Chipooi and Bepari Bazar, advocated by Brigadier General Brownlow. Apart from other objections which might be urged, the physical difficulties and the great expense which the construction and maintenance of such roads would involve prevent His Excellency in Council from taking either project into favourable consideration. At the same time His Excellency in Council considers it advisable that the District Officers in Cachar should give every encouragement of the Lushais themselves to maintain a passable road of their own to Tepai Mookh, at which point they can obtain easy water-carriage to Cachar, and where, if a mart be eventually established, they will meet the traders from British districts.

4. As regards the defence of the southern boundary of Cachar, there is a unanimity of opinion that the present posts should be maintained, or new posts selected in better situations, and that the posts at Monierkhal, Doarbund, Julnacherra, and Chutterchoora, or such other posts as may be established in their place, should be connected by cleared paths, and have communications opened out by roads to the rear connecting them with supports in the settled districts. I am to forward, for His Honor's information, a memorandum dated 30th July, from Lieutenant-Colonel Roberts, which may prove of much use in determining the sites for the posts on the Cachar Frontier, and the strength in which they should be held. It is necessary for the effective protection of the frontier that the posts should be placed on commanding positions and not in the valleys. When a final determination has been come to by the local authorities as to the most advantageous positions for the posts, His Excellency in Council would wish a definite report to be submitted. The posts, when occupied, should be connected and supported by roads in the manner suggested, and His Excellency in Council will be prepared to take into favourable consideration estimates for their construction, either by military labour or otherwise, as recommended by the Lieutenant-Governor. The line of defence in this quarter, running, as it does, at right angles to the mountain ridges and drainage of the country, presents many difficulties, which should receive very careful consideration.

5. His Excellency in Council agrees with the Lieutenant-Governor that opportunity should be taken in the ensuing cold season to have a careful and accurate survey made of the whole country between Cachar and Chittagong, embracing also the country to the south of Peak Z. His Excellency in Council does not think the reasons advanced by Mr. Edgar in paragraph 17 of his letter of 5th June 1872, are sufficient for excluding the portion of country south of Peak Z from the survey. On the contrary, he considers it necessary that as complete a knowledge as possible should be obtained of the whole country between the eastern frontier of Hill Tipperah and the range on which that peak is situated, and between Cachar in the north and Chittagong in the south. His Honor is requested to report specially what measures should be taken, either through the District Officers or otherwise, to secure the safety of the survey party which the Survey Department will be instructed to arrange for, in direct communication with the Bengal Government. It will probably be desirable hereafter more fully to explore and survey Hill Tipperah; but this is a matter which may be left for future consideration.

6. Subject to such results as the exploration to be undertaken in the cold season may produce, His Excellency in Council agrees with the Lieutenant-Governor that the eastern boundary of Tipperah should be defined. Probably, as suggested, the best line will be along the Julnacherra and Hachik ranges to the Sorphuel Peak. This line appears to correspond with what Mr. Edgar describes to be the actual limits of Tipperah; and if it prove otherwise suitable for purposes of defence, there will be an advantage in adopting that line rather than the Rai Jan and Towrang range, as proposed by Colonel Brownlow. Mr. Edgar states that it is doubtful whether the latter range runs on to Cachar, and from paragraph 20 of Captain Tanner's memorandum, enclosed in his letter of 30th March 1872, to the address of General Brownlow, it would appear to pass through a forest country, and to leave Sookpial's villages to the west of, and within the line of defence. The precise line, however, which it may be necessary to adopt, cannot be definitely settled till the result of the further exploration is known.

7. Whatever may be the eastern boundary laid down for Hill Tipperah, His Excellency in Council considers, as you have been already informed in my letter No. 17C, dated 11th April 1871, that the responsibility for the defence of Tipperah must, in the first instance, rest with the Rajah, under the guidance and advice of the Political Agent. For this purpose it may be advisable that the Rajah should be required to entertain a small body of picket and drilled men, who should be located in such posts on the frontier as may be selected by Government, and whose supervision, distribution, duties, and efficiency it should be the duty of the Political Agent to see to.

8. From the Sorphuol Peak, the Lieutenant-Governor proposes to run the defence line by the best ridge that the survey may discover along the Sirthay Klang, and on to the British Burma frontier, joining the advanced post in Arrakan at Tulukma. From Captain Tanner's memorandum, already referred to, it appears that the best line will either be the Oheepoon ranges or the Saichul range to the west of the Oheepoon. Both appear to join a few miles north of the Burma frontier, which they cut at a place called Keekradong. The most southern post proposed by General Brownlow on the Oheepoon is 40 miles from Tulukma. In connection with this matter, I am to convey the desire of His Excellency in Council that His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor should communicate directly with the Chief Commissioner of British Burma in regard to the connection of the Chittagong frontier with that of Arrakan, as well as on the subject of your letter No. 4017, dated 1st July, and that the Government of India may thereafter be furnished with a definite report as to the ridge on which the posts should be established from Sorphuol Peak southward, the points at which the posts should be located, and the strength in which they should be held. Till this report is received, His Excellency in Council will reserve his opinion on the question put forward in paragraph 5 of your letter No. 4271, dated 18th July, viz., whether the ridge should be held by two or more strong posts, or by one strong post with smaller guards on either flank. I am, however, to draw attention to the views of Government already expressed in my letter No. 2186P., dated 12th December 1870, and to state that whatever be the line of frontier defence eventually adopted, the line of posts must not be beyond the limits of our actual jurisdiction, and no advanced posts must be thrown out without the previous sanction of the Government of India. Should the boundary through the Sirthay Klang be adopted, it will be matter for special report how this will affect our relations with Button Pooca, and whether he is willing that his possessions, west of the ridge, should be under British jurisdiction. For the present I am to remind you that the post near Button Pooca's village has only been temporarily sanctioned.\*

9. When the frontier line is once defined, the instructions already issued sufficiently provide for the duties of the civil officers beyond it. These are to leave the tribes as far as possible to manage their own affairs, to cultivate trade and friendly intercourse with them, to endeavour to establish personal influence over the Chiefs, and to maintain such vigilance along the line of defence as to deter the tribes from committing raids, or to cut off the parties that may attempt them. In carrying out this policy, His Excellency in Council thinks it will be best to maintain the existing marts described by Mr. Edgar in paragraph 18 of his letter of 5th June. Opportunity might, however, be taken to run a road from Demagiri to Bepari Bazar, which will give two outlets to Lushai trade, — one by water to Cachar, and one by land to Chittagong. The road should be a mere trade route, over which no attempt should be made to exercise any jurisdiction, and which, when constructed, the Deputy Commissioner of the Chittagong Hills endeavour to get the Lushais themselves to keep up.

10. I am here to invite attention to the views expressed by General Brownlow in paragraph 11 of his letter of 1st May 1872, regarding personnel of the frontier police, and the advantage of employing Goorkhas. His Excellency in Council considers this a matter of primary importance. In the event of a recurrence of raids, the first skirmish may be of the utmost consequence, and no other considerations should be allowed to interfere with the fighting efficiency of the force. His Excellency in Council observes that the Commissioner of Chittagong has expressed himself strongly in favour of Brigadier Brownlow's recommendation in this respect.

11. His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor will, I am to observe, doubtless adopt such measures as may seem desirable, with reference to Mr. Edgar's remarks as to the supply of labour in Cachar.

12. Lastly, I am to state that His Excellency in Council agrees with the views of His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor, as expressed in the 3rd paragraph of your letter No. 4270, dated 18th July, viz., that there is no necessity to enlarge the establishment of the Chittagong Hill Tracts in the manner proposed by Captain Lewin and Mr. Hankey. Regarding the proposals (1) to appoint Lieutenant Gordon and Mr. Knyvett to be Assistant Commissioners in the Hill Tracts, their places in their districts being filled up, (2) to appoint a European Medical Officer to the Chittagong Tracts, and (3) to grant

\* See letter No. 556P., dated 8th March 1872.



Captain Lewin an advance of Rs. 3,000 to establish a bazar at Demagiri in November next, and to appoint a Native officer on Rs. 50 a month to superintend that bazar, a separate communication will shortly be addressed to you.

*From A. MACKENZIE, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to the Secretary to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department,—No. 3149, dated Calcutta, the 19th August 1873.*

I am directed to forward, for the consideration of His Excellency the Governor General in Council, the papers noted below\* containing the reports of the officers who were, in accordance with the orders contained in paragraphs 6 and 6 of your letter No. 1883P., dated 4th September last, charged with the duty of exploring the eastern frontier of Hill Tipperah and the country lying between Western Cachar and Chittagong.

2. The Lieutenant-Governor is sure that the Government of India, on a perusal of these reports, will concur with him in awarding very high praise to both Captain Badgley and Mr. Power for the manner in which they executed their difficult and toilsome task. Captain Badgley's numerous and energetic services of a similar kind are well known, and the Lieutenant-Governor only hopes that the Bengal Government may have more of them. In this instance, the success of the expedition was largely due to Mr. Power, the Political Agent of Tipperah, who spared no personal trouble of any kind to enable Captain Badgley to accomplish his survey, and accepted a responsibility in a difficult situation from which he extricated himself most successfully.

3. We have at last succeeded in carrying our explorations across the unknown tract between Cachar and Chittagong, and completed what was wanting in the results of the Lushai expedition. The Lieutenant-Governor trusts that we shall not lose ground in futuro, but increase our communications with, and means of transit through, that part of the Lushai tract that intervenes between our own districts of Cachar and Chittagong.

4. It will be seen that it has now been clearly ascertained that the western part of Hill Tipperah is quite uninhabited, and that there are no unknown tribes living there who could have committed the raids from which Sylhet and West Cachar have in former years suffered. We have to guard against raids by tribes that we now fairly know. The Lieutenant-Governor agrees with all the officers whose opinions he has had, that we cannot expect the Rajah of Tipperah to organise an efficient frontier defence, and that it would not be much use if he could, so long as the country is uninhabited. It is shown conclusively in the reports that a chain of posts along the Hachik or Jampai, *i. e.*, on the eastern frontier of Hill Tipperah, could only be kept up at an enormous expense which that State certainly could not support, and which would be almost certainly useless if established.

5. The conclusion which His Honour has been led to form by a careful review of all the data before him is, that our proper course is to hold a certain control over these Western Lushais, and by encouraging communication and familiarity—to do in fact what Captain Butler is doing so successfully among the Angami Nagas. How this can, he believes, be done, the Lieutenant-Governor will now proceed to explain.

6. It is shown by Captain Badgley and Mr. Power that Sookpila, the most powerful Chief of the Western Lushais, and since the expedition probably the most powerful Chief in the Lushai Hills, has been moving back his villages from the Cachar side, and has brought himself within one day's march of the village of Laljeeka, a Syloo Chief well known in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. In Laljeeka's village, during all last cold weather, a guard of our Hill Tracts Police was stationed at the special request of the Syloos, who entirely supported it while it remained there. Nothing would, it is believed, be more agreeable to the Syloo Chiefs, whose sole aim since the expedition has been to cultivate intimate relations with us, than the establishment of a post in their midst. A reference to the report by the Commissioner of Chittagong, No. 393, dated 9th May, forwarded with my letter No. 3150 of this day's date, will show precisely how matters stand on the Chittagong side of the Lushai tract. The country where the post would be is high and healthy, is inhabited by a friendly tribe, and is in communication with the strong post of Sirthay, which must, it is certain, be the centre of our system of defence, and our chief means of influencing the Chittagong Lushais.

\* From the Political Agent, Hill Tipperah, No. 61, dated the 26th May 1873.

From the Surveyor General of India, No. 409P, dated the 15th July 1873, with annexures and maps.

7. The Lieutenant-Governor has already, in my letter to the Military Department, No. 1755, dated 7th May, forwarded to you with my endorsement No. 1756 of that date, suggested that the establishment of a post at or near Laljoeka's village would be a desirable measure. He believes that it is of little use to be content with assuming an attitude of suspicion and *quasi*-hostility by establishing a mere chain of defensive posts, and keeping the tribes outside these. It is, His Honour thinks, better to place ourselves at once in communication with those whom we seek to influence. He does not propose to govern them or control them directly, but to take up a safe position near them with their own consent, and to bring the political influence of our officers directly to bear on them as we have done in the Naga Hills. In my letter of this day's date on the southern defence line, the Lieutenant-Governor has alluded to the healthiness of these upper ranges as compared with the posts at present occupied by us at Rungamattoo and elsewhere. A copy of Captain Lewin's letter No. 615, dated 21st July, bearing upon this subject, is attached for ready reference. In the cold weather whatever unhealthiness has been experienced in this new country has been attributable solely to want of proper covering and comfort—wants that can very easily be supplied. The late expedition tested the climate well during that season, and Captain Lewin's present report is demonstrative that in the rains up to late in July even Demagiri, which is to some extent shut in, is much healthier than our ordinary Hill Tracts District, while Sirthay and the higher ranges towards Laljoeka's are in every way desirable and remarkably well-suited as a station for troops. While the police at Rungamattoo were almost to a man down with fever, Dr. Murphy, the Civil Surgeon, reports that at Demagiri the hospital was almost empty. The Lieutenant-Governor believes that it would be desirable to have some troops in Chittagong as a military support to the frontier police, and if this were granted, it is a question whether they should not be sent at once to occupy an advanced post such as is above suggested on these high and healthy ranges of the Syloo country.

8. The Lieutenant-Governor thinks that we may probably bring Sookpial's tribe to terms of greater familiarity as we have the Syloos. In all likelihood it is only suspicion that keeps him back, and if we have a post not in his territory but near it, we shall soon break the ice and learn the easiest through routes to Bepari Bazar. For the present we may be content with the one post proposed, and trust to pacific influence to establish a trade and post route from Chittagong to Bepari Bazar, and thence to Cachar.

9. It is not likely that with an outpost only a day's march from his villages, Sookpial would venture upon any hostile movement towards Cachar or Sylhet. If the trade at Bepari Bazar, by which he mainly profits, develops fairly, it will be his interest to prevent any such movement. For the present the Lieutenant-Governor does not propose to place any guard at Bepari Bazar. He would rather let the trade stand on its own merits as it were. But His Honour would maintain for the present the line of posts and roads along the Cachar and Sylhet frontier as already settled by the local civil and military authorities, and referred to in the correspondence ending with my letter No. 1755, dated 7th May last, already quoted. It would be premature to withdraw these, as the planters, coolies and people have not yet recovered complete confidence, and are still liable to apprehensions. Hill Tipperah also may perhaps be able to strengthen the Sylhet portion of the line, and to cover British Tipperah by establishing proper posts on the verge of its own cultivation. This is a point on which Mr. Power must report.

10. The eastern frontier of Tipperah should, however, be now defined as the Government of India has repeatedly desired. In some maps the Jampai range, and in some the Hachik-Chutterchoora range, has been put down as the limit, and the question has hitherto been considered to be, which of these two ridges should be accepted as the boundary. Hill Tipperah was formally demarcated up to the Jampai; but east of the Jampai, a general geographical line was loosely run down on the map as the boundary between British territory and the wild country to the south. At that time nothing was known of the Lushais; and the line running north and south between them and Tipperah could in no wise be affected by the general east and west line above mentioned. As it is clear that the country on the border, especially to the west of it, is uninhabited and not in the actual possession of any one, we may in settling the details be guided by geographic and political convenience, though we may hope that this country may again be inhabited as it once was. Captain Badgley shows in paragraph 29 of his report that in these tracts a river is by far the best, and a hill range the worst form of boundary, as the tops of the ranges generally come to be occupied by villages and cultivation, while the river sides are not occupied. The Lieutenant-Governor agrees with this view, which indeed he has had occasion to express on several occasions in dealing with these

## APPENDIX.

western frontier countries; and he would take for the eastern boundary of Hill Tipperah, neither the Jampai nor the Hachik-Chutterchoora range, but the Lungai River, which runs between them, and is described by Captain Badgley as "a clear stream with a sandy bed and good current." After being carried up the Lungai to its sources in the Betting Sib Peak, the line would run across by the watershed to the peak of Dolajuri, and thence follow the recognised southern border of Hill Tipperah by Surdaing to the Fonny. Mr. Chennell will probably be able to give a clear definition of the line from Betting Sib. But the Lieutenant-Governor would ask the Government of India's approval of the general direction indicated.

*From A. MACKENZIE, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to the Secretary to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department,—No. 3150, dated Calcutta, the 19th August 1873.*

I am now directed to forward, for the purpose of being laid before His Excellency the Governor General in Council, copies of the papers noted below\* having reference to the question of the survey and defence of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Frontier, and to submit for consideration the following remarks of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor on the subject.

2. In my separate letter No. 3140 of this day's date, the Lieutenant-Governor has, in connection with the reports of Messrs. Badgley and Power, set out with sufficient fulness the measures that he would adopt with respect to the Sylao country and the tract lying between Cachar and the Hill Tracts of Chittagong, and has also suggested what seems to him the best mode of defining the Hill Tipperah boundary, and providing for the defence of Cachar and Sylot. The present letter will therefore be confined to a discussion of the best line of defence against the Howlongs and Shindoes, lying to the east of the Hill Tracts of Chittagong, the posts which it is necessary to occupy, and the force which must be provided for those posts.

3. The Lieutenant-Governor has just had the advantage of discussing all these matters personally with Mr. Hankey, the Commissioner, who has himself inspected the present frontier arrangements, and with Colonel Graham, who was formerly in charge of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, and whose experience on this and other frontiers enables him to give valuable advice.

4. During the past cold season, while Captain Lewin, with Mr. Cooke as Surveyor, were exploring the Oheepoom and Saichal ranges to the south, a body of the frontier police force was establishing itself in the post at Sirthay, provisionally sanctioned by the Government of India after the expedition, a large force being at Demagiri, the highest point to which the river is navigated, and near Sirthay, and a smaller body in advance in the Sylao country. The good effect of this measure has been, as Mr. Hankey shows in his letter of the 9th May, very marked and gratifying. Notwithstanding the interruption caused by his southern journey, Captain Lewin has been able to establish the most intimate relations with the Sylaos, to relieve their distress, to convert them, in short, into a friendly and subservient clan, who look to our officers for orders even as to the ranges they may fill. They have supported entirely at their own expense a guard of fifty men lent them at their own request, as a protection in their present disabled state from attacks by remoter tribes. More has been learnt of the frontier tribes and their relations, and more influence has been gained in these few months than in a long course of years previously. The Lieutenant-Governor has no doubt whatever that under any policy that may be adopted, having for its basis the principle of influencing the tribes by direct association while preserving an attitude of defence and preparedness, the maintenance of this post at Sirthay, or somewhere beyond it on the higher ranges, is essential.

5. His Honour has, in the letter of to-day's date above quoted, stated his own conviction that the only way to secure the safety of Cachar and Sylhet, and he would now add to cover the north of Chittagong, is to place a strong post well in advance of Demagiri at some such place as that (Laljeeka's village) where we have had a guard all

\* Pol. Proceedings of this Government for July 1873, Nos. 22 to 24.

From Officiating Commissioner of Chittagong, Nos. 632, dated 28th July 1873, with enclosures.

Memorandum from Officiating Commissioner of Chittagong, dated 7th August 1873, with annexure.

From the Surveyor General of India, No. 4092, dated 15th July 1873, with annexures and maps.

this last season. Demagiri and its neighbourhood is, however, the central point to occupy in order to make our system of defence on the side of Chittagong complete and consistent. Demagiri itself lies on the river at the point where the stores for the advanced posts have all to be landed. It has proved healthier than any of the positions more within the ordinary district that we have hitherto occupied, but it is not nearly so desirable a site as any post on the summit of the Sirthay range would be. The healthiness of the upper ranges is much insisted on in the papers now forwarded. The Lieutenant-Governor, while placing enough men at Demagiri to protect the store magazines, would make the main post on the ranges above. This post should be in fact the head-quarters of the frontier force, and strong enough for offensive measures, should these at any time be required. The Lieutenant-Governor in this part of the frontier would look less to a preventive line of posts than to our influencing and dominating the tribes, and it is in this view mainly that he advocates the maintenance of a strong post on the Sirthay or one of the Syloo ranges.

6. We have here to deal with the nearer Syloos, Howlongs, and other tribes whom we know. As we move south, however, we come abreast of a country of which we know nothing, and have to guard against raids by tribes with whom we can have no intimate relations, viz., the more distant Howlongs and especially the Shindoos. Here we must trust to a line of patrol and defensive posts. The survey has now made it clear that neither of the two alternative ranges which were hitherto supposed to be open to us to choose from can be adapted for a patrol line in its entire length. The northern part of the Oheepoom runs fairly level and clear, and is fit for patrol, and can be comparatively easily supplied. The northern part of the Saichal is broken and cannot be supplied easily. The southern part of the Oheepoom breaks away into hillocks, and becomes impracticable. The southern part of the Saichal rises into a well-defined ridge, exactly what we want. Accordingly, it is proposed to run the line of patrol from Demagiri down the Oheepoom for a certain distance, then across to the Saichal, and so along the Mraoetong, till it meets the Arracan line of posts.

7. The local officers think that two posts on the Oheepoom, one about the centre of the Saichal, and a strong guard near Poleetye to cover Rooma, the head-quarters of the Sungoo Valley Sub-Division, would enable them to keep up regular patrols, and be sufficient for all purposes. The position of these posts will be seen from the enclosed sketch, and can easily be identified on the accompanying map on which they are marked with red crosses.

8. Beyond Poleetye to the south, it was intended that the Arracan Hill Tracts should take up its share of the frontier defence, and complete the chain of posts and patrols by establishing a guard half way up the Kerama and another at the mouth of the Kola. It was believed by our officers, and the Arracan frontier officer who met them, that in this way we should have a fair defence against any raids of Shindoos, the most formidable of the tribes in the south, and the dread of whose ravages has made the Upper Sungoo almost a desolation. The Lieutenant-Governor learns, however, that the Chief Commissioner of British Burma has expressed doubts of any proposal to extend the Arracan Hill Tract posts and patrols to link on with those of Chittagong, and has suggested that the Chittagong Hill Tracts should provide for their own defence by carrying its line of defence westward. This proposal would probably in fact involve two extra posts in the south of the Hill Tracts, one between Poleetye and Singopha, and the other at Singopha itself to close the Sungoo Valley to raids from the south. It would, moreover, be reverting to a system of isolated posts in the broken country westward of the clear ranges, which has hitherto proved so unsatisfactory, and which the local officers unanimously condemn. It seems to the Lieutenant-Governor that in settling a matter of this kind much weight must be given to local opinion and the testimony of officers who have seen the ground, and if the plan of a continuous patrol commends itself to the Governor General in Council as a desirable and feasible plan upon the evidence available, the Lieutenant-Governor would hope that the consideration that Arracan and Chittagong are after all only integral parts of one empire, may override any doubts as to how the duties of defence are to be apportioned. The fact is that our officers in the Chittagong Hills have almost no knowledge of the Shindoos. The Shindoos have raided often enough on our people, but we have never been able to establish any relations with them, and hardly know where their villages lie. What intercourse has taken place between them and British officers has been, His Honour believes, confined entirely to the Arracan side. And it would probably be found by far the best plan to make over entirely to the Arracan Hill Tracts officers the control of our

defensive arrangements against the Shindoes, or even perhaps the whole of the Sungoo Valley. There is ample work for the Chittagong officers in the north. This is, however, a matter for separate consideration.

9. The immediate plan of patrol and defence suggested is, it will be seen, a very simple one, and when once it is settled whether Arracan is to make connctions with us or not, there will be no great difficulty in arranging the sites of posts.

10. As regards the strength of the proposed posts, the local officers originally suggested the following :—

	Mem.
Head-quarters at Demagiri, from which provision may be made	
for a post farther to the north	200
A small post on Sirthay, north of Demagiri	50
Oheepoom (No. 1)	50
Oheepoom (No. 2)	50
Saichal (No. 3)	50
Sungoo Valley and Poleetye (No. 4)	150
Total	550 in all.

Including 100 civil police, the total number of police in the Hill Tracts of all ranks is now 650, costing Rs. 94,236 per annum. Allowing 100 for civil duties, 550 would remain available for frontier posts. The Lieutenant-Governor hopes that, properly distributed and stockaded, 550 of armed men and officers ought to be sufficient for all the posts and patrols proposed by the local authorities. Some addition will be required for extra guards to the south, if Arracan declines to do her part in the patrol. The Lieutenant-Governor thinks that we should have a detachment of troops as a military support in preference to any great increase of the Hill Police. As already suggested, these might find healthy quarters at Sirthay, and set free the police for patrol and outpost duty, and to accompany the political officers in visit to the neighbouring tribes. To sum up, accepting the posts proposed for the Oheepoom and Saichal, the Lieutenant-Governor would have a strong post of troops or police on the ranges north of Demagiri with a moderate guard at Demagiri to protect the store depôts.

11. The cost of provisioning has been separately reported on by the Commissioner, and is now being considered by the Inspector General of Police. At first this will probably be considerable, possibly amounting to an outside sum of Rs. 40,000 per annum. But it is anticipated that, as soon as the guards are settled, they will be able to arrange for supplies of rice with the Syloos and others, and to grow many things for themselves. The Commissioner anticipates that this item of expense will not be long maintained.

12. The Lieutenant-Governor has treated the question above entirely as one involving the situation of a line of defence and not of jurisdiction or absolute boundary. The two questions are in fact quite distinct. The line proposed does not indeed enclose any tribes not now our subjects, and brings in no complications on that account ; but the first post on the Oheepoom is just on the verge of the tract in which Rutton Poa is now located. More particulars have been called for as to this Chief's position. He is himself willing to become "our man", but the question will be hereafter submitted to the Government of India. Meantime, we may exercise what influence we can without settling a definite boundary for purposes of jurisdiction. In these eastern countries rivers are better boundaries than ridges, but ridges are best for patrols. The Lieutenant-Governor would not now settle more than the line of our patrols and the general scope of our political influence, leaving the exact boundaries of ordinary and political jurisdiction to be settled hereafter with reference to circumstances, the position of Rutton Poa, and the circumstances that may eventuate.

13. The Lieutenant-Governor has passed orders in my letter No. 2173, dated 18th June, on most of the subsidiary points in the Commissioner's report of the 9th May. The question of administrative arrangements in the Hill Tracts is reserved for separate discussion. There is one matter, however, that he would press very much on the consideration of the Government of India, and that is the necessity of maintaining telegraphic communication with Demagiri. At present the Telegraph Office has, after repeated requests, been temporarily retained at Rungamattoo. But Rungamattoo is distant from Sirthay fifty miles of extremely difficult travel, and it takes as long for a letter to reach Sirthay from Rungamattoo as it would for it to reach Calcutta.

14. On the questions of general policy and the recovery of captives from the Howlungs and others, the Lieutenant-Governor does not feel that at present any very precise instructions can be given. Captain Lewin must, it seems to His Honour, be guided very much by circumstances, and it will be better to defer any positive orders until the result is known of his proposed visit to the neighbouring Chiefs next cold weather; at any rate the subject can be more profitably discussed with Captain Lewin personally when he brings Rutton Posa to Calcutta next cold season.

15. The Lieutenant-Governor, before concluding, would ask attention to paragraphs 68 to 76 of Captain Lewin's report on the political administration of the hills, enclosed in Mr. Hankey's letter of 9th May. These paragraphs refer to the very difficult question of the arms trade. It is suggested that the importation of flint-guns ought to be prohibited in the hills or near them. The Lieutenant-Governor would prohibit it altogether, but would permit the supply of percussion guns, under a proper system of registration, to our own villages and to friendly tribes.

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*From A. MACKENZIE, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to the Secretary to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department,—No. 3530, dated Calcutta, the 11th September 1873.*

Referring to paragraph 12 of my letter No. 3150, dated the 19th August 1873, on the subject of the defence of the Chittagong Hill Tracts frontier, I am now directed to forward, for submission to His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council, the accompanying copy of a letter from the Officiating Commissioner of Chittagong, No. 706, dated the 29th ultimo, enclosing copy of a report from Captain Lewin, the Deputy Commissioner of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, in which that officer discusses the question of the boundary line up to which our jurisdiction in the Chittagong Hill Tracts should extend, and the policy to be pursued towards Rutton Posa and his tribe.

2. Captain Lewin suggests that our line of jurisdiction should be continuous and identical with the proposed line of frontier defence, and he urges that there can be no valid objection to this so long as the system of administration in the Chittagong Hill Tracts is a loose and non-regulation one. He thinks that the Sirthay, Oheepoom, and Saichul ranges would be about as good a line of jurisdiction as any. This would meet the views expressed in paragraph 8 of your letter No. 1883P., dated the 4th September 1872, viz., that "the line of posts must not be beyond the limits of our actual jurisdiction." The Lieutenant-Governor has, however, already, in paragraph 12 of my letter of the 19th ultimo, expressed an opinion, in which he is supported by Captain Badgley and other competent judges, that in these countries rivers make better boundaries than ridges. He would prefer therefore to take as the boundary the rivers running at the eastern foot of the above-named ridges, as shown on the compilation general map of the eastern frontier of Bengal, submitted with my letter above referred to. It might be described as a line running from Betteing Sib (where the line of boundary for Hill Tipperah, proposed in my letter No. 3148, of the 19th August, turns to the west) along the course of the Tulenpui or Sujjuk River to its junction with the Kurnasoolie, and thence along the course of the Tui Chong to the confines of Arracan. This, it appears, would be as good a line to take for jurisdiction as any (if the Government of India insist upon laying down such a line), even if the rivers are not very accurately described on the map. Captain Lewin has himself demi-officially approved of this line.

3. With regard to the policy to be pursued towards Rutton Posa and his tribe, it will be seen that the tract of country within which this Chief claims the right of joom (marked B in the map accompanying this letter) falls on the borders of our proposed line of jurisdiction, and as regards part of the Oheepoom and Sirthay ranges, within it. Captain Lewin, however, explains that it is not intended to confine him to this tract, but only to give him to understand that while he jooms within its limits, he will receive the support and protection of Government, which he has certainly earned by his services of late years so long as he remains near us. If he moves away we are in no way responsible for the consequences that may ensue, and if he does not like us he will no doubt remove himself from British territory. In point of fact, therefore, the coincidence of our lines of defence and jurisdiction does not affect our relations with this Chief in any sensible degree. We are under no permanent and definite engagement to him, but he

has been allowed to assume that, so long as he remains faithful to us, we will not allow him to be molested by the independent tribes. If our subjects move into his jooming ground, he would perhaps expect to be allowed to tax them, but this is a point which Captain Lewin thinks might be settled when the question arises.

4. The Lieutenant-Governor submits these proposals as they commend themselves to him in a general way; but as he has already said, he would prefer not to lay down anything very precise, either with reference to jurisdiction or the policy to be pursued towards Rutton Poa, until such time as our frontier posts are established and we see our way a little more clearly.

5. His Honour proposes shortly to address His Excellency in Council regarding the future administrative charge of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Frontier and the line of division between the Chittagong Division and British Burma.

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*From C. BERNARD, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, General Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department,—No. 136J., dated Calcutta, the 9th October 1873.*

With reference to the latter part of paragraph 2 of your letter No. 2404, dated 30th July last, proposing, when constituting the Chief Commissionership of Assam, to deal with the Chittagong Hill Frontier by leaving the political control of that frontier with the Commissioner of Chittagong, but placing him for that purpose only directly under the Government of India, copies of all correspondence\* being, however, forwarded by the Commissioner to the Government of Bengal for information, I am to say that there will be a certain amount of inconvenience about this arrangement, and the Lieutenant-Governor has another proposal to make based on several grounds.

2. The Deputy Commissioner of the Hill Tracts has for some time past been urging that, to enable him to do justice to frontier work, he must be relieved of the civil work of the Hill Tracts district. The Commissioner has to a certain extent supported him in this, but the Lieutenant-Governor has resisted the application on the ground that we cannot afford to create three distinct districts in this quarter. The Deputy Commissioner has been told that if he cannot manage the more settled portion of the Hill Tracts along with his frontier duties, he must make it over to the Chittagong district. The accompanying extracts from the letter of the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner will show the grounds on which the proposal to separate the frontier work was urged and for the time rejected.

3. The Lieutenant-Governor, though he felt obliged to refuse the proposal of the local officers, considers that there is a good deal of force in what they say. It would be a great pity that the fruit of the Lushai campaign which we have begun so well to gather, should be lost for want of the right man to complete the work. Captain Lewin is emphatically the right man for this, and if he has to devote himself to the management of the settled Hill Tracts much must be sacrificed. It is most desirable that he should be allowed to push forward to the watershed towards Cachar and establish political influence over the tribes and open communication with Cachar. His Honour's views on this subject are before the Foreign Department.

4. On the other hand there seems to be no doubt that since there is a cessation of raids, the civil and revenue work of the settled Hill Tracts is acquiring much importance. The country has great capabilities if well colonised and settled. We have introduced a system which requires much care and attention. Large colonies of immigrants from Hill Tipperah and elsewhere are taking up land in the Myntone valley. Plough cultivation is being extended all over the hills under a system of advances which necessitates close supervision and inspection. The forest revenue is susceptible of great development, and an organized scheme of village administration and registration of cultivators is being introduced with the best results. Education has to be pushed. The relations of the Jooma Chiefs to their tribesmen call for close study and attention in view of the

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\* From Chittagong Commissioner's No. 363, dated 9th May 1873, paragraphs 84-110, enclosing Deputy Commissioner's No. 390, dated 26th April 1873, paragraphs 124-127.

rapid strides that are now being made in civilization. With all this, the frontier headquarters' post, where the Deputy Commissioner must spend most of his time, is far distant; communication is slow and difficult; while the civil work requires the full attention of a good administrative officer.

5. The Chief Commissioner of British Burma has expressed a wish to annex Chittagong. To that, however, the Lieutenant-Governor would not willingly consent, for Chittagong Proper is a very old regulation district of Bengal, in easy communication with Calcutta, and if it is not to be attached to Shillong, it certainly ought not to go to Bangoon.

6. But, in looking into the question of languages and tribes, the Lieutenant-Governor has been much struck to find how entirely Burmese are the races, languages, and institutions of the Sungoo sub-division forming the southern portion of the Hill Tracts, while the Chukmas and other tribes in the north are of the Bengali type and language. The whole, indeed, of the Khyongtha tribes under the Bohmong are Burmese in origin, maintain Buddhist customs, speak a Burmese dialect, and are to all intents and purposes Burmese. The Kumi or Kweymee tribe came from Arracan, and maintain regular intercourse with their brethren in that district (Lewin's Hill Tracts, Page 88). Of the Mroos and Khyengs, the same may be said. The Census Report shows also that the southern part of Chittagong Proper forming the Cox's Bazaar Sub-division is in like manner largely peopled by Mughls.

7. The records of Government prove that the raiding in the Sungoo Valley has generally been the work, not of the Lushais whom we know, but of the Shindoes who are known to, and communicate with, the authorities of the Arracan Hill Tracts and not with us; and, in discussing lately the arrangements for frontier defence, all the local officers, both of the Chittagong Hill Tracts and of Arracan, were agreed that the shortest and best line of posts for common defence was one linking on with posts in Arracan so as to form a continuous line. The Chief Commissioner of British Burma has objected to advance his posts to meet ours, principally on the ground that it is not for him to extend his posts to defend Chittagong territory. The fact, however, is, that the defence of the Sungoo Valley is a matter which can be managed from Arracan better than from Chittagong. It would be in every way convenient that a tract so essentially Burmese, and having to be defended from tribes approachable only from the Burma side, should be made over to the Chief Commissioner for both administration and defence, it is very difficult for us to deal with the Shindoes at all. If the tract exposed to their ravages be made over to British Burma, the same authorities can deal with the matter as a whole, and judge for themselves what plan of defence is best. The Cox's Bazaar sub-division of Chittagong, lying between the Sungoo sub-division and the sea is, as already stated, largely colonised by Mughls, who are in fact Burmese and speaking a Burmese tongue. It is very remote from Chittagong and practically accessible only by sea. We have great difficulty in properly officering and managing the sub-division. The Lieutenant-Governor would be glad to make this also over to British Burma.

8. Reverting to the subject discussed in paragraphs 2 to 4, I am to submit the following proposal:—

The Lieutenant-Governor has already in correspondence with the Foreign Department regarding the political arrangements of this frontier shown that the best way of dealing with the Lushais is to obtain over them political influence by cultivating direct intercourse with them. This it is proposed to do by establishing the head-quarters of the frontier police on the Sirthay range, and maintaining in the Syloo country a post from which our officers can reach both the Syloos and Howlongs on the south and Sookpilal and the Lushais connected with him on the north. Already the temporary establishment of such a post has had the best effects, Captain Lewin having succeeded in obtaining more knowledge of, and influence over, the tribes during the last cold season than had been possible in many years before. If he be allowed to act as a Political Agent for the Lushai country, as Captain Butler is among the Angami Nagas, there can be little doubt that he would soon bring the whole tract between Chittagong and Cachar into permanent friendly relations with us. From his head-quarters on the Syloo ranges he would be as near to Cachar as to Chittagong, and the Lieutenant-Governor feels no doubt that he would very soon be able to open postal communication with Cachar and Shillong. If the Lieutenant-Governor's views about the maintenance of the telegraph, as expressed to the Foreign Department, are accepted, Captain Lewin



would have telegraphic communication with Shillong *via* Chittagong, and the Commissioner and Collector of Chittagong would be desired to give him every assistance in the way of supplies. He might, therefore, very well be placed under the Chief Commissioner of Assam so as to make all the eastern frontier under one administration.

9. If these transfers were sanctioned (*i.e.*, of the Sungoo Sub-division and Cox's Bazar to Arracan, and of the country outside our ordinary Hill Tracts, say all east of the Saichul and Burkhal ranges, to a Political agency under Assam), the Sudder sub-division of the Hill Tracts, diminished by the country to be politically administered, as above proposed, might be made a special sub-division of Chittagong. It would contain all the people speaking Bengali dialects, but would remain non-regulation as it is now, and subject of the executive authorities in judicial matters. In this manner the Lieutenant-Governor thinks divided jurisdiction in frontier matters would be avoided, and everything be arranged in the best way for all the administrations concerned.

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*From Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Secretary to the Government of Bengal, No. 7 P., dated Fort William, 2nd January 1874.*

In acknowledging receipt of the several letters from the Bengal Government, noted below, relative to the defence of the eastern frontier, I am instructed to convey the cordial acknowledgments of the Government of India to Captain Badgley, Mr. Power, and the other officers whose services in connection with the recent survey operations on the frontier have been specially brought to notice by His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor.

2. The first question calling for decision in the correspondence above quoted is that of the defence of the southern frontier of Cachar. His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor, after consideration of Colonel Roberts' scheme of defence, is of opinion that the adoption of the advanced line of posts recommended by that officer is inadvisable, and that the proposals for the defence of the frontier, which have been recommended by the local civil officers and Brigadier-General Stafford, should be adopted. But it would appear from paragraph 8 of the letter to the Military Department, No. 1755, dated 7th May 1873, that the proposal to adopt the less advanced line of posts on the south of Cachar is more or less connected with the view that the tribes can be more effectively overawed and commanded from the Chittagong side, and with the suggestion made in your letter No. 3149, dated 19th August, to establish a post in Laljeeka's village. The establishment, however, of such a post in advance of the frontier line of defence is contrary to the policy deliberately adopted by the Government of India, and cannot be sanctioned. I am, therefore, to enquire whether the non-establishment of a post in Laljeeka's village affects His Honor's recommendations as to the position of the line of posts on the Cachar frontier.

3. The next point for consideration is that discussed in your letter No. 3149, dated 19th August 1873, *viz.*, the definition of the eastern boundary of Tipperah and the measures to be adopted for its defence. His Excellency in Council approves generally of the eastern and south-eastern boundary of Hill Tipperah as proposed by the Lieutenant-Governor, *viz.* the Lungai River between the Hachik and Jumpang ranges to its source, then across to the Dolajeri peak, and then by the recognized southern boundary to the Fenny. The Survey Department should work out the details at convenience.

4. With regard to the defence of the portion of the frontier so delineated, a hope is expressed in your letter last quoted that the Rajah of Hill Tipperah may be able to strengthen the Sylhet portion of the line, and to cover British Tipperah by establishing proper posts on the verge of his own cultivation. Pending the further information called for from Mr. Power, and the suggestions of the Lieutenant-Governor with reference thereto, the Viceroy and Governor General in Council suspends judgement on the question of the defence of Tipperah. Whether, however, posts be established along one of the ridges or not, it is essential that some scheme of defence be devised. Several serious

No. 1755, dated 7th May 1873.

No. 3149, dated 19th August 1873.

No. 2150, dated 19th August 1873.

No. 3153, dated 19th August 1873.

No. 3235, dated 11th September 1873.

No. 3234, dated 10th October 1873.

No. 4113, dated 22nd October 1873.

raids from which our territories have suffered have been made through Tipperah territory, and no measures can be considered complete which do not bar that door of access. The posts at Chutterchoora and on the south of Sylhet will doubtless afford some protection; but His Excellency in Council is of opinion that the Rajah should be called upon to co-operate effectually in the establishment of a defensive line, and Mr. Power should be required to submit his report at a very early date.

5. It remains now to consider the arrangements for the defence of the boundary from the southern frontier of Hill Tipperah, and also of the frontier boundary of the Chittagong Hill Tracts. As regards, in the first place, the line of boundary, His Excellency in Council sanctions the adoption of the line from the Tipperah boundary along the course of the Tulenpin or Sujak River to its junction with the Kurnafuli, and thence along the course of the Tui Chong. But His Excellency in Council desires me to suggest, for the consideration of the Lieutenant-Governor, whether it would not be better to modify the southern portion of this boundary and at the point where the proposed line of posts leaves the Oheepoom range to run the boundary across the Oheepoom to the west and thence along the Thega Khal to the Arracan frontier. The disadvantage of having a ridge intervening between the posts and the actual boundary line would be obviated by this arrangement. But whether the boundary line be taken up the Tui Chong or the Thega Khal, great caution was to be exercised in allowing, at any part of the eastern frontier boundaries, settlements to be made on the eastern slopes of the hills and the country intervening between the outposts on the crests and the boundary line. Settlements located in such positions, it was said, would always be exposed to attack, being beyond the actual line of posts.

6. The principal question raised by the adoption of this or indeed of any other practicable boundary is that of our relations with Button Poa. It would appear that whatever to the boundary adopted the country which he claims for jooming will be intersected by it. His Excellency in Council understands from your letter No. 8580, dated 11th September 1873, and its enclosures, and also from personal communication with Captain Lewin that Button Poa quite understands and voluntarily acquiesces in his position as regards his possessions to the west of the boundary line and within our jurisdiction. Under these circumstances His Excellency in Council has no objection to the Chief being assured that so long as he continues faithful his jooming lands within the boundary will receive from us the same protection as we extend to other territories west of the boundary line; and in the exercise of our jurisdiction within the line every possible consideration should be shown to Button Poa and all reasonable concession made to him.

7. With regard to the proposed line of posts, the recent survey undertaken by Mr. Cooke shows that the only practicable line lies along the Sirthay, Oheepoom and Saichul ranges. His Excellency in Council, therefore, fully approves of the views and proposals of the Lieutenant-Governor in respect to the location and strength of the posts on these ridges, viz.:-

Demagiri	...	...	...	...	200 men
Sirthay	...	...	...	...	50 "
Oheepoom (1)	...	...	...	...	50 "
Oheepoom (2)	...	...	...	...	50 "
Saichul (3)	...	...	...	...	50 "
Sungoo Valley and Politye	...	...	...	...	150 "

These posts, it is observed, can be taken by the Police at its present strength, leaving 100 men for civil duty.

8. It remains lastly to be considered how this line of posts is to be linked on to the chain of posts in the Arracan Hills, the most northern of which is at Talukmai. The proposals contained in paragraph 8 of your letter No. 3150, dated 19th August, and the suggestion made in the enclosure of your letter No. 3934, dated 10th October, for the transfer of the Sungoo Valley and Cox's Bazaar to Arracan will be referred to the Chief Commissioner of British Burma, on receipt of whose reply a further communication will be addressed to you. Meanwhile His Excellency in Council has decided that the question of the transfer of the control of the Chittagong Hill Tracts to the Chief Commissioner of Assam, which was negatived in the communication from the Home Department, No. 2494, dated 30th July 1873, cannot at present be re-opened. The arrangements already decided upon in this respect will be adhered to at any rate until experience is obtained of their practical working.

9. The policy to be pursued by our frontier officers with respect to the Chiefs and tribes beyond the boundary now defined having for its basis the principle of influencing the tribes by direct association while preserving an attitude of defence and preparedness, but abstaining from any attempt to establish one actual Government among them, has been clearly laid down in my letters noted below, and His Excellency in Council hopes that the views of the Government of India on this subject will be carefully followed.

10. Orders will shortly be issued on the minor points calling for disposal in the letters now under acknowledgment.

*From A. MACKENZIE, Esq., Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to the Secretary to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department,—No. 338, dated Calcutta, the 24th January 1874.*

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 7 P., dated the 2nd January 1874, conveying the orders and observations of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council on the proposals submitted by this Government for the defence of the Eastern Frontier, the definition of the eastern boundary of Hill Tipperah, the settlement of the line of boundary up to which our jurisdiction in the Chittagong Hill Tracts should extend, and other allied subjects.

2. The first question taken up by the Government of India is that of the defence of the southern frontier of Cachar, and it is with reference to the proposal made by this Government to establish an advanced post in Laljeeka's village, that the Lieutenant-Governor is asked whether the non-establishment of such a post affects in any way the recommendations made by him as to the position of the line of posts on the Cachar frontier. His Honor desires to say that he knows personally less of the Cachar frontier than he does of any other part of the eastern frontier. In recommending the adoption of the less advanced line of posts on the south of Cachar, he was guided by a concurrence of opinions on the part of the local officers, both civil and military, on the subject. The question is, the Lieutenant-Governor considers, a very complicated and difficult one, in which the opinion of the local officers seems irreconcilable with that of Colonel Roberts and the military authorities. It is hardly possible for the Lieutenant-Governor now to go into it very thoroughly, and he would, therefore, recommend that it be left for the investigation of the new Chief Commissioner of Assam on his appointment. He hopes, however, that, without establishing a regular post at Laljeeka's village, the Government of India will not object to posting temporarily a small party of the frontier police at that place when occasion arises, as by this means we give confidence to our friends there, exactly as was done last year with so much success. Captain Lewin considers that failure to support, and in some degree to protect, the Syloos will lead to the utter disruption of that clan, and put a stop to the very promising commencement of intercourse with the Lushai tribes which was made through them.

3. The next question dealt with is the definition of the eastern boundary of Hill Tipperah and the measures to be adopted for its defence. The line of boundary proposed by this Government is approved by His Excellency in Council, and it only remains, therefore, to work out the details. The Surveyor General will be asked to arrange to have this done. With regard to the defence of the Hill Tipperah frontier, Mr. Power will, as requested, be called upon to expedite the submission of a report showing the measures which the Rajah of Hill Tipperah may be capable of undertaking for establishing a defensive line of posts on the verge of his own cultivation, with a view to strengthening the Sylhet portion of the line and covering British Tipperah. The report, when received, will be submitted to the Government of India with the views and suggestions of the Lieutenant-Governor.

4. Orders are next passed on the proposals submitted in this Office letter No. 3530, dated the 11th September 1873, regarding the line of boundary up to which our jurisdiction in the Chittagong Hill Tracts should extend. While sanctioning the adoption of the line of frontier boundary proposed by the Lieutenant-Governor, a suggestion is made as to whether it would not be better to take the line along the Thega Khal instead of the Tui Chong River, from the point where the line of posts leaves the Ohseepoom range.

No. 2166 P., dated 13th December 1870.

No. 430 P., dated 1st March 1871.

No. 17 C., dated 11th April 1871.

No. 1893 P., dated 6th September 1872.

Captain Lewin, who has been consulted on the subject, is of opinion that it matters not which of the above lines are taken, and that either will answer. His Honor has no objection to the slight modification suggested by the Government of India; but before deciding finally which would be the better line to adopt, considers that it would be well to see whether the proposal made by him to transfer the Sungoo Valley and Cox's Bazaar Sub-Divisions to Arracan, which it is stated in paragraph 8 of your letter has been referred to Mr. Eden for opinion, is accepted, in which case he thinks the Chief Commissioner of British Burma would probably wish to consider the matter in connection with his own arrangements. The attention of the frontier officers concerned will be drawn to the remarks made in the concluding portion of paragraph 5 of your letter, and they will be requested to exercise great caution in making settlements of lands on the eastern slopes of the hills and the country intervening between the outposts on the crests of the ridges and the actual boundary line beyond.

5. In paragraph 6 of your letter, the question of the policy to be pursued towards Botton Poa is taken up and orders passed thereon. The proposal to guarantee protection to this chief as regards his jooming lands within our line of boundary, so long as he remains faithful to us, is approved by His Excellency in Council, and it is furthermore enjoined that every possible consideration should be shown, and all reasonable concession made, to him in the exercise of our jurisdiction over him. Captain Lewin will be instructed accordingly.

6. In paragraph 7 the approval of the Government of India is conveyed to the views and proposals of the Lieutenant-Governor in regard to the location and strength of the posts on the Chittagong Hill Tracts frontier. Orders will be issued with a view to the necessary arrangements being carried out as speedily as possible. Captain Lewin, however, mentions that the main line of posts cannot be occupied until next November, as parties will have to be sent out to select sites, build barracks, fortifications, and store godowns, and to make arrangements for the supply of provisions, water, &c., and for the carriage of stores to the several posts, all of which will take time to complete. The local officers will be called upon to submit the necessary estimates without delay, and to select, if possible this season, the proper sites for posts. The whole question of frontier defence, as at present sanctioned, hinges, according to the Deputy Commissioner, upon the question of adequate provision supply. This matter has been recently reported on by Colonel Raban, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, who was specially deputed to the Chittagong Hill Tracts for the purpose. The matter is now under the Lieutenant-Governor's consideration. Captain Lewin considers that Sirthay should be the main post at present, and that all efforts should this year be directed to making it strong and habitable, by constructing reservoirs, strengthening the fortifications, and building good houses, barracks, and store godowns. The post, as it at present stands, cannot, he says, accommodate more than 100 men, and until the necessary alterations and additions are made, the main body of the frontier force will, he states, have to be located at Demagiri about six miles distant from Sirthay, in a lower and less healthy site.

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*From the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal,—No. 505 P., dated Fort William, the 23rd February 1874.*

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 338, dated 24th ultimo, communicating the observations of His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor on the instructions conveyed by the Government of India as to the defence of the eastern frontier of Bengal, &c.

2. His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council sanctions the proposal in paragraph 2 of your letter to leave for the investigation of the Chief Commissioner of Assam the question as to the line of posts to be established for the defence of the southern frontier of Cachar.

3. As regards the proposal to place temporarily a small party of the Frontier Police at Laljeeka's village when occasion arises, I am to state that the sanction of His Excellency in Council should in each case be obtained before such a step is taken.

4. The Viceroy and Governor General in Council has no objection to the suggestion made in the 4th paragraph of your letter that the final decision as to the frontier boundary of the Chittagong Hill Tracts should be deferred pending the submission of the views of the Chief Commissioner, British Burma, on the proposal to transfer the Sungoo Valley and Cox's Bazaar to Arracan.

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*Extract from a letter from the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal,—No. 1692 P., dated Fort William, the 3rd August 1874.*

PARA. 3. As regards the suggested modification of the boundary between Cachar and the Lushai Hills, I am to state that His Excellency in Council considers it undesirable to re-open this question. The boundary has not only been sanctioned by the Government of India, but it has been entered in the sunnuds given by Mr. Edgar to the Lushai Chief Sookpilal. Any alteration of the boundary now might possibly lead to misunderstanding and to mischievous consequences. The technical advantages to be gained, as described in paragraph 3 of Captain Badgley's letter of 20th February, are not worth the risk.

The Lieutenant-Governor, it is observed, states, with reference to the letter from this Office, No. 505 P., dated 23rd February, that the matter is one which now rests with the Chief Commissioner of Assam to investigate. On this point I am to intimate that the question which was referred to the Chief Commissioner in that letter was the location of the different posts for the defence of the boundary, not the question of the boundary which had previously been settled.

## APPENDIX F.

CORRESPONDENCE REGARDING THE FRONTIER DEFENCE OF  
ASSAM—(PAGE 318.)

*I.—From S. O. B. RIDSDALE, Esq., Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Assam, to the Secretary to the Government of India,—No. 1621, dated Shillong, the 1st September 1879.*

I am directed to submit herewith, for the consideration of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council in the Department of Home, Revenue and Agriculture, the enclosed Note by the Chief Commissioner (Sir S. C. Bayley) on the military requirements of Assam, as it treats of the augmentation which will be necessary in the police force of the province in the event of the military being reduced.

2. The Note has already been submitted direct to the Military Department as an enclosure to my reply to their No. 205 S. B., dated 7th July 1879, calling for information and suggestions to be laid before the Army Commission now sitting.

*Note by the Chief Commissioner on the military requirements of Assam, dated the 12th August 1879.*

In order to lay fully before the Commission my views on the military requirements of Assam, it is necessary to advert briefly to the physical configuration of the province, and to the nature of the various tribes within and round it. Speaking roughly, the province consists of the two valleys of the Berhampooter and the Surma rivers, with the intervening ranges of mountains. It is bounded on the north by the lower spurs of the Eastern Himalayas, and our neighbours on this border, beginning from the west, are first the people of Bhutan Proper, next the Bhuteas of Towang, a dependency of Thibet. Both peoples live under an organised Government, and have for some years past been very good neighbours, from whom we have nothing to fear.

2. Next come the savage tribes of Akas, Dufflas, and Miris. With the Dufflas we had some trouble five years ago, but none of these are warlike tribes, nor need any serious injury be apprehended from them. Outposts of armed police, however, have to be maintained along the frontier to guard against any petty raids that might be projected. Eastward again beyond these are the Abors, a warlike and turbulent tribe, against whom we have made more than one unsuccessful expedition. In their claim to the whole country between the low hills and the Berhampooter, and in their predatory habits, there are standing causes of quarrel, which will probably lead to an open attack before long. The proposed advance of our line of posts on this frontier will strengthen our position, but for many years to come this portion of the frontier will need to be strongly guarded both to repel and, if need be, to punish aggression.

3. Beyond there are the Mishmees, who also occasionally give trouble, but who will be held completely in check by the advanced line of posts. From them no serious danger need be apprehended; but, in their case likewise, numerous armed posts have to be maintained for defensive purposes. On the eastern frontier, the Mishmee hills, which sweep round the Berhampooter Valley, form our boundary, and are inhabited by Singhpoos and Khamptis, the latter a Shan tribe, and the former having also a Burmese origin. These tribes give no trouble, and under ordinary circumstances are

unlikely to give any ; but through their country lie the routes between the valley of the Berhampooter, and both Upper Burma and the Bathang-Bhamo road, and it is probable that we shall some day come into closer relations with them, either amicable or hostile.

4. There is a portion of the boundary here, where the hills turn to the south-west,

**Manipur.**

not yet surveyed. These hills are inhabited by some of the tribes who go under the indiscriminate name of Nagas, but the Nagas generally will come under consideration hereafter. Turning southward, the frontier marches with that of Manipur for some distance. Manipur has an estimated army of 5,000 or 6,000 strong. The men are said to be of good physique and possessed of many soldierly qualities, and the Political Agent thinks that, with the assistance of a few European officers, they might be made of very great use in case of complications arising with Burma, and, even as they now are, may be very useful auxiliaries against the Nagas on one side or the Lushais on the other. Their ignorance of drill and discipline makes them of little account in scientific warfare, and, under present circumstances, I apprehend no danger whatever from Manipur. I ought not to omit here the fact, *quantum valeat*, that the Assam valley has been, and might again be, disturbed by the incursion of Burmese over the Patkoi into the Valley of the Dehing. Personally I look upon such a contingency as in the highest degree improbable,

\* Mr. S. Peal.

but attention having been called to it in the newspapers by a gentleman\* of great knowledge and experience, I think proper to mention it.

5. Leaving Manipur, the boundary of the Assam Province on the south may be said

**Lushais.**

for the present to be the range of low hills inhabited by the Lushai tribes, and further west by the people of Hill Tipperah, beyond which it is needless to go. The Lushais have at times given us serious trouble, and inflicted very considerable loss ; but since the expedition of 1871-72, there have been no raids made by them, and by the maintenance of bazaars in their neighbourhood we have acquired a very considerable hold over them. But pressure from other tribes to the south-east, or internal dissensions, or the rise of a new chief, may at any moment bring about a renewal of their restless spirit, so that, on our part, an incessant watchfulness, and the maintenance of numerous and efficient posts, are still of the first necessity along this part of our boundary.

6. I have hitherto abstained from speaking of the most formidable and aggressive

**Nagas.**

of the tribes with whom we have to do, viz., the heterogeneous clans, or tribes, whom we group under the name of Nagas, because they are not, geographically speaking, external to the province, but inhabit the range of hills dividing the valley of the Berhampooter east of the Doyang, from that of the Surmah, east of the Jynteah hills, and may be said to be almost wholly within the territorial boundaries of the province. We have lately taken up a permanent position at Kohima, in the centre of the Angami tribe of Nagas, from which we can control this, the most warlike of the clans, far better than from Samugooting ; but with this position we have also undertaken the responsibility of bringing the tribes gradually under subjection to the law, and of repressing the unceasing raids and massacres which have, with sickening reiteration, been reported in every annual report, but which have never yet been systematically met or repressed. It is needless to say that the retention of Kohima and its sub-division of Wokha in the Lhota-Naga country will, no less than the steady enforcement of the Government policy, be in all probability resented by them, and that both our outposts and communications in this country will require to be most carefully guarded. Consequently a strong force, not only for defensive purpose, but available for punitive and repressive measures, must be deemed an absolute necessity, and, for some years to come, our position will be that of a garrison in an enemy's country.

7. Little need be said of the other races inhabiting this range of mountains. To the west

**Khasiahs, Jynteahs, and Garos.**

of the Nagas come the Syntengs or Jynteahs who broke into rebellion 18 years ago, but who, like their neighbours, the Khasiahs, are now a peaceful and contented race, unlikely to give trouble ; and again, to the west of the Khasiah and Jynteah Hills, come the Garos, who likewise are settling down into a peaceable and civilised community. But though I anticipate no trouble from these hill tribes, it must be remembered that their peacefulness and abstinence from bloodshed is of recent date, and is a lesson still only partially

learnt; consequently that they cannot be left, like the people of the plains, to the mere moral authority of the civil police, but must be subjected to the visible control of some armed force among them.

8. From the above survey it will be seen that we have little to fear from any organised aggression of a foreign enemy, or from internal rebellion; but that, on the other hand, we have to guard, at every point along an enormously extended external frontier, and along the quasi-frontier of the Naga hills, against raids from barbarous tribes, who, of no organised strength, can yet issue from the hills, cut up villages, and carry back their plunder with great ease, causing us much harassment and expense in the endeavour to enforce punishment. Speaking generally, none of these tribes have any cohesion; none of them act together. Some of them have neither tribal nor even village Chiefs; and if it were a question of meeting them in our own territory only, 50 men at any one point would be more than a match for any force that could well be brought against that point. But it might very easily happen, not by design, but accidentally, that we were simultaneously called on to meet Lushai incursions in the south and Abor incursions in the north, while a Naga expedition was going on in the middle of the province. The occasional necessity, moreover, of meeting these incursions by punitive measures, and making hostile expeditions into the enemies' country, must not be lost sight of. This necessity involves something in the shape of reserves at particular points on the frontier, in addition to the actual strength of the defensive posts, besides central reserves properly so called; and it is from the double necessity of guarding and strengthening numerous posts along the frontier, and at the same time being ready to undertake frequent hostile expeditions, that the existing system of distributing our armed force has grown up. This system I now proceed to describe.

9. The central reserve consists of the head-quarters of four Native regiments, each 800 strong. Of these, two are stationed at

Present system of frontier posts.

Shillong, which has the advantage of being very healthy, and so far centrally situated as to be equidistant from the northern, southern, and Naga Hills frontier. But it has some disadvantages in that supplies have to be brought up either from the Berhampooter by 60 miles of an imperfectly metalled cart-road which is almost impassable in the rains, or else 50 miles from Bholagunge (the nearest point for water-carriage on the south side) by a steep and difficult bridle-path. Consequently Shillong is one of the most expensive places in India, the moving of troops from there is not easy, and the reserve there, though equidistant from many points of danger, is within easy reach of none. For the requirements of the Khasia Hills themselves two companies would suffice.

The head-quarters of another regiment is at Debrogurh, the highest point on the Berhampooter to which the river steamers ply, and a glance at the map will show that at present this is the most suitable place that could be chosen in Upper Assam, and the head-quarters of the remaining regiment is at Cachar (Silchar), which, being the furthest available spot on the Surmah River, having the Lushais to the south, Manipur and Burma to the east, and Naga Hills to the north, is obviously an obligatory spot in any system of military defence.

Next in the chain come what (for want of a better name) I may call the local reserves, of detachments from these regiments at Gowhatty, Jeypore, Golaghat, and Sudya, none of which (hardly even the last) are frontier outposts; and finally come the series of frontier posts strictly so called, including the Naga Hills posts.

10. These frontier posts are 50 in number (excluding the above local reserve stations), and, of these 50, some 36\* are

\* Including the frontier police of the Naga Hills reserve at Kohima.

held by frontier police with 734 men, and 14 by the military with 646 men.

I should explain that in Assam the police are divided into two branches—(a) the civil police, who take the ordinary station duties connected with detection and prevention of crime; and (b) the armed or frontier police, whose duty it is to guard jails and treasuries, furnish escorts, and man these frontier outposts, but who have nothing to do with the ordinary criminal work of the district. These frontier police are armed with rifles and



are drilled and receive musketry instructions, and their duties are almost entirely of a military nature; and in the districts where they have to deal with hostile tribes, such as Garo and Naga Hills and Cachar, they are enlisted mainly for their qualities as soldiers from among such races as the Nepalese, or the tribes inhabiting the hills and slopes of Assam, such as Jharuas, Rabhas, Cacharis, &c.

These 50 frontier outposts, as I have said, are held partly by military and partly by frontier police. A complete list of them, with their geographical distribution and the class and number of the garrison, will be found in Appendix A, from which it will be seen that the members garrisoning them vary in the outposts proper from about 50 men of all ranks to 14 of all ranks in those held by the military, and even dwindle down to five and seven in a few of those held by the police.

They are held, moreover, quite indiscriminately—here a police outpost, there a military, then two more police posts, then again one held by troops. There is no sort of system, such as central posts being held by troops and flanks by police, or important and dangerous posts by troops and the less dangerous by police, or even one district by troops and another by police; but it is an absolutely haphazard arrangement, with a slight tendency observable to relieve the military of the most unhealthy and of the most distant posts, but even this much has been carried out in a very erratic and uncertain fashion.

11. The inconveniences and objections to this system are obvious. The first is the want of administrative unity. The posts being garrisoned by men under different organisations, they cease at once to be a connected chain of posts ready to co-operate with each other, but each post communicates with its own military or civil head-quarters only, and practically, instead of being a link in a chain, is merely an isolated garrison commanding the ground on which it stands. Patrolling between the posts is not kept up. The duty can be enforced on the police but not on the military, unless the Commanding Officer approves. The district officer, who is responsible for meeting and repelling such petty raids, can do what he likes in regard to the police outposts. He can give no orders to the military without delay and circumlocution, and without obvious danger of friction.

12. From a military point of view the objections to the present system are even greater. It breaks the hearts of Commanding Officers to see their regiments split up on this petty detachment duty. Small bodies of troops, rarely more than 50, and sometimes as few as 15, are sent off by themselves to distant and unhealthy posts in the jungle, where it is difficult to supply them with food, and where they remain unvisited by an European officer sometimes as much as six months together. Naturally the Commanding Officer complains that it is impossible to keep up proper drill, proper shooting figures, proper health, or proper smartness in such circumstances; and there cannot be a doubt that detachment duty, when it involves, as in these cases, enforced idleness, isolation in small parties, and absence of supervision, must have the worst effect both on the health and discipline of the men. Add to this that the provisioning and maintenance of these posts is a troublesome and expensive business, and it will be admitted that the military dislike to sending men on this duty is justified.

13. Unfortunately, as I have shewn above, the frontier posts must be kept up, and detachment duty must be done; but I am quite of opinion that it need not in Assam be done by the troops. It seems to me that, theoretically speaking, this sort of small outpost duty is strictly and properly worked for an armed frontier police: not for disciplined troops organised on the regimental unit. It is not the defence of the country against invasion, it is to guard against petty raids, committed by 50 or 100 savages at a time, that we keep up these posts. I conceive the legitimate duty of the military to be that of an armed reserve, collected at convenient central stations, whence they could be sent to support the police on an emergency, or to undertake the brunt of any hostile expedition outside our own territory. I may observe, in support of my views as to the proper distinction of duties, that in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and along the Arakan frontier (I believe), where the circumstances are almost identical with those of the Assam frontier, the outpost duty is wholly and entirely taken by the armed police.

14. I next have to enquire whether such an arrangement as is here suggested is feasible, and this depends on the question whether our Frontier Police are up to the Substitution of police for military.

work (1) in efficiency, (2) in numbers. In point of efficiency I have little hesitation in saying that for this special business—the prevention and punishment of raids among savage tribes in jungle-covered hills—the armed police are even more efficient than the military. The actual fighting is the smallest part of the task. The essential qualities are mobility and handiness. Now, the troops are not easily moved, and are, in fact, very helpless in the jungle. I am not speaking of exceptional regiments like the 44th S. L. I., which is recruited from Nepalese, and has had very special experience of jungle warfare, but of the ordinary Poorbea or Punjabi sepoy. The troops require a large proportion of carriage; they require to have their paths cut for them, their supplies brought to them, their stockades built for them. In fact they require to be waited on, whereas the armed policeman is accustomed to the jungles from his infancy, cuts his own paths, runs up his own huts, fetches his own food, and waits upon himself. The sepoy is armed with a breech-loader, and is thus no doubt more useful in actual fighting; but in actual fighting, when it comes to musketry, none of the wild tribes are much to be dreaded, and there is ample evidence on the records both of the Bhutan and Lushai campaigns, and of the many subsequent expeditions that have taken place in the Naga Hills, that, in actual fighting, the armed policeman is quite fit to take his place side by side with the sepoy. That I am not speaking without authority in the foregoing remarks, I would refer to what took place in 1875, when it was resolved to send a punitive expedition against the Nagas. Colonel Keatinge, who was at that time Chief Commissioner of Assam, found that the orders of the Supreme Government could not be carried out, and in explanation stated that, owing to panic amongst the coolies, he was unable to impress them for transport purposes, or even to guard them when impressed, and as he could not provide carriage for the baggage and provisions, the troops were unable to leave their head-quarters. Finally, a small force of 150 men was sent out, but, being under orders to return within three days, they accomplished nothing. It was not until the coolie corps liberated by the termination of the Duffla expedition had been placed at the Chief Commissioner's disposal that effective measures were taken for the punishment of the Nagas.

Colonel Johnstone, Political Agent at Manipur, in his annual report dated 25th February 1879, to the Government of India, notices this want of mobility in our troops. He points out that while the Manipur raw levies were ready to march at a moment's notice, carrying their own baggage supplies, and at the end of the march building their own huts and stockades, our Native troops were unable to move without a long array of coolies, who had to do everything for them.

15. In point of efficiency, then, I say that the frontier police are even now not less efficient than the men of ordinary Native regiments, and, from their greater mobility, would be, if armed with breech-loaders, decidedly more efficient for this particular duty. In point of expense there can be no comparison. Each soldier of an Assam regiment costs the Government not less than Rs. 337 a year, each policeman costs Rs. 180, and, if equal efficiency is granted, it is obvious that considerations of economy point to the change; but numerically the force of armed police is at present too weak to relieve the military of all the frontier posts, and will have to be increased by about 1,000 men. If this is done, I am of opinion that two Native regiments can, with perfect safety and unquestionable economy, be set free from Assam.

The following are the details of the scheme :—

- |  |                      |
|--|----------------------|
| 16. The Assam armed police force, as at present constituted, consists of — |                      |
| 13 English officers,   | 185 Head Constables, |
| 8 Inspectors,  | 1,899 Constables,    |
| 30 Sub-Inspectors,   | 21 Buglers,          |

distributed over the different districts as shewn in Appendix B (not printed), and holding 35 frontier posts.

The cost of the present force of armed police, including a moiety share of European officers' salaries, is Rs. 3,43,208.

In making up the strength of the police to 3,000 men, I would propose certain modifications both as to the constitution of the force and as to salaries.

The following statement gives my views as to the constitution of a cadre of 1,000 men, and shows the salaries that would have to be paid to officers and men:—

	Rs.		Rs.
4 Inspectors, <i>i. e.</i> —		20 Buglers—	
2 Inspectors at Rs. 150.		10 Buglers at Rs. 10.	
2 Ditto at „ 100.		10 Do. at „ 9.	
Yearly cost. ...	6,000	Yearly cost. ...	2,280
10 Sub-Inspectors, <i>i. e.</i> —		2 Armourers at Rs. 50.	
2 Sub-Inspectors at Rs. 60.		Yearly cost. ...	1,200
8 Ditto at „ 50.		Good conduct pay at Rs. 1 per 15	
Yearly cost. ...	6,240	per cent. of strength, 150 by 12.	
100 Head Constables—		Yearly cost. ...	1,800
20 Head Constables at Rs. 25.		1 Marksman's pay at Rs. 50.	
20 Ditto at „ 20.		Yearly cost. ...	600
40 Ditto at „ 15.		Clothing allowance at Rs. 8 per	
20 Ditto at „ 12.		man, 1,120 men ...	8,960
Yearly cost. ...	20,880	Contingencies at Rs. 5 per cent. ...	7,750
1,000 Constables—			
200 Constables at Rs. 10.		Total ...	1,62,510
500 Ditto at „ 9.			
300 Ditto at „ 8.			
Yearly cost. ...	1,06,800		

On this scale of pay the cost of 3,000 Frontier Police, including the full complement of Native officers, would be Rs. 1,62,510 by 3 = Rs. 4,87,530. The present Frontier Police Force is officered by seven District Superintendents and six Assistant Superintendents, whose salaries amount to Rs. 80,000, one-half of which, or Rs. 40,000, is debited to the Frontier Police: the other half (as these officers have to perform ordinary police work) is met from civil funds. It would be necessary to increase the European staff on strengthening the present police force, and I consider that four additional Assistant Superintendents of Police would be sufficient.

The European staff would be graded as follows:—

1 District Superintendent at Rs. 1,000.	4 Assistant Superintendents at Rs. 400.
2 Ditto ditto at „ 800.	4 Ditto ditto at „ 300.
3 Ditto ditto at „ 600.	2 Ditto ditto at „ 250.
2 Ditto ditto at „ 500.	Total yearly cost ... Rs. 94,800

one-half of which would be met from civil funds.

	Rs.
The total yearly cost of the proposed new Frontier Police would be ...	4,87,530
Half-pay of European officers ...	47,400
Total ...	5,34,930

which gives an average cost of Rs. 178½, or, roughly, Rs. 180 for each constable (excluding pension charges). For distribution of this force see Appendix D (not printed).

17. It will be seen from Appendix C (not printed) that each sepoy costs the State Rs. 337.

There is therefore a saving of Rs. 157 on each Frontier Police constable substituted for a sepoy.

18. Assuming that the military are relieved of the entire outpost duty of the province, the question remains as to what force is necessary for the purposes of a reserve pure and simple.

I am of opinion that a garrison of two full regiments would be ample.

In the earlier part of this Note I have shewn what, in my opinion, the chances of danger from external attack are; and for offensive operations, should we have to undertake a serious punitive expedition against any one of the most powerful tribes, such as Nagas, Lushais, or Abors, I consider that a force of 500 men is the largest that could be effectually utilised, considering the quality of the enemy, the nature of the country, the difficulties of transport, and the want of communications.

If we had to invade Manipur or Bhutan, it might be necessary to increase our strength; but this would involve imperial and not merely local interests, and in either case there would be ample time to draw upon the central reserves at Calcutta.

I am of opinion that with such an armed police as I have proposed, maintained at its full strength, and armed with breech-loaders, a force of 1,200 troops would, in existing circumstances, be sufficient to ensure the safety of the province; but as regiments are now organised at a strength of 800 men, I would say two full Native regiments are ample.

To make this force effective for instant defence and punishment of the frontier tribes, it should be placed, more directly than is usual, at the disposal of the Chief Commissioner, not of course in matters of detail, but in the general power of ordering immediate operations of reinforcement or pursuit.

These two regiments I would distribute as follows:—

One full regiment at Shillong.	
One regiment ..	... { 400 men at Sudya. 400 men at Cachar.

I prefer Sudya to Debrogur as being somewhat healthier and more available for reinforcing the chain of posts along the north bank of the Berhampooter, as it is 60 miles up stream, and the troops can come down stream rapidly, but move up stream with difficulty. The choice, however, between these two sites is quite open, and I lay no great stress on the selection. The reasons for selecting Cachar have already been explained. With these as the stations for the central reserve, all the minor reserve stations may eventually be abandoned, though, until the police force is brought up to its full strength, the local reserves at Golaghat and Sudya must necessarily be retained.

The regiments should, if possible, be recruited from Nepalese and other hill tribes. Neither Hindustanis nor Punjabis thrive in the climate, nor are they well adapted for jungle work. It is probable that, with only two Native regiments in Assam, a separate brigade staff will be deemed superfluous.

26. To sum up, my proposals are—

- (1) to relieve the military of all frontier outpost duty;
- (2) to make this duty over to the frontier police;
- (3) to bring up the strength of the frontier police to 3,000 men;
- (4) to reduce the military garrison of Assam by two regiments;
- (5) to abolish the brigade staff;
- (6) to place the two remaining regiments—
  - one at Shillong,
  - one-half at Sudya or Debrogur,
  - one-half at Silchar, abolishing all other cantonments;

## APPENDIX A.

*Names of Outposts, with strength of Garrisons, on the Assam Frontier.*

## SURMA VALLEY.

SYLHET DISTRICT ...	Police ...	...	{	Adampore ...	...	32		
				Khambar Ghat ...	...	32		
				Langai ...	...	33		
	Total ...			95				
	Military ...	...	{	Alinagar ...	...	46		
				Chargola ...	...	45		
				Total ...			91	
CACHAR DISTRICT ...	Police ...	...	{	Assaloo ...	...	11		
				Thenkar ...	...	18		
				Hengroom ...	...	18		
				Mangloo ...	...	18		
				Chutarchura ...	...	40		
				Jhainacherra ...	...	42		
				Mainadhar ...	...	27		
				Jhiri Ghat ...	...	19		
	Total ...			193				
	Military ...	...	{	Monierkkall ...	...	41		
				Nawarband ...	...	41		
				Political Agent's guard	...	41		
				Total ...			123	

## HILL DISTRICTS.

GARO HILLS	...	Police	...	{	Rongrengirri	...	27
					Mijulgirri	...	14
					Ryak	...	14
					Damalgirri	...	14
					Total	...	69
KHASI HILLS	...	Military	...	Jowai	...	50	
NAGA HILLS	...	Police	...	{	Dimapore	...	18
					Diphupani	...	9
					Bhandari	...	7
					Wokha	...	44
					Samugudting	...	30
					Total	...	108
		Police	...	Reserve at Kohima	...	100	
		Military	...	{	Wokha	...	61
					Samugudting	...	43
Kohima	...				100		
			Total	...	214		

## ASSAM VALLEY.

DURRUNG	{	Police ...	{	Helem	...	...	13
				Balipara	...	...	13
				Daimara	...	...	13
		Total		...	39		
	{	Military ...	...	Oodalguri	...	...	58
<hr/>							
NOWGONG	...	...	...	...	...	...	Nil.
GOWHATTY	...	...	...	...	...	...	Nil.
GOALPARA	...	...	...	...	...	...	Nil.
SIBSAGAR	{	Police ...	{	Debrapahar	...	...	9
				Amguri	...	...	5
				Gelleki	...	...	11
				Behubar	...	...	14
				Obhoypore	...	...	11
		Total		...	50		
<hr/>							
LUKHIMPORE	{	Police ...	{	Mukhum	...	...	17
				Diphoo	...	...	18
				Dikrong	...	...	11
				Domoh	...	...	11
				Bordoloni	...	...	7
				Lalakdoloni	...	...	7
				Borpathar	...	...	7
		Total		...	78		
		Military ...	{	Pobha Mukh	...	...	46
				Seesri	...	...	24
				Dibrong	...	...	14
				Jaipore	...	...	26
				Total		...	110
<hr/>							
Police Posts	...	...	...	...	...	...	35
Military do.	...	...	...	...	...	...	14
<hr/>							
		Total		...	...	...	49

Excluding head-quarters, there are—

35 police outposts with 634 Frontier Police.

14 military outposts with 646 military.

The average strength of police outposts' garrisons : strength of military outposts : : 18 : 48

				Rs.
Total	...	...	...	2,66,208
Add miscellaneous charges	...	...	...	37,000
Half-pay of European officers	...	...	...	40,000
Total	...	...	...	3,43,208

1,899 men cost Rs. 3,43,208 = Rs. 180 per man.

*II.—From C. BERNARD, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, to the Chief Commissioner of Assam,—No. 119, dated Fort William, the 27th March 1880.*

In your memorandum of the 12th August 1879 was submitted to the Army Organization Commission a scheme for reducing the garrison of Assam from four regiments to two, for raising the strength of the frontier police to 3,000 men.

2. The Army Commission have fully accepted the view that frontier outposts duty in Assam should be undertaken by police, that the distribution of regiments over many small outposts impairs the efficiency and discipline of the troops, and that the frontier police force should be increased so as to undertake the whole outpost duty. But the Commission do not support the proposal to reduce the military garrison of Assam to two regiments of the present strength. They propose to leave in Assam two-and-half battalions of Native Infantry, such battalion being 912 strong; and also to place a division of Mountain Artillery, two guns with about 40 men, in Assam. They propose also to keep standing Government carriage, elephants, mules, and a coolie corps sufficient to move out half the force, fully equipped, at 24 hours' notice.

3. The Government of India have not yet passed orders upon the Army Commission's Report. But I am to ask you to report, as soon as may be convenient, how far your scheme for increased frontier police can be modified, if the garrison proposed by the Commission is sanctioned for Assam. The saving caused by military reductions, under the scheme put forward by the Commission, will of course be considerably less than under the scheme set forth in your memorandum of August last. Meanwhile, an increase of 300 men to the frontier police has been sanctioned by the Government of India to meet present needs. And it would be well to consider what is the least addition to the

Home Department No. 100 of 18th March 1880.  
Foreign Department No. 176 of 13th February 1880.

frontier police you would require, on the understanding that all the outpost duty is to be undertaken by the police.

*III.—From C. J. LYALL, Esq., C.I.E., Officiating Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Assam, to the Secretary to the Government of India,—No. 1206, dated Shillong, the 28th July 1880.*

The Chief Commissioner has delayed answering your letter No. 119, dated the 27th March, till he could see some prospect of a definite settlement as to the future policy to be adopted in the Naga Hills. In paragraph 56 of my letter No. 948, dated the 17th June, to the address of the Foreign Department, the Chief Commissioner recommended that, for the present, a whole Native regiment should be quartered in the Naga Hills and at its base of supplies (Golaghat). This view has, he understands, been urged also by General Nation on the military authorities, and it has been recommended both by Captain Williamson and by Major Michell, the present Political Officer of the Naga Hills.

2. Sir Stuart Bayley is not aware what view the Government of India are inclined to take of these recommendations, but he is unwilling any longer to delay answering your inquiries as to the number of frontier police required to take up all the outpost duty in Assam, in accordance with the views expressed by the Army Commission. On the assumption, however, that Kohima, or some other central position in the Naga Hills, will be maintained, in order to control the Angamis and protect our settled districts from their raids, and that a full regiment will, for some time at all events, be absorbed in this duty, I am to say that the retention in Assam of two-and-a-half battalions, instead of the two regiments which he had previously recommended, will not enable the Chief Commissioner to reduce by a single man the estimated number of frontier police proposed in his memorandum of the 12th August for garrisoning the frontier posts.

3. Sir Stuart Bayley does not hesitate to admit that his views have been considerably modified since that the memorandum was written. First came the massacre of Mr. Darnant and his party in October, and the inability of the garrison at Kohima to disperse their foes and secure food and water; and these were followed by the protracted operations of General Nation's force, which though at one time it amounted to 1,400 men, required six months to reduce three Naga villages to submission, was unable to subject them to any very memorable defeat, suffered in killed and wounded more loss than it

inflicted on the enemy, and was unable either to prevent or adequately to punish such daring attacks as those on the Baladhan garden in Cachar. Sir Steuart Bayley does not recapitulate these facts as in any way reflecting on the troops or their officers. On the contrary, he has no reason to suppose that any Native troops could have done the work with better spirit, or more efficiently; but it is for that very reason that he appreciates what a difficult task it must be for a long time to come to control the Angamis in their own hills and to prevent their raiding on our territory. It is not surprising if, in the face of these events, the Chief Commissioner desires to modify the views expressed in paragraph 18 of that memorandum, and to place the minimum military force of the province, even when all outposts are held by the police, for the present at three regiments, and hereafter at two-and-a-half battalions and two guns, as proposed by the Commission.

4. But this will not diminish the number of outposts, nor of frontier police required to garrison them. The frontier police will still have to take over 14 posts, which will absorb 646 men. The proposed re-establishment of the North Cachar Sub-Division will absorb 100 men, who will practically be a reduction from the 400 men estimated for the Naga Hills Police. The same force may also have to strengthen the Cachar Police, who ought to supply the escort of the Political Agent at Manipur, but are too weak to do so, as the posts required to protect the exposed tea gardens of Cachar must still be maintained. While all over the province the reserves are so weak that the strain of sending up 200 men to the Naga Hills last October caused them absolutely to disappear from every station. Without some reserve, regular drill and instruction cannot be maintained, and the Chief Commissioner is convinced that the scale of 3,000 constables, as proposed in the 16th paragraph of his memorandum above referred to, is the very lowest which will allow of the outpost duty being taken over from the military. This number, of course, is inclusive of the additions of 200 men recently sanctioned in your letter No. 110, dated the 10th March 1880, to the frontier police of the Naga Hills, and of 100 men similarly added to the Cachar Frontier Police by letter No. 176 J.P., dated the 13th February 1880, from the Foreign Department. In regard to the general expediency of the transfer of all outposts from the charge of the military to that of the frontier police, the Chief Commissioner has no doubt whatever; the pecuniary saving will be less than was at first estimated, but it will still be considerable, and will be accompanied by increased administrative and military efficiency.

*IV.—Note by the Chief Commissioner MR. ELLIOTT on the Re-organisation of the Police Department in Assam.*

**PART I.—FRONTIER POLICE.**

During the last cold weather I have paid much attention to the condition of the Frontier Police and to the location and equipment of their outposts; and I have had the advantage of hearing the question discussed by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief during his tour in Assam, and of receiving from him subsequently a memorandum in which he recorded his views on the subject. I wish, therefore, to begin these remarks by publicly acknowledging the obligations I am under to him for the assistance which he has thus afforded me. I have also had before me Sir Steuart Bayley's note of 12th August 1879 (forwarded to the Government of India with his Secretary's letter No. 1921, dated the 1st September 1879), in which he treated at length of the changes he proposed to introduce, which were (1) to relieve the military of all frontier outpost duty, (2) to make over this duty to the Frontier Police, and (3) to bring up the strength of the Frontier Police to 3,000 men. His views on heads (1) and (2) have my entire concurrence, though I differ a little from him under head 3, as to the way in which I would propose to organise the Frontier Police.

2. The sanctioned strength of the Frontier Police is as shown in the margin; this includes an increase of 27 officers, 8 buglers, and 300 constables sanctioned by the Government of India for special service in the Naga Hills, but the cost of which has not been included as yet in the Provincial finances and contract. This force, as at present constituted, performs semi-civil, semi-military duties.

Except in the Garo and Naga Hills, where no Civil Police exists, they are not employed

Inspectors	...	...	9
Sub-Inspectors	...	...	34
Head Constables	...	...	213
Constables	...	...	2,190
Buglers	...	...	20
<b>Total</b>	...	...	<b>2,463</b>



in the detection of crime or the arrest of criminals ; but the civil duties they perform are those of guarding outcherries, treasuries, and jails, and escorting prisoners and treasure. On the military side, their chief duty is to guard the 45 outposts, which have been established either to check frontier raids along the borders of the province or else to keep down internal disturbances, as in the case of the Garo and Naga Hills. Then there is a certain strength kept up at each district head-quarters as a reserve for purposes of drill and to supply reliefs and casualties. The exact numbers are of necessity always varying ; but, approximately speaking, the present strength of the police force is divided among the three classes of employments as follows :—

Guards, escorts, and other semi-civil duties at head-quarters of district					
and sub-divisions	...	...	...	...	610
Frontier outposts	...	...	...	...	669
Garo Hills	...	...	...	...	332
Reserves, vacancies, sick, and on leave	...	...	...	...	872
					2,483

3. Regarding the semi-civil duties of the Frontier Police, I agree with some remarks made by the late Inspector General, Major Peet, in a note on this subject, where he says—

“ Station guards and escorts do not require highly-trained soldiers. \* \* \* To put a highly trained Goorkha on a jail or treasure guard is a pure waste of money, and more than money.”

I propose, therefore, that, except at the stations where in future the reserves of Frontier Police are to be massed, which reserves can conveniently be utilised for this purpose, these station duties should be made over to the Civil Police, who, if armed, and taught to use their arms, should be quite sufficient for the purpose. They are found sufficient in other provinces, and there is certainly no reason why, with a gentle and peaceful population like the Assamese, a more warlike instrument should be required for such purposes than elsewhere. The Frontier man costs rather more than a Civil Policeman, so that for every reason it would be better to transfer these duties to the Civil Police. The change will affect the stations of Sibsagar, Nowgong, Tezpur, Dhubri, all the sub-divisional stations, and, to some extent, Sylhet and Gauhati. But at the two large jails of Sylhet and Gauhati I should still prefer to retain the Frontier Police as guards, since there are no troops in those stations, and an outbreak among the prisoners, however unlikely, might be a serious calamity, if not immediately put down.

4. Turning next to the question of outposts, we have to consider—(1) the nature of the duties to be demanded from Frontier Police at an outpost ; (2) the location of the outposts ; (3) the manner in which the outposts should be fortified ; (4) the strength to be allotted to each outpost. As to the first question Sir D. Stewart has written that the outposts ought to be entrusted entirely from the Frontier Police, and the military should be relieved of this duty, and should be massed to form a reserve ; that the duties performed by the police in watching the frontier are “ of a military rather than a civil character ;” that “ it is necessary to give them an organisation of a more military character than has hitherto obtained, and to improve their training and equipment ;” and that “ the purpose of the police posts along the frontier is to acquire information and to guard against a surprise.” This authoritative declaration is of great value to me, and especially the last clause of it, which gives the true key-note as to the object with which the outposts are constructed. This object has not been always kept in mind ; and, while some posts are so weakly manned that they cannot perform these duties, it has been argued by some officers that they ought to be so strongly equipped as to serve the purpose of a garrisoned fort, able not only to resist prolonged attack, but to prevent the irruption of a strong body of enemies. This, the Commander-in-Chief declares, is not their duty : for such serious work as this we must look to the military to protect the country. The Frontier Police ought to be, in the main, the eye, and not the hand, of the executive ; but, in order to be this effectually, they should be strong enough to patrol in force, and to resist a sudden rush, or a slight or ordinary attack, at least for a few hours. To fulfil these conditions, I think the ordinary strength of a police outpost, where it is more than a few hours' march from its reserve, should be 2 head constables and 20 constables. Such a body would be able to supply two sentries—one at the gate and one at a high post of observation ; and to send out a patrol daily in two directions to join on to the nearest

outpost. They would also be able, if attacked, to divide into two parties; a head-constable with 10 men could be left in the post, while the other half the force sallied out either to attack the assailants, or to cut their way through and summon assistance.

5. As to the second point, the location of the outposts, Sir D. Stewart has remarked that "as a general rule the actual sites of the outposts have not been well chosen for defence." I am not sure if His Excellency is writing here only of those military outposts which he saw himself, on the way to and near Sadiya, or if he refers to information received as to other frontier police outposts in that neighbourhood. I would not put my own opinion in opposition to that of so great an authority; but I venture to think that, if the Commander-in-Chief had seen a large number of the outposts which I visited, he would not have formed so unfavourable an opinion of their sites. At least, I paid particular attention to this question, and was seldom, if ever, able to suggest a better site, all points considered. In an undulating and wooded country it is often impossible to secure a site which is perfect both from an engineering and from a political point of view, which is completely suitable for defence and secure against attack, and at the same time commands the road or path or stream which it is necessary to hold in check. Water is one of our chief difficulties in selecting a site; it is always found low down, and the outpost must be close to water; a necessity which prevents it being placed on the top of a hill. But if the jungle is cleared for a distance of 200 yards all round, and the ground sloped so that it can be swept with fire from the outpost throughout that distance, I think that, considering the class of enemies with which we have to deal, the site may be considered fairly strong, even though it would be untenable against an enemy armed with weapons of precision.

6. Passing now from the actual site chosen to the general location of an outpost in a particular valley or on a particular road, the principle adopted seems to have been to choose a line along which the frontier tribes have already raided, or which is a track used by them for communication and trade, and likely to be used by them in war. It is difficult to say what other principle could be adopted, for it is impossible to guard every track and pathway. I may, however, refer to my two notes on the South and North Cachar lines of outposts, dated the 24th February 1882 (copies of which are appended to this paper), as showing my views in greater detail, and illustrating them by application to particular cases. And I would say briefly that the following principles might be laid down: (1) that the outpost should command a track along which frontier tribes have raided, or which is so convenient of access that they would be likely, if they did raid, to use it; (2) that it should not be far in advance of the population and cultivation it is intended to protect; (3) that it should not be nearer another outpost, nor further, than the distance which can be conveniently covered by a patrol, provided that the intervening country is such that it is important to patrol through it in order to learn what is going on.

7. On the whole, I think the location, as now existing, has been the result of common sense and practical experience, and cannot be much improved upon. I have ordered one or two alterations, such as the abolition of the Jaipur post, which was only four miles off another post, and commanded no regular route of Naga access: and there are three or four of the smaller outposts which I have not yet visited, and about the necessity of which I am not quite certain. But these are matters of small detail. If, as is suggested in the 5th paragraph of my note on the southern line of outposts in the Surma Valley, the Government of India think it worthwhile to appoint an officer or a commission to decide on the question of general location and of actual sites, I shall be well pleased, but I doubt myself if the gain will be commensurate with the cost. I should think it sufficient if the Government of India would lay down the general principles by which the location of an outpost should be governed, and if I were to authorise Major Williamson, the Inspector General of Police, now on furlough, to see that those principles are carried out. He has had both Civil and Military training, and has also had experience of fighting with the Garos and Nagas; he knows therefore what is wanted and how to provide it.

8. Subject to any further reconsideration, the list which I have drawn up shows my present proposals as to the positions of the Frontier Police outposts which ought to be kept up: of these Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 30, 32, 39, 41, 43, 45 have been chosen, I believe, as commanding easy and much-used lines of communication. Nos. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 15, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 42, 44, have either been actually attacked by raiders or have been constructed to guard paths along which raids have been made. Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10, 34, 36, and 37 have hitherto been occupied by the military. It was my predecessor's wish, and it has been mine, to substitute Frontier Police for sepoy; and now that the Commander-in-Chief has pronounced that the frontier duties can be more efficiently and economically performed by police than by

soldiers, I have no hesitation in proposing the substitution. No. 10, Bomjur, has been recently occupied to check an expected advance of the Aboms. Nos. 27, 28, and 29 have not yet been occupied, but are posts which the Deputy Commissioner has selected under my orders in the Naga Hills, and which I propose to establish, and to man with Frontier Police, so as to hold that country more thoroughly in hand, and to make our Government more visible to the Nagas than it can be while concentrated at Kohima and Wokha. In the course of time, no doubt, it will be possible to reduce their strength, but it would not be wise at first to expose our new system of administration to any disaster by planting out too weak a force in the midst of these barely-tamed savages. Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 12, 18, and 19 are those which I mentioned in the preceding paragraph as posts regarding the necessity of which I am somewhat doubtful. Of these 45 posts I have visited 26 during my cold weather tour.

9. I have not included in this list the ten outposts in the Garo Hills, of which I have only seen three. These are outposts of a rather different character, being intended (like Nos. 27, 28, 29 in the Naga Hills) to hold the district in check, and prevent the still half-savage Garos from giving trouble, and they take the place of the civil thanas and outposts in other districts. I am not able to offer any suggestions regarding this district, and have no reason to think that any change is required, as the outposts were selected by Major Williamson while he was Deputy Commissioner of the district, and knew more of it than any one else. The number of police was shown not to be excessive last year when there was a rising among the Garos, and Major Peet had some difficulty in bringing together 100 or 150 men to put it down; but, and at the same time, I do not think it is too small, and I propose for the present to make no change in the strength of the Frontier Police in the Garo Hills or in their location.

10. As to the manner in which these outposts should be fortified, I beg leave to refer to paragraph 9 of my note on the Cachar outposts. Since writing that note, I visited the new stockades made by Major Beresford at Nizanghat and Bomjur, and found that they fulfilled all the conditions which I had thought necessary. I think all the outposts should imitate the defences set up here, though those less exposed to attack need be less strongly built.

11. I come next to the way in which the police should be distributed at these outposts. As was stated above, I propose generally to man them with two non-commissioned officers or head constables and 20 men: but to place a smaller number in those minor outposts, such as Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 16, 18, 20, 39, where the frontier tribes have for years shown themselves so peaceable that there is now little apprehension of an attack, and at those places, such as Nos. 11, 12, 23, 24, 43, 45, which are so near their reserves that they could be reinforced in a few hours if attacked, where there are three or four outposts in a continuous chain, I would give a Sub-Inspector to visit them constantly and keep up discipline. At sub-divisional head-quarters, such as Sadiya (No. 15), Wokha (26), and Gungong (40), and at posts particularly exposed, such as Nos. 10, 27, 28, 29, 34, and 42, I propose to give a stronger force, amounting in some cases to 50 men, and would place in some of them an Inspector in charge.

12. The numerical total of the force distributed at outposts, as I propose, is 5 Inspectors, 16 Sub-Inspectors, 95 Head Constables and 940 Constables: the present force being 2 Inspectors, 10 Sub-Inspectors, 55 Head Constables, and 608 Constables.

But then I set free 8 commissioned and 35 non-commissioned officers and 268 sepoy of the regular force, besides providing for three new outposts in the Naga District, which will employ 150 constables, together with their complement of officers. I trust, therefore, my proposed distribution will not be thought extravagant. Including the guard for the two large jails, the effective force required is 5 Inspectors, 16 Sub-Inspectors, 99 Head Constables, and 976 Constables.

13. The next question is the strength of the reserve, which has to be kept in order to maintain the Frontier Police in a state of efficiency. It is admitted by every one that a long continuance of outpost service has a bad effect on the *morale* of the men: they forget their drill, and get slack in their discipline; in the constant performance of the same routine duties they lose their alertness and carry out their work in a perfunctory way. It is necessary that they should be frequently relieved and brought back to head-quarters to recover their *esprit de corps* and their drill. I propose that they should never spend more than six months of the year at outposts, that is to say, the reserve always be equal to the force required to hold the outposts. It will depend on local circumstances, such as distance from head-quarters and state of the communications, whether should spend six months continuously on outpost duty or have two spells of three months at a time.

14. In order to keep both the force on actual duty and the reserve at their full numbers, it is necessary to provide for casualties, such as sickness, leave, and short recruitments. Vacancies cannot always be filled up at once: the Chief recruiting season is the cold weather, and the recruit requires six months' training before he is sufficiently efficient to be sent on outpost service. I find that the average number of men on leave and sick in hospital has during the last year been about 6 per cent. of the whole. We have of late been about 7 per cent. below our full nominal strength through failure to recruit, and the average duration of a Frontier Policeman's service may be taken as about ten years. The average number of recruits to be obtained annually is therefore about 10 per cent.; and as these are ineffective for half a year, we may reckon that half of the number, or 5 per cent., are permanently ineffective throughout the year. The total number of ineffective to be provided for is therefore about 11 per cent.; but in the present calculations it will perhaps be sufficient to estimate it at 10 per cent., and the total Frontier Police force should be constituted as follows:—

	Inspectors.	Sub-Inspectors.	Head-constables.	Constables.
On outpost duty (including jail) ...	5	16	99	976
Reserve for reliefs ...	5	16	99	976
Surplus to supply the place of ineffective, at 10 per cent. ...	1	3	20	194
Garo Hills Police ...	2	6	24	300
Buglers ...	...	...	...	20
<b>Total</b> ...	<b>13</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>242</b>	<b>2,466</b>

15. Lastly, we come to the question of how these Frontier Police should be organised. Hitherto it has been the practice to allot to each district a fixed number of Frontier Police sufficient to perform both the semi-civil and semi-military duties described in my 2nd paragraph, and also a reserve sufficient both to supply reliefs and casualties and to be available to put down any disturbance which may arise. In this way, the reserve strength of the Frontier Police, which according to the figures in paragraph 2 looks considerable, has been frittered away by being divided among ten districts, so much so that in none of these, except Cachar, was it ever possible to bring any considerable number of men on to parade at one time. As I have already said, it is part of my scheme to relieve them of the semi-civil duties (except the guarding of the Sylhet and Gauhati Jails); and by this change there will be no Frontier Police left in the Goalpara and Nowgong Districts, in Kamrup only at the Gauhati Jail, in Darrang two small outposts (Nos. 1 and 2), and in Sibsagar three (Nos. 18, 19, and 20). It has hitherto been the practice to place both the Civil and Frontier Police under the same District Superintendents, who are in no case military men. Sir D. Stewart has laid his finger on this blot, by advocating that experienced officers should be appointed to serve with the Frontier Police, so as to make it really efficient as a military (or, as I should rather call it, semi-military) police. Accordingly, I propose that, instead of being organised in ten distinct bodies, and attached to ten districts, the Frontier Police should in future be organised in four bodies: two for the Garo Hills and Naga Hills, the area of jurisdiction being identical with that of the civil district; one for the Surma Valley, consisting of the Cachar and Sylhet Districts, with head-quarters at Cachar; one for the North-Eastern Frontier, with head-quarters at Dibrugarh or Sadiya, embracing the small outposts in the Sibsagar and Darrang Districts, and supplying the Gauhati Jail. If a special political officer is placed in charge of our relations with all the tribes of the North-Eastern Frontier, and is posted to Sadiya, I should be inclined to place the head-quarters of the Frontier Police reserve at Sadiya: but, as this is not settled, I have in the appendix proposed to divide it between Sadiya and Dibrugarh, since Sadiya is at a rather inconvenient distance from the outposts lower down the valley.

16. These would be the four divisions of the Frontier Police. As I have said, I propose no change in the Garo Hills at present, because I am not well acquainted with the district; and, as there are no roads, and the police must be much scattered, I hardly think it is possible to attain much military discipline and efficiency there: at least, I would rather wait and try what can be done under more favourable conditions. The other three divisions should, as the Commander-in-Chief proposes, be ordinarily commanded by young military officers, who would be lent for the purpose for a five years' term. But, for the present, I should be content that the Cachar-Sylhet Division should remain under Mr. Daly, who, though a civilian, has a good deal of military knowledge, and who has brought his Frontier Police into a state of much greater efficiency than those of any other district. It would be a great discouragement to him to take the reformed police out of his hands, when he has done so much for the unreformed police, and I think it will be safe to retain him at any rate for a year or two, till we see if his police fall behind

those of the two other divisions or not. If, then, my scheme is sanctioned, I should ask for two young officers as "Commandants of the Assam Frontier Police." Their pay as Lieutenants would be Rs. 225, and I recommend that a staff pay of Rs. 300 or Rs. 400 should be added to it. The amount of the staff allowance which is requisite to make these appointments attractive can be best decided by the military authorities. Brigadier-General Nation thinks that less than Rs. 400 would not tempt a young officer to forfeit his chance of succeeding to the adjutancy, or even to an acting wing command, during a period of five years: but perhaps it would be better on this account to fix the term at three years as a minimum, with option to continue for five years. It must be remembered that in both the Dibrugarh and Naga Hills Districts living is very expensive. The staff pay, however, should cover everything except travelling allowance. I would not grant the Naga Hills allowance to the Commandant of the Frontier Corps.

17. To keep up the pay bills and returns of each corps the clerical establishments which already exists can be utilised. The separation of Frontier Police and Civil Police will, if anything, make office work easier, and diminish the amount of office establishment required. No extra expenditure will be required on this account.

18. One small change which I advocate has been very urgently pressed upon me both by the men and their officers: it is that their titles should be assimilated to those of the Military and not to those of the Civil Police. There is no doubt but that the service will be more popular, and recruitment among fighting castes easier, if they are called Sipahis, Havildars, Jemadars, and Subadars, and I trust the Government of India will see no objection to this. It has already been conceded in the case of the Chittagong Hill Police.

19. If these proposals are approved, I should recommend that, of the annual number of recruits enlisted, 50 per cent. should be chosen among Jharwas (men of the Assam Valley) or Cacharis, and 50 per cent. among Goorkhas. We cannot get for the police quite as good a class of Goorkhas as the military can obtain; but I am informed that we have for the last two or three years succeeded in enlisting a very fair number of Nepalese of good physique and fighting traditions. It is of course essential that they should be enlisted on the terms of the Regulation proposed in my Secretary's No. 884, dated the 11th June 1881, in order to bring their term of service, the period of notice they have to give on withdrawing from the force, and the punishments to which they are liable while in it, into conformity with those prescribed for sepoy.

20. I have shown this note to Brigadier-General Nation, C. B. (as requested by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief), and am authorised to say that he agrees in all the proposals it contains. He has also suggested that the reserves at Dibrugarh, Kohima, and Silchar should be occasionally called on to parade with the regular regiments stationed there, and be annually inspected by the superior officer the Brigadier-General may nominate, the inspection report being communicated to the Chief Commissioner through the Inspector General. These suggestions have my entire support, and I think such a collection of the Frontier Police and military will be most valuable.

21. I refrain at present from entering into the comparative financial effects of these proposals, because they must be taken in conjunction with the changes they necessitate in the strength of the Civil Police, to which I shall next advert. But the expense of the Frontier Police, organised as above proposed, may be estimated as follows:—

	Monthly. Rs.	Annually. Rs.
4 Commandants of Frontier Police Corps—		
2 Lieutenants at Rs. 225 and staff pay Rs. 300 ..	1,050	12,600
Mr. Daly, Cachar ... ..	800	9,600
Mr. Fisher, Garo Hills ... ..	600	7,200
13 Frontier Subadars, average pay Rs. 150	1,950	23,400
41 Do. Jemadars average pay Rs. 60	2,460	29,520
242 Do. Havildars, average pay Rs. 16	872	46,464
2,466 Do. Police Sipahis, average pay Rs. 8-8	20,961	2,51,532
Naga Hills allowance, 680 men, at Re. 1-8	1,020	12,240
Total ... ..		3,92,556

The present costs of the Frontier Police (taking only salaries of officers and men into the account) is put down at Rs. 3,15,522 in the budget for 1882-83. The proposed cost, omitting the pay of the four officers, is Rs. 3,63,156. For the former sum 2,433 officers and men, for the latter 2,762, are provided, but the number of officers is raised in a larger proportion than that of the men. This is a necessary consequence, flowing from the detached nature of the duties which the police will be called upon to perform, since it is essential (as shown in paragraph 4) that there should always be at least two officers with every force, however small, which may be exposed to attack.

*Comparative Statement of present and proposed strength at Police outposts, including proposed strength of reserves and provision for casualties.*

	PRESENT.				PROPOSED.			
	Inspectors.	Sub-Inspectors.	Head Constables.	Constables.	Inspectors.	Sub-Inspectors.	Head Constables.	Constables.
<b>North-Eastern Frontier—</b>								
1. Daimara ... ..	...	...	1	7	...	...	2	12
2. Balipara ... ..	...	...	1	8	...	...	1	12
3. Borpathar ... ..	...	...	1	6	...	...	1	12
4. Lalukdoloni ... ..	...	...	1	6	...	...	1	8
5. Beiblichak (or Bordoloni) ... ..	...	...	1	6	...	...	1	8
6. Dimar ... ..	...	...	2	20	...	1	2	20
7. Pobamukh (Military) ... ..	...	...	4	40	...	...	...	20
8. Samsari Do. ... ..	...	...	1	3	...	...	2	20
9. Dibong Do. ... ..	...	...	1	3	...	...	2	20
10. Bomjur Do. ... ..	...	...	1	8	1	1	5	40
11. Dikrang ... ..	...	...	1	10	...	...	1	8
12. Disol ... ..	...	...	1	10	...	...	1	12
13. Diphu ... ..	...	...	2	12	...	...	2	20
14. Sonpura ... ..	...	...	1	10	...	...	2	20
15. Sadiya (Reserve) ... ..	...	...	...	1	1	2	20	200
16. Makum ... ..	...	...	1	12	...	...	1	12
17. Jaipur ... ..	...	...	1	12	...	...	2	20
18. Bihubar ... ..	...	1	1	10	...	...	1	12
19. Galeki ... ..	...	...	1	9	...	1	2	20
20. Debragar ... ..	...	...	1	8	...	...	1	12
Head-quarters reserve ... ..	...	...	2	24	...	...	2	16
Casualties, at 10 per cent. ... ..	...	...	...	...	...	1	7	62
Total { Police ... ..	...	2	19	173	3	9	77	756
{ Military ... ..	...	4	17	127	...	...	...	...
<b>Naga Hills—</b>								
21. Borpathar ... ..	...	...	1	6	...	...	1	12
22. Dimapur ... ..	1	1	1	22	...	1	2	20
23. Samaguting ... ..	...	...	1	10	...	...	1	12
24. Nibn Guard ... ..	...	1	1	16	...	...	1	12
25. Piphma ... ..	...	...	2	12	...	1	2	20
26. Wokha ... ..	...	1	4	60	1	1	6	80
27. Lozema ... ..	...	...	...	...	...	1	6	80
28. Lakhema or Henima ... ..	...	...	...	...	1	1	6	80
29. Vishwema ... ..	...	...	...	...	...	2	6	80
Head-quarter reserve ... ..	...	...	...	...	2	6	27	276
Casualties, at 10 per cent. ... ..	...	...	...	...	...	1	6	55
Total Naga Hills Corps ... ..	1	3	9	126	5	13	60	607
<b>Surma Valley—</b>								
30. Adampur ... ..	...	...	2	30	...	...	2	20
31. Alinagar ... ..	...	1	2	30	...	1	2	20
32. Langai ... ..	...	...	2	30	...	...	2	20
33. Olivacherra ... ..	...	...	2	29	...	...	2	20
34. Chatsachura (Military) ... ..	...	1	4	30	1	1	3	30
35. Jhalnacheria Do. ... ..	...	1	4	41	...	...	2	20
36. Noarbund Do. ... ..	...	1	4	25	...	1	2	20
37. Monierkhal Do. ... ..	...	1	6	40	...	...	2	20
38. Mainadhar ... ..	...	...	2	23	...	...	2	20
39. Jatima Valley ... ..	...	...	1	4	...	...	1	8
40. Gunjong ... ..	1	1	5	45	1	1	4	40
41. Guilong ... ..	...	...	2	26	...	1	3	24
42. Hangrum ... ..	...	1	3	32	...	1	3	20
43. Aisacheria ... ..	...	...	2	15	...	...	2	12
44. Jaipur ... ..	...	1	2	26	...	...	...	...
45. Binadhan ... ..	...	...	2	15	...	...	2	20
46. Jirighat ... ..	...	...	2	23	...	...	2	12
Sylhet Jail ... ..	...	...	2	32	...	...	2	20
Head-quarters reserve ... ..	...	...	...	...	2	6	87	366
Casualties, at 10 per cent. ... ..	...	...	...	...	...	1	7	71
Total Surma Valley { Police ... ..	1	5	31	369	5	13	61	793
{ Military ... ..	...	4	18	136	...	...	...	...
Total of three Corps ... ..	2	10	59	658	13	35	218	2,146
Garo Hills ... ..	2	6	24	300	2	6	24	300
Grand Total ... ..	4	16	83	958	13	41	242	2,446
Military ... ..	...	8	35	263	...	...	...	...

## PART II.—CIVIL POLICE.

I have two changes to propose in the Civil Police. The first change follows from the proposal to transfer to the Civil Police, in six districts, the semi-civil duties formerly carried on by the Frontier Police. One of these is the provision of escorts to accompany prisoners and treasure. The demands on these accounts vary at different times, but I find that on one date 5 head constables and 36 constables, at another date 8 head constables and 50 constables, were thus employed. I should be inclined to allow to each of the six districts concerned 1 head constable and 10 constables for these duties, or 6 head constables and 60 constables in all. In the Lakhimpur, Cachar, Naga Hills, and Garo Hills Districts the Frontier Police will take these escorts. The arrangements in the Khasi Hills will remain unchanged.

2. In the Sibasagar District there are five little outposts on the Trunk Road manned by 17 frontier constables, solely for the purpose of patrolling. It will be enough to allow 1 head constable and 12 constables for this object, to be located at a thana somewhere on the Trunk Road; and the patrolling of the road here, as in other districts, will then be undertaken solely by Civil Police.

3. The number of orderlies employed is in some cases excessive. In each of the six districts, two orderlies may be allowed to the District Superintendent and one to the Deputy-Commissioner, 18 in all.

	Treasury, jail, and lines.		Relief.	
	H.	C.	H.	C.
Lakhimpur	2	8	1	4
Sibasagar	2	20	1	10
Jorhat	2	8	1	4
Golaghat	2	8	...	...
Nowgong	2	20	1	10
Tezpur	3	24	1	12
Mangaldai	2	8	1	4
Gauhati	1	8	1	4
Barpeta	2	8	1	4
Goalpara	2	8	1	4
Dhubri	2	8	1	4
Sylhet	2	8	1	4
Sunamganj	2	8	1	4
Habiganj	2	8	1	4
Karimganj	2	8	1	4
Hailakandi	2	8	1	4
	32	168	16	84
	48		252	

4. The distribution of police for jail, treasury, line, and magazine guards should be as shown in the margin. This list has been made out after a consideration of the number of sentries required at each place. It is not necessary here, as with the Frontier Police, to provide a reserve equal to the number of these guards; but some provision for relief must be made, and I think it will be sufficient if we arrange that half the requisite number are added to the thana strength, and thus a daily relief can be given from these and other unoccupied police at the thana.

5. The total addition to the Civil Police required on account of these four classes of duties is—

	Per mensem.	Per annum.
	Rs.	Rs.
55 head-constables, average pay Rs. 16 ...	...	880
342 constables, average pay Rs. 7-12 ...	...	2,651-8
Total	...	42,578

\* \* \* \* \*

C. A. ELLIOTT,  
Chief Commissioner.

The 20th June 1882.

*V.—Note by the Chief Commissioner of Assam on the Chain of Outposts in the South, of the Surma Valley, dated the 24th February 1882.*

I have now visited the following outposts in this chain:—Adampur, Alinagar (so called, should be Budbasha), Langai, Olivlacherra, Ohatachura, Jhalnacherra, and Noarband. I have not been able to visit Monierkhal or Mainadhar, nor the site proposed for Rukni.

2. On the whole, I am satisfied with the position of these outposts, and do not wish to see them changed. None of the sites are faultless, but I think they are as good as any others that could be chosen *per se*, and I do not think our object should be to erect

for tresses which should be irresistible to attack or capable of standing a long seise, but strong stockaded posts which cannot be taken by a rush, and present such physical obstacles to an attack that the enemy could not get in, even if the garrison were not on the alert, without some delay. This object they fulfil, or will fulfil, if a few ordinary repairs and alterations are effected.

2. Putting aside objections taken to the sites, *per se*, the chief reasons for the proposals which have been made for changing them have been based on their position in relation to cultivation and tea gardens. It has been assumed that an outpost ought to be in advance of all cultivation, and should be pushed forward as cultivation advances along the valleys or into the jungles. This view I emphatically reject. Persons who advance their cultivation into the jungle do it at their own risk, and must be prepared to protect themselves. The outposts should be located with a view to the protection not merely of the most advanced tea gardens, but of the whole valley or block of cultivation; and, for this purpose, I am of opinion that they are best placed where they are, not on the skirts of the jungle, but a little in rear of the foremost line of cultivation. Raiders will either attack the stockades or they will pass them by and fall on the villages and ooclie-lines or garden bungalows. If they attack them, all that we are concerned with is the strength of the site and the stockade's power of self-defence; if they avoid them and fall on the villages, then I consider that the force located at the outpost is more likely to be able to attack and drive off the raiders, and protect the flying villagers or oochies, if the spot assailed is in front of them than if it is behind them. Speaking generally, I should say that a valley with its front advancing into jungle is best protected by an outpost located from three to five miles from the skirts of the jungle.

4. This disposes of the proposal to push forward the outposts of Adampur, Langai, and Noarband, and to remove the Oliiacherra post, trusting to the defence of the Chargola Valley from an outpost perched on the Chatachura range. As to the Chatachura post itself, I consider that it is best where it now is. Supposing it pushed forward to the point advocated, on a level with Jhalnacherra and Oliiacherra, and supposing a Lushai raiding party to slip past this line, the whole country behind lies open to their ravages, whereas the military in their present post would be more readily able to fall upon a party which was engaged in plundering, say, Rupacherra or Kukicherra on one side, or any of the Chargola gardens on the other.

5. I think, indeed, that it is possible that when I have worked out my scheme for the Frontier Police, the Government of India may desire that a mixed military and civil commission should be appointed to consider these outposts in detail, and I should welcome such an appointment. But this makes it all the more unnecessary to discuss changes at present.

6. Assuming, therefore, that the post stand for a year at any rate, it is advisable that they should be made efficient and serviceable to last that time. I have written special inspection notes on the Frontier Police outposts in Sylhet, and directed alterations to be made. With regard to the military outposts in Cachar, I have no doubt the Brigadier General will desire that the same degree of efficiency should be attained. There is at present a great difference between the condition of the police and military outposts, and it is not in favour of the military. I refer to such matters as the timber and bamboos of the stockade, the state of the magazine, the water-supply, and the ability of the defenders to command the approaches to the stockade on all sides. What I recommend is that in all of them the magazine be constructed with mud walls, and a flat timber roof covered with earth, that the stockade timbers or bamboos be renewed where rotten, and the bamboo *panjis* made effective; that a clear glacis be provided which can be swept with fire from the walls to a distance of about 200 yards, that no buildings be allowed within that distance which can afford shelter to an enemy, and that a sufficient supply of earthen *gharras* or iron buckets, or both, be kept in each to provide drinking water for one or two days, and also to preserve the buildings against fire. I further strongly advocate that all these repairs be effected by the men themselves, working pay being given them, and I know that in saying this I am carrying out the wishes of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. I also trust that an efficient system of patrolling may be established. At present patrols are sent out for two or three miles only. It would do the men much good to be sent on long walks of ten miles out and ten miles back, and such patrols would enable most of the outposts to join hands. I think a patrol from Chatachura should go out one day along the ridge some seven miles to a point where patrols from Jhalnacherra and Oliiacherra would meet it returning in the evening. The next day the patrol might go down the hill on both sides, meeting patrols from Oliiacherra on one side and



Jhalnacheria on the other in their respective valleys. I do not think it is necessary for Jhalnacheria and Noarband to be connected, as there is no route from Lushai land between them, but there is such a route along the Rengtipahar and the Rukni, and therefore I think a daily patrol should go from Noarband and Monierkhal, meeting half way, and similarly from Monierkhal and Mainadhar. A patrol-path must be cut for this object, which will be excellent practice for the men, and a rest-house should be built between Monierkhal and Noarband, and another at the point seven or eight miles north of Chatachura outposts, at which the patrols would meet and rest before returning. With these precautions, I think we shall have taken all the steps that prudence requires to guard against a Lushai raid.

7. Since writing the above remarks, I have visited all but one of the northern outposts in Cachar, and have issued orders in the Police Department for making the defences and the patrolling system more efficient.

8. A copy of this Note should be sent to the Brigadier-General, with the request that, if he agrees with the remarks I have made, he will favour me with a copy of the orders he issues on the subject.

C. A. ELLIOTT.

*VI.—Note by the Chief Commissioner of Assam on the Frontier Police Outposts in Cachar, dated the 24th February 1882.*

I have visited all the outposts in Cachar manned by the police, except Aisacheria and Mainadhar, and record a few notes on them.

2. *Gunjong*.—The fort has been realigned by Mr. Daly on a smaller scale than before, and there are a large number of coolies and a few police engaged in digging the ditch and throwing up the parapet. The site is a good one. As to the defences, what I have to say elsewhere applies here also. Some fresh decision should be come to as to the numbers to be stationed here, which were, I think, too small before. District Superintendent and Deputy Commissioner should report their proposals through Inspector General of Police.

3. *Gwilong*.—Re-building. Defences consist of ditch and parapet, both at present very weak; position good; magazine of straw; no patrolling done; huts erected too close to the stockade.

4. *Hangrum*.—Very fine position for defence, but far off the road along the Chiri, it is supposed to guard; water rather far. Defences, a wall of rough stone which any one can climb over in a moment; magazine good, earthen walls and roof, safe from fire, but no door or lock. No patrolling done.

5. *Baladhan*.—Situation as good as can be got here; slopes steep and earthen wall high except at west end, where it is low and weak. The level part outside at this end should be taken in as an outwork, and cut down in height, and the parapet raised so as to protect the inner fort if the outwork were taken. Patrolling every other day to Jaipur (four miles). Angami Nagas who come to trade in Lakhimpur show their passes here, and hillmen from other parts report themselves, and their coming and return is entered in a very chaotic register; those from distant places not known to the police receive passes. Magazine, good, but no door.

6. *Jaipur*.—A low wall and no ditch, situation not particularly good, and place hardly defensible; no magazine at all: ammunition kept in a corner of the sloping barrack, which is thatched. A well which runs dry, but fills again with very little rain, evidently only surface drainage, not spring; slope close to north-east bastion so steep as to afford protection to enemy. Patrol goes every other day to Baladhan, and every day half-way to Aisacheria; no written password. This place is only four miles from Baladhan, and it commands no road. I cannot conceive what was the reason for erecting a fort here.

7. *Thirighat*.—Fairly good site, but commanded by hill about 200 yards off, or less; parapet weakest and lowest on this side, where it should be highest. Earthen wall (no ditch), steep slope, stuck with *panjis*, which come out at a touch, and could almost be blown away with a high wind. Patrol to Baladhan daily; no written password.

8. These posts do not come up to the efficiency which I expected and which I desire. The chief points to be noticed are defences, patrols, drill supplies, registers.

9. *Defences.*—What I desire in these outposts in such an amount of defence as will hinder by natural obstacles the rush of an enemy, supposing the garrison to be caught unprepared. Some of Mr. Daly's defences fulfil this condition. They should all be stockaded and *pauji* interwoven in the bamboos or timber of the stockade, in such a way that no one can get in without losing a little time in tearing down the stockade, and during that time the garrison would be able to run up and collect themselves. The magazines should all be secure from fire; earthen walls and a timber flat roof covered with earth, as at Guilong, are sufficient, but there should be a door and a lock, and the key should be kept by the officer in command. Each outpost should have its full complement of 200 rounds to a man; at present they are far below this. There should be a large supply of water in *chungas* in the fort, both to put out fire and to support the garrison in case they were cut off from water for a day or two. There should be as few cooking-houses as possible: at Jaipur there are two lines of them, which take up nearly the whole interior area. I think there were four houses to five men. One for each caste is enough. It is not enough to *pauji* the slope of the ditch and parapet: Mr. Daly suggested this, and I thought at first it might do till I saw the weakness of the defences at Jhirighat.

10. *Patrols.*—I wish more attention to be paid to this. It is essential to have constant patrols, not only in order to get and convey information, but also to train the men, who must get soft and out of condition when cooped up in these posts with no exercise. I wish to see a continuous line of daily patrols from Gunjong to Baladhan and back, and another from Jhirighat to Ainacherra and back. A written pass would be given at Gunjong of this kind:—

*Patrol Pass.*

Gunjong, January 1,	Constables A and B	left for Guilong at 7 A.M.
Guilong do. 1,	do. C and D	arrived, having met the
Gunjong patrol at 6 P.M.		
Ditto do. 2,	do. E and F	left for Hangrum 7 A.M.
Hangrum, do. 2,	do. G and H	arrived, having met the
patrol from Guilong at 6 P.M.		
Ditto do. 3,	do. I and M	left for Baladhan at 7 A.M.
Baladhan, do. 3,	do. N and O	arrived, having met the patrol
from Hangrum at 6 P.M.		

and so on from Baladhan back to Gunjong, where it would be laid before the Sub-Divisional Officer. A similar patrol pass should run from Jhirighat to Aisacherra and back, and thence be posted to the District Superintendent. The form used above might be printed, and the words in italics left blank and filled up at each station. Three rest-houses would have to be erected half-way between Gunjong, Guilong, Hangrum, and Baladhan; I have already mentioned this in my Note on North Cachar. The patrol-path must be very much improved; at present no regular path exists between Baladhan and Guilong, and the path from Jaipur to Baladhan, which I went along, has been utterly neglected, in spite of the grant of special funds.

11. *Drill.*—These outposts might be made the best possible training school for the Frontier Police, but at present they are very injurious to discipline, because little or nothing is done to employ the men. Hardly any have a rifle-range, and the drill-ground in most of them is extremely small. Even the patrolling system I have ordered will only employ two or four men a day, and the rest will have a great deal of time on their hands. I should wish a rifle-range to be made at each outpost, and arrangements made for putting them through target practice. Whenever the Inspector and the District Superintendent visit the outpost, they should take the men out to fire, their visits should last some days; and the District Superintendent should train them in firing not only on measured ground but at unknown distances and uneven heights, across ravines and up hill sides. I should also like him once in every year to take a large party of police (leaving only enough for the current work at the outposts) out with him on a rough expedition in the hills, cutting their way through jungle, hutting themselves every night, and so forth; in this way they will be trained to the work they would have to perform if actually called out to serve against an enemy.

12. *Supplies.*—I have already written about sending up a year's supplies at a time to the hill posts: as for those in the inner line, the men should provide their own food,

and the present system of paying for coolies at Government expense must be abandoned. There are tea garden bazaars near all these posts; at Jhirighat one is held under the very walls of the fort, and yet a boat is kept up at Rs. 25 a month, chiefly in order to fetch supplies a little cheaper from Lakhipur. This cannot be allowed to continue.

13. *Registers*.—At most of the outposts they have merely to record the setting of sentries and the sending out of patrols. At Baladhan and Aisacherra, and also at the little post at Cutlicherra, in the Jatinga Valley, they have to watch over the coming and going of Angami Nagas and other hillmen. A proper book should be sent to each outpost, ruled and paged, with printed headings, to record these events, and a counterfoil pass-book out of which to give passes. The Register might perhaps be drawn out as follows:—

1. Date (*i. e.*, date when party reports itself on its way to the plains).
2. Tribe to which party belongs.
3. Village from which party comes.
4. Name of head of party.
5. Number of persons composing party.
6. Place to which going.
7. Object of journey.
8. If Angami Nagas, number of pass given at Kohima, and copy of particulars given in it.
9. If hill people from North Cachar, number of pass given by head constable.
10. Date of return on homeward journey.

A monthly abstract of this book should be made and sent in to the District Superintendent, showing the number of persons who have passed towards the plains, whether Angamis, North Cachar people, or people from nearer *punjis*; and the District Superintendent should communicate to the District Superintendent, Naga Hills, to see if the number of passes given by him corresponds with the number of Angamis visiting the plains. The Annual Administration Report should contain the statistics resulting from these registers.

The pass-book kept at each outpost should contain the same items as in columns 1 to 7 of the Register, and should be in counterfoil. When the party returns and reports itself, and column 10 of the Register is filled up, the pass should be taken from them, and these passes should be sent in monthly to the District Superintendent's Office.

The police at Lakhipur, Silchar, Barkhola, and other places visited by the hill people, should examine their passes, and report or detain any suspicious cases of Nagas or Kukis coming without passes.

14. As to the inner line of posts, I am of opinion that it was right to construct them at the time of the Baladhan raid, but that they must not be looked on as a permanent necessity. They may, however, continue for the present, all but Jaipur, which is quite useless: it is too near Baladhan to be wanted, and it is on no trade route. When it is vacated at the beginning of this rains it should be dismantled, and not re-occupied after the rains.

C. A. ELLIOTT.

VII.—From A. MACKENZIE, Esq., C. S., Secretary to the Government of India, to the Chief Commissioner of Assam,—No. 26, dated Fort William, the 31st January 1883.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 933, dated the 22nd June 1882, forwarding a Note on the subject of the reorganization of the Police Department in Assam. The chief proposals made by you in that Note are—

- (1) to relieve the troops of all frontier outpost duty, and to make such duty over to the Frontier Police;
- (2) to relieve the Frontier Police of all station duties, and to entrust those duties to the civil police, except at stations where in future the reserves of the Frontier Police are to be massed, which reserves can conveniently be utilized for this purpose;

- (8) to constitute four divisions of the Frontier Police, and, excepting in the Garo Hills where the existing arrangement will continue, to place young military officers in charge of the other three divisions, Mr. Daly remaining at present in charge of the Cachar-Sylhet Division; and

\* \* \* \* \*

The net extra cost involved in the proposed reorganization is estimated at Rs. 79,964 per annum, and you request that, if your proposals are approved, a sum of Rs. 80,000 may accordingly be added to the Provincial allotment on this account.

2. In reply, I am to say that the Government of India see no objection to your proposals (1) to (3) from an administrative point of view, but the Governor General in Council regrets that he cannot promise at the present time such a large addition as Rs. 80,000 per annum to the Provincial allotment. His Excellency in Council is advised that, by relieving the troops of all outpost duty, it will be possible to withdraw from Assam the Bengal Native Regiment now stationed at Cachar, and it is estimated that an annual saving of approximately Rs. 40,000 would thereby be effected. This sum, if so made available, the Government of India would not object to place at your disposal in order to enable you to carry out to such extent as may be possible the reforms which you recommend.

\* \* \* \* \*

4. The above remarks deal with the more important recommendations made by you; and I am now to request that you will be good enough to submit revised proposals, bearing in mind that the contribution from Imperial Funds cannot exceed Rs. 40,000.

#### *VIII.—Note on the re-organization of the Frontier Police, dated 18th May 1883.*

The Government of India, in the Home Secretary's letter No. 26, dated the 31st January 1883—

- (1) decided that they could not give me Rs. 80,000 for the purpose of re-organizing the Frontier Police, but could probably give me Rs. 40,000, and directed me to frame new proposals suitable to the expenditure of that sum;

\* \* \* \* \*

2. I have now gone carefully over my original plans and estimates, have discussed them with the Inspector General of Police and the District Officers concerned, and have reduced them as much as possible. I originally asked for force of 13 subadars, 85 jemadars, 218 havildars, and 2,146 sipahis, over and above the Garo Hills Police, which I do not propose to alter, and do not further allude to in this Note. I think now that the work may be done with 9 subadars, 84 jemadars, 190 havildars, and 2,008 sipahis. In some respects I should prefer to have a rather larger number. In every case I have cut down the strength a little below what the District or Police Officers would like to have; but, on the whole, I think we can do with this force. In my revision I have followed the advice verbally given me by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, who was good enough to examine for me the details of my original plan. He thought it undesirable to have the Gauhati and Sylhet Jails manned by Frontier Police at a great distance from head-quarters, and he thought the outposts in the Darrang and Sibsagar Districts would also be too much out of the way of supervision. Accordingly, I now propose to guard Sylhet and Gauhati Jails with armed Civil Police, and to keep up two detachments of Frontier Police at Tespur and Sibsagar. The former will supply guards and reliefs to the two outposts of Daimara and Balipara, and will keep the peace at the annual Udalguri Fair. I have intimated to the General Officer Commanding the Eastern Frontier District that

the detachment of military hitherto stationed at Tezpur may be withdrawn, and I hope after next year, if the scheme works well, to relieve the military also of the duty of attending the Udalguri Fair, a duty which has hitherto always been followed by much sickness. The Sibsagar detachment will provide guards and reliefs for the four outposts on the Naga frontier, and a reserve to assist them in case of trouble. I do not think so long a frontier as this should be left with no troops nearer than Dibrugarh.

3. Thus we shall have 6 bodies of Frontier Police. Two small detachments will be stationed at Tezpur and Sibsagar; the Garo Hills corps will be unchanged; and three strong corps, consisting respectively of 712, 614, and 502 sipahis (with their complement of officers), will be posted in Cachar, Lakhimpur, and the Naga Hills. The Lakhimpur corps should have its quarters at Sadiya, only enough men for current duties being stationed at Dibrugarh and at North Lakhimpur. It will be observed that the Cachar force is the strongest, and has the strongest reserve; this is necessary if the project of the Government of India, of withdrawing the regiment from Hindustan and posting a wing of one of the local regiments at Silchar, is to be carried out. The outposts in South Sylhet are kept up, but are attached to the Cachar District, with which they are in fairly close contact. It will be as easy to relieve and support them from Silchar as from Sylhet; and on every ground it is desirable that, forming, as they do, a continuous chain of outposts on the Lushai frontier, they should be under one system and one authority.

4. On the whole, I think, the scheme now submitted is better and more suitable than the one I originally proposed. If the Government of India could give me 100 men more, with their complement of officers, I could improve some details which are a little starved, and should be quite satisfied.

5. The cost of the Frontier Police as now proposed will be as follows:—

			PRESENT.			PROPOSED.	
			Number.	Rate (average).	Pay.	Number.	Pay.
				Rs. As.	Rs.		Rs.
Subadars ..	...	...	7	150 0	1,050	9	1,350
Jemadars ..	...	...	27	60 0	1,620	34	2,040
Havildars ..	...	...	187	16 0	2,992	190	3,040
Sipahis ...	...	...	1,970	8 8	16,745	2,008	17,068
Total ...			2,191	.....	22,407	2,241	23,498

The increase in numbers is 50 men: in cost Rs. 1,091 a month, or Rs. 13,092 a year, in pay alone. Besides this, there are additional annual expenses on account of Naga Hills allowances for 80 men (Rs. 1,200), and contingent expenditure at Rs. 16-8 per annum for 50 additional men (Rs. 825): and also a large initial expenditure for increased barrack and hospital accommodation and medical attendance, arms and accoutrements for the additional men, and so forth.

6. The next point is the strength of the armed Civil Police, who are to take the place of the Frontier Police in the districts of Sylhet, Goalpara, Kamrup, Darrang, Nowgong, and Sibsagar. These also I have revised after careful scrutiny and consultation, and have given up the proposal that a reserve of one-half the strength should be kept up as a relief: these men will have to do continuous duty, without relief, or with very little relief, as treasury and jail guards or escorts, and in cases of sickness or leave their places must be taken by the ordinary Civil Police. This decision has enabled me to cut down my proposed numbers, so that, although I now provide for the Gauhati and Sylhet Jails and for escort duties, I only require 1 Sub-Inspector, 45 head constables,

and 301 constables, instead of the 55 head constables and 343 constables originally asked for in my Note, Part II, paragraph 5. The cost of these will be—

				Average rate.		Total pay.	
				Rs.	As.	Rs.	As.
1	Sub-Inspector	...	...	...	60 0	60	0
45	Head constables	...	...	...	16 0	720	0
301	Constables	...	...	...	7 13	2,332	12
Monthly total				...	...	3,112	12
Annual do.				...	...	37,353	0

Contingent expenditure, at Rs. 16-8 per head per annum, will come to Rs. 4,966.

7. The appendix shows district by district the full details of the establishment I propose to employ, both the Frontier Police and the armed Civil Police, and a reference may be made to it to clear of any obscurity. I should mention here that the Brigadier-General would like to be relieved of the guard at the Jowai block-house, which has always been held by a detachment from the regiment stationed at Shillong, and thinks that, if there is only a wing of a regiment stationed at Shillong, it will be impossible for it to provide this guard, in addition to other station duties. I shall be quite ready to relieve the Military, if I can be granted money to pay for an equal guard of armed Civil Police,—1 Sub-Inspector, 2 head constables, and 25 constables,—whose cost at Khasia Hill rates will be Rs. 4,084. Under present circumstances, however, and unless any reduction in Military strength takes place, this is less urgent than the other changes proposed, because Jowai is the only outpost whose guard is supplied by the Shillong regiment, now that I have relieved them of Tezpur (they keep up a small detachment at Gaubati, but that is only to guard their own stores, I am told, and is not needed by me for the defence of the Province), whereas the other regiments have several outposts to keep up, and their strength at head-quarters is much reduced in consequence.

8. I come next to the question of the Commandants and Superintendents of Police. With two large bodies of Frontier Police at Kohima and Sadiya, it is absolutely necessary that there should be special officers to look after their drill and discipline, or they will become a mere rabble. I rely on being granted the services of two young Military Officers as Commandants of these corps. The other corps will be under the officers of the present staff.

\* \* \* \* \*

16. Orders were issued in December to concentrate all the Frontier Police from Goalpara, Kamrup, and Nowgong, on Sadiya, and to supplement them by armed Civil Police, and these orders have been gradually carried into effect, so that almost the full strength indicated in paragraph 6 is now actually employed, and the military have been relieved of the outposts of Nizamghat, Poba, and Tezpur. I would not ask for any grant on this account for the months of January to March, but the Government of India will probably think it fair to make the grant of Rs. 40,000 payable from the 1st April 1883, so as to recoup the Province for expenditure incurred in 1882-83. I would also repeat the request made in paragraph 3, Part III of my former Note, that in any new financial arrangements made on account of police reorganisation, the so-called Imperial Frontier Police may be amalgamated with the Provincial force, and a grant made for their pay (which appears to be Rs. 55,000, not, as before stated, Rs. 57,000), this obviating the necessity of keeping up a separate set of accounts and submitting separate bills.

17. In conclusion, I think it right to acknowledge the great assistance I have received from Mr. Murray, Inspector General of Police, Assam, in revising this scheme. I may add that a proof of this Note has been shown to the General Officer Commanding the Eastern Frontier District, and I understand the scheme has his approval.

C. A. ELLIOTT,

Chief Commissioner of Assam.

*The 18th May 1883.*

*Appendix to Note by the Chief Commissioner of Assam, dated the 18th  
May 1883.*

## STATEMENT I.

*Proposed strength of Frontier Police.*

(a).—CACHAR.

Outpost or Station.	Dry-weather strength.				Rains strength.			
	Subadars.	Jemadars.	Havildars.	Sepoys.	Subadars.	Jemadars.	Havildars.	Sepoys.
Adampur ... ..	...	...	2	20	...	...	2	10
Fatah-kuli ... ..	...	1	2	20	...	...	2	10
Langai ... ..	...	...	2	20	...	...	2	10
Olivia Cherra ... ..	...	...	2	20	...	...	2	10
Chatachura ... ..	1	...	2	20	...	...	2	16
Jhalna Cherra ... ..	...	1	3	30	...	...	2	10
Noarband ... ..	...	1	2	20	...	...	2	10
Monierkhal ... ..	...	...	2	20	...	...	2	10
Mainadhar ... ..	...	2	2	20	...	...	2	12
Jatinga Valley ... ..	...	...	1	4	...	...	...	...
Gunjong ... ..	1	1	4	40	...	...	2	12
Guilong ... ..	...	1	2	24	...	...	2	12
Hangrum ... ..	...	1	2	24	...	...	2	12
Marti Cherra ... ..	...	...	2	12	...	...	...	...
Baladhan ... ..	...	1	2	20	...	...	2	12
Jhirighat ... ..	...	...	2	12	...	...	1	8
Total of outposts ...	2	7	34	326	...	...	27	154
Silchar Jail ... ..	...	...	2	12	...	...	2	12
Treasury ... ..	...	...	1	6	...	...	1	6
Hailakandi Treasury and Lock-up ...	...	...	2	8	...	...	2	8
Reserve at head-quarters ...	1	6	28	300	3	14	41	532
Casualties and recruits ...	...	1	6	60	...	...	...	...
Grand Total ...	3	14	73	712	3	14	73	712

(b).—DARRANG.

Outpost or Station.					Jemadar.	Havildar.	Sepoys.
Daimara ... ..	...	...	...	...	...	2	12
Balipara ... ..	...	...	...	...	...	1	12
Reserve ... ..	...	...	...	...	1	3	36
Total ..	...	...	...	...	1	6	60

## (c).—SIBSAGAR.

Outpost or Station.						Jemadar.	Havildar.	Sepoys.
Abhaipur	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	12
Bohubar	...	...	...	...	...	1	2	20
Galeki	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	12
Debrupar	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	12
Reserve	...	...	...	...	...	1	5	64
Total						2	10	120

## (d).—LAKHIMPUR.

Outposts or Stations.	Dry-weather strength.				Rains strength.				
	Subadars.	Jemadar.	Havildars.	Sepoys.	Subadars.	Jemadar.	Havildars.	Sepoys.	
Borpathar	...	...	1	12	...	...	...	...	
Lalukdoloni	...	...	1	8	...	...	...	...	
Bhebeli Suk	...	...	1	8	...	...	...	...	
Lakhimpur (including a small reserve)	...	1	3	18	...	1	2	8	
Dijmur	...	1	2	20	...	...	...	...	
Poha	...	1	3	40	...	1	3	40	
Sesseri	...	...	2	20	...	...	...	...	
Dibong	...	...	2	20	...	...	...	...	
Bomjur	...	1	1	8	100	...	...	...	
Dikrang	...	...	1	16	...	...	1	16	
Disoi	...	...	1	12	...	...	...	...	
Diphu	...	...	1	20	...	...	...	...	
Chunpura	...	...	2	20	...	...	...	...	
Makum	...	...	1	12	...	...	1	6	
Jaipur	...	...	1	8	...	...	1	8	
Total at outposts	...	1	5	31	334	...	2	8	78
Jail	...	...	2	12	...	...	...	...	
Treasury	...	...	1	6	...	...	...	...	
Reserve at Dibrugarh and Sadiya	...	1	3	19	212	2	6	50	536
Casualties and recruits	...	...	5	50	...	...	...	...	
Total	...	2	8	58	614	2	8	58	614

## (e).—NAGA HILLS.

Borpathar	...	...	...	...	1	12	...	...	1	4		
Dimapur	...	...	...	...	1	2	20	...	1	2	20	
Nichu Guard	...	...	...	...	...	2	20	...	...	1	10	
Pipima	...	...	...	...	...	1	2	20	...	...	1	10
Wokha	...	...	...	...	1	1	5	80	1	1	4	50
Lowema	...	...	...	...	1	1	4	50	...	1	4	50
Henima	...	...	...	...	...	1	3	40	...	1	8	40
Head-quarter reserve	...	...	...	...	2	4	20	220	3	5	27	318
Casualties and recruits	...	...	...	...	...	4	40	...	...	...	...	..
Total	...	...	...	...	4	9	43	502	4	9	43	502



## STATEMENT II.

*Proposed force of Armed Civil Police to take the place of Frontier Police.*

## (1).—SYLHET.

					Inspector.	Sub-Inspector.	Head Constables.	Constables.
Sylhet Jail	...	...	...	...	...	...	2	24
Do. Treasury	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	9
Magazine	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	4
Orderlies	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	3
Escort duty	...	...	...	...	...	...	2	15
Four sub-divisions	...	...	...	...	...	...	8	...
Reserve at Sylhet	...	...	...	...	...	1	1	8
Total				...	...	1	14	63

## (2).—GOALPARA.

					Inspector.	Sub-Inspector.	Head Constables.	Constables.
Dhubri Treasury	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	6
Do. Magazine	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	4
Escort duty	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	10
Orderlies	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	3
Goalpara Treasury and Lock-up	...	...	...	...	...	...	2	8
Reserve	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	8
Total				...	...	...	5	39

## (3).—KAMRUPOUR.

Gauhati Jail	...	...	...	...	...	...	2	24
Do. Treasury	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	6
Do. Magazine	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	4
Escort duty	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	10
Orderlies	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	3
Barpeta Lock-up and Treasury	...	...	...	...	...	...	2	8
Reserve	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	8
Total				...	...	...	7	63

(4).—DARRANG.

	Inspector.	Sub-Inspector.	Head Constables.	Constables.
Taspur Jail ... ..	...	...	2	15
Do. Treasury ... ..	...	...	1	6
Escort duty ... ..	...	...	1	10
Orderlies ... ..	...	...	...	3
Mangaldai Lock-up and Treasury ...	...	...	2	8
Reserve ... ..	...	...	...	...
Total ...	...	...	6	42

*Note.*—No reserve is provided, because the Frontier Police reserve is expected to take any casual duty that may be required.

(5).—NOWGONG.

Treasury ... ..	...	...	1	6
Jail ... ..	...	...	1	8
Magazine ... ..	...	...	...	4
Escort duty ... ..	...	...	1	10
Orderlies ... ..	...	...	...	3
Reserve ... ..	...	...	1	8
Total ...	...	...	4	39

(6).—SIBSAGAR.

Sibsagar Jail ... ..	...	...	2	8
Do. Treasury ... ..	...	...	1	6
Escorts ... ..	...	...	1	10
Orderlies ... ..	...	...	...	3
Jorhat Lock-up and Treasury ...	...	...	2	8
Golaghat do. do. ... ..	...	...	2	8
Derhgaon Thana ... ..	...	...	1	12
Reserve Nil ... ..	...	...	...	...
Total ...	...	...	9	55

*Note.*—No reserve is provided, because the Frontier Police reserve is expected to take any casual duty that may be required.

## SUMMARY.

*Frontier Police.*

DISTRICT.	PROPOSED STRENGTH.				PRESENT STRENGTH.			
	Subadars.	Jamadars.	Havildars.	Sepoys.	Subadars.	Jamadars.	Havildars.	Sepoys.
(a) Cachar ... ..	3	14	73	712	...	...	...	...
(b) Darrang ... ..	...	1	6	60	...	...	...	...
(c) Sibsagar ... ..	...	2	10	120	...	...	...	...
(d) Lakhimpur ... ..	2	8	58	614	...	...	...	...
(e) Naga Hills ... ..	4	9	43	502	...	...	...	...
Total ... ..	9	34	190	2,008	7	27	187	1,970

*Additional Civil Police.*

DISTRICT.	PROPOSED STRENGTH.		
	Sub-Inspector.	Head Constables.	Constables.
(1) Sylhet ... ..	1	14	63
(2) Goalpara ... ..	...	5	39
(3) Kamrup ... ..	...	7	63
(4) Darrang ... ..	...	6	42
(5) Nowgong ... ..	...	4	39
(6) Sibsagar ... ..	...	9	55
Total ... ..	1	45	301

IX.—The scheme submitted in the last preceding note was sanctioned by G. O. No. 236, dated 15th August 1883, the Government of India contribution being raised to Rs. 50,000.

## APPENDIX G.

## HOPKINSON'S EXPEDITION UP THE KOLADYNE—(PAGE 336).

*The following extracts from Lieutenant HOPKINSON's Journal of an expedition up the Koladyne in December and January 1847-48 are reproduced as giving a lively account of the kind of work Frontier Officers in the Chittagong and Arracan Hills have to perform at times.*

[After seven days' journey in boats up the Koladyne from Akyab (four days' journey beyond the Koladyne Thana) the force arrived at the mouth of the Bhuroon Khyoung, at which point the land journey began. They mustered fifty sepoy with Native officers, besides a civil force of musketeers and burkundazes.]

We got the men together, and about 5 A.M. commenced our march directly up the bed of the Bhuroon Khyoung. Sandys had formed his detachment into three sections, and our order of march was first the guides, in charge of two or three trusty musketeers; then a section forming the advance guard, its rear brought up by S., self and our highland gillies bearing our guns; then came centre section followed by the porters; lastly, rear guard of sepoys and musketeers. These latter I had contemplated throwing out on either flank as skirmishers to dislodge any ambush, but soon saw that the nature of the country rendered this impracticable, and that a rigid Indian file was the only formation we could preserve. It had been strongly impressed on us Europeans, when we left the station, that the only way to escape getting jungle fever was by being careful to avoid wetting our feet, and at first starting therefore we took amazing care to be lifted over, when the course of the stream afforded no narrow edge or margin to admit of our passing dry shod; yet we found it impossible to persevere in this precaution, for at a few windings from its mouth, the nullah, hemmed in by either impervious jungles or rugged rocks, presented no passage save in mid channel, so that, as we could not submit to be carried altogether, wading was clearly our only alternative,—rather unpleasant we found it at first, for the water was death cold. In this way we proceeded for about a couple of hours up the stony bed of the nullah, now become a mountain torrent, huge stones and large trees obstructing its course, and still more ours. Suddenly the party came to a halt, and going to the front, I found our guides had lost their way; but after a deal of pipe-smoking and consultation on their part, and threats on mine, they discovered that they had gone up a wrong branch of the torrent, and that there was nothing for it but to try back; so right about we trudged, luckily not having to retrace our steps very far. About twenty minutes brought us to the right branch, a smaller nullah apparently more stony than the bed of the one we had wrongly taken. Proceeding up this for a short way, we passed a cleared spot of ground and a shaddock tree shewing where a village had once stood; but who had been its occupants I could not learn. Nearly opposite this deserted village we quitted the nullah by its right bank, turning sharply to our left, and commenced the ascent of a steep hill, up which we plodded our weary way blessing nature that she had planted it abundantly with bamboos, which growing singly about two feet apart supplied us with excellent standing walking sticks, or rather climbing poles; for we had to make more use of our hands than our feet, and here and there too with all the bamboos found a little judicious assistance from our attendant highlanders in the shape of a shove behind, indispensably necessary. At length coming to where some large crags jutted out from the hill side, I judged (the appearance of the native rock is generally a sign), that we were near the top, and telling Sandys he cried a halt, and all hands sat down for a smoke, but resumed our march to find that our hardest task lay yet before us. We had in fact merely surmounted a spur of the hill, the chief ascent still remained; and on we went higher and higher, when, as I was beginning to look around me for ferns and fir, doubting whether we should stop but at the regions of eternal snow, a joyful shout ahead conveyed the welcome information that the mountain crest was at last gained. Of course there was another halt here and the guides

climbed a large tree whence they pretended to be able to overlook the Akhoung Hill and wanted me to get up and have a look too, but I was not going to incur any unnecessary waste of physical force; and as soon as our party was tolerably well breathed, we commenced our descent, meeting after some little time the source of a mountain stream down whose rocky bed our course, a most painful and toilsome one, lay for the rest of the day's march. Now we were wading through the stream, stumbling over the boulders that strewed its bottom, now where it leaped down some frightful precipice, turning the fall by climbing the hill that overhang it. We passed several cascades, beautiful and picturesque, enough to have roused all our feelings of admiration, had excessive weariness not dulled us to the sense of everything but the path we were pursuing, our only thought where we might safest plant each successive footstep, for often would a false step have been destruction. At length about sundown we reached the spot where it was intended we should bivouac for the night, the bed of a nullah, the Rulet Kyoung, of which the mountain torrent which we had been descending is a feeder. The course we have come to-day has been on the whole, I imagine, a north-easterly one, but at intervals we have followed every point of the compass. We managed to make our bivouac a very comfortable one, the bamboos and wild plantain which surrounded our camp soon providing us in the expert hands of our hill allies with very excellent cover. A dense fog too descending after sunset on the valley where we lay, permitted us to light fires, without any fear that the enemy would see the smoke.

*25th Decembr.*—Got the men under arms and at about half an hour after day-light commenced our march, pursuing up stream the course of the Rulet Kyoung. I thought nothing could have been worse than yesterday's march, but our work to-day disagreeably undeceived me. The water in the nullah was much deeper; that was nothing, but its course was blocked up by boulders, or masses of rock, of the most formidable dimensions, and to climb over these, slippery as they were rendered by a green slime, and the falling wet, was a most severe task. I was half tempted to take off my shoes, for their thick soles had no hold whatever on the surface, but I feared that I might not be able to put them on again when it was requisite. The sepoy did not like this march at all, and after about some four or five hours of it, when we came to a check at a barrier of stone extending right across the stream, and beyond which the road was so intolerably bad, that even our hill guides appeared to have some misgivings as to whether it could be pursued any further, loud were the murmurings; however we got on again, and in a short time turned into a jungle, and halted under some large forest trees, when our guides went forward to reconnoitre, and after some little delay returned with the most welcome intelligence that we were all right (I was beginning to have my doubts), that they had come on the hill cultivation of the village we were to attack, and that the village must be therefore close at hand; then diving again into the jungle they again returned after a few minutes, and bid us follow them, as they had now found the path that led to the village itself. We had then to retrace our steps for a few hundred yards until we reached the foot of a mountain fall, which found its way from the left into the stream we had been ascending. Sandys here halted, and having completed his military arrangements for an immediate advance and attack, we resumed our march up the fall, following it to its source, and then continuing our ascent up a steep hill-side. Here I was toiling along in somewhat of a nonchalant mood, when one of the guides put his hand on my shoulder, and pointing to some object before him, but to what I could not see, told me with most extravagant gestures that the prey was in our hands; that he would put up a hundred thousand prayers for our success, but that I must let him now stay behind as he was a non-combatant. He had scarcely spoken—and I was laughing at his absurd antics—when I heard the sudden report of a musket, then the sharp rattle of a dozen; there was evidently work ahead then. I snatched my gun from a fellow behind me, rushed on, and making my way through a lot of gateways and spiked doors, found myself in the midst of a good-sized village, regularly stockaded, and the gallant A. L. B. in possession, blazing away in great style. I passed on at once to the front, when observing a young child of some six or seven years old running off at the opposite end of the village, and aware of the importance of any capture, I pursued and succeeded in catching it, and bringing it back in my arms to where I quitted the detachment. I found Sandys busy getting his men under proper cover, the enemy annoying him by a galling fire kept up principally from two block houses—human nests I may call them erected like eagles' eyries in the lofty branches of two gigantic forest trees, which sprang up from the side of the hill whereon stood the village; the block-houses being actually connected with the village by very ingeniously contrived bamboo suspension bridges, about two feet broad, and which a kick would sever from their connexion with the door of the block-houses, and hurl into the abyss

below. Immediately on our entrance to the village, the women and children, supported by one or two of the ablest warriors of the clan, who were now firing on us, had retired to these block-houses; they were of course quite inaccessible, and we could only silence the fire from them by sharp volleys from below. However, these at length ceased and very glad I was, for I could not help thinking that each of our bullets might find for its destination the person of some unfortunate woman or child. A few shots came still dropping in from the neighbouring hills, but they did us no harm, and we now betook ourselves to the consideration of the course to be pursued next.

It was by this time nearly sunset, and of course therefore we must bivouac where we were for the night, using what day remained to entrench ourselves in our new possessions and make all secure against a night attack. The stockade was examined and repaired, houses likely to afford cover to the enemy removed, and bamboo spikes plentifully set. Whilst thus engaged, my attention was attracted to the sound of shouts and cries from the neighbouring hills, and soon after, one or two of my headmen and the hill guides came and told me that the enemy sought a parley. To this, after some consideration, desiring first that the stray fire kept up on us from the neighbouring hills might be stopped, which was immediately done, I consented; a little hesitation, arising from doubts as to our good faith perhaps, succeeded on the part of the Akhoungs and their confederate clans (for by this time all the fighting men from the adjoining villages were collected and hovering round us); but at length two of their head men (one might be considered the first of the tribe: he was at least represented as the most influential man in it; he turned out to be too, by an odd coincidence, the father of the little child I had caught; this had induced him to come into us) came up to the wicket of the stockade, and were admitted. They were in a great state of alarm, and it was some time before they could recover themselves sufficiently to find speech. They proceeded to say that "mistaking us for the Shans, they had alone dared to fire on us; had they known that it was the officers and soldiers of the "Lord Company" who had come down on them, they would have offered no resistance. That they hoped we should be content with the injury we had already done them, and spare their village, with their wives and children in the block-houses. That they had been made aware that our attack was in retaliation of the dacoities they had committed on the Mrus and others, but if we would now show them mercy they would swear henceforth to engage no more in such depredations, but tendering their entire submission to pay us their due quota of tribute, and to be in all things dutiful and obedient subjects.

Having thus then determined on a pacific settlement, I now told the interpreter to signify to the Anoo chieftains that I was prepared to accede to their prayer, whereupon they proceeded to make oath, swearing by the demon of the sword, the shield, and the spear, the demons of the hill and of the valley, the demon of the forest, and the demon of the mountain torrent, and the great spirit of the Koladan, to observe all the conditions they had previously submitted, and which I have given above. The solemn compact was finally sealed by the sacrifice of a fowl to the powers whom they had thus invoked, and the bloody knife used to cut the fowl's throat was pressed against theirs, that its imprint might be a sign against them unto the avenger if they broke their vow. This business over, Sandys at my request kindly paraded his men in single rank, making as much of them as he could, and a very satisfactory effect they appeared to have upon the nerves of these wild men. We also treated them to a bugle blast. Both the envoys were with their own consent detained in our camp as hostages for the good conduct of their people during the coming night, or as long as we might remain in the village. Sandys, however, very properly did not the less take all precautions against a surprise by establishing his chain of sentries posting pickets at the wickets of the stockade, &c., &c. Our Anoo hostages soon seemed to feel quite at ease with us, and made themselves useful in showing our people where to procure water, &c., &c. We on our part allowed them to collect their dead and carry them up and deposit them in the block-house. They also brought out a wounded man from the block-house to receive surgical assistance from us, but he was past all skill. A ball had entered his abdomen, injuring the vital parts and coming out at the reins, and the blood was running freely from both apertures. I ascertained of the Akhoungs that seven persons had been killed outright, two (including the case I have just mentioned) had received mortal hurts, and four others were wounded more or less severely; fourteen casualties in all; a large proportion in a village of twenty-five houses. On our side a musketeer was killed (shot through the brain), another

musketier was also shot in the knee, and a sepoy received a ball in the hip, but in both instances the wounds were likely to do well. We were fortunate to have got off so cheaply. Had the enemy been prepared for us and stood, our loss must have been very severe. In fact, I do not see how we could have taken the place. It was a position that four resolute men might have maintained against a whole battalion; the village was stockaded, and the main wicket, the one we gained entrance by, protected.

*Sunday, 26th December.*—Up betimes, but did not hurry our departure from the village. I suppose it was about 8 A.M. before we prepared to quit, our people and ourselves first taking a comfortable breakfast. I required our hostage chieftain and his companion to accompany us, not merely to act as guides, but, if I may use the expression, as a piece of feudal service or homage to mark our new relations.

I also stipulated that they were to conduct us through all the country in occupation of their tribe, and to point out the respective villages among which it was distributed. Thus our route, after leaving Akhoung village, was altogether different from the one by which we had gained it; no longer following a painful course up the stony bed of the mountain torrent, we now pursued, alternately ascending and descending a regular beaten track over successive crests of hills. We were evidently on the Anoo highway. About a couple of hours' march brought us in sight of Tweeng, perched on a high hill on the distance to our left. This village belonging to the Anoo confederacy, was one which, by the terms I had granted, I was bound to respect, and it was a respect I was just as well pleased as not at having to observe, for it would have taken some six hours' very hard marching to have reached it, and the sepoys were already beginning to show signs of fatigue, some unable to carry their muskets, walking lamely with a stick, and so on. About 12 A.M., or a little later, we passed Adeng, another of the Anoo villages. The road went within a stone's throw, thirty or forty yards' distant from it at the outside, so that I could see clearly into the village. There was not a single living thing in it, man and beast had all cleared out.

I was somewhat annoyed at the want of confidence which the abandonment indicated; it was almost a breach of faith; and I expressed a half intention to burn the place down, but here again friend Raipho interposed, representing if I did anything of the kind it would be a violation of the compact, and would upset all that I had done, so I refrained and passed on. Another two hours' march brought us within hail of Phivelan, the last of the Anoo villages, at some little distance from the road, but perched house above house on the craggy summit of a hill, a position exactly like that which Phayre describes the Wallein village to have occupied; a deep and precipitous valley also intervened between us, and the road, the approach to the village, was down this valley by a narrow pathway profusely studded with bamboo spikes. The Phivelan gentlemen were at home, trusting either to their almost inaccessible quarters, or, as I would rather hope, to the convention of yesterday at which they had assisted. On our halting in front of their village, however, their confidence partially deserted them, for they quitted their houses and commenced, gun in hand, climbing, as I should have thought monkeys could scarcely have done, much less anything human, the bare face of the almost perpendicular rock that overhung their village. Our Akhoung chieftain on seeing this movement assumed grand airs of indignation, and ascending a tree overhanging the pathway that led to the village, commenced a long harangue, in mingled tones of anger and command, nor was his speech wanting in effect. In a brief space the villagers descended the rocks, re-entered the village, and might be seen rushing hither and thither, and dodging about under the floors of their houses. Not understanding the meaning of these singular motions, I applied to the Akhoung chieftain for explanation, and learnt that his exhortations had had the desired effect of bringing Phivelan to a sense of its duty; that a deputation from the village would immediately wait on me, and that the scuffling I saw arose in course of capturing a hog (the most valuable property these poor people have, and to which they attach the greatest importance are their hogs), to present by way of tribute and in token of submission and homage. Sure enough, immediately after up came hog and deputation. The foreman of the deputation was in a great state of fright; he trembled in every limb while the perspiration ran in streams from his body; however the mild and benignant manner and countenance I did my best to assume, had the happiest effect in re-assuring him.

On leaving Phivelan, a gradually ascending road, but interrupted by slight descents as it passed from the crest of one hill to another, brought us, after about an hour and a half's march, to the summit of what I take to be one of the highest ridges of these our Arracan Alps. The prospect at this elevation was a most extended one, magnificent or

sublime I will not call it, for the boundless waste of hill, peak upon peak, range after range, stretching as far as the eye could reach on three sides, north, south, and east of us, and covered as by a pall with dense sombre jungle utterly unrelieved by any play of light and shade, could convey only impressions of gloom and despair. I counted five principal ranges intervening between us and Anoo, but the far-famed "Blue Mountains", which figure so conspicuously in all our Arracan maps, were nowhere to be seen. As we rounded the hill top, and got to the westward of the ridge, the scenery improved considerably, and we had now really a very beautiful view; the valley of the Koladan at our feet, with occasional glimpses of the river itself in the distance winding its way through its rocky bed, the low hills on either bank cleared of jungle, and under the rice and cotton cultivation of the Kweymes, while here and there one of their villages might be seen peeping out. Our descent from the ridge was a very serious affair. For about a thousand yards it was as steep as it could well be; the sepoys were unable to carry their muskets with them, but passed or slid them down from hand to hand those above to those below. The soil was a nasty loose friable shale, allowing the feet no hold, while in many places, where the path ran along the very verge of the khuds, a false step would have been perdition. I was very glad when we reached a spur which, jutting out about half way down from the main range, offered a more favourable inclination, but the road still continued very bad, wet and slippery in the extreme, and a great deal of it, so that the sun had set by the time we reached the village of Apoung, where we had arranged to bivouac for the night.

*Monday, 27th December.*—We left Apoung about an hour and a half after daybreak. Apoung, I should observe, is a fine large Kweyme village, containing upwards of thirty houses well stockaded, and is not supposed to have been concerned in any of the late dacoities. It belongs to that class of villages arbitrarily termed "Aroeng" (wild, uncivilized) in contradistinction to other Kweyme villages styled "Ayeng" (tamed, subdued). These latter are generally situated in accessible positions on the banks or the Koladan and other principal streams. Our control over them is complete, and of some standing, while their chiefs and headmen are more or less familiar with the Burmese. They are assessed in a money tax, which they remit directly to the Khyoungok of the Koladan. The "Aroengs" live more in the hills; their submission to our rule is of recent date. It is rare to find any one among them who understands Burmese, and they pay contributions in kind, cotton, tobacco, &c., &c., collected through a Kweyme agent. An "Aroeng" clan after a time becomes "Ayeng," while occasionally we have had an Ayeng village relapsing to Aroeng. Though the Apoung people had never before seen a European (they had never even been visited by a Mugh), we found them very civil, anxious to minister to all our wants, bringing us rice, fowls, eggs, &c., &c., and providing a comfortable hut for us to sleep in, but there was more of fear than of hospitality in this. The Chief kept out of the way, leaving his father-in-law and brothers to do the honors, and all the women with their children betook themselves to the jungle. I was struck too with the excessive good understanding apparently subsisting between our Anoo guides from Phivelan and this village.

From Apoung our march was by a gradual descent for about an hour, when we reached the Tulakmwe nullah at, I imagine, a considerable distance from its source, as the stream ceased to be obstructed by boulders, and now ran smoothly over a gravelly bottom with churs at intervals on either side. We continued our march down its bed, occasionally diverging into the jungle for a few hundred yards to cut off an angle or reach of the river, and at length about midday, or somewhat later, reached its junction with the Koladan River. Here a halt was proclaimed, and we awaited patiently the arrival of our boats from the Bhuroon Khyoung.

[Further on, Lieutenant Hopkinson shows to what a fortunate chance he owed the success of his enterprise.]

On our marches of yesterday and to-day I could not help thinking how extremely fortunate it was that I had refused to be guided by Koolsh Khyoungok when he wished me to advance to the attack of Akhoung by this very Tulakmwe stream. Had I done so, the business must have entirely miscarried. We should then have first reached Apoung, whose people would, I am convinced (from the friendly relations which I have above noticed as evidently existing between them), have communicated intelligence of our coming and object to the Anooes, or even if they did not, the road running over the hill tops exposed the smallest party to be seen by each village hours before it could arrive at it, so that the remotest chance of a surprise would have been out of the question; then too Akhoung would have been the last instead of the first village we should have met,



and by the time we reached it the whole country would have been raised against us. Equally fortunate also was it that we did not proceed *via* the Meekhyoung, for the Akhoung chieftain told me himself that rumours of our meditated advance by that route had reached him, and that his tribe had scouts out the whole way.

*Tuesday, 28th December.*—Halted to-day in our boats. The Native doctor having reported a large proportion of the men unfit for duty, Sandys held a general muster to examine personally into each case, the result of which he made the subject of an official communication to me. I annex a copy. It will be seen that out of the party we had taken with us, viz., 1 subadar, 1 jemadar, 5 havildars, 4 naques, 1 bugler and 50 sepoys, a naque and 23 sepoys were all that we could reckon on as now fit for immediate service. One subadar, 1 jemadar, 1 bugler could not go another march of any length, and as for the rest of the party they were disabled altogether; our halting then turned out to have been a measure of absolute necessity, and had I on our reaching the Tulakmwe requested Sandys to have continued a forward movement on the other villages to be attacked, we should have exposed ourselves to the chance of a very serious miscarriage. It was annoying enough as it was, for it now seemed uncertain how long we might not be condemned to inaction, and I had calculated that after a halt of one day only we might have proceeded to the Tulakmwe villages, when, our business settled there, we should have returned to the mouth of the Tulakmwe, and have then, if necessary, set out in canoes up the Koladan against the Khons. I say if necessary, as I was not altogether certain that this expedition might be required.

*Thursday, 30th December.*—Between 11 and 12 A.M., a shout announced that the canoes of the darogah and the Khon deputation were in sight, a few minutes brought them to our mooring ground, and immediately presenting themselves they announced, to my exceeding gratification, that their mission had been entirely successful, and that they had the Khon Chief with them. I desired that he might be at once introduced, and in he walked, a very personable and imposing looking savage indeed, with a most Mongolian cast of countenance, a realization in fact of one's ideas of Timour the Tartar. His headdress was similar to that of the Kweymes, a narrow-checked Khoung leoung, but with a magnificent plume of the tails of the mocking bird set in it, rising from a tuft of blue jay feathers; he wore a handsome plaid, evidently of Burnese manufacture, and was attended by two ferocious looking gentlemen of his body guard, one bearing his sword, a strange looking weapon. I made him sit down near me, and we had a long conversation together. He expressed himself delighted at the opportunity afforded him of placing himself under British protection, and expressed his intention of quitting his present location and settling within our frontier on the banks of the Koladan. I look upon our securing the attachment of this Chief as a gain of far greater importance than even the submission of the Anooos. In power and influence the Khons rank second only (but a long second certainly) to the Shantoos, between whom and the Koladan tribes they form the medium of communication, and it is only through them, and with their aid and good offices, that the Shantoos can be got at. We have an additional guarantee too now that the Anooos will be quiet, for I find that they are in some sort but the feudatories of the Khons.

## APPENDIX H.

HOPKINSON'S REVIEW OF POLICY ON THE CHITTAGONG FRONTIER  
IN 1856—(PAGE 340).

*From CAPTAIN HENRY HOPKINSON, Commissioner of Arracan, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, (No. 40, dated Akyab, the 7th May 1856.)*

I have the honour to revert to your Office letter to my address, No. 826 of the 1st April 1854, with enclosures.\*

2. This letter found me on the eve of departure for the Neilgherry Hills on sick leave; and it appears that my successor, for what reason I cannot say, having failed to take it up, it has remained unanswered to the present time.

3. It might, however, it appears to me, have been very easily answered, if it were sufficient to confine the answer strictly within the limits of the question propounded, viz., as to the practicability of opening negotiations with the chiefs of the Shindoo tribes. I do not think that I make an overbold assertion in saying that no attempt to open such negotiations would be attended with success. I may go further and say that at present we have no means of even fairly making an attempt.

4. How is the first step to be taken towards entering into even a bare communication with the Shindoos. In some part or another of the mountainous regions lying to the north of Arracan, the west of Burma, and the east or north-east of Chittagong, we have testimony of the existence of a race whom we have agreed to call Shindoos, and suppose to be a branch of the great Khyeng family; but beyond this fact of their existence we know nothing about them: there is no point in our territory from which we could with any certainty say that we were within ten days or a fortnight's march of the nearest of their fastnesses. Ascending the River Koladan, we first fall in among the hill tribes with the Koomes, who acknowledge fealty to the British Government. Beyond these we may meet with other Koomes, who have either cast off their allegiance, or who have never sought relations with us; then we find a host of petty tribes known by different names, and often speaking different dialects, and among them we shall hear for the first time of the Shindoos, yet still not as of a people well known, or with whom there has been any close intercourse. I notice in the correspondence that some reliance is placed on the chance of a man named Chedyn being able to effect a communication with this formidable tribe. Recent circumstances have shewn Chedyn to be quite false and untrustworthy, an impostor who had not a tithe of the influence among the hill tribes which he claimed to possess, yet even he, when he most enjoyed our confidence, never pretended to be bold enough to venture among the Shindoos in person and treat with them directly: he does not know a word of their language, and his negotiations for the release of captives among them were by his own showing conducted in the most round-about way; they were opened with a tribe A, who transmitted or interpreted them to a tribe B, whence they passed to a tribe C, who were confidently stated to have relations with the Shindoos.

5. But, supposing we tried this plan, and that our communication, after infiltrating through a series of tribes, did reach the Shindoos, retaining somewhat of its original purport, what is to be the basis of negotiation? What equivalent is to be tendered to the Shindoos in return for their abandoning their slave trade? Are we to get from them an estimate of their annual income by captives, and promise them the same amount in muskets or rupees? This would be little better than compounding murder and abduction. And what assurance should we have that the composition would be observed in

\* Letter from H. Ricketts, Esq., Commissioner, 16th Division, to the Secretary, Government of Bengal, No. 553, dated 16th August 1847, with enclosures from Secretary, Government of Bengal, to Commissioner, No. 1773, dated 22nd September 1847.

Extract, paragraph 23, from Mr. Colvin's report on the District of Chittagong.

From the Superintendent of Police, to Secretary, Government of Bengal, Chittagong Division, No. 23, dated the 30th January 1854, with two enclosures.

To the Superintendent of Police, Chittagong Division.

From the Secretary, Government of Bengal, No. —, dated 1st April 1854.

good faith by the opposite side? We may be tolerably certain that it would not, such savages understand their own interests as little as children; and no arrangement is to be depended on with them that cannot be backed and supported by strong coercion. Fire and sword are after all the only valid negotiators for the case; and we are not yet in a position to employ these agents with effect. I may take occasion to observe here that I doubt the wisdom of the policy in past times of ransoming captives through the direct interference of Government or its agents. We thus go far towards creating a new inducement to the making of captives for the purpose of selling them, as the tribes may understand the transaction, to Government.

6. Another and almost insuperable objection arises to negotiating with the Shindoos; that they are not, as far as we know, a people united together, and obeying a common head or government, but they are split up into numerous clans, each under its own chief and independent of the other. We should thus have to conclude separate engagements with each clan, and if we left any out the whole scheme would be ruined; for this would be but to buy off some to give a freer scope to the ravages of the rest. But how would it be possible to make terms with every clan?

7. The idea of negotiating with the Shindoos has arisen probably from the impression that they lived in our own acknowledged hill country, or on our immediate border; but, on the contrary, I believe them to be the most distant of all tribes that ever cross our frontier; and for the reasons I have above given, I do not think it would be wise to attempt to enter into any relations with them. I am not sure that the Chittagong authorities will agree with me in this opinion; but if not, and the Government support them, I would suggest that they be charged with the negotiations with the Shindoos, who are at least as accessible from Chittagong as they are from Arracan.

8. Even if we bought off the Shindoos, and in the improbable event of their abiding by their engagements, I doubt if any very material diminution in the number of these horrible outrages would be the result. The statement of dacoities appended to Mr. Stainforth's elaborate report shows this. Out of twenty-one dacoities committed by the hill tribes on the Chittagong frontier from 1830 to 1851, only four are imputed to the Shindoos. Again in the detailed account Mr. Stainforth gives of six dacoities, which takes up from paragraph 11 to 37 of his report, not one is established to have been committed by the Shindoos. A darogah was of opinion that the first was committed by that tribe, but the witnesses, who should have known best, declared they were Lochees. Of these Lochees, as well as of the Kookees, who were the culprits in the second, third, and fourth cases, we in Arracan know nothing. The fifth case, the most atrocious of all, seems to have been committed by a Chittagong Joomees zemindar. The sixth, by Joomees, was an inroad probably from the Arracan side. The fact is, I believe, that the Shindoos have many an outrage, of which they are wholly guiltless, imputed to them, and that they are rather receivers and purchasers of captives than abductors on any great scale themselves in the Chittagong District. I think they would not be likely often to come so far, but that when one of these hill dacoities takes place, our police and people have got hold of the notion that in reporting it "by the visitation of the Shindoos" they make an end to the matter, and leave nothing more to be said or enquired about it. This is an impression which, though the Shindoos are not therein mentioned by name, finds support in the observations of Mr. H. Ricketts, stated in the 24th paragraph of his report; and so also the extracts from Mr. Sconce's letter, which are given in the two following paragraphs (25th and 26th), are suggestive of a similar conclusion. We may have no legal proof on the subject, but the popular belief does the Phrus and Joomees great wrong if they have not had more or less concern in many an outrage that have been laid at other men's doors.

9. I have now reported not only against the practicability in my view of opening communications with the Shindoo tribe, but in giving this adverse opinion, I have also ventured to express a doubt as to the use of any such negotiations, even if I considered them possible. According to the strict tenor of my instructions therefore I might have now closed this communication, had I not had otherwise reason lately given me to suppose that it might be desired I should notice the general question of the policy that should be adopted to check the aggressions along the Chittagong and Arracan frontiers by whatever tribes perpetrated.

10. How difficult the problem is of solution appears by the ability and experience that have been bestowed on it, without any decided result having been obtained; at least I judge by the very bulky documents on the subject to which I have had access, where I find the last writer always modifying his predecessor's views, and so many schemes and opinions propounded, that I cannot grasp or weigh and balance them all at once.

11. But I do not know that I would stop to examine any proposition, of which the starting point went not to adopt the principle of "Mr. Cleveland's plan of subsidizing the chiefs and enlisting the men as soldiers or policemen"—\* a plan more fully described by the Honourable the Court of Directors† in the following words: "The means which have proved most successful elsewhere have been to enlist the chiefs in the hill country or on our immediate frontier, together with their followers, to keep the peace and to resist the inroads of more distant tribes. In acting upon such a system it is necessary that the forms of official proceedings should be dispensed with, so long as the end in view is obtained without substantial injustice or flagrant acts of violence."

12. I can imagine nothing better than the policy so clearly outlined in the foregoing extract. But it is another question whether the Government will agree with me in what I consider necessary to allow of the first feature in it being carried out with success. I mean that we cannot attend to enlist and organize hill chiefs and their followers to combine for their own-protection, to keep the peace, or, in fact, to do any thing at all that we want them to do, unless we have European officers placed in direct relations with them. Interference will do more harm than good without we can make it of the most immediate and effective kind; and it is certain that the ordinary constituted authorities either in Arracan or in Chittagong are powerless to interfere beyond the mischievous point. Of Chittagong it is broadly stated "that we have no hold at all of the country in the occupation of the Phrus"; or, as in a foot-note of Mr. Ricketts' report, that "the Magistrate has really no means of doing anything in the Kupas Mehal"; and in the hill tracts on the Arracan frontier the state of affairs is still more difficult one, from the absence of any paramount family like that of the Phrus, through whom some general influence can be exercised—every petty Phru chief, of whom there may be some hundreds, being the head of his clan. My opinion therefore is that extraordinary authority must be resorted to; that if the pacification of these regions is a measure that has been seriously and earnestly determined as a thing that has got to be done, special agents must be appointed to do it; in a word, that both the Kupas Mehal and the Upper Koladan should be placed in charge of European Superintendents. In Arracan an extra junior assistant would suffice for the duty, and I presume that an officer in an equivalent position would equally answer for the Kupas Mehal. The exercise of any powers with which such officers were entrusted must be unfettered by regulation law; and as of course they would be ex-officio commandants of the police levies, which it would be probably found necessary to make it their first duty to raise, they must be military men. However, it would be time enough to enter upon details concerning the character of the proposed appointment, and the functions that should attach to it, when I find that Government is so far willing to consider its expediency as to desire any further explanations about it.

13. After what Mr. Ricketts has written of the unhealthiness of the Kupas Mehal, I can fancy it being objected *in limine*, if there was nothing else against the scheme of having an European Superintendent there, that no officer could live in such a country; but on this side, at any rate, I think I could place an officer sufficiently near to the scene of action, without exposing him to much greater risk on the score of health, than he would run in any other part of the province. I have also been thinking that an officer on the Koladan might be so able to extend his influence as to embrace the Kupas Mehal within the circle of his protection; and if the Chittagong authorities would answer for their Joomecas and Phrus keeping the peace, that he might prevent aggressions upon them. It might be as well, perhaps, if the experiment was looked on favourably, to confine it in the first instance to a superintendency of the Koladan tribes.

14. I do not believe that a more impracticable set of savages than these tribes exists on the face of the earth; and I am sure a more impracticable country than that which they occupy could not be found. All sorts of attempts have been made to win the confidence of the chiefs, to attach them to our policy, and to humanize them in some degree. Messrs. Bogle and Phayre, as Commissioners of this Province, gave great attention to the realization of these objects; but I have now some sixteen years' experience of Arracan, and I never saw any real progress made towards their attainment; and it is my profound conviction that in the establishment of a superintendency lies the last and only chance of success. If this cannot be tried, or if it is tried and fails, the next best thing is, in my opinion, to leave the tribes altogether to their own devices, internally to allow them the unchecked enjoyment of their accustomed pursuits of rapine and murder, externally to cut them off from all intercourse at the point at which

\* Memorandum on tribes on the Chittagong frontier, with Judicial Proceedings, 13th April 1844, No. 120.

† Despatch No. 23 of 1855, dated the 22nd August, paragraph 11.

our authority ceases to be completely established. There no boundary has ever been fixed for Arracan on the north, the tract watered by the Upper Koladan and its affluents has never been more than a nominal part of the British dominion, and there are no considerations but those of expediency to prevent our renouncing it.

15. In speaking of cutting off all intercourse from the tribes of the Koladan with the rest of the world, I should not overlook that this is in itself a coercive measure, from which, if perfectly carried out, some advantage might result. In a petty kind of way there is a good deal of trade between the hills and the plains; the former receive rupees, salt, and salt-fish, piece goods, beads, and various trifling articles in exchange for cotton and tobacco; and to stop and intercept this trade, which I believe can be done when any outrage was committed, might tend greatly to keep the tribes on their good behaviour.

16. In taking up the question of the management of the hill tribes under its Arracan aspect, I rely upon my own experience, and can speak more confidently than when I go over to Chittagong and the Kupas Mehal, of which my only knowledge is derived from reading, and that chiefly in the correspondence cited at the head of this letter. So far, however, as I may be permitted to form an opinion on what I have read, I should say that the system of superintendence I have proposed was as applicable to the Phrus and Joomceas of the Kupas Mehal as to the Arracan hill tribes. I believe Phrus, Joomceas, Koomeas, Morung, and Kookies, to be all pretty much the same thing under different names; and I believe further, that if the whole truth could be known, we should become aware that the Joomceas of the Kupas Mehal was often the dacoit in the Koladan, and the Joomceas of the Koladan the dacoit in the Kupas Mehal. As in Arracan, I think also that in the Kupas Mehal, supposing my idea of establishing absolute superintendence to be dismissed, that the great point should always be to avoid interference altogether; and I think, were I suddenly called upon without any further information to undertake the management of the mehal, I should prefer to revive and revert to Mr. Ricketts' policy of 1847.

17. I might even go further than Mr. Ricketts. I would not care if I released the whole of the sudden jumma of the Phrus, but I would make it more than an expectation from them that they should protect the frontier. I would hold them responsible for its protection. I would exact from them the payment of the ransom of any captives that were taken, and amerce them in the amount value of property plundered in every dacoity. I think if in this way it was made so directly for their interest to stop raids, they would be stopped. Kalindi Rani might be brought under the same engagements; but I have not the proper local knowledge to judge of this point, or how far either the Roajahs, who are settled with for separate mehals, could be similarly dealt with.

18. I do not find it anywhere accounted for how it happened that all forays having ceased for two years after Mr. Ricketts' agreement with the Phrus they should suddenly have re-commenced. Had not Mr. Ricketts then left Chittagong, and does not the suspicion arise against the Phrus, that while their treaty was fresh and the matter on the other part present, they could accomplish its object, and that afterwards they got careless, and the old state of things returned because they would not be at the pains to prevent it?

19. There seems a perfect agreement of all opinions on the subject of the Shindoos, that until they are put down, the frontier will always be more or less liable to incursion; but that marching troops against them would be too difficult and hazardous an operation to undertake in the present state of our information about them. Concurring in all this, I will only add that we shall never be able to get at the Shindoos until we have confederated the intervening tribes and made them our own; but the Shindoos would then be unable to penetrate into our territory, and we should not want to march against them; at the same time I repeat my belief that their incursions into Chittagong are much rarer than is supposed.

20. The policy recommended by Mr. Mytton in his letter No. 131 of the 26th December 1850, might, I think, be justified in its application to the Koladan tract, which can hardly be said to have been ever constituted an integral portion of our territory, the tribes occupying it being regarded rather as tributaries than as subjects; but the Kupas Mehal seems to have been thoroughly incorporated with, and held as part and parcel of the Chittagong District for the last half century, and now to sever and cast it off on the ground that we could not protect life and property in it, or that we were unwilling to incur the cost of doing so, would, it appears to me, be a proceeding as unworthy of us as it would be inconsistent with the traditions of our policy.

21. Mr. Stainforth mentions another proposition, one by Mr. E. Lautour, for the establishment of four frontier posts; and if there were only four passes by which the hillmen could come, this plan might answer; but, as I should expect, Mr. Steer says that the whole line of frontier is exposed to their attacks, and in that case neither four nor forty, nor four hundred posts would keep our territory inviolate. In such a country, too, I am of opinion that a post can only protect itself the ground it actually covers. If circumstances were otherwise favourable, the existence of a military post within a mile of a village would not interfere with the success of a dacoity in it. When the Burmese stockaded Naregan, and the whole of the Arracan local battalion was thrown into the Aeng Pass, and not a mile of the road could be reckoned on beforehand as free from the presence of military parties, the hillmen found means to carry off the officers' stores, their wine, beer, and cheroots, and, if I remember rightly, either two of their servants or two sepoyes, acting as convoy, were on one occasion made prisoners.

22. Mr. Plowden proposed, and is supported by Mr. Stainforth in, a scheme for the establishment of a Joomeesa police "within the Joom tract, locating thannaahs in such number and in such places as might be necessary for effecting police administration." Whatever the merits of this plan, I doubt whether we should have an opportunity of testing it by experience, for I quite agree with Mr. Steer in thinking that the difficulty would be to find men to carry it out. I can imagine no inducement prevailing with the Joomeesas to give up their Jooms and to become policemen; or, if tempted in their ignorance to enter the police, they would never submit to the necessary restraint and discipline. The only possible way in which I believe a force could be organized among these people is through the agency of an European Superintendent, such as I have recommended the appointment of. Located among them, if he could gain their confidence and affection; if he could get them to look up to him as their leader, their protector, their chief, he might in time engage them generally to assist him and be able to command the services of a more immediate body of adherents, who would at length become the police we want: but any attempt to embody the Joomeesas through thannaah darogahs, or their own hill chiefs, would, I am satisfied, prove a perfect failure. If I were hereafter told that such a police had been raised in that way, I would not believe it.

23. Besides the natural disinclination of the Joomeesas themselves to enter the police, we should have, I fear, the powerful influence of the chiefs against us, if its establishment was to be accompanied, as proposed by Mr. Stainforth, by the discontinuance of the remission of revenue heretofore sanctioned by Government in their favour.

24. As I would place the Kupas Mehal under a special officer, so of our I would exclude it from the regular jurisdiction of the Chittagong District. I observed that Messrs. Ricketts, Plowden, Bowring, and J. B. Colvin are all in favour of such a separation; while the considerations on which Mr. Stainforth has been laid to think it inexpedient have no application in the case of the appointment of a Superintendent. Another objection as to the difficulty and expense of laying down a boundary line between the two jurisdictions I do not dwell on, I do not see the necessity of laying down such a line; there is a tract that has been always known by the name of the "Kupas," or cotton mehal, quite distinguishable from the settled part of the Chittagong District by natural features, which must prevent any confusion as to the limits of the two; and the term Kupas Mehal would be a sufficiently particular description of the tract in any Act passed to exempt it from the operation of the general law. No boundary line has ever been laid down between the Province of Arracan and the Chittagong District, but I never remember any case arising in which the authorities had any difficulty in determining the jurisdiction on that account.

25. Having, as far I trust as will be considered necessary, noticed what has been previously written on the subject, I may now proceed with the consideration of Mr. Commissioner Steer's report of the 19th March 1856 (No. 78 of 1856). I understand by it, first, that Mr. Steer is of opinion "that the Poang cannot be relied on," and is not to blame for his failure; in other words, that experience has shown that Mr. Ricketts in his arrangements of 1847 overrated the power and influence of the Phrus, and that they have therefore been ineffective; second, that the establishment of a strong police on the plan proposed by Mr. Plowden would prove equally useless; third, that to procure tranquillity we must look rather to retributive than to preventive or detective measures; and fourth, that for this last purpose, though he overlooks none of the risks, Mr. Steer would employ military force to be exerted by the Arracan local battalion. Upon the two first propositions I have already expressed an opinion, venturing to question whether the papers prove that Mr. Ricketts' policy was as thoroughly enforced as it might have been; and whether the experiment of pushing it further, by giving the Phrus greater privileges, yet making them more responsible, might not have been tried, and coinciding with Mr. Steer in thinking that the Joomeesa police plan would

not answer. In his third proposition also I very nearly concur with Mr. Steer, and I will return to it again when I have stated shortly the difficulties that to my mind oppose the reception of his last proposition.

26. Upon the general question of the employment of troops in the hills against the Shindoos, I submit that Mr. Steer has shewn no good grounds for reversing the judgment of condemnation pronounced against it by Colonel Bogle, Colonel Lister, and other authorities, and which was so emphatically affirmed by the Supreme Government itself; and that upon the evidence of the report of the very expedition, to which Mr. Steer alludes as having succeeded, that success appeared so fortuitous, that it is not enough to say now that there is no reason why a similar expedition from Chittagong should not succeed, but rather reasons are wanted to show that it would. Let us at least first learn against whom the troops are to go, where they are to go, the distance, and how they are to be supported. In the way of a mere special objection or objections, I have to explain, in allusion to the 13th paragraph of Mr. Steer's report, that sepoy of the Arracan battalion are only comparatively better than Hindoostances, that is to say, so far as service in the plains of Arracan goes. Their constitutions suffer cruelly in the hills, and they are not accustomed to travel in them before entering the service. In the expedition Mr. Steer has alluded to, half the detachment I had with me were footsore at the end of three days. In the present state of the battalion, moreover, no men could be spared under any circumstances and for any service at Chittagong; the corps should now muster a thousand strong, Government having proposed to add two companies to it on the withdrawal of regular troops; but not only has this not been done, but owing to men taking their discharge, desertion and to the difficulty of getting recruits, it is far below its normal strength, and does not suffice for its most ordinary duties—so weak indeed is it, that I believe there has lately been question in the Military Department of sending a wing of Regulars to its assistance.

27. But besides as I have said, that we have no troops adapted to the service, a regular military force is not essential, I think, to carry out the retributive measures, which I concur with Mr. Steer in opinion must be resorted to. Let there be a Superintendent such as I have advocated the appointment of, and let him have his levy of Joomeas, Mugh, Koonnee, Morung, or Kookie Joomeas—(for I understand by Joomeas not the name of a tribe, but of a calling, all who cultivate Joomeas); and I think a sufficient agency will have been provided to carry out the stern, uncompromising policy, which, if we interfere in the business at all, and if we are to make an end of the disorders on our frontier, we must be prepared to pursue. There can be no question then made of administering the law,—law is for the preservation of order, wherever the latter has been established; but law never terminated anarchy, nor is it its proper remedy, but rather that rougher system (more or less war), wherein the many must sometimes be made responsible for the acts of the few, the innocent for those of the guilty, and suffer with them, that the ends of justice may be attained and peace reign. In this view, on the commission of a dacoity, as soon as I had ascertained who the dacoits were, I would proceed at once against any one or more tribes to which they belonged, and carefully avoiding bloodshed, except in self-defence, I would burn down the villages of those tribes, drive their cattle, and destroy their crops. I would serve without warning any tribes also in the same manner, on proof of their harbouring dacoits, conniving at, or assisting in the commission of dacoity, or buying or selling slaves, knowing the same to have been obtained by dacoity. Such are the retributive measures I should not scruple to employ. So far as I am informed of the nature of the country, and of the habits, customs, and condition of its inhabitants, they are the only kind from which I should expect success; while from detective or preventive measures, I hope little or nothing, except at least from those preventive, not exactly measures but results, which would surely accrue from the establishment of European authority in the hills; that the people would be taught to combine for their mutual protection; that they would become inspired with more confidence in themselves; that the defences of their villages would be better looked after; that their own intestine feuds would be healed, and those traitors (and spies) among them whom the robbers look to, to guide them to their prey, and without whose assistance they will seldom undertake an expedition, would be discovered and got rid of. In some sort as a preventive measure to adopt, I might here suggest that, until some policy be determined on, great care should be taken how muskets and ammunition find their way into the hills on the Chittagong side.

28. I trust I shall not be considered too much out of order in alluding to a leader in the *Friend of India* of the 1st May on the subject of this letter, and received here while writing it, merely to say that had it contained any suggestions which appeared to me plausible or available, I should have considered it my duty to enter upon their examination.

## APPENDIX J.

## EXTRACTS FROM THE ASSAM CENSUS REPORT, 1881.

The following extracts from the Assam Census Report for 1881 are here reprinted for facility of reference in connection with the subject-matter of this work. The census did not extend to the independent hill tribes, not living within the limits of our districts.

1. Assam occupies the north-east corner of the Indian Empire, and is bounded on

## Geographical.

the north by the eastern section of the Himalayan range, which portion is inhabited by the Bhutias, Daffias, Akas, and other hill tribes, on the west and south by Bengal, and on the east by the native State of Manipur and the wild regions of Upper Burma. It is naturally divided into three distinct portions, namely, the valley of the Brahmaputra on the north, that of the Surma on the south, and the hilly regions running west and east which lie between these valleys and form the watershed of the two basins, and help with numerous streams to swell the waters of two of the largest rivers in Assam, which at the present day form the chief highways of communication with the outer world.

Along the banks of the Brahmaputra lie the six districts of (beginning from the east) Lakhimpur, Sibsagar, Nowgong, Darrang, Kamrup, and Goalpara, which comprise the "Assam Valley Districts;" then follow from west to east the hill districts of the Garo Hills, the Khasi and Jaintia Hills, the sub-division of North Cachar, and the Naga Hills, known as the "Hill Districts;" and lastly, the "plains" portion of Cachar and Sylhet, forming the districts of the "Surma Valley."

The province of Assam was constituted in the year 1874-75, when the eleven districts comprising it were separated from the Lieutenant-Governorship of Bengal, and established as an independent administration under a Chief Commissioner.

The districts of the Brahmaputra and Surma Valleys are known as the "Plains" portion of Assam, and the hill tracts intervening between the two valleys are the "Hill Districts." The different portions differ considerably in their conditions, and are differently administered. With the exception of the District of Goalpara, which for the most part is permanently settled, the remaining five districts of the Assam Valley are temporarily settled. These districts are under the direct control of a Commissioner, who is subordinate to the Chief Commissioner, and has his head-quarters at Gauhati, the chief town of the Kamrup District; while Sylhet and Cachar, the two districts of the Surma Valley, are under the direct administration of the Chief Commissioner, without the intervention of a Commissioner. The hill districts are all semi-political charges administered under special rules, and the regular laws are not in force in them. Assam being, as stated above, divided by nature into three distinct portions, each differing widely in its conditions, the leading idea in setting forth the results of the census is to keep the results obtained in the Plains distinct from the results of the hills.

In the third of the areas specified (the hill districts) it was nowhere possible to attempt any synchronous enumeration. In the hill tracts of the Garo Hills only the houses were counted, and a detailed enumeration of every house was made in certain selected specimen villages, and the data thus ascertained of average population to a house and distribution of sexes were applied to the villages counted. In the Khasi and Jaintia Hills the census was taken in full detail, but it extended over several weeks. In the North Cachar Hills the schedules were filled in by the tahsildar, who went round from village to village in the course of the cold weather. In the Naga Hills, on account of the recent disturbances, only the civil and military population of the station of Kohima was censused.

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181. In Robinson's *Account of Assam* it is stated that the Mikirs have a tradition that their ancestors originally came from the Jaintia Hills. Colonel Dalton's version of the legend is that they only went to Jaintia on their expulsion from Tularam's country by the



Kacharis, and that, not being satisfied with their new quarters, they eventually placed themselves under the protection of the Rajahs of Assam. The story that I have been told of their first appearance in Assam is that being driven out of the Jaintia Hills into what is now the Nowgong District, they sent emissaries to claim protection from the Ahom Governor of the province of Baha. These luckless persons being unable to make themselves understood were straightway buried alive in a tank which that officer was then engaged in excavating. The hostilities which ensued were concluded by an embassy to the king himself in Sibsagar, and the Mikirs have been living peacefully ever since in the territory assigned them. Their present seat is chiefly in the Mikir Hills, a low mountain tract in Nowgong, cut off by the valleys of the Kopili and Dhanairi from the main range of the Naga Hills, but with a Naga population in its southern half, while large numbers again are to be found still in their original settlements along the foot of the Jaintia Hills both in Nowgong and Kamrup. A few communities have emigrated into Upper Assam and across the river into Darrang.

132. The Mikirs do not claim relationship with any other race, and the name by

Tribal divisions. which they call themselves, Arleng, means simply 'a man.' They are divided into three

tribes, namely, Chhintong, Ronghang, and Amri, whereof the first two rank rather higher than the third, because Amri excused itself from sending a man on the dangerous embassy to the Ahom king in Sibsagar, when a representative was required from each tribe. Hence Amri is excluded from sharing the liquor at a sacrifice, and is held in contempt by the western Mikirs especially. These latter are a fourth tribe called Dumrāli by the Mikirs and Tholua by the Assamese, and from the fact of their acting as interpreters to the embassy, we may presume that they had then been settled in the Assam Valley for some time. All four tribes, as it seems, have the same divisions or phoids, within each of which marriage is interdicted. In this respect the Mikirs contrast strongly with their immediate neighbours, the Lālunge, for they have only four phoids, viz.—

I. Ingti	II. Terang	III. Lekti	IV. Timung
and the sub-divisions of these are not very numerous, namely,			
I. Táro.	II. Beh.	III. Hanse.	IV. Tokbi.
Kátár.	Kro.	Tutso.	
Hensek.	Ingjár.	Inghi.	
Inglang.			

Though all the phoids are socially on an equality, have no scruples as to eating together or intermarriage, yet their traditional rank is in the order given above. Ingti and Terang appear to be priestly clans, though their office has fallen entirely into desuetude. Lekti is said to have been the military clan, while Timung embraced the rest of the people.

133. But whatever sort of polity the Mikirs may have had in the old days, they

Their mode of life. have none now. Each little hamlet manages its own affairs. In their own hills the Mikirs

cultivate cotton and summer rice in forest clearings made mostly on the slopes of the hills. Their implement is the hoe, cattle are not kept, and milk is regarded as impure. In the plains, however, they are giving up this prejudice and learning to cultivate winter rice with the plough. A Mikir village or *cháang* (so called from the high platforms on which the houses are raised, ten or twelve feet above the ground) consists of single houses or disconnected groups scattered about the jungle and constantly liable to change as their inhabitants shift their dwellings in search of fresh lands. Usually all the members of a family, however numerous, occupy a single house, which may thus be of very respectable size. The houses are very strongly put together. Under the platforms live the pigs and fowls which contribute victims to the Mikir gods.

134. The principal deity is Arnám Kethe, i. e., the great god, whom the western

Their religion. Mikirs are said to call Hujai, but this word may simply be the name of a district (*Hozai*),

or may be connected with the Bodo *Nájo*, a hill. His victim is usually a pig. The sacrificial ground is a cleared space near every village, and the principal times for worship are the first days of Mágh, Baisákh, and Kátik. The ground is swept clean and spread with leaves of wild plantain and wild cardamum (*tora*), upon which are placed the offerings of flowers and whole and ground rice. The pig is then introduced to Arnám Kethe, by the medicine-man (*see tora kti*), who addresses the god in words to this effect: "We have come here to offer to you all the things you see, and we hope in return that you

will keep us safe." The blood and some of the cooked food are offered to the god before the company eat. Once a year at least all the people of a *chang* meet together for this solemnity, which they call *Rongker*, perhaps an Assamese word. But propitiatory offerings have constantly to be made by individuals to evil spirits whose names and numbers are indefinite. They are demons of the higher hills, of the streams, and even of large *bila*, or collections of water, and some are household devils, as *Mukrang* and *Peng*, who are worshipped indoors by the family once or twice a month by way of disarming their malice. The list may be increased at any time by the discovery of new devils. In the case of sickness, meeting a tiger, or any other mischance, the medicine-man is called upon to divine the particular devil in fault, who is thenceforth propitiated by his new worshipper with yearly offerings of a fowl or goat. The names of the dead are also reckoned among the powers of evil. Mikirs burn their dead.

#### Funeral rites.

The funeral service is held either at the time or afterwards over the burnt bones, and consists in the offering of a victim to the spirit of the departed, followed by drinking, singing, and dancing, often kept up for several nights in succession, and always running into excesses which a more civilized people would consider shameful. Those who can afford it set up an upright stone (*long-e*) as a memorial of the deceased, with a flat horizontal stone (*long pat*) before it, to serve as a table for the offerings of rice occasionally supplied as food to the dead man. Mikirs never

#### Marriage.

marry before maturity. Polygamy is permitted if a man can afford it; on the other hand, a man too poor to support a wife is not supposed to marry at all. Betrothals by the parents seem to be unknown. If a man takes a fancy to a girl he calls on her parents with a present of rice-beer, and if approved of by the young woman he wins her by serving in her father's house for a term agreed on—usually two years—after which he carries off his bride to his own home. Social intercourse between the sexes is entirely unrestrained, and the women take an equal part in all the occupations, ceremonies and diversions of the men.

135. The Mikirs have yielded but little to the influence of Hinduism. They do

#### Influence of Hinduism over them.

indeed call their principal deity (*Arnám Kethe*) by the alternative name of *Pirte Recho*, corrupted from the Hindu *Prithi Raja*, but they have not begun to place themselves under the protection of Goshains. In their native hills they are safe, but the colonies on the north bank of the Brahmaputra will probably soon yield to the fascination which the Hindu religious system has for all wild tribes.

#### Their numbers.

136. The number of Mikirs in the Assam Valley returned by the census of 1872 compares as follows with the figures of 1881:—

	1872.	1881.
Goalpara ... ..	383	...
Kamrup ... ..	11,447	15,548
Darrang ... ..	510	1,315
Nowgong ... ..	34,823	47,497
Sibsagar ... ..	219	1,403
Lakhimpur ... ..	...	2,753
Total ... ..	47,382	67,516

There are also 5,546 Mikirs in the Khaai and Jaintia Hills, 3,045 in Northern and 659 in Southern Cachar, making altogether 77,765, the total number of the Mikir race. The enumeration of 1872 was less careful and extensive than that of 1881 in the Mikir country proper. What was then shown as the Naga Hills belongs now to Nowgong. The large increase of Mikirs in Darrang, Sibsaagar and Lakhimpur is due most probably to immigration. In Kamrup they are confined exclusively to the hilly part of the district extending eastwards from Gauhati.

140. The Khamtis in Assam come from the country known to the Assamese as Bor

(b) Khamtia. Their origin. Khamti, or great Khamti land. It lies high on the Irrawaddy, in latitude 27° and 28° N. eastwards from the frontier of Lakhimpur. Captain Wilcox visited it in 1836, and found the Khamtis living in the midst of an alien population, the descendants of races whom their ancestors had subjugated. The original seat of the Khamtis, as of the Ahoms, was the ancient Shan kingdom of Pong, with the city now called Mongoung for its capital. The

date of their emigration northwards to Bor Khamti, where, they say, they have been settled for centuries, is unknown, but if it did not correspond with the Ahom emigration to Assam, it would seem, at any rate, that some Khamtis either accompanied Chulapha or came in under his successors, for the name Khamti occurs as the appellation of one of the rulers of the Ahom kingdom towards the end of the 14th century. Subsequent events assigned very different fortunes to these two branches of the Shan people. When the ancient kingdom of their common ancestors was broken up by the Burmese about the middle of the last century, stray parties of Khamti emigrants, pushed forward by pressure

#### Their history in Assam.

from the south, began to appear on the borders of Sadiya. They brought with them the religion of Buddha, and found the Ahoms thoroughly Hinduized. Civil war had weakened the hold of the Ahom king on the province of Sadiya, and the Khamtis were allowed to oust the governor and instal their own leader in his place. This arrangement was left undisturbed by the British Government, until in 1839 the Khamtis attempted to imitate the Ahoms in their conquest of Assam, and had to be put down by force of arms. Their Sadiya-khom, or jagirdar of the Sadiya District, and all his clan with him were relegated to Narayanpur on the Dikrang, where they continue to live, cultivating the soil on the same terms as their Assamese neighbours, but preserving their national dress, language, customs and religion; the rest of the Khamtis of Sadiya, after some years of a fugitive life, were permitted to return and settle again in their old haunts. Colonel Dalton mentions an accession to their numbers by fresh emigration from Bor Khamti in 1850.

141. Closely connected with the Khamtis, but of somewhat inferior status, are the

Kamjang, Aitonia, Pani Nora and Phakial.

tribes known as Kamjang, Aitonia, Pani Nora and Phakial. The first of these takes its name from one of the stages on the route followed by the Ahoms in entering Assam, and all of them live on the extreme eastern or south-eastern edge of the valley. We read in Assamese histories that in the 15th century Kamjang, Aitonia, and Pani Nora, who were then counted three tribes of the Ahoms, sought to transfer their allegiance to the Nora or Shan ruler of the country lying to the east of the Patkoi mountains, and corresponding perhaps in part with the Bor Khamti of the present day. They seem, in fact, whether by reason of their Khamti origin, or simply because of their position beyond the frontier of the plains, to have been subject to influences from the eastern rather than the western side of the Patkoi, and consequently they appear at the present day as Buddhists, not Hindus. The Phakials are more recent Buddhist settlers. The census of 1881 has not distinguished any of these tribes from the general mass of Khamtis. The name Pani Nora signifies little or inferior Nora, and none of the four tribes are allowed to take wives from the Khamtis, though the Khamtis do not object to taking wives from them.

142. The colony at Narayanpur affords a good example of the mode of life character-

#### Mode of life of the Khamtis.

istic of the Khamti in Assam. The houses are built on platform raised a few feet above the ground. The chief's house is a very large structure, 90 feet long by 30 broad, with the customary deep verandah or porch in front. Both men and women still retain their national costume, viz., a blue cotton jacket and kilt of chequered cloth for the former, and for the latter a blue cloth tied under the arms and reaching down nearly to the ankles, with a jacket above. Thus attired, the women may be seen on an evening bringing in large loads of firewood to the village. Both sexes have that robust and well-nourished appearance which distinguishes the non-Aryan races of Assam from the Hindu, whenever the former have not yet been persuaded to relinquish their freedom of eating and drinking. Though professedly followers of the Buddhist religion, the Khamti laity eat all kinds of flesh (except beef) and drink strong liquors, but their priests are bound to abstinence. The Bepu-Chang, or monastery, is a large house outside their village, with only two residents, an old man who has lived there five-and-thirty years, and a young lad in training to be his successor. Their daily meal of rice and curried vegetables is supplied to them by the women of the village. The interior of the home is occupied by the carpets and beds of the priests, their domestic utensils, and a shrine with a red canopy, containing several images of Gautama, one of which is a clay model three feet high, and gilded, but of coarse workmanship, while another is a small image of white marble, and both are of the ordinary Buddhist type. The priests shave their heads, and wear a yellow dress.

The doctrines of their religion are contained in sacred books written in the Khamti character, but believed in some cases to be of the Pali language. They have not, however, any very definite notion of the religion they profess. They celebrate Thursday as the

birthday of Goutama, or Kodoma, as they call him, but of the month and year of his birth they are ignorant. Their principal feasts are on the full moon of Asari and Asin. The common people worship both Kodoma and the Hindu goddess Debi or Durga, but they are not the followers of any Goshain, and they employ in her service their own priests, instead of Brahmans. The priests of Debi are called Pomu, while those of Kodoma are called Thomon (*Assamese* bāpu). Fowls, pigs and buffaloes may be offered to Debi, but not a duck nor a goat; the service of Kodoma consists of floral offerings only. The worship of Durga, like the custom of burning their dead, is said by themselves to date from time immemorial, but it seems more probable that both practices have been adopted from the Hindus with whom this little colony has been thrown so intimately into contact. The Khamtis of Sadiya, in Colonel Dalton's time at least, used not only to bury their dead but to preserve the graves with particular care. The chief man of the colony, who has adopted the Hindu name of Mani Ram, is the grandson of the old Sadiya-khoa, whose office was taken away in 1839. He belongs to the noble family, or sept, of Lungting, while the common folk of his village are Mānchi, Lung-na, and Lungtha.

Their clans.

Other septs in the Sadiya country are Man-phai, Man-Sai, Mutun and Lung-pong.

143. From the foregoing account it will be understood why the Khamtis are found in the Lakhimpur District only. They numbered 1,562 in 1872, and are 2,683 now, including Kamjangs and Phakials. Twenty-one Khamtis were numbered in the Sibsaigar District in 1872, in whose place 275 people are now returned as Shans, and these are probably Aitonias.

144. Miri, Daphla, and Abor are names which have been given by the Assamese to three sections of one and the same race, inhabiting the mountains between the Assam Valley and Tibet, and settled also to some number (especially the Miris) in the valley itself, where they follow a system of migratory cultivation. Their principal crops are summer rice and mustard, maize, and cotton, sown in clearances made by the axe and hoe in the forest or the jungle of reeds. Their villages, usually placed on or near the banks of a river, consists of a few houses built on platforms raised four or five feet above the naked surface of the plain, presenting a strong contrast to the ordinary Assamese village with its orchards of betel, palm, and plaintain and its embowering thicket of bamboos. Under the houses live the fowls and pigs which furnish out the village feasts, and the more prosperous villages keep herds of buffaloes also, though these people, like so many of the non-Aryan races of Assam, eschew milk as an unclean thing. The language spoken by all three sections of the race is practically one and the same. In geographical order, beginning from the eastern frontier of Bhutan, the succession is as follows:—Akas, a tribe closely akin to the Daphlas, but who have hitherto made no settlements in the plains; then Daphlas; next the hill Miris; and finally the Abors, at the eastern end of the valley. In point of importance, however, the Miris rank a long way first.

145. The Miris are much the oldest settlers and the most numerous. They are divided into two mutually exclusive sections, which are respectively known as Barahgam and Dohgam or the twelve-clan and ten-clan Miris. These Assamese names give no clue to the origin of the distinction, but it seems probable that the Barahgam Miris are the older settlers. Their tradition is that their ancestors, to the number of twelve-score ladders (the ladder standing for the house to which it is the means of access) came down from the hills under their king Buruk Chutiya, who was himself one of the clan, and hence the Barahgam Miris call themselves Rajbansi. A third appellation of theirs is Chutiya, which, they say, was given them by the Ahom kings, and which seems to denote that they were found resident in the Chutiya dominions at the time of their conquest by the Ahoms, and are thus to be distinguished from more recent settlers. They explain their subjection to the Ahoms by the fact that the ancestor of the Ahom king came down from heaven by a ladder of gold, while the clan of king Buruk originated in a person who came down by the humbler means of a ladder of bamboo, and was therefore destined to occupy an inferior position on the earth. Their king was entitled, however, to sit on the throne of the Ahoms for a day and a half in the year. The Barahgam Miris have only two phoids, or clans, Pegu and Dore, both of which are exogamous, so that a Pegu man must marry a Dore woman, and *vice versa*. They say these are the names of two brothers

the ancestors of the tribe while yet in its native seats. The list of their *kheles* appears to be the following :—

- |                 |                  |
|-----------------|------------------|
| 1. Dambukujal.  | 7. Bongkual.     |
| 2. Saengia.     | 8. Tamaragoya.   |
| 3. Moiengiyal.  | 9. Jongoya.      |
| 4. Oenial.      | 10. Pangoya.     |
| 5. Lasong-goya. | 11. Pani-pau.    |
| 6. Dohutiya.    | 12. Yorang goya. |

It is not clear whether these 12 *kheles* correspond with the 12 clans of the Barahgam, but the clans are probably of much older origin, while the *kheles* chiefly take their names from places in the Assam Valley, only Oenial, Saengia, and Moiengiyal appearing to be genuine Miri names, and these three are claimed also by the Dohgam Miris. The Dogam, or Oringam (as they call themselves, *oring* being the Miri word for "ten"), are divided into

(b) Dohgam Miris.

the exogamous *phoids* of Nora, Mili, Paen Kārtho, Koman, Pogak, and Sinte. The story which the Dohgam Miris tell of their coming to Assam is that one of the Ahom kings established three depôts (*bhorat*) of salt, dried fish, and cloth, wherewith he tempted them to come down and aid him against the Khamtis (whose invasion of Sadiya occurred in the last twelve or fifteen years of the 18th century), and that their original settlements were in Abhaipur, a tract of country between the Naga Hills and the Disang, which seems to have been assigned by the Ahom kings as a dwelling-place for more than one tribe of uncivilized allies.

146. Whether late or early immigrants, the Miris have hitherto preserved the purity of their race, their language, and their religion.

Physical aspect and customs. Colonel Dalton describes them well as being "of the yellow Mongolian type, tall and powerfully framed, but with a slouching gait and sluggish habits." The beardless cheek and obliquely-set eyes of the Mongolian may be recognized in any Miri village. The strong well-nourished appearance of men and women alike is due, no doubt, to the animal food (beef excepted) which forms a large portion of their diet. Another point in favour of the race is their custom of marrying only at adult age. Betrothal may take place at childhood, but marriage is deferred until the young couple are able to set up house for themselves. Often the bridegroom-elect has to serve for his wife, perhaps several years, in the house of his father-in-law. The women weave their own petticoats of coarse cotton cloth in stripes of gray colours wrought with dyes obtained (as they say) from the Khamtis. Another article of domestic manufacture is the Miri rug (*jim*) made of cotton ticking on a backing of thick cloth. Upon the men alone devolves the labour of first clearing the jungle or felling the forest, but the use of the long Miri hoe is familiar to both sexes, and the women certainly take their full share of field labour.

147. The religion of the Miris is of a very rude and vague character, *Nekir Nekiran*

Their religious belief.

(or *Mekiri* and *Mekiran*) seem to be the departed spirits of their male and female relatives, who require to be propitiated on the occasion of any small or great mischance. They also reverence the sun (*doinya*), the heaven (*talang*), and the earth (*mobashind*). The intermediary between these deities and mankind is the *Mib* or *Mimbua*, a kind of sacrificial priest or medicine-man. The function is so far hereditary that one of the sons of a Mimbua will usually be a Mimbua, but the election depends upon the deity, who may just as easily choose an outsider. The process of vocation is thus described: About the age of eighteen the favourite of the god is driven by the spirit into the jungle, where he remains for many days unsupported by any food but what he finds there. At the end of the time he comes home a changed person, perhaps wearing snakes coiled harmlessly round his neck, but at any rate able thenceforth to commune with the invisible world, and to answer all manner of questions by intuitive knowledge; he also possesses the gifts of prophecy and of healing by prayer. Sometimes these gifts develop themselves only after the lad's illness on his return from the jungle, in which case a Mimbua has to be called in to plead between him and the afflictive hand of the god. The Barahgam Miris, as older residents of the valley, are partly fallen away from their old religion. *Nekir* and *Nekiran* serve them well enough for small domestic occasions, but in public worship (*bor kasea*) they invoke Sankar and Parameswar, and though it is still the Mimbua who officiates, the ordeal of vocation has been

Traces of Hinduism in religion of Barahgam Miris.

dispensed with or forgotten. Whatever the deity, the essentials of worship are the same, consisting of the sacrifice of a fowl, a pig, or, on great occasions, a buffalo, and the drinking of rice-beer.

148. Miris bury their dead. They surround the grave with a fence, inside which

Disposal of the dead.

they set up a piece of cloth at the end of a tall bamboo. During the following days they visit the grave and look for the footprints of men or animals in its vicinity, and, if any are seen, they conclude that the person or creature to whom or which they belonged will shortly die.

149. The Miris, like other wild tribes, are distinguished by the Assamese into

Influence of Hindu Goshains.

*bhakatia* and *abhakatia*, according as they are or are not followers of a Goshain. Their Goshains are chiefly those of the Sibsagar District, on the south bank of the Brahmaputra, though the great majority of the Miri settlements are on the north bank or in the island of the Majhuli, itself the seat of some of the biggest Goshains in Assam. Their connection with the Goshain, however, is rather temporal than spiritual. It is worth their while to secure him as their friend by presents of a few annas yearly and a portion of mustard and pulse according to each man's means and inclination; but they have no Brahmins, nor do they adore any idol. In some places, however, I found that they had been prevailed on to leave off eating buffalo's flesh. That they are sinking into the mass of the Hindu population, however slowly, is proved by the existence of the class known as *mati* or ground Miris, who have given up their national custom of platform-houses and taken to living on the ground—a change which signifies also a departure from many other national customs, religion included.

150. The religion of the Hill Miris, who come down to the valley with madder in

(c) The Hill Miris.

the cold season, is quite as vague as that of the settlers in the plains, but here the place of Nekirí and Nekirán is taken by the Yápum, a kind of sylvan deity, who suffices for the needs of every-day life, though in critical conjunctures some greater god has to be gained over by the sacrifice of a mithan. A Hill Miri told me how he had once, while a boy, actually seen a Yápum. The character of this god is that he lives in trees, and all the beasts of the forest obey him. My informant was throwing stones in a thicket by the edge of a pool, and suddenly became aware that he had hit the Yápum, who was sitting at the foot of a tree in the likeness of an old grey-bearded man. A dangerous illness was the consequence, from which the boy was saved by an offering of a dog and four fowls made by his parents to the offended Yápum, who has subsequently visited him in dreams. The hillmen propitiate also the spirits of the dead, called "Orom" in their own language (apparently), and "Mora deo" by them in Assamese. Their tribes are very numerous. I easily obtained a list of some fifty, which are subjoined :<sup>(1)</sup>

#### I.—PANIBOTIA MIRIS

(who come down the rivers.)

Bini.  
Bottom.  
Biku.  
Gocham.  
Moragám.  
Golom.  
Ghomoor.  
Goda.  
Gobha.  
Taya.

Laha.  
Talen (Talam).  
Chimirr (Timur).  
Hipu.  
Gochi.  
Lumai.  
Haro.  
Dul.  
Doomur.  
Chilihuri.  
Nimar.  
Meil.  
Lidak.  
Dochs.

#### II.—TARBOTIA MIRIS

(who come across country).

Homdon (Homdan).	Dowám.
Doboun.	Tár.
Ukar.	Báio.
Bomrik.	Bongá.
Nidu.	Súli.
Lie.	Phel.
Taga.	Ol.
Paro.	Alka.
Rakpo.	Mobá.
Lika.	Móli.
Sojan.	Mibá.
Kerlu.	Hili.
Kabak.	
Tekár.	

But these include some *phoids* of the same tribe, i.e., section or families within the limits of which marriage is interdicted. The Timur or Chimirr tribe, for instance, has the four *phoids* of Hepo, Tejir, Tore and Lumo. Over and above this minute sub-division into tribes, there seem to be two main divisions of Táre and Táne, or the inhabitants of the lower and the higher ranges respectively. The Chutiya Miris are said by their hill

<sup>(1)</sup> I believe, however, that these are really the names of Miri (and in some cases of Abor) villages in the mountains, though possibly each village may also be a clan.

brethren to have belonged to the Târe, while the so called Anka (or tattooed) Miris, who are distinguished from all others by having for their habitation a spacious well-watered plain far back in the mountains, are of the Tâne or Tening (Colonel Dalton's *Tensee*); or it may be that the division is the other way, and that Anka and Chutiya Miris are related to each other as *Tâne* and *Târe* of the same tribe.

151. The accepted explanation of the name *Miri* is that it is an Assamese word signifying a go-between, and that it was applied to this section of the northern hill-

Relations of the Miris to the Abors.  
people in their special character as traders and interpreters between the mountains and the plains. We find the same thing on the south side of the valley, where the Nagas of the nearer ranges enjoy the monopoly of trading, and are ready to defend it by force of arms against the tribes of the background. The plains-dwelling Miris, less fortunate, have been pushed down from their hills by the pressure from behind. The common story is that they were slaves to the Abors, and they themselves, while not actually confessing this, admit that hostilities with the Abors (whom they claim as near relations) were the cause of their leaving the hills. One of their settlements on the Dikrang is known as that of the *khalas* or freed Miris. It must always be borne in mind, however, that the name *Miri* is merely an Assamese term applied at random. Hill Miris and Plains Miris speak almost exactly the same language, while the language of the Hill Miris is said to be identical with that of the Abors.

152. The mountain region occupied by the Miris is situated midway between the country of the Abors on the east and that of the Daphlas on the west. The Assamese word

(3) The Abors.  
*abor* means independent (*bori* means "subject or dependent" and *bor* is the root of the verb meaning "to submit or own allegiance") and the Abors may have been so called by way of contrast with the vassal Miris. So closely are Abors and Miris connected that the names of some of their tribes (Botton, Beni, Talen, Hepu, Laha and Chimirr) are the same, but the Abor branch of Chimirr is said to be distinguished by the custom of eating dogs; in fact, they are cynophagists. Occasional intercourse is still maintained between them and Miris long settled in the plains. In one of the houses of a Miri village of the Majhuli, I found a young Abor girl who had been purchased from her parents for Rs. 60 by a Miri on a trading visit to the hills. He had brought her up as one of his family, but she was easily distinguishable from them by her fairer complexion and more strongly marked Mongolian features. The Abors have only just begun to settle in our territory, mostly between the inner and outer lines of frontier, and consequently beyond the limit of the census.

153. The origin and meaning of the name Daphla are not known. As pronounced in Lakhimpur, it would be written Dompila.

(3) The Daphlas. Meaning of the name.  
They call themselves *Niso* or *Nising*. The Miris they call *Bodo* and the Abors *Tegin*, but this last word seems to be merely the name of a tribe common to the Abors and Daphlas. The Daphla name for the natives of the Assam Valley is *Haring*.

154. The Daphlas, like the Abors, are recent settlers. Of late years they have been coming down in small communities of five or six families at a time, driven by scarcity of food or by the oppressions of the Abors. Some of these little colonies suffer terribly from sickness, and a Daphla hamlet too often presents a sad array of tenantless and decaying houses. The Daphlas are less laborious cultivators than the Miris. Their villages are not so well stocked, nor so comfortable, nor are the men so tall as the Miris, though the eastern Daphlas are physically very fine fellows. They bring the hair forward, wind it in a ball over the forehead, and stick a skewer of wood or metal through it (a silver arrow in the case of a chief.) A habit of slightly contracting the brows gives them a singularly proud and stern appearance. As one goes westward, however, the race degenerates in physique and in the outward appearances of prosperity, and the westernmost Daphlas are squalid and dirty. Yet they regard themselves as superior to the Miris, with whom they will acknowledge no relationship—a fact which seems to bear out the tradition of Miri vassalage.

155. Daphla and Miri speak practically the same language, and their deities, Yapum and Orom, are the same. The Yapum are male and female, and exist in indefinite numbers.

Their religion.  
A white goat or fowl is their appropriate victim. The Daphlas also count the sun among their deities, but their great god, who requires a mithan to propitiate him, is called Ui or Wi, of whom no Daphla cares to speak much for fear of incurring his displeasure. His character may be guessed from the Assamese equivalent of his name, Yom or Yama, the god of the infernal regions.

156. In contrast to their repudiation of the Miris, the Daphlas are very ready to claim close relationship with the Abors, who seem to be the most powerful of the three sections of the race. Though separated by the whole breadth of the Miri country as marked on the map, the Daphlas and Abors have a number of tribes in common, speak the same language, and are free to intermarry. The following is a list of Daphla tribes :—

Tána	Tanggö	Báto
Toku	Tobu	Chiri
Tachu	Aya	Pámá
Téfi	Nabum	Tákhak
Kára	Píi	Tálak
Yávö	Táde	Hödung
Hölu	Tángö	Táphu
Níri	Ráfa	Tesin
Chuhu	Tábiyá	Teghing
Tening	Beta	Tabáng
Tochi	Goling	Táo
Táde	Obubor	

Marriage between members of the same tribe is forbidden, as also between members of tribes which are regarded as having a common ancestor.

157. The total numbers of Miris, Abors, and Daphlas in the Assam Valley (within the inner line) in 1872 and 1881 is shown in the subjoined table—

MIRIS.							ABORS.	DAPHLAS.				
		Karrup.	Darrang.	Nowgong.	Sibesar.	Lakhimpur.	Total.	Lakhimpur.	Darrang.	Lakhimpur.	Total.	Grand Total.
1873 ...	...	107	2,048	225	6,651	4,896	13,917	None	263	155	418	14,335
1881 ...	..	...	2,113	...	10,836	11,697	25,636	821	339	210	649	27,006

The Abors, it will be seen, are quite recent settlers. Daphlas are found in the western part of North Lakhimpur and the eastern part of Darrang. They once had a settlement so far west as Hakomata, within 27 miles of Tezpur, but it was abandoned some years ago for sites further east. The number returned by the census has since been augmented by new colonies of immigrants in 1882 and 1883. The increase among the Miris is remarkable, and must be ascribed chiefly to immigration.

158. Two remarks are due to the reputation of these tribes. Colonel Dalton says that polyandry is common among the Daphlas.

Repudiation of certain customs. To me, however, they repudiated the practice with horror, and declared that it would be visited with death. The Miris of the Majhuli, again, utterly denied that their boys and girls were ever allowed to come together in the manner which "Colonel Dalton describes as a festival which few of the uninitiated even hear of."



179. It is doubtful whether Matak (Moran) should have been returned as a separate

(17). Matak (Moran).—(1) Matak. caste at all. Matak is the name of an old division of Upper Assam lying between the Noe Dihing, the Brahmaputra, and the southern mountains, and thus including nearly the whole of the present Lakhimpur District on the south bank. The common designation of the people of this country would be Matak (a word which Robinson says is of Khamti origin), but what the term now denotes is not a resident of the country, but a follower of the Matak Goshain, and this latter distinction again, whatever may have been its effect in former times, does not now avail to constitute a separate caste. The original Matak or Moamaris Goshain was a Kolita, who taught the doctrines of the Vaishnava school, which he had probably inherited from Sankar, and whose disciples, comprising the great bulk of the inhabitants of Matak country, may have been bound together by community of worship into a single religious body, in which caste differences were for the moment sunk. The tradition, in fact, is that the Matak were converted by Sankar. They are characterised by Robinson and others as people of the lowest castes. The Lakhimpur census returns explain what this means, for they show that two-thirds of the population of Matak consists of non-Aryan tribes, while among the Hindu portion the two respectable castes of Kolita and Keot constitute barely one-fifth. The Assamese of the lower districts regarded the Goshain and his medley following with some contempt, which they expressed by the term Moamaris, or catchers of the *Moa* fish, in allusion to the fishing carried on by his Dom disciples in the lake on whose bank the Goshain had his seat. This was in the Majhuli, a large island in the Brahmaputra between the Sibsaigar and Lakhimpur Districts, and the name of the first Goshain who resided there is said to have been Aniruddh. The Shattri was subsequently transferred to the vicinity of Gorhat. Towards the middle of the last century an Ahom queen, jealous of the honour of Gokhani (Kali), the goddess of her own Tantrik Goshain, compelled certain Moamaris and their Goshain to do homage to the goddess by rubbing the sacrificial blood on their foreheads. Such an insult, the extremity of pollution for a Vaishnava, was not forgotten, and some thirty years later the Moamaris rose in open rebellion, and obtained possession of the capital, whence they were not finally expelled until after several disastrous conflicts, which shook the Ahom kingdom towards its fall. In their own country they maintained their independence, and remained a tributary state under British rule until 1839, when their chief was deposed, and they were absorbed into the rest of the province. As religious body, however, they never recovered from the effects of the bloody struggles around the Ahom capital, in which the Goshain had been killed and his most devoted followers dispersed. Forty years ago they were still to be found, under the name of Moamaris, in all parts of the Assam Valley, but the nickname has since fallen out of use, and its former synonym Matak is now heard only in Upper Assam, where it may mean either an inhabitant of the Matak country, or a follower of some Rolita Goshain who claims to represent the historical Moamaris. In the latter sense the bearer of the name is usually careful to distinguish himself as a *purana bhagat*, or old believer. But this, as remarked above, is not a caste distinction, though it may happen that the followers of such a Goshain are mainly drawn from some one caste, such as the Doms.

The few Matak shown in the census returns are characterized as Moran. The

(2). Moran.

meaning of the word Moran is not very clear. It was the name applied to the upper portion of the Matak country, and is now used to designate the extensive tract of waste land to the east and north-east of Dibrugarh, where several Goshains still have their residence. A follower of one of these Goshains would call himself Matak Moran, but the distinction is one neither of caste nor nationality. In Pemberton's *Report on the Eastern Frontier*, and in other early works relating to Assam, the Moamaris, Matak, or Morans are spoken of as a distinct tribe or nation. The Morans are mentioned in Assamese history as having been subdued by the Ahom invader in 1251, A.D. Robinson says that the word *Mora* means "inhabitants of the jungles": and the occupation assigned them by the Ahom conqueror, namely, that of wood-cutters, consorts well enough with this derivation. In a list of divisions of the people according to the service exacted from each class under the Ahom system of government, grass-cutters are mentioned as *Habungis* or *Moran*, the former of which words certainly means "frequenter of the jungle" (*habti*). The distinctive nationality of the Morans, whatever it may have been, has long since disappeared. I suspect that 220 persons returned in the present census as

Matak (Moran) are all inhabitants of a single village in North Lakhimpur, and in that case they are Ahoms. The census of 1872 shows 14 Matak in Kamrup, 64 in Sibsaigar, and 113 in Lakhimpur.

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187. With regard to the non-Aryan languages, the chief authorities are Mr. Brian Hodgson's *Essays*, in which he gives a vocabulary and grammar of the "Bodo, Koch and

Dhimal tribes," with a dissertation on their origin and history; and (in the 2nd volume) comparative vocabularies of a number of tribes in the eastern part of the Brahmaputra Valley. Colonel Dalton, in his *Ethnology of Bengal*, gives short descriptions of most of the hill and aboriginal tribes of Assam, with specimens of vocabularies; and comparative lists of words have been compiled by Sir George Campbell in 1874, and by Dr. W. W. Hunter. Colonel McCulloch, in his account of Manipur, gave a series of vocabularies of Naga and Kuki dialects, and the late Mr. Damant also published a pamphlet containing vocabularies in a great number of languages between the Brahmaputra and the Ningthi.

The non-Aryan languages may be grouped as follows :

I.—*Bodo or Boro*, the language of the great Kachari race (Koch is merely the tribal name of Kacharis who have given up their native speech and adopted Bengali), under which come Meoh and Babha (it is doubtful if they differ materially from Kachari), Lalung, Chutiya, Garo with its offshoot Hajong, and Tiperah; Mikir is perhaps an outlying member of this group. The vocabulary is very different, but the grammatical structure is said to be similar.

II.—*Aka, Dafla, Miri, Abor and Mishmi*.—These five tribes live on the Himalayan slopes to the north of the British frontier, and are said to be all more or less mutually intelligible. The Miris of the valley are said by some authorities to speak a different language from the hill Miris (in Dr. Hunter's *Comparative Dictionary* they occupy a separate place), but is generally thought that the speech is the same.

III.—*The Shán languages*, which are nearly identical: their members in Assam are Ahom, which is said to be lost as a current speech, but to survive among the Deoris or priests, and Kamti, Phakial and Aitona, which are distinguished from Ahom by the fact that the two former tribes had been converted to Buddhism before their advent in Assam, and their vocabulary has been affected thereby. The Aitonias are of mixed descent, and are said to speak a language compounded of Khamti and Assamese. Extensive libraries of religious Shán books in manuscript exist in most large villages of these races in the house of the bápu or monk.

IV.—*Thibetan*, the language of Bhutan, whether independent or subject to Lassa; the Bhutan Bhutias, Thibengia Bhutias and Towang Bhutias all come down to trade in Assam, but rarely to settle.

V.—*The Naga group* of languages, which possibly includes the Singpho.

VI.—*The Kuki group*, reaching up from south of Manipur and Cachar to the North Cachar and Naga hills, and probably including Manipur; a Manipuri dictionary exists, and Major Lewis has published a volume on the "Dzo or Lushai Kuki language."

VII.—*The Khasi*, which is believed to be an isolated race and tongue of which no relative exists nearer than Annam.

All these languages are represented in the census, except the Aka, Ahom, Chutiya, Phakial and Aitonia tongues; the Ahom, as already observed, is hardly a spoken tongue now, but several villages exist in which the three last are spoken, though the enumerators have failed to record them.

188. The following table shows the number who are returned as speaking the different languages talked in the country, which have been described above :—

## Numerical Statistics

	Sarna Valley.	Brahmaputra Valley.	Hill Tracts.	Total of Province.
<i>Class I.—Aryan Languages of Permanent Inhabitants.</i>				
Bengali .. .. .	6,114,808	209,988	1,814	2,435,578
Assamese .. .. .	1,837	1,350,759	534	1,361,250
Urdu .. .. .	50,581	84,314	1,663	94,558
<i>Class II.—Non-Aryan Languages.</i>				
Kachari .. .. .	5,098	248,977	11,117	263,193
Mech .. .. .	...	57,865	5	58,880
Rabha .. .. .	307	55,365	7	55,680
Laining .. .. .	88	45,347	1,805	46,240
Garo .. .. .	297	23,517	86,434	112,248
Hajong .. .. .	885	581	80	1,546
Tipperah .. .. .	3,964	...	...	3,964
Mikir .. .. .	689	68,515	8,561	77,765
Dakha .. .. .	...	549	...	549
Miri .. .. .	...	25,634	...	25,636
Abor .. .. .	...	821	...	821
Mishmi .. .. .	...	661	...	661
Khampti .. .. .	...	2,883	...	2,883
Burmese .. .. .	...	73	...	73
Bhutaneese .. .. .	...	1,840	...	1,840
Naga .. .. .	5,984	1,840	4,026	11,650
Singpho .. .. .	...	1,774	...	1,764
Manipuri .. .. .	47,356	149	115	47,620
Kuki .. .. .	3,642	3,795	7,067	10,504
Khasi .. .. .	2,736	518	164,439	167,693
Total of Class II .. .. .	70,610	536,966	275,383	863,307
<i>Class III.—Spoken by Temporary Settlers.</i>				
Nepalese .. .. .	400	2,531	1,465	4,186
Santhali .. .. .	4,644	2,968	114	7,744
Nagpuri .. .. .	1,942	377	...	2,319
Uriya .. .. .	1,733	704	3	2,439
Marwari .. .. .	...	914	17	931
Punjabi .. .. .	...	247	63	310
Pushtu .. .. .	10	...	3	13
Tamool .. .. .	219	13	10	242
Telugu .. .. .	83	...	4	87
Armenian .. .. .	5	...	...	5
Arabic .. .. .	1	...	...	1
Chinese .. .. .	...	9	...	...
Total of Class III .. .. .	9,136	1,077	1,670	18,884
European language .. .. .	399	991	234	1,624
Unspecified .. .. .	4,065	1,079	3	5,150

189. Garo is spoken only by the Garo race, who are found not only in the Garo Hills but in the lower slopes and valleys at the foot of the hills in the Cachar and Sylhet,

Goalpara and Kamrup. A few scattered members of the clan were also censused in Darrang, Nowgong and Sibagar. In the valley tract attached to the Garo Hills 3,093 persons were enumerated as Garos by race, but a larger number, 3,242 as speaking the

Garo language. This can hardly be true. Educational works in the Garo tongue (which is believed to be akin to Kachari) have been published by the American missionaries at Tura, transliterated in the Roman and the Bengali character.

194. The Meoh and Babha languages are closely connected with Kachari, and it is

Meoh, Babha, Hajong.

believed that there is no real difference between them; but their grammar and vocabulary have not been reduced to writing yet. It is reported that a Babha will often describe himself, when asked his race, as a Babha-Kachari. The same persons are returned as Meohs and Babhas by language and by race in every district. The Hajongs, again, are believed to be semi-Hinduised Garos, who have settled on the lower spurs and in the valleys at the foot of the Garo Hills on both the north and south sides of the range; in the valley tract attached to the Garo Hills, 3,689 have been returned as Hajongs by race, while only 581 are recorded as speaking that language. Here, perhaps, the discrepancy (if it be not due, as in Lakhimpur, to an error of the enumerators) may be taken as a sign that the use of the language is dying out, and that Bengali is usurping its place.

195. All Mikirs by race are recorded as speaking the Mikir language, of which a vocabulary has been published by the local American Mission.

Mikir.

196. The same persons (25,635 in number) are returned as belonging to the Miri race and speaking the Miri language. They are found in Darrang, Sibsagar and Lakhimpur.

Miri.

197. The term Naga covers a variety of languages as well as of races. The "Kachcha Nagas" of North Cachar have no

Naga

connection, as far as we are aware, with the Nagas or Nagas in the hills south of Sibsagar, of whom several branches exist, differing in tongue or at least in dialect, such as the Jobokas, Banteras, Nameangias and many others, as far as the Patkoi range; and in the Naga Hills District there are four races, the Angamis, Lhotas, Rengmas and Semas, who differ completely both in language and dress. Three grammars and phrase-books of the Angami Naga language have been prepared by three officers to compete for a prize offered by the Chief Commissioner, and one of these will, it is hoped, ere long be published.

198. The Manipuris for the most part settled in Cachar and Sylhet about the time

Manipuri.

of the Burmese invasion of Manipur, and the local officers do not believe that any considerable emigration goes on now from Manipur into the Surma Valley. They have identified themselves with the habits of the people of the valley, and though a race of mixed Kuki and Naga origin, have become more Hindu than the Hindus, professing themselves to be Kshatriyas and to regard the tenets of caste with especial veneration. It might therefore have been expected that a large number of them would have dropped the Manipuri as their mother-tongue and have adopted the Bengali of Cachar and Sylhet, which in effect they all habitually speak. But not only have all Manipuris by race been returned as speaking that language, but in Cachar, while there are 26,745 Manipuris by race (Table VIII), the census returns show 33,922 persons as speaking Manipuri. This is an obvious error, but no explanation of the way in which it occurred has been given. The number of Manipuris is believed to be much under-rated in both districts, but especially in Sylhet, where the Deputy Commissioner believed that they approached more nearly 30,000 than 13,000. It is possible that some of them desirous of exalting their rank returned themselves as Hindus of good castes.

199. The Santeng has been classified in Table IX as a different language from the

Khasi.

Khasi, this is a mistake; the language of these two races is identical, though there is a tendency to divergence in different parts of the district as to the use of particular words. The number of Khasis by race and by tongue agrees in respect of all districts except the Khasi Hills, but here a strange discrepancy occurs: Table VIII shows 101,575 Khasis by race; and Table IX, 106,820 Khasis by language; so that people have been returned as speaking the language though not of the Khasi race. Attention has already been drawn to the anomaly that in Table III B, 104,177 persons are recorded as Khasis by religion. The Khasi has no written character, and has been transliterated in the Roman character by the Welsh missionaries who have published several works in it for the use of their primary schools and of English students of the language.

300. The languages of the smaller hill races—Bhutanese, Daphis, Abors and  
 Smaller Hill Races. Miahmis on the north frontier, Khamtis and  
 Singphos on the north-east, Kukis on the  
 south-east and Tipperahs on the south—call for no special remark: in all these cases the  
 numbers agree in the tables which record race and tongue.

*Extracted from Final Table I.*

		Area.	Villages.	Houses.	Males.	Females.	Total po- pulation.
		Sq. miles.					
HILL DISTRICTS ...	Cachar Hill Tracts	2,465	300	5,470	12,368	12,065	24,433
	Garo Hills ....	3,180	768	18,616	43,360	42,784	86,144
	Khasi and Jaintia Hills.	6,157	1,546	35,048	80,543	80,817	161,360
	Naga Hills, Civil and Military.	6,400	1	100	1,361	20	1,380
	Naga Hill Tracts (estimated).		231	...	46,500	46,500	93,000
	Total ...	18,302	2,836	56,134	184,112	180,005	373,907

## APPENDIX K.

## ARTICLES ON FRONTIER WORK AND POLICY, 1870-72.

*Pioneer, the 12th March 1870.*

It is always to be regretted if, in a case where the Government of India, for reasons of State policy, has recourse to exceptional legislation, it does not take care that full information as to its aims and motives is at once laid before the public. Nothing is more calculated to produce disquiet, in the minds even of reasonable men, than the idea that the Executive Government is prepared to set aside the action of the Courts of law by *ex post facto* enactments, framed to give validity to arbitrary and illegal proceedings. If the provisions of Act XXII. of 1869 (the Garo Hills Act) have been subjected already to hostile criticism, this has, we believe, been entirely owing to the reticence of Government itself—reticence which, now that the Act has become law, is not only meaningless but mischievous. We have had an opportunity of perusing a volume of papers bearing on the early history of the Garo frontier, printed and privately circulated by the late General Jenkins; and these read in connection with other published documents enable us to give what we think a correct account of the Act in question and its *raison d'être*.

The plains lying at the foot of the Garo Hills were found by the Muhammadan invaders of Eastern Bengal in the possession of a few powerful landholders of Hindu, or possibly of mixed Hindu and Garo blood, to whom the Muhammadans gave the title not of 'Zemindar' but of 'Chowdry.' The revenue settlement made with these Chowdries was assessed not upon the land as elsewhere, but upon certain transit and market dues, the bulk of which was realized on the trade carried on with the Garo mountaineers at the "kotes of passes" or frontier markets established at the foot of the hills. The main staple of this trade was cotton, which the Garos brought down annually in large quantities to barter for cloth and salt. So long as the Chowdries paid their tribute at Rungamatta, and 'squared' the Foudar there with occasional gifts of elephants or sandalwood, they were left to manage their estates as they pleased. Accordingly, the more ambitious of them entered upon a career of conquest in the hills, and on the side of Gawalpara several of them succeeded in annexing such outlying spurs as ran into their zemidarees on the plains. On the Garo villages so conquered they levied a house-tax, and generally took as much as they could manage to get, after the manner of annexationists, ancient or modern. The natural consequence of these proceedings, and of the never-ending chicanery and oppression practised on the hillmen at the frontier markets, was a chronic enmity between the Garos and the Zemindars, relieved occasionally by wild murderous raids of the hillmen into the plains, or tax-gathering forays of burkundazes into the hills. And this state of things continued for years after the British Government had taken nominal possession of North-East Bengal. The revenue settlement of the Chowdries was, however, placed by us upon a different footing. We generally directed our best attention to revenue settlements. An assessment was put upon the land, and a more enlightened policy led ultimately to the abolition of 'sayer' and transit dues throughout the country. But as 'sayer' had been a prolific source of income to the landholders of Gawalpara and Mymensing, particular enquiries were instituted as to the amount of compensation to be given them for its loss. Accordingly Mr. John Elliott in 1788-89 made careful inquiry along the north boundary of Pergunnahs Sherepore and Shoocong, in Mymensing, as to the dues levied by the zemindars at the frontier markets. He found that as the Garos were too wary to venture far into the plains, these markets were invariably established at, or in, the passes leading to the hills, and were strongly

guarded by the zemindar's burkundases. Beyond these markets the zemindars dared not venture save with large armed parties for elephant-hunting or for purposes of high-handed pecculation. "The Garos beyond the kotas of passes were (he said) entirely independent." The zemindars were, therefore, given a land settlement for their estates on the plains only, and they got compensation for the loss of the dues they levied at the marts. But beyond the line of these markets they engaged for nothing. That was the country of the Garo men. The Surveyor General's Department and the sub-divisional system had not, however, then been inaugurated, and, in the absence of local supervision and precise maps, the zemindars sedulously, and with much satisfaction to themselves, continued to levy dues at the Garo hâts, and succeeded now and again in collecting tribute from some wretched village in the hills. In Gowalpara the ever-recurring raids of the Garos led the Government to discover the irritant cause; and as the task of repressing incursions now fell on the Government Police, it was determined after careful enquiry to exclude the Bengali zemindars and their rapacious amlah entirely from the hills, giving them such compensation as might prevent their suffering by the loss of any profits they there enjoyed, however illegally acquired. Regulation X of 1822 was passed to give these arrangements the force of law, and it was distinctly the intention of Government at that time that it should apply to the whole of the Garo Hills. As a fact, Garo villages on the Mymensing side were actually settled by the Gowalpara authorities under that regulation. Long years passed of which we know little, till a series of bloody raids by Garos on the plains of Mymensing led the Bengal Government in 1860 to enquire into the state of the hills on that side, and it was found that the villages were in a ferment because the Shooesung zemindar had been steadily pushing further and further into their midst, levying house-tax by armed burkundazes and closing the frontier markets entirely to those who proved contumacious. Twelve serious raids in the course of four years showed that matters were come to a crisis. A costly expedition was sent into the hills to punish the perpetrators of the last incursion, and the inquiries then made clearly established the fact that the oppression of the Shooesung Rajah's amlah was the cause of all the trouble. In 1859 it had been decided by the Revenue authorities that Pergunnah Shooesung terminated at the foot of the Garo Hills—as the records of 1789 now show that it indubitably did. The Rajah was, however, suing in the Civil Court to establish his right to include in it over 500 square miles of territory in the hills. Of this suit Government knew nothing till it came into the High Court, when it was too late to offer further evidence than had locally been proffered, and the Rajah was able to prove easily enough that some Garo villages had now and again paid him tribute, and that the local officers had now and again admitted this. Local officers in Bengal know little of the previous history of their district, and take little trouble over Government suits. With the approval of the Secretary of State it was determined to put Regulation X of 1822 in force, and to exclude the Rajah from interference in the hills as the only means of preserving a quiet frontier. This was done, but the High Court, on the very imperfect case put before it for Government, decided that the wording of the Regulation was not wide enough to cover these arrangements. It ruled that the Rajah had shown that he had some rights beyond the line laid down by the survey as the north boundary of his estate, but it left him still to show what the extent of these rights actually was. In 1866 the Government had inaugurated in the Garo Hills that policy of direct management by selected officers which will, we believe, in a few years reclaim all the wild tribes on our north-east frontier, and the question which it had now to decide was, whether it should permit the civilization of a whole people to be indefinitely hindered by the grasping machinations of a Bengali zemindar, when it knew his pretensions, however specious, to be unsound. The High Court itself had, as regards the Bhutan Dwâra, pressed upon Government the fact that their tribunal, bound as it was to decide only on legal proof, was not a proper forum when considerations of frontier policy, and the settlement of barbarous tracts, came to be dealt with. Tenderness or regard for the social virtues of the Shooesung Rajah, and we believe he is not destitute of these, would have been a crime. Act XXII of 1869, therefore, by re-enacting Regulation X of 1822 in less ambiguous terms, enabled the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal to exclude the Rajah's dependents from the hills, and to place the direct management of the Garos in the hands of the Deputy Commissioner. Full compensation will under the Act be given to the Rajah for every right he can show that he exercised; for all the profits he can prove that he enjoyed. What the result of Government policy in dealing with the Garos has been we may be able at some future day to show. But meantime we trust we have made it clear that higher considerations than a petulant resolve not to be worsted in a civil suit led the Government to the passing of the Garo Hills Act of 1869.

*Pioneer, the 16th March 1870.*

In dealing with the hill people on the North-East Frontier, the Government is

*The Garo Hills District.*

confronted by two distinct problems. It has first to ward off the attacks of the outer tribes dwelling amid the great mountain systems that flank the Empire, and next it has to consider how best to bring under control the inhabitants of the ranges that intersect our settled districts. In regard to the former, it has long ago been seen that to enter on a career of indefinite conquest towards Thibet, China, or Burma, were vain and profitless. The policy adopted, therefore, has been in theory one of watchful preparedness, subject no doubt to occasional lapses, but on the whole effective. Conciliation by free admission to trade, interpreted and emphasized by a strong line of frontier posts, is what Government offers to the Abors, Mishmees, and such like tribes. A similar policy was for a long time pursued towards those other races who occupy the broad range of hills that lies between the Assam Valley and the plains of Cachar, Sylhet, and Mymensing. Leaving out of sight the Khasias, with whom special circumstances led us into settled relations at a comparatively early date, we here refer particularly to the Nagas and Garos. Of the Nagas, their history, their sufferings, and their reclamation we may find another opportunity to speak. At present we must confine our remarks to the more westerly tribe of Garos. Long before our accession to power, these mountaineers had dealings with the low country; and among the earliest documents in our records is a proposal by Kengta, Chief of all the Garos, to become a Company's zemindar, were he only delivered from the oppression of his neighbours, the Bengalees of the plains. Nothing, however, came of this, and the Garos were left to settle their own quarrels, and ravage periodically the frontier villages, till the time of Mr. David Scott, the great Pro-Consul of North-East Bengal. Under his vigorous rule efforts were made to bring the Garo Chiefs under our influence and control. Regulation X of 1822 was passed to remove from their midst the intrigues and oppressions of Bengali zemindars and their amlah. The frontier markets were thrown open to the hillmen, and for a time it really seemed as if this would be one of the first races to accept our rule and its attendant benefits. But David Scott died—the conquest of Assam and more imperial claims drew off the attention of Government—the Garos of the inner hills fell away from all engagements with us, and only on the outer verge of the plateau was an uncertain control kept up and a kind of spasmodic order preserved by the darogahs and burkundazes of the neighbouring thannahs. The country became a land unknown; the people were proved uncouth and dangerous. Protected by deadly and all but impenetrable thickets the Garos' fastnesses were for long years inviolate; their outrages unchecked and for the most part unpunished. When now and again some more than ordinarily ferocious raid had desolated whole villages, and filled each little frontier mart with horror, a Company of Sepoys or Police would perhaps struggle up into the hills, and after burning the first village they could find, hurry down again, half of them silly from fever, and the rest halt and maimed from stumbling over the pitfalls of an enemy they had never seen. The general policy of both Local and Supreme Governments up to 1860 was to have no direct dealings whatever with the savage tribes of the Assam Valley. Non-interference did its worst. Bengal, however, at last got a Ruler who saw in these mountain ranges an integral part of the province committed to his charge, and who did not regard with complacency the gross darkness that had gathered round them, broken only, as it seemed, by the glare of burning villages on hill and plain. Sir Cecil Beadon took up the problem so long laid by, and enunciated a policy the results of which have already surprised those who hoped for most. It was in truth no new policy. It was merely the reiteration of the old, but still inexplicable fact, that one British officer of tact and firmness living in the midst of an inferior race, ready to redress their grievances, to sympathize with their wants, and punish their crimes, can turn the hearts of that people to himself, and lead them forward to civilization and peace. In 1866 the Garo Hills District was founded, and Lieutenant Williamson, an officer whose subsequent proceedings have amply shown the wisdom of his selection, was directed to establish himself permanently on the Tura peak, in the very heart of the Garo Hills. Furnished, of course, with a sufficient guard he lost no time in taking up his station. The Garos at first viewed his advent with suspicion, but he fortunately possessed accomplishments that awoke their wonder, and ultimately won their respect. Unerring skill with the rifle, and a soundness of wind and limb that enabled him to beat the village leaders in a race uphill, were a better introduction for him than even his armed police. Community after community have come in to tender their allegiance, and when last the Commissioner visited the hills, there met him from one circle alone seventeen Chiefs, fourteen of whom had never paid tribute to man. And all these are bloodless victories.



Raids have apparently ceased to be. Human sacrifice has been everywhere repressed, a dog now taking the place of the nobler victim. Only a small portion of the country remains unvisited, and into that no English foot has ever penetrated. Lieutenant Williamson, however, hopes to enter it from the side of the Khasi Hills next cold weather; and already the Commissioner has reported that he sees in near prospect the complete submission of the Garo Hills to the British Government—a conquest as cheap financially as it is politically valuable. The field here opened for the Teacher and the Missionary we need do no more than indicate. We scarcely dare hope that there may not hereafter arise some difficulties. A nation is not born in a day. But to secure success it is essentially necessary that the influence of our officers brought to bear on these savages directly and undisturbed. The invariable consequence of the machinations and encroachments of Bengalee landlords in these hills has been outrage and bloodshed. We know that they have no substantial right there, but let us buy up whatever they by use have acquired. The simplicity of a hillman makes him the easy victim of the Bengalee, whether it be in Southalia, or among the Garos, or in the Hill Tracts of Chittagong. Our Government has had some costly lessons on this subject, let us hope it will profit by them.

The system under which the Garo Hills are administered is simple and devoid of technicalities. Each village has its Lukma or headman, who is primarily responsible for the payment of its tribute, the production of offenders and the maintenance of order. Over every circle of villages is placed a Luskur or petty Chief, chosen for his influence and good character. The Luskurs try all cases of theft, injury to property, injury to the person not affecting life or limb, house-trespass and affronts, provided neither of the parties is a near relative of their own or a foreigner. They punish by fine, after proceedings held in open durbar in the presence of at least three witnesses. Either party, if dissatisfied, can appeal forthwith to the Deputy Commissioner who tries the case *de novo*. In the same way the Luskurs each in his own jurisdiction, try civil suits—their procedure being entirely oral. The Deputy Commissioner hears such cases on appeal, and ordinarily settles them by reference to a punchayet. Houses, needful clothing, cooking utensils, implements of husbandry and seed-grain are exempt from attachment and sale. No professional pleaders or mocktars are allowed. The tribute paid as a house-tax levied on each village is intended to be rather an acknowledgement of submission than a source of revenue. Altogether, the idea of the hill administration is village self-government under the immediate superintendence and watchful eye of the resident British officer. What the results have been we have already shown.

*Pioneer, the 18th August 1870.*

We have more than once drawn attention to the progress which civilisation and order

are making in the Garo Hills. We have done this with a two-fold object. It is, on the one hand, interesting to know the dealings of Government with hill races, hitherto reckoned dangerous and irreclaimable; and, on the other, it is no small encouragement and satisfaction to our frontier officers to think that their labours are not wholly overlooked, and that their countrymen are sympathising with their trials and triumphs. We doubt if the residents in towns and favoured stations, the frequenters of band-stands and lovers of croquet, ever realise the position and life of the gallant young fellows, who amid jungles and swamps and rugged hills are rough-hewing the savage peoples of the frontier into shapely members of the body politic. The solitude and self-sacrifice of such a life are but little understood. With no companions but his police guard; no recreation save that afforded by his gun; exposed to the deadly miasm of the valleys; a Native doctor his only medical adviser; liable at any moment to treacherous attack; no aid or succour within many miles; his house a hut, his food uncertain, with no luxuries and few comforts, the Hills Tract Officer must have heart in his work, or he will utterly fail, and be of all men most miserable. But if he sees his efforts prospering; if he sees savage communities abandoning their lawlessness and burying their feuds; if he finds them coming to him for advice, for redress of injuries, and adjustment of disputes; if barbarous customs drop quietly out of use, new industries spring up, new wants arise; if he knows that a nation is awaking to new being in his hands, we can imagine no reward more rich, no satisfaction more pure than his. For this reason it is that the annual reports of such districts should, and we believe do, engage the attention of Government. They are generally unpretending

documents. The best men tell their story in the quietest way. Their enthusiasm is reserved for their every-day work, and the diffidence of young Englishmen comes over them with the assumption of their pen. Such men make little show when visiting a Lieutenant-Governor or Secretary. A card with a well known name is brought in, and there enters a shy-looking, weather-beaten young man, who can scarcely be brought to tell the facts of his last exploit: how he seized with his own hand a murdering Chief in the centre of his astonished clan, or stormed some well-nigh impregnable stockade filled with angry and excited braves. The North-East Frontier has known many such men, but their story will never perhaps be fully told. The eyes of India turn only westward, and the pettiest skirmish on the Black Mountain is more to the Government, and more to the public, than the obscure victories, now-a-days mostly bloodless, which have added whole districts to our empire, and are securing for us a quiet frontier on the East.

Glancing more particularly at the Garo Hills Administration Report for the past year, which lies before us, we find that twenty-three communities have in that time submitted to our rule. There are now only some fifty villages in the whole of the hills, which claim to be independent, and even these are practically under our influence and control; most of the Chiefs have submitted voluntarily. In a few instances subjection was insisted upon as a punishment for outrage, but thanks to the firm bearing and admirable tact of Lieutenant Williamson, not a single shot was fired, though occasionally collision seemed all but certain. The main duty of the Deputy Commissioner, since his settlement in the hills, has been that of a peace-maker. To put an end to the interminable blood feuds of the Garos has been the object he has kept steadily in view. It is generally impossible in any case to tell how far back a quarrel runs, or with whom rests the blame. So the mode of reconciliation adopted is this. A strong party is marched to the neighbourhood of the villages concerned. The chief men are summoned, and informed that the British Government has determined that there shall be no more feud, but that all its subjects shall live in peace with one another. The skulls and ghastly trophies of past murders are brought forth, and in presence of both parties publicly burnt. A solemn oath of friendship is then sworn, the sanction of which is the warning that the village that first violates the truce shall be summarily punished by the Saheb himself. None of these engagements have yet been departed from. The system so much in vogue at times of bribing the headmen of such communities into good behaviour is being entirely abandoned. A percentage upon the tribute collected is given to the Chief selected by the Deputy Commissioner for the charge of a circle or a village, but annual presents and an indiscriminate distribution of rewards are now becoming things of the past.

It may be interesting to give the history of one Garo feud, finally settled during the past year, that some idea may be formed of the vitality of such quarrels and the extraordinary ramifications they take. Lengsang, the head man of Ribugiri, cast eyes of unlawful love on a married woman in his village, Sookri by name. Like David, when enamoured of Bathsheba, he determined to get rid of the inconvenient husband, a relation of his own, by putting him in the fore front of the very next battle; but he went further, for he made a secret arrangement with the enemy, the men of Mandalangiri, that they should come up speedily as though to attack his village of Ribugiri, and there slay Ringrang, his woman's spouse. The plot was carried out, Ringrang died in the affray, and Lengsang with a readiness to forgive injuries which amazed those not in the secret, made peace with Mandalangiri and took Sookri to his house. The avenger of blood was however not far distant. At Boldakgiri was a boy called Dingrang, related to both Lengsang and the dead Ringrang, who grew up in the belief that on him lay the duty of repaying to Mandalangiri the slaughter of his relative. Arrived at man's estate he slew a native of that place and so re-opened the feud. Elated by the success of the first raid he planned another, and in this he was joined by Ribugiri and Lengsang himself, who thus craftily sought to vindicate his own innocence of Ringrang's murder. Mandalangiri however best them off. Then Dingrang and Lengsang quarrelled, and by treachery the young man surprised the older sinner and butchered him and seven of his family. In this affair one-half of Ribugiri assisted Dingrang. Mandalangiri now came up and stormed that part of Ribugiri which had helped to murder their old secret ally, Lengsang, putting to death all they could capture in the place. At this point the Deputy Commissioner stepped in. Dingrang and his accomplices were seized and transported. The villages concerned were all heavily fined. The skulls of the murdered were produced and burnt, a lasting peace sworn, and cultivation was resumed as though feuds had never been.

We are glad to see that the Government has resolved to give every encouragement to the American missionaries in their efforts to educate the Garos. The Government schools at the foot of the hills only reach the half breeds. The missionaries by entering into the interior will secure the real hillmen. In the course of a few years we may hope to find the Garos as peaceful as the Kols; and if Christianity should interpose to prevent their falling into the gross superstitions and caste absurdities of Hinduism, that surely is only matter for gratulation. A good work will have been well done.

*Pioneer, 24th March 1870.*

Separated from the Garos by the country of the Khasias and the Sintengs dwells that agglomeration of tribes known by the generic name of 'Naga.' Philologists find in them direct descendants of the 'serpent' races of the Vedic chronicle. History, less imaginative, knows them as the Nangtas' or 'naked' savages who disturbed the borders of the Ahom kings. The hills which in the Garo country are broken up by numerous ravines and clothed with dense thickets of useless jungle, rise among the Nagas to meet the great central range, and though difficult enough to traverse, yet open out here and there into broad sweeps of rolling savannah, wooded with oak and beech and fir. The tribes inhabiting this part, which may be roughly described as lying between Assam and Manipur, are all known as Nagas, but they have no inter-tribal relations, no common bond of union. Each village is self-contained and self-governed; stockaded to meet the open attack, and ever on its guard against the treachery of its nearest neighbour. The smaller villages it is true obey for their own sakes the behests of the more powerful; but in most things each community stands alone. In years now happily gone by, the advance of a common foe, whether in the shape of the pony cavalry of Manipur, or the red-coated sepoys of the Sahibs, might draw them together for a time; or the prospect of a successful raid upon Cachar or Assam would induce a temporary oblivion of village jealousies; but to trim his rough kilt and collar with the hair of his enemies was the ambition of each Naga warrior—a delight not easily to be foregone. The blood feud of two communities could only be appeased by blood, and each fresh settlement renewed the mutual debt. Such were the savage hillmen with whom we first made acquaintance in the year 1832. It would be wearisome to bring together all we know of their various septs, or to recapitulate the dealings of our Government with them for the last forty years. Nor would the retrospect be in all points a pleasant one. It is only now that we can look with unmixed satisfaction upon our avowed policy in the hills. The first attempts to open up the Naga territory were made rather in the interests of Manipur than of India, and were due to the fact that Rajah Gumbhir Sing was desirous of strengthening his hands against Burma by intimate trade relations with Assam, and it was thought well to encourage him in this policy. But the only effect of this encroachment on their hills was to rouse the whole Angami Naga clan and bring them down in vengeful foray, not on Manipur, where there was little to get and many to keep that little, but on the defenceless villages of the Cachar and Assam plains. In due course retaliatory or, as they were called, punitive expeditions were sent into the hills; and although some attempts were made by the officers conducting these to establish amicable relations for the future, but little success seems to have attended their efforts. The hills were claimed as British territory and Manipur was warned to confine itself to certain prescribed limits. Engagements for the payment of a nominal tribute were entered into by the Angamis, only to be broken when our troops withdrew. The establishment of a police station in the hills was met by vehement protest expressed in the murder of its Darogah. Between 1839 and 1850 ten military expeditions had been sent against the Nagas, with no more tangible result than the burning of many villages, the destruction of much grain, the loss of many lives, and the confirmed hostility of the whole tribe. Baffled at length by the inveterate savagery of the people and the difficulties of their hills, the Government fell back on a policy of absolute non-interference and defence; and even the Imperial Dalhousie emphatically pronounced the game not worth the candle. We had nothing to gain, he said, by annexing a wild people and their barren hills. So we relegated them to a kind of political "Coventry." In the year 1851 our troops withdrew, and the Nagas relieved their feelings on the occasion by a grand series of two and twenty raids, of which we prudently took no notice. For fifteen years we left them to themselves and to the tender mercies of

**Manipuri ravagers.** At last, however, Government became convinced that a policy of masterly inactivity in dealing with a savage tract lying in the midst of our settled districts is no policy at all—but a specious synonym for neglect of duty. As in the Garo so in the Naga Hills, Sir Cecil Beaden in 1866 urged upon the Government of India the necessity of dealing specially with the circumstances of the case. No line of posts, however strong, could guard the plains from the incursions of a foe to whom hill and swamp and forest were aids instead of hindrances. What we had to do was to enter boldly on the work of civilising the hillmen themselves, and to change the whole standard of their national morals. In the very midst then of the Angami country was a site selected, at which Lieutenant Gregory, a specially chosen officer, should be permanently located. Attended by a strong guard, but avoiding all appearance of aggression, he built his head-quarters station at Samoogoodting, a place which had once before been a police post, and the people of which were willing to submit to our rule and enjoy our protection. They agreed to pay a house-tax of Rs. 2 per annum, commutable to eight days' labour in the year. No attempt was made to annex any community by force. They were all invited to meet Lieutenant Gregory at Samoogoodting, and the objects of his settlement there were fully explained to them. A general amnesty of all old offences was proclaimed, except as regards one village which had recently been guilty of a bloody raid on a Meekir hamlet. At the same time there was no weakness of demeanour shown. The assembled Chiefs were warned that outrage would be met by summary chastisement, and as earnest of this the offending village of Rasepemah was razed to the ground and its inhabitants distributed through other communities. All were told that no interference would be exercised in respect of their internal feuds, though the Deputy Commissioner was ready to act as arbiter on reference voluntarily made. Those who chose to submit themselves to the British authorities and pay the small tribute demanded in token of fealty would be received and become entitled to protection. But all without distinction were invited to trade, and were permitted to frequent the markets established near the foot of the hills, on receiving a pass from the Deputy Commissioner and leaving their spears at Samoogoodting till their return. In anticipation of the time when our influence should be paramount, it was decided as regards civil and criminal administration to work on the basis of recognised custom. In petty crime and civil cases the Gaonboora, or village Chief or Chiefs, were to decide with the aid of assessors, subject to the appellate and general control of the Deputy Commissioner. They were also to be held responsible for police and for the tribute of their community, receiving 2½ per cent. on the collections by way of salary. Such in brief was the system introduced, and what has been the result? First and foremost there has not been a single Angami raid since Samoogoodting was occupied. This is of itself no mean success. Then again the Deputy Commissioner has been able to visit in peace most of the principal communities. He has not made any attempt to exact tribute or extort labour, but the Nagas in large gangs voluntarily offer their services to construct roads and build the station. For this of course they are paid fair wages. Last year 3,000 of them visited the plains for trade, without committing a single outrage. Deputies from all the principal villages now attend at Samoogoodting and act as means of communication between their people and the Deputy Commissioner. "The name of Angami," writes the Deputy Commissioner of Assam, "once a terror to the frontier peasantry of Nowgong and Golaghat, and an abhorrence to civil officers, promises soon to designate as peaceful and industrious a people as any we have dealings with".

The Nagas who live to the south of Sebsaugor and on the westerly slopes of the central range are not so open to our influence, and have to be dealt with as the Abors and Mishmees, and other external tribes. So late as 1867 they committed a raid at Gellaki, but as all their supplies are drawn from the plains we can punish them effectively by closing the markets to them. This course induced them to deliver up to justice the leaders in the Gellaki raid; and the gradual civilization of the Angami District on their flank will soon give us such a point of vantage as will render outrage impossible for the future. There is much yet to be done, and there may be difficulties yet to come, but the right path has at last been struck, and time must lead us to a happy issue.

*Pioneer, 28th March 1870.*

In the brief account which we lately gave of the Garo Hills District we said the Government was on its north-east frontier engaged in working out two distinct policies, the first defensive and directed to warding off the attacks of the outer peoples who are geographically and politically beyond our

control; the other aggressive and civilising, designed to bring into the body politic those tribes whose habitat is undoubtedly within the limits of the Empire. We have now to turn to a part of our frontier where these problems present themselves for solution in a composite shape. We find ourselves in Chittagong hemmed in eastward by a great mountain system within which dwell warlike tribes of whose history, wants, and local position, we know as little as we do of the Abors and Mishmees; while northward between us and the settled District of Cachar intervenes a tract of hill land hitherto unexplored, the inhabitants of which, the Lushais, harass us north and south as the Garos were wont to harass Gawalpara and Mymensing. Theoretically it would seem that our course of action was clear before us. We have, one would think, only to protect the plains eastward by a chain of police posts, and to occupy the Lushai country as we occupied Tura and Samoogoodting, to effect the same good results. What should be done as regards the Lushais we may on some future day discuss. Meantime let us examine the position of the Government in the hills lying east and south of the Regulation District of Chittagong. The first fact which complicates our problem here is that we have not been able, as on the north side of Assam, to confine our administration to the plains. When we took possession of Chittagong, we found two Mugh chieftains established in the hills, paying a tribute in cotton to the authorities at Islamabad. They had obtained a sort of rude sovereignty over the wandering tribes who "joomeas" along the course of the mountain streams, and who were known under the various titles of Koomees Kookies, Mrungs, &c. In 1789 we converted the cotton tribute into a money payment, which oddly enough is to this day known as the "Kapas" mehal or tax, the basis of this tax being a capitation fee levied annually by the Chiefs on each couple of *joomeas* owing them fealty. It was the duty of the Chiefs as well to repress any lawless tendencies among their own subjects as to ward off the attacks of the less settled races living in the upper hills towards Burma and Arracan. The whole country south of the Kurnafoolie River was nominally the kingdom of the Phroo family; and to the head of this family in 1847 the Government granted a considerable remission of revenue on his undertaking to defend the plains and his proper hills from the Shindoos and other powerful tribes who were even then pressing upon British territory. North of the Kurnafoolie jurisdictions were more divided and separate settlements more numerous. Hence our earliest steps in direct administration of the Hill Tracts were confined to the north of that river. It was not till 1860 that the Hill Tracts of Chittagong were formally separated from the regulation district and placed under a special Superintendent; and even then—although Act XXII. of 1860 enabled Government to provide a complete system of management—the main object of the Superintendent's appointment was that he might, through the agency of the Chiefs, prevent raids which had of late years become somewhat numerous. Before the Superintendent entered on office there took place that most disastrous incursion of savages into the plains of Tipperah known as the great Kookie invasion. Passing across the north of the Chittagong Hill Tracts a horde of wild mountaineers burst suddenly upon the unsuspecting Bengalee villages of the plains, and burnt, plundered, slew, and carried captive, retreating safely to their jungles when the troops at length arrived. It was the attempt to punish this outrage that first opened our eyes to the character of the country and the task that lay before us. With infinite difficulty an expeditionary force penetrated to the village from which the war party had set out. To burn it down and struggle back again was all they could effect. The hills were deadly in climate, clothed with impenetrable thickets, utterly destitute of supplies, broken up by ravines and countless water-courses; the only paths were torrent beds, along which a light-armed Kookie might perhaps safely travel, but which to the sepoy were as difficult as the jungle on their sides. Such was the country we had now to enter. The nearer ranges were inhabited by tribes of peaceful *joomeas*, our undoubted subjects whom we were bound to protect. We took their revenue and they fairly claimed our aid. The interests of our settled districts also demanded consideration; and well nigh hopeless as with the available means the task appeared, it was yet undertaken. A line of strong police posts was planted on the outer verge of the *joomeas* tract from the Fenny to the Kurnafoolie, and the Superintendent of Hill Tracts took up his station at Chundergon, a missionary of civilization to the tribes he had to guard, and pledged to do his utmost to keep them safe from harm. How material prosperity and improvement have been advancing within the protected tract the annual returns of the district show; but to those who believe that our guardianship has been a farce, it will be a novel and startling experience to be told that since the establishment of our posts there has not been reported one single raid north of the Kurnafoolie. We could not have anticipated this *a priori*. There is not a point of the defended line that is not permeable to a war party of savages. It is only lately that connecting paths have been cut from post to post. The communication with the head-quarters base is difficult and long. Every principle of

military security seems wanting, but the fact remains; the posts have stopped the raids. Up to the end of 1866 the defence of the country south of the Kurnasoolie was left in the hands of the Poang or Bohmong at the head of the Phroo family is called; and it is in this quarter that the raids of which we hear so much have all occurred. Not that they have been so numerous even here as is commonly supposed. There were none in 1861, 1862, or 1863. Since that time ten raids, or rather ten outrages, have been reported, several of them being by the same raiding party, the sack of one homestead being often called a raid. These outrages have generally been the work of Shindoos, a powerful tribe living in the far interior, quite beyond the reach of the Chittagong authorities, and accessible, if at all, only from the side of Burma. The Kookie or Lushai tribes of Howlongs and Syloos living to the north-east of the Hill Tracts District have also raided in the south, passing across the face of our posts to reach their prey. The best energies of our Superintendent have been devoted to the establishment of amicable relations with these last, but not, we fear, with any real success. We have still to make such a demonstration of power in their midst as shall convince them that we are as powerful as we are peaceable. The kindred clan under Ruttun Poa, whose village we burnt in 1860, has been friendly ever since that time, and it is now, we believe, proposed to station an officer with a strong guard at this Chief's head-quarters, to confirm him in his alliance, and serve as a check upon the Howlongs and Syloos, who would be chary of sending out large war parties southwards, leaving two hundred hill police to intercept their return. Within the last three years we have extended our police posts south of the Kurnasoolie, but they neither go far enough, nor are they strong enough to protect the country. A considerable increase of force is required. But this given, we would deprecate any great expenditure of men or money on this part of our frontier. A vastly exaggerated idea of the nature of the attacks—now-a-days called raids—appears to us to be generally prevalent. They are not in most cases great tribal inroads, but petty hill dacoities, attended no doubt with murder and outrage, but much facilitated and encouraged by the habits of the unfortunate victims. A joomea family, having exhausted the ground at its present clearing, wanders away into the jungle, following the course of some mountain stream. When it finds a spot sufficiently solitary and otherwise eligible, it burns down the jungle, builds a wretched hut, and after dibbling holes in the soil sows in these five kinds of seed, for the coming up of which it sits down to wait. If the site is good other families may follow, and then for common defence a stockade is run up. A Kookie scout spies from a distant hill the gap in the forest or the smoke of the fires, and in the gray of some dim dawning, with yells and shots and arrow flights, the place is harried, the women and children carried captive while the men of the family fly to the jungle or fall by the spear. Days after at the nearest post the joomea father tells the Sub-Inspector of the raid. In another week a panting constable gets to the Superintendent. The telegraph informs Calcutta that the Kookies are out. Police are hurried off, the posts are strengthened, but the raiders have vanished in the forest, and we can only guess from whence they came, and vaguely wonder whither they went. Occasionally, no doubt, these attacks are on a larger and more extended scale: but what we wish to maintain is that it is impossible on such a frontier to secure perfect immunity from the inroads of hill savages; that what we have to do is to take up a definite line and defend it as best we can, declining to give protection to joomeas wandering beyond it; and that there must be some ratio between the amount of protection afforded and the value to us of the country protected. There are no imperial considerations whatever involved in the defence of this vast jungle such as influence us on the north-west frontier. Prudence, financial and political, warns us not to be quixotic.

*Pioneer, the 9th April 1870.*

Five and forty years ago the north-east frontier had imperial claims upon the attention of Government and of the public. But since the Burmese were driven out of Assam, the interest therein has flagged and flickered,

#### North-East Frontier Defence.

to be only temporarily revived by the war with Bhutan, and finally to be classed among things provincial and obscure. We propose now to inquire what is involved at the present day in the idea of frontier defence as applicable to the Divisions of Cooch Behar, Assam, Dacca, and Chittagong; to examine the provision already made in this behalf; and to seek to arrive at some conclusion as to possible improvement and the desirability of change. First, then, we may exclude from the list of our probable foes in this quarter

Burma, which was at one time the most formidable of them all. It is no longer likely that Burmese Generals will lead regular armies through Manipur into Cachar, or by the Patkoi Pass into Upper Assam. Nor need we fear any serious danger from Thibet, although it is a fact not generally known that in 1852 a Thibetan army advanced to within a few miles of our frontier by the Kurriapara Dwār. Bhutan is indeed the only power capable of making an organized attack upon the plains; but that the Bhuteah will ever do so we cannot for a moment anticipate. Their outrages, though sufficiently annoying, have always been petty in character; and the lessons lately read them, coupled with their wretched state of internal anarchy, may serve to guarantee us against serious danger. Sikkim, even if willing to give trouble, is not able, and is sufficiently controlled by Darjeeling. Besides which our subject does not take us into the interior of the hills in this quarter. Civilized or semi-civilized enemies we have not then to dread. We have to deal only with savage hillmen of various designations whose incursions cannot be foreseen, and who possess neither the arms nor the habits of regular warfare. With regard to such of these races as lie entirely within our border, we have lately shown that a policy of direct management has met with remarkable success. The presence of a British officer and of armed police among the Garos and Nagas, and of troops among the Khasias and Sintengs, has apparently rendered the plains of Assam, Mymensing, Sylhet, and Cachar, secure from raids so far as those tribes are concerned. There is still, however, even here a certain residuum of danger. The experiment is new in its extended application, and we cannot prudently, in discussing the question of frontier defence, omit all consideration of possible outrage by the inhabitants of the tracts above specified. Besides these we have in Assam Akas, Dufflas, Abors, Miris, Mishmis, Singphos, Khamptis and Bor Nagas, who, however quiet now and anxious to trade, must yet be confronted with a show of force, and led to love through salutary fear. The country which has to be protected from their incursions is one of the most hopelessly difficult in all India. Void of roads, void of supplies, intersected by more rivers than any other province of equal size, for the most part a vast swamp covered with dense forest, where villages and clearings show like oases amid wastes of foliage, Assam has to be defended in almost infinite detail. If the protecting force is to be anything more than a name it must be dispersed over a line a thousand\* miles in length. It is obvious that such minute sub-division is foreign to any strictly military organization, and that no regiment could undertake such duty without detriment to its efficiency and subversion of its discipline. Accordingly we find that the Assam regiments which performed this outpost work before the introduction of the new police were notoriously ineffective. When the 43rd Native Infantry was ordered for service some years ago a large proportion of the men rejoined its head-quarters for the first time in eight or ten years, having never in that period had a single regimental parade. After the Bhutan war the police relieved the military of all outpost duty in Assam, and for the last five years we have had three regiments idling at a few sadder stations, while an armed police has held the whole frontier line and garrisoned the Naga and the Garo Hills. It is true that were the troops away the same number of police as are now employed could not be relied upon to protect the province. But the duties which have to be performed are those which only a force constituted like an armed police can carry out, and if they were numerically stronger and regularly sent into the reserves for drill, our Assam Police could defend the whole valley, as indeed they do now discharge the more active functions of its watch and ward. Confining ourselves still to Assam and the neighbouring mountain tracts let us see what is the strength and cost of the arrangements now subsisting. The annual cost of the 42nd, 43rd, and 44th Regiments with head-quarters at Debroghur, Gowhaty, and Shillong, respectively, is Rs. 6,69,310. The strength of each regiment is supposed to be 800 men. The total strength of the police for the districts of Assam, including the Khasi, Naga, and Garo Hills force is 2,064 men, costing Rs. 3,52,210 only exclusive of European superintendence, which may be taken to raise the total cost to Rs. 4,11,010. We believe that if the police were increased by 1,200 men at a cost of, say, Rs. 2,50,000, the troops might be entirely withdrawn and four lakhs of rupees be legitimately saved. It must be remembered also that the whole criminal work of the province is done by the present police force in addition to its outpost duty and active defence of the frontier. On the Bhutan frontier we have two regiments stationed, the one at Julpigori, the other at Buxa. Their annual cost is about Rs. 3,76,000. If it be necessary to have any troops at all on this part of the frontier, which we doubt, believing as we do that a military police would do the work better and more cheaply, we would move one of these regiments to Doobree, on the Berhampooter,

\* That is to say, taking north and south sides of the valley together.

where it could act effectively either towards Bhutan or towards Assam, and relieve the minds of those who consider the sight of scarlet to have some magical efficacy in securing quiet. The second regiment might retain its head-quarters and one wing at Julpigori, the other wing being posted at Buxa and supported by a strong body of police. Were this done reductions would also be possible in the direction of the brigade and head-quarters staff at Shillong, costing now over half a lakh per annum. Turning now to Sylhet and Cachar, we find that the only foes to be guarded against are the Kookie tribes dwelling between Hill Tipperah and Manipur, who have been much heard of lately under the name of Lushais. The rebellion of the Sintengs of Jaintia in 1869 indicated another possible source of danger to the north; but we believe that it is not likely to recur, and that the force, be it police or be it troops, in the Khasi Hills will be able to keep all needful order. The people are, moreover, fast being civilized. At present we have in Cachar a wing of the regiment whose head-quarters is at Dacca, and a police force, in Cachar and Sylhet together, of 896 men, costing Rs. 1,50,026. We would not reduce the military force, but would station it in Sylhet instead of Cachar, and treat it purely as a reserve. The police, organized as we would have them in Assam, could hold the frontier and prevent at the same time those raids into Manipur by exiled Rajputras, which are a constant source of anxiety to the District Officers and to the Resident at Manipur. But if we are ever to be secure from raids, the Lushai tract interposed between Cachar and Chittagong must be specially dealt with. We have no better suggestion to make than those put forward last year by the Bengal Government and publicly discussed at the time. A road must be cut through from Cachar to Chittagong; such a road as erewhile civilized the Khasi Hills. A specially chosen officer, with a strong guard, must go into the country there to dwell, and ultimately to rule, taking the work of Gregory at Sameogooding and Williamson at Tura as his model. The wonderful success being achieved by Mr. Edgar at this present moment in the very heart of these hills will pave the way for such an advance. The mysterious Sookpial, that old man of the mountain, has at last been reached and turns out a very amicable bogy after all. The time is not far distant when Lushai raids will be things unheard of. Hurrying southward we find ourselves in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. The circumstances of our position here we lately described. Only a strong body of armed police can secure immunity from outrage in these hills. Our present force numbers 400 men, and costs Rs. 75,404. It must be largely increased so as to enable it to protect the country south of the Kurnafoolie from the Shindoos and other such marauding tribes. The Howlongs and Sylcos must be kept in check by the deputation of a special officer with 200 armed police to an advanced post, where he can confirm the feeble faith of Botton Poas, our ally, and ultimately co-operate with the officer in charge of the Lushai Hills north of the watershed. Anything that we can say on the defence of the north-east frontier within the limits of an article must of necessity be sketchy and incomplete, but if we have succeeded in drawing attention to the facts of the case, or in making the conditions of our frontier policy more clear, our object will have been fully attained.

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*Pioneer, the 4th May 1870.*

If absolute independence and freedom from control is calculated to make princes happy, or entitles them to preeminence among their peers, the Rajah of Hill Tipperah is surely the most fortunate and foremost of

**Hill Tipperah.**

Indian princes. Ruler of three thousand square miles of territory, in which his word is law for life or death, paying no tribute to any paramount power, waging war or levying subsidies at his own free will, subject to the inquisition of no British officer, interviewed by no strangers, criticised by no press, this Chief stands alone in the proud independence of his State. Yet (such are the anomalies of actual fact) this hill kingdom is but a portion of an impartible Raj, the rest of which is a permanently-settled semindari in a British district. The title to succeed is tried in due course of law in our Civil Courts. The Rajah on the plains is assessed to income-tax and pays for chowkeedars. He receives no salute. He is invited to no durbars. The events of late years have given rise to much consideration of the position of Hill Tipperah. Flanked on three sides by settled districts it is bordered on the east by that unknown land of mountain, stream, and jungle, from which burst forth the bands of Lushais or Kookies that from time to time ravage our tea gardens in Cachar, or butcher our cotton-growers in the hills of



Chittagong. For the last sixty years a suspicion has lurked in the breast of Government that fuller knowledge of this tract would prove that the Tipperah Rajah was to some extent responsible for the outrages so done. Responsible, we mean, in this way—that while in some few cases the attacks were probably committed by his own proper subjects without his antecedent knowledge, in nearly all they were brought on by his mode of dealing with the fierce tribes of the interior, who were unable to distinguish in retaliation between his territories and those of the British Government. Further, there could be no doubt that neither by affording information, nor by substantial assistance, had the Rajah disavowed himself from the responsibility so attaching to him. No definite case against him has, however, at any time been made out, for the very simple reason that we have never had an officer resident in his territory who could ascertain for us the facts. At one time indeed, in 1823, the evidence became so strong that he was warned by the Governor General that, Rajah as he was and independent as he had been, if the case were by further inquiry proved against him, he would be tried as a criminal in the Courts of Sylhet. At another time, in 1844, a party of troops entered the hills and captured the leader in a recent raid, the Rajah and his followers looking quietly on while their internal police was thus managed for them and in their despite. And yet the Government has never to this day taken steps for bringing this little State under proper supervision, though the Kookie invasion of 1860, when fifteen British villages were burnt and well nigh three hundred British subjects slain or captured, was directly traced to mis-government in Hill Tipperah, which had irritated the subordinate Chiefs into calling in the Kookies for revenge. Our districts suffered to a great extent by mistake, but the evil was the none less real for all that. Then again the raids last year, on Sylhet at any rate, were, it is almost certain, made by the Lushais, when in pursuit of a Chief subordinate to the Tipperah Rajah, with whom they had cause of quarrel, and who had fled within our boundary. It is high time now that an officer were stationed in Hill Tipperah to guide the Counsels of the Rajah, and see that no rash measures of his shall incense the inner tribes with whom Mr. Edgar has just opened such promising negotiations, and who profess that it was never their wish to make us their foes. A good opportunity for revising our relations in this quarter has just occurred. In 1863 the present Rajah got possession of the *guddee*, but his right to retain it was disputed by a near relative, who, according to precedent, instituted a suit in our Courts *quoad* the zemindari, which has been pending all these years. The Privy Council has, however, now confirmed the reigning Rajah's title, and a few months since he applied to Government for investiture which had been withheld till the result of the suit was known. This investiture is the only token of fealty the Rajah has hitherto yielded. It was only on the last occasion that a *nuzzur* was for the first time demanded by Government, though now it has been decided on the next succession to demand the full *nuzzurana* of half a year's revenue from the hill territory. We regard this as a necessary step in the direction of a full and proper control. Be that as it may, the investiture was on the 8th of March carried out by the Commissioner of Chittagong at the (capital of the State, with sufficient pomp and traditional ceremonies. The Rajah, relieved of all anxiety as to his position, is free to enter upon measures of reform if only the way be shown him. He is not by any means ill-disposed, and only requires to be freed from the control of his *amlah*, who are opposed of course to anything likely to diminish their influence. Let us then, both for the sake of Hill Tipperah and for our own interests, assert our paramount rights and delegate an officer to that State as we have done long since to Manipur. Then we can settle on a definite basis the questions as to the surrender of criminals and realisation of civil claims which now perplex our Court. Then we can consider with knowledge all the political bearings of the mutual relations of the frontier tribes. Then we can effectually guarantee the peace and safety of our subjects in Sylhet and Cachar, if not in Chittagong.

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*Pioneer, the 10th June 1870.*

On the 14th of August 1832 the Province of Cachar was annexed by proclamation to British India. Two years previously

The Lushais.

Rajah Govind Chandra had perished by the hand of an assassin, crowning a miserable life by a miserable end. For seventeen years a king in name, he had seen his country made the battle-field whereon three Manipuri brothers contended for supremacy. He had seen its plains parcelled out among them, and been himself thrust forth, while in the Northern Hills a menial servant had successfully raised the standard of rebellion and had

gotten to himself a kingdom. The Burmese had next invaded the land and laid waste its villages. Vast tracts had fallen out of cultivation; the people had fled in numbers to the neighbouring districts; and when the strong arm of British power and the exigencies of British policy replaced Govind Chandra on the throne, it was to rule over a desolated poverty-stricken realm, till, a few years later, he died a violent death. No part of Cachar had suffered more from the troubles of the time than the great fertile tract lying south of the Barak. Seventeen hundred square miles of the richest soil lay here deserted. Finely wooded with valuable timber, watered perennially by the Dulaisuri and Sonai, the land was equally good for tillage or pasture. It had been long years before populous and prosperous. But apart from the ravages of the semi-civilized armies of Manipur and Burma it had suffered fearful things from the wild Kookies of the Southern Hills, to whom the disorganization of all Government had afforded rare chance of plunder such as no savage would willingly forego. The southern limit of Cachar had never been defined. An unexplored country of hill and jungle, supposed to belong to Tipperah, marched the district in that quarter. The home of ravening beasts and savage men—none, save perhaps a few adventurous wax-gatherers, had ever penetrated its shades. But for miles along the lower courses of the streams that issued from these hills, our officers found sites of villages and traces of cultivation, which showed that at one time the country had enjoyed undisturbed prosperity. Under British rule this happy state of things very speedily returned. Settlements of Manipuris and other cultivators spread fast southward. Then came the discovery of tea and the influx of European planters; and now our gardens extend far up the valleys, a tempting prey to the lawless tribes of the interior, who to this day retain their savage characteristics in unmitigated perfection.

Of what goes on within these hills we have had till lately little or no information. But one singular fact has been demonstrated which no political student can afford to overlook. It is that there is some persistent pressure acting on the tribes from the south that drives them northward into our acknowledged territory. First, a tribe of Nagas came fleeing across the Barak, driven up by the Tangune Kookies. Then came the Tangunes themselves, expelled by the Changsaels and Tadoes. Still later, in 1846, we find the latter, in their turn, seeking a refuge from the Lushais; and now we know that the Lushais, powerful as they are, dread the advance of the Poo, of whom we can only conjecture that they are connected with the Shindoes, who have for many years troubled the verge of our hill tracts in Chittagong.

The serious attention of Government was first called to the Lushais in 1847, when Colonel McCulloch, the Political Agent in Manipur, reported that a tribe so called armed with muskets, and having among them fighting men dressed like Burmese, was ravaging the south of Manipur. The country intervening between the Kathe Valley and Tipperah was supposed at that time to belong to the Hill Tipperah State, and accordingly the petty ruler of that anomalous kingdom was invited to give information in regard to this new invader. He however professed an ignorance of their history and doings, which were probably real. We were not long left in doubt as to their aggressive character and dangerous qualities. In November 1849 they came down in force upon Cachar and perpetrated a series of raids and massacres upon Kookie villages lying within ten miles of the station of Silchar. A simultaneous attack was made upon the borders of Sylhet precisely as we saw happen last year. Fortunately for itself the Government lost no time in despatching a punitive expedition. In January 1850 Colonel Lister, whose gallant conduct of operations in the Khasi Hills had brought him great renown, marched southward with the Sylhet Light Infantry. In ten days he arrived at the village of Mullah, which he carried by surprise in the absence of the fighting men. It contained from 800 to 1,000 houses, full of grain and cotton. So struck was Colonel Lister by the appearance of the country, pathless, difficult, unknown, and by the strength of the villages stockaded and inaccessible, that he burnt down Mullah and made a hasty retreat lest he should be cut off in the forests and come to disaster. The only tangible result of this expedition, therefore, was to show the Lushais that their fastnesses could be reached and stormed and burnt *when there was nobody there to defend them*. One good thing we did secure. We delivered some 400 captives, who were kept by the Lushais to till their jooms. But the Lushais by way of relieving their exasperated feelings butchered all that remained in their hands. It was the universal opinion of our local officers at this time that the tribe would only be emboldened by the partial result of the expedition. These expectations were not however fulfilled. Our foray set the Lushais upon inquiring as to the power and character of the white people now for the first time seen by them. They determined to make overtures of peace. In October muntrees or representatives from five

Chiefs—Sookpilal, Barmoccelin, Boottai, Langroo, and Lalpoo—came into Cachar and invited us to become their allies against the Poe. In December Sookpilal himself came in and had interviews with Colonel Lister. It is denied, we believe, now that this was Sookpilal; but it is certain that a Chief whom all the Kookies in Cachar recognized as Sookpilal was for days in the station. His retinue were armed with flint muskets of American pattern with "G. Alton" on the locks. We of course declined to war on the Poe. But friendly speeches were interchanged and Sookpilal presented *assure* "in token of submission". In 1855 he re-appears again, though not in person, asking our aid against neighbouring Chiefs who had attacked him, and grounding his request on the fact that he was "our man" and had paid us tribute. His request was refused; and his next appearance was in January 1858, when three villages on the confines of Sylhet were burnt by him, and the inhabitants either slain or carried captives. Instead of sending a force against them on this occasion, the Cachar authorities were ordered to negotiate and endeavour to bind him and the other Chiefs to respect our boundary and restore their captives. Up to the close of 1855 this palavering went on without any substantial result, till in 1856, the Government, despairing, assembled the police to form an expedition into the hills. These preparations led Sookpilal to renew negotiations, and he gave up four (!) captives and promised to behave well for the future! The expedition was abandoned. This was in 1857. And up to this point it seems to us that the Lushais have by no means had the worst of it. The Adumpong massacre, as the outrage of 1862 was called, was unavenged. We returned good for evil, presents for smiting, fair words for foul deeds.

*Pioneer, the 11th June 1870.*

Our narrative brought us down to the year 1867, and it will be well, before going further, to "put ourselves in the place" of

More about the Lushais.

Sookpilal, or any other of the Lushai Chiefs, and try to realize how an astute and boastful

savage would regard us after all that had passed. Would he not think that the fierceness of his attacks had paralysed our nerve; that his position was so inaccessible as to be secure from our troops; that we dreaded the chance of conflict with his warriors amid their native woods, and either stole upon his villages when garrisoned by old men and women, or sent embassies with presents to court his favor rather than risk the dangers of a warlike enterprize? One thing at any rate is certain. We had given the Lushais no real cause to dread our power. We had negotiated without any show of substantial strength, such as would impress a savage vain of the unchecked career of victory his tribe had hitherto pursued. Whether our impressions of the nature of our frontier policy in this quarter be correct or no, this at least is the fact, that, after an interval of only one raiding season, the Lushais came down with fire and sword upon our settled villages of Sylhet and defenceless tea gardens in Cachar. The Chief who despatched the raiders against Sylhet was none other than Sookpilal—Sookpilal, receiver of embassies, restorer of captives, payer of tribute—submissive, conciliated Sookpilal! Three days after the attack on Monierkhall tea garden, the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar was in receipt of Government orders directing him to follow up the raiders with such troops as were at hand, and inflict condign punishment for these renewed outrages. Within four days from the arrival of that telegram troops were *en route* for the frontier, and a plan of operations had been settled and approved by the Bengal Government. Charming energy prelude surely some great result! Three days later, however, the superior military authorities found that all this was very irregular. It was not in accordance with the precepts of the Aide Memoire, or whatever the military Hoyle is called, to send anything less than a small army into an enemy's unknown country. Artillery and Sikhs were absolutely required. On the 28th of January 1869, the avenging force, as first proposed, handy and serviceable, was on the frontier ready to start. It was not till the 22nd of February that the artillery arrived. On the 1st of March the rain began. Two columns of invasion entered the Lushai country. The first, under the Brigadier-General of the North-Eastern Frontier, was to follow the line of the Dullesuri Valley. Two days' march from Julnacherra brought them to Pukwa Mookh, and here the rain caught them. For five days the force remained in camp at Pukwa, watching the rivers rise. On the sixth they advanced five miles, failed to get the elephants and artillery across a hill stream, returned two miles to the camp perched on the top of a muddy *tilak*, and next day fairly

set their faces for Cachar. This column at any rate could not have had much moral effect on the Lushai tribes. The second column was to operate on the Sonai Valley to the east of the Dulleshuri, and was accompanied by Mr. Edgar in person. It had been long ready to start, and the tidings of its preparedness had reached the Lushai settlements, for before it broke camp messengers came in from the villages of Vompil, Chief of the eastern clans, making submission and friendly overtures and deprecating any hostile attack. This column, therefore, advanced for purpose of demonstration along a line of friendly country. But it did advance in spite of rain and storm, and that mainly owing to the indefatigable efforts of Mr. Edgar, ably seconded as he was by young and enterprising officers, unencumbered by responsibilities, none of whom luckily was over the standing of a Major. They penetrated right up to the Lushai villages, received deputations from the surrounding Chiefs, who one and all of course denied having raided on Cachar, and after solemnly warning the Lushais of the punishment that awaited them for future outrage, the force quietly and safely returned. So far the Sonai column, no doubt, did its work well. But the tribes on that river are quite distinct from those on the west upon the Dulleshuri and Gootur, to which Sookpial belongs. The column directed against the western clans did not, to say the least, succeed in reaching these. But there was a third column operating from Sylhet, to which we have not yet alluded. This was not intended to be a column of attack, but was to create a diversion (not in the way it probably has among the Lushais, but) by distracting the attention of the western tribes. It was to push on and join the Dulleshuri column in its anticipated triumphal march through Sookpial's Poonjis. Trusting to the irresistible might of our troops, the little party from Sylhet went pushing gaily forward, not very careful about supplies, as they hoped to find these with the main body, till they reached the Gootur and found themselves with 180 police and 55 sepoy right among the Lushai fastnesses. Beacon fires blazed out on every hill, shots came dropping into camp from the woods around, the whole country was up, provisions were entirely exhausted, and not a sign of the Dulleshuri force was to be seen—(it was by this time safe in Silchar). So the Sylhet column too had to turn away and hurry back to food and civilization. Sookpial and his neighbours would no doubt set this result at any rate down to their own credit, as a positive repulse of our force. As regards punishment for outrage done and rescue of captives taken, this Lushai expedition was clearly a failure. It was the decided opinion of the local officers, and we believe of the Bengal Government, that no peace or safety could be looked for on this frontier for the future, till effective measures had been taken to convince the Lushais that we are as able to punish as we are willing to be friendly. It was proposed that a carefully organized, and not too unwieldy, force of police and Goorkhas should at the proper season enter the hills, not necessarily to plunder and to ravish, but to bring the hitherto hostile Chiefs to reason and to terms, to rescue captives and exact pledges, and, finally, to pave the way for bringing all these tribes under the direct control of a British officer, who, residing in their midst and studying their habits, might lead them on to peaceful paths such as it has been our policy to introduce among the Nagas, Khasias, and Garos. The Government of India, however, would not hear of an expedition. "It was averse on principle to move bodies of troops or police to effect reprisals for outrage, or chastise offenders by following them into their hills." But it was willing to try the plan of direct management by a selected officer. Frontier posts were to be erected and frontier villages armed for defence. The Lushais, in short, were to be managed by love, while they had not yet learnt the respect and fear which, when followed by forbearance, alone lead such savages to love. The Supreme Government was peremptory, and the local officers loyally fell into its views. A deputation from the Eastern clans had come into Cachar to renew the friendly intercourse begun under the dread of our troops, and Mr. Edgar seized the opportunity to arrange that he should in the cold weather visit their neighbourhood. His proposals were sanctioned by Government. Every art of conciliation was employed by him to induce the western clans also to receive him. He was warned by Government to feel his way cautiously and carefully—not to advance at any risk. He was given full discretion as to the mode of negotiation. What the result of his expedition has been we hope soon to show. It is obvious at starting that he had a most difficult task before him. He had to conciliate without exciting contempt. He had to dictate terms to tribes who had no reason to dread us. He had to work under the depressing influence of the knowledge that our attempts at coercion had hitherto failed: that the Government would not support his threats, if such were called for by substantial show of force. He had to make political bricks out of an infinitesimal quantity of material chaff, for he had scarcely a full grown straw to cling to. How he succeeded or failed we have yet to learn.

*Pioneer, the 19th July 1870.*

We are now in a position to give some account of the journey lately undertaken by

Mr. Edgar among the Lushais.

Mr. Edgar, the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, with a view to the pacification and conciliation of the Lushai tribes. In our preliminary articles we showed what the nature of our political relations towards these tribes had been, and how outrages had been met by empty threats, friendly overtures, or futile expeditions. We stated our conviction that Mr. Edgar had a most difficult task before him, inasmuch as he had to conciliate triumphant savages without exciting further contempt, and to be firm and peremptory under the depressing thought that Government would probably not be itself peremptory in case of need. We had, however, faith in our frontier officers' tact. We had more than faith in the omnipotent rupee. Silver hath charms to soothe the savage breast; and even among the Lushais we doubted not each man and village had its price, if not in cash, then in cloths, and beads, and gewgaws. On the 20th of last December, Mr. Edgar, accompanied by Major Macdonald, set out from Silchar, a small police guard and a gang of coolie porters forming their only escort. The expedition shaped its course for the Sonai, and the eastern clans of Lushais bordering on that river. For this there were many reasons. Along this stream Mr. Edgar had himself succeeded in guiding a party of troops the year before. Friendly overtures had been made to him by some of the clans in this quarter, and he was indeed ostensibly responding now to an invitation conveyed to him by the delegates of their chiefs. Besides this, as his progress was to be cautious and deliberate, there were hopes that the tidings of his peaceful errand, the bruit of his promises, the fame of his presence, would penetrate across the hills to the Dullessuri to melt the heart and moisten the mouth of Sookpial. On the 1st of January Mr. Edgar and his party arrived at Lushai Ghat far up the Sonai, in the very heart of the country. Here they established themselves for purposes of negotiation; and as no one could say when such a comprehensive palaver would end, the police and coolies under Major Macdonald's directions built a bungalow, godowns, and lines, and cleared the jungle round so as to guard against treachery or surprise. Two muntries, or deputies, from two leading communities had accompanied Mr. Edgar from Cachar. These were Jampitang, who represented the village of Kholel, and Mora, who was deputed from Dollong. Dollong is ruled over by a very aged lady, Impanu by name, the mother of that Vopnilal, deceased, whose village Colonel Lister destroyed in 1850. Kholel belongs to a minor son of the said Vopnilal. Though their Chiefs are thus connected, it would seem that considerable jealousy exists between the villages. Certainly there was no lack of it between the rival muntries. Mr. Edgar was constantly being taken aside by Mora and warned against "that rascal Jampitang"; and Jampitang, when Mora's back was turned, never had a good word to say for him. These savage worthies were now despatched to summon their Chiefs to meet Mr. Edgar according to their promise: but days passed and no Chiefs came. Mora returned from Dollong, saying Impanu was mourning for a daughter and could not attend. He brought however two muntries from Pibuk, Sookpial's mother, and two from Khalkom, Sookpial's son. This was promising, as indicating a desire to treat on the part of the western clans, and Mr. Edgar very judiciously made his face stern to them, rejected their paltry offerings of fowls and demanded why Sookpial, the arch offender, had not come to make his peace. At the same time enough was said to show that peace would not be hard to find. To test the truth of Impanu's excuses, Hurri Churn Surma, Mr. Edgar's right-hand man, who from long residence on the frontier knew the Lushais and their ways, and through whom everything was done in this expedition, went up to Dollong, and there truly he found the old lady sunk in grief and haggard with weeping, but seeking some solace for her woes in smoke—drying the corpse of her daughter over a low fire. Nothing daunted, the Baboo sat him down beside her, and broached to her then and there Mr. Edgar's wishes. She assented readily to everything; though indeed there seems to us to run through her replies an under-strain of complaint. "Have it as you will—only for pity leave me with my dead." Scarcely had Hurri Churn got back to camp when the clash of barbaric music, chiefly gongs, announced to the party the advent of a personage. This proved to be Khalkom, the son of Sookpial, attended by some 200 men, mostly armed, and having in company a juvenile chief, the son of one Darmangpi, who did not himself appear. It was clear that although Mr. Edgar had given full proof of his amicable intentions, in the free-handed way in which he paid for services rendered, and in the overtures made to the deputies from the clans, still the predominant feelings in Khalkom's breast were fear and mistrust. Diplomacy now assumed the form of rum and curacao, or some such conciliatory compound, and after various speeches Khalkom, protesting that he would be the saheb's man for ever and a day, but that the muntries would settle all business details, skuttled off in a dooly

with visible symptoms of relief. Mr. Edgar was in camp at Lushai Bazar from the 1st of January till the 8th of February, but Khalkom was the only Chief he saw during all that time. He had, however, long discussions with the muntrees of the Chiefs already mentioned and with others, and unfolded to them the proposals he had to make. What these were we may now see. Between the tea gardens and cultivation of South Cachar and the Lushai villages intervenes a broad tract of uninhabited hill and jungle, which effectually masks to us all the movements of the tribes beyond it. A raiding party may appear at any moment by paths to us unknown, and, after burning and plundering a village or a tea garden, plunge back again into the forest gloom, leaving us entirely ignorant of the precise clan to which they belong. The idea therefore has been started that if we could induce the tribes, all or any of them, to move northward so as to occupy this fertile but desolate tract, we should have them under our immediate control, and might in time find it possible to arm and strengthen them, so that they might serve as a shield to Cachar against inroads from the south. Mr. Edgar therefore proposed to lay down a boundary line beyond which our civil jurisdiction should not extend, and he invited the muntrees to cause their Chiefs to settle each a village on this line. He promised them, if friendly, arms and ammunitions when the villages were established. These proposals were on the whole favourably received, and next cold weather ought to show us what is the worth of the promises the muntrees so freely made. At one point in the negotiations the Kholel men gave considerable trouble. When pressed about last season's raids, they showed much impatience. Mr. Edgar said such things could not be allowed to go on, and that if there was no other way of stopping them, Government would station an officer in their midst. On this they left the camp in a rage, called out their armed men and paraded in force across the river. We think it was a mistake to place the idea of stationing an officer among them in the light of a threat. The mutual advantages of such a measure might well have been insisted on rather than its repressive character, even although it was afterwards found impossible to get a proper site for a resident officer. But we think a graver mistake was committed on the following day when, though they still continued refractory and hostile, they were wooed back to good humour by presents all round. With a guard of 80 men and a strong camp we should have liked to see Mr. Edgar wait a little longer. But it is, we admit, difficult to judge of the propriety of such actions on bare statements of the facts. While the expedition remained in camp Major Macdonald succeeded in making his way to the top of the main peak of the ridge between the Dullessuri and Sonai, and there got sights, which, with his other observations, enabled him to add to our maps correct representations of these two valleys and the surrounding hills. A brisk trade was also carried on in the camp, and hundreds of Lushai came down to see the sahebs, a favourite amusement being to measure themselves against Major Macdonald's lofty person, to inspect his weapons, and criticise his drawings. Two sketches of a tiger and an elephant, drawn to different scales, did not please them, as the tiger was made so much bigger than the elephant. Shrewd savages! What most took their fancy was a proposal to establish an annual fair in the hills. The enquiries made by Mr. Edgar at this place seemed to show that many of the outrages in Cachar had been committed by the Lushais to avenge wrongs done them by the Kookies living there under our protection. A fruitful source of raids has been the possession of certain mysterious gongs, carried off, as the Lushais allege, from them and kept for many years by certain Thado Kookies in Cachar. There is no limitation of time to a Kookie's suit, and Mr. Edgar's promise to investigate the case on his return gave much satisfaction.

On the 8th February the expedition set out across the hills for the Dullessuri Valley in the hope of seeing Sookpilal. On the 12th they reached that river and turned south. On the 21st they got to Bepari Bazar and set up their second camp, there to wait till Sookpilal chose to come in. Difficulty was experienced in getting messages faithfully conveyed to that Chief as every village muntree employed wanted to retain the profits of go-between as long as possible. At last some messages arrived from Sookpilal's village, and on the 21st of March a month's patient waiting was rewarded, for Sookpilal, the mysterious old man of the hills, then arrived, now for the first time to be gazed on by Europeans,—a shrewd, hard-faced old barbarian with gimlet eyes; thoroughly appreciating the fiery cup of greeting presented to him by his host and poured down his throat by attendant muntrees. Negotiations then began, and here again we cannot but view with some regret the line of persuasion adopted by Mr. Edgar. He told these people that the Sylhet sahebs were very angry with them, and wanted to punish them for the late raids, but that he had interceded for them and guaranteed their future good behaviour. We should be disposed to doubt if it was well to draw broad views of distinction between Sylhet and Cachar. We would not have in words so readily condoned all the

outrages this old villain had committed. We would have enquired as to the captives carried off from our villages, and would have talked a little big, in the hope of covering the unpleasant fact that we were cajoling, when we ought to have been dictating terms to a humble well-threshed savage. Sookpial readily agreed to the proposal to fix a boundary to South Cachar, and promised to place a village on the line. Arrangements were then very judiciously suggested by Mr. Edgar, under which traders protected by his pass should be allowed to go freely up the Goochar and Dullesuri on payment of fixed dues to the Chiefs. To this also Sookpial agreed; and then was he clad in gorgeous raiment to delight his barbaric soul: a purple coat brodered with green and gold; loose drawers of green, flowered in gold and scarlet; a hat of silk, mixed green and white; a necklace of glass buttons and gold beads, and long glass earrings finished off the suit. Placed then before a looking glass the Chief grew vain, smirked, grinned and, finally fairly melted, flung himself on Hurri Thakur's neck and hugged him like an ecstatic bear. This closed the palaver. On the 25th of March the expedition started on its return journey to Silchar, and now how shall we sum up the results?

No praise can be too high for the patience, perseverance, and tact displayed by Mr. Edgar throughout these three months. Differ from him as we may on some minor points, we desire emphatically to congratulate him on his enterprise as a whole. The policy which dictated it was not his. But loyally he accepted it and ably he brought it to such issues as were possible. Were the negotiations with the Lushais to end here, we should have no hope that the safety of our frontier was any the more secured. But we believe that the Government intend to send similar expeditions into the hills every cold weather. This one is said to have cost some Rs. 15,000: and we have no doubt that an annual expenditure of say Rs. 10,000 will prevent raids as far as the Lushais are concerned. Government never was so liberal before. But how the tribes view the policy may be judged from the fact that, before Mr. Edgar was well away, the eastern tribes sent messengers to Manipur to say that the *sakels* had come into the hills and duly paid tribute to the Lushai Chiefs. We look with great suspicion on the fact that only two full-grown Chiefs met our officers during the whole time. We fear this was meant as an insolent assumption of superiority. If, however, Mr. Edgar can succeed in getting the tribes to move within reach of our posts; if he can develop a profitable trade and establish popular fairs on the frontier, we may in time be able to take a more decided and more dignified attitude. But meanwhile there is always the danger that these unreasoning hillmen may imagine that a stimulating raid will elicit better terms, or Mr. Edgar's successor may be wanting in the tact and caution necessary to the situation. We are at best trying an experiment; and shall be only too glad if it succeed.

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*Observer, the 11th February 1871.*

Between the eastern districts of Bengal and the empire of Ava is interposed a great

#### The Lushais.

mountain system, of which we know little more than it is peopled by numerous savage tribes of warlike habits and predatory instincts.

From the western face of this central range, the general run of which is north and south, branch off almost at right angles two minor systems, the one separating the valley of Assam from the Districts of Cachar, Sylhet, and Mymensingh, the other shutting off Cachar and Sylhet from Chittagong, Noakhali, and the Bay of Bengal. In the first of these cross ranges, live the various races of Nagas, the Sintengs, the Khasias, and the Garos, all of whom, in days past, habitually raided on the lowlands to their north and south defying for many years the attempts of our frontier officers to bring them to order. Now, happily, a wise policy of direct management by chosen officers, supported by a show of strength adequate to repress outrage, has brought the beginnings of civilisation and peace home to these wild and warring tribes; and the northern marches of Cachar, Sylhet and Mymensingh have been for some years free from the incursions which were wont annually to disturb them. The attention of Government and of the public, has of late been chiefly drawn to the southern range, the eastern half of which is shown in the maps as "Lushai tribes, unsurveyed," the western portion constituting Hill Tipperah, that anomalous little tract which became, we believe, a kingdom by mistake. A series of raids unparalleled for daring and atrocity has, within the last ten years, been perpetrated on British territory, north and south, by tribes issuing from these hills; and if the slaughter of its native subjects was not enough to lead the Government to deal seriously with the facts,

there is some hope that the English blood which has been recently spilt, and the European interests that are now imperilled, will compel a speedy adoption of measures well fitted to punish for the past, and prevent similar outrage for the future.

To understand these raids properly, it is necessary to remember that the Lushai country, though it intervenes between Cachar and Chittagong, does not on the south look down upon the plains. It merges in the outer ridges and broken spurs of mountain system dividing Chittagong from Burma, upon which various peaceful tribes under our rule carry on a "joom" cultivation of cotton and rice. The Chittagong Hill Tracts are under a European Officer, and are flanked on the east and north-east by the savage races of Shindoes, Howlongs, Syloos, and Rutton Posa's clan. The Howlongs and Syloos and Rutton Posa's people, as well as the tribes living north of the water-pent between Cachar and Chittagong, are generally known as Lushais. We have thus Cachar Lushais and Chittagong Lushais: the former always raiding to the north, and the latter—it was till the year supposed—confining their ravages to Arracan, the Chittagong Hill Tracts, and Tipperah. There is reason to believe that some of the Chiefs of the Cachar Lushais are connected by blood or marriage with Chiefs of the Howlongs and Syloos; and although there is no such thing as a Lushai confederacy, each Chief being as a rule independent, there is no doubt that, for purposes of war and plunder, temporary alliances are made, and formidable bands are got together. With the help of a map, the local conditions of the frontier in this quarter will now, we trust, be tolerably clear.

Let us next briefly summarise the history of these hills for the last ten years, and of the raids committed by the tribes there dwelling. To take the Chittagong side first. In January 1860, five hundred Lushais, under Rutton Posa, their Chief, swept across the north of our hill tracts, burst into the plains of Tipperah, burnt 15 villages, butchered 185 British subjects, and carried captive 100 souls. In those days we avenged the slaughter of our people where we could, and precisely one year afterwards, a body of military police, under Captain Baban, penetrated to Rutton Posa's village, and inflicted considerable chastisement on him and on his tribe. The policy of vigor brought its own reward. It was followed by the unconditional submission of the Chief; and the subsequent establishment of a chain of police posts has, ever since, kept the hill tracts north of the Kurnafolie free from raids. Rutton Posa has continued friendly. He has given information from time to time of raids contemplated by his neighbours, the Howlongs and Syloos. He dare not render more active help owing to the exigencies of his own position. And naturally enough he does not scruple to intrigue in order to maintain his advantage as the sole medium of communication between us and the other Lushais near him. These Lushais, chiefly Howlongs, as well as the more southern and still more warlike Shindoes, have raided frequently on the south of our hill tracts, where the population is sparse and the police posts few and far between. The whole of these tracts is indeed a confused jumble of broken hills and ravines covered with the densest jungle, where the only paths are the beds of torrents. The climate is for three-fourths of the year deadly to natives of the plains, and posts can only therefore be maintained during the cold season. Their effect is at best rather moral than practically formidable. Many attempts have been made to cultivate amicable relations with the Howlongs and Syloos. The greater number of their Chiefs swore not long since oaths of friendship with Captain Lewin, the Superintendent of the Hills, but the Howlongs have always been insolvent in manner, and frequently in active hostility, while the Syloos have been more open to conciliatory overtures.

Turning now to the Cachar frontier, we find that the Lushai tribes north of the water-pent are divided apparently into two sets, the one living on the upper waters of the Dullessur, the other approached by the valley of the Sonai. In 1862 (to pass over all previous outrages) Sookpial, a Chief of the western section on the Dullessur, made a savage raid upon Hill Tipperah, and on villages lying in the south-east corner of Sylhet. For four years desultory attempts were made by the local officers in Cachar to ascertain Sookpial's precise position, and to open communications with him. It was thought possible that he had not intended to attack British territory, and that he would on demand surrender the captives and give pledges of his future good behaviour. Negotiation failing, police were in 1866 got together for a punitive expedition, but the difficulty of penetrating to an uncertain goal through an unknown country led to its abandonment. The Lushais had clearly, so far, no cause to repent of their evil deeds. The policy of 1866 was not in this instance one of vigor, but years had been lost in tracing the offenders. In December 1868, Sookpial again raided in Tipperah and Sylhet, and on the 15th of January 1869 Lushais burnt the tea-houses at Loharband in Cachar and attacked Monierkhal. The



Cachar raiders were supposed to be of the Sonai tribes, but were probably acting in concert with Sookpial. To punish these outrages, a great military expedition was taken in hand. Three columns were to enter the Lushai country, one by the Sonai Valley, one by the Dullesur, and the third from Sylhet through the Tipperah Hills. The Sylhet attack eventually dwindled to a police reconnaissance. This party marched through the hills till it got close to Sookpial's villages, and there finding itself in hot quarters, fired upon, and unsupported, it very wisely came away again, rapidly. The Dullesur column was the main attack, and to uphold its dignity and ensure success, it waited for guns and elephants and grenadiers, until the rains were just about to begin. It then marched a few miles into the hills, got very wet, and came back again, *re infecta*. The Sonai party was more persevering, and somewhat more successful. It got up to some Lushai villages, but not being certain who were the guilty parties, it frightened the neighbourhood generally by firing a few rounds in the air, accepted conciliatory chickens from the Chiefs around, and returned covered with glory and mud to Cachar. Up to this point again the results seem to be that the Lushais may have been a little scared, but had not yet been hurt or punished for their repeated misdeeds. We must remember that they know but very little of us or of our power; that like all ignorant savages they have great ideas of their own prowess, and the majority of them have good reason to believe in the inaccessibility of their present sites. In view of this state of things, the local officers and the local Government urged strongly upon the Government of India the propriety of sending into the country a carefully organised expedition at the very commencement of the next cold weather, not necessarily to burn and slay, but to convince the tribes of our power to punish, and to open up communications with Chittagong. It was also suggested that permanent security could not be looked for until we had treated the Lushai tract as the Garo Hills and Khasi Hills had been treated, by placing an English officer with a strong guard in the midst of it, and doing away entirely with the anomaly of allowing a hostile and savage strip of highlands to intervene between two British districts. The Supreme Government would not, however, hear of an expedition. It declared itself, according to the Administration Report, "averse, on principle, to move bodies of troops and armed police, even in limited numbers, in order to effect reprisal for outrages on any part of our extended frontier". Another policy was now to be tried. The Lushais were to be taken in hand by a special officer, but his influence was to be based on conciliation and not on respect. He was to lead by love, not govern by salutary fear. Now in savage countries, conciliation is too often only the Latin equivalent for rum and rupees. In the case of the Lushais, we believe, it eventually involved gifts of green pyjamas. It means, in short, cozening where we cannot compel.

There is much to be said for the view of the case taken by Lord Mayo's advisers. The difficult nature of the country, the uncertainty of our being able to inflict *adequate retribution* to produce any lasting effect, were strong reasons for discountenancing an expedition. But if the Lushais were beyond the reach of punishment, they were also beyond the pale of negotiation. The Government, however, thought otherwise. Mr. Edgar, the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, to whom some of the Sonai Chiefs had, when fearing an expedition, sent messengers, was directed to visit the hills with a guard, and endeavour to establish amicable relations with the tribes. What the results of Mr. Edgar's mission really were, and how the geographical information acquired by his companion, Major Macdonald, has improved our position and ability to punish for the renewed outrages of the present year, we must enquire hereafter. It is, however, only too apparent that such overtures, coming after such marked failures to coerce, were open to the most fatal misconstruction.

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*Observer, the 25th February 1871.*

In a former article we brought the history of our dealings with the Cachar Lushais

The Lushais conciliated. down to the point where, after having failed to punish for outrage done, the Government determined to adopt a policy of conciliation pure and simple. We have said plainly enough that this mode of treating a savage and hostile people was a policy without a back bone—a limb and nerveless phantom not to be leant upon at all. Let us now very briefly see what it was that Mr. Edgar really achieved by that conciliatory journey, the details of which were laid rather exultingly before the public some nine months ago. Accompanied by Major Macdonald of the Survey, protected by a well-armed guard, and followed by a crowd of coolies bearing food for the travellers and fripperies for the

Lushai, Mr. Edgar started from Silchar on the 20th of December 1869. He arrived at Lushai Hâth on the Sonai by the 1st of January following. His guides were two *muntries* or representatives of Chiefs living near that river, each of whom used daily to take the Deputy Commissioner aside, and give him mysterious warnings against the other, huskily whispering in Kookie gutturals "Dollong is the friend, not Kholel". The very day after their arrival at the Hâth, the Lushais began their demands for money, exhibiting much unlovely temper because they did not get it there and then. So sulky indeed were they, that Mr. Edgar wrote to the station ordering more police to be sent up by degrees, as he thought "these people might give trouble". For thirty-eight days the emissaries of the great and conciliatory British Empire sat in their fortified camp at Lushai Bazar, and during the whole of that time they were never invited or admitted to a single Lushai village, and saw only one personage who even professed to be a Chief—Kalkom, to wit, the son of Sookpilal. Savages of the commoner sort flocked round them in plenty. *Muntries*, too, from different queer named potentates attended to ask what on earth the Sahibs wanted, and to ascertain what they were prepared to give. With infinite patience and wonderful tact, displaying at once the good humour of an Irishman, and the immobility of a Falstaff, Mr. Edgar received and palavered. Not once but often his visitors would try to bully and extort. Hostile demonstrations even were not wanting, and noisy parades of armed warriors threatened, at safe distances, the security of the camp. With instinctive prevision of an approaching civilisation, they would scream in their rage that he had come to ruin their clans and seize their villages. One day all would leave the camp in dudgeon, to return again the next, allured by the fascination of a trade in which all the profit was on their side, and all the loss on ours. Big dinners and bigger drinks to the *muntries*, cash payment for each service done and each point conceded, judicious threats and conciliatory acts, but above all eighty armed police in a strong camp brought Mr. Edgar safely through the first part of his adventure—fortunate chiefly in this, that he had succeeded in bribing some *muntries* to show him roads over the hills hitherto unknown, and that he had acquired an insight into the inter-tribal relations of the savages which he could never have attained in his cutchery at Cachar.

We do not, of course, mean to say that no more than this was attempted. On the contrary, the main point to which Mr. Edgar directed his arguments, was to induce these clans which should profess themselves friendly to move northward, and settle in the forest close to the south of our cultivated tracts and gardens, there to be supplied by us with arms, and form a defensive barrier against the inroads of wilder tribes from the south. It was not to be expected that all this could be brought about *tout a coup*. But beyond the post-prandial assurances of the *muntries*, we fail to see any indications that even a promising beginning of negotiation had in fact been made. All officers acquainted with our eastern frontier attach much importance to frequent personal interviews with the Chiefs themselves, and to the receipt of friendly invitations to the villages of the tribe. Reading the conduct of the Eastern Lushais towards Mr. Edgar in the light of general frontier experience, we should incline to doubt if his visit was at all welcome, save as regards the material and temporary benefits it brought with it; and we are very far from sanguine that the proposals made by him were ever seriously entertained by the tribes. Certainly they have since taken no steps whatever to fulfil their part of the bargain.

On the 8th of February Mr. Edgar's party left Lushai Bazar to cross the central range of Bengti Pahar into the Dullessur Valley, in the hope of coming to terms with Sookpilal, believed by us at that time to be the most powerful of the Lushai Chiefs. He was at any rate the one who had done us most damage. On the 20th of February the expedition reached Bepari Bazar, after being detained for some days on the road owing to shortness of supplies. Messengers were at once sent off to invite Sookpilal to attend in person. For a whole month, however, he kept Mr. Edgar waiting, but on the 21st of March this old man of the hills did actually condescend to appear. It was a real triumph of patience getting hold of him at all. Doubtless, had he not heard full accounts of the very placable and munificent conduct of the Sahib towards the eastern tribes, he would never have come. If, however (he may have thought), *muntries* were well treated, how would he, a Chief, be entertained? But again we note that he did not ask Mr. Edgar to his village or near it, and that our officers were never in fact within some days' journey of it. Negotiations began, as usual, with stimulating beverages. In this instance rum and curacao tickled the chieftain's palate, and warmed his unsophisticated heart. Mr. Edgar then proposed that a boundary should be laid down, which should be respected by us and them. On this line Sookpilal was to place a *Poonji* and a guard, which should guarantee the safety of the frontier. Arrangements were further made by which he should enjoy a monopoly of the trade with Cachar by the Gootur, levying fixed rates on all

licensed dealers and wood-cutters entering the country. All this would be admirable, if carried out, for the irregular exactions of the various Chiefs, and their occasional weakness for plunder and heads, had hitherto greatly interfered with traffic. When these matters had been satisfactorily settled, Sookpial was invested with a dress of honor specially made for him,—green pyjamas with scarlet and gold flowers, a purple coat with green and gold embroidery, an indescribable hat of green and white silk, a neckpiece of glass buttons and gold beads, and two glass earrings! One farewell tot of “Edgar’s peculiar,” and the Sahib and the Savage parted with mutual esteem. The policy of conciliation had reached its grand climacteric. But before the patient diplomatist had reached his bungalow in Silchar, messengers from the Lushais were proclaiming in Manipur that the Sahib had been into the hills to pay tribute to the Chiefs,—sure proof of their puissance, and significant warning to their remaining foes. Now, if it should be the case, as we believe it is, that Sookpial is very far from being the most powerful of the Lushais, that there are other Chiefs as warlike, and as partial to green pyjamas, we can easily imagine with what feelings they will have learnt the story of Mr. Edgar’s doings in the hills. What had Sookpial done to bring down on him such showers of good things? Simple question! He had raided with impunity and success. Nothing could be more congenial to their own habits and wishes. If Sookpial had slain his tens, they would slay scores, if Sookpial had butchered defenceless peasants, they would have heads of police, of sepoy, and of Sahibs. We may imagine, too, what jealousy there would be of the happy Sookpial through all the independent *Poonjis* of the hills. The Howlongs, whose war parties had spread panic and desolation southward to Arrakan, had never received such tribute to their prowess. Their great Chief, Vandoola, had never been so honoured, leader though he be of at least 4,000 fighting men, 2,000 of them armed with guns. Is it too much to suppose that, so far from permanently pacifying the frontier, the result of Mr. Edgar’s negotiations was to hold out direct incentives to a score of warlike peoples to come and do as Sookpial had done, that they might fare as Sookpial had fared? We know now that it is not alone to the attacks of the tribes dwelling on the Cachar streams that our gardens and villages are exposed. The long ranges running up to the water-pent prove to be but paths by which the powerful races of the Burma and Chittagong mountains may ravage our territory and retire unharmed. It is more profitable to plunder tea-gardens with a view to contingent green pyjamas, than to harry the huts of Joomas in the jungles of Chittagong. The war-trail will in future point north instead of south.

One thing, however, we have now discovered, and it is this, that if we care to abandon the policy of conciliation—that now somewhat discredited policy of rupees and rum—the villages of these raiders are not beyond our reach. We have left ourselves no space to show what we believe to be the only successful way of dealing with these tribes. For this, another opportunity must serve. The problem before Government, in face of the renewed outrages of last month, is not by any means an easy one. None can be more sensible of its difficulties than we. But it must be solved, and solved thoroughly and for ever, if our administration is not to be a scandal to our civilised subjects, and a mockery to our savage foes.

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*Observer, the 11th March 1871.*

We have now to consider very briefly what measures it seems incumbent upon

#### The Lushai Policy.

Government to adopt in view of the renewed outrages of the Lushais, and to enquire by what means our frontier districts of Cachar and Chittagong may be rendered reasonably secure from the attacks of these or cognate tribes. In Chittagong, we have to defend a long line of broken highlands, in which dwell peaceful forest races paying us revenue and looking to us for protection. It is morally impossible for us to draw back the limits of our empire and leave these our subjects to the mercy of their savage neighbours in the other hills. We must, therefore, look for a fairly defensible frontier, either within our acknowledged civil jurisdiction, or as little to the eastward of that as possible. Fortunately we have not far to go to find this. Both north and south of the Kurnatoolie, and just to the east of the tracts at present occupied by our Joomas, run two almost continuous ranges,—that to the north called Demagiri, and that to the south known as Seychul. On the Seychul range there are at present no inhabitants, but there can be little doubt that it is used as a convenient highway by the

Howlongs and other tribes in the north when they sent raiding parties towards Arracan or into the Sungoo Valley. Our present outposts are situated in the broken country well to the westward of this line. They are useless save as a moral demonstration, and they protect only the ground on which they stand; sometimes, indeed, not even that. They might occasionally be able to send a detachment to cut off the retreat of a raiding party, but ordinarily the Lushais passing up the bed of some secluded stream, or stealing through the forest by elephant tracks, penetrate where they will, and ravage as they choose, knowing well that their presence near the jooms will not be discovered until they have disappeared with their captives and their ghastly spoil of heads. So perfectly is this fact recognised that during the raiding season the cultivators retire nightly from their villages into the jungle round about, where, surrounded by their families and moveable property, they sleep malaria-haunted slumbers, thankful if at morning they find their huts intact. It is now, we believe, being admitted that no system of fixed police posts can protect efficiently a country of this kind. The other alternative is a system of strong patrols, and if these are to be of any good, they must have a clearly defined and fairly open line along which to patrol. Such a line is afforded us by the Seychul range. Along the summit of this a path must be cleared, and at reasonable distances stockades must be erected between which armed parties of police shall constantly pass to and fro. No Kookie foray could cross this line without its traces being discovered within a few hours of its passage. We may feel pretty sure that no Kookie Chief would ever venture to cross it, if the police are reasonably strong and moderately energetic. Nor would these advanced patrols have to be maintained throughout the year. Lushais cannot live by raids alone. They too have jooms to till and crops to garner. Plunder and slaughter are only the cold weather amusements of generally bucolic existence. During the rains the frontier guard might be withdrawn to head-quarters, where the men might enjoy the society of their wives, and profit by school and steady drill. We believe that the Government of India has already sanctioned the organisation of an efficient frontier force for the Chittagong Hill Tracts, and that now, happily, all the local officers are at one as to the best mode of utilising it.

We have up to this point spoken in detail only of the Seychul range, south of the Kurnafoolie. Proceeding northward we find at the point where the extremity of these hills debouches on the river that we come in contact with the group of Lushai communities that run down like a wedge into the hill tracts district from the central and northern ranges. Rutton Poa, the Chief whom we effectually conciliated ten years ago by a sound thrashing, is at present moving his village sites from the north of the Kurnafoolie on to the extreme spur of the Seychul range. He is, as we have already shown, amicably disposed, and is our one real ally among these southern Lushais. He cannot afford to do much for us, because the Syloos and Howlongs are more powerful than he, and are more ready to punish for supposed treachery than we to protect for service rendered. But, if we are ever to have a hold over these invaders of our territory, we must by establishing a strong post near Rutton Poa's village, confirm a week-kneed ally and menace in permanence the fastnesses of the Howlongs. Such a post would not only form the best *rendezvous* for the patrols on the northern half of the Seychul, but it would command a line of road along the Demagiri range, which should be similarly patrolled in order to give efficient protection to the hill tracts north of the Kurnafoolie. When the patrols and stockades on the Seychul and Demagiri ranges are fully established, we shall have, as regards Chittagong, a well defended line between our Joomes ryots and the raiding tribes. But our work must not stop here. Our line is turned at the north by the tribes inhabiting the *terra incognita* between Cachar and Chittagong. Had we only the last named district to look to, we might possibly complete our scheme of defence by carrying our line of patrols westward as best we could, athwart the streams and broken hills, until we reached the Fenny and the boundaries of Hill Tipperah; such a line would close in our Chittagong Hill Tracts as in a ring-fence. But we have a more difficult task before us than this. We have the Cachar frontier to provide for, lying between Hill Tipperah on the west and Manipur on the east. It might be possible to run a line of posts across this strip, and by dint of extensive and costly patrol, to defend the tea gardens from raiding parties attacking from the south; but, in the first place, to secure any really good line, we should have to advance some considerable distance into the Lushai tract, to cover those gardens which have already-pushed far up the valleys of the Dulassuri and the Sonai; and, in the next place, our posts might always be turned on either flank by parties marching through the sparsely peopled territories of Tipperah and Manipur. Besides all this, any merely defensive police would fail to meet the due requirements of the case. Wartlike tribes have been allowed to

attack us with impunity. They have spied out the richness and the unprotected condition of the land. They have been within ten miles of a *sadr* station, a wealthy bazar, and a well-filled treasury. Is it to be supposed that even the prospect of losing a few young warriors in the field will deter the Howlongs and Syloos from repeating their invasion? On the contrary, rumour is already rife that they intend to avenge their losses at Monierkhal by raid on a scale hitherto unknown, and in numbers which, without preparation, it will be hard to meet. We must teach these savages that we are strong as well as conciliatory. They must learn to know that the lives of our subjects are not to be taken with impunity. They must practically feel that we can reach them in their most secluded fastnesses. The Government will naturally be chary of renewing the military *fiasco* of 1869. But indeed no more retaliatory raid will now serve our turn. With careful deliberation the plan must be worked out. There are men at hand well qualified to help. Money will have to be spent, and our rulers, we know, are thrifty and the times hard. But if we once realise that an adequate outlay now will save us both money and trouble hereafter, and will lay a permanent basis for future tranquillity, none of us will grudge the necessary funds.

The expeditions made by Mr. Edgar and Majors Macdonald and Graham have shown that the Lushai villages are not so entirely inaccessible as we have long believed. Three good routes at least, two of them by water, lead far into the interior from the north. In the same way paths have been discovered and rivers explored to within a few miles of Botton Pooa's village on the south. Between the two points to which we can thus penetrate, and to the eastward of them lie the villages of the tribes with whom we have to deal. *The points alluded to are only forty miles apart.* True the country is difficult, but we are not merely going to march through it. We must occupy it in force for at least three months, and having inflicted on the offending villages condign and righteous punishment for the outrages of the past, we must take due steps to make them harmless for the future. This will best be done by running a road right through the Lushai tract into Cachar in continuation of the Demagiri patrol road. Such a road brought order and civilisation into the Khasi Hills when all other means had failed. It must, for some years, perhaps, be strongly patrolled, and commanding posts on either side must be occupied by strong guards in stocked camps; but very soon the road will bring the Lushais as peaceful traders to our bazars. The civilising influence of commerce will permeate the hills, and it is possible that a few years hence we may see Vandoola, the Howlong Chief, owning great hills of tea, and shipping at Chittagong choice specimens of Pekoe to rival the produce of the very gardens he but lately ravaged. The idea may seem extravagant, but history, local and petty enough but true, tells us that Ningroola, a Singpho Chief, who long troubled us in Dibrrooghur, underwent in days gone-by a similar transformation.

The Government will, we believe, no longer hesitate to devise some scheme for stamping out these raids which shall be *thorough*. We are confident that both imperial and local authorities will work together for this end, and while we have indicated in rough outline the plan that most commends itself to us, we trust that no theoretic views will prevent the best devised measures from being carried into full effect.

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*Pioneer, the 22nd February 1872.*

It is high time that the Government of India gave some sign of its ultimate intentions as regards the Lushais and its hill-tracts policy.

#### The Lushai Policy.

The expedition has done well all that it was possible for an expedition to do. It has shown the tribes, both north and south, that punishment for outrage, though slow in coming, is now and then sure; and that the same hands that teem at times with rupees and green *pyjamas* can deal out far-reaching destruction when the need arises. It has burnt villages and destroyed grain enough to mark its presence in the hills for many a day to come. This was its duty—the only way open to it of accomplishing its task. We are not of those who first clamor for punishment, and then beg off the culprits because "it hurts." When the tribes would not submit to our arms, the only alternative was to break up and disintegrate their communities. In the end it is quite possible that a show of submission may be made by some at least of the recalcitrant Chiefs—a handful of captives may be surrendered, and the policy of conciliation may crown with much official shouting the edifice which rough-handed war has built. It is because we distrust

entirely this conciliatory policy as at present expounded, that we draw attention to the subject at this early stage. Punitive expeditions are an absolute necessity in dealing with aggressive and ferocious borderers. On the north-west frontier they are matters of common occurrence, and attract little or no attention. We described one, the most recent, yesterday : it was vigorously conducted and entirely successful, for the present time and for that particular place ; but it will assuredly not be the last of its kind. They are indeed in that quarter almost the only means open to us of maintaining order. The races we have to keep in check are the foreigners, dwelling outside the limits of Hindustan. On the north-east the circumstances are altogether different. The limits of the empire are drawn far outside most of the tribes we have to meet, and this alone has necessarily led to fluctuations in policy and uncertainty of aim. At one time the plan of annual expeditions and retaliatory raids was perseveringly tried, as in the Naga Hills. But while the efforts of Government practically began and ended with these, no lasting effect was produced. At other times the policy of conciliation, pure and simple, has been in fashion. Indeed this policy has always found favor with a Government professedly paternal. But when tried in this shape, it too has generally proved abortive. The only policy which has at all met with permanent success is one which leaves nothing to chance—where conciliation takes its stand upon strength and preparedness, and where personal influence is backed by material power. How then are we to apply the lessons of the past to the circumstances of the present case ? We had suffered outrage, repeated and gross. Instead of promptly punishing, we made fruitless demonstrations, and finally despatched a conciliatory embassy. Personal influence descended upon the Lushais in showers of rupees and gorgeous raiment. Boundary treaties were interchanged. Chiefs hitherto inaccessible pledged our envoy in liquors to them hitherto unknown. To remoter tribes the news spread magnified, and before our messengers had left the hills, this story had run through Lushai land, from Tipperah to Manipur, that the British Government had paid tribute and sought peace of Sookpilal. The policy thus inaugurated had the result most men, save its authors, anticipated for it. Next year, while the officer who loyally carried it through against his own convictions was again in the hills, there happened such a series of raids both north in Cachar and south in Chittagong, as had never before devastated the frontier. But still the Government of India were averse to punishment ; and it was only when the clear-seeing mind of the Commander-in-Chief grasped, after local inquiry, the facts of the case, that reluctantly an expedition, which might, it was hoped to the last, be a military promenade, was at length sanctioned to. That expedition has been thus far successful. But if when it is over we are to revert to the policy of conciliation and personal influence in its original shape, we can look for no permanent good results. We shall leave behind us, in the hills, tribes exasperated by the loss of their villages, though no doubt convinced of our power to penetrate a certain distance into their fastnesses. They will have learnt that to punish any raid requires years of deliberation, and the employment of an agency very different in calibre and mode of action to that which ordinarily protects the hill tracts. They will have noted that, even when such abnormal and very destructive agency appears, offenders have only to submit and say "they are sorry," when the threatening visitors will at once receive them into favor, and disburse liquor and rupees as visible tokens of amity and good-will. If it should therefore happen that on the withdrawal of our troops, the old nonsense about conciliation and personal influence is the only policy put forward, we shall be much surprised if next season does not witness a renewal of the raids on a scale and with a ferocity of which we have at present little conception. There will be revenge to goad the Lushai on the war-path, as well as the ordinary lust for plunder and slaves. What is wanted is permanent security, and a permanent possibility of punishing outrage without expensive expeditions on the Abyssinian scale.

First, then, we must open up the country as far as possible by roads, not necessarily macadamised turnpikes, but broad, serviceable paths, along which a body of troops or police can march with elephants. One such path, driven through from Cachar to Chittagong, would do more to civilise the Lushais than any other scheme suggested. The experience of all hill tracts teaches us this. In truth, we do not see how the policy of personal influence is to be worked at all save in combination with a system of roads by which our officers can get at those they are to influence. Failing these, this wonderful animal magnetism will operate only once a year at an annual *mela*, as heretofore in the Chittagong Hills, or fitfully upon one or two Chiefs at a time after laborious journeys of months, as in Mr. Edgar's Lushai tours. Roads are essential both to conciliation and to repression. Some officers are, we know, opposed to them, on the ground that they would open out the tea-gardens to the Lushais as well as the Lushai villages to our police. But surely this is a very short-sighted line to take. With our roads we must have frontier

posts; we must have armed patrols. If a raiding party did slip past, they ought always to be intercepted on their return. The dread of this would any way tend to prevent raids; and as a fact, a system of posts and patrol paths has secured the north of the Chittagong Hills from inroads these ten years past. On the side of Cachar our policy, whether conciliatory or not, must rest on a basis of paths, posts, and patrols. In face of the strong (but weak) determination of Government to allow this anomalous Lushai land—a mere strip between the British districts—to continue independent, we can do no more. On the side of Chittagong similar arrangements must be made; but the physical characteristics of the country, and the position of the tribes, will compel us here to go further. In Cachar the line of posts may be within our own territory—the roads alone must invade the jooming tracts of the Lushais. But in Chittagong it is impossible to establish an effective line of defence wholly within the limits of our present jurisdiction. Every local officer agrees in this. To perch a series of stockades among the broken hills and dense jungles of our hill tracts district would be mere waste of men and money. We must take up a line further eastward, where we can cut a continuous patrol path along the summit of one of the ridges that here run almost uninterruptedly north and south. On this line we must place our stockades; and, properly held, it will be an almost impassable barrier to raiders from beyond. If they got through to raid, they ought never to return alive to boast. On the north these ridges join on to the more open ranges, where Button Posa and the Syloos dwell. Here we must have a strong guard permanently posted, as well to protect Button Posa, our ally, from the revenge of the Syloos, as to be a permanent menace to them and to the Howlonges. This done, we may allow personal influence to have its turn. It will not *then* be mistaken for timidity. It will rest on material power, and run no risks of being misunderstood. Apart from these or such-like measures of preparedness, we have no faith whatever in the policy of conciliation. Our troops must soon turn home again. It is high time the Supreme Government gave tokens of its plans.

*Pioneer, the 6th May 1872.*

In anticipation of the early publication of the views of Government, both as to the

What the Left Column did in Lushai land, results of the late expedition and the policy to be adopted towards the Lushais for the future, we propose to review, as well as our imperfect materials will permit, the work done by the two columns of the force, and to bring together, in the form of consecutive narrative, the information scattered through the letters of special correspondents and the meagre paragraphs of communicated telegrams. We shall endeavour to convey some idea of the character of the country traversed, and the difficulties overcome; and as we can hardly venture to hope that our readers will honour us by tracing our progress on the map as we go along (if indeed they have maps available), we shall strive to make the story as clear and self-contained as we can. We shall begin with the left column which started from Cachar, and shall afterwards follow the fortunes of the Chittagong force on the right, and finally attempt to estimate for ourselves the probable results of the expedition as a whole.

The strength of each column of the expedition was fixed by the Commander-in-Chief at half a battery of mountain artillery (with rockets), one company of Sappers and Miners, and three regiments of Native Infantry. The regiments selected for the Cachar side were the 22nd, 42nd, and 44th, consisting mainly of Punjabees, Sikhs, and Goorkhas—races specially adapted for the work before them, and equally expert with the mattock and the bayonet. Carriage was reduced to a minimum, for the way was long and rough, and the routes uncertain. Tents were dispensed with, each man being furnished with a waterproof sheet for his bedding, and left to cut branches and bamboos to keep the dew from his pillow. One maund of personal baggage sufficed for the General: six seers only were allowed to the soldier. We need not tarry to explain how elephants and coolies were got together and sent up, how boats were seized and boat-men impressed, how the Commissariat toiled and district officers went almost wild, and how the fell scourge of cholera threatened at one time to mar the whole. By the end of November the column had fairly started into the hills, and on the 6th of December the civil officer, Mr. Edgar, had left Silchar to join the troops. Before accompanying them on their weary progress, it will be well to understand the dispositions made in support of their advance, and the instructions which we gather were given them for their guidance. The goal which the left column

had (if possible) to reach was the village of Lalboorah, son of Vonohi, who had been mainly concerned in the raids upon Monierkhal. It was known that this Chief dwelt far within the hills to the south-east of Tipai Mookh—the trijunction point where Cachar, Manipur, and Lushai land join their boundaries. The line by which he had to be reached lay therefore to the extreme east of the District of Cachar and up the course of the Barak River, which there runs northward from the hills. The whole southern frontier of Cachar stretched westward from the column's right flank, and had of course to be properly protected. This was done by stationing strong guards at the points where the ordinary Lushai routes debouched on the district. Beyond the hills again to the east of the line of march lay the territory of Manipur, the confines of which towards the south-west pointed towards Lalboorah and the other Lushai clans of that neighbourhood, the only intervening tribes being those of the Sakti Kookies—a race hostile to the Lushais and friendly to Manipur. Advantage was taken of this to move a strong Manipur force down towards the south, with orders not to invade or attack the Lushais, but merely to serve as a threatening demonstration against them and as a support to the Saktis. This Manipuri contingent was the net into which subsequent events drove all the captives held by Lalboorah and many other Chiefs. Having thus stationed permanent supports, as it were, on both his flanks, General Bouchier prepared to carry out the plan of the expedition entrusted to his conduct. It was a task requiring much political discrimination as well as military skill. The information which Government had as to the perpetrators of the raids was at the best incomplete. The names of the leaders were, it is true, pretty well ascertained; but our knowledge of their tribal relations was admittedly imperfect, and it was impossible to say with certainty that *this* village shared the guilt while *that* was undoubtedly altogether innocent. Hence it was evident that the expedition could not merely march into Lushai land to plunder and to ravish, careless of where its blows might fall, and eager only to burn and slay. If during its progress guilt were with certainty brought home to any particular villages, the General's orders were to punish without scruple. The surrender of Chiefs known to hold British subjects in captivity was to be demanded rigorously, and in the event of non-compliance their houses and property were to be unhesitatingly destroyed. Restoration of captives was also to be insisted on. Should it appear that some only of the inhabitants of a village had joined in the raids without complicity on the part of the village as a whole, the payment of a fine and the surrender of the guilty were the punishment to be inflicted. Hostages were to be demanded, did this appear necessary. If hostility was met with, resisting villages were to be attacked and burnt, and the surrounding crops laid waste. It was, however, strongly impressed on all that retaliation was not the main object of the expedition. It was the desire of the Supreme Government to show the Lushais that they are completely in our power, to establish permanent friendly relations with them, to induce them to promise to receive our Native agents, to make travelling in their country safe to all, to demonstrate the advantages of trade and commerce, and to prove to them, in short, that they had nothing to gain but everything to lose by acting against the British Government. This was the general programme on which both the columns had to work; and with this before us we may at last venture to set out from the sadder station of Cachar.

For all that portion of their journey which lay between Silohar and the first Lushai villages, it may be roughly said that the force had to follow the course of the Barak. For 14 miles or so from the station, they had a fair track due east to Luckeepore, where the river takes its great southern bend: but here the difficulties of the road commenced, and the troops had actually to begin their pioneering labours one day's march from their head-quarters. At the frontier outpost of Mynadthur the force was fairly on the verge of the wild country, and from the depot here established the stores required in front were regularly despatched thereafter. The second grand depot was at Tipai Mookh, on the junction of the Barak and the Tipai, between which and Mynadthur were four distinct stations or camps. Up to this point water-carriage was to some extent available, though the river was rapidly falling, and not to be depended upon. On the 21st November the 44th had marched to Luckeepur. By the 9th December it had out its way to Tipai Mookh. There was much to do here in the way of building hospitals, store-houses, and stockades. But they were now close upon the Lushai fastnesses, and it was deemed expedient to show the enemy without delay what the force was capable of effecting. Accordingly, on the 13th December, the General pushed on the Sappers and a Wing of the 44th to a camp five miles out, and commenced therefrom the ascent of the Seubong Range through fine timber forests, encamping ultimately at an elevation of 4,000 feet. From this point, looking southward, the Toeebhoom River was seen flowing from the east into the Tipai. Across the latter stream to the west stretched the *jooms* and cottages of Kholei, while far



away on the south-eastern hills perched the more advanced villages of Poiboi. From its lofty camp on the Seubong the little party descended by a long day's march towards the confluence of the Tipai and Tooeebhoom, crossing the former stream by a weir, in spite of the yells and threatening demonstrations of a crowd of armed Lushais. It was in vain the General assured them that his intentions were not necessarily hostile; that if they did not molest his men he would do them and theirs no injury. Nothing succeeded in producing confidence, and with a final yell of defiance they at last disappeared to take counsel for the work of the morrow. Next day (the 23rd December) the troops commenced the ascent of the hill on which the Kholei villages lay, and were received at the first clearing by a volley from a Lushai ambuscade. This of course prevented all hope of peaceful negotiation. Had they remain quiet, we should merely have marched into their villages, interviewed their Chiefs, and settled our relations for the future. As it was the village was taken with a rush, fired, and its granaries destroyed. Another village, a mile further along the ridge, was occupied as a camp; and a third village at the summit of the mountain was captured and burnt before evening closed. Next day, and the next, the troops were occupied with raids on the surrounding villages and granaries, and a lesson was read to the unbelieving men of Kholei which they are not likely soon to forget. It was disappointing to be met with hostility at the outset, especially from villages with the chief men of which Mr. Edgar had had some apparently friendly palaver before the expedition started. Mora, the *muntiri* of Impanu, the old lady who at present rules these villages, had indeed met the General at the crossing of the Tipai, but had disappeared with the rest when the troops crossed over. On the 26th December the force evacuated Kholei and retired to the camp in the valley below, near the stream; but being still constantly harassed by firing from the surrounding jungles, a second foray was made on the 29th, the mountain was again scaled more to the west by a party of the 42nd, which had now come up; and the blaze of fresh villages and granaries would soon have followed had not the enemy suddenly, unexpectedly, and very dramatically made complete submission. As the troops advanced they were met by Darpong, a *muntiri* of the still distant Poiboi, who had been with them at an early stage of the expedition. This gentleman, clad in orange-coloured garments and decked with a lofty plume, now came and interceded for Kholei, and by anticipation for Poiboi. Assured that it was not our wish to continue hostilities which we had not begun, he climbed up a tree, and from its summit emitted an unearthly yell that echoed among the surrounding peaks, put a sudden stop to the dropping fire in the jungles, and brought in the Lushais in crowds to fraternize with their late opponents. The *muntiris* declared that the elders of the tribe had never wished for war, that the young braves had rashly commenced hostilities and brought all this sorrow on their homesteads. On the 30th and 31st, Mora and other *muntiris* came in, peace-offerings were offered and accepted, and the year closed in comparative quiet. Here for to-day we must leave the force with the first stage of its work well over, its first foes subdued and reconnoiled, but having still before it the task of punishing the Cachar raiders, and reaching villages the very situation of which was at best uncertain.

*Pioneer, the 7th May 1872.*

We left General Bouchier and his column in their camp at the confluence of the Tipai and Tooeebhoom after receiving the submission of the clans of Kholei. The camp was soon thronged by Lushais, young and old, bringing pumpkins, fowls, and ginger for barter, and curious to examine "the appurtenances" of civilisation in the shape of watches and burning glasses. Every effort was made to gain their confidence, and messengers were sent to the tribes ahead to explain more fully to them the objects of the expedition. On the 6th of January the forces advanced from the Tooeebhoom east by south towards the Tooeetoo, another affluent of the Tipai, crossing the intervening ridge at a height of 8,400 feet. Thence almost due south over a difficult road they marched to the village of Pachnee, the ninth station out from Mynadur, overhanging a sudden bend of the Tipai. Here they could see to the eastward the precipitous cliffs on which stood the principal northern villages of Poiboi, while as far as the eye could reach to the west lay villages and *jooms*. Waiting here for reinforcements and stores, the General took the opportunity of making an excursion to the old site of Kholei, where was the tomb of Vompilal, the former Chief of that clan. The village had been burnt six days before our arrival, but the tomb was intact, and consisted of a stone

What the Left Column did in Lushai land  
No. II.

platform 20 feet square and four feet high, surrounded by poles, on which hung skulls of wild oxen, deer, and goats, enigmatical representations, drinking vessels, and the skull of a pony slaughtered at the funeral. On the 13th the force made preparations for its onward march. It was but 2½ miles from Pachnee down to the Tipai, but it gave two wings of the 22nd and 44th hard work to clear a road. So steep was it naturally in places that the Lushais had been wont to let themselves down by ropes of cane, which primitive aids to locomotion were hanging down the face of the rock when our men arrived. The force was now coming close upon Poiboi, already referred to as one of the most powerful Chiefs of this quarter, whose attitude, notwithstanding the presence in camp of his *mansri*, Dharpong, was still uncertain. Two wings had been left to overawe Kholei in the rear. There was a wing at Tipai Mookh, and a wing in the two stations immediately in rear of the advance, which itself consisted of two wings, with the General and headquarters. Small detachments held intermediate posts, and the artillery had got as far as the camp at the confluence of the Toosebboom and Tipai, but was fast pushing on to the front, and had indeed joined the General before he crossed the bend of the Tipai below Pachnee. It was well, as it turned out, that he was in a position to make a good display of force at this point. The Lushais were evidently very unhappy at his determination to proceed. The villages of Chipooee and Tingridong, which lay on the mountain across the river, were nominally subject to Poiboi, but were situated so far from his chief village as to be to some extent independent. We were anxious therefore to secure their neutrality, but at the same time they were half afraid to treat us well lest Poiboi should resent it hereafter. As the force scaled the hill to Chipooee, they were met by Dharpong and a crowd of Lushais, who pretended that Poiboi himself had come to meet the General. The man put forward as the chief turned out, however, to be an impostor, and as a punishment for the deception the General warned them that he would now listen to none but Poiboi himself in his principal residence. Leaving a strong party to watch these doubtful villages, and taking the headmen on as hostages, the force again set on south-eastward. The road as usual led over a lofty ridge down to another affluent of the Tipai, and then up a mountain chain on the other side. The reconnoitring party in advance came here upon two paths, one running along the ridge, the other turning down to the east. Across the latter was suspended a rude imitation of a gallows with figures *ens. per coll.*, and a block roughly cut into the representation of a body with the scalp off. These were intended at warnings not to take the path so guarded; warnings, however, which were afterwards known to be treacherous and deceitful. Fortunately the leaders of the advance were not easily frightened, and they forthwith selected the tabooed road, which they explored without accident. On the road left open the Lushais were lying in wait and ready for an attack! Next day (the 25th January) Dharpong, who had been sent on to summon out Poiboi, appeared in camp and warned the General that he would be attacked if he went on. This of course had no effect: but attacked he was on all sides, in the midst of one of the worst bits of ground yet traversed by the troops. The men, however, behaved splendidly, and though the General himself was wounded the enemy was driven off and severely punished, and the road in advance secured. This attack proved that Poiboi and Lalboorah had actually coalesced, and had determined to oppose the further march of the column. Accordingly, as a foretaste of what they might expect, parties were sent out to burn Poiboi's villages on the neighbouring heights, and here for the first time the artillery made play, and struck terror and wonder into the minds of the Lushais, who fled from their stockades in panic and left their homesteads eventually undefended. It is worth mentioning here that on the bodies of some of the Lushais slain in this skirmish was found ammunition taken from the sepoy killed at Nupdigaon in the Cachar raids—proof positive that the expedition was on the right track, and that the tribes, who now opposed us, were actuated rather by despair of pardon than hope of success. The lessons thus taught him seem, however, to have convinced Poiboi that he had better separate himself from his ally, Lalboorah. He was warned that a heavy fine of hill oxen and other things, with complete submission, could alone condone his rash resistance, and that his villages would all be burnt unless he too came in. He began sending in presents forthwith, but the General replied that he would treat only in Sellam, the chief village of the tribe. And for Sellam, on the 1st February, the column marched, crossing three ridges, one 5,950 feet high, to the top of the Lengting range, where they came in sight of Sellam and its dependencies, crowning the hill over against them, and stretching with *joom* and clearing for some three or four miles. Here again Dharpong, the *mansri*, appeared bearing offerings; but nothing served to stay the advance; and Sellam, deserted by Poiboi and his followers, was occupied in peace. The very furniture from the Chief's house, a great hall 100 feet long, had been removed. Skulls and antlers alone hung on the deserted walls. Next day, however, the

Lushais came fearlessly to the camp, and were given to understand that only Polboi's submission could eventually save their villages. Polboi with his guilty fears had, it now appeared, sent embassies to General Nuthall and the Manipuris; but his submission to General Bouchier in Sellaam was what was uniformly insisted upon, and to Sellaam he seemed determined not to come. Here the preparations were made for the final dash upon Lalboorah. Two guns and 400 men were the force detailed for this service; baggage was almost entirely got rid of. Time was pressing, and the work required to be speedily done with. On the 12th February the troops started upon the last stage of the expedition. Five days' marching almost due south through an elevated mountain region, over ridges in some places 8,600 feet high, brought them at length in full view of the valley of the Champai, the head-quarters of Lalboorah, son of Vonolel, leader of the raids on Monierkhal. On the 17th of February they reached the village. But other invaders had been there before them; and signs of war and slaughter greeted them on every side. The withdrawal of the Manipur Contingent from the frontier, owing to sickness, had set free the Sakti Kookies—old enemies of the Lushai, who, seizing the opportunity and knowing the panic caused by the advance of the British column, made fierce onslaught on Lalboorah under the guidance of Kamhow, their Chief. Lalboorah had, it is true, beaten them off with loss; but their attack had probably prevented his occupying a strong position, which he had stockaded and prepared, across the route by which the column came, and frustrated the hopes he entertained of entangling them in the mountains. His village was now found deserted, and was forthwith burnt to the ground, only the tomb of his father Vonolel escaping the flames. On a neighbouring height dwelt the widow of Vonolel, herself a powerful and wise old woman, who had in vain urged her sons to submission. From her a fine was levied of war-gongs, oxen, goats, and such like, which she did not refuse to pay. Besides this it was stipulated that three headmen should return as hostages to Tipai Mookh, that they should receive Government Agents in their villages when required, that either the 12 muskets taken at Monierkhal and Nugdigon should be given up, or a similar number of their own fire-arms be surrendered. On the 20th February the conditions were complied with, and next day the force, its task accomplished, set out on its return. Polboi, in nervous dread of punishment, had, we may notice, been hovering round the camps all the way from Sellaam, and had even met the Native assistants of the civil officer, but nothing had induced him to come in to sue for peace. This is the one failure in the operations of this column. It was 92 days since the head-quarters of the expedition had left Cachar. During that time they had been almost constantly on foot, cutting the roads by which they advanced over lofty mountains, ridge after ridge, crossing and re-crossing numberless streams, scaling fastnesses of hostile tribes, burning their villages and destroying their crops when punishment was demanded, proving, at the same time, to the peaceably disposed that conciliation was more agreeable to us than scourge. The return march was a feat rather than an armed progress. Molested by no enemies, the column retraced its steps, attended by crowds of admiring Lushais, who thronged its camps and bartered their country produce for trifles valuable to them and costing little to us. Head-men and *muntries* from all the tribes attended the General to Tipai Mookh. By noon, on the 10th of March, the last man had left that station, and the column withdrew to Cachar, leaving behind it some 100 miles of mountain road to testify to the perseverance and pluck of the gallant corps, which had cut and blasted a path from Mynadthur to Chumpai, and avenged the outrage of Monierkhal at the tomb of Vonolel.

*Pioneer, the 10th May 1872.*

Since our notice of the doings of the left column and most of what now follows was written, the *Gazette* has made the story in its fullest possible shape common property. What the right column did in Lushai land, It is only because there are many who will read in a leader what they avoid in small type that we continue our summary of events in the Chittagong Hills.

In treating of the doings of the left column which penetrated to Lalboorah's village from Cachar, we set forth the general principles by which the expedition as a whole was to be guided. We may now note that while the main object of the left column was to get at and punish the tribes who had raided on Monierkhal and East Cachar, it was the aim of the Chittagong force to reach the Syloo Chief, Savoonga, who was known to have been concerned in the raids on West Cachar, the sack of Alexandrapore and the murder of Mr. Winchester. With the Howlongs, too, we had a score to

settle, but it was not at the outset certain which column could most effectually deal with them. Mr. Edgar had hoped that the Cachar troops would have penetrated by tolerably easy roads to Lalboorah's village, and remaining there would, at leisure, have subdued the neighbouring tribes, including the Howlongs, who were supposed to be near. But the difficulties of the way made it late in the season when Lalboorah was reached, and the site of his village was found to be so far to the east that General Brounlier at Chumpai had over thirty miles of mountain ridges between him and General Brownlow at the most easterly point to which the latter attained. To the Chittagong Column, therefore, fell the task of dealing both with Syloos and Howlongs, and, though the two branches of the expedition never met among the hills, we shall see that each did its work thoroughly and well; and we shall find that in the end their failing to unite was a matter of very secondary importance. The great advantage possessed by the right column as compared with the left was, that it had the sea, or rather Calcutta, as a tolerably convenient base, and that it had water-carriage up to a point in the almost immediate vicinity of its active operations. The Kurnafoolie, which cleaving the north of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, is navigable by river steamers up to Rangamuttia, a distance of 61 miles; thence to Kassalong, 17 miles further up, light country boats of 18 inches draught could go; and beyond that 12 miles on to Lower Burkhal small boats and canoes, carrying about five maunds each, could very well be used. The troops selected for this column were the 2nd and 4th Goorkhas and the 27th Punjab Infantry, with half a mountain battery and a company of Sappers and Miners—a force precisely the same in composition and character as that with General Bouchier. On the 28th October General Brownlow landed in Chittagong, and no time was lost in completing the Commissariat arrangements, already well advanced, and in pushing on provisions as far as Kassalong. The course of the Kurnafoolie above this place is broken at intervals by dangerous rapids, the first of which is situated between Upper and Lower Burkhal. From Kassalong to Burkhal the river runs due east. At Burkhal it takes a sudden northward turn, and above the rapids is found a clear, deep, sluggish stream navigable by boats for 19 miles to the rapids of Ootum Chutra. By dint of great labour boats were dragged up the Burkhal falls, and a river service established on the reach above. Beyond Ootum Chutra to Demagiri the course of the stream as we ascend turns again to the east till we reach Demagiri, a point where the great Ohepoom range abuts on the Kurnafoolie from the south, and the Sirthay Klang meets it from the north. Canoes, it was found, could be got up the Ootum Chutra rapids as far as Demagiri. It was well indeed that this boat service between Burkhal and Demagiri was possible, for the land route between those places was all but impracticable. Only 16 miles apart as the crow flies, it was a five days' march of 4½ miles to traverse by the ordinary Kookie path, two-thirds of which lay along the beds of torrents, the rest being through almost impervious jungle. By dint of great labor a road was cut passable for unladen elephants and coolies, but laden elephants were to the last unable to traverse it. From the ranges on either side of Demagiri a fine view was obtained of the Syloo and Howlong country. Five ranges lay before them to be crossed, rising to 4,000 and 5,000 feet, covered with forest to the very top. In every intervening valley was a stream, now rushing fiercely shallow amid its boulders, and now flowing deep and unfordable between dark silent woods. At Burkhal the General was joined by Rutton Posa, the Kookie Chief of whom we have heard so much, and who, since 1860, has been our more or less faithful ally. His present villages lie on the Ohepoom range south of Demagiri, and he offered to lead the force by land as far as that place. What the road he led them was like we have seen above. At Demagiri there was much to do; a standing camp had to be cleared, and provisions for the whole force got up in anticipation of an advance. Demagiri was to the Chittagong Column what Tipai Mookh was to that from Cachar. It was the 1st of December before there was food enough in store to warrant a forward movement. For four miles above Demagiri the river was impracticable, but canoes were placed on the reach above as they had been above Burkhal, and ten miles more of water-carriage was thus secured. Some little way above this point the force left the valley of the Kurnafoolie and turned northward along the Sahjuck. From the furthest point on this stream to which the canoes could go the troops commenced their regular hill work, marching north by east to attack Vanoonah, the first great Syloo village on the Belkai range, and to commence that severe course of discipline which in time taught the Syloos that the way of transgressors is indeed hard. On the 14th December Vanoonah was captured by surprise, common both to the Lushais and to our reconnoitring party, which came suddenly on the village from above after losing its way in the woods. The Syloos had, in reply to our overtures, already intimated their full intention of fighting, and had made no sign of submission. On the contrary, a few days later they vindicated their reputation as warriors

and braves by attacking in force three little Gookhas carrying the post-bag, and were very much astonished to find that, after shooting one of them from behind a tree, the other two did not run away, but showed effective fight until a rescue came. From Vanoonah's village Colonel Macpherson with three companies was sent on a five days' raid to the east. Down into the valley below, and up the range beyond, his men toiled scrambling, and on the third day they made for Lall Hoera, only eight miles from Vanoonah as the crow flies. This they burnt with two other villages beyond, and destroyed vast quantities of grain, getting back to Vanoonah on Christmas Day. Another raiding party had been out during their absence to the north-east, and done equally good service of a similar kind, and returned home "driving off the cattle" to assist the stores of a much-tried Commissariat. On the 27th the head-quarters moved northward along the ridge from Vanoonah for 13 miles, and thence a few days later turned eastward on its way to Savoonga (the head village of the Syloo tribe) and the Howlong fastnesses beyond. From Upper Hoolien, a captured village *en route*, a full view was obtained of the country they had to traverse, and it was seen that there were still three ranges to cross with the intervening valleys. While the force rested at Hoolien, a party raided north, and took villages and stockades, defended with some energy though without persistence. On the 13th of January Syloo Savoonga was occupied and found deserted, and the conquest of the Syloos was then complete. The position of this village was singularly fine—lying on a hill 3,200 feet high with the Kloon Doong or Dullessuri flowing under it on its way to Cachar a tributary of the Goutor rising at its western base, and a branch of the Kurnafoolie taking its course southward close by. The Syloo Chief dwells as it were at the very *Omphalos* of the hills, and sends out his war parties north and south to plunder in Cachar or slay in Chittagong. We have spoken of the troops raiding and burning in the course of our narrative as things of course, but in fact no effort was spared to induce the Syloos to come in and make terms. By messengers and notices, by shouting parleys across rivers and amid the woods, they were warned and encouraged and invited to come in: but their hearts were guilty and their hands not clean, so, savage like, they doubted of that which should happen unto them. Their doubts were their destruction. And in truth, politically speaking, it was better for the future peace of the hills that things were as they were. Punishment has more effect when felt than when fancied, and if we have one regret in connection with the whole Expedition, it is this—that the more easterly villages of the southern Howlongs (the most formidable of the tribes) were wise enough to submit at the first summons, as we shall see below, and that the residence of their principal Chief Vandoola was never occupied even for an hour. Bloodshed and burning we do not affect; but peaceful occupation to vindicate our power and policy was much to be desired. We are, however, anticipating. The rest of our narrative we must condense. From Savoonga the destruction of other Syloo villages to the north was effected, and Rutton Poa was despatched as a messenger to the northern Howlongs dwelling across the Dullessuri. Rutton Poa travelled by a more southern and round-about road to avoid the refugee Syloos, and was met by messengers from the Howlongs bringing in Mary Winchester as an earnest of peace. General Brownlow waited patiently at Savoonga from the 12th January to the 11th February, to give his emissary time to work upon the Howlong mind. Then finding that no reply had come from the northern section of the tribe, though the southern Chiefs said they would come in at Demagri, the force at last crossed the Dullessuri. No resistance was offered, though the villages were fired by the inhabitants as they advanced. On the 16th, however, Sungboonga and Benkoea, the great Chiefs of the clan, came into camp and submitted, agreeing to give up their captives and to admit our troops to their villages. No other terms were insisted on. Two days later Lalboorah (not he of Chumpai), Latoma, Lieurikoom, and other leading Chiefs, came in, and the same day the first instalment of the returned captives rewarded the exertions of the force, and testified to the sincerity of the Lushais. A detachment of Gookhas attended the survey officer through the villages, and on the 23rd the troops set out on their homeward march, accompanied for a time by crowds of Howlongs, male and female, clad many of them in dark cotton tartan, and wearing as ornament the true Highland sporrans. With curious inconsistency, the Syloos, having been utterly harried and ruined, came in as the force retired, and made full submission. On arrival at Demagri General Brownlow started with four companies eastward to quicken the movements of the southern Howlongs, who had not yet appeared. Forty miles' march over a fearful country and a final climb of 4,000 feet brought them to the village of Sypoea, an inferior Chief, who at once submitted. At the Dullessuri beyond, the General was met by Vantonga, one of the leading Chiefs, and by the sons of the great Vandoola, who brought in captives and did homage on their father's behalf. The season was now late, and General Brownlow accepted this and

returned, to save the force the three days' eastward march which lay between the river and Vandoola. We cannot blame him for this, but of all the Chiefs in that quarter, Vandoola is the one whom we should have most wished to see humbled. There are, however, good grounds for hoping that the permanent establishment of a strong post at Demagri will secure his good behaviour for the future.

The right column had now done its work. Its four months' campaign had reduced two powerful tribes and brought in fifteen Chiefs, rescued many captives, and added to our maps in detail three thousand square miles of hill country. What the political result of the expedition as a whole may be, we shall try to estimate hereafter.

*Pioneer, the 8th January 1872.*

We always look with comparative eagerness for the annual reports of those tracts in which free scope is given to the administrative abilities of individual officers, who are left untrammelled by the formalities of Regulation law and made answerable for their actions only to God and the Government. Such are the hill districts now dotted along our Eastern Frontier. Of them we have often written, and in them our interest never flags. Did we, indeed, not edit the *Pioneer*, we would fain rule over the squat swart Garos of the hills, or teach Nagas to grow potatoes on the rich terraces of the Buraill! But not in those hills alone are English energy and directness of aim working out great results. In many a jungle solitude, where fever lurks in every brake, and uncouth savage races dispute with wild beasts possession of the clearings, we can point to devoted men, little heard of by the public, little noticed by their Government, who are spending and being spent for the sake of the people they control, and bringing by degrees whole tribes to learn the rudiments of civilization and progress. It is with no invidious design, or wish to exalt one such administrator above his brethren, that we instance Captain Johnstone's management of the forest races of Keonjhur as a type of the thing we mean. We refer to him because he is not now in India or likely ever to read these lines, and because we know that he stuck to his post long after doctors and friends had urged his immediate departure, solely that he might see the first fruits of the labours on which his whole heart was set. With a frame all saturated with malaria, he is now doubtless fretting in enforced leisure at home at being separated from his beloved Bhoosias and Jowangs. Our readers will remember the way in which the management of Keonjhur fell into our hands. It is one of the so-called tributary mehals of Cuttack, neglected little principalities left, as a rule, almost entirely to the control of their native Chiefs. The British Government exercises of course a paramount supervision. But this is entrusted to the Commissioner of Cuttack, a busy, over-worked officer, who, with the dread of another famine always before his eyes, has to concentrate his energies upon the civil administration of Orissa, and has little time for visiting the distant and unwholesome forests that fringe his satrapy. Years ago the Keonjhur Rajah died. He had done good service in the mutiny; and the Government, either by way of gratitude or from a vague sense of duty, removed the boy, his successor, for education to Cuttack. The training of a Babu was hardly the one best suited to a forest Chief. But there was worse in the arrangement than that. The young Rajah was removed for years from all contact with the simple races he was to govern, from all intercourse with the officers of the primitive state to which he had succeeded. He was not the Dowager Rani's son, and she, a clever, unscrupulous woman, made good use of the time given her. Adopting a relative of the most powerful neighbouring Chief, she put him forward to the people as the rightful ruler. He grew up in their midst, and won their affections; and when the actual Rajah returned under the auspices of the Commissioner to his inheritance, graced with all the accomplishments of a zillah school, he found that he was received as an outcast and imposter, and that the hearts of the people were gone utterly from him. He was, however, duly installed, and fortified by much good advice, he commenced his feeble attempt at independent management. The regular cultivators might, perhaps, have acquiesced after some grumbling in the rule of the Chief selected by Government; but the ruder men of the woods were otherwise minded. It was not in consonance with their simple faith to desert the Chief

to whom they had hitherto paid fealty. The knotted cord ran through their villages as the fiery cross along the margin of Achray, and

"Fast as the fatal symbol flies  
In arms the huts and hamlet rise."

A "little war" was on the hands of the Bengal Government, and it was only when bullet and gallows and treachery had done their work, that the Keonjhar forest tribes, their leaders gone, their spirits broken, their Chief removed, bowed to the mysterious will of the Sirkar, and accepted the Babu Raja whom unkind fate had sent them.

It was to conciliate these tribes, to heal the wounds that policy had been forced to inflict, that Captain Johnstone was deputed. Many men would have been content with holding the country in sullen subjection, scouring it with an armed police and reporting the dull silence of despair as "satisfactory" evidence of penitence and submission. But Captain Johnstone thought otherwise. He loved the people in a way that puzzled red-tapists, and made them at times deem him not a little mad. Nothing could have been more judicious than the way in which he set about educating the Rajah in the true sense of that word, bringing him into sympathy with his subjects, strengthening his character without boring him by homilies, and instilling into him true principles of government by slow degrees. This was his duty, and he did it well. But it was in his own dealings with the wilder tribes that Captain Johnstone most delighted. A mighty hunter, lord of elephants, one of the few who understand the manners and customs of that earth-shaking beast,—he had special opportunities of becoming intimate with the forest-dwellers. His success in winning their confidence was something marvellous. We have no space to go into details: one or two facts will serve to mark the results. He has induced the Bhooiyas to go in heartily for popular education. Six hundred and sixty babes of the wood now daily attend his schools, children but a year or two ago so wild that at sight of a stranger they buried themselves in the jungle like startled deer. The most remarkable thing about them now is their wonderful memory. He does not inflict on them moral maxims of the copy-book pattern, but they read story-books, and look upon the *ashit* as a sort of beneficent deity who sheds pice and smiles on every little urchin who waddles up to his verandah. The cattle of the district are being improved by a breeding stud. Agriculture has become in the eyes of the people a new art by improved seed and staples. Markets have been established, and efficient order is maintained throughout the State by a force of 33 policemen. But Captain Johnstone's principal triumph is the clothing of the Jowang women. The Jowangs are a tribe of some 4,000 souls, who dwell in the far recesses of the forests, in a state of most degraded savagery. For two years Captain Johnstone sought to win their confidence and bring them within the pale of civilized man. As a first step to this it seemed to him desirable to raise their standard and ideas of comfort, and to enlist the ladies of the tribe on the side of progress. Now all the ladies aforesaid clad themselves as Eve was clad when shame first seized upon her. Leaves were their only drapery. Moreover, they believed that were they to wear aught else than leaves, tigers and bears would infallibly rend them. This was the idea he had first to remove. After much discussion among the males, a resolution was come to—"flat experimentum." An aged hag, whom nobody would miss, was clothed and watched. No ill results followed to the lady, and after months of patient waiting and coaxing Captain Johnstone was permitted to clothe the whole female population, 1,846 women and girls at his own expense. The discarded leaves were gathered into a heap and solemnly burnt, and the men of the tribe entered into covenant never more to permit their women to appear unclad. Can we doubt that the taste for millinery once implanted, woman's influence will induce the men to adopt settled habits of labor to earn the means of supplying these new wants? We may laugh over the story, but the moral of it is much to the thoughtful student.

*Pioneer, the 23rd April 1873.*

Thanks to the work of men like Butler, Williamson, and Lewin, the North-East Frontier of Bengal is fast becoming a more

Lewin's Proverbial Philosophy.

interesting study than seemed possible a few years back. In 1865 the only idea which

most men had, with reference to its hills and forests, was that they were the habitat of

savage tribes, whose bloody raids and thieving forays threatened serious danger to the cause of tea. In Assam there were still some who remembered how Scott had tamed the Garos, and Brodie brought in the Nagas; how Wilcox, Bedford, and Neufville had traversed the wild borders of Lakhimpur, and the Khampis and the Singphos had first paid in homage. But Dalhousie had pronounced the Assam Frontier a bore. Our officers were to mind their mousahs and leave the hillmen alone, and we gradually drifted into ignorance even of their tribal names. We lumped together as Nagas all the tribes from the Patkoi to the Kopli, and dubbed all hillmen Kookies, from North Cachar to Arracan. In 1868 Sir Cecil Beadon—who, for all his misfortunes, had the instincts of a statesman—undertook to change all this. A policy of direct administration by selected officers was inaugurated and carried through, and these columns have borne repeated testimony to the way these chosen men have worked, and to the success which has in general crowned their labors. In the hills of Chittagong some attempt had been made a few years before the enunciation of Sir Cecil Beadon's views to bring the tract known as the Kapas Mahal, or cotton farm, under the direct control of an English officer. The men sent there were, with one or two exceptions, unsuited for the rough life of the highlands, and did not possess in any marked degree the faculty of conciliating their ruder neighbours in the inner hills. It was just when the Government were casting about for officers fitted for work of this kind that the account reached them of a journey undertaken by the District Superintendent of Chittagong through the hills to Arracan, marching barefoot, clad in *dhotee* and *puggree*, with no dyspeptic aversion to hill beer. An admirable performer on the fiddle, Captain Lewin, was revealed to the Joomeas as a new and more agreeable species of *sahab*, a welcome addition to a hill fireside. He was forthwith put in charge of the hill tracts, with full administrative and police powers, and his intimate acquaintance with hill customs and languages has since then been abundantly proved.

We now have before us his last brochure, consisting of 278 proverbs in the original, with English renderings, a preamble, and occasional notes. These terse little sentences throw much curious light on the social habits and characteristics of a simple race. They are concentrated and sententious wisdom of the Khioungtha, or children of the river—a people of Arracanese origin, speaking the ancient Arracanese dialect, and conforming in every way to Buddhist customs. The Tougtha, or children of the hills—the more savage tribes of Kookie and Lushai—have not yet advanced far enough to furnish much field for similar inquiries. Already, in his account of the hill tracts, Captain Lewin had given us a few specimens of Khioungtha proverbs corresponding in sentiment very closely to some of the better known English sayings. For instance—"Food refused when offered, search in seven houses and you will not find," was appositely compared with—"He that will not when he may when he will he shall have nay." We were also introduced to the following:—"If I must die I must die, but do not touch my top knot, as the peacock said," very neatly capped by Leech's—"Take all, take money, take life; but spare, oh, spare my collars!" In the present collection we find many proofs that human nature is after all very much the same whether it is trained in the woods of Chittagong or amid the leafy lanes of England. "He got angry with the rat, and set fire to the house," is the hillman's way of "cutting off his nose to spite his face." The Englishman "shuts his door when the steed is stolen," the Khioungtha lets his pot fall, and *then* tucks up his waistcloth. "At home "the bad workman quarrels with his tools;" in Chittagong "the unsuccessful firerman curses the river, rough people lay the blame on their dress." A very large proportion of Captain Lewin's proverbs are devoted to the merits and shortcomings of hill wives and maidens. From his former book we gathered that the relations between the sexes were of a rude society remarkably idyllic; we now find that there are two sides to the picture, and that a Khioungtha husband has his anxieties, a Khioungtha youth his doubts, and that domestic quarrels are not unknown. The process of wooing is, however, much the same all the world over. "Spread pan and betel before guests, *la*" presents before a woman." The following, called at random, call for little comment: they are each and all luminous with suggestion:—"People make salutation on monastery; women laugh when they see their lovers." "If you want a good husband find it first; if you want a good wife, know her first." "If you love your wife, never tell her your secrets nor make friends with young policemen" (an interesting tribute to the gallantry of Captain Lewin's force.) "Caulk a new boat, beat a new wife," is attested for by "Prop up an old house, cherish an old wife." "One's own home is always the pleasantest, and she is loveliest whom one loves best," is in contrast to "The mind of the bride's mother is as uneasy as peas in a brass plate." "If a man runs after a woman he falls into marriage, if a woman runs after a man she falls into ruin." Repeated blows make the drum sound: a wife gains her ends by often asking." "The sweetest



marriages are the most worm-eaten; a beautiful woman is least to be trusted;" but "good soil gives good grain, a good husband makes a good wife." "Half-grown grain wants the rain; to her with child be soft and mild." On the whole, we think there is ample evidence that the social virtues are more potent than the social vices among these children of the river and the wood.

There is scarcely an incident of hill life which proverbs do not utilise or illustrate. The great tribal or village feasts which figure largely in our frontier policy evoke the comment:—"Dry vegetables smell in the pot: cold people thaw at a feast." The miseries of those exposed to raids breathe in the saying, "A thorn under the nail is unbearable; so is it to have a relation in slavery." The caution incumbent upon a man visiting a strange and possibly hostile clan is inculcated thus:—"If you go on a strange river take down your flags; if you enter a strange village, take the strut out of your walk." "In your own village crow and be cock; when you're in another, you must be a hen." "Entering into a wood blaze a tree, on visiting a village make a friend." The love of the people for intoxicating drinks is touched off in these:—"An old house wants props" an old man wants drops." "For drink, Khowng (fermented beer); for the cold, a quilt." "An axe is spoiled by the knots in the wood; a man is ruined by the glasses he swallows." The raised houses of the villages are put before us in the warning—"If you talk secrets in the day time, look behind you; if at night, look under you." That their forests produce vermin and noxious herbs is hinted at in this:—"Dust your bed before sleeping; in eating always eject the first mouthful." In the following we get much concentrated wisdom and wordly shrewdness:—"Do not talk on important matters to a man just off a journey." "Seek no quarrel with one just awakened." "As a pole punts a boat, so does speech assist wisdom." "A thousand ants can carry an earthworm; so the words of many turn a lie into truth." "No one runs open-mouthed up a hill; do not run headlong into anger." "He who cultivates an old *joom* will have much weeding; he who marries a widow will have to pay her debts." "Do not close an old road; have no quarrel with an ancient friend." "A dog is disliked for his teeth and man for his tongue." "Too high is broken by the wind, too low eaten by the goats." "Content is covered with the Sheshia leaf; but for discontent a plantain leaf would not suffice." In jungle scrub the castor tree is king; any knife is sharp amongst potatoes." "Home counsel is bitter; you will get honey enough outside." "If you give, give quickly; if you trade, ready money." There are a good many of these proverbs, not quoted by us, in which the relations of the people to the king are set out in various lights, reminding us in several instances of the cynical advice of Solomon on the same subject. It is, we think a pity the translator has not given us an exact rendering of the word he turns into king. As it stands, it gives, we think, a false idea of the tribal economy. We suspect it is only a free rendering of *raja*, or village headman. We doubt, moreover, whether the proverbs are in all cases literally translated. But it is a moot point how any such task as this should be executed, and Captain Lewin himself is fully conscious of its difficulty, and far from boastful about his success. He has, however, done much to increase our interest in the people among whom he dwells, and for whom he cherishes a warm regard.

